Wesco金融2000年度股东大会——查理·芒格讲话纪要

2000 · 会议 · 原文约 2797 词
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查理·芒格发言

西科金融年会纪要

惠特尼·蒂尔森

2000 年 5 月 15 日

作为沃伦·巴菲特的崇拜者和伯克希尔·哈撒韦(纽交所代码:BRK.A)的股东,我坚持参加公司年度股东大会,以便从他对股东们数十个问题的回答中学习。与他同台的是查理·芒格——伯克希尔·哈撒韦的副董事长,以及巴菲特长期以来的合伙人。

那场面相当有趣:巴菲特通常先回答一个问题,但给出答案后会转过身说,“查理?”而芒格一整天都纹丝不动、面无表情(他们就算临时换上一个假人撑好一阵子,估计也没人会发现),通常回答说:“我没什么要补充的。”

但正如你们从我今年会议纪要中(总结在上期专栏里)看到的,芒格经常确实有要补充的内容,而且总是犀利又深刻。从很多方面看,他比巴菲特更有趣,因为他说话不拐弯(我认为他那句“把葡萄干和大便混在一起”一定会载入伯克希尔的史册)。

久而久之,我意识到芒格本身就是个天才,而且对巴菲特的思维产生了深远影响(巴菲特自己也坦然承认)。那么,这个(用他自己的话说)“脾气古怪、观念老派”的人到底是谁?我觉得珍妮特·洛即将出版的《绝对正确》一书会揭示很多答案,她告诉我那本书 10 月份就能上市。但我还是想亲自去了解,于是最近参加了西科金融(美国证交所代码:WSC)的年度股东大会,在会上,这家公司的长期董事长芒格用了两个小时回答股东提问。(从 1973 年起,伯克希尔·哈撒韦就持有西科 80.1% 的股份。我是西科的股东,打算今后写一篇专栏介绍这家公司以及我认为它定价吸引人的理由。)

就像我上一篇专栏做的那样,我会尽量从我的笔记中提炼出最重要内容。注意,有些地方我做了意译,因为我实在写不了那么快。

开场陈述

Charlie Munger Speaks Notes from the Wesco Annual Meeting By Whitney Tilson May 15, 2000 As an admirer of Warren Buffett and a Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) shareholder, I make a point of attending the company's annual meetings so I can learn from the answers to dozens of questions from his shareholders. Sharing the stage with him is Charlie Munger, Berkshire Hathaway's Vice Chairman and Buffett's long-time partner. The dynamic is pretty funny to watch: Buffett generally takes the first stab at answering a question, but after giving his answer turns and says, "Charlie?" Munger, immobile and expressionless throughout the day (they could easily substitute a mannequin for quite a while and no-one would notice), typically replies, "I have nothing to add." But as you can see from my notes from this year's meeting (summarized in my previous column), Munger often does have something to add, and it is invariably sharp and insightful. In many ways, he's more entertaining than Buffett because he doesn't pull any punches (I think his "mixing raisins and turds" line will go down in Berkshire history). Over time, I have come to realize that Munger is a genius in his own right, and has had a profound effect on Buffett's thinking (which Buffett freely acknowledges). So who is this "cranky, old fashioned" man (to use his words)? I think many of the answers will be revealed in Janet Lowe's upcoming book, Damn Right, which she tells me will be available in October. But I wanted to find out for myself, so I recently attended Wesco Financial's (AMEX: WSC) annual meeting, where Munger, the company's long-time Chairman, took questions from shareholders for two hours. (Since 1973, Berkshire Hathaway has owned 80.1% of Wesco. I am a Wesco shareholder and plan to write a future column about the company and why I believe it's attractively priced.) As I did in my last column, I will try to distill my notes down to the most important things I heard. Note that in some cases I am paraphrasing because I couldn't write quickly enough. Opening Statement

“这表面上是股东大会,实际上倒更像是在听邪教副教主布道。”

