2021 年 CNBC《财富与智慧》专访

2021-06-29 · 巴菲特与芒格长访谈 · 原文约 8017 词
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时间6 月 29 日周二,东部时间晚上 8 点

WHENTuesday, June 29th at 8pm ET

地点CNBC 频道《巴菲特与芒格:财富的智慧》。以下是 CNBC 长达一小时的特别节目《巴菲特与芒格:财富的智慧》的非官方文字记录,节目嘉宾是亿万富翁投资者沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格,主持人是 CNBC 的贝基·奎克,今晚(6 月 29 日周二)首播。以下是 CNBC.com 上完整视频的链接:https://www.cnbc.com/live-tv/cnbc-originals/full-episode/buffett-munger-a-wealth-of-wisdom/1916406339994 所有引用须注明来源为 CNBC。第一部分 [2015 年 5 月] 沃伦·巴菲特:我是沃伦,这是查理。他能听见,我能看见。我们一起合作。[2016 年 5 月] 查理·芒格:我经常引用沃伦的话,大家都很喜欢,你走正道,那条路并不拥挤。[2018 年 2 月] 巴菲特:我们知道我们俩是天造地设的一对,这么多年我们从来没有争吵过,我们只是都很有主见。[2016 年 5 月] 巴菲特:得到好搭档的办法就是自己先做个好搭档,这些都是非常老派的观念,但效果就是出奇得好。

WHERECNBC's "Buffett & Munger: A Wealth of Wisdom" Following is the unofficial transcript of CNBC's hour-long special, "Buffett & Munger: A Wealth of Wisdom," with billionaire investors Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger and CNBC's Becky Quick, which premiered tonight, Tuesday, June 29th. Following is a link to the full video on CNBC.com: https://www.cnbc.com/live-tv/cnbc-originals/full-episode/buffett-munger-a-wealth-of-wisdom/1916406339994 All references must be sourced to CNBC. PART I [MAY 2015] WARREN BUFFETT: I'm Warren, this is Charlie. He can hear and I can see. We work together. [MAY 2016] CHARLIE MUNGER: I constantly quote Warren and everybody always loves it, you take the high road and its uncrowded. [FEBRUARY 2018] BUFFETT: We knew we were sort of made for each other and we've never had an argument in this whole time, we are strong minded. [MAY 2016] BUFFETT: The way to get a good partner is to be a good partner and these are very old-fashioned ideas and they just work so fabulously well.

贝基·奎克沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格,朋友超过 60 年,商业伙伴超过 50 年,两人共同执掌美国最大公司之一——伯克希尔·哈撒韦。巴菲特,董事长兼首席执行官,人称“奥马哈先知”,坐拥超过 1000 亿美元身家,在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的办公室里经营着这家综合集团,收购股票和公司。副董事长芒格,从小在离巴菲特家不到 1 英里的地方长大,本行是律师,实际是投资者。两人成年后才相遇,那时芒格已经搬到了现在的家——洛杉矶。两人相隔 1500 英里,愣是把伯克希尔·哈撒韦从一家纺织厂做成了 6500 亿美元的巨头,旗下企业包括铁路运营商伯灵顿北方圣达菲(BNSF)、保险公司 GEICO,还有水果织布机、冰雪皇后(Dairy Queen)和克莱顿住宅公司,另外还管理着一个 3000 亿美元的股票组合,持有苹果、美国银行和可口可乐等公司的股份。今晚,我们要讲的是他们最了不起的成就——60 年的友谊,以及他们在商业和生活中一路走来,从彼此身上学到的经验和教训。90 岁的巴菲特,话多;97 岁的芒格,话少,但句句都在点子上。[2004 年 5 月] 芒格:我宁愿把一条毒蛇塞进衬衫里,也不愿意请薪酬顾问。[2006 年 5 月] 芒格:对,嗯,我看他是疯了。[2015 年 5 月] 芒格:你不能跟你那个游手好闲、酗酒的姐夫合伙做生意。

BECKY QUICKWarren Buffett and Charlie Munger, friends for more than six decades, business partners for more than five, together sitting atop one of the country's biggest companies, Berkshire Hathaway. Buffett, the Chairman and CEO, known as the oracle of Omaha, amassed a more than $100 billion fortune running the conglomerate, acquiring stocks and companies from his office in Omaha, Nebraska and Vice Chairman Munger, who grew up less than a mile from Buffett, a lawyer by training but an investor by practice. They met as adults after Munger had moved to his current home, Los Angeles. From 1,500 miles apart, the duo built Berkshire Hathaway from a single textile mill to a $650 billion powerhouse, running companies from railroad operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe and insurance company Geico to Fruit of the Loom, Dairy Queen and Clayton Homes and managing a portfolio of $300 billion in shares of companies like Apple, Bank of America and Coca Cola. Tonight, we bring you the story of perhaps their greatest accomplishment, sixty years of friendship and the lessons they've learned from each other along the way in business and life. 90-year-old Buffett, a man of many words, and 97-year-old Munger, a man of fewer, but his are more pointed. [MAY 2004] MUNGER: I would rather throw a viper down my shirt front than hire a compensation consultant. [MAY 2006] MUNGER: Yeah, well, I think he's demented [MAY 2015] MUNGER: You can't form a business partnership with your shriftless drunken brother in law.

奎克巴菲特和芒格说话直来直去,又不肯跟风追逐那些偏离基本面分析的时髦市场热点,这让他们并不总是受欢迎,比如他们对比特币的看法。[2019 年 5 月] 芒格:比特币毫无价值,是人造黄金。[2019 年 2 月] 巴菲特:比特币构思巧妙,区块链也很重要,但比特币本身毫无独特价值,它不产生任何东西。你可以整天盯着它看,也不会冒出什么小比特币来。它基本上是一种幻觉。[2021 年 5 月] 芒格:我觉得我该谦虚地说,我认为这整件该死的事情令人作呕,而且违背文明的利益。

QUICKBuffett and Munger's outspoken nature and their refusal to chase hot market fads that stray from fundamental market analysis don't always win them friends, like their take on Bitcoin. [MAY 2019] MUNGER: Bitcoin is worthless, artificial gold. [FEBRUARY 2019] BUFFETT: Bitcoin its ingenious and blockchain is important but bitcoin has no unique value at all it doesn't produce anything. You can stare at it all day and no little bitcoins come out or anything like that. It's a delusion basically. [MAY 2021] MUNGER: I think I should say modestly that I think the whole damn development is disgusting and contrary to the interest of civilization

奎克这对搭档用伯克希尔的投资组合在 45 年里跑赢了市场,但在过去 5 年和 10 年里,他们落后于标普 500 指数,这让人怀疑他们是不是江郎才尽了。他们自己倒不担心。[2021 年 5 月] 芒格:我拿着伯克希尔的股票很舒服。我觉得我们的企业比市场平均水平好。

QUICKAnd while the pair delivered market beating performances with the Berkshire portfolio for four and a half decades, they have lagged the S&P 500 for the last 5 and 10 years leading some to question whether they've lost their touch. They're not concerned. [MAY 2021] MUNGER: I'm quite comfortable holding Berkshire. I think our businesses are better than the average on the market.

奎克我们请芒格和巴菲特谈谈他们对最近商业界一些头条新闻的看法,这些新闻可能对市场的运作方式产生持久影响——首先要说的是瑞士信贷因与 Archegos 资本管理公司的业务而损失的 55 亿美元。

QUICKWe asked Munger and Buffett their thoughts on some of the latest headlines in the business world, those that could have lasting impact on how markets operate beginning with Credit Suisse's five and a half billion dollar loss stemming from its business with Archegos Capital Management.

芒格想想看,这有多愚蠢。当然,吸引他们的就是那些蠢货付给你的轻松钱——给一个混蛋当主经纪商。而那家伙是个被判过刑的内幕交易者,来自对冲基金行业最疯狂的那部分。他们通过提供不寻常的信贷赚取不寻常的利润。我的意思是,整个世界都在对他们喊,“骗子,傻瓜。”他们就是不听。他们想的是,“这就是赚轻松钱的地方,骗子和傻瓜。”

MUNGERThink of how massively stupid that was. And of course, it was the lure of the really easy money that the idiot was paying you, being the prime broker for a jerk. But he was a convicted insider trader that came out of the craziest part of the hedge fund industry. And they were getting unusual profits by extending unusual credit. I mean, it was just, the world was shouting at them, "Crook. Fool." And they didn't listen. They thought, "This is where the easy money is, crooks and fools."

巴菲特有一条规则——

BUFFETTThere's one rule--

芒格我们两种都不喜欢——

MUNGERWe don't like either of--

巴菲特我们很早以前就学到了一条规则:你不可能跟一个坏人做成好交易。算了吧。如果你觉得你能起草一份合同,对付一个坏人,那坏人会赢。但有一点,他们可能喜欢打官司,但伯克希尔·哈撒韦作为一个实体,或者我个人,任何情况,我们都不想一辈子干那种事。而且,坏人会赢。他们知道更多花招。他们可能最后会输,但那不值得你花一辈子时间。

BUFFETTThat, that we learned a long time ago is that you can't make a good deal with a bad person. Just forget it. Now, if you think you can draw up a contract that, that is going to work against a bad person, they're gonna win. But one thing, they, they probably enjoy litigation but ah, Berkshire Hathaway as an entity, or me personally, or anything, we don't wanna spend our life, you know, doing that sort of thing. And, and besides, the bad guys win. They know more games. They may lose eventually in the but, but it's no way to spend your life.

