致合伙人信(1967-07-12)
巴菲特合伙有限公司
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 基威特广场
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
奥马哈,内布拉斯加州 68131
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
电话:042-4110
TELEPHONE 042-4110
1967 年 7 月 12 日 上半年业绩 照例,这封信写于 6 月下旬,赶在全家去加州之前。为了保持一贯的时间顺序(每逢要把损益表也弄得工整对称,我总是尽量压住自己的审美冲动),我会先留几处空白,相信数字填上之后,结论看起来仍然站得住脚。1967 年开局令人揪心,1 月成了我们经历过最糟的月份之一:BPL 上涨 3.3%,道琼斯指数却涨了 8.5%。尽管开局不利,上半年收官时我们仍录得约 21% 的涨幅,领先道琼斯指数 9.6 个百分点。和 1966 年一样,这一次道琼斯指数是个相对好对付的对手(尽管主流看法不以为然,它却不会年年如此),大多数投资管理人都跑赢了这个标尺。下表照例汇总了迄今为止的业绩:
July 12, 1967 First Half Performance Again, this is being ,written in late June prior to the family's trip to California. To maintain the usual chronological symmetry (I try to sublimate my aesthetic urges when it comes to creating symmetry in the profit and loss statement), I will leave a few blanks and trust that the conclusions look appropriate when the figures are entered. We began 1967 on a traumatic note with January turning out to be one of the worst months we have experienced with a plus 3.3% for BPL versus a plus 8.5% for the Dow. Despite this sour start, we finished the half about plus 21% for an edge of 9.6 percentage points over the Dow. Again, as throughout 1966, the Dow was a relatively easy competitor (it won't be every year, prevailing thinking to the contrary notwithstanding) and a large majority of investment managers outdid this yardstick. The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual
基础:
basis:
1957 年 1958 年 1959 年 1960 年 1961 年 1962 年 1963 年 1964 年 1965 年 1966 年 1967 年上半年 累计结果 年复合收益率
Year 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 First half 1967 Cumulative Results Annual Compounded Rate
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
道琼斯整体回报率 (1) -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 18.7% 14.2% -15.6% 11.4%
Overall Results From Dow (1) -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 18.7% 14.2% -15.6% 11.4%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
合伙企业业绩 (2) 10.4% 40.9% 25.9% 22.8% 45.9% 13.9% 38.7% 27.8% 47.2% 20.4% 21.0%
Partnership Results (2) 10.4% 40.9% 25.9% 22.8% 45.9% 13.9% 38.7% 27.8% 47.2% 20.4% 21.0%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
有限合伙人业绩(3) 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 22.3% 36.9% 16.8% 17.3%
Limited Partners’ Results (3) 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 22.3% 36.9% 16.8% 17.3%
148.3% 9.1% 1419.8% 29.6% 843.3% 23.8%
148.3% 9.1% 1419.8% 29.6% 843.3% 23.8%
(1)以道琼斯指数每年的价值变动为基础,加上当年持有道指成分股应收到的股息。该表涵盖合伙基金运作的全部完整年份。(2)1957 至 1961 年的数据,为全年运营的所有前身有限合伙企业的合并业绩,已扣除全部费用,但尚未向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人划拨收益。(3)1957 至 1961 年的数据,按前一列的合伙业绩计算,依现行合伙协议向普通合伙人划拨收益,但尚未扣除有限合伙人每月的提款。BPL 上半年的业绩并未反映我们控股公司估值的任何变动,因此完全出自年初投入有价证券的那 63.3% 净资产。
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity. (2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner. (3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners. BPL's performance during the first hall reflects no change in valuation of our controlled companies and was thus achieved solely by the 63.3% of our net assets invested in marketable securities at the beginning of the year.
