收获旋风1
GMO 季度信函 2008 年 10 月《收割旋风》¹ 杰里米·格兰瑟姆
指责任何人的时间应该已经过去,至少随着泡沫不可避免地开始破裂而暂时搁置,在危机过去之前一切都说尽了,但我发现无法避免这种说法,即危机得到控制,而经济也声称是完全健康的。抱歉。无论如何,只是为了设定场景,有必要简要回顾一下我们共同播下的那阵毒风。
- 我们经历了一段长时间的过度增长:货币供应量、贷款增长、杠杆率都过高,且利率低于正常水平。
- 这与一个极为幸运的全球经济环境(我们曾称之为“近乎完美”)相结合,催生了资产类别的泡沫——根据我们的研究,这种组合无一例外地都会导致泡沫。由于所有这些因素都是全球性的,这一组合产生了我们所称的“第一个真正的全球性泡沫”,几乎涵盖了所有地区的所有资产,只有少数温和的例外。
- 在这些资产泡沫膨胀期间,在宽松货币的助推下,当局——美联储、美国证券交易委员会、财政部和国会——非但没有收紧现有监管,反而部分地拆除了它们。他们放松了对商业银行的管控,同时进一步减少了对投资银行的监管,让杠杆率得以腾飞。更近期,他们几乎是无缘无故地、在没有任何压力的情况下,取消了卖空提价规则。而这只是冰山一角。与此同时,在某些方面试图应对日益增长的风险的努力,都被民主党人和共和党人联手击退或削弱了。这方面的例子包括早期遏制股票期权的努力,以及试图加强对房利美和房地美的监管。
- 有利条件与来自当局的非理性繁荣鼓励相结合,产生了一个更毒性的泡沫——这个泡沫就存在于冒险行为本身。每个人,我的意思是每个人,都明白了冒险的收益是不对称的,并且争相去承担更多风险。这里的不对称性在于:如果事情搞砸了,他们会帮你兜底(这听起来很耳熟!),但如果一切顺利,你就只能靠自己了,可怜的家伙。啊,纯粹资本主义的乐趣!
- 在这方面,一些致命的基础工作已经由理性预期或市场有效性这一概念奠定。该理论认为我们都过于理智,不会出现重大泡沫。这是一个方便数学处理的理论,但显然与充满贪婪和恐惧的现实世界完全脱节。它危险地鼓励了一种信念:如果你承担更多风险,你就自动会获得更多回报。这种情况通常,甚至往往,是成立的,因为在正常的平静市场中,这种关系的粗略近似通常会被定价到市场中去。但在风险被错误定价的狂暴市场中,这就不成立了。从 2006 年 6 月到 2007 年 6 月,根据我们的七年期数据,被这些信念和市场状况所麻痹的投资者,实际上是在历史上首次为承担风险而付出代价。
GMO Quarterly Letter October 2008 Reaping the Whirlwind1 Jeremy Grantham The time to blame should be past, or at least in abeyance as the bubbles inevitably began to break, all was said until the crisis is past, but I find it impossible to avoid it to be contained and the economy was claimed to be completely. Sorry. In any case, just to set the scene, it is strong. necessary to review briefly the poisonous wind that we 4. The combination of favorable conditions and all sowed. irrationally exuberant encouragement from the 1. We had an extended period of excess increase in authorities produced an even more poisonous money supply, loan growth, leverage, and below bubble – that in risk-taking itself. Everybody, and I normal interest rates. mean everybody, got the point that risk-taking was 2. This combined with a remarkably lucky global asymmetrical and reached to take more risk. The economic environment that we described as “near asymmetry here was that if things worked out badly perfect” to produce a bubble in asset classes, as such they would help you out (this sounds very familiar!), a combination has done without exception according but if all went well you were on your own, poor thing. to our research. Since all these factors were global, Ah, the joys of pure capitalism! the combination produced what we have called “the 5. In this regard, some deadly groundwork had been first truly global bubble” in all assets everywhere with laid by the concept of rational expectations, or market only a few modest exceptions. efficiency. This argued that we were all far too sensible for major bubbles to appear. This is a convenient 3. While these asset bubbles were inflating, facilitated theory for mathematical treatment, but obviously by easy money, the authorities – the Fed, the SEC, totally unconnected to the real world of greed and the Treasury, and Congress – rather than tightening fear. It dangerously encourages the belief that if you existing regulations, partially dismantled them. They take more risk you will automatically receive more freed commercial banks while further reducing controls reward. That condition might often, even usually, on investment banks, allowing leverage to take wing. be the case because in normal quiet markets a rough More recently they almost gratuitously, without being approximation of that relationship is usually priced pressured, removed the uptick rule for shorting. And into the markets. But in wildly-behaving markets this is just a sample. Simultaneously, attempts in where risk is mispriced, it is not true. From June 2006 some quarters to address growing risks were beaten to June 2007 on our seven-year data, investors lulled back or diluted by Democrats and Republicans alike. by these beliefs and the conditions of the market Examples here include early efforts to rein in stock were actually paying to take risks for the first time in options and the attempt to add controls to Fannie and history.
弗雷迪。(我咬着嘴唇才没指名道姓。)更糟的是,监管当局似乎鼓励了最恶劣的过度行为——他们赞扬新奇金融工具的精巧设计(好吧,那是格林斯潘),还反复强调泡沫不存在(或许根本不可能存在),并且声称处于顶峰的房地产市场“仅仅反映了美国经济的强劲”。最终,美国房地产市场——一个明显的泡沫,价格比此前极为稳定的趋势线至少高出 30%——正在回归正常,而股票和风险承担或许也已完全恢复。
所有泡沫终会破裂,这次也不例外。泡沫破裂绝非意外,也绝不是像某些人辩称的那样是异常事件。1998 年和 1999 年以及 2003 年至 2007 年期间形成的泡沫,才是真正的异常事件。当危机来临时,你需要能力和勇气去应对。这场危机中最令人失望的是,当局——尤其是那位曾经备受尊敬的美联储主席——如此彻底地将资产价格和风险承担泡沫的积累合理化并视而不见。“因为他们种的是风,收的将是旋风。”(《何西阿书》8:7)当飓风刮起时,工程兵团,可以这么说,正日以继夜地支撑着一座可疑的、草草搭建的建筑。
金融和经济世界因这些泡沫破裂而承受的压力,向来都是巨大的。重复我 18 个月前说过的一句话:“如果一切顺利(泡沫破裂时),痛苦也总是很多。如果出了任何差错,痛苦会更多。令人越来越印象深刻且惊讶的是,这次我们做错的事情居然有这么多!”我们的领导在哪里?
Freddie. (I’m biting my lip not to name names.) Worse yet, the regulating authorities appeared to encourage 6. Just as all bubbles have broken, these bubbles did. the worst excesses by admiring the ingenuity of new Far from being a surprise, the bubbles breaking were financial instruments (okay, that was Greenspan), and absolutely not outlier events, contrary to protestations. by repeating their belief that no bubbles existed (or The bubbles forming in 1998 and 1999 and in 2003 perhaps could ever exist) and that housing at the peak through 2007 were the outlier events. The U.S. “merely reflected a strong U.S. economy.” Finally, housing market, which was a clear bubble with prices at least 30% above a previous very stable trend, is 1 “For they sow the wind, and they reap the whirlwind.” Hosea 8:7 well on its way back to normal, and equities and risk- with hurricanes blowing, the Corps of Engineers, as taking may well have made it all the way back. it were, are working around the clock to prop up a suspiciously jerry-built edifice. When a crisis occurs, 7. The stresses on the financial and economic world you need competence and courage to deal with it. of these bubbles breaking was always going to be The bitterest disappointment of this crisis has been great. To repeat a comment I made 18 months ago, how completely the build-up of the bubbles in asset “If everything goes right (as a bubble breaks) there prices and risk-taking was rationalized and ignored will always be lots of pain. If anything is done wrong by the authorities, especially the formerly esteemed there will be even more. It is increasingly impressive Chairman of the Fed. and surprising how much we have done wrong this time!” Where Was Our Leadership?
8. 到目前为止,我们体系最大的失败在于未能及时应对重要资产泡沫的形成(见上季度的信函)。这就引出了一个问题:为什么我们的领导人会鼓励放松监管、鼓励杠杆操作和冒险行为,却完全忽视或无视日益增长的麻烦迹象以及我们所说的泡沫破裂的“近乎确定性”?嗯,我有两种理论。第一种是老生常谈,与我目前的惯常演讲有关,名为“职业风险与泡沫破裂:唯一重要的事”。职业风险解释了为什么受托管理我们资金的首席执行官们,在游戏进行到很晚时仍在跳舞。舞会已过午夜钟声,他们早已变成了南瓜或老鼠,却浑然不觉。这就是我所说的“高盛效应”:高盛提高了杠杆率,其利润率飙升至天际。其他银行急于跟上,却缺乏高盛的才华和精力,模仿它们,最终酿成灾难性后果。而那些错过这场游戏、看起来像个老古董的首席执行官们,可就惨了。董事会会以保护股东未来利润为名,直接把他踢出去,然后从瑞士信贷之类的地方雇一个更像枪手的人进来。
我的第二种理论更难证明,那就是:首席执行官的选拔看重左脑技能——专注、勤奋、果断、有说服力、政治技巧,如果运气好,还有分析能力和魅力。“伟大的美国高管”不是靠耐心选出来的。事实上,如果他们能拼写出“耐心”这个词,就会被炒鱿鱼。他们拿薪水不是为了把脚翘起来,或者浪费时间思考历史和长远未来;他们拿薪水是为了果断行事、立刻行动。
8. By far, the biggest failing of our system has been its This brings us to ask the question: Why did our leaders unwillingness to deal with important asset bubbles as encourage the deregulation, encourage the leveraging they form (see last quarter’s Letter). I started a long and risk-taking, and completely miss or dismiss the diatribe on this topic in 1998 and 1999 and reviewed growing signs of trouble and what we described as the it in Feet of Clay (2002), which is aimed at my arch “near certainties” of bubbles breaking? Well, I have two villain, Alan Greenspan. With the housing bubble theories. The first is our old chestnut and is related to my even more dangerous to mess with than equities, current stump speech, which is called “Career Risk and Bernanke joined my rogues’ gallery. If we change Bubbles Breaking: the Only Things that Matter.” Career risk is why CEOs, entrusted with our money, were still our policy and move gently but early to moderate dancing late into the game. So late that the clock had bubbles, this crisis need never be repeated. There already struck midnight and they had already turned back are signs that the previously intractable authorities into pumpkins or rats, but just didn’t know it. It’s what are reconsidering their bone-headed position on this I call the Goldman Sachs Effect: Goldman increased its topic. If they change, all this pain will not have been leverage and its profit margins shot into the stratosphere. totally in vain. (See Part 2 of this Letter, titled “Silver Eager to keep up, other banks, with less talent and energy Linings,” in two weeks or so.) than Goldman, copied them with ultimately disastrous 9. The icing on the cake as far as the bust is concerned consequences. And woe betide the CEO who missed the has been provided by Buffett’s “financial weapons of game and looked like an old fuddy-duddy. The Board mass destruction” – the new sliced and diced packages would simply kick him out, in the name of protecting of loan material so complicated that, shall we say, the stockholders’ future profits, and hire in more of a few understood them. The uncertainties and doubts gunslinger from, say, Credit Suisse. generated by their complexities were impressive. Trust My second theory would be even harder to prove, and this and confidence are the keys to our elaborate financial is it: that CEOs are picked for their left-brain skills – focus, structure, which is ultimately faith-based. The current hard work, decisiveness, persuasiveness, political skills, hugely increased doubt is a potential lethal blow to and, if you are lucky, analytical skills and charisma. The the system and must be addressed at any cost as fast “Great American Executives” are not picked for patience. as possible. Concern about moral hazard is secondary Indeed, if they could even spell the word they would be and must be put into abeyance for the time being. Wall fired. They are not paid to put their feet up or waste time Street leaders are in any case now fully scared and are thinking about history and the long-term future; they are likely to stay that way for a few years! paid to be decisive and to act now.