奎克查理,被卷进去的不只是瑞信。很多公司都在跟 Archegos 做生意——

QUICKCharlie, it wasn't just Credit Suisse that got pulled in by that. There were a lotta firms that were doing business with Archegos and--

芒格是的。是的。他们都很蠢。但瑞信成功地成了最蠢的那个。

MUNGERYes. Yes. They were all foolish. But, but Credit Suisse has managed to be the biggest fool of all.

巴菲特嗯,贝基,如果你回头看——

BUFFETTWell, Becky, if you look back--

芒格那个排名的竞争还挺激烈——

MUNGERA lot of competition for that order--

巴菲特在 19——

BUFFETTIn nineteen--

芒格荣誉。

MUNGERHonor.

巴菲特在 1934 年,大崩盘之后——好吧,其实是 1932 年和 33 年——他们召开了这些听证会。他们认定,过高的杠杆是 1929 年那场危机的原因之一。而且这可能会,可能会对整个经济构成风险。于是,他们授予联邦储备委员会制定人们用股票作为抵押能借多少钱的权力,也就是保证金要求。比如——

BUFFETTIn 1934, after the great crash well, 1932 and '33 they held these hearings. And they decided that unusual amounts of leverage were one cause of the problem in the 1929. And that, that it posed, it could pose dangers even to the economy. So, they gave the Federal Reserve Board the right to establish how much people could borrow against stocks, margin requirements. Like when--

芒格那真是一个很好的主意。

MUNGERWhich was a very good idea.

巴菲特那是一个绝妙的主意。然后他们——

BUFFETTIt was a terrific idea. And they--

芒格完全合理。

MUNGERTotally sound.

巴菲特美联储在 1934 年到 1973 年之间,行使这项权力我记得有 23 次还是 24 次。他们甚至把保证金要求提高到了 100%。但他们才是那个判断过高杠杆是否会引发系统性问题的监管者。然后,1973 年或 74 年的规则是 50%;如今的规则依然是 50%。在过去这,你知道,40 多年里,其实是最初那 40 多年里,这项规则变了 23 次。它到过 100%,也降到过,你知道,各种水平。而且它曾是向经济发出的信号,涵盖方方面面。可本质上,华尔街最终想出了怎么绕过这道规则。

BUFFETTThe Federal Reserve, between 1934 and 1973, used that power I think 23 or 24 times. They even raised margins to 100%. But they were the regulators of determining whether excess leverage might have systemic problems associated with. And then and, and the rule in 1973 or '4 was 50%; the rule today is 50%. It has in the last, you know, 40+ years, first 40-some years, it, it had 23 changes. It went to 100%; it went down to, you know, all kinds. And it was the signal to the economy and all kinds of things. And essentially, Wall Street figured out how to get around that.

芒格他们通过游说促使法律做出了修改。

MUNGERThey lobbied through changes in the law.

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

芒格这样一来,他们就能拥有无限的杠杆,把那些交易都放在表外,并且任凭其处于一种不透明的会计处理之下。

MUNGERSo, they could have unlimited leverage, and keep the transactions off the books and subject to murky accounting.

奎克那些,那些银行会说:“我们挺过来了。我们自己承担了所有问题的后果,而且我们当中很多人,你知道,甚至都不会因此在资产负债表上受到重大的冲击。”那——

QUICKThe, the banks would say, "We made it through this. We absorbed all the problems ourselves and, and many of us, you know, won't even take a substantial hit on the, on the balance sheet for it." What would—

芒格呃,有个老掉牙的故事,说的就是所有这些觉得自己干得相当不错的银行。两个家伙拿着剃刀打架。一个人猛地挥了一刀,另一个人说:“你没划到我。”那人说:“等你摇摇头再说吧。”

MUNGERWell, there's an old story about the all these banks that think they've done so well. These two guys are fighting with razors. One takes a big swipe and the other guy says, "You missed me." And the guy says, "Wait until you shake your head."

奎克所以,你今天会对监管者说什么呢?你们会怎么——

QUICKSo, what would you tell regulators today? What would you do--

芒格呃,监管者们,他们现在需要修改法律。但当然,如果你经营的是一家赌场,你当然希望大玩家们赌得更疯狂。而证券行业恰恰就放任人们这么做。这是个巨大的错误。它制造了大量痛苦,我们可不想把人们诱进赌局,让他们赌上远远超出自己承受能力的筹码。再说,这还涉及清算问题,这中间存在清算风险。整个市场一度陷入混乱。那些从这种毫无节制的信用扩张中赚到钱的人会为此极力辩护,也没人站出来明确反对。回溯上一次,我们能出台正确的监管措施,也就是那项对保证金负债的限制,并以法规形式存续了相当长的时间,仅仅是因为我们刚刚经历了英语世界历史上最严重的大萧条。得付出那样的代价才能让政客们稍微醒悟一点。而这一轮,指望的是总收益互换。

MUNGERWell, the regulators aren't, they need to change laws now. But of course, if you're running a gambling parlor, you want the big players to gamble more furiously. And that's what the securities business allowed people to do. It was a big mistake. It created a lot of misery all this we don't wanna suck people into gambling for way more than they can afford. And you get into clearance, there were clearance risks in the thing. The whole market was in chaos. The people who are making money out of this unreasonable extension of credit argue for it, and nobody's speaking against it. And l, last time around, we got the correct regulation that came and stayed for a long time on margin debt only because we had the worst depression in the history of the English-speaking world. That's what it took to get a little sense into the politicians. This time around, it just total return swap.

奎克那到底什么能解决问题?我是说,一直有建议说要更多的——

QUICKSo what fixes it though. I mean, there have been suggestions that there needs to be more--

巴菲特嗯,我们曾经解决过——

BUFFETTWell, we fixed it--

奎克透明度,需要确实采取严厉措施来禁止人们像这样加杠杆。那,什么——

QUICKTransparency, there needs to be really a crackdown on allowing people to lever up like this. What, what's--

芒格正确的——

MUNGERThe correct--

奎克答案是什么?

QUICKThe answer?

芒格答案是一开始就不该让这类事情有发生的可能。

MUNGERAnswer was never to have allowed most of this stuff to start.

巴菲特但我认为——

BUFFETTBut I think--

芒格如果你允许错误的事情开始,它就会反过来吞噬你——

MUNGERIf you allow the wrong kinda stuff to start, and it runs on you--

巴菲特但这对监管者来说确实非常、非常艰难。你知道,去追查那些大案要案很容易,但那是在动一个又一个、一个又一个机构的利润中心。

BUFFETTAnd but it's, it is tough to be very, very, very tough to it's a regulator. It's easy to, you know, to really go after the big stuff, you're attacking the profit center of institution after institution after institution.

芒格主经纪业务,究其本质,就是专门借钱给那些大玩家。这当然很危险。而他们所违反的那些规则,同一个人同时向四五家经纪商伸手。而且,他买股票就是为了支撑股价,防止追加保证金。一旦你开始那么做,结局就会很难看,结果也确实如此。

MUNGERThe, the prime brokerage things, by very nature, means you're, you're specializing at lending, lending to the big swingers. And of course, it's dangerous. And rules they violated, the same guy was hitting up four or five brokers at once. And of course, he was buying stocks to keep them up to prevent margin calls. Once you start doing that, you're headed for a ugly ending, and of course it happened.

奎克但你认为,是不是非得等到一场系统性崩溃之后,变革才会真正再次落地,就像你提到的大萧条那样?

QUICKBut do you think that it would take a systemic breakdown before changes would actually get implemented again, like you reference with the Great Depression?

芒格嗯,上一次,可是用了英语世界有史以来最严重的一场大萧条,才换来了上一次的纠正。这当然不是我想要的。

MUNGERWell, I, the last time, it took the worst depression in the English-speaking world in all history. That's what it took to get the last correction. I certainly don't want that.

巴菲特其实——

BUFFETTNow, it--

芒格一个明智的监管者——

MUNGERA wise regulator--

巴菲特我们完全可以——

BUFFETTWe could just start--

芒格但一个明智的监管者会在这类事情开始之前就将其阻止。

MUNGERBut a wise regulator stops this stuff before it starts.

巴菲特不过想要阻止很难——

BUFFETTIt's very hard to stop though--

芒格让我感兴趣的是,共产主义中国正在践行我推崇的做法。而我们自己了不起的自由企业经济,却在任由这些疯狂的人走向如此严重的极端。正在避免这种状况的,反而是共产主义中国。他们会先发制人地介入,以阻止投机。

MUNGERWhat, yeah, what interests me in this is that the communist Chinese behave the way I am talking in favor of. And our own wonderful free enterprise economy is letting all these crazy people go to this gross excess. People who are avoiding it are the communist Chinese. They step in preemptively to stop speculation.

奎克查理,你说共产主义中国正在做我们当下该做的所有事情,我很难不去想他们正在……

QUICKCharlie, you said communist China is doing all the things that we should be doing right now, and I, I can't help but think of what they're--

芒格嗯,我有一个——

MUNGERWell, I have a--

贝基·奎克看看他们对马云做的事。

QUICKWhat they've done to Jack Ma.