关于伯克希尔·哈撒韦和西科金融的评论

做出正确的人事决策

“令人惊讶的是,几十年来我们几乎没需要解雇过什么人——远比其他公司少。这不是因为我们心软或者犯傻,而是因为我们更明智、更幸运。大多数人回头看去,会说自己犯过最大的错就是没能及时解雇某人。[我们不会这么说。]我们的记录棒极了。我们是老派作风。比如,在 CORT 商业服务公司[西科今年收购的一家家具租赁企业]这件事上,沃伦对我说:‘你会喜欢保罗·阿诺德[CORT 的 CEO]的。’他说得没错。保罗从法学院时期就开始经营这家公司,而且热爱它。”

伯克希尔·哈撒韦的文化

“伯克希尔所有子公司都有某些共同的优点。我们不去创造这些优点——我们只挑选那些已经具备这些优点的公司。我们只要不搞砸就行了。”

再写更多保险

“伯克希尔·哈撒韦和西科金融相对于我们的盈余,承保的保险金额都低得出奇。这给了我们投资上的灵活性。我们只是找不到足够多的保险可写——如果能写更多,我们肯定会写。对伯克希尔·哈撒韦来说,能承保相当于盈余 10% 的保险,那简直是天堂了——我们离那还差得远呢。西科也一样,不过我们今年确实接下了一单大业务。”

业绩的波动性

“这是我们作为保险公司的一个优势——我们根本不在乎业绩的波动。其他所有人都在试图取悦华尔街。这可不是一个微不足道的优势。”

伯克希尔·哈撒韦面临大规模巨灾损失的风险

“我们不承保那种没有上限的大额巨灾合约[cat 指 catastrophe,灾难;例如,为加州大地震提供保险]。在一次事件中,我们公司资产税后损失超过 6%-7% 的可能性微乎其微。真正的风险由那些承保基本房主保单(例如抗击暴风雨或地震的保单)却没有将部分风险分保出去的保险公司承担。这大致就是 20 世纪公司[20th Century]遭遇的情况:他们在加州北岭大地震中损失了 100% 的资本金,原因是在地震区域集中签发了大量小保单。”

"This only masquerades as a shareholder's meeting. It's really a gathering to hear the thoughts of the assistant headmaster of a cult." Comments on Berkshire Hathaway and Wesco Making the Right Personnel Decisions "It's amazing how few times over the decades we've have to remove a person -- far less than other companies. It's not that we're soft or foolish, it's that we're wiser and luckier. Most people would look back and say their worst mistake was not firing someone soon enough. [We don't say that.] Our record is fabulous. We're old-fashioned. For example, in the case of CORT Business Services [a furniture rental business that Wesco acquired this year], Warren said to me, 'You're going to love Paul Arnold [CORT's CEO].' And he was right. Paul's been running the business since he was in law school and loves it. Berkshire Hathaway's Culture "There are certain virtues that are common in all of Berkshire's subsidiaries. We don't create them -- we select companies that have them already. We just don't screw it up." Writing More Insurance "Both Berkshire Hathaway and Wesco write amazingly low amounts of insurance relative to our surplus. It gives us investment flexibility. We just don't find enough insurance to write -- we'd do more if we could. Writing insurance equal to 10% of surplus for Berkshire Hathaway would be hog heaven -- we don't come close to that. Wesco didn't either, but we took on one big policy this year." Lumpy Results "That is one of our advantages as an insurer -- we don't give a damn about lumpy results. Everyone else is trying to please Wall Street. This is not a small advantage." Risks to Berkshire Hathaway from Large Super Cat Losses "We don't write big super cat contracts where there's no upper limit [cat means catastrophe; for example, insuring against a large earthquake in California]. It's inconceivable that we'd lose more than 6-7% of the company's assets after tax in one event. The real risk is borne by insurers who write, for example, basic homeowner's policies against a storm or earthquake and don't lay off some of that risk. That's roughly what happened to 20th Century, where they lost 100% of their capital in the Northridge (CA) Earthquake due to writing lots of little policies concentrated in an earthquake area."

巴菲特接班人

一位股东指出,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的继任计划需要两个人来接替巴菲特:一个人负责投资,另一个人负责监督运营公司。GEICO 的路·辛普森已被指定(至少非正式地)担任前一个职位,因此这位股东问道:“您能否告诉我们谁被指定了后一个角色?”芒格简洁地回答:“我可以,但我不说。”[过去,巴菲特曾为他决定不透露这个人选辩护,因为他可能会改变主意,并希望避免一旦发生这种情况就不可避免会出现的媒体炒作。]

为什么不用西科金融进行小额投资?

