不确定性有

2020 · 书信 · 原文约 5619 词
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不确定性很少像现在这样高。奇怪的是,股市也是如此。

本·英克 | 第 1-6 页

病毒、经济与市场

杰里米·格兰瑟姆 | 第 7-10 页

一季度不确定性信函 | 2020 年一季度 | 很少像现在这样高。奇怪的是,股市也是如此。

本·英克 | 资产配置主管

执行摘要

在 3 月份的低点,大多数风险资产似乎处于合理估值或廉价状态,即便假设严重衰退对合理估值造成中等程度的冲击也是如此。在我们的多资产组合中,我们在低点前后的几周内增加了股票和信贷的持仓。我们的预期是,考虑到经济不确定性极高且大部分不确定性偏向负面,市场将继续波动,难以取得太大进展。然而,在随后的六周里,风险资产(尤其是股票)出现了大幅反弹。我们用了不到两个月的时间,就获得了四到六年的“正常”股票回报。与此同时,我们对全球经济下行风险的评估并未显著减轻。因此,我们利用价格上涨的机会,大幅降低了多资产组合中的有效股票权重,将其中的一部分转为多空交易,从而在保持对相对廉价股票敞口的同时,降低了组合对整体市场方向的敏感度。我们这样做并非出于对市场未来走向的确定性判断,而是因为相信在当前价格水平上,市场似乎正在反映接近最乐观情景的预期。这种情景当然有可能实现,尤其是在能快速研发出有效且可广泛获得的疫苗或针对 Covid-19 的显著有效疗法的情况下。但如果我们未能迎来那种理想结果,我们认为大多数股票市场很可能出现大幅亏损。面对这种并不吸引人的风险/回报权衡,我们相信,通过利用市场提供的异常显著的相对选股机会(而非押注股市未来几个月的实际走向)来承担更多风险,可以为客户创造更好的回报。为此,我们将无基准配置策略中的净股票敞口从约 55% 下调至约 25%。

UNCERTAINTY HAS QUARTERLY LETTER 1Q 2020 SELDOM BEEN HIGHER Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market Ben Inker | Pages 1-6 THE VIRUS, THE ECONOMY, AND THE MARKET Jeremy Grantham | Pages 7-10 1Q UNCERTAINTY HAS QUARTERLY LETTER 1Q 2020 SELDOM BEEN HIGHER Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market Ben Inker | Head of Asset Allocation EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At the March lows, most risk assets appeared to be fair value or cheap, even assuming a moderate hit to fair value from a severe recession. In our multi-asset portfolios, we added to our holdings of equities and credit over the few weeks around the lows. Our expectation was that markets would continue to be volatile and would have a hard time making too much headway given very high levels of economic uncertainty and the fact that most of that uncertainty was to the downside. Instead, over the following six weeks we saw a massive rally in risk assets, particularly equities. We got four to six years of “normal” equity returns in the space of less than two months. Meanwhile, our estimate of the downside risks to the global economy have not notably lessened. As a result, we have taken advantage of the higher prices to significantly reduce the effective equity weight in our multi-asset portfolios, turning some of it into long/short trades where we maintain exposure to relatively cheap stocks but reduce the portfolio’s sensitivity to overall market direction. We are not doing this out of a sense of certainty as to the market’s direction from here, but due to a belief that at current prices, markets seem to be pricing in something close to the best-case scenario. Such a scenario is certainly possible, particularly if an effective and widely available vaccine or strikingly effective treatment for Covid-19 were to be developed quickly. But if we do not get that happy outcome, we believe substantial losses would be likely across most equity markets. In the face of that unattractive risk/reward trade-off, we believe we can do better for our clients by taking more risk on the extraordinary relative stock selection opportunities the market is offering and less on the direction the stock market actually takes over the coming months. To that end, we have reduced our net equity exposure in our Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy from around 55% to about 25%.

过去几个月,我们在努力理解这场疫情对全球经济和各类资产的潜在影响,其中最显著的特征是:从此刻开始的路径存在极大的不确定性。许多可能性都存在——从 V 型复苏,到在没有快速可用的疫苗和/或广泛有效的治疗方法的情况下经济艰难挣扎着恢复“正常”的漫长过程,再到真正的全球性萧条——即便我们熬过了疫情的另一端,无数小企业的毁灭仍会让成百上千万人失业。再加上由各国政府和央行为了抵御疫情最严重的冲击而印钞和支出的令人瞠目结舌的巨额资金可能引发的通胀复苏,以及美国和苏联之间爆发核战争的可能性,这些因素都比冷战期间大得多,所以你面临的下行不确定性在未来几年可能带来的结果,比二战以来的任何时候都要多。但文明毁灭性事件的一个迷人之处在于,你根本不必担心它们对投资组合的影响!你需要准备应对的是那些糟糕的、但不会终结文明的事件。

As we have worked over the last couple of months to understand the likely impact of the pandemic on economies and asset classes around the world, the most striking feature is the extraordinary uncertainty of the path from here. Many things are possible, from a V-shaped recovery, to a longer slog as economies struggle to get back to “normal” without a rapidly available vaccine and/or widely available effective treatment, to a true global depression as the destruction of countless small businesses leaves millions upon millions out of work even after we do reach the other side of the pandemic. Throw in the possibility of an inflationary resurgence driven by the truly On the plus side, the odds of a nuclear war between mind-blowing amounts of money that are being printed and spent by governments and the U.S. and Soviet Union are a whole lot less than they central banks around the world to stave off the worst impacts of the pandemic’s toll and were during the cold war, so that downside uncertainty you have more potential uncertainty about what the next several years will bring than has gotten a good deal better. But the one charm of civilization-destroying events is that you do not have to at any time since World War II.1 Our job is to try to understand the impacts of those worry about their impact on your portfolio! It’s the bad, but scenarios on the assets we forecast and put together a portfolio that gives an attractive not civilization-ending events that you need to prepare for.

不确定性很少像现在这样高。奇怪的是,股市也几乎从未如此高企。| 我们尽可能多地模拟各种情景下的第 2 页结果。当我们的工作今春持续推进之际,全球风险资产也同步上演了一场惊人的反弹。虽然反弹在美国最为显著,但全球各地的风险资产都参与了进来。

Uncertainty Has Seldom Been Higher. Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market. | p2 outcome in as many scenarios as we can manage. As our work was progressing this spring, so too was a striking rally in risk assets around the world. While the rally has been most pronounced in the U.S., risk assets have participated all over the world.