查理·芒格这让我觉得挺有意思,你知道——

MUNGERThat amuses me, you know--

贝基·奎克那他们对马云做的事呢?他好像已经消失了——

QUICKWhat about what they've done to Jack Ma? He's kind of disappeared as--

查理·芒格嗯,是的,但马云是那种爱冒险的人。所以他们直接掐掉他的念想,撂下一句:“滚你的蛋。”他基本上是在一个一党制国家发表演讲时说:“你们这帮家伙就是一群蠢货,根本不知道自己在干什么。而我知道自己在干什么,而且我会干得更好。”然后他还打算大举杀入银行业,毫无规矩,想怎么干就怎么干。

MUNGERWell, yes, but Jack Ma is one of the swingers. So, they just cut his, they said, "To hell with you." He basically gave a speech when he said to a, to a one-party state, "Well, you guys are a buncha jerks, don't know what you're doing. And I know what I'm doing, and I'm gonna do it better." And he was gonna wade into banking and no rules and just do whatever he pleased.

贝基·奎克他还把——

QUICKHe also brought--

查理·芒格中国人,中国人——

MUNGERThe Chinese, the Chinese--

贝基·奎克——把银行服务带给了很多人——

QUICKBanking to a lot of people—

查理·芒格共产党人做得对。他们直接叫来马云,说:“小子,这事儿你别干。”我倒真希望我们也有——我不是想要一整套中国制度——但我确实想把其中金融监管那一套搬到我们自己国家来。

MUNGERCommunists did the right thing. They just called in Jack Ma and say, "You aren't gonna do it, sonny." And, and I wish we had a, I don't want the, all of the Chinese system, but I certainly would like to have the financial part of it in my own country.

贝基·奎克尽管如此,蚂蚁金服此前一直在为大量没有银行账户的人群提供金融服务。我的意思是,他们当时做的一些事情——

QUICKAlthough Ant Financial was bringing banking to a huge un-banked population before. I mean, there were things that they were doing that--

查理·芒格我知道,但你不能让一个爱冒险的人来管银行。银行有政府的隐性担保,就不能让任何爱冒险的人去经营银行。让那些爱冒险的人去干点别的吧。

MUNGERI know, but you don't want a swinger to run. The banks have the implicit guarantee of the government, and you don't, you don't want to let any swinger run a bank. Let the swingers do something else.

贝基·奎克我们国家里,爱冒险的人又是谁呢?

QUICKWho are the swingers here in this country?

查理·芒格嗯,我可不想开始点名谁爱冒险。

MUNGERWell, I don't wanna start naming swingers.

巴菲特他们会自己现身的。

BUFFETTThey'll, they'll appear.

贝基·奎克你知道,这个故事大致被描述成这样:中国共产党不想失去权力,而有些资本家获取的权力可能已经超过了共产党至少乐于见到的程度。

QUICKYou know, the way the story's kinda been painted is that it's the Chinese communists who don't wanna lose power. And some of the capitalists who have maybe gained too much power under, under at least what the communists might like to see.

查理·芒格两个群体都想要更多权力,而不是更少。但是——

MUNGERBoth groups want more power, not less. But--

巴菲特这个国家的政客——

BUFFETTPoliticians in this country--

芒格但他,但是——

MUNGERBut he, but--

巴菲特想要更多权力。富人想要更多权力。

BUFFETTWant more power. The rich want more power.

芒格对,对。不,中国的情况有什么不同呢?是啊。而且、但是银行体系搞影子银行那套,这在咱们国家也有。人们会说,“呃,它还是个年轻的银行。”可是,整个杠杆收购贷款业务实际上几乎都从银行流出来,跑到了咱们自己国家的影子银行。至今还没惹出什么大乱子。但要是一直不出事,我倒会觉得奇怪了。

MUNGERYes, yes. No, what's so, what's so different in China? Yeah. And, and but, but the banking system take shadow banking, which we have in this country. People say, "Well, it's a young bank." But, well, whole leverage buyout lending practically left the banks and went to shadow banks in our own country. And it hasn't caused any big trouble yet. But I'll be amazed if it doesn't.

贝基·奎克嗯,杰米·戴蒙确实说过这话。比如,“要留心某些金融科技领域”,它们并不——

QUICKWell, Jamie Dimon has said that. Like, "Look out for the, some of the fintech areas," that they're not--

芒格是的,在这一点上我同意杰米·戴蒙。我不觉得让世界上所有那些投机分子都像银行一样行事是个好主意。

MUNGERYes, I agree with Jamie Dimon on that. I, I don't think allowing all the swingers in the world to act as though they're banks is a good idea.

贝基·奎克或许我们该聊聊 Robinhood 以及——

QUICKWhich maybe we should talk about Robinhood and some of the areas that--

芒格哼,Robinhood 简直不值一提。

MUNGERWell, Robinhood is beneath contempt.

贝基·奎克为什么?

QUICKWhy?

芒格它就是一个赌场,却伪装成体面的生意。

MUNGERWell, it's a gambling parlor masquerading as a respectable business.

贝基·奎克对此的反驳一向是,“这是让普通大众进入市场的一种方式,”那些人——

QUICKAnd the pushback on that is always, "This is a way of getting average people into the markets," people--

芒格这个,你当然不想——

MUNGERWell, of course you don't want--

贝基·奎克——那些人过去没有渠道——

QUICKWho didn't have access--

芒格说它是个赌场,它确实就是个赌场。

MUNGERTo say you're a, it's a gambling parlor, but it is a gambling parlor.

巴菲特它不是鼓励人们去买一只成本极低、极低、极低的指数基金然后持有 50 年。我敢向你保证,你走进去绝对听不到这种建议。

BUFFETTIt's not encouraging people to buy a very, very, very low-cost index fund and hold it for 50 years. I will guarantee you that you will not walk in there, get that advice.

芒格对。

MUNGERNo.

巴菲特相反,你会听到一堆关于如何交易期权的建议,然后、然后、然后他们会跟你说——

BUFFETTInstead, you'll get advice on how you can trade options and, and, and, and, and they'll tell you that--

查理·芒格这种做法告诉人们不用付佣金,其实佣金只是被隐藏在了交易里。这本质上就是一种卑鄙无耻、不光彩的勾当。有意思的是,有些你乐意让他跟你家族联姻的好人,竟然也给这种生意掏了钱。第二部分

MUNGERAnd it's telling people they aren't paying commissions when the commissions are simply disguised in the trading. It's basically a sleazy, disreputable operation. And the interesting thing about it is that some good people you would be glad to have marry into your family and have backed it. PART II

贝基·奎克在本·科恩和杰里·格林菲尔德、奥普拉和盖尔、或是谢尔盖·布林和拉里·佩奇之前,沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格就已经是传奇组合了。两人都出生并成长于内布拉斯加州的奥马哈,都曾在巴菲特祖父的杂货店打过工,但两人直到巴菲特 29 岁、芒格 35 岁时才相遇。要理解商业史上最成功的一对搭档,最好从他们初次相识开始讲起。

QUICKBefore Ben and Jerry, Oprah and Gayle, or Sergey Brin and Larry Page, there was Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. Born and raised in Omaha, Nebraska, both worked at Buffett's grandfather's grocery store, but their paths didn't cross until Buffett was 29 years old and Munger was 35. To understand the most successful couple in business, it's best to start at the beginning and how they first met.

巴菲特好,想不想讲讲这个故事?

BUFFETTWell, want to tell the story?

芒格继续吧。

MUNGERGo ahead.

巴菲特有一对医生夫妇,在奥马哈很有名,丈夫叫埃迪·戴维斯,妻子叫多萝西·戴维斯。实际上是戴维斯太太给我打的电话,她管所有事。她说:“我们听说你管钱,有点兴趣听听你的故事,看看你怎么做,还有我们能不能跟你合作。”于是我就过去跟他们聊。那时候我特别自我膨胀,提到股票我就滔滔不绝,根本停不下来。多萝西·戴维斯非常聪明,她一字不落地听着。而那位医生呢,靠在角落里,摆弄悠悠球之类的东西,根本没怎么在意。等我全讲完了,妻子看向丈夫,说:“我要给他 10 万美元。”我当时管的资金大概只有 50 万美元,所以这算一笔大买卖。我很有礼貌地说:“戴维斯医生,您刚才好像没怎么注意听我说的话。我挺想知道,您为什么愿意给我这 10 万美元?”不过话说得比这更委婉一些。戴维斯医生看着我,说:“嗯,你让我想起查理·芒格。”我说:“我不认识查理·芒格是谁,但我挺喜欢他。”他就给了我 10 万美元。后来他们跟我讲查理的事,说他是个年轻人,经常跑到他们那儿问医学问题、给他们上课——他们显然非常喜欢他。从那以后,他们好像就暗自把撮合我们俩当成了一项使命。1959 年,查理的爸爸去世了,他回到了奥马哈,他母亲住在那儿。戴维斯夫妇真的把我们撮合到了一起,安排了一顿晚餐。大约聊了五分钟,查理就开始在地上打滚,自己笑自己的笑话,这和我一模一样。我当时就想:“这人,我再也找不到第二个这样的了。”我们一拍即合。

BUFFETTThere was a doctor couple, very prominent in Omaha, and his name was Eddie Davis, her name was Dorothy Davis. And it was Mrs. Davis that called me, actually. She did everything. She said, "We've heard that you manage money and, and we'd be kind of interested in listening to your story about how ya, how you do it, and what we might do with you." So I went over and I talked to 'em. And I was all full of myself and like that's, you know, I couldn't talk fast enough about stocks in those days. And, and Dorothy Davis, very smart, and she listened to every word. And the doctor was kind of over in the corner, submitting a yoyo or something, and really not paying much attention. And, and I got all through and the wife looked over at the doctor and said, "I'm gonna give him $100,000." And I was managing about $500,000 at the time, so it was a big deal. And in a very nice way, I said, "Dr. Davis," I said "you know, you really haven't been paying much attention to what I've been saying and everything. I, I'd kinda like to know why you're giving me this $100,000," I said. But it was much more modest than that way I edged into it. And Dr. Davis looked at me and he said, "Well," he says, "you remind me of Charlie Munger." And I said, "Well, I don't know who Charlie Munger is, but I like him." And he gave me $100,000 and, and then they told me about Charlie and what young kid, how he would be over there asking 'em questions on medicine and giving 'em lectures or I mean, they, they clearly loved him. And it sorta became their mission that, that sometime they wanted to get me and Charlie together. So, so Charlie, in, in 1959, his dad died and he came back to Omaha. His mother lived there and the Davises really got us together. So they arranged the dinner. And about five minutes into it, Charlie was sort of rolling on the floor laughing at his own jokes, which is exactly the same thing I did. So I thought, "This, I'm not gonna find another guy like this." And we just hit it off.

