致合伙人信(1970-02-25)

合伙人信 · 原文约 5430 词
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巴菲特合伙公司

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.

基威特广场 610 号

610 KIEWIT PLAZA

内布拉斯加州奥马哈 68131

OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131

电话 042-4110

TELEPHONE 042-4110

1970 年 2 月 25 日

February 25th, 1970

致各位合伙人:

To My Partners:

这封信想给各位做一次关于免税债券的入门介绍,重点讲我们预计下个月会协助合伙人购买的债券类型和期限。如果你打算让我们帮忙买债券,务必把这封信仔细读透(有必要的话,不妨再读一遍),因为它将是我提出具体买入建议的基础。你若对债券类型或期限的结论有异议,未必没有道理——事实上,一两年前你若在期限问题上跟我意见相左,对的是你,错的是我——但对于我们推荐范围以外的债券,我们实在帮不上忙。光是集中精力在我们推荐的领域,就已经够我们忙的了,因此可转债、公司债和短期品种,我们既无法协助,也无法提供建议。这封信我已尽量精简。有些地方会略显生涩,有些地方又失之过于简略,这些缺憾我先在此致歉。我的感觉是,我想把一本一百页书的全部精华塞进十页纸里,还得让人读起来像漫画一样轻松。

This letter will attempt to provide a very elementary education regarding tax-exempt bonds with emphasis on the types and maturities of bonds which we expect to help partners in purchasing next month. If you expect to use our help in the purchase of bonds, it is important that you carefully read (and, if necessary , reread) this letter as it will serve as background for the specific purchases I suggest. If you disagree with me as to conclusions regarding types of bonds or maturities (and you would have been right and I would have been wrong if you had disagreed with me on the latter point either one or two years ago), you may well be correct, but we cannot be of assistance to you in the purchase of bonds outside our area. We will simply have our hands full concentrating in our recommended area, so will be unavailable to assist or advise in the purchase of convertible bonds, corporate bonds or short term issues. I have tried to boil this letter down as much as possible. Some of it will be a little weighty - some a little oversimplified. I apologize for the shortcomings in advance. I have a feeling I am trying to put all the meat of a 100 page book in 10 pages - and have it read like the funny papers.

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我相信各位都明白,我们这次协助买债券,并不意味着日后我还会就这些具体债券或一般的投资决策继续提供帮助。我之所以愿意在此时搭把手,是因为各位刚从我们这里一次性拿到了一大笔现金。我无意直接或间接涉足投资顾问这一行,3 月 31 日之后,我不会再参与任何财务问题的讨论。

I am sure you understand that our aid in the purchase of bonds will involve no future assistance regarding either these specific bonds or general investment decisions. I want to be available at this time to be of help because of the unusual amount of cash you have received in one distribution from us. I have no desire to be in the investment counseling business, directly or indirectly, and will not be available for discussion of financial matters after March 31st.

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免税债券的操作流程。对于希望我们帮忙的合伙人,我们会安排直接从全国各地的市政债券交易商处买入债券,并让他们将成交确认直接开给你。这份成交确认函应作为税务用途的基础凭证妥善保存。你不必给债券交易商寄支票,因为他会把债券连同一张汇票一并送达你的银行,由银行从你的账户中扣款支付。若从二级市场(即已发行流通的债券)买入,结算日通常在确认日之后约一周;而新发行的债券,结算日可能晚至一个月之后。结算日在确认单上写得清清楚楚(新发债券的情况下,这是第二张也是最终的确认单,而非最初那张“假定发行”的预备单),你要确保结算日当天银行账户里有资金可供付款。如果你目前持有国库券,只需提前几天通知,银行就能按你的指令卖出,因此按时备足资金应该不成问题。即便债券交易商向你的银行交付有所延迟,利息也从结算日起开始为你计息。债券以可转让形式交付(即所谓的“无记名”形式,使其像现钞一样流通),

The mechanics of Tax-Free Bonds. For those who wish our help, we will arrange the purchase of bonds directly from municipal bond dealers throughout the country and have them confirm sale of the bonds directly to you. The confirmation should be saved as a basic document for tax purposes. You should not send a check to the bond dealer since he will deliver the bonds to your bank, along with a draft which the bank will pay by charging your account with them. In the case of bonds purchased in the secondary market (issues already outstanding), this settlement date will usually be about a week after confirmation date whereas, on new issues, the settlement date may be as much as a month later. The settlement date is shown plainly on the confirmation ticket (in the case of new issues this will be the second and final ticket rather than the preliminary "when issued" ticket), and you should have the funds at your bank ready to pay for the bonds on the settlement date. If you presently own Treasury Bills, they can be sold on a couple of days notice by your bank upon your instructions, so you should experience no problems in having the money available on time. Interest begins to accrue to you on the settlement date, even if the bond dealer is late in getting them delivered to your bank. Bonds will be delivered in negotiable form (so-called "bearer" form which makes them like currency) with

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并附有息票。债券面额通常为 5,000 美元,而且往往可以换成记名债券(有时需支付一笔不小的费用,有时免费——视具体条款而定)。记名形式下的债券未经你背书转让便不可流通,因为在过户代理人的记录上,你才是登记的所有人。债券几乎全部以无记名方式交易,记名债券若不先转回无记名形式,实际上几乎卖不出去。因此,除非你将持有数量极多的实物债券,否则我建议保留无记名形式。这也就意味着要把债券存放在极其安全的地方,并每半年剪一次息票。剪下的息票,可以像支票一样存进你的银行账户。假如你持有 25 万美元的债券,那大概就是 50 张单独的凭证(5,000 美元面额),每年可能要去往保险箱所在处六到八趟,以剪取和存入息票。你也可以在银行开立一个托管账户,只需一笔相当低的费用,银行就会替你保管债券、代收利息并保留相关记录。举例来说,对于一个 25 万美元的投资组合,银行提供这项托管服务大约每年收费 200 美元。如果你对托管账户感兴趣,可向你开户商业银行的信托专员了解其服务性质和收费标准。否则,你应自备一个保险箱。

