Wesco金融2008年股东大会——查理·芒格发言纪要
标题:2008 年西科金融股东大会——查理·芒格讲话笔记
年份:2008
类型:会议
等级:B1
来源网址:https://worldlypartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2008-wesco-annual-meeting-notes-of-charlie-mungers-remarks-peter-boodell.pdf
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2008 年西科金融股东大会:详细笔记
作者:沙伊·达达什蒂 发表时间:2008 年 5 月 9 日 | 涉及股票:BRK.A / BRK.B / WSC
西科金融年会,加州帕萨迪纳,2008 年
2008 年 5 月 7 日
笔记由彼得·布德尔提供;感谢!
http://valueinvestingresource.blogspot.com/2008/05/2008-wesco-shareholder-meetingdetailed.html
(按照惯例,记录这些笔记时未使用录音设备。这全归功于我高中的打字老师。因此,这些笔记仅为回忆内容——并非原话引用,不应被当作逐字记录来依赖。——PB)
查理·芒格:测试一下,后面能听到吗?德纳姆先生有个通知要宣布。
德纳姆:我们请求大家不要使用摄像机,谢谢。
查理·芒格:欢迎参加西科公司第 49 届年度股东大会。请在入口处登记投票。想要发言的人,请报上姓名,等待麦克风。股东名单显示,已收到 96% 的流通股代理投票权。董事选举?全体同意吗?【同意】。动议通过。
六位候选人当选。接下来是冗长的问答环节,在此之前,由董事长进行苏格拉底式独白。现在会议结束。
我们现在开始问答环节,先从一场漫长的苏格拉底式独白开始。在提问阶段,不要问我们在买入或卖出什么。其他任何问题都可以问,但我们不保证会回答。
由于你们许多人远道而来,在回答你们的问题之前,我先讲几句。我将谈两个主题:总体投资环境【以及伯克希尔·哈撒韦的教训】。我们通常会像躲瘟疫一样避免【讨论总体投资环境】。大多数资产的价格已经处于很难让人兴奋的水平。一套不错的公寓很难获得 4% 的收益率,而且这还没算更换地毯的费用。优质公司债券的收益率是 4%。公司股票的年派息率是 2%,每年增长 4%。这样的世界,并不是那个让你们所有人都能来参加这个会议的世界。上一代人简直是掉进了天堂——虽然有些波折,但却是最容易发家致富的时期。在那天堂般的十八年之前,耶鲁大学捐赠基金的购买力下降了 60%。他们的实际投资回报率是 0%,甚至是负的。像耶鲁这样聪明的投资者未来获得糟糕的结果,并非完全不可能。
人们习惯于把钱存起来,并以标准方式进行投资,从而感到相当舒适。人们很容易忘记这一点并非理所当然。许多人已经认识到这一点,但对于那些管理养老基金的人来说,【调整假设以降低预期】很难——就像提高税收那样痛苦,或者像作为一名公司首席执行官看起来不够出色那样难受。他们中的一些人怀疑,在运作固定收益养老金计划时,自己是否签下了一个过于艰巨的任务。那群人不想将预期回报率降到 4-5%,因为纠正计划的资金缺口太大。债券收益率只有 4%,所以他们转向了带有利润分成机制的另类投资。他们通过给予“合理回报”来解决问题,并出售对冲基金和风险投资基金、中后期基金、后期基金、私募股权等等等等。他们执行复杂的交易策略,投资于非洲的私募股权。他们还购买林地。【音响系统出现故障】显然,那台机器不喜欢刚才的话。人们涌入另类投资,而迄今为止这运作得相当成功。很多大学捐赠基金都这么做了——而这也正是我们参与的游戏。如果自然回报率是 5%,想把它提高到 9%,长期来看效果非常可疑。
人们想要通过延迟消费获得高实际回报将会很困难。我这一代人之所以做得这么好,多少有点侥幸,而这未必会持续下去。未来会有很多欺诈行为。许多人声称获得了阿尔法收益——但实际上他们只是在承担地震风险。到年底,要是没发生地震,他们就把钱揣进兜里。这是一种不光彩的投资方式。通过降低期望值而不是寻求极限结果来获得满足感,总是更容易。
我们还会有很多丑闻。大量腐朽的东西已经渗透到系统中。这已经引发了不愉快。接下来会是什么?我建议,全球的衍生品交易账簿就是下一个目标。衍生品账簿中允许使用的会计方法糟糕透顶。其中的道德和才智也糟糕透顶。他们用的一句话是:“我走了,你也会走。”这些账簿里埋藏的东西很危险,带有结算风险,并且基于会计师们允许的乐观假设。我在所罗门公司的时候,正赶上利率互换的会计处理方法被改变。他们有一个匹配账簿。他们赚了 700 万美元,用 1800 万赚了 2500 万。双方都希望以对自己有利的方式对交易进行估值。如果没有糟糕的会计处理,他们就留不住衍生品交易员。这里存在大量的格雷欣法则现象,即劣币驱逐良币。
如果你经营一家好银行,而街角一家充满雄性荷尔蒙的银行又在给你压力,那么你面临着巨大的趋同压力。每个人都会开始模仿。如果每所大学都将其 2% 的资产投入林地,这可以持续很长时间。但这是一个自我实现的过程。当清算来临时,当他们都想离场时……很多事情都依赖动量。估值会让每个人在一段时间内看起来都很不错。
我们已经在这场抵押贷款危机中看到了后果,情况并不好看。过去十八个月中暴露出的欺诈和愚蠢之多,令人难以置信。我先问一个问题,然后尝试回答它。为什么会发生这一切?贪婪、嫉妒,以及糟糕的会计处理是部分原因。普遍缺乏保守主义精神。“一切事物都必须经受巨大压力考验”的工程师思维被“只要音乐还在响,你就得跳舞”所取代。我没有跳舞的冲动,也不想随大流。
我最喜欢的故事之一是关于德克萨斯州的一个男孩。老师问全班一个问题:羊圈里有九只羊,一只跳了出来,还剩几只?每个人都答对了,说还剩八只。那个男孩说一只都不剩了。老师说你根本不懂算术,男孩说:“不,是你不懂羊。”萨姆·戈尔德温有句名言——“把我排除在外”——这是我非常喜欢的一个表达。
人们在分发那些他们自己不会购买的东西。这是现代世界的结构。我心爱的哲学家是弗兰克尔。他说,制度必须承担责任。做决策的人必须承受决策的后果。在古罗马,建筑商和设计师在脚手架拆除后要站在桥下。在跳伞中,你要自己打包自己的降落伞。资本主义也是这么运作的。在一家餐厅,老板承担着后果。如果他搞砸了,他就做不好。弗兰克尔会对餐饮业感到满意,但对投行业不会满意。他们卖出产品,拿了钱,然后回家——这行不通。而且,如果没有会计师的认可,人们也无法蒙混过关。我在所罗门公司时,是审计委员会的成员。有一群人过来说,他们想改变会计处理方法,指出“我们的信用评级很糟糕——我们想报告自动产生的利润”——比如,因为交易对手想卖出,所以我们能低价买断他们。我告诉他们:“除非我死了,否则你们别想用那种会计方法。”我赢得了那场战役,但我输掉了整场战争。
安然事件之后,会计师们规定,你的信用越差,你报告的利润就必须越高。在旧系统里,负债总是 100% 可靠的——你需要担心的是资产。会计师们把这个系统抛弃了。他们已经把它变成了标准。如果你去问会计师,他们会说这太复杂了,我们三年内都搞不定。他们想要一些简单易行的方法。一个愚蠢的程序和愚蠢的结果,只要它写在某本书里,他们就不在乎。这并非管理一个行业最明智的方式。
法律行业也招致了自身的谴责。奸诈之徒故意视而不见。他们不想从几个醉醺醺的壮汉手中抢走潘趣酒碗。我有一个朋友,曾在合伙公司提出一条规定:每年基于道德理由解雇一名客户。他们每年要赶走一个最唯利是图、最危险的客户。这个提议遭到了彻底否决。这其中存在一定程度的故意视而不见。如果你想防范,你就必须有一整套人们不被允许从事的活动。【音响系统又出问题了】我们就在加州理工学院的眼皮底下,却连音响系统都搞不定。嫉妒影响着公司薪酬。人们想像电影明星而不是大主教那样获得报酬。我认为这没有必要。大多数人会愿意以较低的薪酬来担任最高职位。这对文明来说是可怕的。它在整个社会中引发了极端的嫉妒情绪。在英国,他们把税收提得非常高,以至于任何有产者都被拉平到只能自己种西红柿的地步。这并不好,非常适得其反。这是出于嫉妒。劳动大众要求这样做,这是对嫉妒效应的反应。我们拥有现在这样的结果,并不好。