一位股东指出,巴菲特和芒格长期以来一直认为,伯克希尔·哈撒韦的规模使得寻找有吸引力的投资变得困难。那么,他问道,他们为什么不用西科金融进行小额投资呢?芒格回答:“路·辛普森偶尔会做小额投资。但我们没有设置进行小额投资的架构。而且,沃伦和我都有点古怪,不太可能改变我们的习惯。”

伯克希尔·哈撒韦回购股份

“过去,当伯克希尔的股票变得便宜时,我们找到了其他更便宜的股票可以买。我总是更倾向于这么做。公司缺乏声誉,以至于我们只能通过买断其他股东的股份来为部分股东赚钱,这可没什么意思。”

为什么没有更多公司和个人效仿伯克希尔·哈撒韦?

“这是个好问题。我们的方法对我们有效。看看我们、我们的经理人和我们的股东玩得多开心。应该有更多人效仿我们。这并不难,但看起来很难,因为它不合常规——它不同于通常做事情的方式。我们管理费用低,没有季度目标和预算,也没有标准的人事制度,我们的投资比平均水平集中得多。这很简单,也符合常识。

“我们的投资风格被起了一个名字——聚焦投资——这暗示着持有 10 只股票,而不是 100 只或 400 只。聚焦投资有所增长,但真正增长的是无限量地使用顾问来提供资产配置建议、分析其他顾问等等。

“我最近和杰克·麦克唐纳聊过,他在斯坦福商学院开设了一门根植于我们原则的投资课程。他说这很孤独——他感觉自己就像那个修理工梅泰格(Maytag 的维修工,暗示无人问津)。”

Buffett's Successors A shareholder noted that Berkshire Hathaway's succession plan calls for two people to replace Buffett: one to make the investments and one to oversee the operating companies. Lou Simpson of GEICO has been designated (at least unofficially) for the former position, so the shareholder asked, "Could you share with us who has been designated for the latter role?" Munger's succinct reply, "I could but I won't." [In the past, Buffett has defended his decision not to reveal this person because he might change his mind and wants to avoid the media circus that would invariably occur were this to happen.] Why Not Use Wesco to Make Smaller Investments? A shareholder noted that Buffett and Munger have long maintained that Berkshire Hathaway's size makes finding attractive investments difficult. Why then, he asked, don't they use Wesco to make smaller investments? Munger replied, "Lou Simpson will occasionally do smaller investments. But we're not set up to do small investments. Also, Warren and I are idiosyncratic and are unlikely to change our spots." Berkshire Hathaway Repurchasing Shares "In the past, when Berkshire has gotten cheap, we've found other even cheaper stocks to buy. I'd always prefer this. It's no fun to have the company so lacking in repute that we can make money for some shareholders by buying out others." Why Don't More Companies and Investors Copy Berkshire Hathaway? "It's a good question. Our approach has worked for us. Look at the fun we, our managers, and our shareholders are having. More people should copy us. It's not difficult, but it looks difficult because it's unconventional -- it isn't the way things are normally done. We have low overhead, don't have quarterly goals and budgets or a standard personnel system, and our investing is much more concentrated than average. It's simple and common sense. "Our investment style has been given a name -- focus investing -- which implies 10 holdings, not 100 or 400. Focus investing is growing somewhat, but what's really growing is the unlimited use of consultants to advise on asset allocation, to analyze other consultants, etc. "I was recently speaking with Jack McDonald, who teaches a course on investing rooted in our principles at Stanford Business School. He said it's lonely -- like he's the Maytag repairman.