10. 要避免危机的爆发,你需要大量预见力、想象力和能力。就在几个季度前,我曾把我们的金融体系比作一座精心搭建的悬索桥,但愿它用了一些优秀的、老派的维多利亚式过度工程来建造。好吧,它根本就没有过度工程!它只是按在有利条件下正常运行的标准建造的。现在(指 2008 年 10 月的 GMO 季度信函第一部分)是两轮冲击对实体经济产生的影响。另一方面,那些目睹这些问题逐步显现的人,职业风险要小得多,甚至完全没有。我们认识的这样的人不下几十个。事实上,几乎所有掌握良好历史数据且思考周全的人,都在危机到来之前很久就给出了很好的建议。他们全都拥有约伯般的耐心。而且他们都是右脑主导型:更直觉、更倾向于琢磨奇怪的理论、沉迷于历史数据、并且不急于求成。
10. To avoid the development of crises, you need a The type of people who saw these problems unfolding, plentiful supply of foresight, imagination, and on the other hand, had much less career risk or none at competence. A few quarters ago I likened our financial all. We know literally dozens of these people. In fact, system to an elaborate suspension bridge, hopefully almost all the people who have good historical data and built with some good, old-fashioned Victorian over- are thoughtful were giving us good advice, often for years engineering. Well, it wasn’t over-engineered! It was before the troubles arrived. They all have the patience of built to do just fine under favorable conditions. Now Job. They are also all right-brained: more intuitive, more GMO 2 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 given to developing odd theories, wallowing in historical is the effect of both Rounds I and II on the real economy.) data, and taking their time.
顺境时,他们几乎普遍对尾部事件感兴趣——甚至痴迷——执着于那些非常独特、新奇且由不同因素组合而成的情况。这些思考占据了他们大部分的时间。而刚刚好,这次正是那些“前所未见”的因素起了决定作用。不幸的是,我们都对此视而不见。当英国房地产市场的靴子落地时,将迎来又一轮减记和压力,幸运的是,英国纳税人已经主动提出要分担这一切。感谢各位!全球利润率,这第二个几乎确定的事,也在快速下降,但仍有很长的路要走。我们嘲笑了一年的未来盈利预期,仍然高得离谱。
They are almost universally When the U.K. housing shoe hits the floor it will come interested – even obsessed – with outlier events, and with another wave of write-downs and stress that, very unique, new, and different combinations of factors. These fortunately for everyone, the British taxpayers have been ruminations take up a good chunk of their time. Do such volunteered to share. Thank you from everyone! thoughts take more than a few seconds of time for the great CEOs who, to the man, missed everything that was Global profit margins, the second near certainty, are also new and different? Unfortunately for all of us, it was the declining rapidly, but have a long way to go. The estimates new and different this time that just happened to be vital. of future earnings that we have been sniggering at for a year are still inconceivably high.
他们为什么还要折腾?之所以讽刺的是,当麻烦来临时,我们又把这些顶尖 CEO 炒了鱿鱼。标题本应写成:“回来吧,美林、花旗、贝尔斯登和雷曼的领袖们,一切都被原谅了(暂时)。”典型的 CEO 恰恰具备处理紧急情况和走出困境的能力。因此,保尔森正是那个看不准问题要害的人,但也同样正是那个——或者说至少是那个典型的优秀人选——能在压力下应对复杂危机的人。但最具戏剧性的领域已被第三个近乎确定之事所覆盖——风险溢价。因此,我们老调重弹:全球利润率最近处于历史高位。利润率是金融或经济领域中最明确呈现均值回归的序列。它们会回归正常。在大幅波动之后,它们几乎必然回落。以当前这波全球不幸来看,这次它们很可能会大幅回落。
Why do they bother? To It is therefore ironic that we fire these top CEOs when repeat our mantra: global profit margins were recently at the trouble hits. The headline should read: “Come back, record highs. Profit margins are the most provably mean-leaders of Merrill, Citi, Bear, and Lehman. All is forgiven reverting series in finance or economics. They will go (for a while).” The typical CEO is precisely equipped to back to normal. After big moves, they almost invariably deal with emergencies and digging out. Thus, Paulson overrun. With the current set of global misfortunes, they was just the man to miss the point, but equally just the are very likely to overrun considerably this time. man – or at least a typically good one – to deal with a complicated crisis under stress. But the most dramatic ground has been covered by the third near certainty – risk premiums.
读到这部分时,我念给我妻子听,她的反应是:“那董事会呢?难道他们不能用更长期的智慧来弥补 CEO 的短期决断吗?”18 个月前,固收市场的利差还很窄,发达国家的大多数利差早已远超正常水平,尽管可能还有少数人仍没完全意识到某些脚注的恐怖程度。(相比之下,在新兴市场国家,我们猜测这场危机带来的阵痛中的大部分还在前方,而且时不时可能极为严重,尽管总量上远小于发达国家。)这个想法太棒了——在左脑和右脑思维之间取得平衡。按理说,纸面上也应该是这样实现的。可惜的是,我们往往把这种平衡扭曲成了老友和互相吹捧的 CEO 粉丝俱乐部。
From record While reading this section to my wife, she asked, narrow spreads 18 months ago in fixed income markets “But what about the Boards of Directors? Can’t they in developed countries, most are far beyond normal complement the CEOs’ short-term decisiveness with already, although a few probably still don’t get the full longer-term wisdom?” What a great idea – a balance of horror of some of the footnotes. (In contrast, in emerging left- and right-brained thinking. And so it should be, and countries we guess that most of the pain from the crisis actually is intended to be, on paper. What a shame that we unfortunately is still ahead, and here and there it could be have typically subverted this balance into a CEO fan club very severe, although in total much less than in developed of old friends and mutual backscratchers. countries.
这需要花很长时间才能让整个体系消化完毕。)发达市场股票——我们在书中写过,它们是两大主要资产类别中反应较慢的那一类——在 2007 年中期我们谈到的那三个“近乎确定”的事情上,一如既往地比债券花了更久时间才明白过来。至少情况一直如此,直到仿佛就在几分钟前,一声惊雷炸响,它们在一波恐慌中彻底领会了那个丑陋的要点。全球股票市场在三周内完成了至少 20 年来首次从相当昂贵到适度便宜的转变。美国与英国的房地产市场——我们当前困境的直接原因——已经下跌了。
It’s just taking a long time to work through the system for them.) Developed equities – which we have Near Certainties written about as the slow-witted of the two major asset The three “near certainties” we talked about in mid-2007 classes – had, as usual, a much harder time getting the have all behaved themselves. They were that U.S. and U.K. point than bonds. At least that was the case until what house prices would decline, that profit margins globally seems like a few minutes ago when, in a clap of thunder, would decline, and that risk premiums everywhere would they got the whole ugly point in a wave of panic. The rise, and all three with severe consequences on markets global equity markets moved in three weeks from quite and the financial and economic systems. The U.S. and expensive to moderately cheap for the first time in at least U.K. housing markets, the proximate cause of our current 20 years. troubles, have declined.
美国市场可能还有相当长的一段路要走,但很可能已过了本轮调整的中段。英国市场的价格下跌与之相反,才刚刚开始。住房交易量则恰恰相反,已近乎蒸发。事实上,在浩如烟海的数据中,最让我恐惧的一项,是英国 8 月份新增抵押贷款净额同比暴跌 98%(从超过 70 亿英镑骤降至不足 2 亿英镑,几乎完全冻结)!在这种时刻,不妨问问自己:你真正知道什么,或者自以为知道什么?对我们(在我们资产配置部门)而言,肯定不是金融体系的来龙去脉——尽管我们正越来越努力去理解。金融体系复杂得令人难以置信,极少有人——哪怕是那些比我们深入得多的人——能真正搞懂。
The U.S. market has probably quite a way to go, but likely is well over the mid-point Basics of its correction. The price declines of the U.K. market At times like this it is good to ask yourself what it is that have, in contrast, merely started. Housing transactions, you really know or think you really know. For us (in our in contrast, have vaporized. In fact, the scariest single asset allocation division) it is definitely not the ins and data item for me, out of a huge selection, was the August outs of the financial system, although we’re trying harder decline in U.K. net new mortgages of 98% year over and harder. The financial system is so mind-bogglingly year (from over £7 billion down to under £200 million, complex that very few, even those with far deeper a near total freeze-up)!
即便我们团队的背景远不如官方那么深厚,对此也完全心知肚明。令人费解的是,截至 8 月底,尽管我们对财务细节相对无知,但价格指数竟看似仅下跌了 10%。在本次危机的第一轮中,我们比许多专家更准确地预判了最可能落下的几大靴子之一。(我将第一轮视为资产价格泡沫破裂。第二轮是这种破裂对金融体系的影响,尤其是房地产方面。第三轮几乎总是带来超出预期的痛苦。)作为历史研究者,我们认识到,当泡沫破裂时,其后果几乎无一例外地比人们预期的更加痛苦。
And this with the official house backgrounds than ours, fully understand it. Puzzlingly, price index pretending to be down only 10% at the end despite our relative ignorance of financial details, we of August. This is one of the biggest shoes left to drop were more accurate than many experts in the last year of Round I of this crisis. (I think of Round I as asset about the big picture, and we can speculate why. First, price bubbles breaking. Round II is the effect of this, as historians, we recognized that when bubbles break especially of housing on the financial system. Round III they almost invariably cause more pain than expected.
2008 年 10 月季度信函,第一部分 3 GMO
其次,我们是明斯基的忠实信徒,相信——鉴于构成市场的是一群可悲的有缺陷的人类——明斯基关于周期性金融危机几乎是不可避免的看法是正确的。因此,去年年中,当高盛专家预计减记金额为 4500 亿美元时,我当即写道,若最终不是 1 万亿美元,我们就算走运了。我借用他们的专业细节,加上一条通泛的历史观察,就像我曾预言“至少一家主要银行——宽泛定义——将会倒闭”,以及一半对冲基金将在五年内消失那样。在以往的银行业危机中,大型银行确实倒闭过,而对我们这些半专业人士而言,这场危机似乎比大多数更严重。于是我们泛泛研究了以往的危机,在扶手椅上断定应该加注。在一个我们并非真正擅长的领域,我们走运了,我们也清楚自己是走运的。我们将努力保持运气,同时也通过提升技能来对冲风险。增聘爱德华·钱塞勒——一位专注于信贷危机的资深财经记者/历史学家——是一个非常有帮助的开端。
相比之下,我认为我们确实了解的是资产类别定价和泡沫的行为,这两者都源自我们唯一的大真理:均值回归。
Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 3 GMO Second, we are Minsky mavens and believe that, with for moderately more real growth in recent years. In the sadly defective humans making up the markets, Minsky six years since October 2002, the trend line has risen to was right to see periodic financial crises as well-nigh 975 (plus or minus a little – we are constantly fine-tuning inevitable. Thus in the middle of last year when the a percent here or there). Needless to say, two weeks ago experts at Goldman Sachs said they expected write- the market crashed through that level, producing Exhibit 1. downs of $450 billion, I immediately wrote that we’d So now all 28 burst bubbles are present and accounted for. be lucky if it wasn’t a trillion. I was playing off their Long live mean reversion! detailed expertise and adding a generalized historical observation as I had done with the prediction that “at least As for asset class returns, the early October crash has one major bank – broadly defined – would fail,” and that presented us with an opportunity to brandish our 10-year half of the hedge funds would be gone in five years. In forecasts even more than we did last quarter. Exhibit 2 previous banking crises, major banks had failed, and this shows our 10-year forecast from September 30, 1998 and crisis seemed likely, to us semi-pros, to be worse than the actual asset returns for the most important assets for most. So we studied in broad strokes previous crises and us in asset allocation. armchaired that we should up the ante. We got lucky Our 10-year forecast for the S&P 500 10 years ago was in an area in which we were not real experts, and we a lowly -1.1% real, an extreme outlier among forecasts. know we were lucky. We will attempt to keep the luck At the end of September the real return was exactly nil and hedge our bets by also increasing our skills. The (0.0%). But it only took three days of October to hit our addition of Edward Chancellor, an experienced financial -1.1% forecast on the nose! Ten years and three days. For journalist/historian with a focus on credit crises, has been emerging equities, our forecast was +10.9% real and the a very helpful start. actual was +12.8%. Not too bad, but even here in seven In contrast, what we do know, I believe, is asset class days – horrible days, admittedly – the return of emerging pricing and the behavior of bubbles, which are both crossed our forecast on the way down. So today (October derivatives of our single, big truth: mean reversion.