如果我们转向伯克希尔·哈撒韦,我们也有缺点,但我们有意避免了一些常见的缺点。有人计算过,如果沃伦按“2% 管理费加 20% 业绩提成”的标准给自己付酬,结果会怎样。那样的话,我们的税收会更低,所以其他股东会过得更好,但沃伦会拥有是他现在三倍的财富。如果按照那种方式运营,世界会变得更好吗?我不这么认为。当权者与股东一起赚钱,而不是从股东身上赚钱,这一点很有道理。我并不是在要求一种不合理的道德风尚。这在雅典是强制性的。“Liturgos”这个词,意思是“被要求的行为”。如果你是一个领导者,你必须拼命地给予。他们还有流放制度。当语言和传统强加了这些……我们可能需要它。我们应该以一种更传统的方式来约束人们。
我记起我要说什么了。特权。如果你是一家投资银行,而且需要被救助,那么就应该对你的杠杆率和业务的复杂性施加限制。还应该有定性的限制。总的来说,当银行以这种方式运作时,它们表现得很好。在我年轻时,美国银行——不会做它们现在做的那些事。衍生品交易,没有良好的结算,没有规则,过度和疯狂在自我滋养。普通的香草产品被定价到没有利润的地步。他们想做复杂的东西。不确定它是否清算了,或者对手方是否能承受得起。这不会困扰任何人,因为他们想要利润。衍生品账簿中隐藏的麻烦大得惊人。格林斯潘对安·兰德的教条摄入过量。他从未将其从自己的体系中清除出去。只要斧头谋杀是自然结果,那么它们就可以被接受。我认为这并非必要——并且认为你可以通过监管来消除斧头谋杀。人们谈论系统与风险转移的奇迹——但在我们的一些麻烦恰恰来自于过多的风险转移。
南海泡沫之后,英国取缔了上市公司——只允许私人公司存在。然后他们领导了世界一百年。适度的流动性对情况是有利的。过多的流动性会伤害人性。如果我说了那些话,我绝不会获得终身教职。但我是对的,他们是错的。我们不需要最恶劣的过度。我们不需要最聪明的科学和数学人才去搞计算机驱动的策略。这对更广泛的文明来说并非加分项。衍生品交易账簿——是一个尚未迎来结局的巨大的过度积累。
我现在要转向一个更有趣的话题,伯克希尔·哈撒韦现象。我们可以学到什么?在投资方面,人们正在意识到那个老式的观念:努力获得比你付出的价格更多的价值。我认为这个观念正在获得认同,而且我认为这对理性是一个加分。但这并没有让事情变得更容易。从事情的本质来看,轻松赚钱将会很困难。
它是如何组织的?我不认为世界历史上有什么公司能做到伯克希尔这样的规模,却以如此去中心化的方式组织。纯粹的官僚机构规模极小,成本很低,子公司的自主权极大,没有共同的文化来调派人手。这能走多远?这个系统已经比其他任何系统都走得更远了。成本低,嫉妒效应少——在那里没人拿所有东西来比较。子公司的员工有一种感觉——对总部的忠诚度较低。如果你想要一个帝国式的总部,对地方征收高昂的管理费——他们会怨恨的。子公司之间的纯粹内部转移数量极少。这运作得很好。它可以走得更远。以前没有其他人到过这里。
企业集团系统也有缺陷,总部会为各地下达单独的配额,迫使各省去完成中央的数字。这会在总部造成大量开支。通用电气擅长运营企业集团系统。伯克希尔避免了这些弊端。它可以走得更远。它有一个以低杠杆和极度愿意让资产自然收缩的方式来运营金融系统的系统——这是相当罕见的。大多数金融机构说一套做一套。人们无法忍受看着一个地方收缩。就拿通用再保险来说,它们需要衍生品账簿的程度,就像我需要一例梅毒一样。这让总部变得更有趣。当我们需要钱的时候,钱却不在那里。我们的衍生品账簿造成了 4 亿美元的损失,而我们已经比大多数地方都保守了。
【休息,修理音响系统】
我们现在换了一个硬线麦克风,所以请回到座位上。麦克风系统有教育意义。它们不应该被允许做的——就是任何过于复杂的事情。硬线麦克风系统【相对于无线系统】,你瞧,它就像往常一样正常工作。系统需要冗余系统,备用系统一,备用系统二。复杂系统——就连高级祭司通常也不理解它。系统会失控。现在我们让政府为信贷提供担保,然后让投资银行为所欲为——这是一个非常愚蠢的系统。他们应该有行为标准。他们觉得理所当然,而这不是他们在拥有美联储支持特权的情况下应该有的感觉。在伯克希尔,我们保守得可笑。就连我们的准备金也还有准备金。我们不必在每个周一早上更新我们的信贷。我们以一种永远不需要更新信贷的方式行事,而且我们仍然不需要那笔钱。
有人对我们做过的衍生品交易有过评论。既然别人不应该做,为什么我们要做?别人付给我们钱,是因为人们知道我们没有结算风险,我们不依赖于其他方的突发奇想。这是一种非常不同的交易。我们能够进行这些交易的唯一原因,是因为外面没有多少人能让别人信任来做这些交易。如果你问我,我会不会放弃所有衍生品交易的机会,回到一个像过去的工程学那样更简单、更干净的世界——我会毫不犹豫地这么做。但我们在抵押贷款市场上看到的,对于这个拥有糟糕规则和激励的系统而言,只是一道开胃菜。尤其是考虑到男性的胃口——女性不会让我们陷入这种混乱。在一场足球比赛中,如果没有规则,人们会摧毁对方球员的身体。这就是裁判的作用。所以我们需要裁判来告诉那些孩子气的成年人不要伤害别人。我不是在编造这些东西。马克·吐温说过,事实比小说更离奇,因为小说需要合乎逻辑。
有些人称你们这些人为邪教徒,但这里的大多数人是想学习的人。在这个世界上,这是一件非常好的事情。我认为我们正在偶然地创造一些东西,一个学习型机构,并且可能以这种方式运作很长时间。我不认为伯克希尔会在沃伦去世后消亡。我和两位伯克希尔的高管吃过午饭,天哪,这两个家伙很可能会把那个业务打造成世界上最好的之一。怎么可能在一个像伯克希尔这样的地方埋藏着这样的生意?这个地方有非常好的东西。伴随着声誉而来的是责任。我们应该努力配得上它。并且以一种让我们的继任者也做同样事情的方式来运营它。这就是我们正在努力做的。沃伦永远不会花掉这些钱的任何一部分。他从未捐出过自己需要的一分钱。他作为慈善家不值得称赞。我认为我们是你值得关注的有趣事物的一部分。我们接到那些信任我们、并且不相信其他任何人的电话。我们不会接到很多那样的电话,但你们中又有多少人接到过呢?
我扯远了。学术界对伯克希尔的反应是可悲的。这是一门拥有令人羡慕的公式的软科学。所以你必须给计算机编程,只买入高波动性的股票,才能每年多赚 7%?但如果这是真的,计算机会去做。我不明白为什么人们会关注那些想法。“别这样,孩子,”他们说,“你就是不懂现代金融。”而说出这些话的都是成年人。有一个人,他们给了诺贝尔奖,他一直在说伯克希尔只是运气好。一个六西格玛事件——他不会根据现有的事实改变他的理论。商业很简单,但细节很棘手。你需要一些帮你进行日常战斗的“纪念物”。
公司高管唯一的职责就是拓宽护城河。我们必须让它变得更宽。每一天都是为了让护城河变得更宽。我们给了你一个竞争优势,你必须为我们留下护城河。有时候这太难了。但职责应该是拓宽护城河。我能看到一个又一个实例,表明人们在做生意时并非如此。一个人必须专注于拓宽护城河这个球,成为你所获得竞争优势的守护者。英格兰的一位将军说过:“得到你父亲所生的儿子,上帝就会保佑女王。”在惠普,你的责任是培养和交付一个能够接替你职位的下属。这一切并不复杂——所有那些花哨的术语。我们在德克萨斯州制砖,使用的工艺和美索不达米亚一样。你只需要一点点道德准则,特别是工程师的道德准则。通盘思考系统,并获得一个安全边际。就像这个备用麦克风一样。
现场提问 1:谢谢你,查理。金融风险转移——名义价值 500 万亿美元。有点像莉莉·汤姆林说的——情况会在变得更糟之前变得更糟。这一切将如何收场?当中国 A 股完全疯狂时,你可以预测它一定会崩盘。当抵押贷款的过度行为在那些卑劣的小贩手里被层层分割包装时,情况也类似。然而,衍生品交易账簿却并非如此。它肯定没有必然到来的自动崩盘。总有一天它会是一团糟,但我不知道何时。如果贝尔斯登倒闭了,那将会是一场可怕的混乱。在信用违约互换中,假设有一笔 1 亿美元的债券发行,他们允许发行名义价值 1000 亿美元的合约。这给了公司一个巨大的激励去破产。你不允许为其他人——无关的第三方——购买保险。在美国,没有理由让人们对一个没有一方参与其中的 1 亿美元债券发行下如此巨大的赌注。这制造了不必要的复杂性和非常反常的动机。他们说“这是自由市场”。正确的形容词是“疯狂”。
现场提问 2:我是来自澳大利亚的马克。去年我担心银行的偿付能力。我让公司把我的股票以实物凭证的形式寄给了我。现在让大公司持有我们的股票是安全的,还是放在家里更安全?