coupons attached. Usually the bonds are in $5,000 denominations and frequently they can be exchanged for registered bonds (sometimes at considerable expense and sometimes free-it depends upon the terms). Bonds in registered form are nonnegotiable without assignment by you, since you are the registered owner on the Transfer Agent's books. Bonds trade almost exclusively on a bearer basis and it is virtually impossible to sell registered bonds without converting them back into bearer form. Thus, unless you are going to own great physical quantities of bonds. I recommend keeping bonds in bearer form. This means keeping them in a very safe place and clipping the coupons every six months. Such coupons, when clipped, can be deposited in your bank account just like checks. If you have $250,000 in bonds, this probably means about fifty separate pieces of paper ($5,000 denominations) and perhaps six or eight trips a year to the safe deposit section to cut and deposit coupons. It is also possible to open a custody account with a bank where, for a fairly nominal cost, they will keep the bonds, collect the interest and preserve your records for you. For example, a bank will probably perform the custodial service for you for about $200 a year on a $250,000 portfolio. If you are interested in a custodial account, you should talk to a Trust Officer at your commercial bank as to the nature of their services and cost. Otherwise, you should have a safe deposit box.

税收

Taxation

免税债券息票存入后所得的利息,自然是免缴联邦所得税的。这就意味着,如果你处于 30% 的最高联邦所得税档,免税债券 6% 的回报,大约相当于应税债券的 8.5%。因此,对我们大多数合伙人而言(未成年人或部分退休人士除外),免税债券将比应税债券更有吸引力。对于工资或股息收入很少甚至没有、却坐拥大量资本的人,将应税债券(用以将应税收入提升至 25% 或 30% 左右的税档)与免税债券搭配,或许能带来最高的税后总收入。在适当情况下,我们会与你一同来实现这种平衡。至于州所得税,情况就复杂多了。在内布拉斯加州,州所得税是按联邦所得税的一定比例计征的,因此免税债券的利息实际上无需缴纳州税。我对纽约州和加州法律的理解是,本州实体发行的免税债券无需缴纳州所得税,但外州发行的免税债券则要缴纳当地州所得税。我还认为,纽约市所得税对纽约州内实体发行的免税债券予以豁免,却对外州发行的此类债券征税。我并非州所得税方面的专家,也无意去追踪各州或各市的最新变化。因此,我留待你当地的税务顾问来定夺,提这几点笼统印象,只是想让你对潜在问题的存在有所警觉。在内布拉斯加州,无需在税后计算中掺入任何地方性因素。若外州品种需缴纳地方税,你实际承担的州或市所得税成本,会因你在联邦所得税申报中将其扣除而降低。当然,这因人而异。此外,有些州还征收各种无形资产税,可能适用于所有免税债券,也可能仅针对外州实体的债券。内布拉斯加州没有这类税,但其他州的情况我就无从建议了。当债券以低于面值的折价买入,日后卖出或到期(到期兑付)时,所得款项与成本之间的差额需按资本利得或损失处理。(这一说法存在一些小的例外——不幸的是,有关投资和税收的大多数笼统说法都难免存在例外——但如果它们影响到我们推荐的任何证券,我们都会向你指明。)这会拉低净税后收益率,拉低的幅度取决于未来资本利得税的总体水平以及你个人未来的具体税务状况。稍后我们会讨论,在权衡折价债券与“全额息票”债券的相对吸引力时,这类资本利得税会带来怎样的影响。最后,是极为重要的一点。虽然法律条文并不完全明朗,但如果你目前有、或预计将产生一般用途的银行贷款或其他债务,你大概就不该考虑持有免税债券。

The interest received upon the deposit of coupons from tax-free bonds is, of course, free from Federal Income Taxes. This means if you are at a 30% top Federal Income Tax bracket, a 6% return from tax-free bonds is equivalent to about 8-1/2% from taxable bonds. Thus, for most of our partners, excluding minors or some retired people, tax-free bonds will be more attractive than taxable bonds. For people with little or no income from wages or dividends, but with substantial capital, it is possible that a combination of taxable bonds (to bring taxable income up to about the 25% or 30% bracket) plus tax-free bonds will bring the highest total after-tax income. Where appropriate, we will work with you to achieve such a balance. The situation in respect to State Income Taxes is more complicated. In Nebraska. where the State Income Tax is computed as a percentage of the Federal Income Tax, the effect is that there is no state tax on interest from taxfree bonds. My understanding of both the New York and California law is that tax-free bonds of entities within the home state are not subject to State Income Tax, but tax-free bonds from other states are subject to the local State Income Tax. I also believe that the New York City Income Tax exempts tax-free bonds of entities based within the State of New York, but taxes those from other states. I am no expert on state income taxes and make no attempt to post myself on changes taking place within the various states or cities. Therefore, I defer to your local tax advisor, but simply mention these few general impressions so that you will be alert to the existence of a potential problem. In Nebraska there is no need to have any local considerations enter into the after-tax calculation. Where out-of-state issues are subject to local taxation, the effective cost of your State or Municipal Income Tax is reduced by the benefit received from deducting it on your Federal Income Tax return. This, of course, varies with the individual. Additionally, in some states there are various taxes on intangible property which may apply to all tax-free bonds or just those of out-of-state entities. There are none of these in Nebraska, but I cannot advise on the other states. When bonds are bought at a discount from par and later are sold or mature (come due and get paid), the difference between the proceeds and cost is subject to capital gain or loss treatment. (There are minor exceptions to this statement as, unfortunately, there are to most general statements on investments and taxes but they will be pointed out to you should they affect any securities we recommend). This reduces the net after-tax yield by a factor involving the general rate of future capital gains taxes and the specific future tax position of the individual. Later on, we will discuss the impact of such capital gains taxes in calculating the relative attractiveness of discount bonds versus "full coupon" bonds. Finally, one most important point. Although the law is not completely clear, you should probably not contemplate owning tax-free bonds if you have, or expect to have, general purpose bank or other indebtedness.