世人已经很久没有遭遇过这样一种兼具高传染性与高致死率、危险组合的全新疾病了。1918 年西班牙流感大流行距今已逾一个世纪,而此后的历次潜在流行病,幸运的是要么传染性不高(埃博拉、SARS、MERS),要么致死率较低(2009 年禽流感),从而未能对公共健康或经济造成真正大规模的破坏。不幸的是,新冠病毒(Covid-19)是一场真正的全球性威胁。其对全球经济的影响已十分严峻且令人震惊,过去数周内,就业与工业产出的下降幅度史无前例。随着潜在破坏的范围在 3 月初逐渐为投资者所认清,全球市场进入自由落体状态,全球股市在短短 4 周多时间内下跌了 33%。其他风险资产也遭受类似打击,美国高收益公司债与新兴市场主权债各下跌 21%,REITs 下跌 43%。¹ 尽管股市在此轮下跌前相对于历史水平整体偏贵,信用利差也处于偏窄区间,但这次下跌创造了重大的投资机会。鉴于全球经济即将承受显而易见的痛苦,我们立即下调了全球股票的公平价值估算,假设经济衰退的程度大约为 2008-09 年全球金融危机的两倍(我将这一情景称为 GFCx2³)。但即便经过这样的折价,我们仍发现不少风险资产定价颇具吸引力,并在多元资产组合中增持了彭博巴克莱美国高收益公司债指数、摩根大通新兴市场全球多元化指数与 MSCI 美国 REITs 指数所对应的股票与高收益信用债。考虑到不确定性,我们也开始“加压”测试一个比上述 GFCx2 情景严重得多的经济场景。²

¹ 数据期间为 2020 年 2 月 19 日至 2020 年 3 月 23 日。

It has been a long time since the world faced a novel disease with such a dangerous combination of high contagiousness and significant lethality. The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic was more than a century ago, and the more recent pandemic candidates have fortunately lacked either high levels of contagiousness (Ebola, SARS, MERS), or lethality (2009 Avian Flu) to create truly massive disruption to public health or the economy. Covid-19, unfortunately, is a true global menace. The impact on the global economy has been stark and shocking, with recent weeks bringing drops in employment and industrial production never before seen in history. As the scope of the potential damage started to become clear to investors in the first weeks of March, markets around the world entered into a freefall, with global stocks dropping 33% in a little over 4 weeks. Other risk assets took similar hits, with U.S. corporate high yield bonds and emerging sovereign debt each falling 21% and REITs falling 43%.2 While stocks came into this period generally expensive relative to history and credit spreads were on the tighter side, the fall created significant investment opportunities. Given the clear economic pain that the global economy was in for, we immediately marked down our estimate of fair value for equities around the world assuming an economic downturn approximately twice as bad as that of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008-09 (I’ll refer to this scenario as GFCx23). But despite that haircut, we found ourselves with 2 a number of risk assets looking attractively priced, and we increased our holdings of Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Corporate High Yield Index, J.P. stocks and high yield credit in our multi-asset portfolios. Given the uncertainties, we Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Index, and MSCI U.S. REIT also began “stressing” our assumptions for an economic scenario materially worse than index for the period 2/19/2020-3/23/2020.

3 GFCx2.

3 GFCx2.

为了更详细地说明这里的情况,我们并没有简单假设美国小盘价值股会像 2008-09 年那样遭受同样的基本面冲击。今天的经济预测本身就极其困难。即便是最好的时期,经济预测也是一项艰难的任务。实际上,如今的小盘价值股是与当年不同的公司群体,其行业权重和特征都有所不同,未来的结果在很大程度上取决于一场全球仅有五个月集体认知的新冠疫情的演变,这几乎让预测变得不可能。我们所能说的是,出现糟糕经济结果的可能性——无论是“W”形、“L”形,还是某种经济学界和罗马字母表此前未知的形状——都比正常情况下重要得多。这种灾难性事件的可能性始终存在,事实上,股票风险溢价的主要理由正是基于股票在萧条情景下的糟糕表现。如果这类事件不可能发生,股票就不需要被定价到能够提供我们所有人都假设的长期回报。然而,我们通常认为经济灾难情景是真正的尾部事件。让这种可能性完全脱离你的想象是不明智的,但它们也不需要被视为全球经济合理可能的情景之一。如今,情况已不再如此。审慎的态度建议,那些需要在长期内存续的投资者,必须思考一场萧条情景会对其投资组合以及投资组合所服务的整体实体或需求造成多大打击。而且,以历史上罕见的迅速速度,股票已经从合情合理地为非常糟糕的结果定价,转变为或多或少地忽略了这种可能性。

图表 1 显示了我们在 2020 年 3 月 23 日的股票预测版本。这是你们中很少有人见过的版本,因为它综合了我们的完全均值回归和部分均值回归预测,而我们通常会将这两种情景分开展示。就此而言,这两种情景之间的差异并不那么重要,因为它们都假设经济会在七年内恢复正常。在这种情况下,我们还加入了我们对一次“全球金融危机乘以 2”(GFCx2)事件中各组股票公允价值冲击的初步估算。尽管美国大盘股在这些价格下看起来仍然有些估值过高,但全球股票总体上似乎已经为糟糕的经济事件定价,并在此冲击下留出了获取“类似股票回报”的空间。

