如何帮助波兰

When the heads of state meet in Paris later this month, they will have Poland on the agenda. It will be one item out of many, and there is a danger that they will miss an opportunity that comes along only once in a great while.

Poland is at a critical juncture, both politically and economically. The conflict between the Communist state and the civil society which had kept the country paralyzed for the past decade has been superseded by a social contract. Free elections were held, in which the Communists were decisively rejected, but in accordance with the contract, Solidarity has only 35 percent of the Sejm and does not control the government. The leadership on both sides has to contend with hardliners in their own parties as well as general disaffection among the population. They must produce positive results in the economy so that the peaceful transition to a democratic form of government may endure. Both sides have entered into their historic compromise in the firm expectation that the West will help in engineering an economic turnaround.

After a decade of paralysis, the economy is extremely run down; and after the wage concessions of the past year, inflation is spinning out of control. The rise in prices can be expected to exceed 300 percent in the next 12 months, and if the free market rate of the dollar is any guide, hyperinflation is just around the corner. Moreover, the external debt has continued to accumulate and now approaches $40 billion. Around three-quarters of this amount is due to official creditors represented by the Paris Club and one-quarter to the commercial banks, represented by the London Club. The disparity has arisen because Poland has paid the interest on its commercial debt in full while paying practically nothing to the Paris Club. This has caused considerable resentment among Treasury officials who are in charge of the Paris Club, while it has kept the free market price of the bank debt, currently around 38 percent, higher than it would be otherwise.

The dire economic situation has a positive aspect; it would not need a great deal of resources to turn it around. At the current free market rate of exchange, the budget deficit, which is the engine of inflation, is in the region of $ 1 billion. Existing economic structures have become so dysfunctional that there would be little resistance to a complete restructuring of the economy. Moreover, both the government and Solidarity are not only receptive but positively eager for radical change. A trade union agitating for a return to capitalism sounds unbelievable to Western ears; yet that is the case in Poland today. A moment’s reflection will show that a solvent employer is in the best interests of the employee—especially in Poland, where the state is both morally and financially bankrupt.

The stage is set for a radical new departure. Both sides in Poland are ready for it, but the Western governments seem to lack the vision that would make it possible. There is no need for a large infusion of money—the amounts involved are relatively modest and become quite insignificant when considered in the context of our defense spending. What is needed is Western engagement in the Polish reform process and a commitment to see it through to a successful conclusion. This is a case where outside involvement is necessary to bring about internal reform because only an external obligation can justify the dislocations that a radical reform would entail. That has been the mechanism driving the European Common Market. In the case of Poland, the external obligation is readily at hand: the international debt.

I have proposed a kind of macro-economic debt: an equity conversion program in which Polish state enterprises would be converted into joint stock companies and a portion of the shares would be used as one of the elements in a debt reorganization scheme. This long-term restructuring of the Polish economy and of the Polish debt would be combined with a short-term monetary stabilization program in which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would play their roles.

My proposal was received enthusiastically in Poland—both the government and the economic experts of Solidarity have endorsed it—but it encountered a much more reserved attitude among Western officials. Many of the objections can be ascribed to bureaucratic caution—the IMF finds the situation in Poland too chaotic for initiating a program, and most governments seem to prefer a step-by-step approach, extending all aid short of help. But there is one objection that I must acknowledge as substantive: any debt reorganization scheme that disturbs the status quo of the Paris Club debt creates a precedent that could be used by other countries. The problem can be delayed because the actual debt reorganization would not take place for at least three years, but it cannot be avoided forever. The question arises whether the Western governments should avoid doing something real in order to preserve a fiction: nobody can claim the Polish debt is worth 100 cents on the dollar. In any case, there is much more at stake than just the debt. There has been no instance yet of successful economic reform in a Communist country; success in Poland would influence the entire region.

It is to be hoped that heads of state can put matters into the right perspective and hand down the appropriate instructions to their bureaucracies.