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GMO 季度信函,2008 年 10 月

《收割风暴》¹

杰里米·格兰瑟姆

指责的时候应该已经过去,或者至少在泡沫不可避免地开始破灭时暂且搁置,在此之前该说的都说了,直到危机过去,危机得到控制,经济据称也完全稳固。抱歉。无论如何,只为设定场景,这一切都极为强劲。有必要简要回顾一下我们共同播撒的有毒之风。

  1. 我们经历了货币供给、贷款增长、杠杆率持续过度膨胀和利率异常偏低的漫长时期。
  2. 这与我们形容为“近乎完美”的、格外好运的全球经济环境相结合,催生了资产类别的泡沫——根据我们的研究,这样的组合无一例外都会导致泡沫。由于所有这些因素都是全球性的,这一组合产生了我们所说的“第一个真正的全球性泡沫”,覆盖所有地区的所有资产,只有少数几个温和的例外。
  3. 在这些资产泡沫膨胀、由宽松货币推动的同时,当局——美联储、美国证监会、财政部和国会——非但没有收紧现有监管,反而部分拆解了它们。他们解放了商业银行,同时进一步放松对投资银行的管制,让杠杆率展翅高飞。更近一些,他们几乎是无缘无故地、在没有受到压力的情况下,取消了卖空的提价规则。而这只是举例。与此同时,某些方面试图应对日益加剧风险的举措,被民主党和共和党联手打压或削弱。这方面的例子包括早期遏制股票期权的努力,以及试图加强对房利美和房地美的控制。
  4. 有利条件与当局非理性繁荣的鼓励相结合,产生了一个甚至更具毒性的泡沫——即风险承担行为本身的泡沫。所有人,我指的是所有人,都明白了风险承担具有不对称性,于是倾向于承担更多风险。这里的不对称性在于:如果事情搞砸了,他们会帮你脱身(这听起来很耳熟!);但如果一切顺利,你就只能靠自己了,可怜的家伙。啊,纯粹资本主义的乐趣!
  5. 在这方面,理性预期理论,或者说市场有效性理论,已经奠定了一些致命的基础。该理论认为我们所有人都理智得不会让重大泡沫出现。这对数学处理来说是一个便利的理论,但显然与充满贪婪和恐惧的现实世界完全脱节。它危险地助长了这样一种信念:如果你承担更多风险,你就自动获得更多回报。这种情况可能经常、甚至通常是成立的,因为在正常的平静市场中,这种关系的粗略近似通常会被定价到市场里。但在行为狂野、风险被错误定价的市场中,这就不成立了。从 2006 年 6 月到 2007 年 6 月,按我们的七年数据来看,被这些信念和市场状况所麻痹的投资者,实际上是在有史以来第一次为承担风险而支付代价。

GMO Quarterly Letter October 2008 Reaping the Whirlwind1 Jeremy Grantham The time to blame should be past, or at least in abeyance as the bubbles inevitably began to break, all was said until the crisis is past, but I find it impossible to avoid it to be contained and the economy was claimed to be completely. Sorry. In any case, just to set the scene, it is strong. necessary to review briefly the poisonous wind that we 4. The combination of favorable conditions and all sowed. irrationally exuberant encouragement from the 1. We had an extended period of excess increase in authorities produced an even more poisonous money supply, loan growth, leverage, and below bubble – that in risk-taking itself. Everybody, and I normal interest rates. mean everybody, got the point that risk-taking was 2. This combined with a remarkably lucky global asymmetrical and reached to take more risk. The economic environment that we described as “near asymmetry here was that if things worked out badly perfect” to produce a bubble in asset classes, as such they would help you out (this sounds very familiar!), a combination has done without exception according but if all went well you were on your own, poor thing. to our research. Since all these factors were global, Ah, the joys of pure capitalism! the combination produced what we have called “the 5. In this regard, some deadly groundwork had been first truly global bubble” in all assets everywhere with laid by the concept of rational expectations, or market only a few modest exceptions. efficiency. This argued that we were all far too sensible for major bubbles to appear. This is a convenient 3. While these asset bubbles were inflating, facilitated theory for mathematical treatment, but obviously by easy money, the authorities – the Fed, the SEC, totally unconnected to the real world of greed and the Treasury, and Congress – rather than tightening fear. It dangerously encourages the belief that if you existing regulations, partially dismantled them. They take more risk you will automatically receive more freed commercial banks while further reducing controls reward. That condition might often, even usually, on investment banks, allowing leverage to take wing. be the case because in normal quiet markets a rough More recently they almost gratuitously, without being approximation of that relationship is usually priced pressured, removed the uptick rule for shorting. And into the markets. But in wildly-behaving markets this is just a sample. Simultaneously, attempts in where risk is mispriced, it is not true. From June 2006 some quarters to address growing risks were beaten to June 2007 on our seven-year data, investors lulled back or diluted by Democrats and Republicans alike. by these beliefs and the conditions of the market Examples here include early efforts to rein in stock were actually paying to take risks for the first time in options and the attempt to add controls to Fannie and history.

弗雷迪。 (我咬着嘴唇,不点名了。)更糟糕的是,监管当局似乎还在鼓励这些最过分的乱象——他们一边赞叹新型金融工具的“精巧”(好吧,那是格林斯潘),一边反复念叨不存在泡沫(或者也许根本不可能存在泡沫),还说楼市顶峰“只是美国经济强劲的反映”。到头来,所有泡沫都破裂了,这些泡沫也不例外。泡沫破裂绝非意外,也绝不是所谓“极端事件”——恰恰相反,1998 年、1999 年以及 2003 年到 2007 年那些泡沫形成的过程才是极端事件。 ¹ 美国住房市场,那个明显的泡沫——价格比此前极其稳定的趋势线高出至少 30%——正稳步回归正常;而股市和风险偏好,很可能已经彻底回归原点。

当危机降临时,你需要能力和勇气去应对。这场危机最令人失望的是,资产价格泡沫和风险承担的累积过程,被当局(尤其是那位曾经备受尊敬的美联储主席)如此彻底地合理化并忽视。“他们种的是风,收的是暴风。” ² 飓风席卷之际,美国陆军工程兵团(说白了)正在夜以继日地支撑一栋可疑的、随意搭建的建筑。

金融和经济世界在泡沫破裂时所承受的压力,始终都会是巨大的。重复我 18 个月前说过的一句话:“如果一切顺利(在泡沫破裂时),痛苦也一定少不了。如果哪件事做错了,痛苦就会更多。而我们这次做错的事竟然这么多,真是越来越令人印象深刻,也更令人惊讶!”

我们的领导层在哪里?

Freddie. (I’m biting my lip not to name names.) Worse yet, the regulating authorities appeared to encourage 6. Just as all bubbles have broken, these bubbles did. the worst excesses by admiring the ingenuity of new Far from being a surprise, the bubbles breaking were financial instruments (okay, that was Greenspan), and absolutely not outlier events, contrary to protestations. by repeating their belief that no bubbles existed (or The bubbles forming in 1998 and 1999 and in 2003 perhaps could ever exist) and that housing at the peak through 2007 were the outlier events. The U.S. “merely reflected a strong U.S. economy.” Finally, housing market, which was a clear bubble with prices at least 30% above a previous very stable trend, is 1 “For they sow the wind, and they reap the whirlwind.” Hosea 8:7 well on its way back to normal, and equities and risk- with hurricanes blowing, the Corps of Engineers, as taking may well have made it all the way back. it were, are working around the clock to prop up a suspiciously jerry-built edifice. When a crisis occurs, 7. The stresses on the financial and economic world you need competence and courage to deal with it. of these bubbles breaking was always going to be The bitterest disappointment of this crisis has been great. To repeat a comment I made 18 months ago, how completely the build-up of the bubbles in asset “If everything goes right (as a bubble breaks) there prices and risk-taking was rationalized and ignored will always be lots of pain. If anything is done wrong by the authorities, especially the formerly esteemed there will be even more. It is increasingly impressive Chairman of the Fed. and surprising how much we have done wrong this time!” Where Was Our Leadership?