“我在后备军官训练团待了六年,看到(军队里)文化非常局限,新想法很少。别的地方也一样。”

伯克希尔·哈撒韦的未来展望

“伯克希尔·哈撒韦未来的日子会更难,原因有两个:

1)我们规模太大了。这限制了我们的投资选择,只能去那些竞争更激烈的领域,而这些领域已经被像艾丽斯·施罗德(坐在听众席里的潘恩韦伯保险分析师)这样非常聪明的人研究透了。

2)当前的市场环境使得未来 15-20 年普通股的前景,远远低于我们过去 15-20 年所经历的。去读读沃伦在《财富》上的文章——我完全同意。

“但这并非悲剧。我们很满足。伯克希尔·哈撒韦和西科金融每年都会积累现金,而且我们的架构给了我们巨大的灵活性。虽然我们规模太大,买不了一家小公司的股票,但我们有个优势,就是整个公司会主动找上门来卖给我们。总会有机会找上门的。我并不气馁,但我觉得你们在这里的钱,不会再像过去那样增长。”

"I was in the ROTC for six years and saw a very limited culture [in the military] with few new ideas. It's the same elsewhere" Future Outlook for Berkshire Hathaway "The future will be harder for Berkshire Hathaway for two reasons: 1) We're so big. It limits our investment options to more competitive areas that are examined by very smart people like Alice Schroeder [Paine Webber's insurance analyst, who was sitting in the audience]. 2) The current climate offers prospects in common stocks over the next 15-20 years that are way less than we've experienced over the past 15-20 years. Read Warren's Fortune article -- I totally agree with it. "But this is not a tragedy. We're content. Berkshire Hathaway and Wesco will accumulate cash every year, and we have a structure that gives us enormous flexibility. While we're too big to buy the stock of a small company, we have the advantage of having entire companies offered to us. Something has always turned up for us. I'm not discouraged, but I don't think your money here is going to do anything like what you're used to."

查理·芒格发言——第二部分

2000 年西科金融年会笔记

作者:惠特尼·蒂尔森

2000 年 5 月 15 日

关于企业的评论

可口可乐

“未来 20 到 30 年,可口可乐会卖出更多的汽水和其他饮料。他们还能适度涨价,提高利润率。所以,如果你持有可口可乐,你完全能赚到钱。[关于股票的高估值,] 如果你把增长预期投射到足够远的未来,你就能得到很高的当前估值。因此,你在可口可乐股价里看到的是这样一种剩余预期:尽管它最近有些踉跄,但 20 年后,它们染颜色的水会多得多。”

Charlie Munger Speaks - Part 2 Notes from the Wesco Annual Meeting By Whitney Tilson May 15, 2000 Comments on Businesses Coca Cola "Over the next 20-30 years, Coke will be selling more soda and other drinks. They will also be able to raise prices moderately and increase margins. Therefore, if you own Coke, you'll do all right. [Regarding the stock's high valuation,] if you project growth long enough into the future, you can get high current valuations. So what you're seeing in Coke's stock price is the residual prediction that despite its recent stumbles, they'll be coloring a lot more water 20 years from now." The Furniture Business

伯克希尔·哈撒韦现在在六个州拥有领先的家具零售商,并通过 CORT 在租赁型(而非租购型)家具业务中占据了重要地位。这一切都是意外得来的。家具业务通常不是好生意,但如果你拥有最好的公司,对我们来说就是一门好生意。CORT 的业务看似不会是好生意,但它确实是。

中美能源公司

“谁能想到我们会买下爱荷华州的一家电力公司?但这确实是一笔相当不错的投资。它还为我们打开了一扇窗,让我们得以窥见一个正在发生许多疯狂事情的领域,这可能会给我们带来其他机会(请参阅我在近期专栏中对中美能源公司拥有的实物期权的讨论)。”

NetJets 公务航空开拓欧洲市场

“欧洲是个很难打入的地方,国家众多,规矩繁杂。我们正在亏损,并且预计这种情况还会持续一段时间。但看看后来者面临的局面:所有同样的麻烦我们都经历过,而我们已经在那里了。可口可乐在全球都是这么做的,看看它是如何获得回报的。”

报业

“未来它成为一门绝佳生意的确定性大大降低了。威胁来自其他信息媒介。每家报纸都在竭力将其现有优势转化为互联网上的主导地位。但这件事情(指成功转化)的确定性,远低于 20 年前基本业务将稳步增长的确定性,因此下行风险更大。这个行业曾经极好的经济特性可能会受到严重损害。”

一般性评论

利润操纵与会计舞弊

“由于报告数字关系着如此巨大的利益,人性使然便会去操纵它们。而且,当很多人都在这样做时,就会出现‘塞尔皮科效应’——每个人都合理化自己的行为,认为既然别人都这么做,那自己也没问题。人性向来如此。