To get into a little more detail here, we did not simply assume that U.S. small cap value stocks would have the Putting firm probabilities on economic scenarios today is extremely difficult. Economic same hit to fundamentals that they did in 2008-09. Today’s forecasting is a difficult proposition in the best of times. The fact that the economic small cap value is a different group of companies with outcomes from here significantly depend on the evolution of a pandemic caused by a somewhat different sector weights and characteristics than the group had then. Instead we looked for the virus that the world has a total of five months of collective knowledge about makes characteristics of companies that had good explanatory the task close to impossible. What we can say, however, is that the possibility of a very power in differentiating how much damage was done bad economic outcome, whether “W” or “L” or some other shape hitherto unknown to companies around the world by the Global Financial to economics and the Roman alphabet, is much more material than is normally the Crisis and assumed that the hit this time around would be proportionate to each group’s characteristics today. case. The potential of such a dire event is always with us and, indeed, the primary 4 justification for the equity risk premium rests on the dismal performance of equities in In Explaining Equity Returns, I talk about this as the depression scenarios. If such events were not possible, equities would not need to be “charm” of equities. It is not the fact that equities are volatile that implies they require a significant risk premium. priced to deliver the long-term returns we all assume4 they will. However, normally A 30-year zero coupon treasury bond has similar volatility we think of economic disaster scenarios as true tail events. It is unwise to allow their to equities and a much lower expected return in the long possibility to fall completely out of your imagination, but they don’t need to be thought run. The reason to expect an equity risk premium is that equities generally deliver their losses at times that are bad of as part of the reasonably likely scenarios for the world economy. Today, that is no not only for the overall portfolio but also for most entities’ longer the case. Prudence suggests that investors with the need to exist in the long run cash flow outside the portfolio. In order to put up with that must contemplate what kind of a hit a depression scenario would inflict on both their unfortunate timing, investors need to be coerced by the portfolios and the overarching entity or need that the portfolios exist to serve. And potential of a significantly higher return outside of those periods. with a rapidity seldom matched in history, equities have gone from plausibly priced for 5 very bad outcomes to more or less ignoring the possibility. Exhibit 1 shows a version of The “partial” in partial mean reversion refers to the fact our equity forecasts from March 23, 2020. It’s a version few of you have seen before as that valuations revert to a level that is fair relative to each other, but with lower required returns than we saw on it is a blend of our full mean reversion and partial mean reversion forecasts, which we average across the 20th century. usually show separately. For this purpose, the difference between those two scenarios 6 isn’t all that important, as they both assume that economically things wend their way To help put that in perspective, in the Global Financial Crisis, U.S. GDP fell 3.25% and took 7 quarters to return to back to “normal” over seven years.5 In this case, we have also incorporated our first-a new high. pass estimate of the hit to fair value in each of the equity groups from a GFCx2 event.6 Uncertainty Has Seldom Been Higher. Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market. | p3 While U.S. large cap equities still looked somewhat overvalued at those prices, global equities in general seemed to have priced in a bad economic event and left room to earn an “equity-like” return7 despite the hit.

附录 1截至 2020 年 3 月 23 日的混合预测值

16.0%

14.6%

14.0%

12.5%

12.0%

10.4%

“类权益”回报率

10.0%

8.6%

8.0%

7.6%

6.6%

6.0%

5.2%

5.3%

4.7%

4.0%

1.9%

2.0%

0.0%

标普 500

美国价值

美国小盘

美国小盘价值

国际

国际价值

国际小盘

国际小盘价值

新兴市场

新兴市场价值

资料来源:GMO

这些预测是 GMO 资产类别预测中均值回归与部分均值回归情景的平均值,并根据一次规模为 2008-09 年全球金融危机两倍的事件所导致的基本面预期恶化进行了调整。

EXHIBIT 1BLENDED FORECASTS AS OF MARCH 23, 2020 16.0% 14.6% 14.0% 12.5% 12.0% 10.4% "Equity-like" 10.0% 8.6% return 7.6% 8.0% 6.6% 6.0% 5.2% 5.3% 4.7% 4.0% 1.9% 2.0% 0.0% S&P U.S. U.S. U.S. Intl Intl Intl Intl Emerging Emerging 500 Value Small Small Value Small Small Value Value Value Source: GMO These forecasts are an average of the mean reversion and partial mean reversion scenarios for GMO’s asset class forecasts, adjusted for the expected deterioration of fundamentals associated with an event of twice the magnitude of the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis.

面对这些有吸引力的预测,我们放心地增加了股票配置,将资金分配给了国际大盘和小盘价值股、新兴市场价值股,以及由我们的重点股票团队构建和管理的新 GMO 周期性聚焦策略。该投资组合聚焦于在衰退中遭受重创的行业里实力更强的公司。⁸ 鉴于自 3 月以来反弹范围广泛,我们认为我们在 3 月和 4 月买入的所有股票相对于整体市场仍然非常便宜,但从 3 月 23 日以来,我们看到了一个坦率地说令人震惊的反弹,如图 2 所示。

Given these attractive forecasts, we felt comfortable adding to our allocation to equities, allocating to both international large and small value and emerging value stocks, along with the new GMO Cyclical Focus Strategy, built and managed by our Focused Equity team. This portfolio focuses on the stronger companies within industries that have been hard-hit by a downturn.8 Given the wide scope of the rally since March, we feel that all of the equities we bought in March and April remain very cheap relative to broad markets, but since March 23rd we have seen a rally of frankly stunning proportions, as we can see in Exhibit 2.

“类股权”回报率是预期回报率的平均值,即均值回归情景下公允价值股票的预期实际回报为 5.7%,部分均值回归情景下为 4.5%。这一投资组合是我们在 2009 年于 GMO 提出的一个理念的再现。当时的想法是,某些行业因全球金融危机而被市场抛弃,但我们确信经济迟早会复苏。如果“迟早”中的“迟”成为现实,受重创行业中较弱的公司未必能存活,而那些资产负债表更强劲、竞争地位更优越的公司,则能够挺过衰退期——如果经济低迷持续较长时间,它们甚至可能从较弱竞争对手的困境中获利。这个逻辑在当时非常有道理,我们认为今天同样如此。因此,我们的聚焦股票团队正在进行与 GMO 质量策略类似的分析,但重点是从那些在衰退中遭受市场尤其严厉惩罚的行业中选股。

来源:标普、罗素、MSCI、GMO | 数据时间:2020 年 3 月 23 日至 4 月 30 日

“Equity-like” returns are the average of the expected return EXHIBIT 2: BROAD MARKET RETURNS to fair-value equities in the mean reversion (5.7% real) and partial mean reversion (4.5% real) scenarios. 35% 30% 30% 31% 8 30% 30% This portfolio is the reincarnation of an idea that we had 30% 28% at GMO in 2009. The idea then was that certain industries 23% 25% 22% 22% 22% were being left for dead due to the Global Financial Crisis, whereas we were confident that sooner or later the 20% economy would recover. While weaker companies in hard-hit industries would not necessarily survive if the “sooner 15% or later” proved to be “later,” the companies with stronger balance sheets and better competitive positions could 10% survive through the downturn and might well be able to 5% profit from the travails of weaker competitors if conditions remained depressed for an extended period of time. It 0% made a lot of sense back then, and we believe it makes a S&P U.S. U.S. U.S. Intl Intl Intl Intl Emerging Emerging lot of sense today. As a result, our Focused Equity team 500 Value Small Small Value Small Small Value has been doing analysis similar to that done in the GMO Value Value Quality Strategy, but with an emphasis on picking stocks in those industries the market has punished particularly Source: S&P, Russell, MSCI, GMO | Data from 3/23/2020-4/30/2020 harshly in a downturn.