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多元化零售公司(DRC)与伯克希尔·哈撒韦(B-H)若要重估,将安排在 12 月,早于承诺函最终定稿之时,并以当时的全部相关标准为依据(包括当时的运营、市场与信用状况)。上半年,DRC 和 B-H 都完成了重要收购。DRC(持股 80%)及其两家子公司(霍克希尔德·科恩和联合棉纺店)的整体进展十分令人满意。然而,B-H 在纺织业务上正面临切实的困难,也面临着真实的挑战。就目前而言,我并不预见其基础价值会有任何损失;但同样地,我也看不出投在纺织业务上的资产能有多好的回报。因此,只要道琼斯指数继续上行,投资组合的这一块就会明显拖累我们的相对表现(上半年已经如此)。在强势上涨的市场里,控股公司拖累相对表现本在意料之中;可一旦生意本身毫无起色,这种拖累便更为刺眼。用我一位朋友的话说:“所谓经验,就是你在找别的东西时撞见的那样东西。”
Any revaluation of Diversified Retailing Company (DRC) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (B-H) will be made in December prior to the time the commitment letters become final and will be based upon all relevant criteria (including current operating. market and credit conditions) at that time. Both DRC and B-H made important acquisitions during the first half. The overall progress of DRC (80% owned) and both of its subsidiaries (Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) is highly satisfactory. However, B-H is experiencing and faces real difficulties in the textile business, while I don't presently foresee any loss in underlying values. I similarly see no prospect of a good return on the assets employed in the textile business. Therefore, this segment of our portfolio will be a substantial drag on our relative performance (as it has been during the first half) if the Dow continues to advance. Such relative performance with controlled companies is expected in a strongly advancing market, but is accentuated when the business is making no progress. As a friend of mine says. “Experience is what you find when you're looking for something else.”
投资公司
Investment Companies
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
下面照例做个对比,列出两家最大的开放式和两家最大的封闭式投资公司的业绩,它们都奉行 95%–100% 投资于普通股的方针。年份 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 年上半年 累计业绩 年复利收益率
The usual comparison follows showing the results of the two largest open-end and two largest closed-end investment companies which pursue a policy of 95-100% investment in common stocks. Year 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 First half 1967 Cumulative Results Annual Compounded Rate
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
马萨诸塞投资信托基金 (1) -11.4% 42.7% 9.0% -1.0% 25.6% -9.8% 20.0% 15.9% 10.2% -7.7% 11.3%
Mass. Inv. Trust (1) -11.4% 42.7% 9.0% -1.0% 25.6% -9.8% 20.0% 15.9% 10.2% -7.7% 11.3%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
投资者股票(1) -12.4% 47.5% 10.3% -0.6% 24.9% -13.4% 16.5% 14.3% 9.8% -10.0% 12.3%
Investors Stock (1) -12.4% 47.5% 10.3% -0.6% 24.9% -13.4% 16.5% 14.3% 9.8% -10.0% 12.3%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
雷曼(2) -11.4% 40.8% 8.1% 2.5% 23.6% -14.4% 23.7% 13.6% 19.0% -2.6% 19.3%
Lehman (2) -11.4% 40.8% 8.1% 2.5% 23.6% -14.4% 23.7% 13.6% 19.0% -2.6% 19.3%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
Tri-Cont (2) -2.4% 33.2% 8.4% 2.8% 22.5% -10.0% 18.3% 12.6% 10.7% -6.9% 14.4%
Tri-Cont (2) -2.4% 33.2% 8.4% 2.8% 22.5% -10.0% 18.3% 12.6% 10.7% -6.9% 14.4%
143.3% 8.9%
143.3% 8.9%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
道琼斯指数 -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 18.7% 14.2% -15.6% 11.4%
Dow -8.4% 38.5% 20.0% -6.2% 22.4% -7.6% 20.6% 18.7% 14.2% -15.6% 11.4%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
有限合伙人 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 22.3% 36.9% 16.8% 17.3%
Limited Partners 9.3% 32.2% 20.9% 18.6% 35.9% 11.9% 30.5% 22.3% 36.9% 16.8% 17.3%
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
126.4% 185.4% 156.8% 148.3% 843.3% 8.1% 10.5% 9.4% 9.1% 23.8%
126.4% 185.4% 156.8% 148.3% 843.3% 8.1% 10.5% 9.4% 9.1% 23.8%
(1)按资产价值变动,加上年内向登记在册持有人所作的任何分配计算得出。(2)1957 至 1966 年取自 1967 年版《穆迪银行与金融手册》;1967 年上半年为估算值。潮水的涨落,远比泳者自身的本事更为要紧。
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year. (2) From 1967 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1966. Estimated for first half of 1967. The tide continues to be far more important than the swimmers.