  1. 迄今为止,我们体系最大的失败在于——这引出了一个问题:为什么我们的领导人不愿在重大资产泡沫形成之初就着手应对(见上季度信函)。我在 1998 年和 1999 年就开启了关于这个话题的长篇抨击,并在《泥足巨人》(2002 年)中做了回顾,这本书直指我的头号反派人物艾伦·格林斯潘。比起股票泡沫,楼市泡沫更危险、更难以处理,因此伯南克也加入了恶棍名册。如果我们改变政策,在泡沫早期温和而果断地行动,这场危机本不必重演。有迹象表明,此前顽固不化的当局正在重新思考他们在这个问题上的愚蠢立场。如果他们真能改变,那么所有这些痛苦就不会完全是徒劳的。(见本信函第二部分,题为“一线希望”,约两周后发布。)
  2. 就泡沫破裂而言,压垮骆驼的最后一根稻草来自巴菲特所说的“大规模金融杀伤性武器”——那些被层层切割、重新包装的贷款产品,复杂到只有极少数人能真正理解,这么说吧。其复杂性所引发的不确定性和质疑令人印象深刻。信任和信心是我们精密金融结构的关键,它归根结底是建立在信念之上的。当前急剧增长的不信任感对这个体系构成了潜在的致命一击,必须不惜一切代价尽快解决。对道德风险的担忧是次要的,必须暂时搁置。无论如何,华尔街的领袖们现在已彻底吓破了胆,而且很可能在未来几年内都会一直保持这种状态!

8. By far, the biggest failing of our system has been its This brings us to ask the question: Why did our leaders unwillingness to deal with important asset bubbles as encourage the deregulation, encourage the leveraging they form (see last quarter’s Letter). I started a long and risk-taking, and completely miss or dismiss the diatribe on this topic in 1998 and 1999 and reviewed growing signs of trouble and what we described as the it in Feet of Clay (2002), which is aimed at my arch “near certainties” of bubbles breaking? Well, I have two villain, Alan Greenspan. With the housing bubble theories. The first is our old chestnut and is related to my even more dangerous to mess with than equities, current stump speech, which is called “Career Risk and Bernanke joined my rogues’ gallery. If we change Bubbles Breaking: the Only Things that Matter.” Career risk is why CEOs, entrusted with our money, were still our policy and move gently but early to moderate dancing late into the game. So late that the clock had bubbles, this crisis need never be repeated. There already struck midnight and they had already turned back are signs that the previously intractable authorities into pumpkins or rats, but just didn’t know it. It’s what are reconsidering their bone-headed position on this I call the Goldman Sachs Effect: Goldman increased its topic. If they change, all this pain will not have been leverage and its profit margins shot into the stratosphere. totally in vain. (See Part 2 of this Letter, titled “Silver Eager to keep up, other banks, with less talent and energy Linings,” in two weeks or so.) than Goldman, copied them with ultimately disastrous 9. The icing on the cake as far as the bust is concerned consequences. And woe betide the CEO who missed the has been provided by Buffett’s “financial weapons of game and looked like an old fuddy-duddy. The Board mass destruction” – the new sliced and diced packages would simply kick him out, in the name of protecting of loan material so complicated that, shall we say, the stockholders’ future profits, and hire in more of a few understood them. The uncertainties and doubts gunslinger from, say, Credit Suisse. generated by their complexities were impressive. Trust My second theory would be even harder to prove, and this and confidence are the keys to our elaborate financial is it: that CEOs are picked for their left-brain skills – focus, structure, which is ultimately faith-based. The current hard work, decisiveness, persuasiveness, political skills, hugely increased doubt is a potential lethal blow to and, if you are lucky, analytical skills and charisma. The the system and must be addressed at any cost as fast “Great American Executives” are not picked for patience. as possible. Concern about moral hazard is secondary Indeed, if they could even spell the word they would be and must be put into abeyance for the time being. Wall fired. They are not paid to put their feet up or waste time Street leaders are in any case now fully scared and are thinking about history and the long-term future; they are likely to stay that way for a few years! paid to be decisive and to act now.

要避免危机的发生,你需要大量远见、想象力和能力。几个季度前,我曾把我们的金融体系比作一座精心设计的悬索桥,希望它像一些优质的旧式维多利亚时代建筑那样被过度加固。然而,它并未被过度加固——它只是在有利条件下表现良好而已。现在,(GMO 季度信函,第一部分——2008 年 10 月,其中谈到了第一轮和第二轮冲击对实体经济的潜在影响。)那些看到这些问题逐步显现的人,另一方面,他们面临的职业风险要小得多,甚至压根没有。我们认识几十个这样的人。事实上,几乎所有掌握可靠历史数据且思考深刻的人,都在危机到来前很久就给出了很好的建议。他们都有约伯般的耐心。他们也全是右脑型人格:更依赖直觉,更倾向于琢磨古怪的理论,沉浸于历史数据,并且不急于下结论。

10. To avoid the development of crises, you need a The type of people who saw these problems unfolding, plentiful supply of foresight, imagination, and on the other hand, had much less career risk or none at competence. A few quarters ago I likened our financial all. We know literally dozens of these people. In fact, system to an elaborate suspension bridge, hopefully almost all the people who have good historical data and built with some good, old-fashioned Victorian over- are thoughtful were giving us good advice, often for years engineering. Well, it wasn’t over-engineered! It was before the troubles arrived. They all have the patience of built to do just fine under favorable conditions. Now Job. They are also all right-brained: more intuitive, more GMO 2 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 given to developing odd theories, wallowing in historical is the effect of both Rounds I and II on the real economy.) data, and taking their time.

几乎所有人都会在英国的楼市靴子落地时站出来——他们对此饶有兴趣,甚至痴迷——关注那些罕见事件,以及新一轮的资产减记和压力测试,认为这是极其特殊、全新且不同因素的组合。幸好,英国的纳税人们自愿站出来分担这一切。感谢大家!这种思考占据了他们大量时间。这样的想法对那些伟大的 CEO 们来说,会耗费超过几秒钟吗?——可他们全都错过了所有那些全新且不同的事情。不幸的是,对我们所有人而言,恰恰是那些“这次不一样”的因素最终被证明至关重要。

全球利润率,这第二个几乎确凿的趋势,也在快速下滑,但仍有很大的下降空间。我们过去一年一直在暗自嘲笑的那些未来盈利预测,如今高得依然令人难以置信。

They are almost universally When the U.K. housing shoe hits the floor it will come interested – even obsessed – with outlier events, and with another wave of write-downs and stress that, very unique, new, and different combinations of factors. These fortunately for everyone, the British taxpayers have been ruminations take up a good chunk of their time. Do such volunteered to share. Thank you from everyone! thoughts take more than a few seconds of time for the great CEOs who, to the man, missed everything that was Global profit margins, the second near certainty, are also new and different? Unfortunately for all of us, it was the declining rapidly, but have a long way to go. The estimates new and different this time that just happened to be vital. of future earnings that we have been sniggering at for a year are still inconceivably high.

他们为什么要操这份心呢?因此,具有讽刺意味的是,我们在危机降临时解雇了这些顶级 CEO,却不断重复我们的信条:全球利润率最近刚刚达到历史高位。利润率是金融或经济学中最具均值回归特征的数据系列。它们迟早会回归正常。在经历了大幅波动之后,它们几乎必然会回落。在当前全球种种不幸的背景下,这次它们很可能显著回落。

Why do they bother? To It is therefore ironic that we fire these top CEOs when repeat our mantra: global profit margins were recently at the trouble hits. The headline should read: “Come back, record highs. Profit margins are the most provably mean-leaders of Merrill, Citi, Bear, and Lehman. All is forgiven reverting series in finance or economics. They will go (for a while).” The typical CEO is precisely equipped to back to normal. After big moves, they almost invariably deal with emergencies and digging out. Thus, Paulson overrun. With the current set of global misfortunes, they was just the man to miss the point, but equally just the are very likely to overrun considerably this time. man – or at least a typically good one – to deal with a complicated crisis under stress. But the most dramatic ground has been covered by the third near certainty – risk premiums.