不确定性鲜有如此之高。奇怪的是,股市也鲜有如此之高。| p4 为了正确看待这轮上涨,涨幅最小的那类股票——国际价值型股票——其涨幅已相当于一个估值合理的股票组合 4.4 年的“类股权”回报。美国大盘股和小盘股上涨的幅度相当于 6 年的“类股权”回报。鉴于在 3 月 23 日至 4 月 30 日之间,我们并未获知任何足以显著改变我们对于未来可能经济情景判断的信息,这理所当然地对我们的预测产生了负面影响。图表 3 展示了截至 2020 年 4 月 30 日这些预测的情况。

Uncertainty Has Seldom Been Higher. Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market. | p4 To put the rally in perspective, the group that went up the least, International Value stocks, earned the equivalent of 4.4 years of an “equity-like” return for a fair-valued group of stocks. U.S. large and small cap stocks rose the equivalent of 6 years of “equity-like” returns. Given that we didn’t learn anything between March 23rd and April 30th that should have meaningfully altered our estimation of the plausible economic scenarios from here, this understandably has had a negative effect on our forecasts. Exhibit 3 shows what those forecasts looked like as of April 30, 2020.

**展品 32020 年 4 月 30 日的混合预测**

14.0%

12.0%

11.3%

9.7%

10.0%

8.0%

5.8%

6.0%

5.2%

4.8%

3.9%

4.0%

1.6%

2.1%

2.0%

0.7%

0.0%

-2.0%

-2.1%

-4.0%

标普 500 美国价值 美国 美国小盘 美国小盘价值 国际 国际价值 国际小盘 国际小盘价值 新兴市场 新兴市场价值

来源:GMO

我们认为,非美国价值股和全球小盘价值股在经济糟糕情境下仍定价合理,能够提供公允回报或更好回报,但现在美国大盘价值股和美国以外的广泛发达市场都不再定价在能给出任何接近“公允”回报的水平。事实上,在价值风格以外,唯一在经济糟糕情境下定价能提供“公允”回报的类别是新兴市场。需要澄清的是,这并非因为我们假设新兴市场在这种事件中能避免基本面冲击。实际上,我们假设 GFCx2(两倍全球金融危机)情景对新兴市场股票的平均打击程度比发达市场股票更严重。然而,将所有新兴国家都视为无力应对疫情是过于简化的看法。其中一些国家确实如此——例如,拉丁美洲和非洲的许多地区既缺乏公共卫生资源,也缺乏财政和货币空间来缓冲新冠疫情的冲击。但东亚国家总体上应对得好得多,它们利用了 17 年前应对 SARS 疫情时学到的经验。我们的新兴国内机遇团队构建了一个涵盖新兴和发达国家的疫情准备度排名。虽然准备最差的国家全是新兴国家,但准备最好的国家也大多是新兴国家——在 MSCI 新兴市场指数中,58%(按指数权重计)来自看起来能相当好地应对疫情的国家,而只有约 11% 属于准备最差的类别。她们的排名综合了从公共卫生系统质量、国家政府官员领导力到财政和货币资源等约十几个因素。中国、台湾和韩国得分特别高——高于任何主要发达经济体——并且在 MSCI 新兴市场指数中权重最大。然而,尽管这些经济体中一些国家在良好应对危机的能力有所帮助,但我们认为新兴市场股票应提供更高回报的主要原因很简单:它们目前的交易估值特别低,这为正常化盈利的下滑留下了充足空间,同时仍能为股东提供良好回报。新兴市场价值股则便宜得多,目前似乎定价能在两倍全球金融危机情景下提供两位数的预期回报。关于这一准备度排名框架的更多信息,请参见 GMO 白皮书《新冠疫情:新兴市场的风险与韧性》。

EXHIBIT 3BLENDED FORECASTS AS OF APRIL 30, 2020 14.0% 12.0% 11.3% 9.7% 10.0% 8.0% 5.8% 6.0% 5.2% 4.8% 3.9% 4.0% 1.6% 2.1% 2.0% 0.7% 0.0% -2.0% -2.1% -4.0% S&P U.S. U.S. U.S. Intl Intl Intl Intl Emerging Emerging 500 Value Small Small Value Small Small Value Value Value Source: GMO We believe non-U.S. value stocks and global small cap value are still priced to give a fair return or better in a bad economic scenario, but now neither U.S. large value nor broad developed markets outside of the U.S. are priced to deliver anything particularly close to a “fair” return. In fact, the only group outside of the value style at all which is priced to deliver a “fair” return in a bad economic scenario is emerging markets. To be clear, that is not due to an assumption on our part that emerging markets will avoid a fundamental hit in such an event. In fact, we assume the GFCx2 scenario is worse for emerging market stocks on average than it is for developed market stocks. However, it is an oversimplification to assume that all emerging countries are poorly positioned for the pandemic. Some of them certainly are – much of Latin America and Africa, for example, lack both the public health resources and fiscal and monetary space to cushion the blow from Covid-19. But the east Asian countries are generally handling things much better, taking advantage of what they learned in dealing with the SARS outbreak 17 years ago. Our Emerging Domestic Opportunities team has built a Covid preparedness ranking of both emerging and developed countries. While the worst positioned countries are all emerging ones, so are most of the best, with 58% of the 9 MSCI EM Index in countries that look quite well-positioned to handle the pandemic Their ranking takes into account about a dozen factors against about 11%, which are in the worst positioned category.9 But while the ability from the quality of the public health system to the leadership of national government officials to fiscal and of some of these economies to handle the crisis well is helpful, the primary reason we monetary resources. China, Taiwan, and Korea score believe emerging stocks should give a higher return is simply that they are trading at particularly highly – higher than any major developed much lower valuations, which leaves significant room for normalized earnings to fall country – and are the largest weights in the MSCI emerging markets index. For further information about while still providing a good return to shareholders. Emerging market value stocks this preparedness ranking framework, please see the GMO are far cheaper still, and today seem priced to offer a double-digit expected return white paper, “Covid-19: Risk and Resilience in Emerging in a GFCx2.

Markets.”

Markets.”