“现在,这就像连锁信骗局一样。因为它与风险投资等合法活动混杂在一起,所以看起来体面。但我们正把体面的活动和不体面的活动混在一起——这就是为什么我在伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会上说过,如果你把葡萄干和大便混在一起,结果还是大便。会计制度根本无法阻止不诚信的经理人从事连锁信式的欺诈行为。”

"Berkshire Hathaway now owns the leading furniture retailer in six states and, through CORT, has a substantial position in the rent-to-rent [as opposed to rent-to-own] furniture business. This all came about by accident. The furniture business is generally not a good one, but if you own the best companies, it's a fine business for us. It seems like CORT's business wouldn't be a good one, but it is." MidAmerican Energy "Who would have thought we'd buy an electric company in Iowa? But this is a perfectly decent investment. It also gives us a window into a field where a lot of crazy things are going on, which may give us other opportunities [see the discussion of the real options that MidAmerican has in my recent column]." Net Jets' Expansion into Europe "Europe is a bitch of a place to get into, with all its countries and rules. We are losing money and expect that this will continue for a while. But look at the situation faced by the 2nd mover: all the same troubles and we're already there. Coke has done this all over the world and look how it's paid off." The Newspaper Business "It is way less certain to be a wonderful business in the future. The threat is alternative mediums of information. Every newspaper is scrambling to parlay their existing advantage into dominance on the Internet. But it is way less sure [that this will occur] than the certainty 20 years ago that the basic business would grow steadily, so there's more downside risk. The perfectly fabulous economics of this business could become grievously impaired." General Comments Earnings Manipulation and Accounting Shenanigans "With so much money riding on reported numbers, human nature is to manipulate them. And with so many doing it, you get Serpico effects, where everyone rationalizes that it's okay because everyone else is doing it. It is always thus. "Now, it's chain letter mechanics. Because it's mixed with legitimate activities like venture capital, it looks respectable. But we're mixing respectable activity with disrespectable activity -hence my comment at the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting about if you mix raisins with turds, you've still got turds. There is nothing in accounting that can prevent unscrupulous managers from engaging in a chain-letter-type fraud.

我极其厌恶 GAAP(美国通用会计准则)在衍生品和互换合约上的处理方式。摩根大通为了提前确认收入,竟然向这种会计手法妥协。我认为这简直是耻辱。

利率

“无论在沃伦还是我本人的投资记录里,靠押注利率赚到大钱的情况都从未出现过。话虽如此,这个共和国的每一位明智公民多少都会思考这个问题。在我这一生中,我亲眼目睹过利率从 1% 到 20% 的波动。我们努力做到让公司经营在利率无论向哪个方向极端波动时都不会太糟糕。当利率处于像现在这样的中间区间时,我们持不可知论态度。”

日本的衰退

“任何人都会对日本的衰退感到瞠目结舌——在利率低于 1% 的情况下,这轮衰退竟然持续了 10 年。政府用尽了各种货币政策手段,却毫无效果。如果你把这种局面描述给哈佛的经济学家听,他们一定会说这不可能。然而与此同时,香港却出现了资产泡沫。为什么?因为日本和中国是两种截然不同的文化——中国人天生爱赌。

“这是一个经典例证,说明了为什么要想成为成功的投资者,必须从多个学科中汲取养分。想象一下,如果有一个经济学家在一次经济学家会议上站起来,用我的理由去解释这种现象,那绝对不符合政治正确!但经济学的工具确实无法解释正在发生的一切。”

给其他投资者的建议

小投资者的机会

“如果你今天还很年轻,只有一点点资本,那么机会比我年轻时少。那时候我们刚从大萧条中走出来,资本主义还是个坏词。20 世纪 20 年代有过很多市场滥用行为。当时流传着一个笑话,有个人说:‘我买股票是为了养老,结果还真管用了——只用了六个月,我就感觉自己像个老人了!’