读到这里我想起一个插曲:我把这段念给我妻子听时,她问道:“那董事会呢?难道他们不能用更长远的智慧来弥补 CEO 短期决策的不足吗?”这个主意太妙了——左脑与右脑思维的平衡。按理说,这种平衡应当存在,制度设计上也是这么想的。可惜,现实中的典型做法,是把这种平衡扭曲成一个由老友和互相捧场的人组成的 CEO 粉丝俱乐部。

From record While reading this section to my wife, she asked, narrow spreads 18 months ago in fixed income markets “But what about the Boards of Directors? Can’t they in developed countries, most are far beyond normal complement the CEOs’ short-term decisiveness with already, although a few probably still don’t get the full longer-term wisdom?” What a great idea – a balance of horror of some of the footnotes. (In contrast, in emerging left- and right-brained thinking. And so it should be, and countries we guess that most of the pain from the crisis actually is intended to be, on paper. What a shame that we unfortunately is still ahead, and here and there it could be have typically subverted this balance into a CEO fan club very severe, although in total much less than in developed of old friends and mutual backscratchers. countries.

只是它们需要相当长的时间才能消化这一冲击。)发达股市——我们曾在 2007 年中期谈及三个“近乎确定的走向”——相比债券,这类资产通常后知后觉,反应慢得多。至少直到不久之前还是如此。然而,就在一声惊雷中,恐慌浪潮席卷而来,让它们在一瞬间彻底明白了这个残酷的现实。全球股市在三周之内从相当昂贵跌至中等便宜,这是至少 20 年来头一回。这三个“近乎确定的走向”是指:美国与英国的房价会下跌,全球利润率会下降,以及各地的风险溢价会上升——这三个走向无一不对市场、金融体系和经济体系造成严重后果。而美国与英国楼市,正是眼下这场危机的直接导火索。

It’s just taking a long time to work through the system for them.) Developed equities – which we have Near Certainties written about as the slow-witted of the two major asset The three “near certainties” we talked about in mid-2007 classes – had, as usual, a much harder time getting the have all behaved themselves. They were that U.S. and U.K. point than bonds. At least that was the case until what house prices would decline, that profit margins globally seems like a few minutes ago when, in a clap of thunder, would decline, and that risk premiums everywhere would they got the whole ugly point in a wave of panic. The rise, and all three with severe consequences on markets global equity markets moved in three weeks from quite and the financial and economic systems. The U.S. and expensive to moderately cheap for the first time in at least U.K. housing markets, the proximate cause of our current 20 years. troubles, have declined.

美国市场或许还有相当长的一段路要走,但很可能已经过了调整的中点位置。相比之下,英国市场的价格下跌才刚刚开始。房屋交易量则已几近蒸发。实际上,在大量统计数据中,最让我感到恐惧的单项数据是:英国 8 月份新增净抵押贷款同比暴跌 98%(从超过 70 亿英镑骤降至不足 2 亿英镑,几乎完全冻结)!在这样的时刻,不妨问自己一个问题:你到底真正了解什么,或者自认为真正了解什么?对于我们(在我们的资产配置部门而言)来说,金融体系的里里外外绝对不是我们能看透的,尽管我们正越来越努力地去理解。金融体系复杂到令人瞠目结舌,极少有人——哪怕是那些比我们研究深入得多的人——能够真正看懂。

The U.S. market has probably quite a way to go, but likely is well over the mid-point Basics of its correction. The price declines of the U.K. market At times like this it is good to ask yourself what it is that have, in contrast, merely started. Housing transactions, you really know or think you really know. For us (in our in contrast, have vaporized. In fact, the scariest single asset allocation division) it is definitely not the ins and data item for me, out of a huge selection, was the August outs of the financial system, although we’re trying harder decline in U.K. net new mortgages of 98% year over and harder. The financial system is so mind-bogglingly year (from over £7 billion down to under £200 million, complex that very few, even those with far deeper a near total freeze-up)!

而我们,尽管对财务细节相对无知,却比许多专家更准确地预测到去年八月这场危机第一轮结束时,还有一只最大的靴子尚未落地。(我将第一轮视为资产价格泡沫破裂。第二轮是这一破裂对金融体系的影响,尤其是房地产领域的影响。第三轮——作为历史研究者,我们认识到,泡沫破裂几乎总会带来比预期更严重的痛苦。)

And this with the official house backgrounds than ours, fully understand it. Puzzlingly, price index pretending to be down only 10% at the end despite our relative ignorance of financial details, we of August. This is one of the biggest shoes left to drop were more accurate than many experts in the last year of Round I of this crisis. (I think of Round I as asset about the big picture, and we can speculate why. First, price bubbles breaking. Round II is the effect of this, as historians, we recognized that when bubbles break especially of housing on the financial system. Round III they almost invariably cause more pain than expected.

2008 年 10 月季度信函,第 1 部分

3 GMO

其次,我们是明斯基的信徒,相信在构成市场的有缺陷的人类手中,明斯基是正确的,他预见到周期性金融危机几乎是不可避免的。因此,在去年年中,当高盛的专家们表示他们预计减记额为 4500 亿美元时,我立刻写道,如果最终不是 1 万亿美元,我们就该庆幸了。我是在借助他们详尽的专业知识,并加上一个概括性的历史观察,就像我之前预测“至少有一家大银行——广义上的——会倒闭”,以及一半的对冲基金将在五年内消失一样。在以往的银行业危机中,大银行确实倒闭过,而这次危机,在我们这些半专业人士看来,很可能比大多数危机都要严重。于是我们粗略地研究了以往的危机,坐在扶手椅上推敲后决定,我们应该提高赌注。我们在一个并非真正擅长的领域走了运,而且我们知道那是运气。我们会努力保住这份运气,同时通过提升技能来对冲风险。爱德华·钱塞勒的加入——他是一位经验丰富的财经记者兼历史学家,专注于信贷危机——是一个非常有帮助的开端。

相比之下,我相信我们真正了解的是资产类别的定价以及泡沫的运作方式,这两者都源于我们唯一的核心真理:均值回归。近几年的实际增长还算温和。自 2002 年 10 月以来的六年里,趋势线已上升至 975 点(上下略有浮动——我们不断地在一些百分点的细节上微调)。不用说,两周前市场跌破了这个水平,产生了图表 1。所以现在,所有 28 个破裂的泡沫都已找到,并记录在案。均值回归万岁!

至于资产类别的回报,10 月初的崩盘让我们比上季度更有机会展示我们的 10 年预测。图表 2 显示了我们自 1998 年 9 月 30 日所做的 10 年预测,以及对我们在资产配置中最重要的资产的实际情况。10 年前我们对标普 500 指数的 10 年预测是可怜的实际年化回报率 -1.1%,这在当时的所有预测中是一个极端的异类。到 9 月底,实际回报率恰好为零(0.0%)。但仅仅用了 10 月的三天时间,就精准命中了我们 -1.1% 的预测!整整十年零三天。对于新兴市场股票,我们的预测是实际年化回报率 +10.9%,而实际回报是 +12.8%。还不算太差,但即使是在这里,在七天之内——诚然是可怕的日子——新兴市场在下跌途中也跌穿了我们预测的回报点。所以今天(10 月 10 日),我们发现自己处于一个有趣的位置。

Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 3 GMO Second, we are Minsky mavens and believe that, with for moderately more real growth in recent years. In the sadly defective humans making up the markets, Minsky six years since October 2002, the trend line has risen to was right to see periodic financial crises as well-nigh 975 (plus or minus a little – we are constantly fine-tuning inevitable. Thus in the middle of last year when the a percent here or there). Needless to say, two weeks ago experts at Goldman Sachs said they expected write- the market crashed through that level, producing Exhibit 1. downs of $450 billion, I immediately wrote that we’d So now all 28 burst bubbles are present and accounted for. be lucky if it wasn’t a trillion. I was playing off their Long live mean reversion! detailed expertise and adding a generalized historical observation as I had done with the prediction that “at least As for asset class returns, the early October crash has one major bank – broadly defined – would fail,” and that presented us with an opportunity to brandish our 10-year half of the hedge funds would be gone in five years. In forecasts even more than we did last quarter. Exhibit 2 previous banking crises, major banks had failed, and this shows our 10-year forecast from September 30, 1998 and crisis seemed likely, to us semi-pros, to be worse than the actual asset returns for the most important assets for most. So we studied in broad strokes previous crises and us in asset allocation. armchaired that we should up the ante. We got lucky Our 10-year forecast for the S&P 500 10 years ago was in an area in which we were not real experts, and we a lowly -1.1% real, an extreme outlier among forecasts. know we were lucky. We will attempt to keep the luck At the end of September the real return was exactly nil and hedge our bets by also increasing our skills. The (0.0%). But it only took three days of October to hit our addition of Edward Chancellor, an experienced financial -1.1% forecast on the nose! Ten years and three days. For journalist/historian with a focus on credit crises, has been emerging equities, our forecast was +10.9% real and the a very helpful start. actual was +12.8%. Not too bad, but even here in seven In contrast, what we do know, I believe, is asset class days – horrible days, admittedly – the return of emerging pricing and the behavior of bubbles, which are both crossed our forecast on the way down. So today (October derivatives of our single, big truth: mean reversion.

