在欧洲思考更小规模
要解决一场不可能之事已变为可能的危机，就必须思考不可想象之事。因此，要解决欧洲的主权债务危机，现在必须为希腊、葡萄牙、或许还有爱尔兰出现违约并脱离欧元区的可能性做好准备。
To resolve a crisis in which the impossible has become possible, it is necessary to think the unthinkable. So, to resolve Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis, it is now imperative to prepare for the possibility of default and defection from the eurozone by Greece, Portugal, and perhaps Ireland.
在这种情况下，必须采取措施防止整个欧元区出现金融崩溃。首先，银行存款必须得到保护。如果存入希腊银行的欧元因违约和退出而损失，那么存入意大利银行的欧元将立即比存入德国或荷兰银行的欧元价值更低，从而引发对赤字国家银行的挤兑。
In such a scenario, measures will have to be taken to prevent a financial meltdown in the eurozone as a whole. First, bank deposits must be protected. If a euro deposited in a Greek bank would be lost through default and defection, a euro deposited in an Italian bank would immediately be worth less than one in a German or Dutch bank, resulting in a run on the deficit countries’ banks.
此外，一些违约国家的银行必须维持运营，以防止经济崩溃。与此同时，欧洲银行体系需要重新注资，并置于欧洲层面而非各国的监管之下。最后，欧元区其他赤字国家发行的政府债券必须受到保护，以免遭受风险蔓延。（即使没有国家违约，最后两项要求也适用。）
Moreover, some banks in the defaulting countries would have to be kept functioning in order to prevent economic collapse. At the same time, the European banking system would have to be recapitalized and put under European, as distinct from national, supervision. Finally, government bonds issued by the eurozone’s other deficit countries would have to be protected from contagion. (The last two requirements would apply even if no country defaulted.)
所有这些都需要花钱，但根据欧元区各国领导人商定的现有协议，再也拿不出更多钱了。因此，别无选择，只能补上缺失的一环：建立一个有权征税、进而能够借贷的欧洲财政部。这需要签订一项新条约，将欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）转变为一个真正意义上的财政部。
All of this would cost money, but, under the existing arrangements agreed by the eurozone’s national leaders, no more money is to be found. So there is no alternative but to create the missing component: a European treasury with the power to tax and, therefore, to borrow. This would require a new treaty, transforming the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) into a full-fledged treasury.
但这需要德国人民，尤其是德国人民，从根本上转变观念。德国公众仍然以为，自己有权选择是否支持欧元。这是一个严重的错误。欧元已经存在，全球金融体系的资产与负债都围绕着这一共同货币深度交织，一旦欧元崩溃，将引发一场超出德国当局——以及其他任何国家——控制能力的灾难。德国公众认清这一冷酷事实所需的时间越长，他们以及全世界将要付出的代价就越高。
But this presupposes a radical change of heart, particularly in Germany. The German public still thinks that it has a choice about whether to support the euro. That is a grave mistake. The euro exists, and the global financial system’s assets and liabilities are so intermingled on the basis of the common currency that its collapse would cause a meltdown beyond the capacity of the German authorities – or any other – to contain. The longer it takes for the German public to realize this cold fact, the higher the price that they, and the rest of the world, will have to pay.
问题在于德国公众能否被这个论点说服。安格拉·默克尔总理或许无法说服她的整个联盟认同其中的优点，但她可以依靠反对派来建立新的多数派，支持采取必要措施来拯救欧元。一旦欧元危机得到解决，她在下一次选举中就会少一些担忧。
The question is whether the German public can be convinced of this argument. Chancellor Angela Merkel may not be able to persuade her entire coalition of its merits, but she could rely on the opposition to build a new majority in support of doing what is necessary to preserve the euro. Having resolved the euro crisis, she would have less to fear from the next election.
为可能出现的三个小国退出或违约欧元做准备，并不意味着这些国家必然会遭到抛弃。恰恰相反，有序违约的可能性——由欧元区其他国家和国际货币基金组织提供资金支持——将为希腊和葡萄牙提供政策选择空间。此外，这将终结目前威胁欧元区所有赤字国家的恶性循环：紧缩措施削弱了这些国家的增长前景，导致投资者要求高得离谱的利率，进而迫使政府进一步削减开支。
Preparing for the possible default or defection of three small countries from the euro does not mean that those countries would necessarily be abandoned. On the contrary, the possibility of an orderly default – financed by the other eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund – would offer Greece and Portugal policy choices. Moreover, it would end the vicious cycle – now threatening all of the eurozone’s deficit countries – whereby austerity weakens their growth prospects, leading investors to demand prohibitively high interest rates and thus forcing their governments to cut spending further.
脱离欧元区能让处境最困难的国家更容易恢复竞争力。但若这些国家愿意做出必要的牺牲，它们也可以留在欧元区：欧洲金融稳定基金（EFSF）将保护其国内银行存款，国际货币基金组织（IMF）将帮助其银行体系进行资本重组，从而帮助这些国家摆脱当前的困局。无论走哪条路，欧盟都不应坐视这些国家崩溃，进而拖垮整个全球银行体系——这不符合欧盟的利益。
Leaving the eurozone would make it easier for the most distressed countries to regain competitiveness. But, if they are willing to make the necessary sacrifices, they could also remain: the EFSF would protect their domestic bank deposits, and the IMF would help to recapitalize their banking systems, which would help these countries escape from their current trap. Either way, it is not in the European Union’s interest to allow these countries to collapse and drag down the entire global banking system with them.
欧盟成员国——不仅限于欧元区国家——必须接受一个事实：要拯救欧元，必须缔结一项新条约。这个逻辑是清楚的。因此，关于新条约应包含哪些内容的讨论应当立即开始，因为即便欧洲领导人在尽快达成协议上面临极端压力，谈判也必然是一个旷日持久的过程。然而，一旦原则达成一致，欧洲理事会可以授权欧洲央行介入填补缺口，并事先免除其对偿付风险的赔偿责任。
The EU’s member countries, and not only those in the eurozone, must accept that a new treaty is needed to save the euro. That logic is clear. So the discussions about what to include in such a new treaty ought to begin immediately, because, even with European leaders under extreme pressure to agree quickly, negotiations will necessarily be a prolonged affair. Once the principle is agreed, however, the European Council could authorize the ECB to step into the breach, indemnifying it from solvency risks in advance.
欧元区主权债务危机若能找到解决方案，金融市场将松一口气。即便如此，由于任何新条约的条款都将不可避免地由德国主导，经济严重放缓几乎板上钉钉。这可能会促使德国态度进一步转变，进而允许采取反周期政策。到那时，欧元区大部分地区才有可能恢复增长。
Having in sight a solution to the eurozone’s sovereign-debt crisis would be a source of relief for financial markets. Even so, because any new treaty’s terms will inevitably be dictated by Germany, a severe economic slowdown would be almost certain. That might induce a further change of attitude in Germany, in turn allowing the adoption of counter-cyclical policies. At that point, growth in much of the eurozone could resume.