附注 1 泡沫破裂 泡沫最终破裂
回到 2000 年,当我们还在因为那个疯狂达 2.6 倍的科技泡沫持续违背地心引力而战战兢兢时,我们试图通过回顾历史上的泡沫来给自己打气。我们发现自 1920 年以来共有 28 个泡沫——这是一个随意但合理定义为两个标准差事件的标准,在高斯世界中应该每 40 年出现一次。除一个泡沫外,其余全部破裂,价格一路回落到泡沫开始前的趋势线。唯一的例外是 2000‑02 年的标普 500 指数本身。在我所称的“足以让死人行走的足够刺激”影响下,标普指数从 1550 点下跌,却未能完全触及我们计算出的趋势值 725 点。相反,它在 775 点处反弹。(它需要下跌 55% 才能触及趋势,但只跌了 50%。差一点,但不够。但更关键的是,我们原本预期会出现相当明显的过头下跌,这在历史上非常常见。)看到这一反常事件后,我们将 2002‑07 年的市场上涨描述为“史上最大的傻瓜式反弹”。现在有一个难点:与大多数人不同,我们衡量牛市和熊市的方法是基于其在通胀调整后沿趋势线的增长。从历史来看,标普指数的实际增长仅为每年 1.8%,但由于技术原因(特别是低派息率),我们已允许实际趋势增长率为 2%。注:趋势线为每年 2% 的实际价格增长。 *去趋势实际价格 = 价格指数除以 CPI+2%,因为标普 500 价格的长期趋势增长约为 2% 实际增长率。*
Exhibit 1 Bubbles Breaking The Bubble Finally Breaks Back in 2000, as we continued to shake in our boots as the 2.6 mad tech bubble kept defying gravity, we tried to reassure S&P 500: 1992-October 10, 2008 ourselves by looking at historical bubbles. We found 28 bubbles since 1920, defined arbitrarily but reasonably as 2.2 two-standard-deviation events that in a Gaussian world should occur once every 40 years. All but one burst all Detrended Real Price* the way back to the trend that existed prior to the start of the bubble. The single exception was the S&P 500 1.8 itself in 2000-02. Under the influence of what I’ve called “enough stimuli to get the dead to walk,” the S&P, down from 1550, could not quite reach its trend value, which 1.4 we had calculated to be 725. Instead it rallied at 775. (It had to fall 55% to reach trend, but fell 50%. Close, but no cigar. But, more critically, we had expected a fairly major 1.0 Trend Line overrun, which is historically so common.) Seeing this aberrant event led us to describe the market advance from 2002-07 as “the biggest sucker’s rally in history.” Now a 0.6 wrinkle here is that, unlike most, we measure bull and bear 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 markets based on their trend line growth after adjusting Note: Trend is 2% real price appreciation per year. for inflation. The real growth in the index has historically * Detrended Real Price is the price index divided by CPI+2%, since the long-been only 1.8% per year for the S&P, but for technical term trend increase in the price of the S&P 500 has been on the order of 2% reasons (low payout rates in particular) we have allowed real.
来源:GMO 截至 2008 年 10 月 10 日 GMO 第四季度信函,第一部分——2008 年 10 月 附件 2 10),我们 10 年前的预测可谓乐观,如果您允许我们宽限几天的话。准时到达,尽管有些颠簸。标普 500 指数累计实际回报 我们现在何处?
Source: GMO As of 10//10/08 GMO 4 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 Exhibit 2 10), our forecasts of 10 years ago were optimistic, if you On-Time Arrivals, Despite Some Turbulence allow us a few days’ leeway. S&P 500 Cumulative Real Return Where Are We Now?
50% 因此,挥舞着我们那张 10 年前的旧预测,并抵制那种“瞎猫撞上死耗子”的 40% 想法,实际上,我们曾有一定信心地说,到 10 月 30% 时,全球股市从绝对价值看已显便宜,并且比 20 年内的任何时刻都要便宜 20%。完全披露要求我们补充 10%,在我们看来,这听起来并不像表面那么高明,因为自 1994 年以来,市场或多或少地 0% 一直处于长期高估状态,而真正便宜的时候只有 -10% 预测 1982-83 年以及在 1987 年可能持续了几周。还有一个 10/7/08 可怕的警示(难道不总是如此吗?),它体现在 -20% 的图 3 中,该图展示了 20 世纪三个最重要的股市 -30% 泡沫:1929 年、1965 年以及 1989 年的日本。你会注意到 Sep-98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08,这三者都在价格趋势线上过度回调了 50% 以上 EAFE!为了广大群众的总体幸福感,我们不常展示这些图表 100%,而且直到最近,它们还被视为完全无关甚至是不得体的。但归根结底,这只是 80% 的历史。和大多数人一样乐观,我们画下 60% 的线,不相信这次会发生如此可怕的事情 Actual。
50% So brandishing our old 10-year forecasts and resisting the 40% idea that even a blind pig will occasionally find a truffle, Actual we have had some confidence in saying that by October 30% 10th global equities were cheap on an absolute basis and 20% cheaper than at any time in 20 years. Full disclosure requires 10% that we add that, in our opinion, this is not as brilliant as it sounds, for markets have been more or less permanently 0% Crossed overpriced since 1994 and have not been very cheap since -10% Forecast over on 1982-83 and perhaps a few weeks in 1987. There is also a 10/7/08 terrible caveat (isn’t there always?), and that is presented -20% in Exhibit 3, which shows the three most important equity -30% bubbles of the 20th Century: 1929, 1965, and Japan in Sep-98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 1989. You will notice that all three overcorrected around EAFE their price trends by more than 50%! In the interest of Cumulative Real Return general happiness, we do not trot out these exhibits often 100% and, until recently, they would have been seen as totally irrelevant and perhaps indecent. But, after all, it’s just 80% history. Being optimistic like most humans, we draw the Actual 60% line at believing something so dire will happen this time.
我们当然可以躲在“只有三个数据点”这样的借口后面,毕竟每个有自尊的统计学家都不会太看重它们。我们也能说服自己:“这次不一样”——因为包括本次在内的四次事件,每一次的背景都不同。其中一次伴随着高通胀;另外三次(包括当前这次)则没有。日本和 1929 年的特点是完全的无能,而这次我们面对的——姑且这么说——只是极为广泛的无能。这一次我们更快地投入了战斗,尽管还没有快到某些人期望的程度。并非所有差异都对我们有_利:我们的系统更加全球化、相互关联且复杂,其中包括了对冲基金这样的非银行参与者。我们还拥有“金融大规模杀伤性武器”——经过分层、切分和重新打包的资产支持证券——以及,或许最具破坏性的是,完全不受监管的信用违约互换。这一次我们的贪婪和短期导向比他们更严重吗?嗯,肯定没_减少_!然而,偏离超过 50% 似乎是不可接受的。各国政府大概会觉得,资产价值如此损失的后果太可怕了,它们会不惜一切代价去阻止。也许,仅仅是也许,它们的“一切”会奏效。但一个相当保守的投资者在看到这些数据后,会倾向于至少允许 20% 的偏离(比如标普 500 指数跌到 800 点),并且脑子里要留出一小部分空间,意识到情况可能会糟糕得多。
Crossed We can hide behind the fact that there are only three data 40% points, and therefore no self-respecting statistician can over on 9/5/08 give them much weight. We can convince ourselves that 20% things are different this time since the background to each 0% of the four events, including this one, is different. One of them had high inflation; three, including the current -20% Forecast situation, did not. Japan and 1929 were characterized -40% by complete incompetence, while this time we had Sep-98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 only – shall we say – very widespread incompetence. This time we have thrown ourselves more quickly into Emerging Equities battle, although not so quickly as some would have liked. Cumulative Real Return Not all of the differences are favorable: we have a more 500% global, interlocking, and complicated system, including 450% Actual non-bank players like hedge funds. We also have the 400% “financial weapons of mass destruction” – asset-backed 350% securities that are tiered and sliced and repackaged – and, 300% perhaps most destabilizing of all, totally unregulated 250% credit default swaps. Did we have even more greed and Crossed 200% over on short-term orientation this time than they did? Well, we 150% 10/6/08 certainly didn’t have less! Still, a 50% overrun seems 100% unacceptable. Probably governments would feel that the 50% Forecast consequences of such a loss in asset value would simply 0% be too awful and would do anything to prevent it. And -50% perhaps, just perhaps, their “anything” would work. But a Sep- 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 reasonably conservative investor looking at the data would Source: GMO As of 10/10/08 want to allow for at least a 20% overrun to, say, 800 on Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 5 GMO Exhibit 3 the S&P 500, and have a tiny portion of their brain loaded Overrun! with the notion that it just might be quite a bit worse. 2.3 S&P 500: 1920-1932 The Curse of the Value Manager 2.1 1.9 We at GMO have a strong value bias, and our curse, therefore, like all value managers, is being too early. In Detrended Real Price* 1.7 1998 we saw horribly overpriced stocks that at 21 times 1.5 earnings equaled the two previous great bubbles of 1929 1.3 and 1965. Seeing this new “peak,” we were sellers far, 1.1 Trend Line far too early, only to watch it go to 35 times earnings! 0.9 And as it went up, so many of our clients went with it, reminding us that career risk is really the only other thing 0.7 that matters. The other side of the coin is that only sleepy 0.5 value managers buy brilliantly cheap stocks: industrious, 0.3 wide-awake value managers buy them when they are 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 merely very nicely cheap, and suffer badly when they become – as they sometimes do – spectacularly cheap.
2.5 标普 500 指数:1946-1984 年 我在 1999 年就曾说过,当时正因过早卖出而吃亏,我的下一个重大错误将是过早买入。对一个被视为长期看空者的人来说,这话听起来可能很荒谬,但我是认真的。经历了 14 年的标普 500 指数高估之后,一个人会觉得自己像长期看空者,就像 1973-1986 年经历了 13 年的低估市场后,我觉得自己像长期看多者一样。但那已经是很久以前的事了。好吧,令人惊讶的是,我们又一次来到了这里。终于!在 10 月 10 日,我们可以说,标普 500 指数在 900 点时,美国股票已经很便宜,而海外股票更便宜。因此,在这些价格水平上,我们将成为稳步的买家。不一定是快速买入,实际上很可能不是,但会是稳步买入。但 46 50 54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 我们并不抱幻想。择时很难,显然通常不是我们的特长,尽管三个月前我们极其幸运地、非典型地迅速减仓新兴市场股票。那暂且不谈。我们依赖数据。我们也认识到,严重而典型的超跌是真实存在的可能。我们还认识到,当前的危机伴随着全球崩盘的独特危险。简而言之,我们认识到,我们很可能在过早买入。买者自负。
2.5 S&P 500: 1946-1984 I said as far back as 1999, while suffering from selling too soon, that my next big mistake would be buying too 2.0 soon. This probably sounded ridiculous for someone who Detrended Real Price* was regarded as a perma bear, but I meant it. With 14 1.5 years of an overpriced S&P, one feels like a perma bear just as I felt like a perma bull at the end of 13 years of underpriced markets from 1973-86. But that was long 1.0 Trend Line ago. Well, surprisingly, here we are again. Finally! On October 10th we can say that, with the S&P at 900, stocks 0.5 are cheap in the U.S. and cheaper still overseas. We will therefore be steady buyers at these prices. Not necessarily 0.0 rapid buyers, in fact probably not, but steady buyers. But 46 50 54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 we have no illusions. Timing is difficult and is apparently not usually our skill set, although we got desperately 3.0 Japan vs. EAFE ex-Japan: 1981-1999 and atypically lucky moving rapidly to underweight in emerging equities three months ago. That aside, we play 2.5 the numbers. And we recognize the real possibilities of severe and typical overruns. We also recognize that the 2.0 Relative Return current crisis comes with possibly unique dangers of a global meltdown. We recognize, in short, that we are very 1.5 probably buying too soon. Caveat emptor.