展品 1 泡沫破裂 泡沫终于破裂 回到 2000 年,当时的科技泡沫极度疯狂,像违背地心引力一样持续膨胀,我们则一直胆战心惊。为了给自己壮胆,我们回顾了历史上的泡沫。我们发现自 1920 年以来共有 28 个泡沫,这个判定标准虽然主观但还算合理:它是两个标准差的事件,在高斯世界里本应每 40 年才发生一次。除了一个例外,其余所有泡沫最终都彻底破裂,回落到泡沫开始前的趋势线位置。这个唯一的例外是 2000-02 年的标普 500 指数本身。在我所谓的“足以让死人走路的刺激力度”影响下,标普 500 指数从 1550 点下跌,却未能完全触及我们计算出的趋势值 725 点,而是在 775 点就反弹了。(它需要下跌 55% 才能触及趋势线,但实际只跌了 50%。差一点,但就差了那么一点。但更重要的是,我们原本预期会出现相当明显的超跌,这在历史上是相当常见的情况。)看到这个反常现象,我们便将 2002-07 年的市场上涨描述为“历史上最大的傻瓜反弹”。这里有一个小细节:与大多数人不同,我们衡量牛市和熊市的依据是经通胀调整后相对于趋势线增长的幅度。从历史上看,标普 500 指数实际年增长率仅为 1.8%,但由于技术原因(尤其是派息率较低),我们允许了 2% 的实际长期趋势增长。

Exhibit 1 Bubbles Breaking The Bubble Finally Breaks Back in 2000, as we continued to shake in our boots as the 2.6 mad tech bubble kept defying gravity, we tried to reassure S&P 500: 1992-October 10, 2008 ourselves by looking at historical bubbles. We found 28 bubbles since 1920, defined arbitrarily but reasonably as 2.2 two-standard-deviation events that in a Gaussian world should occur once every 40 years. All but one burst all Detrended Real Price* the way back to the trend that existed prior to the start of the bubble. The single exception was the S&P 500 1.8 itself in 2000-02. Under the influence of what I’ve called “enough stimuli to get the dead to walk,” the S&P, down from 1550, could not quite reach its trend value, which 1.4 we had calculated to be 725. Instead it rallied at 775. (It had to fall 55% to reach trend, but fell 50%. Close, but no cigar. But, more critically, we had expected a fairly major 1.0 Trend Line overrun, which is historically so common.) Seeing this aberrant event led us to describe the market advance from 2002-07 as “the biggest sucker’s rally in history.” Now a 0.6 wrinkle here is that, unlike most, we measure bull and bear 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 markets based on their trend line growth after adjusting Note: Trend is 2% real price appreciation per year. for inflation. The real growth in the index has historically * Detrended Real Price is the price index divided by CPI+2%, since the long-been only 1.8% per year for the S&P, but for technical term trend increase in the price of the S&P 500 has been on the order of 2% reasons (low payout rates in particular) we have allowed real.

来源:GMO 截至 08 年 10 月 10 日 GMO 第四季度信件,第一部分 —— 2008 年 10 月 附录 2 如果允许我们宽限几天的话,我们 10 年前的预测是过于乐观的。准时到达,尽管经历了一些颠簸。标普 500 指数累计实际回报 我们现在身处何方?

Source: GMO As of 10//10/08 GMO 4 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 Exhibit 2 10), our forecasts of 10 years ago were optimistic, if you On-Time Arrivals, Despite Some Turbulence allow us a few days’ leeway. S&P 500 Cumulative Real Return Where Are We Now?

50% 那么,拿出我们那些 10 年前的预测,并抵制那个连瞎猪偶尔也能找到松露的想法,实际上,我们有几分信心这么说:到 10 月 30 日,全球股市从绝对意义上算很便宜,比 20 年来的任何时候都便宜 20%。但全面披露要求我们补充一句——在我们看来,这话听起来并不那么高明,因为自 1994 年以来,市场或多或少一直处于永久性高估状态,而真正便宜的时候只有 1982-83 年,以及 1987 年的几周。还有一个可怕的警告(不总是有吗?),这体现在图表 3 中,它展示了 20 世纪三个最重要的股市泡沫:1929 年、1965 年以及日本 1989 年。你会注意到,这三个泡沫对其价格趋势的过度修正都超过了 50%!为了大家的普遍愉悦,我们并不经常拿出这些图表,而且直到最近,它们还会被视为完全无关甚至不合时宜。但毕竟,这只是历史。像大多数人一样乐观的我们,划了一条线,不相信这次会发生如此可怕的事。

50% So brandishing our old 10-year forecasts and resisting the 40% idea that even a blind pig will occasionally find a truffle, Actual we have had some confidence in saying that by October 30% 10th global equities were cheap on an absolute basis and 20% cheaper than at any time in 20 years. Full disclosure requires 10% that we add that, in our opinion, this is not as brilliant as it sounds, for markets have been more or less permanently 0% Crossed overpriced since 1994 and have not been very cheap since -10% Forecast over on 1982-83 and perhaps a few weeks in 1987. There is also a 10/7/08 terrible caveat (isn’t there always?), and that is presented -20% in Exhibit 3, which shows the three most important equity -30% bubbles of the 20th Century: 1929, 1965, and Japan in Sep-98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 1989. You will notice that all three overcorrected around EAFE their price trends by more than 50%! In the interest of Cumulative Real Return general happiness, we do not trot out these exhibits often 100% and, until recently, they would have been seen as totally irrelevant and perhaps indecent. But, after all, it’s just 80% history. Being optimistic like most humans, we draw the Actual 60% line at believing something so dire will happen this time.

我们可以这样自我安慰:因为只有三个数据点(40%),所以任何有自尊的统计学家都不会对此给予太多权重。我们可以说服自己这次情况不一样,因为包括这一次在内的四个事件,每个的背景都不同。其中一个事件伴随着高通胀;另外三个事件(包括当前这次)则没有。日本和 1929 年的特点是彻底的无能,而这一次我们只有——姑且这么说吧——非常普遍的无能。这一次我们更快地投入了新兴市场的战斗,尽管没有某些人希望的那么快。并非所有的差异都是有利的:我们的系统更加全球化、相互关联且复杂,其中还包括像对冲基金这样的非银行参与者。此外,我们还有“金融大规模杀伤性武器”——经过分层、分割和重新打包的资产支持证券——以及,或许最具破坏性的是,完全不受监管的信用违约互换。这一次我们的贪婪和短期导向比他们更严重吗?嗯,我们至少不输给他们!尽管如此,超出 50% 还是让人无法接受。政府可能会觉得资产价值如此损失带来的后果实在太过可怕,会不惜一切代价去阻止。也许,只是也许,他们的“不惜一切”会奏效。但一个相当保守的投资者看着这些数据,应该会想要为至少 20% 的超跌做好准备,比如标普 500 指数跌至 800 点左右,并且在自己的头脑中保留一小部分认知,那就是情况可能会更糟得多。

我们 GMO 有强烈的价值投资偏好,因此我们和所有价值投资者一样,诅咒就是入场太早。1998 年,我们看到了估值高得离谱的股票,21 倍市盈率堪比 1929 年和 1965 年的两次大泡沫。看到这个新的“顶峰”,我们卖出得太早、太早了,结果眼睁睁看着市盈率一路涨到了 35 倍!而且随着市场上涨,我们那么多客户也跟着上涨,这提醒我们,职业风险其实才是唯一真正重要的另一件事。硬币的另一面是,只有昏昏欲睡的价值投资者才能买到极其便宜的股票;勤勉、警觉的价值投资者会在股票只是相当便宜的时候就买入,而当这些股票变得——有时确实如此——惊人地便宜时,他们就会吃尽苦头。