不确定性从未如此之高。奇怪的是,股市也是如此。 | p5  市场价格几乎总是以比公允价值更波动的方式变动。在正常情况下,我们愿意让股票组合在上涨行情中“跑一段”,因为以价值为导向的预测往往在牛市中过早卖出、在熊市中过早买入股票。这种模式在急跌急涨和更渐进的涨跌中似乎大多仍然成立。然而,这次我们不仅要面对估值快速恶化的股票,而且经济出现极差结果的可能性也远高于平均水平,这意味着股票的结果将比我们的预测差得多。这种极差结果远非确定无疑。我们都可以希望它能够避免,并且疫苗开发者有些夸大的承诺能够成真。但继续持有重仓股票的配置不再显得审慎,因为:第一,除乐观情形外,其他情形下的回报看起来很令人失望;第二,我们可以通过做空广泛股票指数,来对冲我们持有的、定价似乎足以承受大量坏消息的价值股,从而维持良好回报。

Uncertainty Has Seldom Been Higher. Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market. | p5 Market prices almost always move in a more volatile fashion than fair values. Under normal circumstances, we are prepared to let our equity portfolios “run” for a while during a rally, given that value-driven forecasts tend to be too quick to buy or sell equities in bull and bear markets. That pattern does still seem to hold more often than not in rapid falls and rises as well as more gradual ones. However, in this case we do not merely have stocks whose valuations have deteriorated quite quickly, but we also have a much higher than average possibility of a very bad economic outcome, which would mean significantly worse outcomes for stocks than what is embodied in our forecasts. That bad outcome is by no means assured. We can all hope that it will be avoided, and the somewhat extravagant promises of vaccine developers prove to be true. But it no longer seems prudent to hold onto an equity-heavy portfolio given that first, returns in anything other than the optimistic case look to be disappointing, and second, that we can maintain good returns by shorting out broad equity indices against the value stocks we hold that look priced to withstand plenty of bad news.

过去一年左右,我们已经多次撰文讨论价值股的吸引力,这里不再赘述。但一图胜千言,读起来也快得多,所以图表 4 展示了美国、EAFE(欧洲、澳洲和远东)以及新兴市场中价值股相对折价的长期走势。⁹ ¹⁰

图表 4:MSCI 区域价值因子的价差

价值股相对于市场的估值

0.90

0.85

0.80

0.75

0.70

0.65

0.60

0.55

0.50

83 年 3 月 87 年 6 月 91 年 9 月 95 年 12 月 00 年 3 月 04 年 6 月 08 年 9 月 12 年 12 月 17 年 3 月

美国 国际 新兴市场 美国(当前) 国际(当前) 新兴市场(当前)

来源:MSCI、Worldscope、GMO | 截至 2020 年 4 月 30 日

估值为 MSCI 区域价值指数相对于其基础区域指数的四种不同价值衡量标准的综合。

We have written extensively on the attractiveness of value stocks over the past year or so, and I don’t want to rehash all of that here. But a picture is worth a thousand words and is a lot quicker to read, so Exhibit 4 shows the discount to value stocks in the U.S., EAFE, and emerging markets over time.10 EXHIBIT 4: SPREAD OF VALUE FOR MSCI REGIONAL VALUE FACTORS 0.90 Valuation of value stocks relative to market 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.55 0.50 Mar-83 Jun-87 Sep-91 Dec-95 Mar-00 Jun-04 Sep-08 Dec-12 Mar-17 U.S. Int'l EM U.S. Current Int'l Current EM Current Source: MSCI, Worldscope, GMO | As of 4/30/2020 Valuations are a blend of four different value measures for MSCI Value regional indices relative to their base regional index.

EAFE 市场的价值股正以史上最大折价交易。新兴市场价值股的折价幅度略高于这一水平,历史上仅在某个月份达到过此低位。美国市场的价差则更大一些——这是指 MSCI 价值指数相对于其区域市场对应指数的表现。即便我们“仅仅”处在 1999 年 12 月初的相对估值水平,你也可以将价值股剪裁出上千种方式,每种都有其合理性,而当时美国市场又延续了数个月的极端走势。MSCI 的价值定义与我们的不同,但在价值股跑赢大盘 6%、17% 和 26%(分别对应随后 1 年、2 年和 3 年)的情况下,这仍是对基本“因子”的合理诠释。而且,无论你如何切分当前的价值股,它看上去都极为便宜——这还是在它们于互联网泡沫时期触及当前折价水平之后的表现¹¹。

Value stocks in EAFE are trading at the largest discount they ever have in history. Emerging value stocks are trading at a slightly bigger discount than that, a level they breached only one month before in history. The spread is slightly wider still in the U.S., This is for the MSCI Value indices relative to their regional market counterparts. You can cut value a thousand even if we are “merely” at the relative valuation level of early December 1999. But different ways, and there are justifications for each of while things proceeded to get even more extreme in the U.S. for several more months, them. MSCI’s version of value isn’t the same as ours, but value stocks beat the broad market by 6%, 17% and 26% over the next 1, 2, and 3 years it’s a reasonable take on the basic “factor.” And any way you slice value at the moment, it looks incredibly cheap. from when they hit the current level of discount in the internet bubble.11 Performance of Russell 1000 Value relative to Russell 1000 from 11/30/1999 to 11/30/2000, 11/30/2001, and 11/29/2002.

不确定性罕有如此之高。奇怪的是,股票市场也一样。 | 第 6 页 本·英克 英克先生是 GMO 资产配置团队的负责人兼 GMO 董事会成员。他于 1992 年从耶鲁大学获得经济学学士学位后加入 GMO。在 GMO 任职期间,英克先生曾担任量化股票和资产配置团队的分析师,管理过多个股票和资产配置组合的投资组合经理,担任过国际量化股票团队的联合负责人,并曾担任量化发达市场股票的首席投资官。他是一名特许金融分析师(CFA)。

投资总是在不确定性中做出决策。我们很少认为我们了解市场短期内会如何变化。同样,这次我们也不认为我们知道短期走势会如何。虽然如今许多股票在我们看来估值过高,但股票市场估值过高并非新鲜事。新鲜的是,灾难性经济结果的显著可能性与大幅高估的股票市场结合在一起。灾难情景绝非必然发生。但它足够合理,以至于我们希望在投资时采取一种方式,如果灾难真的发生,能够减少损失,前提是这种方式不会给不那么严峻的情景带来过多的预期收益成本。仅仅持有现金可以消除灾难情景下的下行风险,但如今现金不提供任何回报。从股票转向现金,相当于用确定的不充分回报来交换可怕结果的可能性。幸运的是,我们并不局限于那种选择。总体而言,全球价值股相对于市场的便宜程度,除了 TMT 泡沫时期的一两个月之外,是前所未有的。这种便宜为糟糕的经济结果提供了大量的安全边际,同时仍然提供了高于发达股票市场的预期回报。¹² 我们认为,这种价差加上新兴市场价值股(世界上最便宜的股票)的多头头寸,在当前时点提供了比传统股票仓位好得多的风险/回报权衡。