1.0 第三回合:经济效应的趋势线
0.5 第一回合和第二回合——资产泡沫破裂与信贷危机——很快将基本成为过去,但不幸的是,对于 81、83、85、87、89、91、93、95、97、99 年的我们所有人而言,对经济产出现实世界的影响,几乎完全在前方等待。沿用我们惯常的、倚重历史经验的“扶手椅分析”手法,我们已经连续几个季度撰文指出,全球经济疲弱将比官方预测严重得多,持续的时间也会长得多。尽管官方预测已大幅下调,我们仍然坚持这一观点。
注:趋势为每年实际价格上涨 2%。* 去趋势实际价格 = 价格指数 ÷ (CPI + 2%),因为标普 500 指数价格的长期趋势涨幅约为实际值的 2%。来源:GMO
1.0 Round III: The Economic Effects Trend Line 0.5 Rounds I and II – the asset bubbles breaking and the credit crisis – will soon be mostly behind us, but the effect on 0.0 the real world of economic output lies, unfortunately for 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 all of us, almost entirely ahead. Employing our usual historically loaded armchair technique, we have been Note: Trend is 2% real price appreciation per year. writing for several quarters that global economic weakness * Detrended Real Price is the price index divided by CPI+2%, since the long- will be substantially worse and will last substantially term trend increase in the price of the S&P 500 has been on the order of 2% real. longer than the official forecasts. We maintain that view Source: GMO even though official forecasts have dropped considerably.
GMO 6 季度信函,第一部分 – 2008 年 10 月 全球经济很可能会显露出这些所谓盎格鲁-撒克逊国家留下的伤痕,并将陷入持续数年的长期危机。尤其是,与过去十年相比,未来十年左右由资产价格过度膨胀所创造的财富幻觉将成为一个令人沮丧的特征。这确实是一个时代的终结。这种幻觉已被大幅削弱,尽管这一效应的主要部分已经过去,但部分欧洲国家和美国仍有一大部分房价下跌尚未到来。我们所有人都一直在消费,就美国而言,还在进口,仿佛我们比实际要富裕得多。
要结束本函的第一部分,关于这个话题我只想再补充一点,那就是关于中国。
GMO 6 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 The global economy is likely to show the scars of this so-called Anglo-Saxon countries, and will be a permanently crisis for several years. In particular, the illusion of wealth depressing feature of the next decade or so compared with created by over-inflated asset prices has been dramatically the last decade. It is indeed the end of an era. reduced and, though most of this effect is behind us, a substantial part of the housing decline in some European To end Part 1 of this Letter, there is only one further point countries and the U.S. is still to occur. We were all I want to add on this topic, and that is about China. spending and, in the case of the U.S., importing as if we were much richer than is in fact the case.
特别像一只闯进瓷器店的黑熊,在美国,家庭债务的持续增加暂时掩盖了实际工资二三十年几乎零增长带来的阵痛。我上季度曾指出,要求正面临维持史上最高经济增长率这一极其复杂任务的中国政府展现出色的金融和经济技能,是荒谬的。(我说“他们肯定会栽跟头。”)但我越想越觉得,这既是最可能发生、也是最危险的失望(甚至震惊),正等待着如今的我们。自 1982 年以来,家庭债务每年为消费者支出增加超过 1 个百分点。不幸的是,这种净好处不会永远持续下去。在你借入相当于收入 1% 的第一年,利息支付几乎不造成什么影响,你的支出接近可支配收入的 101%。
Particularly Like a Bear in a China Shop here in the U.S., increasing household debt temporarily I suggested last quarter that it was ridiculous to expect masked some of the pain from little or no increase in real great financial and economic skills from the Chinese hourly wages for 20 to 30 years. Household debt since government, which is faced with the spectacularly 1982 has added over 1% a year to consumer spending. complicated task of maintaining the highest economic Unfortunately, this net benefit does not go on forever. growth rate in history. “Surely they will stumble,” I said. Well, the more I think about it, the more likely it In the first year in which you borrow 1% of your income, seems that this is both the most likely and most dangerous the interest payment barely makes a dent and your spending disappointment (even shock) that awaits the current is close to 101% of your disposable income.
但是,每一年你多借一个百分点的债务,你的利息负担就会加重。在一个平均利率为 7% 的世界里,大约 15 年后——让我们回到 5.6 万英尺高空的扶手椅上(你不怀念协和式飞机吗?)——一位业余经济学家可以总结说,当你看消费者时,累积债务的利息完全抵消了新增借款。嗯,我们美国更接近这样一个模式:过去 30 年每年多借一个百分点,这意味着我们早在几年前就已经过了盈亏平衡点,现在支付的利息远远超过我们每年新增的借款。只要每个人都能并且愿意支付利息,这对一个过胖的金融结构来说是有利的,但它对全球经济的疲弱毫无抵御能力。
But each consensus. year you borrow an incremental 1%, your interest load grows. After 15 years or so in a world of an average 7% Moving back to our armchair at 56,000 feet (don’t you miss interest rate, the interest on the accumulating debt fully the Concorde?), an amateur economist could summarize offsets the new borrowing when one looks at consumers and simplify the Chinese economy as 39-37-37: an collectively. Well, we in the U.S. are closer to a model of astonishingly large 39% of the GDP is capital spending, 30 years of borrowing an incremental 1%, meaning that 37% is internal consumption, and an amount equal to we passed through break-even years ago and now pay 37% of GDP is exported. (These numbers do not sum to much more in interest than we borrow incrementally. This 100 as we are not using exports net of imports because is a situation favorable to an overfed financial structure as we are concerned with the vulnerability of total exports long as everyone can and will pay their interest, but it is to a weak global economy.)
相比之下,美国在总消费层面已不再复现 1970-2013 年的有利格局,令人不安地处于常态的另一侧:70% 的消费依赖传统方式——等你存够了钱再去买一台电视机——而德国这一比例是 57%,中国更是接近两倍。的确,一位来自日本或中国的访客考察两个国家——一个累积的消费债务高达 GDP 的 1.5 倍,另一个为零——会发现在繁荣时期前者拥有巨大优势。但如今,我确信,除了消费贷款网点数量减少之外,你几乎看不出任何差别。不过,我们或许要问:当一排排钢厂空置时,你如何刺激新建一座钢厂?当全球经济不仅放缓,而且出人意料地极度疲软时,你如何增加出口?
The U.S., in comparison, is no longer beneficial to aggregate consumption compared 19-70-13, disturbingly on the other side of normal; 70% with the good old-fashioned way of waiting until you had consumption compared with 57% in both Germany and actually saved up to buy a TV set. Indeed, a visitor from Japan, for example, and nearly twice that in China. China’s Mars examining two countries, one with accumulated mix is of course an utterly unprecedented one, and comes consumer debt of 1.5 times GDP and the other with zero, with great advantages in booming times. Now, however, would, I am sure, notice no difference except for the we might ask: how do you stimulate the building of a new reduced number of consumer lending outlets. steel mill when rows of mills are sitting empty? How do you increase exports into a global economy that is not just This generally unfavorable picture gets worse when you slowing, but is unexpectedly very weak?
他们难道认为,未来 10 年我们足以有效刺激本地消费,足以让个人债务每年小幅下降 0.5%——这么点比例在 GDP 中微乎其微——能抵消年总收入及持续利息支出,同时还能承受股票和房产下跌带来的负财富效应?所以,当本地市场价格逆转时,债务积累效应也会逆转吗?高价股票和房产带来的财富幻觉,尤其是对一笔像样的累积养老金的那种幻觉,也会破灭。简单的“经济学 101”思维会告诉我们,他们的资本品行业跌幅将超过其他经济部门,出口增速可能从极高放缓到零甚至更糟。正如我们两年前所说(对巴菲特的话加以发挥):当高价资产的潮水退去,暴露的不仅是没穿泳裤的人,还有对积蓄的虚幻信心。
And are they consider that we are likely to have, for the next 10 years or good enough at stimulating local consumption to have an so, a modest annual reduction in personal debt of, say, 0.5% impact on such a small percentage of GDP in the face of of gross income per year as well as a continued interest a negative wealth effect from declining stock and housing payment. So the debt accumulation effect reverses as does prices in their local market? the illusion of the wealth effect from overpriced stocks and housing, especially the illusion of a decent accumulated Simple old “Econ 101” thinking would suggest that their pension. As we said two years ago (embroidering on capital goods sector will have a bigger drop than the rest Buffett), when the tide of overpriced assets goes out, it of the economy, and that export growth rates might slow will be revealed not only who is not wearing swimming from very large to even nil or worse.
那类只做多不做空的基金,还有那些只有一点点养老金的人!我们那个愚蠢的笑话,到两年后已经变得一点也不好笑了。抵消效应或许存在于凯恩斯主义或罗斯福式的政府支出中,他们大幅增加了本已庞大的基础设施支出(这是一个专业的经济学术语)。他们肯定会这么做一部分。这种虚幻财富效应的逆转,叠加去杠杆化,将在全球范围内被感受到,尤其是在……总体而言,我越来越确信,这正成为我们与市场共识的第一大分歧。如果我们是正确的,将对全球增长构成一个非常重要且令人不安的意外。好消息是,这远非我们近期对房地产、利润率以及风险溢价观点的那种“近乎确定”。
The one open-shorts, but also who has a small pension! Our silly joke ended offset might be in Keynesian or Rooseveltian has become a sick one in just two years. government spending, upping their already massive infrastructure spending by A LOT. (This is a specialized This reversal of the illusory wealth effect added to economic term.) And they will surely do some of that. deleveraging will be felt worldwide, but especially in the On balance I find myself more and more convinced that Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 7 GMO this is becoming our #1 disagreement with consensus. If have been set up for some very unusual developments. we are right, it will be a very important and distressing The market would have continued to fall for a few more surprise for global growth. The good news is that this weeks or worse (as by October 16th it seems to be doing) is far from the “near certainty” of our recent views on until eventually the world’s central bankers got their act housing, profit margins, and risk premiums.
充其量,如果两者合在一起,那不过是来自安乐椅的灵感洞察。到那时,隐含的七年回报率可能——假设正确的话——新兴市场达到每年实际 15%,美国达到 11%,而 EAFE 达到每年 12% 或 13%。这些非凡的机会,几乎与 1982 年和 1974 年那两次传奇般的低点相当,在我看来,会给严肃的投资者制造出一个地狱般的悖论。他们将要面对的是一场持续 18 个月的真正失望饮食;失望既来自全球经济增长,更关键的是,也来自市场共识中全球盈利的表现。
论抵消错误的优点
10 月初(截至 10 日),全球股市在我们看来终于得到了相当有效的定价,至少是在等待了 20 年之后的那一两天里。但我们并没有达到那个让我们的 10 年预测恰好完全正确的时点,哪怕只是一秒钟,因为市场已经将这一切都消化了进去。
At best, if together. The imputed seven-year returns by then might right, it is an inspired insight straight from the armchair. have reached, say, 15% real per year for emerging, 11% At worst, if wrong, an ill-researched hunch. for the U.S., and, say, 12% or 13% a year for EAFE. These exceptional opportunities, nearly equal to the legendary On the Virtues of Offsetting Errors lows of 1982 and 1974, would have set up, in my opinion, During early October (up to the 10th) global equities, in a paradox from hell for serious investors. They would our opinion, were finally quite efficiently priced, at least have been looking forward to an 18-month-long diet of for a day or two after a 20-year wait. But we did not sustained genuine disappointments; disappointments in get to this point where our 10-year forecasts were exactly both economic growth globally and, more importantly, in right for a second because the market had taken into its global earnings for the market’s consensus.