好问题。我认为在信誉良好的公司的现金账户中风险很低。即使在保证金账户中,我认为风险也很低。把它们放在家里很不方便。它们最终还是会进入存管机构。每个人都依赖于电子脉冲。我认为相当安全。
2008 Wesco Shareholder Meeting: Detailed Notes by: Shai Dardashti posted on: May 09, 2008 | about stocks: BRK.A / BRK.B / WSC Wesco Annual Meeting, Pasadena CA 2008 May 7, 2008 Notes courtesy of Peter Boodell; thank you! http://valueinvestingresource.blogspot.com/2008/05/2008-wesco-shareholder-meetingdetailed.html (As is standard, no recording equipment was used to reproduce these notes. My high school typing teacher gets all the credit. As a result, these notes are recollections only – not quotes, and should not be relied upon as a literal transcript. –PB) CM: Testing, can you hear in back? Mr Denham has an announcement. Denham: We ask you not to use your video recorders, thanks. CM: Welcome to the 49th annual meeting of shareholders of Wesco Corp. Please register to vote at entrance. Anyone wishing to speak, state name, wait for microphone. List of shareholders, 96% of outstanding proxies received. Election of directors? All in favor? [Aye]. Motion is carried. Six nominees are elected. There will be a long Q&A preceded by Socratic solitaire conducted by the Chairman. Meeting is adjourned. We now begin Q&A, starting with a long game of Socratic solitaire. During questions, do not ask what we are buying or selling. Any other question is fair game, but we don’t agree to answer them. Because many of you have come from such a long distance, I will talk before I take your questions. I will address two topics, general investment climate [and learnings from Berkshire Hathaway]. We normally avoid [discussing the general investment climate] like the plague. Most assets are priced to a level where it is hard to get excited. It is hard to get 4% yield on a nice apartment, and it doesn’t include replacing the carpets. Bonds of strong corporations are 4% yield. Corporate equities are paying 2% pa, growing 4% per year. Such a world isn’t the one that made all of you able to come to the meeting. Last generation has been in hog heaven – some bumps, but it had easiest time getting ahead. In the eighteen years that preceded hog heaven, the purchasing power of Yale’s endowment went down 60%. They were getting real investment return of 0%, negative. It is not at all impossible that brilliant investors like Yale get bad results in the future. People are used to laying money aside and investing in standard fashion, and become quite comfortable. It is easy to forget that this isn’t guaranteed. Many have recognized this, but for those running pensions it is difficult [to adjust down assumptions] —like the agony of raising taxes or not looking good as CEO of a company. Some of them wonder if they have signed up for something too hard when running a defined pension plan. That crowd doesn’t want to go to a 4-5% assumption, because the pain of the money needed to correct the plan is large. Bonds pay 4%, so they go to alternative investments with profit sharing. They solve the problem by giving ‘reasonable return’ and sell hedge funds and venture capital fund, mid-stage, late stage, private equity, etc etc etc. They do complex trading strategies, private equity in Africa. They buy timber. [audio system malfunctions] Evidently that machine didn’t like the remark. People go into alternatives, and this has worked very well so far. A lot of university endowments have done it – and that is game we are in. If natural return is 5%, getting it to 9% is very unlikely to work well long term. It’s going to be difficult for people to have high real returns from deferring consumption. The reason my generation did so well was kind of a fluke, and won’t necessarily continue. There will be lots of chicanery in future. Many claim alpha – but really they are just taking earthquake risk. At end of year, when there is no earthquake, they take the money. This is a dishonorable way to invest. It is always easier to get felicity by reducing expectations instead of seeking extreme results. We have plenty of scandals coming. Lots of rot has gotten into system. It has caused unpleasantness. What is next? I suggest the derivative trading books of the world are next. The accounting allowed in derivative books has been god awful. The morals and intelligence has been god awful. ‘I’ll be gone and you’ll be gone’ is phrase they use. What is buried in those books is dangerous, with clearance risks with optimistic assumptions that the accountants allowed. I was at Salomon when interest rate swap accounting was changed. They had a matched book. They were making $7mil, 25m over 18m. Both sides wanted to mark trades profitably. They couldn’t retain derivative traders if they didn’t have bad accounting. There is a lot of Gresham’s law here, where the bad practice drives out the good. If you run a good bank, and testosterone bank around corner pressures you, there are tremendous pressures to conform. Everyone starts replicating. If every university puts 2% into timber, that can go on a long time. But it is self-fulfilling. When it comes to the unwind, when they all want to get out. A lot of things rely on momentum. Valuations make everyone look good for a while. We have seen consequences in this mortgage meltdown, not pretty. The amount of knavery and folly revealed in last eighteen months has been unbelievable. I will ask a question, then I will attempt to answer it. Why did this happen? Greed, envy, and terrible accounting was part of it. There was a general lack of conservatism. The engineering mindset that everything must withstand great stresses was thrown out for ‘if music is playing, you gotta dance’. I don’t feel compulsion to dance, to join the crowd. One of my favorite stories is boy in Texas, when the teacher asked the class the following question. There are nine sheep in pen, and one jumps out, how many are left? Everyone got it right, and said eight are left. The boy said none are left. The teacher said you don’t understand arithmetic, and he said ‘no you don’t understand sheep’. Sam Goldwin had a saying – ‘include me out’ – it is one of my favorite expressions. People were distributing stuff that they wouldn’t buy themselves. It is the structure of the modern world. Favorite philosopher: Frankl. He said the systems have to be responsible. People who are making decisions must bear results of decisions. In Rome, the builder and designer stood under the bridge when the scaffolding was removed. In parachutes, you pack your own chute. Capitalism works that way too. At a restaurant, owner is bearing the consequences. If he slips, he doesn’t do well. Frankl would be pleased with restaurant business, and not pleased with investment banking. They sell, take the money, go home – it doesn’t work. And people wouldn’t get by if accountants didn’t bless it. When I was at Salomon, I was on the audit committee. A group came and said that we want to change our accounting, and where our credit is terrible – we want to report automatic profits – ie, to buy counterparties out cheaply because they want to sell. I told them that ‘You will have that accounting over my dead body’. I won that battle, but I lost the war. Post Enron, accountants made mandatory that where the worse your credit gets the more profits you make. In the old system, the liabilities are always 100% good – it’s the assets you have to worry about. Accountants have thrown it out. They have made it standard. If you ask accountants about it, they say it is so complicated we won’t get to it in 3 yrs. They want something simple to do. A silly procedure and silly result doesn’t bother them as long as it is in some book. That is not wisest way to run a profession. Legal profession comes in for own opprobrium. Knavish people were deliberately blind. They didn’t want to wrestle punch bowl away from a couple burly drunks. I had a friend who once proposed a rule at the partnership that they would fire one client per year on moral grounds. They would get rid their most venal and dangerous client once a year. That proposal went down in flames. There is a certain amount of deliberate blindness. If you want to prevent, you must have whole lines of activity that people are not allowed to engage in. [more problems with sound system] We are in shadow of Caltech and we can’t get the sound system right. Envy effects corporate compensation. People want to be paid like movie stars rather than archbishops. I don’t think it is necessary. Most would occupy top position at lower compensation rate. It is terrible to civilization. It brings extreme envy into population at wide. In Britain, they took taxes so high that anyone with property was leveled down to growing their own tomatoes. It was not good, very counterproductive. It was matter of envy. The working population required it and it was reaction to envy effects. It is not good to have the results we have had. If we turn to Berkshire Hathaway, we have faults, but some of standard faults we deliberately avoid. Someone recorded what we would have had if Warren had paid himself 2&20. We would have had much lower taxes, so some other shareholders would have been better off, but Warren would have had 3x what he has now. Would world have been better if it had been run that way? I don’t think so. There is a lot to be said that people in power make money with shareholders, not off them. I’m not asking for an unreasonable ethos. It was compulsory in Athens. Liturgos, means required behavior. You had to give like hell if you were a leader. They had banishment. When language and traditions impose these… we might need it. We should restrict people in a more old fashioned way. I remember what I was going to say. Privileges. If you are an investment bank and had to be rescued, there should be limits on leverage and the complications of your business. There should be qualitative limits too. By and large banks behaved well when it worked this way. When I was young, Bank of America – would not have done things they do now. Derivative trading, no good clearance, no rules, excess and craziness feeding on itself. The plain vanilla products got priced down to no profits. They wanted to do complicated stuff. Not sure if it cleared, or other side would be good for it. It didn’t bother anyone since they wanted the profits. The hidden trouble in derivative books is awesomely large. Greenspan overdosed on Ayn Rand ethos. He never got it out of his system. As long as axe murders were a natural outcome, then they were okay. I don’t think it is necessary – and think you can regulate ax murders away. People talk about marvels of system and risk transfer – but some of our troubles COME from having so much risk transfer. After South Sea Bubble, Britain outlawed public corporations – only private ones allowed. And they led the world for 100 yrs. A modest amount of liquidity will serve the situation. Too much liquidity will hurt human nature. I would never be tenured if I said that. But I’m right and they are wrong. We don’t need worst excesses. We do not need smartest people in science and math in computer driven strategies. This is not a plus for wider civilization. Derivative trading books – is one big clump of excess not having had its denouement. I am now going to turn to a more interesting subject, the Berkshire Hathaway phenomenon. What are the lessons? On investment side, people are realizing that old fashioned idea of trying to get more value than you are paying for. I think that idea is gaining, and I think a plus for rationality. It doesn’t make it any easier. By the nature of things, it will be difficult to make easy money. How is it organized? I don’t think in history of world has anything Berkshire’s size organized in so decentralized a fashion. Net amount of bureaucracy is tiny, costs are low, autonomy in subsidiaries is vast, no common culture shuffling people around. How far can this go? This system has gone farther than any other system. Low cost, not a lot of envy effects – where everyone compares everything. People in subsidiaries have a feeling – whereby there is less fealty to headquarters. If you want an imperial headquarters which exacts a big overhead charge on the provinces – they will resent it. Net number of intrasubsidiary transfers is tiny. It has worked well. It can go a lot farther. No one else has been here before. There are defects to the conglomerate system, where you have a separate quota system driven by headquarters driving provinces to meet central numbers. It causes a lot of expenses at headquarters. GE is good at running a conglomerate system. Berkshire has avoided the minuses. It can go farther. It has a system of running a financial system with low leverage and extreme willingness to let assets run out – that is quite rare. Most financial institutions talk our talk but don’t walk our walk. People can’t stand watching a place shrink. If you take General Re, they needed a derivative book like I needed a case of syphilis. It made headquarters more interesting. When we reached for money it wasn’t there. Out derivative book produced $400m of losses, and we were more conservative than most places. [break to fix the sound system] We have moved to a hard mike, so please return to your seats. Microphone system has an educational value. What they should not be allowed to do – is anything that is too complicated. The hard mike system [vs the wired], lo and behold, is working as it always did. Systems need duplicative systems, back up system one, and back up system two. Complicated systems – the high priests usually don’t understand it either. The system just goes out of control. Now we have government guaranteeing credit and then letting investment banks do what they want -- it is a very foolish system. They ought to have behavioral standards. They feel entitled, and that is not what they should feel with privilege of Federal Reserve backing. At Berkshire, we are ridiculously conservative. Even our reserves have reserves. We don’t have to renew our credit every Monday morning. We behave in way that we never need to renew our credit, and we still don’t need the money. There have been comments on derivative trades we have done. If other people shouldn’t be doing it, why are we? Other people pay us money because people know we don’t have clearance risk, we are not at whim of other parties. It is a very different kind of a trade. The only reason we can make those trades is because there aren’t many out there who others would trust to make those trades. If you ask me, would I give up all of the opportunities of derivative trading to go back to a simpler cleaner world like engineering of yore--I would do it in a heartbeat. But what we have seen in mortgage market is only an aperitif to what we would see, in a system with bad rules and incentives. Especially with the appetites of males – women wouldn’t get us into this mess. In a soccer game, if there were no rules, people would destroy the body of the person on the other side. That is what referee is for. So we need referees to tell boyish adults not to hurt others. I don’t make this stuff up. Mark Twain said that truth is stranger than fiction because fiction has to make sense. Some people call you people cultists, but most here are people who want to learn. It is a very good thing to be in this world. I think we are accidently creating something which is a learning institution, which may work that way for a long time. I don’t think Berkshire will perish when Warren dies. I had lunch with two Berkshire executives, and my heavenly days, those two guys are likely to make that business one of best in the world. How could there be a business like that buried in a place like Berkshire? There are very good things in this place. With reputation, comes duty. We should try to earn it. And run it in a way that people who succeed us do the same thing. That is what we are trying to do. Warren will never spend any of the money. He has never given a way a dime he needed. He deserves no credit as a philanthropist. I think we are part of something quite interesting and worth following. We get calls from people who trust us, and who don’t trust anyone else. We don’t get many calls like that, but how many of you get any? I have rambled on. Academic response to Berkshire has been pathetic. It is soft science with enviable formulas. So you had to program a computer to buy only highly volatile stocks in order to make 7% per annum more? But if true, computers would do it. I don’t know why people pay attention to those ideas. Down boy, they say, you just don’t understand modern finance. And these are grown up people. One man, to whom they gave the Nobel, he kept saying Berkshire just lucky. A six sigma event – he wasn’t going to change his theory on the facts available. Business is simple, the details are hard. You need mementoes in place to help you in daily fight. The only duty of corporate executive is to widen the moat. We must make it wider. Every day is to widen the moat. We gave you a competitive advantage, and you must leave us the moat. There are times when it is too tough. But duty should be to widen the moat. I can see instance after instance where that isn’t what people do in business. One must keep their eye on ball of widening the moat, to be a steward of the competitive advantage that came to you. A General in England said, ‘Get you the sons your fathers got, and God will save the Queen.’ At Hewlett Packard, your responsibility is to train and deliver a subordinate who can succeed you. It is not all that complicated – all that mumbo jumbo. We make bricks in Texas which use the same process as in Mesopotamia. You need just a few bits of ethos, and particularly engineering ethos. Think through the system, and get a margin of safety. Like this backup microphone. Q1: Thank you Charlie. Financial risk transfers – 500trillion notional value. Sort of like Lilly Toms – things will get worse before they get worse. How does this all unwind? When the Chinese A-shares went utterly crazy, you could predict this has to collapse. When mortgage excesses got crazy on slicing and dicing by scummy hucksters, it was similar. Derivatives trading books however are not similar. It has no automatic collapse surely to come. Some day it will be a mess, but I don’t know when. The mess that would have been if Bear Stearns went under would have been awesome. In CDS, assume $100mil bond issue, and they allow issuance of $100b notional contracts. You have huge incentive for company to go broke. You are not allowed to buy insurance on other people, unrelated parties. There is no reason in America to have vast bets on $100m bond issue to which no one is party. It creates needless complexity and very perverse incentives. They say “it’s a free market”. The correct adjective is insane. Q2: Mark from Auz. Last year I was concerned about solvency in banks. I had stocks sent to me in scrip form. Is it now safe to let large corporations hold our stock or safer to keep at home? Good question. I think risks are low in a cash account at reputable firms. Even in a margin account I think risks are low. It is inconvenient to keep them at home. They all end up in depositaries anyway. Everyone relying on electronic blips. I think fairly safe.
问题 3来自纽约。目前市场上衍生品规模达 30 万亿美元,是 GDP 的 3 倍。您认为这个规模未来会带来危险吗?您有没有和写衍生品的人聊过?
这很复杂。它们显示了巨额利润。奇怪的是——它们还能膨胀到如此庞大的规模。利率互换——被高估了。监管很不完善,对我们其他人构成了危险。
问题 4:来自加利福尼亚。我们给儿子取名沃伦。我们正在加州找房子。想听听您对房价的看法。
在加州大部分地区,房价正在下跌。如果你想在帕萨迪纳买房,如果房主报价 180 万,最好从 185 万开始出价。所以并非所有地方都在下跌。总的来说,买房的最佳时机是你需要的时候。如果从中赚了钱,那只是你履行家庭义务的副产品。
问题 4:来自纽约。您有没有要求子公司的优质项目提高利润率?
我们尽量收购这样的公司,它们被良好的企业精神深深渗透,不需要总部来检查。我们努力生活在一片应得的信任织就的无缝网络中。这对我们很管用,也是最理想的生活方式。如果你的婚姻伴侣有一份 60 页的合同,你就不该结婚。你想要的是信任的无缝网络。如果生活很艰难,你也许需要一套命令控制体系。但我们会尽量避开。
问题 5:来自新泽西。铁路监管?
查理·芒格:它们受到监管。多年来赚的钱实在太少,我预计未来规定会有所改善。它们大幅提升了运力。这代价高昂。我不认为监管负担会变重,因为铁路行业的表现一直不错。
问题 6:来自纽约。理性?没有谁是 100% 理性的。您如何调和理性与成功人际关系所需要的非理性?
