1957 年度致合伙人信
1957 年信
1957 Letter
沃伦·E·巴菲特
WARREN E. BUFFETT
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市安德伍德大道 5202 号
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
致有限合伙人的第二封年度信
SECOND ANNUAL LETTER TO LIMITED PARTNERS
1957 年的股市概况
The General Stock Market Picture in 1957
在去年致合伙人的信里，我写下了这样一段话：
In last year's letter to partners, I said the following:
我对市场总体水平的判断是，价格已高于内在价值，这里说的是蓝筹股。倘若判断无误，那么所有股票——无论被低估的还是别的——都可能大幅下跌。无论如何，我认为五年之后再回头看，当前的市场水平被视为便宜的可能性微乎其微。不过，即便来一场全面的熊市，也不至于让我们套利仓的市值伤筋动骨。假如市场重新回到低估的状态，我们的资金或许会全部投向普通股，届时还可能动用一部分借来的钱做这件事。反过来，假如市场涨得过高，我们的做法则是趁利润显现逐步减持普通股，同时加码套利组合。说这些，并不是要暗示市场分析在我心里排第一。任何时候，我的首要精力都放在发掘那些被严重低估的证券上。过去一年，股价温和下跌。我之所以强调“温和”二字，是因为随手翻翻报纸，或是同那些近来才接触股票的人聊上几句，往往会给人留下跌幅要大得多的印象。可在我看来，在眼下的经营环境中，股价的跌幅其实远小于企业盈利能力的下滑。这说明，公众对蓝筹股和整体经济前景依然十分乐观。我无意预测经济，也无意预测股市；上面这些话，只是想打消一种错觉——以为股票已遭遇重挫，或以为大盘正处在低位。就长期投资价值而言，我依旧认为大盘定价偏高。
My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially. If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio. All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities. The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word "moderate" since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market, is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.
我们 1957 年的运作
Our Activities in 1957
市场下跌在低估类证券中带来了更大的机会，因此总体而言，与套利类相比，我们组合中低估类证券的比重比去年更重了。这里或许该解释一下“套利类”（work-out）这个说法。套利类是这样一种投资：它的利润取决于某项特定的公司行为，而不像低估类那样，指望股价随大势普涨。套利类的机会来自出售、合并、清算、要约收购等等。每一种情形下的风险，都在于半路杀出什么变故，搅黄了原定的计划，而不在于经济恶化、股票普跌。1956 年底，我们一般类证券与套利类证券之比约为 70 比 30，如今约为 85 比 15。过去一年里，我们介入了两个投资对象，其仓位已大到我们有望参与公司决策的地步。其中一个占各合伙企业组合的 10% 到 20%，另一个约占 5%。这两笔投资多半都要花上三到五年才见分晓，但眼下看来，它们有望以极小的风险换来颇高的年均回报率。它们虽不归在套利类里，却几乎
The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term "work-out" is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15. During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little
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不依赖股票市场的整体走势。当然，倘若大盘大幅上扬，我料想我们这部分组合的表现会跑输大市。
dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.
1957 年的业绩
Results for 1957
1957 年，我们 1956 年成立的三家合伙企业，业绩明显跑赢了大盘。年初，道琼斯工业平均指数报 499 点，年底跌至 435 点，下挫 64 点。若持有该指数，投资者可拿到 22 点股息，全年净亏收窄为 42 点，折合 8.470%。这一亏损，大致相当于把钱投进多数投资基金所能得到的结果；据我所知，当年没有一家投资股票的基金实现盈利。1956 年成立的三家合伙企业当年都有盈利，按 1956 年底净值计算，收益分别约为 6.2%、7.8% 和 25%。这自然引出一个疑问：最后那家合伙企业为何表现如此突出，尤其在前两家合伙人的眼里更是如此。这件事恰好说明，短期里运气有多要紧，尤其是资金到账的时机。第三家合伙企业在 1956 年成立得最晚，那时市场处于更低的位置，几只证券格外诱人。手头资金充裕，我们便在这些证券上重仓建仓。而更早成立的两家合伙企业，此前已大体投满，只能在这些证券上建些相对小的仓位。说到底，各家合伙企业买的是同样的证券，比例也大致相当。只是在起步阶段，资金到账的时点和市场高低各不相同，因此业绩上的参差要比日后年份大一些。放眼长远，只要每年能比大盘平均高出 10%，我就相当满意了；就这三家合伙企业而言，1957 年是成功的一年，大概也好于寻常年景。另有两家合伙企业在 1957 年年中成立，从成立到年底，其业绩与大盘大致相当——这段时间大盘约下跌了 12%。眼下，它们的组合正开始向 1956 年那几家看齐，往后整个群体的业绩应当会更具可比性。
In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year. All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues. Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year. Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.
对业绩的解读
Interpretation of results
在某种程度上，我们 1957 年跑赢平均水平，是因为那一年对多数股票来说本就不好过。我们的相对表现，多半熊市里比牛市里更亮眼，因此从上面这些结果推演时，还得掂量一句：那一年恰是我们本该表现相对出色的年份。若逢大盘大涨，我能跟上指数的涨幅就心满意足了。我可以笃定地说，1957 年底我们组合的价值，比 1956 年底更高。一来是整体价格更低，二来是我们有了更充裕的时间，去建那些非有耐心不可、被严重低估的证券的仓位。前面提到过我们的最大持仓，占各合伙企业资产的 10% 到 20%。我打算日后把它提到所有合伙企业资产的 20%，但这急不得。道理很明显：在任何建仓期里，我们最盼着的是这只股票按兵不动、甚至下跌，而不是上涨。所以在任何时点，我们组合里都可能有相当一部分处在不生息的状态。这套做法虽然要耐得住性子，却应当能把长期利润做到最大。
To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages. I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.
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我尽力谈了我认为诸位或许感兴趣的几点，也在不涉及具体个股的前提下，尽可能多地道出了我们的理念。若诸位对运作的任何环节有疑问，欢迎随时来信。
I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.
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