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法律不允许为购买或持有免税债券而借入或续借的贷款利息进行税前扣除,而且随着时间推移,对该法规的解释很可能会日趋严格。举个例子,我的印象是:如果你有一笔房产抵押贷款(除非该笔债务正是为购买市政债券而借入),那么即便你同时持有免税债券,在联邦税申报表上扣除这笔抵押贷款利息也不会有问题。然而,我认为如果你有一笔一般用途的银行贷款,即便贷款资金直接用于购买股票、建造手球场等,并且免税债券也未用于为该笔贷款提供担保,你如果一边扣除利息,一边又持有免税债券,这就是在自找麻烦。因此,我会在持有免税债券之前先还清银行贷款,但我将此问题的详尽审查留给你和你的税务顾问。我提这一句,只是想让你对潜在的问题心中有数。

The law excludes the deductibility of interest on loans incurred or continued to purchase or carry tax-free bonds, and the interpretation of this statute will probably tend to be broadened as the years pass. For example, my impression is that you have no problem if you have a mortgage against real property (unless the debt was incurred in order to acquire municipal bonds) in deducting the mortgage interest on your Federal Tax return, even though you own tax-free bonds at the same time. However, I believe that if you have a general bank loan, even though the proceeds were directly used to purchase stocks, a handball court, etc. and the tax-free bonds are not used for security for the loan, you are asking for trouble if you deduct the interest and, at the same time, are the owner of tax-free bonds. Therefore, I would pay off bank loans before owning tax-free bonds, but I leave detailed examination of this question to you and your tax advisor. I merely mention it to make you aware of the potential problem.

流动性

Marketability

免税债券与普通股或公司债券有一个本质区别:市面上的品种成千上万,其中绝大多数持有人极少。这极大地阻碍了紧密、活跃市场的形成。每当纽约市或费城想融资时,它往往会发行二十种、三十种乃至四十种不完全相同的证券,因为它会提供涵盖这么多个不同到期日的一期债券。一张 1980 年到期的纽约市 6% 债券,与一张 1981 年到期的纽约市 6% 债券,是两种不同的东西。二者不可互换,卖家必须为手中持有的那个特定品种找到买家。再想想纽约市一年可能发债数次,就不难明白,仅这一座城市,市面上存续的品种就可能有一千种左右。内布拉斯加州格兰德岛可能有 75 种存续债券。每期平均规模或许为 10 万美元,每期平均持有人数可能为六到八个。因此,想做到所有品种随时都有报价,是绝无可能的,买卖价差也可能非常大。你不可能早上出门指定要买某个格兰德岛品种。它可能在任何地方、任何价位都没有人报出,就算你真找到一个卖家,也没理由要求他的报价必须与同等品质的其他品种相比较为合理。反过来看,也存在俄亥俄收费公路、伊利诺伊收费公路等单一品种,发行规模达 2 亿美元或更多,持有人成千上万,持有的是完全同质、可互换的同一个品种。显然,这类债券的市场性就很高。我的印象是,市场性通常取决于以下三个因素,按重要程度递减排列:(1)该期债券的发行规模;(2)发行主体的规模(一笔 10 万美元的俄亥俄州债券,会比一笔 10 万美元的俄亥俄州波敦克镇债券更具市场性);(3)发行主体的信用质量。迄今为止,绝大部分销售精力都倾注在了新发债券的销售上。平均每周有 2 亿美元以上的新债发行待售,债券分销的整套机制,就是冲着将它们卖出去而设置的,无论规模大小。依我看,债券在发行时的收益率差异,往往不足以弥补初始销售推动结束后将出现的市场性差异。我们常常碰到有些债券的买卖价差会拉到 15%。没有必要去买有可能出现这种荒唐市场的债券(尽管最初把这些债券卖给公众的交易商,从中赚取的利润空间通常比市场性更好的债券更宽),我们不会替你们去买这些。我们准备买入的债券,其价差(反映的是你在同一时点净买入所付代价,与净卖出所得之间的差距)通常会在 2% 至 5% 之间。这样的价差,你若试图在其中来回交易将是毁灭性的,但我认为它不应该成为长期投资者的障碍。真正的关键是远离市场性极为有限的债券——而这类债券,通常正是当地债券交易商最具金钱动力去推销的品种。

Tax-free bonds are materially different from common stocks or corporate bonds in that there are literally hundreds of thousands of issues, with the great majority having very few holders. This substantially inhibits the development of close, active markets. Whenever the City of New York or Philadelphia wants to raise money it sells perhaps twenty, thirty or forty non-identical securities, since it will offer an issue with that many different maturities. A 6% bond of New York coming due in 1980 is a different animal from a 6% bond of New York coming due in 1981. One cannot be exchanged for the other, and a seller has to find a buyer for the specific item he holds. When you consider that New York may offer bonds several times a year, it is easy to see why just this one city may have somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 issues outstanding. Grand Island, Nebraska may have 75 issues outstanding. The average amount of each issue might be $100,000 and the average number of holders may be six or eight per issue. Thus, it is absolutely impossible to have quoted markets at all times for all issues and spreads between bids and offers may be very wide. You can't set forth in the morning to buy a specific Grand Island issue of your choosing. It may not be offered at any price, anywhere, and if you do find one seller, there is no reason why he has to be realistic compared to other offerings of similar quality. On the other hand, there are single issues such as those of the Ohio Turnpike, Illinois Turnpike, etc. that amount to $200 million or more and have thousands of bondholders owning a single entirely homogeneous and interchangeable issue. Obviously, here you get a high degree of marketability. My impression is that marketability is generally a function of the following three items, in descending order of importance: (1) the size of the particular issue; (2) the size of the issuer (a $100,000 issue of the State of Ohio will be more marketable than a $100,000 issue of Podunk, Ohio); and (3) the quality of the issuer. By far the most sales effort goes into the selling of new issues of bonds. An average of over $200 million per week of new issues comes up for sale, and the machinery of bond distribution is geared to get them sold, large or small. In my opinion, there is frequently insufficient differential in yield at time of issue for the marketability differences that will exist once the initial sales push is terminated. We have frequently run into markets in bonds where the spread between bid and asked prices may get to 15%. There is no need to buy bonds with the potential for such grotesque markets (although the profit spread to the dealer who originally offers them is frequently wider than on more marketable bonds) and we will not be buying them for you. The bonds we expect to buy will usually tend to have spreads (reflecting the difference between what you would pay net for such bonds on purchase and receive net on sale at the same point in time) of from 2% to 5%. Such a spread would be devastating if you attempted to trade in such bonds, but I don't believe it should be a deterrent for a long-term investor. The real necessity is to stay away from bonds of very limited marketability - which frequently are the type local bond dealers have the greatest monetary incentive to push.