查理·芒格:有些关系,如果你很理性,根本不可能有。如果有人邀你参加海洛因派对,你要是理性,就不会加入。我认为理性大有裨益。它是一种深层的道德责任,你必须像信托一样持守,并且要不断磨炼。不擅长理性的人,就得找另一位大师。我生来就是另一种人。
问题 7:来自华盛顿州。通胀?
查理·芒格:如果你有竞争优势,销售利润率是 10%,而由于通胀销售额增加了 10%,你往往会多赚一点钱。至于我们赚得少还是多,我的答案是可能会多赚一点。
Q3NY. The amount of derivatives out there today 30tril, 3x GDP. Do you think
volumes will present danger in future, have you ever spoken to someone who writes derivatives? It is complicated. They show large profits. It is peculiar thing – allowed to morph to huge size. Interest rate swaps – overstated. So imperfectly regulated it has a danger to the rest of us. Q4: CA. Named our son after Warren. We are in market for a house in CA. Wanted your views on house prices. Housing prices are going down in most places in CA. If you want house in Pasadena, if offer price 1.8m better to start bid at 1.85m. So not going down everywhere. Generally speaking the time to buy a house is when you need one. If you make money on it, it is just a byproduct of you doing your family duty. Q4: NY. Have you ever asked quality programs at subsidiaries to improve margins? We try to buy companies so permeated by good ethos that they don’t need checking from headquarters. We are trying to live in a seamless web of deserved trust. It has worked for us, and it is the ideal way to live. If your marriage partner has sixty page contract, you shouldn’t enter. You want to get a seamless web of trust. If life is hard, you may need a command control system. But we try to avoid it. Q5: NJ. Railroad regulation? CM: They are regulated. Earned so little money for years, that I expect rules will be better in future. They have increased capacity in a great way. It has been costly. I would not anticipate regulatory burdens to be high because the railroads have behaved well. Q6: NY. Rationality? No one is 100% rational. How do you reconcile rationality with irrationality required for successful human relationships? CM: There are some relationships you couldn’t have if you were rational. If someone asked you to join heroin smoking party, you wouldn’t qualify if you were rational. I think rationality is of immense benefit. It is a deep moral duty, you must hold it in trust and must hone it. People who are no good at it, they have to go to a different guru. I was born into a different skin. Q7: WA. Inflation? CM: If you have competitive advantage, and make 10% of sales, and sales go up 10% due to inflation, you will tend to make a little more money. Whether we will earn less or more, my answer is probably earn a little more.
第 8 问UT。通用再保险。布兰登辞职。
我们不想谈那个话题。但我们支持乔·布兰登。他干得非常出色。我们坚持这个看法。我本人信任他。
[掌声]
第 9 问:TX。你好。美国每天向其他国家输送 20 亿美元。每天 20 亿美元给别国,这能持续吗?
如果我是这个国家的管理者,我不会搞双赤字。我会推行一些政策,不让事情走到现在这么远的地步。
第 10 问:丹·里佐夫斯基。讨论一下观点,以及达成共识要用哪种模式?
我们千载难逢才会达成一致。他做的事我极少会不做。偶尔我们会改变彼此的看法。我们就像一对老夫老妻,哼哼哈哈,点个头就定了——根本不需要交谈。
第 11 问:来自洛杉矶的哈罗德。谈谈对艾伦·格林斯潘、安·兰德,以及那位不敢相信伯克希尔成功的金融学教授的看法。有没有像今天这样的时刻,事实对当权者来说如此无足轻重?
你和那些同党混在一起。你应该避免这样。很多人完全自信自己知道答案。当你有了这种自信,你需要克服它。
第 12 问:来自匹兹堡的詹姆斯·阿姆斯特朗。你曾说过,穆迪和哈佛商学院拥有全世界最强的定价权。是什么导致穆迪的护城河缩水?
所有评级机构,用后见之明来看,表现都很糟糕。当你表现糟糕时,你就损害了自己的经济特许权。他们不够根本。这正是我刚才说的那类事情的典型例子。为了赚更多钱,他们把自己的位置搞得更糟了一点。这很明显,不是吗?
第 13 问:来自洛杉矶的斯科特。如果管理的是 200 万美元的投资组合,而不是伯克希尔那样的规模,你的职责会有什么不同?小规模 vs 中等规模,美国 vs 国际,等等?
如果我是管小资金,我会去小地方找,找定价错误的机会。但我不想跟你换位置。[笑声]
第 14 问:来自圣何塞的马特。加州是 AAA 评级。唯一比它差的是路易斯安那州。
两党都在搞选区划分。除非你是极左或极右的疯子,否则很难当选。在一个疯狂的体系里,这是完全自然的结果。我们不会自愿去改变这个体系。我是上次试图改变这个体系的最大捐款人。结果一败涂地。敬请期待。
Q8UT. General Re. Brandon resignation.
We want to stay away from that subject. But we will stand behind Joe Brandon. He did a magnificent job. We stand behind that observation. I would trust him personally. [applause] Q9: TX. Howdy. US force feeding 2bil per day. $2b a day to other countries, is it sustainable? I would not be running twin deficits if I was running this country. I would have policies that didn’t push things as far as they have been pushed. Q10: Dan Rizowsky. Discuss opinions and which model to reach a resolution? We come to agreement once in a blue moon. Very seldom does he do something I wouldn’t do. Once in a while will we change each others’ view. We’re like an old married couple, humph humph and a nod and it is decided – no conversation necessary. Q11: Harold from LA. Comments on Alan Greenspan and Ayn Rand and finance professor who can’t believe the success of Berkshire. Has there been a time like today when facts on the ground count so little for people in position of power? You hang around with fellow ideologues. You should avoid this. Many people are totally confident they know the answer. When you have this confidence you need to get over it. Q12: James Armstrong from Pittsburgh. You have said that Moody’s and HBS have the best pricing power of anyone in the world. What causes Moody’s moat to shrink? All the rating agencies with 20/20 hindsight have performed poorly. When you perform poorly you impair your franchise. They weren’t quite fundamental enough. Exact example of the kind of thing I was speaking about. In an attempt to make more, they made their position a little worse. This is obvious isn’t it? Q13: Scott from LA. With portfolio of $2m, vs. that of Berkshire, how would your mandate be different? Small vs mid, us vs intl, etc? If I was managing smaller money I’d be looking in smaller places, I’d look for mispricing. But I don’t want to change places with you. [laughter] Q14: Matt from San Jose. California is single A rating. Only other one is worse is Louisiana. Both parties have been gerrymandering the legislature. It’s hard to get elected unless you’re a left or right wing nut. It’s a perfectly natural result in an insane system. We are not voluntarily going to change the system. I was the largest donor to the last attempt to change this system. We went down in flames. Stay tuned.
Q15来自圣莫尼卡的 Sam。您对反恐战争和伊拉克战争有何看法?
A:你问得有点远了。恐怖主义是个非常棘手的问题。人们对解决方案过于自信了。他们很可能犯了错。
Q16:股东 Phil。如果您是美联储主席,您会怎么做?对信贷紧缩的短期和长期解决方案有何建议?
改变这个体系,让它更负责任。几十年来我们有过保证金要求,美联储强制实施。如今,期权和衍生品组合在一起,保证金要求已经消失了。美联储没有去杠杆化的权力。我认为这个体系有严重问题。
Q17:来自帕萨迪纳的 Casey。沃伦喜欢的是对无形资产的高回报。您还看重什么?
我们最近买卡夫食品,是因为钱太多了。我们现在接受的回报率比十年前低得多。这是世界竞争加剧的自然结果。
Q18:您如何看待实际收益率为负的国债市场?
如果那是我最好的机会,那会很令人沮丧。
Q19:来自得克萨斯州沃斯堡的 Forest。您是从重置价值的角度来看铁路的吗?
你知道今天重建伯灵顿北方铁路要花多少钱吗?我们不会再去建另一条横贯大陆的铁路了。这些资产很有价值,有实用价值。现在他们想提高卡车的柴油价格。真希望我几年前就能聪明点看出这一点。避开人类最极端的愚蠢行为,会让你变得更好。
Q20:来自加州。为什么商业地产的跌幅没有住宅地产那么大?
资本化率大幅下降,资产价值大幅上升。融资交易正逐渐脱离狂热状态。很多房地产财富是靠高杠杆赚来的。商业地产对我们来说不是好生意,但对企业家型的人来说还行。我们不应该做这个。
Q21:来自纽约市的 Matt。伯克希尔如何通过其子公司管理年度预算流程?