然而,要实现最终的合理或有效,还得经历两次失望。市场很可能通过持续的巨大抵消性错误来稳定上涨!我确信,市场的上涨并非因为从极度低点反弹——经济恐慌会在不经意间意外地产生比所有坏消息更多的失望,市场也难以轻易接受未来收益和经济增长趋势究竟有多低。这会在智力上极难应对:你预测到一件不愉快的意外,却仍然应该买入!这将是一个罕见的历史事件,而这里的大幅反弹可能会改变它。没错,我记起来了。市盈率应该因其稳定性改善和经济管理提升而走高。(哦,是的,我记起来了,市盈率应该因为稳定性大为改善和经济管理更加优秀而合理走高!)事实上,我相信,要使真正黯淡的全球前景被充分认识,至少还需要一年时间。
Yet into those head to finally be reasonable or efficient. No, it took two disappointments the market would likely have steadily giant offsetting errors! I am sure the market does not risen because the recovery from the extreme lows of the yet get the full extent of future earnings and economic panic would have inadvertently and accidentally more disappointments, nor does it easily accept how low trend than offset all the bad news. This would have proved line P/Es are. (Oh yes, I remember now. P/Es should intellectually very difficult to deal with: you predict an be higher because of much improved stability and better unpleasant surprise, but yet you should buy! It would economic management!) In fact I believe it will take at have been a rare historical event, which a big rally here least another year for the truly dreary global outlook to be may change.
不过,谁知道呢,运气这东西谁也说不准。当时市场已经完全消化并充分定价了,我还在指望好事或许还会发生。(说句题外话,1932 年的时候,在连续多年异常糟糕的消息所催生的、持续不断的经济灾难情绪中,一轮持续超过一年的涨幅超过 111% 的反弹还是启动了。)幸运事件、道德风险以及不断上涨的资产价格,这些都算在里面。
Still, you never know your luck. Something fully appreciated and priced in. I was also counting on like it may still happen. (For the record, in 1932 a rally of over a year or more being required to break the high animal 111% started in the face of persistent disastrous economic spirits that had been baked in by years of exceptionally news.) fortunate events, moral hazard, and rising asset prices.
临时建议。抵消这种乐观情绪的是,我们以一种相当传统的方式——贪婪与无能混杂,但程度巨大——在标普 500 指数低于 1000 点(10 月 10 日标普 500 指数在 900 点附近)时制造了一场全面恐慌。没有人信任任何人的财务诚信(往往包括他们自己),因此对于愿意提前行动的勇敢的价值型经理来说,美国股票在 1000 点以下是非常合理的买入时机。同样的结论也适用于 EAFE 指数和新兴市场股票,而且在 10 月 10 日的价格水平上,甚至更加明显。历史警告我们,市场更有可能创出新低而非新高。固定收益领域则出现了大范围极具吸引力的异常定价。美元和日元目前看来尚可,但英镑则不然。完全不必担心通胀。我们可以把对通胀的担忧留到两三年之后,到时候再真正担心吧!大宗商品可能会出现大幅反弹,但未来 18 个月的基本面应该会将其打压至两年新低。至于我们这些从事资产配置的人,我们已经做出了选择:在当前及更低的价格水平上,犹豫而谨慎地买入。祝各位好运,做出明智的决策。
Provisional Recommendations Offsetting this optimism, we produced – with a fairly (October 10 - S&P 900) traditional mix of greed and incompetence, but in a giant At under 1000 on the S&P 500, U.S. stocks are very dose this time – a full-fledged panic. With no one trusting reasonable buys for brave value managers willing to be anyone’s financial integrity (often including their own), early. The same applies to EAFE and emerging equities and with margin calls, redemptions, and other technical factors causing forced selling, we had an old-fashioned at October 10th prices, but even more so. History warns, meltdown. And by some minor miracle, this confluence though, that new lows are more likely than not. Fixed of offsetting events or beliefs produced efficient long-term income has wide areas of very attractive, aberrant pricing. pricing for a few days. (P.S. The rally of October 13th The dollar and the yen look okay for now, but the pound may usher in a more sustained rally and help resuscitate does not. Don’t worry at all about inflation. We can animal spirits so that we might be able to limp through to all save up our worries there for a couple of years from my original target of a market low in 2010, but don’t hold now and then really worry! Commodities may have big your breath.) rallies, but the fundamentals of the next 18 months should wear them down to new two-year lows. As for us in asset If the U.K. plan (also advocated by both Soros and Buffett allocation, we have made our choice: hesitant and careful independently) had not been widely adopted and the global buying at these prices and lower. Good luck with your authorities had followed the dithering U.S. lead, we would decisions.
免责声明:本文所表达的观点为杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2008 年 10 月 17 日的看法,并可能根据市场及其他条件随时发生变化。本文并非任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被理解为上述行为。文中提及特定证券及发行者仅作说明之用,并非也不应被理解为购买或出售此类证券的建议。
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending October 17, 2008, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
版权所有 © 2008 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。
Copyright © 2008 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
GMO 8 季度信函,第一部分 – 2008 年 10 月 GMO 季度信函 2008 年 10 月 一线希望与经验教训 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 总结与结论
10 月 13 日被《巴伦周刊》问及我们是否会从这场持续的危机中学到些什么时,我回答:“我们会在极短的时间内学到大量东西,在中期内学到相当多的内容,而从长期来看则什么都学不到。这是历史先例。”
不幸的是,这很可能就是现实。但至少在接下来的几年里,有许多一线希望和宝贵的经验教训值得汲取。过去 10 年,我们一直处于一个总体上缺乏吸引力且艰难的投资环境中。在这段时间的大部分里,我们的储蓄率一直为负。
我们有一个臃肿的金融行业,靠实体经济为生,而且随着收入分配日益失衡(受到税收变化的鼓励!),社会契约被打破,财富向极富人群倾斜,牺牲普通人的利益。此外,这种新的巨大财富还被不必要地炫耀。最糟糕的是,政府和金融企业领导层目光短浅、狭隘偏执。好吧,这些情况多数正在终结。一些不良元素将长期消失,另一些则仅仅是被缓和,但这确实是一个时代的终结,在我这个节俭的约克郡人看来,这是个相当令人作呕的时代。我们现在可以重新评估自己的许多投资理念,尤其是市场有效性、尾部风险(天哪,纳西姆·塔勒布可真是说对了!),以及分散化和长期资产配置的理论。
全球经济极度疲软并非没有任何部分抵消的益处:我们可以暂时忘掉消费通胀,尤其享受油价下跌带来的好处,比如取暖油和天然气价格降低。金属和农产品价格下跌也将有助于缓解本已拮据的消费者的部分压力。在像这样的全球危机中,美国出乎意料地扮演了避风港的角色。美元坚挺如铁,但我们的贸易逆差仍因早些时候美元持续走弱的后劲而有所改善,这得益于油价暴跌和其他进口消费的减少。在这场危机的众多好处中,首当其冲的是在一些固定收益领域出现了前所未有的投资机会,部分利差之大,已反映出市场功能的严重失调。截至 10 月 18 日,我们还在 20 年来首次看到了价格适中低廉的美国及全球股票。(这些天你非得把日期标上不可!)很可能在不久之后,在接下来一年可能发生的额外阵痛过后,全球股市将提供非同寻常的机会。我们 GMO 已经在谨慎买入。我们接受买得太早,但我们认识到,我们对标普 500 指数 975 点的公允价值估计,从历史先例来看,很可能会被向下冲过 20% 到 40%,从而给出标普 500 指数 585 到 780 点的可能低点区间。全球面临经济活动和企业利润率不可避免的下滑,因此这种冲过走势不太可能比平均水平少多少痛苦,尽管谁知道运气会怎样呢。
我们唯一需要感谢的,就是恐惧本身
值得庆幸的是,纯粹的恐惧——近乎盲目的恐慌——最终促使当局采取了一些实际行动。这个更为果断的阶段——向银行直接注资以及以多种形式提供流动性——是由英国首相布朗发起的,他此前是挥霍无度的财政大臣。欧洲各国政府设法咬紧牙关,克服了他们对追随“背信弃义的英格兰”的本能抗拒。而这反过来似乎又鼓励了美国也加入这种更直接的做法。这是一个改变游戏规则的事件,很可能拯救了我们,使我们免于坠入深渊。不幸的是,在最近的痛苦之后,还将有相当多的金融痛苦接踵而至:更多的全球银行倒闭,来自信用卡和杠杆债务的更大规模减记,以及,如今日益增多的、经济极度疲软之后的典型企业违约。而且大多数国家的经济肯定都会非常疲软。在美国,经济衰退很可能与 1982 年相当甚至更糟,而几乎在所有地方,衰退的持续时间都可能比正常情况长得多。
至于下行空间,这将是一个巨大的进步。我对当局,尤其是美联储,不太有信心,但我相当有信心,至少社会其余部分会更认真地对待资产泡沫的形成。我们能抓住什么就抓住什么。
GMO 8 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 GMO Quarterly Letter October 2008 Silver Linings and Lessons Learned Jeremy Grantham Summary and Conclusions progress from earlier sustained dollar weakness, helped by When asked by Barron’s on October 13th if we would new tumbling oil prices and falling consumption of other learn anything from this ongoing crisis, I answered, “We imports. Chief among the many benefits of this crisis are will learn an enormous amount in a very short time, quite a unprecedented opportunities for investing in some fixed bit in the medium term, and absolutely nothing in the long income areas where some spreads are so wide as to reflect term. That would be the historical precedent.” severe market dysfunctionality. As of October 18th, we also have moderately cheap U.S. and global equities for That is unfortunately likely to be the case. But over the the first time in 20 years. (You really have to put the dates next several years at least, there are many silver linings and in these days!) Probably quite soon, global equities too valuable lessons to be learned. We have had a generally will offer exceptional opportunities after the additional unattractive and difficult investment environment for the pain that is likely to occur in the next year. We at GMO past 10 years. For most of that time we have also had a are already careful buyers. We are reconciled to buying negative savings rate. too soon, but we recognize that our fair value estimate of We have had a bloated financial industry feeding off the real 975 on the S&P 500 is, from historical precedent, likely to world and a breach of the social contract with the increasing overrun on the downside by 20% to 40%, giving a range maldistribution of income (encouraged by tax changes!) in of 585 to 780 on the S&P as a probable low. The world favor of the very rich at the expense of ordinary people. We faces unavoidable declines in economic activity and profit also had unnecessary flaunting of this new great wealth. To margins, so this overrun is unlikely to be much less painful cap it off, we had blinkered, narrow-minded leadership by than average, although you never know your luck. the government and financial corporations. Well, much of this is ending. Some undesirable elements will disappear All We Have To Thank Is Fear Itself for a long time and some will just be moderated, but it is Thankfully, pure fear – approaching blind panic – finally truly the end of an era and a rather disgusting one in my induced some real action on the part of the authorities. opinion, speaking as a thrifty Yorkshireman. We can now This more decisive phase, injecting money directly into re-assess a lot of our thinking about investing, particularly the banks as well as supplying liquidity in many forms, market efficiency, outlier risks (boy, did Nassim Taleb get was initiated in the U.K. by Prime Minister Brown, that one right!), and theories of diversification and longer- the previously profligate Chancellor of the Exchequer. term asset allocation. European governments managed somehow to grind their A very weak global economy is not without partially teeth and overcome their natural reluctance to follow offsetting benefits: We can temporarily forget about Perfidious Albion anywhere. This, in turn, apparently consumer inflation and particularly enjoy the advantages encouraged the U.S. to jump on board with this more of lower oil prices as reflected in lower heating oil and direct approach. gas prices. Falling metal and agricultural prices will also This was a game-changing event that has probably saved help relieve some of the pressure on otherwise squeezed us from tipping into the pit. There will unfortunately be consumers. In a global crisis like this, the U.S. finds itself considerably more financial pain where the recent pain unexpectedly cast in the role of a safe haven. The dollar has come from: more global bank failures, more massive is as strong as a horse and yet our trade deficit still makes write-downs from credit cards and leveraged debt, and, increasingly now, the typical corporate defaults that follow downsides, it will be a giant step forward. I am not too a very weak economy. And the economies of most countries confident of the authorities, especially the Fed, but I am will surely be very weak. In the U.S., the downturn is pretty confident that at least the rest of society will take likely to rival 1982 or worse, and almost everywhere it is the formation of asset bubbles much more seriously. We’ll likely to be a much longer downturn than normal. take what we can get.