具体买入领域

Specific Areas of Purchase

我们大概会把买入集中在以下几个大类:(1)大型创收公共实体,如收费公路、供电区、供水区等。

We will probably concentrate our purchases in the following general areas: (1) Large revenue-producing public entities such as toll roads, electric power districts, water districts, etc.

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这类债券中,许多具有很高的市场性,可以作量化分析,有时还附有有利的偿债基金或其他因素,而这些往往未能在市场上得到充分估值。(2)工业发展局债券,其产生背景是公共实体持有已出租给私人公司的财产的所有权。例如,俄亥俄州洛雷因市持有一项为美国钢铁公司建造、价值 8000 万美元的项目所有权。发展局董事会发行债券为该项目建设融资,并与美国钢铁签订了一份净额和绝对租赁合同,用以覆盖债券的偿付。债券的背后没有市或州的信用作担保,品质仅取决于租约背后的那家公司。许多顶级公司为总额达数十亿美元的此类债务提供了支持,不过由于税法变动,新发行的此类债券规模都很小(每个项目 500 万美元或更少)。曾有一段时期,市场对此类债券抱有极大的偏见,致使其收益率远高于与其内在信用水平相称的水平。这种偏见已趋于消退,导致可获取的溢价收益率下降,但我仍认为这是一个极具吸引力的领域。我们保险公司持有的债券中,大部分属于此类。(3)公共住房管理局债券,适合你们当中希望持有最高等级免税债券的人。实际上,这些债券带有美国政府的担保,所以均被评为 AAA 级。在那些购买本州发行品种能在地方税上享受优惠的州,如果我无法从(1)和(2)类中满足你的需求,我的倾向是为你配置住房管理局债券,而不是从我看不懂的信用品种中硬选。你若指示我买入你所在州的债券,就该预料到会持有大量住房管理局债券。这类债券之间无需分散,因为它们全都代表了能获得的最高信用等级。(4)直接或间接的州政府债券。你们会注意到,我不买大城市发行的债券。我完全不知道该如何分析纽约市、芝加哥、费城等等(前几天一位朋友提到,纽瓦克试图以高得离谱的利率发债时,黑手党非常恼火,因为纽瓦克给他们败坏了名声)。你对纽约市的分析——我承认,很难设想他们会长期不偿债——会不比我差。我对待债券的路子,与我对待股票的路子大致相同。如果我看不懂某个东西,我倾向于把它撇开。错过一个我看不懂的机会——即使有人眼光独到,能分析透彻并从中大赚一笔——并不会让我烦恼。我唯一想确保的是,在那些我确实觉得有能力处理的事情上能获得良好回报——并且在我做出肯定决策时自己是正确的。对你们大多数人,我们大概会买入五到十个品种。不过,如果你要求我将范围限定在你的本州,品种可能会更少——或许还只有住房管理局债券。我们会尽量避免买入低于 2.5 万美元面额的零散债券,条件合适时会更偏好大额。小批量债券在转售时通常会受到惩罚,有时惩罚还很重。债券推销员在卖给你 1 万美元债券时通常不会向你解释这点,但等到日后你试图把这 1 万美元卖回给他时,他便会向你解释了。对于在二级市场买入的小批量品种,我们可能会破例——但前提是正因整批发行规模小,我们在买入价上占到了特别大的便宜。

Many of these issues possess high marketability, are subject to quantitative analysis, and sometimes have favorable sinking fund or other factors which tend not to receive full valuation in the market place. (2) Industrial Development Authority bonds which arise when a public entity holds title to property leased to a private corporation. For example, Lorain, Ohio holds title to an $80 million project for U.S. Steel Corp. The Development Authority Board issued bonds to pay for the project and has executed a net and absolute lease with U.S. Steel to cover the bond payments. The credit of the city or state is not behind the bonds and they are only as good as the company that is on the lease. Many top-grade corporations stand behind an aggregate of several billion dollars of these obligations, although new ones are being issued only in small amounts ($5 million per project or less) because of changes in the tax laws. For a period of time there was a very substantial prejudice against such issues, causing them to sell at yields considerably higher than those commensurate with their inherent credit standing. This prejudice has tended to diminish, reducing the premium yields available, but I still consider it a most attractive field. Our insurance company owns a majority of its bonds in this category. (3) Public Housing Authority Issues for those of you who wish the very highest grade of tax-free bonds. In effect, these bonds bear the guarantee of the U.S. Government, so they are all rated AAA. In states where local taxes put a premium on buying in-state issues, and I can’t fill your needs from (1) and (2) , my tendency would be to put you into Housing Authority issues rather than try to select from among credits that I don't understand. If you direct me to buy obligations of your home state, you should expect substantial quantities of Housing Authority issues. There is no need to diversify among such issues, as they all represent the top credit available. (4) State obligations of a direct or indirect nature. You will notice I am not buying issues of large cities. I don't have the faintest idea how to analyze a New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, etc. (a friend mentioned the other day when Newark was trying to sell bonds at a very fancy rate that the Mafia was getting very upset because Newark was giving them a bad name). Your analysis of a New York City - and I admit it is hard to imagine them not paying their bills for any extended period of time - would be as good as mine. My approach to bonds is pretty much like my approach to stocks. If I can't understand something, I tend to forget it. Passing an opportunity which I don't understand - even if someone else is perceptive enough to analyze it and get paid well for doing it - doesn't bother me. All I want to be sure of is that I get paid well for the things I do feel capable of handling - and that I am right when I make affirmative decisions. We will probably tend to purchase somewhere between five and ten issues for most of you. However, if you wish to limit me to your home state, it may be fewer issues - and perhaps those will only be Housing Authorities. We will try not to buy in smaller than $25,000 pieces and will prefer larger amounts where appropriate. Smaller lots of bonds are usually penalized upon resale, sometimes substantially. The bond salesman doesn't usually explain this to you when you buy the $10,000 of bonds from him, but it gets explained when you later try to sell the $10,000 to him. We may make exceptions where we are buying secondary market issues in smaller pieces - but only if we are getting an especially good price on the buy side because of the small size of the offering.