税收
Taxes
1967 年初,我们持有 16,361,974 美元的未实现收益。截至 6 月 30 日,已实现净资本利得 7,084,104 美元,因此 1967 年很可能会实现相当大一部分年初归属于你们权益的那笔未实现收益。这笔金额已在 1967 年 2 月 2 日的信中作为第三项向你们报告。那封信的副本连同一封税务说明,将于 11 月寄给你们,届时会大致交代当时的税务情形。
We entered 1967 with unrealized gains of $16,361,974. Through June 30 we have realized net capital gains of $7,084,104 so it appears likely that we will realize in 1967 a fairly substantial portion of the unrealized gain attributable to your interest at the beginning of the year. This amount was reported to you as Item 3 of our February 2, 1967 letter. A copy of that letter, along with a tax letter, will be mailed to you in November giving a rough idea of the tax situation at that time.
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一如我常给的建议,预缴税款时最稳妥的做法,是把 1967 年的预估税额照 1966 年的实缴税额来缴。这样办绝不会招来罚款。无论最终数字如何,眼下看来,绝大部分将是长期资本利得,短期利得和普通收入即便有,也只是零星小数。(“收入—本金”那套神话,我一直觉得很适合拿来写一篇温声细语、措辞和缓的批评文章。正如新婚之初我对苏茜说的:“别惦记收入,惦记结果就好。”)
As I regularly suggest, the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1967 as your actual tax was for 1966. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure. Whatever our final figure, it looks now as if it will be very largely long term capital gain with only minor amounts, if any, of short term gain and ordinary income. (I consider the whole Income-Principal Myth fair game for one of my soft-spoken gently worded critiques. As I told Susie in the early days of our marriage, “Don't worry about the income; just the outcome.”)
杂项
Miscellaneous
上半年,斯坦·珀里米特因眼下全职投身投资管理,辞去了解散委员会的职务。老搭档、经验老到的投资者小弗雷德·斯坦贝克经其余成员推选,接替了这个空缺。与往年一样,我们会在 11 月 11 日前后随承诺函发出一份报告,并附上 1967 年税务情形的粗略估算等等。不过,10 月还会另有一封专门的信(好让你们把注意力聚在上面)。信的主题与合伙协议的变动无关,而是关乎几条“基本原则”的若干渐进式调整——我希望你们有充裕的时间去掂量,再去筹划 1968 年。合伙协议代表的是我们之间的法律约定,“基本原则”代表的则是个人层面的理解,某种意义上还是更要紧的一份文件。我认为,任何变动都必须在影响合伙运作或业绩之前讲清、说明——10 月这封信,正是为此而来。顺致敬意,沃伦·E·巴菲特 WEBeh
During the first half, Stan Perimeter resigned from the Dissolution Committee because of his present full-time involvement in investment management. Fred Stanback, Jr., a long time partner and experienced investor, was elected by the remaining members to fill the vacancy. As in past years, we will have a report out about November 11 along with the Commitment Letter, and the rough estimate of the 1967 tax situation, etc. However, there will be a special letter (to focus your attention upon it) in October. The subject matter will not relate to change in the Partnership Agreement, but will involve some evolutionary changes in several "Ground Rules" which I want you to have ample time to contemplate before making your plans for 1968. Whereas the Partnership Agreement represents the legal understanding among us, the "Ground Rules" represent the personal understanding and in some ways is the more important document. I consider it essential that any changes be clearly set forth and explained prior to their effect on partnership activity or performance – hence, the October letter. Cordially, Warren E. Buffett WEBeh
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