免责声明

本文表达的观点是本·英克截至 2020 年 6 月底的观点,并可能根据市场及其他情况随时发生变化。本文不是任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被解释为如此。对特定证券和发行人的引用仅供说明之用,不应被视为或解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Uncertainty Has Seldom Been Higher. Oddly, Neither Has the Stock Market. | p6 Ben Inker Mr. Inker is head of Conclusion GMO’s Asset Allocation Investing always involves making decisions under uncertainty. We seldom feel we team and a member know what the market will do in the near term. We do not feel we know what the short of the GMO Board of term will bring here, either. While many stocks appear to us to be overvalued today, Directors. He joined GMO overvalued stock markets are nothing new. What is new is the meaningful possibility in 1992 following the completion of his B.A. in of a disastrous economic outcome combined with a substantially overvalued stock Economics from Yale University. In his years market. The disaster scenario is by no means a certainty. But it is plausible enough that at GMO, Mr. Inker has served as an analyst for we want to invest in a way that mitigates the losses should it occur, as long as that can the Quantitative Equity and Asset Allocation be done without costing too much in expected returns for less dire scenarios. Simply teams, as a portfolio manager of several holding cash would remove the downside in the disaster scenario, but cash offers no equity and asset allocation portfolios, as co-head of International Quantitative Equities, return today. Moving from stocks to cash would be trading the possibility of a horrible and as CIO of Quantitative Developed outcome against the certainty of an inadequate one. Happily, we are not restricted to Equities. He is a CFA charterholder. that choice. In aggregate, global value stocks are cheaper relative to the market than they have ever been apart from a month or two in the TMT bubble. That cheapness buys a lot of margin of safety for a bad economic outcome while still providing an Disclaimer expected return higher than developed stock markets.12 We believe that a combination of that spread and a long position in emerging market value stocks – the cheapest The views expressed are the views of Ben stocks in the world – provides a far better risk/reward trade-off than a traditional Inker through the period ending June 2020, and are subject to change at any time based equity position at this point in time. on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

版权所有 © 2020 年 GMO 有限责任公司

Copyright © 2020 by GMO LLC.

版权所有。

All rights reserved.

本着“为投资组合进一步加装装甲”的精神,我们的选股模型愿意为那些拥有强健资产负债表和卓越竞争地位的公司支付高额溢价。尽管我们的投资组合仍带有浓厚的价值风格,但我们相信这种偏向使我们能够减轻因持有价值投资领域中质量较差的股票而可能带来的部分破产风险。

In the spirit of “armor plating” the portfolio further, our stock selection models are wiling to pay a meaningful premium for companies with strong balance sheets and superior competitive positions. While our portfolios still have a strong value flavor to them, we believe this bias allows us to mitigate some of the bankruptcy risk that would come from holding the junkier end of the value universe.

病毒、经济、2020 年第一季度季报与市场

杰里米·格兰瑟姆 | GMO 长期投资策略师、联合创始人

我在 GMO 的简单生活——将大部分精力集中在气候变化相关投资上——被新冠病毒粗暴地打断了。这个病毒是一个深不见底的复杂坑洞,充斥着矛盾的数据和猜测。

THE VIRUS, THE ECONOMY, QUARTERLY LETTER 1Q 2020 AND THE MARKET Jeremy Grantham | Long-Term Investment Strategist, Co-Founder My simple life at GMO of focusing most of my efforts on climate change related investing was rudely interrupted by the coronavirus. The virus is a bottomless pit of complexity, contradictory data, and guesswork.

病毒与经济以及新经济措施之间的相互作用是相同的:复杂且史无前例。

The interactions of the virus with the economy and new economic measures are the same: complex and without precedent.

而这些医疗、金融、经济和政治行动与市场心理之间的相互作用,用任何一位有自尊的黑帮分子的话来说就是——“别提它了(Fuhgeddaboudit)”。因此,从 1 月下旬开始——没错,我远比美国和英国政府行动得更早,这两个政府都慢得惊人,迟迟没有意识到问题所在——我一直在花两倍于往常的研究总时间,来应对所有这些新的相互作用,对于任何对数据分析感兴趣的人来说,这都构成了一个惊人的挑战。好消息是日子一闪而过。坏消息是新数据到来的速度超过了人类能跟上的速度。

And the interactions with the market psychology of these medical, financial, economic, and political actions, well, as any self-respecting gangster would say, “Fuhgeddaboudit.” So, starting in late January – yes, I was way ahead of the U.S. and the U.K. administrations, both spectacularly slow to get the point – I have been spending twice my usual total research time on all these new interactions, which for anyone interested in data analysis have presented an amazing challenge. The good news is the days flash by. The bad news is that new data arrives faster than humans can keep up with.

先把这个话题挑明了吧。

For now, let’s get this on the table.

这里没有确定的事。在 GMO,本次危机之前,我们经历过三件大事,无论对错,我们当时都“几乎确信”自己迟早会是对的。1987 年,我们在市盈率 45 倍时完全撤出日本,看着它涨到 65 倍(一度超过美国,规模更大),然后进入持续 30 年且仍在继续的下行调整。1998 年初,我们从市盈率 21 倍(与 1929 年历史最高纪录持平)开始对抗科技泡沫,直到 35 倍后下跌 50%,期间流失了大量客户,又在完整周期内重新赢回更多。2007 年,我们带领客户相对无痛地度过了房市崩盘。在这三次事件中,我们都觉得自己几乎确定是对的。日本、科技泡沫和 1929 年——可惜我错过了——都不是新类型的事件。它们只是极端案例,类似于南海泡沫中投资者的狂热与疯狂。2008 年的事件也相对容易应对,前提是你关注的是美国房市狂热——这是一个 3 个标准差、百年一遇,甚至可以说是独一无二的事件。我们估算过,如果房价回归原有趋势线并出现典型的过度修正,那将令美国消费者丧失 10 万亿美元的名义财富,并导致几十年来最严重的衰退。

There are no certainties here. At GMO we dealt with three major events prior to this crisis, and rightly or wrongly, we felt “nearly certain” that sooner or later we would be right. We exited Japan 100% in 1987 at 45x and watched it go to 65x (for a second, bigger than the U.S.) before a downward readjustment of 30 years and counting. In early 1998 we fought the Tech bubble from 21x (equal to the previous record high in 1929) to 35x before a 50% decline, losing many clients and then regaining even more on the round trip. In 2007 we led our clients relatively painlessly through the housing bust. In all three we felt we were nearly certain to be right. Japan, the Tech bubbles, and 1929, which sadly I missed, were not new types of events. They were merely extreme cases akin to South Sea Bubble investor euphoria and madness. The 2008 event also was easier if you focused on the U.S. housing euphoria, which was a 3-sigma, 100-year event or, simply, unique. We calculated that a return trip to the old price trend and a typical overrun in those extreme house prices would remove $10 trillion of perceived wealth from U.S. consumers and guarantee the worst recession for decades.