可赎回债券

Callable Bonds

我们不会买入发行人有权按某种实质上大幅偏向己方的条款将债券赎回(提前兑回)的债券。看到有人买入四十年到期的债券,而发行人却有权在五年或十年后以极低的溢价将其赎回,我感到十分惊异。这种合同实质上意味着,如果这对发行人有利(对你不利),你就做了一笔四十年的交易;如果原先的合同对你有利(对发行人不利),它就成了

We will not buy bonds where the issuer of the bonds has a right to call (retire) the bonds on a basis which substantially loads the contract in his favor. It is amazing to me to see people buy bonds which are due in forty years, but where the issuer has the right to call the bonds at a tiny premium in five or ten years. Such a contract essentially means that you have made a forty year deal if it is advantageous to the issuer (and disadvantageous to you) and a five year deal if the initial contract turns out to be advantageous to you (and disadvantageous to the

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一笔五年的交易。这类合同确实很离谱,其之所以存在,是因为债券投资者想不透这种合同形式的后果,而债券交易商又不为其客户坚持争取更好的条款。一个极为有趣的事实是:附有十分不利的赎回条款的债券,其收益率几乎与条款完全相同但不可赎回的债券并无二致。需要指出的是,大多数内布拉斯加州债券都附有极不公平的赎回条款。尽管存在这一严重的合同劣势,它们并没有比其他条款更公平的债券提供更高的收益率。避免这一问题的一个方法是买入完全不可赎回的债券。另一个方法是买入折价债券,发行人行使赎回权的价格远高于你的成本价,从而使可能的赎回变得无关紧要。如果你以 60 的价格买入一张可在 103 赎回的债券,你授予发行人提前终止合同这项权利(一项你永远没有的权利)的真实成本就微不足道了。但是,以 100 的价格买入一张洛杉矶水电局债券,它要么在 1999 年以 100 到期,要么在 1974 年以 104 到期,怎么来取决于哪种情形对发行人有利、对你不利——而与此同时,在同类信用品质上本可以获取收益率相当但不带这种不公条款的债券——这便是愚蠢的极致了。然而,恰恰是这样一张债券,于 1969 年 10 月发行了,类似债券至今仍每天在发。我在一个如此浅显的问题上写得这么长,只因从这类债券的持续销售可以明显看出,许多投资者对此如何将自己置于不利境地连模糊的认识都没有,而许多债券推销员也不打算告诉他们。

issuer). Such contracts are really outrageous and exist because bond investors can't think through the implications of such a contract form and bond dealers don't insist on better terms for their customers. One extremely interesting fact is that bonds with very unattractive call features sell at virtually the same yield as otherwise identical bonds which are noncallable. It should be pointed out that most Nebraska bonds carry highly unfair call provisions. Despite this severe contractual disadvantage, they do not offer higher yields than bonds with more equitable terms. One way to avoid this problem is to buy bonds which are totally noncallable. Another way is to buy discount bonds where the right of the issuer to call the bond is at a price so far above your cost as to render the possible call inconsequential. If you buy a bond at 60 which is callable at 103, the effective cost to you of granting the issuer the right to prematurely terminate the contract (which is a right you never have) is insignificant. But to buy a bond of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power at 100 to come due at 100 in 1999 or to come due at 104 in 1974, depending on which is to the advantage of the issuer and to your disadvantage, is the height of foolishness when comparable yields are available on similar credits without such an unfair contract. Nevertheless, just such a bond was issued in October, 1969 and similar bonds continue to be issued every day. I only write at such length about an obvious point, since it is apparent from the continual sale of such bonds that many investors haven't the faintest notion how this loads the dice against them and many bond salesmen aren't about to tell them.

到期年限与债券数学

Maturity and the Mathematics of Bonds

许多人买债券时,是看自己打算持有多久、还能活多久之类来挑选到期期限的。这种想法不能说不明智,但未必最合逻辑。挑选到期期限,首要的决定因素应该是:(1)收益率曲线的形状;(2)你对未来利率水平的预期;(3)你愿意承受、或希望从中获利的报价波动幅度。当然,(2)最重要,却也是这几项里最难说出个子丑寅卯的。我们先看收益率曲线。当债券的其他品质要素相同时,期限长短会带来利率差异。例如,一张眼下发行的顶级债券,如果是六个月或九个月后到期,收益率大概是 4.75%;两年期 5.00%;五年期 5.25%;十年期 5.50%;二十年期 6.25%。当长期利率远高于短期利率时,这条曲线就称为强正向。在美国国债市场上,近来的利率往往呈现出一条负向的收益率曲线;也就是说,过去一年多,长期国债的收益率一直低于短期国债。有时收益率曲线很平,有时则在某个期限(比如十年)以内是正向的、之后就走平。你要明白的是,这条曲线是变动的,且往往变动幅度相当大,而从历史角度看,眼下的斜率大致处于偏高正向区间。这并不意味着长期债券将来会更值钱,但确实意味着,就拉长期限所得到的补偿而言,如今比很多时期都要丰厚。假如未来几年收益率保持不变,那么不管你打算持有多久,长期债券都会比短期债券表现更好。