贝基·奎克查理,他们最初是怎么跟你说沃伦的?他们是怎么向你描述他的?

QUICKCharlie, what did they first tell you about Warren? How did they describe him to you?

查理·芒格戴维斯夫妇就像我的第二对父母。两家各有三个孩子,我父亲最好的朋友是埃迪·戴维斯,我母亲最好的朋友是戴维斯夫人。我在那栋房子里进进出出,感觉就像芒格家的另一处住所。我不听话的时候,戴维斯夫人会赏我面子,动手打我腿,就跟教训她自己的孩子一样。

MUNGERWell, the Davises were like second parents to me. There were two sets of three children, my father's best friend was Eddie Davis and my mother's best friend was Mrs. Davis. I lived in that house back and forth as though it were an alternate house of the Mungers. And Mrs. Davis gave me the honor of switching my legs when I misbehaved, just as if I were one of her own.

巴菲特你可能已经给她够多了——

BUFFETTYou probably gave her plenty--

芒格所以,戴维斯家让我干什么,我就干什么。

MUNGERSo, so, anything the Davises asked me to do, I was gonna do.

贝基·奎克你第一次见到沃伦的时候,对他印象如何?

QUICKWhat did you think of Warren when you first met him?

查理·芒格我们相处得很好。哦,好吧,我们——

MUNGERWe got along fine. Oh, well, we--

巴菲特我们俩的太太当时都在想,“天哪,又来一个。”

BUFFETTBoth of our wives thought, "My god, another one."

查理·芒格我喜欢沃伦的一点是他那股不敬劲儿。我们不会对文明世界所有道貌岸然的头头脑脑们自动顶礼膜拜。

MUNGERWhat I like about Warren is the irreverence. We don't have automatic reverence for the pompous heads of all civilization.

贝基·奎克这是随着年龄增长而学会的东西,还是你们——你们俩——

QUICKIs that something that came with age or you, you guys--

查理·芒格我们一直都是这样。

MUNGERWe were always that way.

贝基·奎克这是与生俱来的——

QUICKWere born with that--

巴菲特没有,我们一直都那样。只是我们更极端一点。我学会表现得稍好一些,查理其实没怎么学会收敛。但,你知道,我第一眼就知道查理是我会喜欢的那种人,也是我会从他身上学到东西的人。不过,那完全不是算计好的决定或类似的东西。那很自然。而且,我们一直只有快乐。

BUFFETTNo, we were kind of always that way. We were, we're a little more extreme. I've learned to behave a little bit better. Charlie really hasn't learned much better. They, but we, you know, I, I just knew instantly Charlie was the kinda guy that I was gonna like, and I was gonna learn from. But, you know, it wasn't anything calculated, a decision or anything like that. The, it was, it was natural. And, and we have had nothing but fun.

贝基·奎克两人做朋友和商业伙伴都很有趣。与芒格相识几年后,巴菲特——当时他的投资合伙公司已发展到超过 25 万美元——发现了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。1962 年开始买进这家纺织厂的股票,1965 年取得了控制权。差不多同一时期,芒格放弃了律师生涯,自己创办了一家投资公司。后来巴菲特说服他关闭公司,加入伯克希尔。

QUICKFun both as friends and business partners. A few years after meeting Munger, Buffett, who had grown his investment partnership into more than a quarter million dollars, found Berkshire Hathaway. He started buying stock in the textile mill in 1962 and took ownership of it in 1965. Around the same time, Munger had given up his career as a lawyer and had been running his own investment firm. That is, until Buffett convinced him to shutter it and join him at Berkshire.

贝基·奎克那你们是怎么开始这段商业合作关系的?

QUICKSo how did the business relationship start?

查理·芒格嗯,沃伦一直鄙视我谋生的方式,而且他确实是对的。我花了好长时间才明白,他找到了一种比我更好的谋生办法。但最终他说服了我,让我意识到自己是在浪费时间。

MUNGERWell, Warren had scorn for my way of making a living, and he was correct in that. It took me a long time to wise up that he had, had a better way of making a living than I did. But he finally convinced me that I was wasting my time.

贝基·奎克你指做律师?

QUICKAs a lawyer?

查理·芒格是的。

MUNGERYeah.

巴菲特我跟他说,这当个爱好还行,但不是该花时间干的正事儿。他基本上决定在洛杉矶复制我在奥马哈做的事情,这太棒了。我们就是投缘。而且我们会在电话上聊很久,那时候长途电话还挺贵的。我不会坐在那儿拿个沙漏计时,但跟查理通话,我家人一听就知道是查理打来的。然后我就会跟他聊上很久很久。

BUFFETTI told him it was okay as a hobby, but not the real way to spend his time. He more or less decided to duplicate in Los Angeles what I was doing in, in Omaha, which was great. We just connected. And we, we talked a long time on, on the phone when it was expensive to talk a long time on the phone. I, I didn't sit there with an hourglass or, but with Charlie, I mean, my family could tell when Charlie was calling. I mean, and then I would, we'd go on for a long, long time.

查理·芒格早年我们干得很开心,那就像打猎远征一样,我们玩得痛快极了。第三部分

MUNGERAnd we had fun in the early days 'cause it was like hunting expeditions. And we had a lot of fun. PART III

贝基·奎克在沃伦·巴菲特执掌伯克希尔·哈撒韦的六十六年里,他做了数百笔交易。但信不信由你,他称收购伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身是他这辈子最糟糕的一笔交易。[CNBC, 2010]

沃伦·巴菲特:事实是,我当时把一大笔钱投进了一家糟糕透顶的企业。而伯克希尔·哈撒韦从此成为我后来所做一切的根基。所以 1967 年,当一家不错的保险公司出现时,我把它买给了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。我其实应该把它买给一个新的实体。因为伯克希尔·哈撒韦当时背负着那个锚,那些纺织资产。所以一开始,全是些毫无价值的纺织资产。然后,我们逐渐在上面叠加了更多东西。但我们始终背着那个锚。我花了 20 年时间跟纺织业务较劲,最后才放弃。而如果当初没把那笔钱投进纺织业务,直接拿保险公司起步,伯克希尔现在的价值会是现在的两倍。

QUICKOver the sixty-six years Warren Buffett has run Berkshire Hathaway, he has made hundreds of deals. But believe it or not, he calls acquiring Berkshire Hathaway itself was his worst trade ever. [CNBC, 2010] BUFFETT: Truth is I had now committed a major amount of money to a terrible business.  And Berkshire Hathaway became the base for everything pretty much that I've done since. So in 1967, when a good insurance company came along, I bought it for Berkshire Hathaway. I really should, should have bought it for a new entity. Because Berkshire Hathaway was carrying this anchor, all these textile assets. So initially, it was all textile assets that weren't any good. And then, gradually, we built more things onto it. But always, we were carrying this anchor. And for 20 years, I fought the textile business before I gave up. And instead of putting that money into the textile business originally, we just started out with the insurance company, Berkshire would be worth twice as much as it is now.

贝基·奎克从第一笔交易开始,巴菲特——不久后查理·芒格也加入进来——持续买入被低估公司的股票。两人表示,他们常常从错误中学到更多,巴菲特与芒格合作的第一笔交易之一——蓝筹印花——就是这样一个案例。

QUICKFrom that first deal, Buffett, soon joined by Charlie Munger, continued to buy stock in undervalued companies. The two say they often learned more from their mistakes, as was the case from one of Buffett and Munger's first deals together, Blue Chip Stamps.

查理·芒格嗯,我们和第三位朋友里克·盖林一起买入了蓝筹印花的股份。不久之后,我们三人就持有了大部分股票。然后,一件事接着另一件事。现在,蓝筹印花已经是伯克希尔的一部分了。当然,赠券业务已经消失了。我们早期共同拥有的所有业务都已经消失了。

MUNGERWell, we bought into Blue Chip Stamps together with a third, we had a third friend there, Rick Guerin. And pretty soon, the three of us together had most of the stock. And, and one thing led to another. And, and Blue Chip Stamps is now a part of Berkshire. And of course, the trading stamp business has disappeared. All the early businesses that we owned together have disappeared.

巴菲特它们没有消失,它们失败了。

BUFFETTThey didn't disappear, they failed.

查理·芒格它们确实失败了。

MUNGERThey failed, yeah.

巴菲特对,没错。

BUFFETTYeah, right.

查理·芒格但是,我们在它们失败之前就从里面拿走了那么多,所以对我们来说,结果还是挺好的。

MUNGERBut, but we took so much out of them before they failed that we, it still worked out fine for us.