“对你们来说难度更大,但这并不意味着你们做不好——只是可能需要更长时间。不过,管他呢,也许你们活得更长呢。”

实践进化

“这一点非常重要。例如,赫兹租车和安飞士租车通过实践进化,开发出了适合它们自己的人员体系等等。它们就像是生态位相似但不同的物种。

“普通股投资者可以通过预测实践进化的结果来赚钱。你没法通过基本面分析推导出这一点——你必须用生物学的方式去思考。

“另一个例子是特百惠。我认为它发展出了一套充满心理操控意味的腐败体系。但实践证明,这套体系行得通,而且经久不衰。几十年来,特百惠派对卖出了数十亿美元的货。

“如果我们不喜欢一个公司的文化,我们就不会买入它。而文化正是长期实践进化的结果。”

投资的思维模型

“你必须掌握各个重要学科中的核心思想,并且一贯地运用它们——是全部运用,而不是只挑几个。大多数人只受过一种模型的训练,比如经济学,然后就试图用一种方法去解决所有问题。你知道那句老话:手里拿着锤子的人,看什么都像钉子。这是处理问题的一种愚蠢方式。”

满足于你所拥有的

“有一条真理,你的典型投资顾问可能会不同意:如果你过得已经很富足安逸,而别人通过投资高风险股票等方式比你富得更快,那又怎样?!总会有人比你富得更快。这绝不是悲剧。

“看看斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒(他曾管理乔治·索罗斯的一只基金,该基金因在投机性科技股和生物科技股上遭受重大亏损而基本清盘):他总是要当最好的,无法忍受别人在这些板块上打败他。

“人生和商业中的很多成功,来自于知道你想避开什么:早死、糟糕的婚姻等等。”

推荐书籍及对硅谷的评论

有人请芒格列出他有生以来最喜欢的书。他回答说:“这很难,因为我从那么多书中汲取了思想。有一本很棒的书是《自私的基因》,它提供了关于人类处境的基本洞见。[过去,芒格曾大力推荐《影响力》

"I hate with a passion GAAP [Generally Accepted Accounting Principles] as applied to derivatives and swaps. JP Morgan sold out to this type of accounting to front-end revenues. I think it's a disgrace." Interest Rates "Neither Warren nor I have any record of making large profits from interest rate bets. That being said, all intelligent citizens of this republic think a bit about this. In my lifetime, I've seen interest rates range from 1% to 20%. We try to operate so that really extreme interest rates in either direction wouldn't be too bad for us. When interest rates are in a middle range, as they are now, we're agnostic." Japan's Recession "Anyone has to be flabbergasted by Japan's recession, which has endured for 10 years, despite interest rates below 1%. The government is playing all the monetary games, but it's not working. If you had described this situation to Harvard economists, they would have said it's impossible. Yet at the same time, there's an asset bubble in Hong Kong. Why? Because Japan and China are two vastly different cultures. The Chinese are gamblers. "This is a classic example of why, to be a successful investor, one must draw from many disciplines. Imagine an economist standing up at a meeting of economists and giving my explanation. It wouldn't be politically correct! But the tools of economics don't explain what's going on." Advice to Other Investors Opportunities for Small Investors "If you have only a little capital and are young today, there are fewer opportunities than when I was young. Back then, we had just come out of a depression. Capitalism was a bad word. There had been abuses in the 1920s. A joke going around then was the guy who said, 'I bought stock for my old age and it worked -- in six months, I feel like an old man!' "It's tougher for you, but that doesn't mean you won't do well -- it just may take more time. But what the heck, you may live longer." Practice Evolution "This is really important. For example, Hertz and Enterprise Rent-a-Car through practice evolution have developed personnel systems, etc. that work for them. They are like different species in similar ecological niches. "Common stock investors can make money by predicting the outcomes of practice evolution. You can't derive this by fundamental analysis -- you must think biologically. "Another example is Tupperware, which developed what I believe to be a corrupt system of psychological manipulation. But the practice evolution worked and had legs. Tupperware parties sold billions of dollars of merchandise for decades. "We wouldn't have bought CORT if we didn't like the culture, which resulted from long practice evolution." Mental Models for Investing "You must know the big ideas in the big disciplines, and use them routinely -- all of them, not just a few. Most people are trained in one model -- economics, for example -- and try to solve all problems in one way. You know the old saying: to the man with a hammer, the world looks like a nail. This is a dumb way of handling problems." Be Satisfied with What You Have "Here's one truth that perhaps your typical investment counselor would disagree with: if you're comfortably rich and someone else is getting richer faster than you by, for example, investing in risky stocks, so what?! Someone will always be getting richer faster than you. This is not a tragedy. "Look at Stanley Druckenmiller [who ran one of George Soros' funds, which is essentially being shut down due to large losses in speculative tech and biotech stocks]: he always had to be the best and couldn't stand that others were beating him by investing in these sectors. "A lot of success in life and business comes from knowing what you want to avoid: early death, a bad marriage, etc." Recommended Books and Comments on Silicon Valley Munger was asked to name his favorite books of all time. He replied, "That's hard because I mix ideas from so many books. One fabulous book is The Selfish Gene, which provides basic insights on human conditions. [In the past, Munger has strongly recommended Influence: The