决定到期期限的第二个因素,是对未来利率水平的预期。在这个领域做过不少预测的人,往往会很快显得十分可笑。一年前,我并不觉得当时的利率没有吸引力,而几乎立刻就被证明大错特错。我现在认为当期利率并非没有吸引力,也可能再次出丑。但不管怎样,总要做出决定;你若是现在买入短期证券,而几年后用于再投资的利率大幅走低,那你也同样会犯下大错。

最后一个因素,关乎你对报价波动的承受力。这就涉及债券投资的数学原理,你理解起来可能有点费力。但无论如何,把其中的原理大致

Many people, in buying bonds, select maturities based on how long they think they are going to want to hold bonds, how long they are going to live, etc. While this is not a silly approach, it is not necessarily the most logical. The primary determinants in selection of maturity should probably be (1) the shape of the yield curve; (2) your expectations regarding future levels of interest rates and (3) the degree of quotational fluctuation you are willing to endure or hope to possibly profit from. Of course, (2) is the most important but by far the most difficult upon which to comment intelligently. Let's tackle the yield curve first. When other aspects of quality are identical, there will be a difference in interest rates paid based upon the length of the bond being offered. For example, a top grade bond being offered now might have a yield of 4.75% if it came due in six or nine months, 5.00% in two years, 5.25% in five years, 5.50% in ten years and 6.25% in twenty years. When long rates are substantially higher than short rates, the curve is said to be strongly positive. In the U. S. Government bond market, rates recently have tended to produce a negative yield curve; that is, a long term Government bond over the last year or so has consistently yielded less than a short term one. Sometimes the yield curve has been very flat, and sometimes it is positive out to a given point, such as ten years, and then flattens out. What you should understand is that it varies, often very substantially, and that on an historical basis the present slope tends to be in the high positive range. This doesn't mean that long bonds are going to be worth more but it does mean that you are being paid more to extend maturity than in many periods. If yields remained constant for several years, you would do better with longer bonds than shorter bonds, regardless of how long you intended to hold them. The second factor in determining maturity selection is expectations regarding future rate levels. Anyone who has done much predicting in this field has tended to look very foolish very fast. I did not regard rates as unattractive one year ago, and I was proved very wrong almost immediately. I believe present rates are not unattractive and I may look foolish again. Nevertheless, a decision has to be made and you can make just as great a mistake if you buy short term securities now and rates available on reinvestment in a few years are much lower. The final factor involves your tolerance for quotational fluctuation. This involves the mathematics of bond investment and may be a little difficult for you to understand. Nevertheless, it is important that you get a general

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弄明白,还是很重要的。我们先假设一条完全平坦的收益率曲线,以及一只不可赎回的债券。再假设当前利率是 5%,你买了两只债券:一只两年期,一只二十年期。现在假定一年之后,新发债券的收益率降到了 3%,而你想把手里的债券卖掉。忽略市场价差、佣金等因素不谈,你当初花 1,000 美元买的那只两年期债券(此时只剩一年到期)能卖到 1,019.60 美元,那只十九年期债券(原为二十年期)能卖到 1,288.10 美元。按这个价格,买家在摊销掉所付的溢价、并兑现每只债券附带的 5% 票息流之后,其资金的实得收益率刚好是 3%。对他来说,是花 1,288.10 美元买你这只十九年期 5% 债券,还是花 1,000.00 美元买一只新发的 3% 债券(我们假设这是一年后当下的市场利率),毫无分别。反过来,我们假设利率涨到了 7%。同样,忽略佣金、折价对应的资本利得税等因素不计。这时,买方对那只只剩一年到期的债券只肯出 981.00 美元,而对那只还有十九年到期的债券只肯出 791.60 美元。既然他买入新发债券就能拿到 7%,那么你的债券只有折价到一定程度,让折价的逐步累积能令他从你的 5% 票息中实现的经济回报,等同于从一只 1,000 美元面值、7% 票息的债券中获得的回报,他才愿意接手。

原理很简单。利率的波幅越宽、债券的期限越长,债券在到期之前的中间价值涨跌幅度就可能越大。有必要指出,在头一个利率降为 3% 的例子中,我们那只长期债券如果规定五年后可按照面值赎回,那它大概只会升值到约 1,070.00 美元;而一旦利率涨到 7%,它照样会跌得一样惨。这恰好说明了赎回条款与生俱来的不公。二十多年来,免税债券的利率几乎一路攀升,长期债券的买家持续吃亏。这并不是说现在买长期债券就是错的——只是说上面这段所描述的情形,在很长一段时间里只朝一个方向运行,于是人们对利率上行带来的下跌风险,远比利率下行带来的上涨潜力要敏感。如果未来利率总体水平概率各半,而收益率曲线又是明显的正向,那么买入长期不可赎回债券的赢面,就大于买入短期债券。这反映了我当前的结论,因此我打算买入期限在十至二十五年之间的债券。你如果在这个范围里有任何偏好,我们会尽量按你的偏好来挑选,但你如果感兴趣的是短期债券,我们就帮不上忙了,因为我们不在这个区间里找品种。在你决定买入一只二十年期债券之前,请回头把说明价格如何随利率变动的段落再读一遍。当然,你如果一直持有到期,拿到的是合同约定的利率;但你如果提前卖出,那么无论是福是祸,你都要承受那一段里所描述的数学力量。债券价格还会因信用质量的逐年变化而变动,但在免税债券领域,与整体利率结构变动带来的冲击相比,这历来是一个——也很可能继续是——相对次要的因素。