我们没有预算流程。对预算过于执着会产生不良激励。只消削减不必要的成本就行。预算委员会往往起到相反的作用。
Q15Sam from Santa Monica. What are your thoughts on the war on terror and the war
in Iraq? A: You’re going pretty far afield. Terror is a hell of a problem. People are vastly overconfident in the solution. They are probably making an error. Q16: Phil, shareholder. What would you do if you were Fed. Suggestions on short and long term solutions to credit crunch? Changing the system so the system is more responsible. We had margin requirements for decades and the fed forced this. Now with the combination of options and derivatives margin requirements have vanished. Federal Reserve has no power to deleverage. I think the system is seriously wrong. Q17: Casey from Pasadena. Strong return on intangible assets is what WB likes. What else do you look for? We buy Kraft these days because we have so much money. We are accepting way lower returns now than we were ten years ago. It is natural consequence of the world getting more competitive. Q18: What do you think of the treasury market with negative real yields? It would be depressing if that was my best opportunity. Q19: Forest from Ft. Worth Texas. Do you look at railroads from a replacement value standpoint? Do you know what it would cost to replace Burlington Northern today? We are not going to build another transcontinental. And those assets are valuable, have utility. Now they want to raise diesel prices on trucks. Wish I was smart enough to identify this few years earlier. Avoiding the most extreme follies of man makes you better. Q20: CA. Why has commercial property not fallen as much as residential? Cap rates came way down and asset values went way up. Financing transactions are getting away from euphoric conditions. A lot of the real estate fortunes have been made with extraordinary leverage. Commercial real estate is not a good business for us but ok for the entrepreneurial types. We shouldn’t be doing it. Q21: Matt from NYC. How does Berkshire thru its subsidiaries manage an annual budgeting process? We don’t have one. Obsessing over budgets creates bad incentives. Just eliminate unnecessary costs. Budget committees tend to do just the opposite.
Q22约翰,股东。最近有什么书推荐吗?
我是个历史迷和科学迷。西奥迪尼的《Yes》不错。大多数心理学教授都搞不定这些现实世界的材料。它不是一本完美的书,也不如《影响力》。就像沃伦说的,经验就是你在寻找别的东西时遇到的东西。
Q23:彼得,纽约扬克斯。保险浮存金和资产管理浮存金,哪个更好?
答:从纯粹的实用角度看,你在资产管理上赚的钱可以比保险业务多得多。很少有像资产管理一样好的生意。财产和意外险的平均回报一直相当可怜。一旦你有了足够的钱,你就停止接受赔偿,只是管理钱——这更男人。世界上至少 95% 的保险业务都比我们的差。
Q24:阿肖克,来自洛杉矶。检查清单?
我没有简单的检查清单。你必须花很长时间、很长时间去努力。经过多年的努力,我仍然会做蠢事。你拥有的重要想法越多,事情就越容易。我们把很多很多东西排除在外,因为它们属于“太难”那一堆。如果你做排除,你会做得更好。然后你必须有一个理性会得到回报的领域。一些政治想法——很难知道它们在接下来的几个世纪里会如何发展。我们不打算卷入其中。我们寻找那些能做到的事。但我没有所谓的小清单。那些在电视上晚上卖腹肌产品的人可能有。我没有让大脑变强的法则。
Q25:惠特尼·蒂尔森。纽约。你公布了收益,但竟然没有一个股东问这个问题。我希望能听听你对伯克希尔收益的看法,以及对按市价计价的衍生品亏损的看法。
这件事非常引人注目。就像福尔摩斯的故事——关于狗的异常行为。福尔摩斯问晚上狗的行为。“狗没有发出任何声音。”“对,这一点很异常。”这也许是一个教训。那些人信任我们。他们信任沃伦,而且理所当然。你看到一个有趣的例子,值得拥有的信任在现实世界中发挥作用,就在奥马哈。顺便说一句,我们喜欢那个位置。会计们不知道自己在做什么,但我不批评他们。
Q26:洛杉矶。25 年后,你认为石油产量会是什么水平?你预计哪一年会出现峰值?
这很抬举我,但我不觉得这个问题或我的回答会对我的声誉有什么帮助。我们不知道是哪一年,沃伦之所以在上周末如此强烈地引用我的回答,原因在于那是一个截然不同的世界——25 年后石油产量会下降,必须做出根本性的调整。哈伯特相当准确地预测了峰值。如果还没到峰值,那也快了,然后就会下降。在 120 美元/桶的价格下,生产系统显然存在压力。
Q27:洛杉矶。我去的私立学校是你捐资建了科学楼的。对于很多少数族裔来说,毕业率很低。政府能做什么来帮助?我们能做什么?
非常严重的问题,让人痛苦。加州曾经有美国最好的公立教育体系。这是一件非常可悲的事情。私立体系非常有竞争力。沃伦曾建议,如果不允许任何人使用私立学校,公民就会确保公立体系良好。我不确定沃伦在这件事上是否正确。就我个人而言,我更擅长提升顶层,而不是托举底层。我为什么不坚持做我更擅长的游戏呢?如果你想知道如何把顶层提得更高,我想我能帮你不少。如果你想提升最底层,我不知道怎么做。
Q28:波士顿。瑞士再保险的交易。你能补充一些细节吗?长尾险?
这会是长尾险。不会是一笔横财。应该会合理,我们喜欢瑞士再保险。
Q29:我很好奇,你是历史的学生。今天的情况让你想起过去的哪个时期吗?为什么?
我在东京酒店的付费频道上按了一下,出来的是一段色情练习。我会说所多玛和蛾摩拉今天依然存在。我认为伯里克利的雅典今天依然存在。我们的恶霸与过去的时代相似。
Q30:洛杉矶。金融危机将如何影响巴西和中国?你会在那里投资吗?
我们有一个互相依存的(经济)体系。(这里的放缓)会在其他地方产生连锁反应。巴西会有麻烦吗?不会。巴西如今地理位置有利。如果我能有同样好的商业前景,我更喜欢美国。巴西拥有的那个铁矿,只需要很少的知识就知道它是世界上最好的之一。农业——他们的地位非常强势。我们目前没有在那里投资。我们持有少量巴西雷亚尔头寸。
Q31:加州。医疗保险?
医疗保险行业得到了不应有的负面报道。当医疗失败时,他们说这就是它的特点。但医疗也阻止了很多干预措施。但好莱坞认为医疗保健的一切都是坏的。我不知道会发生什么。我认为单一支付方可能会发生,而且可能不会太遥远。事实上,它很可能会发生,如果民主党拿下两院,可能性大概 50%。
Q32:洛杉矶。银行体系中荒谬的杠杆。巨大的烂摊子。唯一的反应是,政府把有毒部分拿过来,扔到了自己的账上。
Q22John, shareholder. Any recent books you recommend?
I’m a bug for history and science. Yes by Cialdini is good. Most of the psychology professors can’t handle this real life material. It’s not a perfect book and not as good as Influence. As Warren says, experience is what happens when you’re looking for something else. Q23: Peter, Yonkers NY. Which is better, insurance based float or money management float? A: In terms of pure utilitarian perspective, you can make way more money in money mgmt than insurance business. There are few businesses as good as money management. Average returns in insurance property and casualty have been pretty pathetic. Once you have enough money you stop accepting compensation and just manage money -- it is more manly. At least 95% of the insurance businesses in the world are worse than ours. Q24: Ashok from LA. Checklist? I don’t have a simple checklist. You have to work at it a long long time. I still do dumb things after years of hard work. The more big ideas you have the easier. We exclude a whole lot of things because they are in the too tough pile. If you exclude, you do better. Then you must have field where rationality will be rewarded. Some of political ideas – it is very hard to know how they will work out over next few centuries. We are not trying to involve ourselves. We look for things that can be done. But I have no little short list. People who sell strong abs on TV at night might have one. I have no rule for a strong brain. Q25: Whitney Tilson. NY. You reported earnings, but not a single shareholder asked about it. I was hoping for a comment on Berkshire earnings, and on mark to market derivative losses. It was a very remarkable occurrence. Like the Sherlock Holmes story – about the remarkable happening with the dog’s behavior. Sherlock Holmes asks about the behavior of the dog in the night. “The dog didn’t make a sound.” “Yes, that was remarkable.” That perhaps is teaching a lesson. Those people trust us. They trust Warren, and rightly so. You saw an interesting example of deserved trust working in real world and in Omaha. By the way, we love that position. The accountants don’t know what they are doing but I don’t criticize them. Q26: LA. In 25 yrs, where would you see oil production? What year do you see the peak? This is very flattering, but I don’t think question nor my answer will do much for my reputation. We don’t know year, and the reason Warren picked up on my answer last weekend so strongly is that it is a radically different world where oil production is down 25 yrs from now, with radical adaptations necessary. Hubbert pretty accurately predicted peak. If it hasn’t peaked, it soon will, and it will go down. At $120 / barrel, there are obvious strains in the production system. Q27: LA. I went to private school where you donated science building. For many minorities, there are low graduation rates. What can government do to help? What can we do? Very serious problem, anguish causing. CA had once the best public education system in USA. It is a very sad thing. The private system is very competitive. Warren has suggested that if no one was allowed to use private schools, citizens would make sure public system was good. Not sure Warren is right on this. Personally I am better at lifting top up than the bottom up. Why shouldn’t I stick to game where I’m better suited? If you want to know how to raise top higher, I think I could help you a lot. If you want to raise lowest, I don’t know how to do it. Q28: Boston. Swiss Re transaction. Could you add some color? Long tail insurance? It will be long tail. It won’t be a bonanza. It ought to be reasonable, we like Swiss Re. Q29: I’m curious, you are student of history. Does today remind you of any time in past, and why? I punched premium channel in hotel in Tokyo, and out came exercise in pornography. I would argue Soddom and Gomorah is still around. I think Athens of Pericles is still around today. Our bullies are similar to past eras. Q30: LA. How will meltdown affect Brazil and China. Will you invest there? We have [economic] system which is interdependent. [A slowdown here] would have repercussions elsewhere. Will Brazil have troubles? No. Brazil is favorably located now. If I could get equivalent business prospects I would prefer USA. That iron mine that Brazil owns, you only need small knowledge to know that it is one of best in world. Agriculture – they are in a very strong position. We are not invested there at the moment. We have a small position in Brazilian Real. Q31: CA. Health insurance? The health insurance industry gets bad press it doesn’t deserve. When medical care fails, they say that characterizes it. But they also prevent a lot of interventions too. But Hollywood assumes everything is bad about health care. I don’t know what will happen. I think single payer could happen, and might not be too far in future. In fact it probably would happen, maybe 50% likely if Democrats win both houses. Q32: LA. Absurd leverage in banking system. Large mess. Only response is that government has taken toxic portion and thrown it onto their books.