巴菲特我们让它们进化了。我是说,但说真的,那三桩基础业务最终都消失了。它们,你看,都倒闭了。它们确实倒闭了,在某种意义上,不再适应社会了。实际上,我们参与的第一笔交易是一家叫多元化零售的公司,在巴尔的摩。我们在那买了一家百货商店。当时桑迪·戈特斯曼持有 10%,查理持有 10%,他的合伙公司里他持有 10%,我持有 80%——在我们合伙公司里,我们三个人。我们一直把彼此当做平等合伙人,就算我可能占了 80%。我们投了 600 万美元进去。我们管它叫多元化零售,可实际上就只有一家百货商店连锁。但我们玩得很开心。不过我们也看到,加入后没多久,这家百货商店就——

BUFFETTWe evolved them. I mean, but, but literally, the, the three base businesses all ended up disappearing. They, you know, they went outta business. They did, they no longer fit into the society, in a sense. And actually, the, the first, the very first deal that, that we joined in on was something called diversified retailing which was in Baltimore. We bought a department store there. And we had Sandy Gottesman had 10%, Charlie had 10%, and, and in his partnership, he had 10%, and I had 80% in our partnership, the three of us. And we always treated as, you know, we may have had 80, but we were equal partners. And, and we put $6 million into that. We called it diversified retailing, but we only had one department store chain. But we had, and we had a lotta fun with that. But we also saw, after we were in a little while, department this department store was--

查理·芒格墨迹一干,我们就意识到犯了个大错。根本没用多久。

MUNGERAs the ink dried, we dried, we realized we had made a big mistake. It didn't take very long.

巴菲特是的。

BUFFETTYeah.

贝基·奎克为什么?发生了什么?

QUICKWhy? What happened?

查理·芒格嗯,你们听过那个老笑话吧:“让我从这个陷阱里出去。我想明白了,我不喜欢这块奶酪。”我们只是终于醒悟到,自己买下的是一个极其难做的生意,卖家的决定是对的,而我们做了个糟糕的决定。

MUNGERWell, you heard the old story, "Let me outta this trap. I've decided I don't like the cheese."  We just wised up to the fact that it was one tough business we'd bought into, and that the sellers had made the good decision and we'd made a bad one.

巴菲特我们当时有一些非常出色的人在为我们打理这家公司,他们实际上是桑迪妻子的亲戚。而且——

BUFFETTWe had, we had some terrific people who were running it for us that were actually related to Sandy's wife. And--

查理·芒格极其可敬的人。

MUNGERExceptionally honorable people.

巴菲特确实可敬的人。又聪明。你要是亏着——

BUFFETTReally honorable people. The smart. If you're losing--

查理·芒格是的。

MUNGERYes.

巴菲特钱放在一个聪明、正直的人经营的生意里,你知道,这就出问题了。我是说,这是生意本身的问题。把那个聪明、正直的人调到别的岗位上去,把资本也挪到别的地方去。

BUFFETTMoney in a business with a smart, decent person, you know, it, we got a problem. I mean, that's the business. Use the smart, decent person and move 'em over some other place and move the capital some other place.

芒格这、这家公司当时还没在亏钱,但我们看得出来,很快我们就意识到它马上要亏钱了。

MUNGERThe, the company was not yet losing money, but we could see, we soon realized it was about to lose money.

巴菲特是的。于是,我们就卖掉了那家百货公司。它 1983 年就停业了,而赫茨勒,那家经营高档精品的百货公司,他们关门大概是在,我不确定,1985 或 1986 年。他们都不在了。还有那边的人,想法完全可以理解,想再开几家分店。可是,你绝不会想往一个注定要失败的企业里投更多钱。想想看,我们当时在那里面投了 600 万美元资本,那是个愚蠢的决定,等等等等。可那 600 万美元,查理,现在值多少了?他们当初拿到了 0.4 股。

BUFFETTYeah. And, and so we, we sold the department store. It went outta business in 1983, but Hutzler's, which was the silk-stocking department store, they went outta business in, I don't know, 1985 or '6. They're, they're gone. And, and the people there, quite understandably, wanted to build more branch stores. But you don't wanna put more money into a business that's destined for failure. Now, we put $6 million of capital in that, and it was a dumb decision and everything. But that $6 million, what would it be worth now, Charlie? At, they got four-tenths of a share.

芒格好多好多个十亿。

MUNGERGreat many billions.

巴菲特哦,是几百亿。

BUFFETTOh, it's, tens of billions.

芒格是的。

MUNGERYeah.

巴菲特你看,如果那家百货公司当初成功了,我们现在会有个挺不错的小生意。会给我们寄张不错的小支票,但正因为它失败了,我们反而在那上面赚了 250 亿,嗯,我们赚了超过 250 亿美元,不过当时可是完全看不出来。

BUFFETTNow, if the department store had succeeded, we'd have a nice little business then. Send us a nice little check, but because it failed, we've made 25, well, we made more than $25 billion in that, didn't look like it at the time, though.

贝基·奎克那么,当你们意识到这是个错误时,你们做了什么?你们是怎么处理的?

QUICKSo, when you realized it was a mistake, what did you do? How, how did you address it?

巴菲特我们让桑迪——我们当中最会卖东西的那个——去推销它。然后,我们就把它卖出去了。我们把这笔钱投进了伯克希尔。

BUFFETTWe asked Sandy, who was the best salesman among us, to go sell it. And, and we sold it. And we put the money into Berkshire.

芒格我们拿回了大约 95% 的本金。

MUNGERWe got about 95% of our money back.

巴菲特是的。当时我们还借了 600 万美元,所以手头有了钱,就买了伯克希尔的股票,也买了蓝筹印花的股票,最后把它们全整合到一起。有一阵子情况乱得像一盘意大利面,并不好,因为太复杂了。所以我们就把它们全合并了。你知道,我到现在还留着一些从零售业务里来的股票,查理也留着,我的一些合伙人也是。都是老早以前的事了。我们碰上最好的事,就是这个地方显然失败了——确实是个失败。

BUFFETTYeah. And we'd borrowed $6 million in there, so now we had, so we bought Berkshire stock and we bought Blue Chip Stamp stock and eventually put it all together. It looked like a plate of spaghetti at one time, which was not good, as it was complicated. And so, we, we put 'em all together. And, you know, I've still got stock and Charlie's still got stock that came out of retailing, as do a number of my partners. But from the old days. Best thing that happened to us was that this place failed obviously was a failure.

贝基·奎克为什么?你学到了什么?

QUICKWhy? What did you learn?

巴菲特不好意思——

BUFFETTPardon me--

查理·芒格赶紧走。

MUNGERTo leave quickly.

巴菲特没错。而且,还能把资本转移到别的地方去。

BUFFETTYeah. And, and move the capital someplace else.

查理·芒格我们学到的一点是,如果一件事明摆着是错的,就要尽快纠正。等着是等不出好结果的。第四部分 [2016 年 5 月] 查理·芒格:我体会到了,干 10 个小时的活儿只挣 2 美元是什么滋味。[2016 年 5 月] 沃伦·巴菲特:我们在商店周围那些车道上铲又湿又深又厚的雪。我看着外公,他说:“我该给你们哥俩多少钱?一毛钱太少,一块钱又太多。” 我们从杂货店学到的主要一件事,就是我们不想在杂货店干活。

MUNGEROne thing we've learned is, if it's clear that something is a mistake, is to fix it quickly. It doesn't get better while you wait. PART IV [MAY 2016] MUNGER: I learned how hard it is to work for 10 hours for $2. [MAY 2016] BUFFETT: We shoveled wet, deep, heavy snow from these driveways around the store. I looked at my grandfather who said, "What should I pay you boys? A dime is too little and a dollar is too much. The main thing we learned from the grocery store is we didn't want to work in a grocery store.

贝基·奎克沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格都认为,他们的人生观很大程度上源于中西部地区的成长经历。他们把成功归功于深厚的价值观,这种价值观让他们在整个职业生涯中保持脚踏实地,在商业和生活中与优秀的人为伍,并且在商业交易中坚持走正道。

QUICKWarren Buffett and Charlie Munger agree, a lot of their outlook on life comes from their midwestern upbringing. They credit their success to a deep sense of values, which have kept them grounded throughout their careers, associating with good people, in business and in life, and to taking the high road in business transactions.

查理·芒格如果走正道利润丰厚得多,你选这条路还值得大加称赞吗?真正该受称赞的,是那些哪怕走正道很痛苦,也依然坚持走下去的人。

MUNGERIf the high road is way more profitable, do you deserve a lotta credit for choosing it? People who get the credit are the people that take it even when it's painful.

贝基·奎克两人都表示,这些价值观是在年轻时,由各自生命中的一位关键人物深深植入的。

QUICKBoth say these values were instilled at a young age thanks to a key figure in each of their lives.

巴菲特很久很久以前,大家可能都不知道这事,伯克希尔旗下有两家小保险公司,它们都破产了——但我们没让它们真倒掉。我是说,换句话说,我们本来可以甩手走人,放着不管,因为它们是独立的公司。可我们没有走。我们这辈子也没花时间琢磨怎么赖账,或者搞出些契约条款、再用信用违约互换之类的玩意儿耍花招,想方设法占债主便宜。这,就不是我们的路数。欠了钱,我们就还。

BUFFETTLong, long ago, people don't even know about this, but we owned two small insurance companies at Berkshire that both went broke except we didn't let 'em go broke. I mean, in other words, we coulda walked away from 'em and left the money because they were separate companies. And we didn't walk away. And we haven't spent our lifetime, you know, working at things to try and figure out ways to walk away from debts, or have things in indentures then play games like they have, you know, with, with credit default swaps and, you know, figure out ways to take advantage of the, the lenders. I, it's just not our game. If we owe money, we're gonna pay it back.