在诸多值得庆幸的经验教训中,还有一个潜在教训或许是我们意识到:资本市场并不总是为最佳利益服务。我的老友兼前合伙人保罗·伍利(Paul Woolley,已从 GMO 退休)在伦敦经济学院设立了一个中心,名为“伍利资本市场失灵研究中心”——一个极具诱惑力的名称。(幸运的是,他的朋友王尔德没找到资金赞助这个名称。)我必须坦言,他在 GMO 的投资时机很少如此完美,因为一年之内,他就从可疑的怪人变成了开明的先知,众多知名人士排队想参与其中。我们集体怀有一种感人的信念,认为资本主义——仅仅因为它是经济增长唯一有效的驱动力——基本上完美无缺,任何管控都必然适得其反。纯正的安·兰德式资本主义显然无法处理“公地悲剧”类的社会问题,比如气候变化。它无法将腐败贪婪之辈变成像我们读者这样理性诚实的人。它甚至无法触及社会正义。而且显然,它在应对资产泡沫及其引发的经济和信贷问题方面也表现得糟糕透顶。社会对这一问题的态度将会改变,运气好的话,更开明的监管将增加公共福祉。我个人持乐观态度。美国的国家之船(以及许多其他国家的船)似乎通过过度朝一个方向摇摆而前进,然后就像一艘由业余舵手操控的超级油轮一样矫枉过正。(唉,最近我们确实有过真正业余的舵手!)过去八年,我们经历了一次相当不错的摇摆,现在需要一些修正。无论如何,从长远来看,这艘船似乎以曲折的方式大致驶向正确的方向。像吉姆·格兰特这样的超理性人士以及其他非常明智的人,连同通常的右翼怀疑派,会说加强监管的记录很糟糕,他们说得对。但完全不受监管的资本主义似乎也同样糟糕。我们必须在泥泞中摸索出一个可接受的混合模式,我们唯一可以确定的是——它不会是高效的。但也许足够可以接受,我们必须希望如此。
同样值得庆幸的经验教训是:美联储在资产定价问题上明显改变态度,也是一个潜在教训。科技泡沫的破裂引发了 2001—2003 年的过度刺激,这又必然会催生房地产泡沫——就像通过了一项法律要求所有房价必须上涨 50% 一样确定无疑。现在终于有了希望的迹象:伯南克正在重新考虑:“显然,过去十年表明,泡沫破裂对经济来说可能是极其危险和代价高昂的现象(编辑:这人的确是个天才),毫无疑问,随着我们从金融危机中走出来,我们都会研究这个问题并思考应对之策。”因此,由目光短浅的学术经济学家政策造成的那些不必要痛苦,可能并非完全白费!
然而这绝不是板上钉钉的事。很少有学者改变想法,也很少有科学理论因简单的事实而崩溃。“科学进步是一场葬礼接一场葬礼前进的”,马克斯·普朗克如此表达他对学术灵活性的信念,但建议使用行刑队似乎太过刻薄。美联储成员已经在指出一个显而易见的问题:通过使用“生硬工具”——加息——来干预正在形成的投资泡沫,很可能“短期内会抑制一些经济增长!”¹
但阻止泡沫形成并不会摧毁增长,只会推迟增长,这已经够糟糕的了。相比之下,泡沫破裂揭示了极端资本错配造成的财富毁灭——大量投资被吸入某些领域:互联网初创公司、过度建设住房、雇佣大量房地产经纪人以及设计复杂的结构性金融产品等等。如果泡沫引发真正的信贷冻结,那么一些真正有用投资的投入可能永远失去:未能建成的工厂、无限期推迟的教育以及失业浪费的工时。如果我们集体对资产泡沫及其不可避免的后果更加警惕,那么短视的学术经济学家政策强加给我们的所有不必要痛苦,可能并非完全没有意义!
Also high up the list of silver linings and lessons learned is Another potential lesson learned might be our realization the Fed’s apparent change of heart on the topic of bubbles that capital markets don’t always work for the best. My in asset pricing. The breaking of the tech bubble set up friend and former partner Paul Woolley, now retired from the excess stimulus of 2001–03, which in turn created GMO, set up a center at the London School of Economics the housing bubble as surely as if a law had been passed a year ago bearing the tantalizing title: “The Woolley that all house prices had to be marked up 50%. And Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality.” now at last, there are signs of hope: signs that Bernanke (Fortunately for the title, his friend Wilde could not find is reconsidering: “Obviously, the last decade has shown the funding money.) I must confide that his investment that bursting bubbles can be an extraordinarily dangerous timing at GMO was seldom this perfect, for in one year and costly phenomenon for the economy (Ed.: the man’s he has gone from suspicious eccentric to enlightened indisputably a genius), and there is no doubt that, as we visionary, and long lines of luminaries are queuing up to emerge from the financial crisis, we will all be looking be involved. We have collectively had a touching faith at that issue and what can be done about it.” So all the that capitalism – just because it’s the only effective driving unnecessary suffering inflicted on us by short-sighted force behind economic growth – is basically flawless, and policies dictated by academic economists may not have any controls are bound to be counter-productive. Pure Ayn been entirely in vain! Rand capitalism obviously cannot deal with social issues of the tragedy of the commons variety, such as climate However it is definitely not a done deal. Few academics change. It cannot turn corruptible and greedy types into change their minds, and few scientific theories founder the reasonable and honest types that our readers represent. on the simple facts. “Science advances one funeral at a It cannot begin to address social justice. And apparently time” is how Max Planck expressed his belief in academic it does a lousy job at dealing with asset bubbles and the flexibility, but a suggestion that we use firing squads would ensuing economic and credit problems. Society’s attitude seem mean-spirited. Already, Fed members are making on this topic will change and, with a little luck, an increase the obvious point that interfering with investment bubbles in enlightened regulation will increase the public good. I as they grow by using the “blunt instrument” of raising for one am optimistic. The American ship of state (among rates would likely “in the short run curtail some economic many) appears to move forward by lurching too far in one growth!”1 direction and then like a super tanker with an amateur at But interfering with bubbles forming would not destroy the helm, overcorrecting. (And, oh my, have we had some growth, only postpone it, which is undesirable enough. real amateurs at the helm recently!) For the past eight Bubbles breaking, in contrast, reveal the destruction years, we have had a darned good lurch, and we need some of wealth produced by the extreme misallocation of correction. Somehow, in the long run, the ship seems to capital that has sucked so much investment into certain zigzag its way roughly in the right direction. The Jim areas – dotcom start-ups, overbuilding of housing, Grants of the world and other very sensible people, as well hiring multitudes of real estate agents, and designers of as the usual right-wing suspects, will say that increased elaborately structured financial notes, for example. And if regulation has a dismal record, and they are right. But so the bubbles precipitate a true credit freeze-up, then some does totally unregulated capitalism, apparently. We will inputs into really useful investments may be lost forever: have to muddle our way to an acceptable mix, and we can factories not built, education postponed indefinitely, and be sure of only one thing – that it won’t be highly efficient. man hours wasted in unemployment. If we collectively But it may be acceptable enough, and we must hope that become more leery of asset bubbles and their inevitable it is.
1 Gary Stern.
1 Gary Stern.
GMO 季度信函第二部分——2008 年 10 月 回到元层面,我想提出一个希望,即薪酬及其依托的结构问题。我们当前的不幸遭遇将促使我们重新审视如何选拔领导者。首先,缺乏偏见应该是有益的。如果你要找一位思想开明的人,为什么会选中罗伯特·鲁宾或汉克·保尔森到财政部任职,而这个职位可能——仅仅是可能——涉及对他们心爱的高盛生死存亡的决策?我们当然也会反思,让一个如此过度发展的金融行业——其占企业利润的份额已从 1982 年的 10% 升至去年的 27%——继续存在是否合理。这些人中的一部分——理想情况下是我那些更优秀的竞争对手——可以去做些别的事,一些更具社会价值的事。他们可以成为医生,或者,天理难容,真的去当医生。
GMO 10 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 Still at the meta level, I would like to bring up the hope that remuneration and the structure that enables it. as a result of our current misfortunes we will re-examine Surely we will also reconsider the merits of having such an how we pick our leaders. It would seem for starters that a overdeveloped financial industry whose share of corporate lack of prejudicial bias would be helpful. If you’re looking profits had risen from 10% in 1982 to 27% last year. Some for an open mind, why would you pick Robert Rubin or of these people – ideally my better competitors – could find Hank Paulson for a job at Treasury that might, just might, something else to do with more redeeming social value. involve decisions on the life and death of their beloved They could be doctors or, perish the thought, actually Goldman Sachs?
而在保尔森身上,为何偏偏选一个高调游说美国证券交易委员会(SEC)、极力反对提高投行准备金要求的华尔街五大金融巨头之一来当财长?为何要选像艾伦·格林斯潘这样的极端自由放任主义者来执掌美联储——此人公开鄙视几乎所有形式的监管加强,并视无拘无束的资本主义为最佳选择?难道一个更开明的人选不是更好吗?或者本·伯南克,他那种近乎本能地信奉市场有效性的直觉,难道不是更好?
金融业——就像发情期的房地产中介一样——持续散发的那种永久性看多论调,如今也已暴露无遗,我希望我们能期待一些严肃的反制。永久性看多对客户并无益处。那种从底层盈利预测堆砌出来的荒谬乐观情绪,在严肃投资者眼中早已是个笑话,但我们仍然能看到这种论调盛行不衰。
And in the case of Paulson, why pick one make something. of the five leaders of financial firms who lobbied hard at the SEC against increased reserves for investment banks? The permanently bullish spin put out by the financial Why would you pick an Ayn Rand extremist like Alan industry – like real estate agents in heat – has also been Greenspan to be the Fed Boss when he openly deplored revealed, and I hope we can expect some serious reaction. increased regulation in almost any form and thought Permanent bullishness does not serve the clients well. The untrammeled capitalism was the bee’s knees? Wouldn’t ridiculous bullishness of bottom-up earnings forecasts has an open mind be better? Or Ben B, whose reflex is so long been a joke among serious investors, but we still see clearly to believe in market efficiency?
他对此深信不疑,简直无处不在。这种看涨倾向深深渗透整个行业,以至于他预先判断了关键数据——包括保尔森和其他华尔街 CEO 们。过去几年里非常危险的房地产泡沫。他甚至从更老练冷静的人那里得到估算——比如国际货币基金组织那些人,以及经济学家们总体上——他们的经济预测正在向下修正,同时紧张不安地回头张望:他们拼命避免跑得太远,犯下凯恩斯所说的那种“只有自己错了”的真正大罪。因此,全球 GDP 增长的估算仍然是世界 +3%、中国 +9.2%。
关于同一个话题,我们为什么不在真正关键的工作上坚持要求有经过验证的相关领域卓越记录呢?本·B 作为学术经济学家的记录很出色,但与实际事务接触甚少。他似乎相信,既然这种极端低效不应该存在,那它就不存在。这不是个好主意。
He believes it so them everywhere. The bullish bias pervades the industry profoundly that he prejudged important data such as the right up to Paulson and the other Wall Street CEOs. very dangerous housing bubble of the last few years. He Estimates even from more seasoned cool types, such as seemed to believe that since no such extreme inefficiency those at the IMF, and economists in general have their should exist, then it did not exist. Not a good idea. economic forecasts creeping downward while looking nervously over their shoulders: they are desperate to avoid On this same topic, why would we not insist on a proven getting too far ahead of the pack and committing Keynes’ record of excellence on a relevant topic for the really key crime of being wrong on their own. Thus, estimates important job? Ben B has an excellent record as an of global growth in GDP are still +3% for the world and academic economist, but has had little contact with the +9.2% for China.