grasp of the principles. Let's assume for the moment a perfectly flat yield curve and a non-callable bond. Further assume present rates are 5% and that you buy two bonds, one due in two years and one due in twenty years. Now assume one year later that yields on new issues have gone to 3% and that you wish to sell your bonds. Forgetting about market spreads, commissions, etc. , you will receive $1,019.60 for the original two year $1,000 bond (now with one year to run) and $1,288.10 for the nineteen year bond (originally twenty years). At these prices, a purchaser will get exactly 3% on his money after amortizing the premium he has paid and cashing the stream of 5% coupons attached to each bond. It is a matter of indifference to him whether to buy your nineteen year 5% bond at $1,288.10 or a new 3% bond (which we have assumed is the rate current - one year later) at $1,000.00. On the other hand, let's assume rates went to 7%. Again we will ignore commissions, capital gains taxes on the discount, etc. Now the buyer will only pay $981.00 for the bond with one year remaining until maturity and $791.60 for the bond with nineteen years left. Since he can get 7% on new issues, he is only willing to buy your bond at a discount sufficient so that accrual of this discount will give him the same economic benefits from your 5% coupon that a 7% coupon at $1,000.00 would give him. The principle is simple. The wider the swings in interest rates and the longer the bond, the more the value of a bond can go up or down on an interim basis before maturity. It should be pointed out in the first example where rates went to 3%, our long term bond would only have appreciated to about $1,070.00 if it had been callable in five years at par, although it would have gone down just as much if 7% rates had occurred. This just illustrates the inherent unfairness of call provisions. For over two decades, interest rates on tax-free bonds have almost continuously gone higher and buyers of long term bonds have continuously suffered. This does not mean it is bad now to buy long term bonds - it simply means that the illustration in the above paragraph has worked in only one direction for a long period of time and people are much more conscious of the downside risks from higher rates than the upside potential from lower ones. If it is a 50-50 chance as to the future general level of interest rates and the yield curve is substantially positive, then the odds are better in buying long term non-callable bonds than shorter term ones. This reflects my current conclusion and, therefore, I intend to buy bonds within the ten to twenty-five year range. If you have any preferences within that range, we will try to select bonds reflecting such preferences, but if you are interested in shorter term bonds, we will not be able to help you as we are not searching out bonds in this area. Before you decide to buy a twenty year bond, go back and read the paragraph showing how prices change based upon changes in interest rates. Of course, if you hold the bond straight through, you are going to get the contracted rate of interest, but if you sell earlier, you are going to be subject to the mathematical forces described in that paragraph, for better or for worse. Bond prices also change because of changes in quality over the years but, in the tax-free area, this has tended to be - and probably will continue to be - a relatively minor factor compared to the impact of changes in the general structure of interest rates.

折价债券与足额票息债券

Discount Versus Full Coupon Bonds

你在上文讨论中想必已注意到:你如果想现在通过一只十九年期债券拿到 7% 的回报,可以选择买入一只票面利率 7% 的新十九年期债券,也可以选择花 791.60 美元买入一只票面利率 5% 的债券,它会在十九年后偿付你 1,000 美元。这两种买入方式带给你的,都是恰好 7% 的半年复利回报。从数学上看,二者没区别。但在免税债券上,这道等式却变得复杂了,原因是那 70 美元票息对你完全免税,而折价买入的那只债券,每年带给你 50 美元免税收入,另外在第十九年底还会产生 208.40 美元的资本利得。按照现行税法,你要缴的税可能只是象征性的一点点——如果折价兑现的收益是你在第十九年唯一的应税所得——也可能高达 70 美元以上,如果这笔收益叠加在非常巨额的资本利得之上(新税法规定的资本利得税率为 35%,而从 1972 年起,对于那些已实现巨额

You will have noticed in the above discussion that if you now wanted to buy a 7% return on a nineteen year bond, you had a choice between buying a new nineteen year bond with a 7% coupon rate or buying a bond with a 5% coupon at $791.60, which would pay you $1,000.00 in nineteen years. Either purchase would have yielded exactly 7% compounded semi-annually to you. Mathematically, they are the same. In the case of tax-free bonds the equation is complicated, however, by the fact that the $70.00 coupon is entirely tax-free to you, whereas the bond purchased at a discount gives you tax-free income of $50.00 per year but a capital gain at the end of the nineteenth year of $208.40. Under the present tax law, you would owe anything from a nominal tax, if the gain from realization of the discount was your only taxable income in the nineteenth year, up to a tax of over $70.00 if it came on top of very large amounts of capital gain at that time (the new tax law provides for capital gain rates of 35%, and even slightly higher on an indirect basis in 1972 and thereafter for those realizing very large

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利得的人,间接计算的税率还会略高一些)。除此之外,你可能还得就这笔资本利得缴一些州税。显然,在这些条件下,你不会愿意掏 791.60 美元去买那只 5% 息票的债券,还觉得自己跟花 1,000.00 美元买 7% 息票的债券一样合算。别人也一样不会这么想。因此,品质相同、期限相同的债券,低息票且以折价交易时,其毛收益率会明显高于当期票息较高的债券。有趣的是,对多数纳税人来说,这种更高的毛收益率,实际上对可能要缴的税做了超额补偿。这源于几个因素。其一,没人知道债券到期时税法会是什么样,而假定那时税率会比现在更重,既不奇怪,大概也没错。其二,尽管以 791.60 美元买入面值 1,000.00 美元、5% 息票、十九年后到期的债券,等同于以面值买入一只相同期限、面值 1,000.00 美元、7% 息票的债券,人们还是会优先把更高的当期回报落袋为安。持有 5% 息票债券的人,在他 791.60 美元本金上的当期收益率只有约 6.3%,余下部分要靠在到期时多收的 208.40 美元来补齐,才能达到 7%。最后,当前影响折价债券价格、并且会持续产生影响的最重要因素是:1969 年《税收改革法案》调整了对银行的税务处理,把银行从免税折价债券的买家群体中排除了出去。银行历来是免税债券最大的买家和持有者,凡是把银行挡在市场某个板块之外的规定,都会剧烈改变该板块的供需格局。这或许能让个人投资者在免税折价债券市场中获得一定优势,尤其是那些在债券到期或卖出时,大概率不会处于较高税率档次的个人。如果我能为你争取到明显更高的有效税后收益率(考虑对你个人未来税率各种可能性的合理估计),我就打算替你买入折价债券。我知道有些合伙人偏爱足额票息债券,哪怕有效收益率更低,因为他们想最大化当期现金收益;他们只要跟我说一声,我在操作他们账户时就只买足额票息的品种(或与之极为接近的品种)。