贝基·奎克您,您刚才说,你们俩都觉得这是更赚钱的做法。但这肯定不是大多数商界人士的思考方式。

QUICKYou, you said that it's, it would occur to both that it was the more profitable way. But that's certainly not necessarily how the majority of people in business think.

巴菲特我们俩的父亲都是这么想的。谁知道你的价值观到底从哪来的,但说白了,你人生里会有几个人,他们不是正式的老师,却是你的老师。最重要的自然是你的父母。我这辈子,从没听我爸跟我说过“一定要还清所有债”这种话,但我看着他怎么活就知道了。人这一生,需要一些你不想让他们失望的人。有了他们,你会表现得更好,他们会让你成为比本来更好的自己。查理现在就是那个人,但早些年,我爸是那个人。我不认识他父亲,但根据我听到的所有关于他父亲的描述,他也有同样的经历。

BUFFETTIt's the way our dads thought, in both cases. Who the hell knows where you get your values from exactly, but basically, you know, you have a few people that are teachers to you in life and are not formal teachers. And the most important people are your, definitely are your parents. And, and, you know, I never, I never heard my dad say to me in my life, you know, that, "Be sure you pay all your debts." But I just watched how he lived and, and you wanna have certain people in life that you don't want to disappoint. You'll behave, you know, you wanna have people that, that make you a better person than you otherwise would be. And Charlie does that for me now, but my dad did it for me early on. And, and I think I didn't know his dad, but from everything I've heard about his dad, you know, he had the same experience.

贝基·奎克查理,再多说说你父亲的事。

QUICKCharlie, tell me more about your dad.

查理·芒格嗯,我父亲是个律师,他也是另一个律师的儿子,那个律师后来成了内布拉斯加州林肯市唯一的联邦法官,林肯市是内布拉斯加的首府。芒格爷爷是个了不起的人,也是个很顾家的人。我身边围着一群高素质的人,我父母也有不少高素质的朋友。所以,从人际交往来说,我的人生非常优越。事实上,我后来来到洛杉矶,在生活中取得成功,却为此吃了大苦头。我常常想,我永远也找不到像我父亲在小小的奥马哈那样好的朋友圈子。最后我才意识到,他们在奥马哈的那帮朋友非常不寻常。那纯粹是历史的一个偶然,所以我身边都是高素质的人。这点功劳完全不属于我,我只是被迫模仿了正确的人。

MUNGERWell, my father was a lawyer and he was the son of the, another lawyer who became the only federal judge in Lincoln, Nebraska, was is Nebraska's capital city. And grandfather Munger was a marvelous guy and, and a great family man too. I was surrounded by high-grade people, and my parents had good friends who are high-grade people. So, I had a very privileged life in terms of my associations. In fact, I had terrible trouble by coming out to Los Angeles and succeeding in life. I frequently thought I couldn't ever get, group of friends that were any as good as my father had gotten in little Omaha. And I finally realized that they had a very unusual bunch of friends in Omaha. And it was just a peculiar accident of history so I was surrounded by a buncha high-grade people. I deserve no credit at all for, I was just forced to imitate the right people.

巴菲特查理和我,我们,我们一辈子都喜欢和老年人聊天。我是说,我七八岁的时候就喜欢跟老年人聊天。现在当然问题是没有比我们更老的人了。所以,我这个听众群已经断了。但是,我,你知道,如果我以前会去邓迪长老会教堂参加童声合唱团之类的事情,走路回家的时候,我会顺路去四五户人家跟家庭主妇聊天。我就坐下来跟她们聊。我一直很喜欢跟老年人交流,我觉得查理也是这样。

BUFFETTBoth Charlie and I, we, we like talking to older people all our lives. I mean, I liked when I was seven or eight years old talking to older people. And now of course the problem is there aren't any older people. So, I've run outta that constituency. But, but I, you know, if I would go over to the Dundee Presbyterian Church to sing in the kids' choir or something like that, walking home, I'd drop in at four or five houses where I'd talk to housewives. So, I'd sit and talk to 'em. I've always enjoyed talking to older people and I think Charlie was the same way.

芒格当然。当年我娶了帮我建这栋房子的女人之后,她有个亲戚见到我之后说,“这是我见过的最老的年轻人,我认识的人里最老的。”

MUNGER'Course. When I married the woman that helped me build this house, one of her relatives said, after meeting me, she said, "That is the oldest young man I've ever, man I've even known."

巴菲特但我觉得同样——

BUFFETTBut I think the same--

芒格我哪怕年轻时也总是表现得像一百岁的人。

MUNGERI always behaved like I was 100 years old, even when I was young.

巴菲特现在我们是你们见过的最年轻的老人——

BUFFETTBut now we're the youngest old men that you'll--

贝基·奎克查理,你跟你父亲的关系也很特别吧。

QUICKCharlie, just the relationship that you had with your dad too.

芒格哦,非常棒的关系。那是莫大的福气,有很棒的母亲和父亲,他们还有一堆很棒的朋友。我就是非常幸运。

MUNGEROh, a marvelous relationship. And, and that, that's a great blessing, to have a wonderful mother and a wonderful father and they have a bunch of wonderful friends. It was just it's, I was very lucky.

巴菲特我们这辈子一直能跟自己真心喜欢的人打交道。这就是人生的一种奢侈。

BUFFETTWe've been able to associate with people that we really like in life. Well, that's one of the luxuries of life.

芒格我们还在继续这样做。

MUNGERAnd we're still doing it.

巴菲特我们还在继续,是啊。我们赚了很多钱。但我们最想要的是独立。而且从我们认识后没多久开始,我们就有了经济能力,可以跟我们想交往的人交往。如果我们跟混蛋打交道,那问题出在我们自己。但我们可以不用。现在我们已经享受这种奢侈,差不多六十年了。这比二十五间房的豪宅、六辆车之类的东西强多了。最棒的是,你可以在生活中做自己想做的事,跟自己想交往的人交往。而我们两个一直都是这种心态。

BUFFETTAnd we're still doing it, yeah. We made a lot of money. But what we really wanted was independence. And we have had the ability since pretty much a little after we met financially we could associate with people who we wanted to associate with. And if we had, if we associated with jerks, that was our problem. But we didn't have to. We've had that luxury now for, you know, 60 years or close to it. And, and that beats 25-room houses and, you know, six cars or that stuff is, what really is great is if you can do what you want to do in life and associate with the people you want to associate with in life. And, now, it, it's and, and we both had that, that spirit all the way through.

奎克你们能多快判断出一个人是不是你想交往的对象?

QUICKHow quickly can you figure out if somebody is someone you want to associate with?

芒格我们做得非常快,而且判断错误很少,这很惊人。

MUNGERIt's amazing how quickly we do it, and how few bad mistakes we've made.

奎克那你们看什么?知道什么?

QUICKSo, what do you look for? What do you know?

芒格我也说不准。

MUNGERI don't know exactly.

巴菲特是啊,我是怎么认识查理的?你知道,我第一次见到查理时,在餐厅里聊了几分钟,我就知道这家伙会一辈子出现在我的生活里。我的意思是,我们会玩得很开心。我们会一起赚钱。我们会互相激发灵感。我们会因为认识彼此,而比不认识对方时表现得更好。 PART V

BUFFETTYeah, how did I know Charlie? You know, I knew when I met Charlie, you know, after a few minutes in the restaurant that, that you know, this guy was gonna be in my life forever, you know. I mean it, it, we were gonna have fun together. We were gonna make money together. We were gonna get ideas from each other. We were gonna both behave better than if we didn't know each other. PART V

奎克每年五月的第一个星期六,从 1970 年代到 2019 年,沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格都会出现在这里,在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的舞台上。【2019 年 5 月】巴菲特:早上好,欢迎来到伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会!

QUICKOn the first Saturday in May, from the 1970s to 2019, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger could be found here, on stage in Omaha, Nebraska. [MAY 2019] BUFFETT: Good morning and welcome to Berkshire Hathaway!

奎克被称为“资本主义的伍德斯托克音乐节”的伯克希尔·哈撒韦年度股东大会,最初是国民赔偿公司午餐室里大约 20 人的聚会,后来发展到超过 4 万人涌入奥马哈最大的会议中心,直到新冠疫情迫使它像其他所有事情一样转入线上。2020 年,这意味着巴菲特在没有芒格到场的状态下主持了会议。【2020 年 5 月】巴菲特:这是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的年度股东大会。它看着不像股东大会,感觉也不完全像股东大会。

QUICKDubbed Woodstock for capitalists, the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting grew in size from about 20 people in the National Indemnity Lunchroom to more than 40,000 crowing into Omaha's biggest convention center until the COVID-19 pandemic forced the meeting, like everything else, to go virtual. In 2020, that meant Buffett ran the meeting without Munger. [MAY 2020] BUFFETT: This is the annual meeting of Berkshire Hathaway. It doesn't look like an annual meeting, it doesn't feel exactly like an annual meeting.

奎克而今年,两个人又一起回到了台上,在芒格的家乡洛杉矶办了一场线上大会。会后,我们在芒格家后院与他们坐下聊了聊。他们谈到了疫情对生意的冲击,以及自己远程办公的体会。

QUICKBut this year, the two were back together on stage at a virtual meeting held in Munger's hometown of Los Angeles. We sat down with them after the meeting in Munger's backyard. They reflected on the pandemic's impact on business and on their own experiences working remotely.