在危机中,对混乱且真实世界的预估总是滞后,直到现在依然如此。至于艾伦!他倒是有些优势,但这并无帮助。类似但更糟的是,他有过可靠的记录。多年来,他一直被证明是一个非常平庸、轻量级的商业经济学家,而标普 500 指数的盈利预估却荒谬地维持在高位,远超在接连危机下应有的水平。例如,他坐过几个政治关联委员会,见过不少“对的人”,然后,嘿,变——他就在国家中坐上了第二重要的职位。IBES 对标普 500 指数未来 12 个月的每股盈利预估仍为 98.5 美元。即使在正常利润率下,这个数字也应该是 71 美元;而若利润率低于正常水平 20%,则会降至 56 美元。如果运气好的话,标准预估方法的价值也该被认清。
在权力层级中再往下看,我认为我们已学会不要对 CEO 们估价过高。
In a crisis, the estimates always lag on messy, real world until now. And as for Alan! He had a the upside, and this does not help. Similarly, but worse, proven record. It was proven for years that he was a very the earnings estimates for the S&P have stayed ludicrously mediocre, lightweight commercial economist. He sat on a higher than were likely given the rolling crisis. For example few politically connected committees, met the right people the IBES earnings estimate for the S&P over the next 12 a lot, and, hey presto, had the second most important job months is still $98.5 a share. At even normal margins it in the land. would be $71, and at margins 20% below normal it would Lower down on the pecking order, I think we have learned fall to $56. With any luck, the usefulness of standard not to value CEOs so highly.
我们已经看到了行业建议的局限性——在面临前所未有的压力时,它们会被重新审视和不断调整,我们也审视了其与生俱来的看涨倾向。它们的奖励体系与才能的平庸程度极不相称。或许,也是时候重新审视固定资产配置的方法了——我曾经称之为“眼看着火车开来”效应。从理论上讲,敦促普通投资者在亏损时咬紧牙关、保持耐心是没问题的。但在现实世界中,许多完全正常的投资者在遭受巨大亏损后,根本无法忍受那份痛苦。在我看来,雷曼兄弟的老板在任上尽职尽责、长期服务,我也毫不怀疑他付出了努力。但坦率地说,雷曼兄弟即使在鼎盛时期也只是个 B 级玩家,而在最后几个月里,它成了个 D 级玩家。或许,过分苛责他在最后一程中缺乏技巧、以及他给许多人带来的痛苦,并不公平。
We have seen their limitations industry advice will be reconsidered and routinely adjusted when under novel stresses, and we have examined how for congenital bullishness. their reward system was out of kilter with the ordinariness Perhaps it is also time to reconsider the fixed asset of their talents. The boss of Lehman did an honorable allocation approach – what I used to refer to as the “watch and long service in my opinion, and I have no doubt he the locomotive coming” effect. It is fine in theory to urge tried hard. But frankly, Lehman even in its heyday was ordinary investors to grit their teeth in the face of losses a B player and, in its last few months, a D player. It is and show patience. But in the real world, many perfectly probably unfair to weigh too heavily his lack of skill down normal investors who take huge losses simply cannot bring the home stretch and the pain he inflicted on many by themselves to stand the pain.
坚守阵地、等待太久,等盈利追赶上来需要 15 到 20 年——这对电脑来说是绝佳建议,但电脑不会投资,而人类非常人性化。他们往往会在接近底部时卖出,锁定巨大的痛苦。这是一次绝佳的机会,可以重新评估将更多资产——哪怕是边际上的——从危险的高估资产类别转向相对便宜的资产类别的好处,趁大熊市还未完成其惯常的表演之前。至于另一家公司,他显然非常倒霉,被挑出来当祭品。但即使在崩塌之前,他真的值得积累起 6.5 亿美元的雷曼持仓——这些财富本应归于股东——同时每年还因基本平庸的工作获得巨额报酬吗?我相信社会将重新思考这种做法的合理性。
Holding firm and waiting the holding out too long. He was obviously very unlucky to 15 or 20 years for earnings to catch up is great advice for be picked out as a sacrificial lamb. But even before the a computer, but computers don’t invest, and humans are unraveling, did he really deserve to have accumulated a … well, very human. They will often sell out near lows $650 million holding in Lehman – all wealth that would and lock in enormous pain. This is a great opportunity otherwise have accrued to stockholders – in addition to to re-evaluate the merits of moving more assets – if only immense annual rewards for basically doing an average marginally – away from dangerously overpriced asset job? I believe society will reconsider the merits of such classes toward relatively cheap ones before the great bear Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 11 GMO markets do their usual thing.
我不是在建议像某些战术资产配置者那样每天都在研究科学界无疑会松一口气的市场中奔波。我建议的是偶尔对极端事件(无论是牛市还是熊市)做出重大回应。这当然会带来巨大的职业或业务风险。但,生活就是这样。
I don’t mean to recommend The research science world is no doubt sighing with relief racing around on a day-to-day basis as some tactical asset at their silver lining: the prospect of once again recruiting allocators do. What I do recommend is an occasional some of the best PhDs who had been lining up to work for significant response to outlier events both at the bull and Goldman or a hedge fund (and even, I must admit, a few bear ends of the spectrum. This, of course, runs into major for GMO). There they designed the cleverly repackaged career or business risk. But, that’s life. mortgage paper so admired by Greenspan, or developed It will also be a silver lining if we get rid of some of the quant equity models and “stat arb.” Now they will have gilded-age excess on the part of the titans of industry, to waste their time once again designing nuclear facilities especially in the financial world.
另一个亮点将是,如果我们能消除部分行业巨头(尤其是金融界)的镀金时代式过度行为,那会更好。他们本该把头埋在战壕里,却跳得老高,求人瞄准,结果真被瞄上了。现在,这肯定会以某种形式的敌意立法让他们付出代价。
They should have kept and second generation biomass projects. Oh well. their heads below the trench (see The Blackstone Peak and A real lesson will also have been learned on the “Let’s all the Turning of the Worms, July 2007), and they certainly look like Yale” front. (See Immoral Hazard, April 2008.) did not. They jumped way up, begging for a sharpshooter Yes, diversification is a great idea other things being equal, to notice them, and they were indeed noticed. It will now but if the demand is so trendy that it overwhelms either the surely cost them in hostile legislation in some form or liquidity of small asset classes, or the talent involved in other. hedge funds, private equity, and other fields, then there is One of the biggest silver linings will be in increased always likely to be a problem squeezing through the door household savings.
最大的亮点之一将是家庭储蓄的增加。如今,显然那增加的财富只是暂时的。它是基于严重高估资产的纸面财富。损失必须通过延迟满足——降低消费、增加储蓄——来艰难弥补。悲剧在于,由于超过 10 年的正常储蓄被牺牲给了纸面财富的宏大幻想,所有损失的储蓄几乎不可能再补回来。人们只会比原本可能的情况更贫穷地退休。
Now it is clear that the increased together. And that’s before someone shouts, “Fire! Fire!” wealth was only temporary. It was paper wealth based The great buying pressure from funds aspiring to look on very overpriced assets. The losses will have to be like the great endowment funds facilitated second-rate, repaired the hard way by deferred gratification – lower overpriced private equity deals. (See Appendix to Letters consumption and higher savings. The tragedy here is that XII: Evaluating the Usefulness of Private Equity Managers, since more than 10 years of normal savings were sacrificed July 2007.) Because these deals were typically overpriced to the grand illusion of paper wealth, it is unlikely that in the last three years, excessive leverage had to be used all of the lost savings can ever be made up. People will to even tease out the possibility of a decent return.
有人会指出,增加储蓄将在短期内压低消费和降低 GDP 增长。这种短视在过去一直是布什等人公开鼓励消费、从而鼓励个人债务背后的逻辑。但从长远来看,哪个经济体增长最快?是储蓄率 40% 的中国,还是个人储蓄率为负的美国与英国?高储蓄和高投资率当然会促进增长,如果我们想拥有健康的经济,就必须承受因过度消费而产生的短期负面影响。最近的信贷和资产危机是一记耳光,一个粗鲁的警钟,我们会转向更好的平衡。问题在于时机。虽然我们需要这种向更高储蓄的调整来着眼长远,但如果调整来得太快——因为一个人的额外储蓄就是另一个人意外的营收损失——我们就有陷入螺旋式下降、破坏经济活力的风险。这是 1930 年代让凯恩斯夜不能寐的噩梦。所以必须缓慢而稳定,在这个水平上,额外的资本支出和增加的工业产能会创造其自身的抵消性刺激。
This, simply retire poorer than they might have done. in turn, guaranteed that in a profit margin squeeze all the It will be pointed out that increased savings will depress equity would be lost. The flood of money also allowed for consumption and lower GDP growth in the near term. over-funding of first-rate hedge funds and the start-up of This short-termism has been the logic in the past behind thousands of second-rate funds. Real investment talent has Bush and others who overtly encouraged consumption always been scarce, and does not jump out of the ground and therefore personal debt. But in the long term, which just because there’s a massive demand. Nuclear physicists economies grow the fastest: China with 40% savings, or do not immediately become investment talents even with the U.S. and U.K. with negative personal savings?
所有那些新近时髦的另类投资领域都将被重新评估:它们的非流动性以及它们在蒸汽压路机前捡镍币的倾向将被充分考虑。风险价值(V.A.R.)作为衡量风险的可靠指标,但愿会被拖出去在黎明时枪决。简而言之,我们将生活在一个更现实、虽然不那么激动人心的世界里。
High IQs of 150. savings and investment rates, of course, encourage growth, The hedge fund industry is just an extension of our larger and we have to absorb the short-term negative effects of zero sum game. It adds collectively no value, it just what had become over-consumption if we want to be a reshuffles the existing pool of wealth minus the higher healthy economy. The recent crisis in credit and assets fees. Last year, in its prime, it offered mainly in place is a slap in the face, a rude wake-up call, and we will move to a better balance. The problem here is the timing. of real value added, or alpha, a simulated alpha that was Although we need this re-adjustment to greater savings dependent on rising asset prices, falling interest rates, or for the long term, if we get there too quickly – since one easy credit.
我所学到的
这次经历毫不意外地强化了我对均值回归的信念——所有泡沫都会破裂,最好的做法是研究数据、自己做出判断,并屏蔽大众意见。它强调了与正确的人交往的重要性:我从未意识到我们行业中有这么多明智之人。在令人神经紧绷的时刻,我们无疑感激他们的意见和强化。一个人永远不会有足够的信心。那个小小的声音总是在那里暗示,既然有这么多人持有某种观点,那他们的论据可能有些道理。于是你做多日元、做空金融股,但永远做得不够。它让我们深刻认识到,一些最好的押注非常技术性,我们需要帮助。于是我们寻求帮助,雇用了优秀的人,但太慢了,而一生一次的机会从指间溜走,只给我们留下还算不错的利润。我们学到了,未来我们需要在全球资本主义体系的几乎每个方面都拥有专长——或至少是适度能力。这并不容易,但我们通过艰难的方式学到了——那些稍纵即逝、不会等我们的错失机会——这是必要的。最重要的是,我们学会了永远、永远不要相信政府官员的能力。
All three in many cases. The existing alpha person’s extra saving is another person’s unexpected loss did not increase to meet the increased demand but probably of top-line revenue – we risk getting caught in a downward shrank under the competition, and then the shrunken alpha spiral that breaks animal spirits. This is the nightmare that was spread more thinly over more capital. And all that kept Keynes up at night in the 1930s. So it has to be slow was needed for this phony alpha to be seen as wearing and steady, at which level the extra capital spending and no clothes was a steady return to more normal conditions. increased industrial capacity creates its own offsetting Lord knows, it did not need to be stripped naked in the city stimulus. square so abruptly! Fate really can be cruel.