Crossed We can hide behind the fact that there are only three data 40% points, and therefore no self-respecting statistician can over on 9/5/08 give them much weight. We can convince ourselves that 20% things are different this time since the background to each 0% of the four events, including this one, is different. One of them had high inflation; three, including the current -20% Forecast situation, did not. Japan and 1929 were characterized -40% by complete incompetence, while this time we had Sep-98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 only – shall we say – very widespread incompetence. This time we have thrown ourselves more quickly into Emerging Equities battle, although not so quickly as some would have liked. Cumulative Real Return Not all of the differences are favorable: we have a more 500% global, interlocking, and complicated system, including 450% Actual non-bank players like hedge funds. We also have the 400% “financial weapons of mass destruction” – asset-backed 350% securities that are tiered and sliced and repackaged – and, 300% perhaps most destabilizing of all, totally unregulated 250% credit default swaps. Did we have even more greed and Crossed 200% over on short-term orientation this time than they did? Well, we 150% 10/6/08 certainly didn’t have less! Still, a 50% overrun seems 100% unacceptable. Probably governments would feel that the 50% Forecast consequences of such a loss in asset value would simply 0% be too awful and would do anything to prevent it. And -50% perhaps, just perhaps, their “anything” would work. But a Sep- 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 reasonably conservative investor looking at the data would Source: GMO As of 10/10/08 want to allow for at least a 20% overrun to, say, 800 on Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 5 GMO Exhibit 3 the S&P 500, and have a tiny portion of their brain loaded Overrun! with the notion that it just might be quite a bit worse. 2.3 S&P 500: 1920-1932 The Curse of the Value Manager 2.1 1.9 We at GMO have a strong value bias, and our curse, therefore, like all value managers, is being too early. In Detrended Real Price* 1.7 1998 we saw horribly overpriced stocks that at 21 times 1.5 earnings equaled the two previous great bubbles of 1929 1.3 and 1965. Seeing this new “peak,” we were sellers far, 1.1 Trend Line far too early, only to watch it go to 35 times earnings! 0.9 And as it went up, so many of our clients went with it, reminding us that career risk is really the only other thing 0.7 that matters. The other side of the coin is that only sleepy 0.5 value managers buy brilliantly cheap stocks: industrious, 0.3 wide-awake value managers buy them when they are 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 merely very nicely cheap, and suffer badly when they become – as they sometimes do – spectacularly cheap.

2.5 S&P 500:1946—1984 早在 1999 年,我就曾说过,在因过早卖出而吃亏之后,我的下一个大错将是买入太早。当时我刚经历了一轮卖出过早,而这话从一个被视为永远看空的人嘴里说出来,可能听起来很荒唐,但我是认真的。经历了 14 年标普 500 指数的高估,一个人难免会觉得自己像个永远的空头,就像我在 1973—86 年那 13 年市场低估结束时,觉得自己是个永远的多头一样。但那已经是很久以前的事了。 嗯,令人意外的是,我们又回到了这个局面。终于!在 10 月 10 日,我们可以说,标普 500 指数在 900 点,美国股票很便宜,而海外股票甚至更便宜。因此,在这些价位上我们将是稳定的买家——不一定是快速的买家(事实上很可能不是),而是稳定的买家。但我们不抱幻想。择时很难,而且显然通常不是我们的强项,尽管三个月前,我们在极度不寻常的运气下,幸运地将新兴市场股票仓位急速降至低配。这且不谈,我们按数字行事。我们也认识到,出现严重且典型的过度下跌的可能性是真实存在的。我们也认识到,当前的危机可能伴随着全球金融崩溃这一前所未有的危险。简而言之,我们认识到,我们很可能是买入太早了。买者自负。

2.5 S&P 500: 1946-1984 I said as far back as 1999, while suffering from selling too soon, that my next big mistake would be buying too 2.0 soon. This probably sounded ridiculous for someone who Detrended Real Price* was regarded as a perma bear, but I meant it. With 14 1.5 years of an overpriced S&P, one feels like a perma bear just as I felt like a perma bull at the end of 13 years of underpriced markets from 1973-86. But that was long 1.0 Trend Line ago. Well, surprisingly, here we are again. Finally! On October 10th we can say that, with the S&P at 900, stocks 0.5 are cheap in the U.S. and cheaper still overseas. We will therefore be steady buyers at these prices. Not necessarily 0.0 rapid buyers, in fact probably not, but steady buyers. But 46 50 54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 we have no illusions. Timing is difficult and is apparently not usually our skill set, although we got desperately 3.0 Japan vs. EAFE ex-Japan: 1981-1999 and atypically lucky moving rapidly to underweight in emerging equities three months ago. That aside, we play 2.5 the numbers. And we recognize the real possibilities of severe and typical overruns. We also recognize that the 2.0 Relative Return current crisis comes with possibly unique dangers of a global meltdown. We recognize, in short, that we are very 1.5 probably buying too soon. Caveat emptor.

第三轮:经济效应的趋势线

0.5 第一轮和第二轮——资产泡沫破裂和信贷危机——很快就会成为过去,但不幸的是,对 81、83、85、87、89、91、93、95、97、99 年出生的我们所有人来说,对实体经济产出的影响几乎完全还在前面。采用我们惯用的、带有历史视角的纸上谈兵方法,我们已经在几个季度的报告中指出,全球经济疲软的严重程度将远超官方预测,持续时间也将远超官方预测。即使官方预测已大幅下调,我们仍坚持这一观点。

1.0 Round III: The Economic Effects Trend Line 0.5 Rounds I and II – the asset bubbles breaking and the credit crisis – will soon be mostly behind us, but the effect on 0.0 the real world of economic output lies, unfortunately for 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 all of us, almost entirely ahead. Employing our usual historically loaded armchair technique, we have been Note: Trend is 2% real price appreciation per year. writing for several quarters that global economic weakness * Detrended Real Price is the price index divided by CPI+2%, since the long- will be substantially worse and will last substantially term trend increase in the price of the S&P 500 has been on the order of 2% real. longer than the official forecasts. We maintain that view Source: GMO even though official forecasts have dropped considerably.

GMO 6 季度信函,第一部分 – 2008 年 10 月 全球经济很可能会显现出这些所谓盎格鲁-撒克逊国家的创伤,并将在未来数年内陷入一场持久危机。尤其是,资产价格过度膨胀所创造的财富幻觉已大幅消退,尽管这一效应的主要部分已经过去,但一些欧洲国家和美国相当一部分房价下跌仍未发生。我们都在消费——就美国而言,还在进口——仿佛我们远比实际更为富有。这种虚幻的财富感在未来十年左右将成为一个令人沮丧的特征,与过去十年形成鲜明对比。这确实是一个时代的终结。

为结束本信函的第一部分,关于这个话题我只想再补充一点,那就是中国。

GMO 6 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 The global economy is likely to show the scars of this so-called Anglo-Saxon countries, and will be a permanently crisis for several years. In particular, the illusion of wealth depressing feature of the next decade or so compared with created by over-inflated asset prices has been dramatically the last decade. It is indeed the end of an era. reduced and, though most of this effect is behind us, a substantial part of the housing decline in some European To end Part 1 of this Letter, there is only one further point countries and the U.S. is still to occur. We were all I want to add on this topic, and that is about China. spending and, in the case of the U.S., importing as if we were much richer than is in fact the case.

在美国,不断增长的居民债务暂时掩盖了实际小时工资 20 至 30 年几乎没有增长所带来的部分痛苦。自 1982 年以来,居民债务每年为消费者支出增加超过 1 个百分点。不幸的是,这种净利好不会永远持续下去。在你借钱数额相当于收入 1% 的第一年,利息支付几乎不造成什么影响,你的支出接近可支配收入的 101%。我以前说过,指望中国政府在面临维持史上最高经济增长率这一极其复杂的任务时,展现出非凡的金融和经济技能,是荒谬的。“他们肯定会栽跟头,”我当时说。嗯,我越想越觉得,这既是当前最有可能出现的失望(甚至冲击),也是最危险的一个。

Particularly Like a Bear in a China Shop here in the U.S., increasing household debt temporarily I suggested last quarter that it was ridiculous to expect masked some of the pain from little or no increase in real great financial and economic skills from the Chinese hourly wages for 20 to 30 years. Household debt since government, which is faced with the spectacularly 1982 has added over 1% a year to consumer spending. complicated task of maintaining the highest economic Unfortunately, this net benefit does not go on forever. growth rate in history. “Surely they will stumble,” I said. Well, the more I think about it, the more likely it In the first year in which you borrow 1% of your income, seems that this is both the most likely and most dangerous the interest payment barely makes a dent and your spending disappointment (even shock) that awaits the current is close to 101% of your disposable income.