奎克过去一年,你们两位的生活都因为疫情发生了相当大的改变。查理,我听说你用 Zoom 已经相当溜了。

QUICKThe last year, you both had your lives change pretty dramatically from the pandemic. Charlie, I hear you're, you're pretty adept at Zoom.

芒格嗯,我现在确实迷上了 Zoom。

MUNGEROh, well, I have fallen in love with Zoom.

奎克你多常在 Zoom 上跟人聊?

QUICKHow often do you talk to people on Zoom?

芒格一天至少三次。我在澳大利亚做了一笔交易。我觉得 Zoom 这东西会长期存在,它实在太方便了。

MUNGERAt least three times a day. I made a deal in Australia. I, I think Zoom is here to stay. It's, it just adds so much convenience.

巴菲特对,尤其是当你 97 岁、走动也不方便的时候。不过,查理和我自疫情以来显然聊得很多,但我们还没在 Zoom 上聊过。我是说,这——

BUFFETTWell, particularly if you're 97, it, and getting around. But Charlie and I have talked a lot obviously, since the pandemic started. We haven't talked on Zoom yet. I mean, it, it--

芒格行,不过这不是因为——

MUNGERWell, but it's not because--

巴菲特我嘛,就不是个爱用 Zoom 的人。

BUFFETTI'm, I'm just not a Zoom guy.

奎克你为什么不喜欢 Zoom?

QUICKWhy don't you like Zoom?

巴菲特嗯,我就是看不出它有什么额外的好处。我倒是用过一两次,看见屏幕上满满一格一格的人,我就是没觉得这对沟通有什么加成。我宁可把脚搁在桌上,电话这东西我就觉得很顺手了,真的。

BUFFETTWell, I don't see any plus to it, particularly, I like to I did it once or twice, and they had a whole screen of people that, that it, I just didn't figure it was adding to the experience. I'd rather have my, you know, feet on the desk, and, and I, I find the telephone a very satisfactory instrument, I mean.

奎克那你觉得疫情过后生活会怎么改变?工作会怎么改变?又会怎么回到常态?我是说,你觉得会怎么——

QUICKSo how does life change post-pandemic? How does work change? And, and how does it's, go back to normal? I guess, what, what do you think happens—

芒格嗯,我觉得很多商务出行永远都不会恢复了。就是一家接一家的公司都在决定:一年开一两次当面会,剩下全用 Zoom。我觉得这个趋势会持续。当然,在办公需求上发生的事,只要想想那个领域现在有多痛苦就明白了。很多人发现自己并不需要到现场。我认为各种变化都在发生,我们不会完全回到以前那套做法。

MUNGERWell, I think a lot of business travel will never come back. Just corporation after corporation deciding one meeting a year, two meetings a year in person, and the rest Zoom. And I think that's here to stay. And, of course, what's happened to office demand is just think of the agonies in that field now. And a lot of people have found they don't need to be there. I think all kinds of things are gonna happen that, that we'll be, we don't go back to what we did before.

巴菲特我们旗下有些业务的改变会很大,有些则几乎原封不动。但这会很有意思。我要说,就整个疫情而言,无论是去预测经济走向还是那些通信设施该如何表现,它都在很多方面让我们吃了一惊。它也让我们……到头来,我们仍然不确定。我们对这次疫情确实了解不少,但不知道的地方也还很多。你只要去翻看不同国家被冲击的图表和其他情况,就能看出,一个经济高度发达的世界竟然会在你身处其中的时候,以你无法预料的方式被搅得天翻地覆。经济后果也极为不均衡,成千上万、甚至数以百万计的小企业遭受重创,但绝大多数大公司全都过得不错,除非碰巧是邮轮公司、酒店之类的行业。

BUFFETTSome, some, some of our businesses will change a lot, and some of 'em won't change hardly at all. But it'll be interesting. I, I would say this, in terms of the, the whole pandemic, in terms of predicting both the economic and how the wires should behave, you know, it, it surprised us in a lot of ways. It surprised our, you know, at the end, we still don't know. We know a lot about this, but there's a lot of things we don't know yet. And, and, and, if you look at the graphs of, of how it's hit different countries and everything, it, it, it just shows you how a very advanced economically world can get disrupted by something that in, in ways that, even when you're in it, you can't predict. And the economic impact has been this extremely uneven thing where I don't know how many but many hundreds of thousands or millions of small businesses have been hurt in a terrible way, but most of the big, big companies have overwhelmingly have done fine, unless they happen to be in cruise lines or, you know, or hotels or something.

芒格不过,有些人比我们做得更好。再比如,中国,一个实打实的集权国家,愣是把整个国家一关就是六周。事实证明这么做完全正确。他们不允许任何接触。你到公寓楼下,从一个箱子里把杂货拿上楼,那就是你六周内跟任何人的全部接触。等这阵一过,大家就差不多回去上班了。他们这事儿,就是赶巧了,但也确实做得点滴不差。

MUNGERBut, but some people did better than we. Again, the Chinese simply totalitarian state, they simply shut down the country for six weeks. And that turned out to be exactly the right thing to do. And they didn't allow any contact. You picked up your groceries in a box in the apartment and that's all the contact you had with anybody for six weeks. And, when it was all over, they kind of went back to work. It happened they did it exactly right.

巴菲特但很多方面——换个角度看,其他地方也在封锁,它们当初真以为自己是模范样本,可现在却在经历困难。然后还有其他国家,好比说——

BUFFETTBut a lot about, but, in other cases, they're shutdowns, and the shutdowns really they'd, they thought they were model examples, and then, now, they're experiencing problems. And then you had other countries, you know, like--

芒格是啊。不,就是——

MUNGERYeah. No, it's just--

巴菲特还有其他国家,比如瑞典,瑞典说:“我们不搞这一套。”而且有段时间似乎效果还不错。然后这个事就变得非常、非常、非常难以预测——

BUFFETTYou had other countries like Sweden, Sweden says, "We're not gonna do it." And that seemed to be working fine for a while. And then it, this has been very, very, very unpredictable--

芒格是啊,确实很难。是啊。

MUNGERYeah, very difficult. Yeah.

巴菲特而且这事还没完。我是说,就不可预测性而言。从经济角度看,一直极其难以预测,但对大多数人和大多数企业来说,结果比人们预期的要好。只是,有些人也完全不是自己的错,他们的希望就这么被摧毁了。而这些人,我们希望——你知道——政府应该出手帮助——

BUFFETTAnd it's not over. I mean, in, in terms of the unpredictability. And in terms of the economic, it's been very unpredictable, but it's worked out better than people anticipated for most people and most businesses. And it's just, for no fault of their own, it's just decimated all kinds of people in their hopes. And that, and, and those we want to, you know, the government should be helping--

芒格但,对某些企业来说——

MUNGERBut, for some businesses--

巴菲特我们很兴旺。

BUFFETTWe're prosperous.

芒格它带来的不只是回归正常,还创造了他们没预料到的绝佳成功。汽车经销商正在赚到那些如果没有疫情根本赚不到的钱。

MUNGERIt didn't create just a return to normal. It created fabulous success they didn't anticipate. The auto dealers are coining money that they wouldn't have had except for the pandemic.

巴菲特在我们有合作伙伴的所有经销店里,每家店都极其真诚地认为,他们在三、四月份会遇上大麻烦。有些人可能想申请政府援助,但我们不让,因为他们有个财力雄厚的母公司。但他们当时是真心那么认为的。我们也是真心那么认为的。我们不知道 NetJets 的需求会怎么样。而结果,你知道,就是跟很多人想的不一样。银行在三月中旬吓得半死。我是说,他们看到所有人都在提取信贷额度。但为什么人们不需要用钱的时候还要提取信贷额度?因为他们担心下周额度就没了,你知道。而如果在银行业里有足够多的人相信某样东西下周就会消失,那它下周就真的会消失,除非美联储出面。

BUFFETTAnd all of the dealers that we have partners in each dealership, they very sincerely felt that, that they were gonna have one helluva problem in, in March and April. And some might have wanted to go in for the assistance from the government, but we wouldn't let 'em, because they had a rich parent. But, they honestly believed it. We honestly believed it. We, we didn't know what was gonna happen with NetJets in terms of the demand. And it has been, you know, it's been, just been different than a lot of people thought. The banks were scared stiff in the middle of March. I mean, they, they saw everybody taking down their lines of credit. But why do people take down their lines of credit when they don't need it? Because they're afraid it won't be there next week, you know. And, if you get enough people believing something won't be there next week in banking, it won't be there next week absent the Federal Reserve.

奎克有没有哪件事最让你们感到意外?或者过去一年里学到了什么?

QUICKOne thing that maybe surprised you most? Something you learned the last year?