根本没人知道接下来会发生什么。如果政府聪明地花掉那 5000 亿美元,情况倒不会太糟。可他们现在花得并不明智。我并不震惊我们所有人都得掏出这 5000 亿美元。当年储贷危机时我们就干过,花了 1500 亿美元。
第 33 问:加州。恶性通胀。房地产和黄金?
我对这个话题没什么高见。我们一直不擅长从通胀中获利。好市多的净通胀十年都是零。连好市多都开始感受到压力了。这可不妙。之前那种好日子不可能永远持续下去。如果一件事不能永远持续,那它终会停止。
第 34 问:德国。很多经理人通常会被成功冲昏头脑。这是基因决定的,还是说以后才会显现?
这话太抬举了。成功往往让大多数人变得相当自负。有人曾在一个公开场合问:“你不觉得经济上的成功让芒格变得自负了吗?”我的一位老朋友站起来回答说:“不,这批评有失公允,我认识他时他还年轻又穷,那时他就已经很自负了。”
第 35 问:比佛利山庄。伯克希尔有收购运营公司的历史。西科在这方面一直不太活跃。你们会变得更积极吗?
伯克希尔比我们在收购方面更在行。我们在西科还没买下最后一家运营公司,所以,敬请期待。
第 36 问:澳大利亚。富国银行,你们是如何对其衍生品头寸感到放心的?
他们不会被豁免,但我们相信他们遇到的麻烦会少于同行。我认为他们的文化更好。
第 37 问:加州。普通股未来回报如何?我们应该去海外吗?透明度低那么多……很难满足保守主义的要求。
宝洁和可口可乐在发展中国家都有业务。我们在那里有敞口。对于很多投资者来说,最好的方式可能就是持有可口可乐。我们考虑过这些事。我们并不缺少在世界其他地区的参与。而且我们可能还会增加。
第 38 问:洛杉矶。如果你年轻一些,会加入哪种类型的资产管理公司?
如果再来一次,我会找一个我真心喜欢共事的人,我不会待在一个盛气凌人的地方,干一份烂工作,浪费太多时间。但大部分工作都在糟糕的地方。我在哈佛的法学教授常说——‘告诉我你的问题是什么,我试着让它变得更棘手。’
第 39 问:德国。保险会计:成本法还是市价法,还是成本与市价孰低法?30 年前这对保险公司会计来说是好的举措吗?
Not at all clear what will happen. If government intelligently spent $500bil dollars, it wouldn’t be that bad. But now they do it unintelligently. I am not shocked that we all have to pony up $500b. We did it in savings and loan crisis, $150bil. Q33: CA. Hyperinflation. Real estate and gold? I don’t have a good opinion on that subject. We have not been good at taking advantage of inflation. Net inflation at Costco was zero for ten years. Even Costco is starting to feel it. Not desirable. The previous situation was too good to continue. If it can’t go on forever, it will eventually stop. Q34: Germany. Many managers typically would be carried away by all the success. Is it genes or is it still to come? Very flattering. Success tends to make most people pretty pompous. Someone once suggested in a public setting, ‘Don’t you think financial success is making Munger pompous?’ An old friend of mine stood up and responded, “No, that is unfair criticism, I knew him when he was young and poor and he was still pompous.” Q35: Beverly Hills. Berkshire has history of acquiring operating companies. Wesco has been less active. Will you get more active? Berkshire will be better at stuff than we are. We have not bought our last operating business at Wesco, so, stay tuned. Q36: Auz. Wells Fargo, how did you get comfortable with their derivative positions? They will not be exempt, but we believe they will have less than their share of troubles. I think they have a better culture. Q37: CA. Common stock returns going forward? Should we go overseas? So much less transparency… hard to satisfy conservativeness. P&G and Coca-Cola is in developing world. We have exposure there. For a great many investors, the best way to do it may be to own Coca-cola. We’ve thought about these things. We do not lack participation in the rest of the world. And we may get more. Q38: LA. If you were younger, what asset management type would you join? If doing it again, I’d find someone I really liked being associated with, and I’d serve little time in a pompous place doing a lousy job. But most of jobs are in lousy places. My Harvard law professor used to say – ‘tell me what your problem is and I’ll try to make it more difficult.’ Q39: Germany. Insurance accounting: Cost or market, or lower of cost or market? Was this good move for accountants of insurance coompanies 30 yrs ago?
非常棘手的问题。一般来说,成本与市价孰低法是存货的计量标准,但各种金融人士想方设法要摆脱它。这存在自我实现预言的风险,就像化学里的自催化反应。保守的保险公司按市价标记普通股并不是坏事。如果衍生产品账簿也采用成本与市价孰低法,它们会运作得更好。所有明智的人都这么认为。你为此感到困扰,值得称赞。
问题 40:加利福尼亚州。普通投资者应该投资指数基金。
所有明智的投资都是价值投资。把某样东西称为价值基金并不能免除它的责任。如果你像我一样跳舞,你可以自称为芭蕾舞演员,但这不是一件好事。我不会广泛建议人们投资任何价值基金。我会避开那些每年换手率达到 100% 的基金。对于普通指数基金来说,这是一种荒谬的行为方式。对于大多数一无所知的人来说,这是不完美的,但却是最好的结果,可以避免被傻瓜和骗子误导。
问题 41:美元汇率。美元走弱需要几个月才能让出口商受益?
我不认为美元走弱能解决贸易逆差。
问题 42:明尼苏达州。保险和医疗保健:我们怎样才能以最低的成本获得最好的医疗服务?另外,你的书能不能进入学校?
很多人认为现有体系一无是处。人们厌倦了与愚蠢的保险公司打交道。这或许有些道理。改革一直很困难。你看看我担任主席的那家医院,我们过去是用刀切除肾脏。现在我们用体外碎石术,治愈率 100%。我认为我们的专科医生是洛杉矶有史以来最伟大的医生之一。我认为这个体系既有好的方面也有坏的方面。目前还不清楚它会走向何方。
我确实有一个明确的看法。人们在临终时受到的干预实在太多了。这是国家的耻辱。欧洲在处理这方面比美国好得多。你们欧洲人可以为自己务实的态度感到自豪。我们把更多的钱浪费在愚蠢的临终病例上,而高强度的干预对任何人都没有帮助。
至于让我的家人读我的书,我挺费劲的。
问题 43:美国。我们是否正在失去竞争优势?教育失败,基础设施破旧。公司是否应该迁往海外?
出于税收原因,一些公司确实迁到了海外,但这并没有毁掉这个国家。这是对激励措施的自然反应。伯克希尔本可以节省很多钱,但我们就是没这么做。我们在一些税率较低的地区有公司。但我们缴纳了巨额的所得税。在你和你的钱之间,存在着一笔巨大的税收要求。我们缴纳的税高得惊人。我希望它们能更高。确实有一些为了避税而进行转移的做法。
如果规模变大,那应该引起担忧,但目前规模并不算大。制药公司在波多黎各等地生产药物,等等。
问题 44:加利福尼亚州。保险连接证券。你能谈谈保险连接证券吗?它们是否对承保质量构成威胁?