但每年你都多借入 1%,你的利息负担就会增加。在平均利率为 7% 的世界里,大约 15 年后——让我们回到那个 5.6 万英尺高空的扶手椅上畅想(难道你不想念协和客机吗?)——一位业余经济学家可以将中国经济的消费与出口简单总结为 39-37-37:39% 是极为惊人的资本支出占 GDP 比重,37% 是内部消费,37% 是出口。(这些数字加起来不到 100,因为我们没有使用净出口减去进口的统计方式,我们关注的是总出口对疲弱全球经济的脆弱性。)从集体角度看,当累积债务的利息完全抵消了新借入的资金时,美国的情况更接近一个 30 年来每年多借入 1% 的模式——这意味着我们多年前就已越过盈亏平衡点,现在支付的利息远多于我们增量借入的部分。只要每个人都能并且愿意支付利息,这种状况对过度膨胀的金融结构是有利的,但它也构成了脆弱性。

But each consensus. year you borrow an incremental 1%, your interest load grows. After 15 years or so in a world of an average 7% Moving back to our armchair at 56,000 feet (don’t you miss interest rate, the interest on the accumulating debt fully the Concorde?), an amateur economist could summarize offsets the new borrowing when one looks at consumers and simplify the Chinese economy as 39-37-37: an collectively. Well, we in the U.S. are closer to a model of astonishingly large 39% of the GDP is capital spending, 30 years of borrowing an incremental 1%, meaning that 37% is internal consumption, and an amount equal to we passed through break-even years ago and now pay 37% of GDP is exported. (These numbers do not sum to much more in interest than we borrow incrementally. This 100 as we are not using exports net of imports because is a situation favorable to an overfed financial structure as we are concerned with the vulnerability of total exports long as everyone can and will pay their interest, but it is to a weak global economy.)

相比之下,美国已不再像 1970-13 年间的数据那样有利于总消费,令人不安的是,它已站到了常态的另一侧:70% 的人还在用老式的存钱方式,等攒够了才买电视机——而德国这一比例是 57%,日本来的访客几乎翻倍,中国更是近两倍。中国那种积蓄驱动的模式,当然是一种史无前例的组合,在经济繁荣时期拥有巨大优势:积累的消费者债务相当于 GDP 的 1.5 倍,而另一个国家则是零。但现在,我敢说,除了消费贷款网点数量减少之外,访客看不出任何区别。然而我们可能会问:当一排排钢厂空置时,你如何刺激再建一座新钢厂?当全球经济不仅正在放缓,而且出人意料地极度疲软时,你如何增加出口?这幅总体不利的画面,还会变得更糟。

The U.S., in comparison, is no longer beneficial to aggregate consumption compared 19-70-13, disturbingly on the other side of normal; 70% with the good old-fashioned way of waiting until you had consumption compared with 57% in both Germany and actually saved up to buy a TV set. Indeed, a visitor from Japan, for example, and nearly twice that in China. China’s Mars examining two countries, one with accumulated mix is of course an utterly unprecedented one, and comes consumer debt of 1.5 times GDP and the other with zero, with great advantages in booming times. Now, however, would, I am sure, notice no difference except for the we might ask: how do you stimulate the building of a new reduced number of consumer lending outlets. steel mill when rows of mills are sitting empty? How do you increase exports into a global economy that is not just This generally unfavorable picture gets worse when you slowing, but is unexpectedly very weak?

他们是不是认为,未来 10 年里,我们能有足够的能力刺激本地消费,让个人债务每年温和减少比方说 0.5%——这么小的规模对 GDP 影响不大——同时还要面对每年总收入以及持续的利息支出,还要承受股票和住房价格下跌带来的负财富效应?所以债务累积效应会逆转,当地市场的价格也会如此?从高估的股票和住房中产生的财富效应幻觉,尤其是积累了可观养老金的那份幻觉,也会消失。简单的“经济学 101”思维会告诉我们,当高估资产的潮水退去时,资本品部门的跌幅会比经济其他部分更大,而且出口增速可能从很大变成零甚至更糟。就像我们两年前说的(对巴菲特的话稍作发挥),当高估资产的潮水退去,你就会发现谁没穿泳裤。

And are they consider that we are likely to have, for the next 10 years or good enough at stimulating local consumption to have an so, a modest annual reduction in personal debt of, say, 0.5% impact on such a small percentage of GDP in the face of of gross income per year as well as a continued interest a negative wealth effect from declining stock and housing payment. So the debt accumulation effect reverses as does prices in their local market? the illusion of the wealth effect from overpriced stocks and housing, especially the illusion of a decent accumulated Simple old “Econ 101” thinking would suggest that their pension. As we said two years ago (embroidering on capital goods sector will have a bigger drop than the rest Buffett), when the tide of overpriced assets goes out, it of the economy, and that export growth rates might slow will be revealed not only who is not wearing swimming from very large to even nil or worse.

这个做空/做多组合,还有一个小养老金!我们愚蠢的笑话在短短两年内就从凯恩斯主义或罗斯福主义的弥补方式,变成了一场病态闹剧。政府支出大幅增加(这是一个专业的经济术语)。这种虚幻财富效应的逆转带来的去杠杆化将在全球范围内被感受到,尤其是在……的过程中。总体而言,我越来越确信,这正成为我们与市场共识的第一大分歧。如果我们是正确的,这将对全球增长构成一个非常重要且令人痛苦的意外。好消息是,这远非我们近期对住房、利润率及风险溢价所持观点的“近乎确定”。

The one open-shorts, but also who has a small pension! Our silly joke ended offset might be in Keynesian or Rooseveltian has become a sick one in just two years. government spending, upping their already massive infrastructure spending by A LOT. (This is a specialized This reversal of the illusory wealth effect added to economic term.) And they will surely do some of that. deleveraging will be felt worldwide, but especially in the On balance I find myself more and more convinced that Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 7 GMO this is becoming our #1 disagreement with consensus. If have been set up for some very unusual developments. we are right, it will be a very important and distressing The market would have continued to fall for a few more surprise for global growth. The good news is that this weeks or worse (as by October 16th it seems to be doing) is far from the “near certainty” of our recent views on until eventually the world’s central bankers got their act housing, profit margins, and risk premiums.

充其量,如果判断正确,那也不过是灵光一现的安乐椅洞察:到那时,推算出的七年回报率可能达到,比如说,新兴市场每年实际 15%,美国 11%,而欧澳远东指数(EAFE)每年 12% 或 13%。这些非凡机遇,几乎堪比传奇般的 1982 年和 1974 年低点——在我看来,它们会为严肃投资者设下一个地狱般的悖论。他们将迎来长达 18 个月、持续不断的真正失望:全球经济增速令人失望,而更重要的是,全球盈利(以市场共识衡量)同样令人失望。最坏的情况,如果判断错误,那不过是个调研不周的直觉。

关于错误抵消的价值

在 10 月初(截至 10 日),全球股市——在我们看来——终于定价相当有效,至少是在等待 20 年后的一两天里如此。但我们并未抵达这样一个节点——我们十年期预测恰好在某一刻完全正确,因为市场已将以下因素纳入定价:全球经济增长长期严重低于趋势水平;与此同时,欧澳远东指数(EAFE)和美国市场各自的股权风险溢价仍分别停留在约 3.0% 和 2.5%,这意味着对通胀与增长风险给予了极为有限的补偿。

At best, if together. The imputed seven-year returns by then might right, it is an inspired insight straight from the armchair. have reached, say, 15% real per year for emerging, 11% At worst, if wrong, an ill-researched hunch. for the U.S., and, say, 12% or 13% a year for EAFE. These exceptional opportunities, nearly equal to the legendary On the Virtues of Offsetting Errors lows of 1982 and 1974, would have set up, in my opinion, During early October (up to the 10th) global equities, in a paradox from hell for serious investors. They would our opinion, were finally quite efficiently priced, at least have been looking forward to an 18-month-long diet of for a day or two after a 20-year wait. But we did not sustained genuine disappointments; disappointments in get to this point where our 10-year forecasts were exactly both economic growth globally and, more importantly, in right for a second because the market had taken into its global earnings for the market’s consensus.