gains.) In addition to this, you might have some state taxes to pay on the capital gain. Obviously, under these circumstances you are not going to pay the $791.60 for the 5% coupon and feel you are equally as well off as with the 7% coupon at $1,000.00. Neither is anyone else. Therefore, identical quality securities with identical maturities sell at considerably higher gross yields when they have low coupons and are priced at discounts than if they bear current high coupons. Interestingly enough, for most taxpayers, such higher gross yields over-compensate for the probable tax to be paid. This is due to several factors. First, no one knows what the tax law will be when the bonds mature and it is both natural and probably correct to assume the tax rate will be stiffer at that time than now. Second, even though a 5% coupon on a $1,000.00 bond purchased at $791.60 due in nineteen years is the equivalent of a 7% coupon on a $1,000.00 bond purchased at par with the same maturity, people prefer to get the higher current return in their pocket. The owner of the 5% coupon bond is only getting around 6.3% current yield on his $791.60 with the balance necessary to get him up to 7% coming from the extra $208.40 he picks up at the end. Finally, the most important factor affecting prices currently on discount bonds (and which will keep affecting them) is that banks have been taken out of the market as buyers of discount tax-free bonds by changes brought about in bank tax treatment through the 1969 Tax Reform Act. Banks have historically been the largest purchasers and owners of tax-free bonds and anything that precludes them from one segment of the market has dramatic effects on the supply-demand situation in that segment. This may tend to give some edge to individuals in the discount tax-free market, particularly those who are not likely to be in a high tax bracket when the bonds mature or are sold. If I can get a significantly higher effective after-tax yield (allowing for sensible estimates of your particular future tax rate possibilities), I intend to purchase discount bonds for you. I know some partners prefer full coupon bonds, even though their effective yield is less, since they prefer to maximize the current cash yield and if they will so advise me, we will stick to full coupon issues (or very close thereto) in their cases.

操作流程

Procedure

整个三月我都会一直待在办公室(除 3 月 7 日外,每个星期六也在),届时很乐意见任何合伙人,或与他电话详谈。为便于安排时间,请与格拉迪斯(或我本人)约个时间。我唯一的请求是,在我们谈之前,你尽可能把这封信先消化掉。你也看得出来,要是每一条都得向你们每个人解释一遍,那可就是天大的麻烦了。你若决定让我们帮你买债券,请把这几件事告诉我们:(1)你是否出于地方税的考虑,想把买入限定在本州;(2)你是想把我们限定在全额息票品种,还是让我们自行判断、替你找出最超值的东西;(3)你在十到二十五年这一期限区间里的偏好,或者你更愿意让我们在这方面自己拿主意;(4)你想投多少钱——我们最后可能会比你说的数目少上几个百分点,但绝不会超出;(5)债券该开在哪家银行的账上。我们会在买入债券时以电话或信件通知你。大部分事务性工作会由比尔和约翰来做。不用说,我们任何人在任何一笔交易中都不会有半点经济利益。你若

I intend to be in the office solidly through March (including every Saturday except March 7th) and will be glad to see any partner or talk with him by phone. To aid in scheduling, please make an appointment with Gladys (or me). The only request I make is that you absorb as much as possible of this letter before we talk. As you can see, it would be an enormous problem if I had to explain each item to all of you. If you decide you want us to help you in buying bonds, you should let us know: (1) Whether you want to restrict purchases to your home state for local tax reasons; (2) Whether you want to restrict us to full coupon issues or let us use our judgment as to where you get the best value; (3) Your preference as to maturity in the ten to twenty-five year range or if you prefer to let us use our judgment in that area; (4) How much you want to invest - we may end up several per cent short of the figure you name, but we will never go over; (5) On what bank the bonds should be drafted. We will advise you by phone or letter as we buy bonds. Bill and John will be doing much of the mechanical work. Needless to say, none of us will have any financial interest in any transaction. Should you have any

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对操作细节有任何疑问,请直接找约翰或比尔,因为我大概会忙得不可开交,而他们对具体交易更熟。3 月 31 日之后,我预计好几个月都不会在办公室露面。所以你若想找我聊聊,务必在那之前过来。所有买入的完成可能会拖到四月,但这事由比尔照看,操作细节都会安排妥当。你要明白,正因为前面说的品种极其五花八门,究竟会买到什么,实在没法说死。免税债券市场有时更像房地产,而不像股票。这里有成千上万个可比性各异的品种,有些没有卖家,有些卖家不情不愿,有些卖家又急于脱手。哪一个才是最划算的买入,要看所报品种的质量、它与你需求的契合程度,以及卖家有多急切。衡量的标尺永远是新发债券——每周平均都有好几亿美元的新债得卖出去——不过,具体某个二级市场机会(即已发行流通的债券)可能比新债更诱人,而它究竟有多诱人,只有等我们准备出价时才能见分晓。市场固然会变,但看情形,二十年期这一档的债券,我们要拿到 6.5% 上下的税后收益率应该不难(住房管理局的品种除外)。谨上,沃伦·E·巴菲特 WEBI glk

questions regarding the mechanics, please direct them to John or Bill as I will probably be swamped and they will be more familiar with specific transactions. After March 31st, I don't expect to be around the office for several months. Therefore, if you want to talk things over, come in by then. The completion of all purchases may go into April, but Bill will be taking care of this and the mechanics will all be set up. You should realize that because of the enormous diversity of issues mentioned earlier, it is impossible to say just what will be bought. Sometimes the tax-free bond market has more similarities to real estate than to stocks. There are hundreds of thousands of items of varying comparability, some with no sellers, some with reluctant sellers and some with eager sellers. Which may be the best buy depends on the quality of what is being offered, how well it fits your needs and the eagerness of the seller. The standard of comparison is always new issues where an average of several hundred million dollars worth have to be sold each week - however, specific secondary market opportunities (issues already outstanding) may be more attractive than new issues and we can only find out how attractive they are when we are ready to make bids. Although markets can change, it looks as if we will have no difficulty in getting in the area of 6-1/2% after tax (except from Housing Authority issues) on bonds in the twenty-year maturity range. Cordially, Warren E. Buffett WEBI glk

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