所有这些事件都与历史先例如出一辙,而正是这些先例给了我们信心。

All these events echoed historical precedents. And from these precedents we drew confidence.

病毒、经济与市场 | 第 8 页

但这次事件与以往所有情况都不同。它是全新的,不存在近乎确定的结论,只有若干较强的可能性。这正是我们资产配置主管本·英克感到不安的原因,也是你感到不安(或应该感到不安)的原因。

The Virus, the Economy, and the Market | p8 But this event is unlike all those. It is totally new and there can be no near certainties, merely strong possibilities. This is why Ben Inker, our Head of Asset Allocation, is nervous and this is why you are nervous, or should be.

所有人都能看到并感受到,这次不同寻常,也能察觉到市场反应的诡异之处——以历史盈利数据为基准,标普 500 指数的市盈率处于历史最高的 10% 区间,而与此同时,我们正处在经济形势最糟糕的 10% 区间,甚至可以说是最糟糕的 1%!

Everyone can see and feel that this is different and can sense the bizarre nature of the market response: we are in the top 10% of historical price earnings ratio for the S&P on prior earnings and simultaneously are in the worst 10% of economic situations, arguably even the worst 1%!

更糟的是,在病毒袭来前,美国及全球已面临重重问题:日益紊乱的气候引发全球洪灾、干旱及农业难题;发达国家人口增长放缓,很快将转为负增长;生产率增速持续下滑,尤其是发达国家,因此 GDP 增长趋势也在放缓。在美国,我认为每年 3% 以上的增长趋势已降至最多 1.5%。欧洲则更接近 1% 的上限。如前所述,美国的市盈率处于历史前 10% 的高位,且无论企业还是和平时期的政府,债务水平都达到史上最高。因此,在经历了 10 年的经济复苏之后,从历史规律看,这完全是一个容易出现停滞的正常时点。

And worse, we had U.S. and global problems looming before the virus: an increasingly disturbed climate causing global floods, droughts, and farming problems; slowing population growth, in the developed world, soon to be negative; and steadily slowing productivity gains, especially in the developed world, and therefore a slowing GDP trend. In the U.S., our 3%+ a year trend is down to, at best, 1.5% in my opinion. It is closer to a 1% maximum in Europe. We had, as mentioned, top 10% historical P/Es in the U.S. and much the highest debt level ever in the U.S. for both corporations and peacetime government. So, after a 10-year economic recovery, this would have been a perfectly normal time historically for a setback.

随后,病毒来袭。

And then the virus hit.

与此同时,它正引发前所未有的供给和需求冲击。前所未有。它造成的经济收缩速度远超大萧条时期。与 1989 年的日本、2000 年的科技泡沫(美国)和 2008 年(美国和欧洲)不同,这次冲击是全球性的。四个星期内 GDP 的下降和失业率的上升,相当于大萧条时期一到四年才达到的水平,而其他事件中从未达到过。曾对 2008 年危机进行过权威分析的哈佛教授罗格夫和莱因哈特一致认为,这次事件确实完全不同,并指出至少需要五年才能恢复到 2019 年的经济活动水平。但这只是猜测。我们确实不知道需要多长时间。几乎可以肯定的是,V 型复苏现在看来已无望。最好的结果可能是,到年底奇迹般地出现数十亿剂有效疫苗。但大多数病毒从未有过有效的疫苗,而大多数有效疫苗的研发耗时远超过五年,并且研发出来也只能部分成功。是的,这一次会有前所未有的巨额投入和巨大努力。但即便如此,一位顶尖疫苗专家表示,迅速成功就像“连续多次抽中内顺子”一样。即使疫苗一切顺利,经济上仍会留下深深的创伤。

Simultaneously, it is causing supply and demand shocks unlike anything before. Ever. It is generating a much faster economic contraction than that of the Great Depression. And unlike 1989 Japan, 2000 Tech (U.S.), and 2008 (U.S. and Europe), it is truly global. The drop in GDP and rise in unemployment in four weeks have equaled what took one to four years to reach in the Great Depression and were never reached in the other events. Rogoff & Reinhart, Harvard Professors who wrote the definitive analysis of the 2008 bust, agree that this event is indeed completely different and suggest it will take at least 5 years to regain 2019 levels of activity. But this is a guess. We really don’t know how long it will take. Nearly certain is that a V-shaped recovery looks like a lost hope. The best possible outcome would be that there will be, almost miraculously, billions of doses of effective vaccine by year-end. But most viruses have never had a useful vaccine and most useful vaccines have taken well over five years to develop and when developed have been only partially successful. Yes, this time there will be an enormous effort with unprecedented spending. But still, a leading vaccine expert says quick success would be like “drawing successfully to several inside straights in a row.” And even if all works out well with a vaccine there will remain deep economic wounds.

破产潮已经拉开序幕(赫兹公司于 5 月 22 日申请破产),到年底时,成千上万家企业将涌入本已处于高峰的企业债务悬崖。这需要超凡的管理能力,或许能应付得了。但也可能应付不了。向问题撒钱——纸张和电子脉冲——能改善心理预期,尤其是股市,额外的刺激资金最终可能流入那里,但不一定能让人重返工作岗位;至少短期内失业率将高达 20%。

Bankruptcies have already started (Hertz on May 22nd) and by year-end thousands of them will arrive into a peak of already existing corporate debt. It will need spectacular management, which it may get. But it may not. Throwing money – paper and electronic impulses – at the problem can help psychology and, particularly, the stock market, where extra stimulus money can end up but does not necessarily put people back to work; there will be up to 20% unemployment for at least a moment.

合理且大规模的基础设施投入——包括电网和能源生产的绿化——才是更好的解决方案。至少,初始财政援助的力度和速度——幸好我们在次贷危机中学会如何做到这一点——已经让我们免于再次陷入大萧条。但这只是第一轮。而许多国家的政府,容我们说,并非一贯明智。

Sound and massive infrastructure spending would address the problem better, including greening both the grid and energy production. At least the size and speed of the initial financial help, which fortunately we learned to do in the housing financial bust, has saved us from the certainty of Great Depression II. But this is only round one. And many global administrations are, shall we say, not consistently sensible.