然而,要让市场最终变得合理或有效,这谈何容易。不,要等到两次令人失望的消息出现——市场很可能一直在稳步制造巨大的对冲错误!我确信市场并未上涨,因为从极端低点的复苏尚未完全体现未来盈利和恐慌中的经济意外,而更多的失望会无意间恰好抵消所有坏消息。这将在理智上极难应对:你预测到一个不愉快的意外,但你还是应该买入!这将成为罕见的历史事件,而这里的大幅反弹可能会改变这一点。(哦,对了,我想起来了。市盈率应该因稳定性大幅改善和经济管理好转而走高。)事实上,我认为全球暗淡的前景至少还需要一年才能真正显现,低市盈率的趋势也尚未被市场轻易接受。

Yet into those head to finally be reasonable or efficient. No, it took two disappointments the market would likely have steadily giant offsetting errors! I am sure the market does not risen because the recovery from the extreme lows of the yet get the full extent of future earnings and economic panic would have inadvertently and accidentally more disappointments, nor does it easily accept how low trend than offset all the bad news. This would have proved line P/Es are. (Oh yes, I remember now. P/Es should intellectually very difficult to deal with: you predict an be higher because of much improved stability and better unpleasant surprise, but yet you should buy! It would economic management!) In fact I believe it will take at have been a rare historical event, which a big rally here least another year for the truly dreary global outlook to be may change.

不过,世事难料。有些东西已被充分认识并计入价格。我当初也指望它可能还会发生。(郑重说明,1932 年,在持续灾难性的经济消息和多年累积的极端负面情绪面前,一轮持续一年以上、涨幅达 111% 的反弹开始了。)幸运事件、道德风险以及资产价格攀升。

Still, you never know your luck. Something fully appreciated and priced in. I was also counting on like it may still happen. (For the record, in 1932 a rally of over a year or more being required to break the high animal 111% started in the face of persistent disastrous economic spirits that had been baked in by years of exceptionally news.) fortunate events, moral hazard, and rising asset prices.

临时建议 抵消这种乐观情绪的,是我们以相当传统混合的贪婪与无能——但规模巨大——制造的全面恐慌。在标普 500 指数低于 1000 点时,美国股票非常接近(10 月 10 日 - 标普 900 点),没有谁信任任何人的财务诚信(常常包括他们自己),对于勇敢的价值管理者而言,这反而是合理的买入时机。同样的道理也适用于 EAFE 指数和新兴市场股票,而且在追加保证金、赎回和其他技术性因素导致强制抛售的情况下,我们在 10 月 10 日的价格上遭遇了一场老式的崩盘。但凭着某种小小的奇迹,这些抵消性事件或信念的汇合产生了几天有效的长期定价。历史警告说,新低的可能性大于不创出新低。固定收益领域存在大范围极具吸引力的异常定价。美元和日元目前看起来还行,但英镑不行。完全不用担心通货膨胀。我们可以把对通胀的担忧留到两年后,到时候再真正担心!大宗商品可能出现大幅反弹,但未来 18 个月的基本面应该会将其压低至两年新低。至于我们这些做资产配置的,已经做出了选择:在这些价位及更低价位上,犹豫而谨慎地买入。祝你们的决策好运。 如果英国的计划(索罗斯和巴菲特也独立提倡过)没有被广泛采用,而全球当局跟着美国犹豫不决的步调走,那我们就会在 10 月 13 日的反弹中迎来更持久的涨势,并有助于重振动物精神,这样我们或许能勉强支撑到我最初设定的 2010 年市场低点目标,但别抱太大希望。

Provisional Recommendations Offsetting this optimism, we produced – with a fairly (October 10 - S&P 900) traditional mix of greed and incompetence, but in a giant At under 1000 on the S&P 500, U.S. stocks are very dose this time – a full-fledged panic. With no one trusting reasonable buys for brave value managers willing to be anyone’s financial integrity (often including their own), early. The same applies to EAFE and emerging equities and with margin calls, redemptions, and other technical factors causing forced selling, we had an old-fashioned at October 10th prices, but even more so. History warns, meltdown. And by some minor miracle, this confluence though, that new lows are more likely than not. Fixed of offsetting events or beliefs produced efficient long-term income has wide areas of very attractive, aberrant pricing. pricing for a few days. (P.S. The rally of October 13th The dollar and the yen look okay for now, but the pound may usher in a more sustained rally and help resuscitate does not. Don’t worry at all about inflation. We can animal spirits so that we might be able to limp through to all save up our worries there for a couple of years from my original target of a market low in 2010, but don’t hold now and then really worry! Commodities may have big your breath.) rallies, but the fundamentals of the next 18 months should wear them down to new two-year lows. As for us in asset If the U.K. plan (also advocated by both Soros and Buffett allocation, we have made our choice: hesitant and careful independently) had not been widely adopted and the global buying at these prices and lower. Good luck with your authorities had followed the dithering U.S. lead, we would decisions.

免责声明:本文所表达的观点系杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2008 年 10 月 17 日的个人观点,且可能根据市场及其他条件随时发生变化。本文并非购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被如此理解。文中提及特定证券及发行方仅为说明目的,不构成也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending October 17, 2008, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

版权所有 © 2008 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。

Copyright © 2008 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.

GMO 8 季度信函,第一部分——2008 年 10 月

GMO 季度信函

2008 年 10 月

一线希望与经验教训

杰里米·格兰瑟姆

总结与结论

10 月 13 日,《巴伦周刊》问我,我们是否将从这场持续中的危机中吸取到教训,我回答说,“我们将在极短时间内学到大量知识,在中期内学到相当多,但从长远来看绝对学不到任何东西。这就是历史先例。”

不幸的是,情况很可能确实如此。但至少在接下来几年里,仍有许多一线希望和宝贵教训值得吸取。过去 10 年,我们一直面对一个总体上缺乏吸引力且困难的投资环境。在这段时间的大部分里,我们的储蓄率也是负的。

我们曾有一个臃肿的金融行业,靠实体经济为生,而且社会契约遭到破坏,收入分配日益失衡(受到税收变化的鼓励!),向极富人群倾斜,却损害普通人的利益。我们还不必要地炫耀这种新的大财富。更糟的是,我们受到了政府和金融企业目光短浅、狭隘的领导。

好了,这种情况大多正在终结。一些不良因素将长期消失,另一些则会得到缓和,但在我看来,作为一个节俭的约克郡人,这确实是一个时代的终结,而且是一个相当令人厌恶的时代。我们现在可以重新评估许多关于投资的思考,特别是市场效率、尾部风险(天哪,纳西姆·塔勒布在这方面真说对了!),以及多元化和长期资产配置的理论。

极弱的全球经济并非没有部分抵消性的好处:我们可以暂时忘记消费者通胀,尤其能享受到油价下跌带来的好处,这体现在取暖油和汽油价格降低上。金属和农产品价格下跌也将有助于缓解原本已受挤压的消费者的压力。在像这样的全球危机中,美国发现自己出人意料地扮演了避风港的角色。美元坚挺如马,而我们的贸易逆差却因早先美元持续走弱、如今油价暴跌以及其他进口消费品下降而有所改善。这场危机众多好处中的首要一条,是带来了投资某些固定收益领域的空前机会——某些信用利差已宽到反映出严重的市场功能失调。截至 10 月 18 日,我们 20 年来首次拥有了中等便宜的美国和全球股票。(这些日子你真得把日期写清楚!)很可能不久之后,全球股票在明年可能发生的额外痛苦过后,也将提供绝佳的机会。我们 GMO 已经在谨慎买入。我们承认自己可能买入过早,但我们认识到,我们对标普 500 指数公允价值 975 点的估计,从历史先例来看,很可能会被向下超调 20% 到 40%,从而得出标普指数可能低点在 585 到 780 点之间。世界面临不可避免的经济活动和利润率的下降,因此这种超调不太可能比平均水平轻松多少,尽管谁也说不准。