《说服心理学》,我最近刚读完,喜欢到把它列入了我多年来最爱的投资类书籍清单。

后来,潘恩韦伯公司负责保险行业的爱丽丝·施罗德问他,有没有读过《新新事物》《华尔街打折》或者《贝奥武夫》的新译本。他只读过前者,评论道:“有趣到能让我读完。有些方面它描述了一种令人震惊的文化。虽然硅谷对社会做出了巨大贡献,但有些事情相当接近‘资本主义不可接受的面孔’。”

EVA

被要求在伯克希尔·哈撒韦年会上就斯滕·斯图尔特及其经济增加值概念进一步阐述时,芒格说:

“显而易见,如果一家公司能产生高资本回报率并以高回报率进行再投资,它就会做得很好。但这不足以卖出书,所以引入了很多胡扯和模糊概念,比如资本成本,它们并没有增加多少价值。它之所以被接受,是因为部分内容是对的,但就像精神分析一样,我认为它从整体上不是一个值得赞赏的体系。”

很多人问我是否同意芒格对 EVA 的否定。有点同意。我同意他关于“胡扯”的评论,但担心他可能阻止了人们研究和理解资本回报率——这是我在评估一家公司时考虑的最重要的指标。当然,贝内特·斯图尔特的《价值探索》一书极其晦涩难懂,但 ROIC 不是一个困难的概念,计算起来也不难。关于对 ROIC 的易懂(更不用说免费了)理解,我推荐“傻瓜学校”的《看看 ROIC》以及保罗·约翰逊的《将 ROIC 作为经济度量引入》(重点看第 1 至 9 页和第 35 至 37 页)。约翰逊是《大猩猩游戏》的作者之一,那是我最喜欢的科技投资类书籍。

—— 惠特尼·蒂尔森

Psychology of Persuasion, which I just read and liked enough to add it to my list of all-time favorite books related to investing.] Later, Alice Schroeder, who covers the insurance industry for Paine Webber, asked if he'd read The New New Thing, Wall Street On Sale or the new translation of Beowulf. He had only read the former, and commented: "It was interesting enough for me to finish it. In some respects it describes an appalling culture. While Silicon Valley has made great contributions to society, some things come pretty close to 'the unacceptable face of capitalism.'" EVA Asked to elaborate on his comments at the Berkshire Hathaway meeting on Stern Stewart and their concept of Economic Value Added, Munger said: "It's obvious that if a company generates high returns on capital and reinvests at high returns, it will do well. But this wouldn't sell books, so there's a lot of twaddle and fuzzy concepts that have been introduced that don't add much -- like cost of capital. It's accepted because some of it is right, but like psychoanalysis, I don't think it's an admirable system in its totality." A number of people have asked whether I agree with Munger's dismissal of EVA. Sort of. I agree with his comment about the "twaddle," but fear that he may have deterred people from studying and understanding return on invested capital -- the single most important metric I consider when evaluating a company. Sure, Bennett Stewart's book, The Quest for Value, is unbearably dense, but ROIC is not a difficult concept nor is it difficult to calculate. For an understandable (not to mention free) take on ROIC, I recommend the Fool's School, A Look at ROIC, and Paul Johnson's Introducing ROIC as an Economic Measure (focus on pages 1-9 and 35-37). Johnson is one of the authors of The Gorilla Game, my favorite book on tech investing. -- Whitney Tilson