病毒、经济与市场 | p9 看似无法预料的结局几乎必然会出现。我们所有人都被迫进行了几个月的内省。这有可能成为一个支点或转折点,催生出新的社会与商业趋势:资本主义的缺陷、不平等、气候变化与环境问题、有限世界中的有限资源、当前高消费型经济、不计代价的增长。

The Virus, the Economy, and the Market | p9 Unanticipatable outcomes seem to be guaranteed. We will all have had an enforced several months of introspection. This could turn out to be a fulcrum, or tipping point, for new social and business trends: deficiencies in capitalism; inequality; climate change and our environment: limited resources in a finite world; our current high consumption economy; growth at any price.

在疫情之前,人们对其中几个因素的看法已经开始转变。对现状弊端的抵制已悄然萌动。如今,一切都可能随之改变。

Attitudes to several of these factors were already beginning to shift before the virus. Resistance to the downsides of the status quo was already stirring. Now, all may be up for grabs.

简而言之,我们从未生活在一个未来如此不确定的时代。然而,当前市场较 1 月份的前期高点下跌了 10%,而当时——至少表面上看——经济和金融领域似乎一切正常。即便算不上“正常”,也还算过得去。未来可能的路径中,有许多会改变企业盈利、增长,以及资本主义、社会和全球政治格局的诸多方面。有些或许会变得更好,但有些则不会。这里的关键是不确定性,从某些方面看,它达到我生平所见之最。因此,就风险与回报而言——特别是最坏结果与最佳结果的比较——当前市场似乎沉浸在一厢情愿的乐观中,而此时审慎与耐心才远为恰当。

In short, we have never lived in a period where the future was so uncertain. Yet the market is 10% below its previous high in January when, superficially at least, everything seemed fine in economics and finance. And if not “fine,” well, good enough. The future paths include many that could change corporate profitability, growth, and many aspects of capitalism, society, and the global political scene. Some perhaps for the better, but some not. The key here is uncertainty, which in some ways seems the highest in my experience. So, in terms of risk and return – particularly of the worst possible outcomes compared to the best – the current market seems lost in one-sided optimism when prudence and patience seem much more appropriate.

摘要 我的论点可以用几句话概括:当前美国市场的市盈率处于历史最高 10% 区间。而相比之下,美国经济正处于最糟糕的 10% 区间,甚至可能是最糟糕的 1%。此外,一切皆不确定,或许不确定程度空前。市场市盈率水平通常反映当前状况(请参见附录)。从历史上看,市场喜欢高利润率、低通胀、稳定,以及由此推论的低不确定性。这显然是历史上最显著的错配之一。话虽如此,这是一场新型危机,许多情况将会不同。没有什么是确定的,但很可能仍有一些更好、更安全的主题。耐心和谨慎很可能就是其中两个。

Summary The few-line summary of my argument is this: the current P/E on the U.S. market is in the top 10% of its history. The U.S. economy in contrast is in its worst 10%, perhaps even the worst 1%. In addition, everything is uncertain, perhaps to a unique degree. The market’s P/E level typically reflects current conditions (please see Appendix). Markets have historically loved fat margins, low inflation, stability and, by inference, low levels of uncertainty. This is apparently one of the most impressive mismatches in history. That being said, this is a new type of crisis and much will be different. There are no certainties but there are probably still some better and safer themes. Caution and patience are likely to be two of them.

病毒、经济与市场 | 第 10 页 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 附录:解释市盈率 格兰瑟姆先生于 1977 年联合创立 GMO,是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,担任该公司的长期投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会成员,并在几家非营利组织的投资委员会任职。创立 GMO 之前,格兰瑟姆先生于 1969 年联合创立了 Batterymarch Financial Management,在那里他于 1971 年推荐了商业指数化投资,这被认为是其多项首创的成就之一。他的投资生涯始于荷兰皇家壳牌集团的经济学家。格兰瑟姆先生拥有英国谢菲尔德大学的本科学位和哈佛商学院的工商管理硕士学位。他是美国艺术与科学院院士,拥有英国 CBE 勋章,并荣获卡内基慈善奖章。

The Virus, the Economy, and the Market | p10 Jeremy Grantham APPENDIX: EXPLAINING P/E Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a Over 20 years now, Ben Inker and I have done a lot of work on explaining price member of GMO’s Asset Allocation team, serving earnings multiples. Yes, the market occasionally gets impacted by panics and euphoria, as the firm’s long-term but mostly it reflects the current data. It is a coincident indicator of comfort. Factors investment strategist. He is a member of the that disturb it depress the ratio. And the most important drivers are profit margins GMO Board of Directors and has also served and current inflation. No surprises – the market loves high margins and hates high on the investment boards of several non-profit inflation. Exhibit 1 shows the data. Things can always change and precedents can organizations. Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. become irrelevant, but the bet here is that for the next few quarters earnings and profit Grantham was co-founder of Batterymarch margins will be crushed and sometime during that depressed phase P/E ratios will also Financial Management in 1969 where he be pulled down as is typical, giving us a lower multiple of substantially lower earnings. recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with EXHIBIT 1: INKER-GRANTHAM BEHAVIORAL MODEL TO Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his EXPLAIN P/E undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard 50 Model relies on three factors, which in order of Business School. He is a member of the 45 importance are: Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE 1) Inflation Volatility Price/10-Year Real Earnings 2) Real ROE Correlation: 90% from the UK and is a recipient of the Carnegie 3) Volatility of GDP Medal for Philanthropy..

免责声明 本文所表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2020 年 6 月 10 日的观点,并可能根据市场和其他状况随时变更。本文不构成对任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被解释为如此。提及特定证券和发行方仅供说明之用,并非也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer 20 The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending June 10 2020, and are subject to change at any time 5 based on market and other conditions. This 0 is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific Explained P/E 10 Predicted P/E 10 (Forecast) Realized P/E 10 securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, As of 4/30/20 | Source: GMO recommendations to purchase or sell such Note: Normalized Earnings Yield (E10/P) is regressed on the three factors listed above to securities. come up with predicted earnings yield. Its reciprocal is the explained P/E 10. Forecast for future “fair P/E 10” assumes that the market’s profitability will drop by 30% and that inflation and GDP Copyright © 2020 by GMO LLC. volatility will rise to 2008-like levels as new data comes in.

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