金色衬里
过去这丑陋的一年带来的所有补偿性优点中,最锦上添花的就是廉价资产的出现。我们太容易忘记,只有拥有廉价资产,才能迅速积累财富。对于拥有长远眼光的人来说,资产价格下跌总是更好的,因为这样复利回报会更高。在无与伦比的 20 年里,全球股票,尤其是美国股票,一直处于高估状态。
GMO 12 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 All of these new, recently sexy alternative investment How Low Is Low? areas will now be re-evaluated: their illiquidity and their We have a pretty good fix on fair values. For the S&P tendency to pick up nickels in front of steam rollers will 500 we believe it is about 975 ±25. This is calculated, be fully taken into account. Value at risk (V.A.R.) as a as always, by the simple technique of assuming that at reliable measure of risk will hopefully be taken out and fair price we will have a normal P/E ratio, and that profit shot at dawn. In short, we will all live in a more realistic, margins will also be normal. We also showed two weeks if less exciting, world. ago how typical it is for great bubbles to overrun badly.
GMO 第 12 季度信函,第二部分——2008 年 10 月
能跌多低?
我们对公允价值有相当清晰的把握。对于标普 500 指数,我们认为大约是 975 点±25 点。一如既往,这是通过简单方法计算得出的:假设在公允价值下,我们有正常的市盈率,利润率也正常。我们两周前还展示了,大泡沫通常如何严重超调。通常我们不会根据估计的超调来投资资金,而是缓慢地投入资金,并希望能走运。毕竟,如果股票有吸引力而你却不买,而它们涨上去了,你不仅看起来像个白痴,你确实就是个白痴。不过,我们仍然从超调的研究中汲取信息。那么这次我们处在什么位置?历史表明,在三次重要的股票泡沫后,都出现了超过 50% 的超调。我相信我们也可以从一个非常不同的角度来看待这个问题:我们可以算出在严重衰退中,利润率可能的范围,然后看看历史上市场对同样低迷的盈利给予了什么倍数。在一个理性的世界里,低利润率会被高市盈率所乘,反之亦然,以对经济周期进行正常化调整。在一个伯南克/弗伦奇和法玛式的世界里,相关性会是-1。高利润率总会恰好被低市盈率所抵消,反之亦然,这样市场总会以公允价值或重置成本出售。因此市场总是有效的,而建议无论价格如何都买入并持有指数基金的金融界那部分人将无可争议地正确。相反,在疯狂的现实世界里,我们甚至无法让相关性的符号正确:它是正的 0.32,这意味着高利润率乘以高市盈率,反之亦然。值得注意的是,这在极端情况下尤其明显,相关性会上升。因此,在 2000 年,艾伦无法看到的股市泡沫以历史上最高市盈率(35 倍)乘以历史上最高利润率的价格出售!相比之下,1982 年则以 8 倍乘以低迷的利润率出售。这种双重计算使得市场比它本应有的水平波动剧烈得多,将价格推到远高于和远低于有效价格水平的位置。
Usually we don’t invest our money on estimated likely What I Learned overruns, but instead filter our money in slowly and hope This experience has, not surprisingly, reinforced my faith to get lucky. After all, if stocks are attractive and you in mean reversion – that all bubbles break and that it is best don’t buy and they run away, you don’t just look like an to study the data, make up your own mind, and screen out idiot, you are an idiot. Still we are informed by our work general opinion. It has underlined the importance of mixing on overruns. So where are we this time? History says a with the right people: I never realized how many sensible 50%+ overrun has characterized the aftermath of the three people there were sprinkled through our business. We important equity bubbles. I believe we could also come are certainly grateful for their input and reinforcement in at this from a very different angle: We could work out nerve-wracking times. One never has enough confidence. what we think the likely range of profit margins is going That little voice is always there suggesting that, since to be in a severe recession, and then look at what multiples there are so many of them, there may be something to their have historically been applied to earnings that are equally arguments. So you go long the Yen and short the financials depressed. but never enough. It was rammed home to us that some In a rational world, low profit margins would be multiplied of the best bets were very technical and we needed help. by a high P/E and vice versa to normalize for the economic So we got help and we hired good people, but much too cycle. In a Bernanke/French and Fama world, the slowly, while opportunities of a lifetime slipped through correlations would be -1. High margins would always our fingers, leaving us with merely a decent profit. We be exactly offset by low P/Es and vice versa, so that the have learned that in the future we need to have expertise – market would always sell at fair value or replacement or at least moderate competence – in almost every aspect cost. The market would thus always be efficient, and that of the global capitalist system. It’s not easy, but we have chunk of the financial establishment that urges the buying learned the hard way – missed opportunities that did not and holding of index funds regardless of price would last long and would not wait for us – that it is necessary. unarguably be correct. In the crazy real world, in contrast, Above all, we learned to never, ever trust the competence we can’t even get the correlation sign right: it is positive of government officials. .32, which means that high margins are multiplied by high P/Es and vice versa. Remarkably, this is particularly The Gold Lining true at the extremes where the correlation rises. Thus in Topping off all of the offsetting virtues of this ugly last 2000, the equity bubble that Alan could not see forming year is the arrival of cheap assets. All too easily we forget sold at the highest P/E in history (35) multiplied by the that you can compound wealth rapidly only by having highest margins in history! 1982, in contrast, sold at 8 cheap assets. For those with a long horizon, it is always times depressed margins. This double counting makes better to have assets fall in price so that the compounding the market far more volatile than it needs to be by driving returns are higher. For an unparalleled 20 years, global prices far above and far below efficient price levels. equities, especially U.S. equities, have been overpriced.
图表 1 展示的是我们关于美国利润率的时间序列数据。这是一个相当可靠的均值回归序列,因此你可以极其确信利润率将回归正常水平。人们很容易忘记的是,当然,这些利润率有一半时间会低于正常水平。在预期的全球环境下,标普 500 指数的利润率应该会跌破正常水平,但无论如何,利润率却一直坚挺,结果当然远没有那么严重。然而,我们的结论是,标普 500 指数很可能在未来两年内触底于 600 点到 800 点区间,从历史角度看这不幸地算不上特别悲观。现在,它们终于变得便宜了,而且很可能还会更便宜。我相信,这很可能将构筑一个千载难逢的投资机会(或许在漫长的职业生涯中能遇到两次)。
Exhibit 1 shows our series on U.S. profit margins. This Now, finally, they are cheap and likely to get cheaper. is a pretty dependable mean reverting series so you can Likely, I believe, to set up a once-in-a-lifetime investing be extremely confident that margins will come back to opportunity (or maybe twice in a long career). normal. What is easy to forget is that, of course, they spend half their time below normal. In the global conditions that we expect, S&P margins should fall below their normal Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 13 GMO Exhibit 1 upside, however, and somehow profit margins hang in, the Profit Margins for the S&P 500 result would of course be far less severe. Our conclusion, though, that the S&P is likely to bottom out in the 600 8.5% to 800 range within the next two years can unfortunately be seen as not particularly pessimistic from a historical 7.5% perspective.
平均值:5.6% 6.5% 21% 最后,给利润率超过政府 5.5% 平均利润率的一条建议:我向来不赞同近年来一出现经济衰退迹象就弥漫各方的歇斯底里情绪,以及那种恐慌性地将 4.5% 公共资金抛向经济的做法。温和衰退有几个长期优势,这在早前的致股东信里讨论过,但近年来,我们似乎已经对长期失去了兴趣。
Average: 5.6% 6.5% 21% Finally, a Single Piece of Advice for the Profit Margin above Government 5.5% average profit I have never been a fan of the hysteria that has surfaced on margins all sides in recent years at a hint of recession, and the panic 4.5% to throw public money at the economy. Mild recessions have several long-term advantages discussed in earlier 3.5% Letters, but in recent years we seem to have lost interest in the long term.
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
2.5% 12-58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06 不过,这一次情况不同了。这是真材实料的危机,我们必须欢迎一切能获得的刺激措施。然而,最终很容易出现的情况是,雇人建造一些勉强有用的公园,或者像日本那样,修建几乎毫无用处的、通往虚无的桥梁。政府刺激措施从长远来看可以产生不错的回报(甚至高达 20% 至 40%)。在 1982 年和 1974 年,这两次都算是相当严重的衰退,利润率分别比正常水平下降了 36% 和 39%)。这种刺激方案未必一定是一系列劳民伤财的工程。让我建议,这次的关键词不是“塑料”,而是“替代能源”。在能源领域,以及更理想的节能领域进行大规模支出,将创造就业、刺激经济、产生良好的长期经济回报、减少对日渐枯竭的中东石油的依赖、削减二氧化碳排放量,并就此为其他国家树立一个真正的榜样。从最简单的措施——更好的隔热材料和更高效的机器——到新型替代能源(太阳能、风能、第二代生物质能),再到可能规模巨大的新核电站和高效电力传输投资,这整套方案可能成为美国在经济以及更广泛领域的一场长期盛宴。这样的计划可以抵消日本式长期衰退的风险。它可能带来一个划时代的变革,一个像马歇尔计划那样、让未来几代人引以为豪的变革。
2.5% Dec-58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06 However, this time it’s different. This is the Real McCoy Source: GMO, Standard & Poor's As of 9/30/08 crisis, and we must welcome all the stimulus we can get. It is easy, though, to end up employing people to build mildly useful parks or, in the Japanese style, nearly useless bridges to nowhere. Government stimulus can have a decent (even levels by 20% to 40%. In 1982 and 1974, which were high) return in the long run. It absolutely doesn’t have to respectively quite severe recessions, profit margins fell by be a series of boondoggles. Let me suggest that the magic 36% and 39% below normal. word this time is not “plastics” but “alternatives.” Massive Given the extreme current difficulties in the financial spending on energy and, better yet, energy savings will and economic scene, margins 36% to 39% below normal create jobs, stimulate the economy, produce a good long-would not seem especially Draconian, but let’s be slightly term economic return, reduce dependence on depleting friendly and predict only a 28% overrun this time. These Middle Eastern oil, curtail carbon dioxide emissions, and diminished margins have typically been reflected in a below set, for once, a real example for other countries. From the average P/E as discussed above. The historical expected simplest – better insulation and more efficient machines P/E for profit margins depressed by 28% would be 15% – through the new alternatives – solar, wind power, and to 20% below average; let us assume 17% below. This second generation biomass – to the potentially massive would give us a market selling at 83% of its normal P/E on investments in new nuclear plants and efficient energy profit margins that would be at 72% of their normal. This transmission, this could be in total a long range bonanza computes (.83 x .72) to be almost exactly 60% of fair value. for the U.S. in economic and broader respects. Such a Our current fair value estimate for the S&P 500 of 975 program could offset the risks of a Japanese-style drawnmodified by a likely overrun of 40% would yield a price out recession. It would be potentially an epoch-defining of about 585 in an environment of a quite severe economic change, and one of which, like the Marshall Plan, future and profit recession. If the global economy surprises on the generations might be proud.
免责声明:本文中表达的观点均为杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2008 年 10 月 24 日的看法,并可能随时根据市场及其他状况发生变化。本文不构成购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被如此理解。文中提及特定证券及发行方仅供说明之用,并非且不应被解读为购买或出售此类证券的建议。
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending October 24, 2008, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
版权所有 © 2008 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。
Copyright © 2008 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
GMO 14 季度信函,第二部分 – 2008 年 10 月
GMO 14 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008