巴菲特嗯,我学到的是,人们知道的远没有他们自以为的那么多。但最深刻的体会是,这场疫情注定会发生,而且这根本算不上我们所能想象的最严重的那种。而我们所有人,整个社会,在为那些看似遥远、但切实可能且迟早会降临的事情做好准备这件事上,总是极其艰难。还会有下一场大流行病,这点我们知道;我们也知道存在核威胁、化学威胁、生物威胁,现在又加上了网络威胁。而且,你知道,每一项威胁都蕴含着极其可怕的可能。我们确实做了一些应对,但这似乎不是社会格外有能力完全掌控的事情。网络威胁,你知道,我们才刚刚开始,但看看已经造成的破坏有多大。查理和我在很多方面都幸运得不可思议。但最幸运的一件事,其实是生在了这个时代、这个地方。同时我们还要面对这些问题:世界有 200 多个国家、超过 75 亿人,彼此之间存在着大量紧张关系、各种矛盾、不同的制度、各式各样的政府,等等。我们究竟要怎么做,才能让人类在 50 年、100 年、200 年以后,既能享受本可拥有的、远比现在更美好的生活,又不把这一切搞砸?第六部分

BUFFETTWell, I learned that people don't know as much as they think they know. But the biggest thing you learn is that the pandemic was bound to occur, and this isn't the worst one that's imaginable at all. And, we all, society has a terrible time preparing for things that are remote but are possible and will occur sooner or later. There'll be another pandemic, we know that, we know there's a nuclear, chemical, biological, and now cyber threat. And we, you know, it has, each one of those has terrible possibilities. And we do some things about it, but it's just not something that society seems particularly capable in fully coming to grips with. The cyber threat, it, you know, it, we've just started, and, and look at the damage that's already been done. Charlie and I have been ungodly lucky in many ways. But the luckiest thing was actually being around at this time and place. And we also have these problems in how 200 countries with over seven-and-a-half billion people, and a lot of tensions between them and all sorts of things, and different systems, and selected governments, and all that. And how do we actually do this so that mankind, 50 and 100 and 200 years from now, should enjoy the incredibly better life that could be enjoyed while not screwing it up? PART VI

奎克按市值算,它是全球最大的十家公司之一。全球各地办公室里,有 36 万名员工。但伯克希尔·哈撒韦庞大的业务版图,总部却设在奥马哈一栋大楼里租来的两层楼,管理团队不过区区二十几个人。一切之所以不同,都源于站在最高处的两个人:沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格。

QUICKIt's one of the 10 biggest companies in the world, by market capitalization. It's 360,000 employees work in offices around the globe. But Berkshire Hathaway's sprawling operations are headquartered here, from two floors leased in a building in Omaha, managed by a staff of just two dozen people. It's different because of the two men at the top, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.

芒格我们无意中创造了一个非常有意思的实验:看一个规模如此庞大的机构,能在极其去官僚化、极度分权的模式下运行得多好。我们就像是一个测试案例,看分权能走到多么极端的地步。而且我得说,至少到目前为止,效果更好。这种放手不管的管理方式,给我们带来的好处多于坏处。

MUNGERWe have accidentally created a very interesting experiment in how well a really big place can be run on a very non bureaucratic basis with extreme decentralization. We're like a test case for how extreme you can make it. And I would say so far, that it's worked better. We get more advantages than disadvantages out of our hands-off management.

巴菲特的确如此。

BUFFETTThat's true.

芒格难道你不这么认为吗?

MUNGERDon't, don't you agree with that?

巴菲特的确如此。想模仿我们这套的人很少,不过——

BUFFETTThat's true. We get very few people who wanna copy us, but--

芒格不,没人想模仿我们。而且,如果——

MUNGERNo, nobody wants to copy us, and, and yet, if--

巴菲特这套做法行得通。

BUFFETTIt works.

芒格那些研究我们的人会发现,至少按我们这种做法,效果要好得多。

MUNGERPeople, people study us, they'd find it at least the way we're doing it, it works way better.

巴菲特是的。它也有某些缺点——

BUFFETTYeah. It has certain disadvantages--

芒格没错。

MUNGERYes.

巴菲特我们愿意信任他人。偶尔信任会被滥用。但总的来说,这套做法是管用的。

BUFFETTThat we want to trust people. Occasionally trust is misused. But net, it's worked.

芒格我们做了一项很有用的实验,我敢肯定地预测,总有一天,有人会发现,美国企业界那些愚蠢的官僚体制有一部分是可以砍掉的,我们就能过得更好。就像我们发现可以砍掉一些商务旅行一样,我们也会发现有些愚蠢的官僚体制是可以废除的。我说的是美国企业界。

MUNGERIt's a useful experiment that we've done, and I confidently predict that someday, well, somebody will find out that some of this dumb bureaucracy could be eliminated, we'll be better off. Just as we found we can eliminate some business travel, we're gonna find we can get rid of some dumb bureaucracy. In American corporations.

巴菲特这套做法在大规模下是行得通的,但它不可能带来超常回报——不是说我们手里有某种能产生超常回报的东西——但用这种方式经营,规模上去以后,可以成为一个相当不错的生意。

BUFFETTIt works at large scale, but it doesn't work to produce the kind of returns that, that it is like we've got something that produces extraordinary returns, but, but it can be a very decent business at scale, operating that way.

芒格你难道不觉得,如果我们照搬那套集权管理模式,业绩会比现在差得多吗?

MUNGERDon't you think we've done better than we woulda been if we'd copied the centralized management system?

巴菲特嗯,反正我是不会想在那种地方工作的。你呢,你愿意吗?

BUFFETTWell, I wouldn't have been, I wouldn't have wanted to work there. I mean, would you?

芒格我当然不想。

MUNGERI know no, no, of course not.

巴菲特我会辞职。或者被开除。不,我更愿意跟几个有意思的人一起蹲一间牢房,再配上够多的书看,也比——

BUFFETTI'd resign. Or been fired. No, I would, I'd rather be in a jail cell with a few people who are interesting. You know, and plenty of reading material. Then, then--

芒格不是,你这句话的意思是,我们之所以实行分权管理,也许就是因为这样最符合我们自己的天性。

MUNGERNo, what you're saying is, we may have done it, we may have created the decentralization, 'cause it suited our nature.

巴菲特一点没错。

BUFFETTAbsolutely.

芒格但我们是不经意间创造——

MUNGERBut we've accidentally created--

巴菲特但它管用。

BUFFETTBut it worked.

芒格——创造了一个实验,并证明了它在大规模下也行得通。我认为,这最终会被证明是很有价值的。

MUNGERCreated an experiment, and demonstrated can, can work on a big scale. That will eventually prove useful, I think.

奎克你们两位做了 60 多年的朋友,对方身上哪一点是你们格外欣赏的?

QUICKYou two have been friends for over 60 years, what's one thing that you really admire about the other?

芒格嗯,我喜欢他的幽默,这些都很不错,但“靠得住”确实很重要。

MUNGERWell, I like the humor, and all that, but dependable is really important.

奎克沃伦,你欣赏查理什么?

QUICKWarren, what do you admire about Charlie?

巴菲特说真的,就是他这个人一直以来的样子。我的意思是,他对他人有贡献,也对社会有贡献,而且这远远不止是买一只股票然后高价卖出。他设计过宿舍楼,还帮忙建造。他参与医院的工作,去理解怎么才能把医院办得更好,服务更多人,花的钱还更少。你知道,这种事永远是在逆水行舟,但查理一直在解决重大的难题,而他其实根本不需要做这些。从我认识他到现在,查理对我说的任何事,从来没有丝毫粉饰——他从不把事情换个假象来说给我听。作为合伙人,或者在任何层面,我从来没见过他做过任何利己的事。他让我变成了一个比本来的我更好的人。我不想让他失望。

BUFFETTReally, just the kinda person he's been. I mean, he is, he has contributed given individuals, and also to society, I mean, and it, it goes well beyond buying a stock and selling it higher. He's designed dormitories and helped build them. He's, he's worked at hospitals and to understand how they can be made better and serve more people and do it at less cost. You know, it's, it's an uphill fight all the time, but Charlie's worked on big problems, and he's, and he doesn't need to. And Charlie has never shaded anything he's told me, you know, since we met, in terms of presenting it to me in a different way than reality, or he's never, he's never done anything I've seen that's self-serving, in terms of being a partner, or in any kind of way. He, he's, he makes me better than I would otherwise be. I don't wanna disappoint him.

芒格可你也一样,你对我也是如此。

MUNGERBut you've had the same thing, in reverse.

巴菲特对,嗯,确实就是这种效果,确实是这样运作的。我是说,与比你更优秀的人交往,总是更好的。我的意思是——

BUFFETTYeah, it, well, it works, it does work that way. I mean it's better to associate with people who are better than you are. I mean--

芒格的确如此。这实在是,实在是很有帮助。

MUNGERIt really is. It's, it's so, it's, it really helps.

奎克超过半个世纪的商业伙伴。沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格是终身的导师,是以非传统方式领导企业的公司高管,他们对后世的研究价值毋庸置疑。但在两人加起来近 190 年的人生阅历中,通过这段友谊分享的人生经验,或许更为长久。您有保密的新闻线索吗?我们期待您的来信。注册我们的免费新闻通讯,即可将更多 CNBC 内容直接发送到您的邮箱。将此资讯发送到您的邮箱,并获取更多关于我们产品和服务的详情。© 2026 Versant Media, LLC. 保留所有权利。Versant Media 旗下公司。数据为实时快照。*数据至少延迟 15 分钟。

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QUICKBusiness partners more than half a century. Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are lifelong teachers, corporate executives who lead in an unconventional manner and who will certainly be studied for generations to come. But with almost 190 years of experience between them, it's the lessons in life they've shared through their friendship that may be more lasting. Got a confidential news tip? We want to hear from you. Sign up for free newsletters and get more CNBC delivered to your inbox Get this delivered to your inbox, and more info about our products and services. © 2026 Versant Media, LLC. All Rights Reserved. A Versant Media Company. Data is a real-time snapshot *Data is delayed at least 15 minutes.

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