当然。就像把保险风险切片并切块一样——这不会改善任何问题。
问题 45:你开始投资以来,最大的变化是什么?
我非常感谢巴菲特先生。他说服我花了一些时间。沃伦和我在再保险交易和投资组合转移方面共同变得非常擅长。我们是一起学习成长的。如果伯克希尔停止学习,那就会是一团糟。我们的记录之所以能保持一丝体面,唯一的原因就是我们一直拼命地学习。
问题 46:关于债务,有很多备受推崇的金融专家——认为债务水平堪比大萧条时期?
大力推广信贷让我感到紧张。我知道国家是如何取得进步的,不是靠把消费信贷推到极致。我对这些发展并不热衷。但一个伟大的体系能够承受相当程度的滥用。一些信贷扩张是有益的。我喜欢人们同时摆弄多张信用卡吗?我看起来像是认为这是个好主意的人吗?这会把人变成农奴。你获得的客户只是刚好被压榨到能付钱给你,但他们却意识不到 36% 利息的成本……我不佩服那些擅长获取农奴的家伙。
问题 47:瑞典。为什么你的追随者这么少?
在我看来,我们已经有太多该死的追随者了。我不觉得我们缺少追随者。当然,绝大多数人做事方式不同,因为管理这些体系的人有动机去采取不同的做法。一只证券要被错误定价,就必须有某个傻瓜存在。这对世界来说可能是坏事,但对伯克希尔不是坏事。
问题 48:德国。你如何看待能量饮料业务?以及如何避免错误的婚姻?
我滥用咖啡因,而且喜欢软饮料。我甚至从来没尝过能量饮料。这个市场似乎在增长。关于婚姻:本·富兰克林给出了最好的建议,婚前睁大双眼,婚后半闭半睁。[掌声]
问题 49:得克萨斯州。你在伯克希尔股东大会上说过,如果出现通胀,伊斯卡会赚更多的钱。
Very tough question. Generally speaking, lower of cost or market (standard for inventories) – but various financial types wanted to get away from this. There is a risk of self fulfilling prophecies, like an autocatalytic reaction in chemistry. Conservative insurance companies marking common stocks to market is not a bad thing. If we had lower of cost or market in derivative books, they would have worked better. All intelligent people find it so. You are to be complimented for being bothered by it. Q40: CA. Average investor should invest in index funds. All intelligent investing is value investing. Calling something a value fund doesn’t absolve it. You can call yourself a ballet dancer if you dance like me, but it is not a good thing. I wouldn’t recommend people broadly invest with any value fund. I would avoid funds that have 100% turnover per year. It is a ridiculous way for an ordinary index fund to behave. It is imperfect, but best outcome for most know-nothings, in order to avoid being misled by fools and liars. Q41: USD Currency. How many months would it take for exporters benefit? I don’t think USD weakness will fix trade deficit. Q42: MN. Insurance and healthcare: How can we go about having best medical care at lowest cost? Also, could we get your book in schools? A lot of people think existing system is all bad. People tire of dealing with dumb insurance companies. There may be some reality. Changes have been hard. If you look at hospital I am Chairman, we used to knife the kidney. Now we use lithoscripsy, with a 100% cure rate. I would argue our specialist doctor was one of greatest doctors Los Angeles ever had. I think there are good things in system as well as bad. It isn’t clear how it will work out. I do have one clear opinion. There is way too much intervention when dying. It is a national disgrace. They are way better at handling it in Europe than US. You can take pride in Europe at dealing realistically. We blow more money on stupid cases near death where no one is helped by the intensity of the interventions. I have trouble getting my family to read my book. Q43: US. Are we losing our competitive edge? Education failing, infrastructure falling down. Should corporations move abroad? Some movement offshore for tax reasons is happening, and it hasn’t ruined the country. It is the natural response to incentives. Berkshire could save a lot of money, but we just haven’t done it. We have some companies in lower tax zones. But we pay enormous income taxes. There is a huge taxation claim between you and your money. We pay taxes that are astronomical. I hope they become more astronomical. There is some development to shift around to save taxes. Should be concerned if it gets big, but it isn’t really big at the moment. Pharma co’s make drugs in Puerto rico, etc etc. Q44: CA. Insurance linked securities. Can you discuss insurance linked securities? Are they a threat to quality of underwriting? Of course. Like slicing and dicing insurance risk – it wouldn’t improve matters. Q45: What has changed since you first started investing? I owe a great deal to Mr Buffett. It took a while to convince me. Warren and I together got very good at reinsurance transactions and portfolio transfers. We’ve learned together at it. Berkshire would have been a mess if it had ever stopped learning. Only reason we’ve been able to keep a shred of decency in our record is that we have been hell bent to keep learning. Q46: There is no shortage of well regarded financial experts about debt – equal to great depression? Pushing credit hard makes me nervous. I know how countries got ahead, and it wasn’t by pushing consumer credit to its extreme. I am not wild about the developments. But a great system will handle a fair amount of abuse. Some of the [credit] expansion was good. Do I like multiple credit cards being juggled? Do I look like kind of person who thinks that is good idea? It turns someone into a serf. You get customers just screwed together enough to pay you but who don’t realize cost of 36% interest... I don’t admire the guys who are good at acquiring the serfs. Q47: Sweden. Why do you have so few followers? From my point of view, we have too many damn followers. I don’t think we have shortage of followers. Of course great bulk of people do things differently because people running the systems have incentives to do it differently. For a security to be mispriced, someone else must be a damn fool. It may be bad for world, but not bad for Berkshire. Q48: Germany. What do you think of energy drink business and how to can you avoid a bad marriage? I abuse caffeine, and I like soft drinks. I’ve never even tried an energy drink. There seems to be a growing market for it. Marriage: Ben Franklin gave best advice, keep your eyes wide open before marriage and half shut thereafter. [applause] Q49: TX. You said at the Berkshire meeting that if there is inflation, Iscar would make a lot more money.
伊斯卡的产品卖给的是那些非常专业、懂行的客户。他们不能像某些消费品那样随意提价。如果之前我给人留下他们能大赚一笔的印象,那是我没说清楚。伊斯卡非常擅长提供优质产品,我很难想象当客户赚更多钱时他们销量不增长。他们没有随意的定价权。但涨价就是涨价。
Q50:2005 年,伯克希尔和比尔·盖茨都买了新西兰元。你现在怎么看?
我对新西兰元没什么看法。沃伦做的有些事,我就是不理睬。[笑声,停顿] 如果我有聪明话要说,我会说的。
Q51:为什么不愿投资房地产?
整个企业里房地产持有量几乎为零。董事长有些怪癖。过去买过一些房地产,有时我们确实从旧房产里抵押出权益,再投资到可口可乐和其他东西上。我们现在有巨额现金盈余。但相信我,所有套路我们都懂。未来我们可能会改变做法。
Q52:你会把一家运营企业卖到哪里?
我们通常不卖运营企业。这是生活方式的选择。我们收购得不错。有几家卖掉会更好。但总体来看,如果我们不做“金拉米”式管理、不折腾投资组合,结果会更好。我们想赢得不折腾、不倒卖的名声。竞争优势恰恰来自不做倒卖者。沃伦说,“你应该走正道,因为那条路上人少得多。”
问:美国运通、维萨、万事达。你能比较一下这些公司吗?
美国运通有更好的客户,我们非常喜欢那个定位。
好朋友们——你们又经历了一次我们风格独特的会议。
[起立鼓掌]
沙伊·达达什蒂
Iscar is selling to very professional customers who know a lot. They can just raise prices like some consumer goods. If I gave impression they would make a lot of money, I didn’t make myself clear. Iscar is so good at delivering good products, it is hard for me to imagine them not selling more to customers who are making more money. They don’t have automatic pricing power. But a price increase is a price increase. Q50: In 2005 both Berkshire and Bill Gates bought NZD. What do you think now? I don’t have an opinion about NZ. Some things Warren does I just ignore. [laughter, pause] If I had something intelligent to say, I would say it. Q51: Why the reluctance to own real estate? Total real estate holdings are close to zero in the total enterprise. The Chairman has quirks. Old real estate purchases, at times we did borrow out equity in old real estate in order to reinvest it in Coca-cola and other things. We have huge surplus of cash now. But believe me we know all the tricks. We may behave differently in future. Q52: Where would you sell an operating business? We tend not to sell operating businesses. That is a lifestyle choice. We have bought well. We have a few which would be better if we sold them. But net we do better if we don’t do gin rummy management, churning our portfolio. We want reputation as not being churners and flippers. Competitive advantage is being not a churner. Warren says, ‘you should take high road since so much less crowded.’ Q: Amex Visa Mastercard. Can you compare these companies? American Express has better customers, and we like that position, a lot. Good friends – you are through another of our idiosyncratic meetings. [standing applause] Shai Dardashti