我们要感谢的只有恐惧本身

值得庆幸的是,纯粹的恐惧——近乎盲目的恐慌——最终促使当局采取了一些实际行动。这个更果断的阶段,即直接向银行注资以及提供各种形式的流动性,是由英国首相布朗(此前挥霍无度的财政大臣)发起的。欧洲各国政府不知怎地咬紧牙关,克服了天然的不情愿,没有跟着背信弃义的阿尔比恩(英国)走。这反过来似乎又鼓励美国也加入了这种更直接的做法。

这是一个改变游戏规则的事件,很可能拯救了我们免于坠入深渊。不幸的是,来自最近痛苦的金融痛苦还会更多:更多全球银行倒闭,信用卡和杠杆债务的大规模减记,以及现在越来越多的、经济极度疲弱后典型的企业违约。而且大多数国家的经济肯定会非常疲弱。在美国,这次衰退很可能堪比 1982 年,甚至更糟,而几乎在所有地方,衰退时间都可能比正常情况长得多。

不过,从这些危机中也有可能产生更聪明的监管和更多的国际合作。如果发生这种情况,即便只是对资产泡沫的管理进行温和的改革,那也将是向前迈出的一大步。我对当局(尤其是美联储)不太有信心,但我相当有信心,至少社会其余部分将更认真对待资产泡沫的形成。我们能得到什么就接受什么吧。

GMO 8 Quarterly Letter, Part 1 – October 2008 GMO Quarterly Letter October 2008 Silver Linings and Lessons Learned Jeremy Grantham Summary and Conclusions progress from earlier sustained dollar weakness, helped by When asked by Barron’s on October 13th if we would new tumbling oil prices and falling consumption of other learn anything from this ongoing crisis, I answered, “We imports. Chief among the many benefits of this crisis are will learn an enormous amount in a very short time, quite a unprecedented opportunities for investing in some fixed bit in the medium term, and absolutely nothing in the long income areas where some spreads are so wide as to reflect term. That would be the historical precedent.” severe market dysfunctionality. As of October 18th, we also have moderately cheap U.S. and global equities for That is unfortunately likely to be the case. But over the the first time in 20 years. (You really have to put the dates next several years at least, there are many silver linings and in these days!) Probably quite soon, global equities too valuable lessons to be learned. We have had a generally will offer exceptional opportunities after the additional unattractive and difficult investment environment for the pain that is likely to occur in the next year. We at GMO past 10 years. For most of that time we have also had a are already careful buyers. We are reconciled to buying negative savings rate. too soon, but we recognize that our fair value estimate of We have had a bloated financial industry feeding off the real 975 on the S&P 500 is, from historical precedent, likely to world and a breach of the social contract with the increasing overrun on the downside by 20% to 40%, giving a range maldistribution of income (encouraged by tax changes!) in of 585 to 780 on the S&P as a probable low. The world favor of the very rich at the expense of ordinary people. We faces unavoidable declines in economic activity and profit also had unnecessary flaunting of this new great wealth. To margins, so this overrun is unlikely to be much less painful cap it off, we had blinkered, narrow-minded leadership by than average, although you never know your luck. the government and financial corporations. Well, much of this is ending. Some undesirable elements will disappear All We Have To Thank Is Fear Itself for a long time and some will just be moderated, but it is Thankfully, pure fear – approaching blind panic – finally truly the end of an era and a rather disgusting one in my induced some real action on the part of the authorities. opinion, speaking as a thrifty Yorkshireman. We can now This more decisive phase, injecting money directly into re-assess a lot of our thinking about investing, particularly the banks as well as supplying liquidity in many forms, market efficiency, outlier risks (boy, did Nassim Taleb get was initiated in the U.K. by Prime Minister Brown, that one right!), and theories of diversification and longer- the previously profligate Chancellor of the Exchequer. term asset allocation. European governments managed somehow to grind their A very weak global economy is not without partially teeth and overcome their natural reluctance to follow offsetting benefits: We can temporarily forget about Perfidious Albion anywhere. This, in turn, apparently consumer inflation and particularly enjoy the advantages encouraged the U.S. to jump on board with this more of lower oil prices as reflected in lower heating oil and direct approach. gas prices. Falling metal and agricultural prices will also This was a game-changing event that has probably saved help relieve some of the pressure on otherwise squeezed us from tipping into the pit. There will unfortunately be consumers. In a global crisis like this, the U.S. finds itself considerably more financial pain where the recent pain unexpectedly cast in the role of a safe haven. The dollar has come from: more global bank failures, more massive is as strong as a horse and yet our trade deficit still makes write-downs from credit cards and leveraged debt, and, increasingly now, the typical corporate defaults that follow downsides, it will be a giant step forward. I am not too a very weak economy. And the economies of most countries confident of the authorities, especially the Fed, but I am will surely be very weak. In the U.S., the downturn is pretty confident that at least the rest of society will take likely to rival 1982 or worse, and almost everywhere it is the formation of asset bubbles much more seriously. We’ll likely to be a much longer downturn than normal. take what we can get.

在那些令人欣慰的教训和经验中,另一个值得警惕的可能是我们认识到资本市场并不总能为善。科技泡沫的破裂催生了 2001 至 2003 年的过度刺激,而这又正如通过了一条强制所有房价上涨 50% 的法律一样,必然引发了房地产泡沫。如今,终于有了希望的迹象:伯南克正在重新思考:“显然,过去十年表明,泡沫破裂可能对经济造成极其危险和代价高昂的后果(编者注:此人无疑是个天才),毫无疑问,在我们走出金融危机时,所有人都会审视这个问题并思考应对之策。”因此,由目光短浅的学术经济学家政策带来的所有不必要痛苦,或许并非完全白费!

然而,这绝不是板上钉钉的事。很少有学者改变主意,也很少有一个科学理论会因简单的事实而崩溃。“科学的进步,一次葬礼接一次葬礼”——马克斯·普朗克这样表达他对学术灵活性的信念,但建议使用行刑队就显得刻薄了。联储官员已经在强调一个显而易见的观点:用“生硬手段”提高利率来干预正在膨胀的投资泡沫,可能“在短期内抑制一些经济增长!”但干预泡沫的形成并不会摧毁增长,只会推迟它,而这已经足够令人不快。相比之下,泡沫破裂则会暴露极端资本错配带来的财富破坏——大量投资被吸入某些领域:互联网初创公司、住房建设的过度扩张、雇佣大量房地产中介,以及设计复杂结构性金融产品等。而如果泡沫引发了真正的信贷冻结,那么对真正有益的投资的投入可能永远失去:未建成的工厂、无限期推迟的教育,以及失业中浪费的人力工时。如果我们集体对资产泡沫及其不可避免的后果变得更加警惕,那将是另一个可喜的教训。

我的前合伙人保罗·伍利——现已从 GMO 退休——一年前在伦敦政治经济学院设立了一个中心,冠以诱人的名称:“伍利资本市场功能障碍研究中心”。(好在题目如此,他的朋友王尔德找不到资金。)我必须坦白,他当年在 GMO 的投资时机很少如此完美——短短一年,他就从一个可疑的怪人变成了开明的远见者,众多名流排着队想要参与其中。我们集体怀有一种令人感动的心态:相信资本主义——仅仅因为它是经济增长唯一有效的驱动力——基本上是无懈可击的,任何控制都必然适得其反。纯粹安·兰德式的资本主义显然无法处理诸如气候变化这类“公地悲剧”式的社会问题。它无法将腐败贪婪的人变成像我们的读者所代表的合理而诚实的人。它根本无法触及社会正义。而且显然,它在应对资产泡沫及随后的经济和信贷问题时做得一团糟。社会对这一问题的态度将会改变,运气好的话,开明监管的增加将增进公共利益。我本人持乐观态度。美国的国家之船(在许多国家中也是如此)似乎总是在一个方向上走得太远,然后像一艘由业余舵手操控的超级油轮一样过度修正。(哦,天哪,近来我们确实遇到了一些真正的业余舵手!)过去八年,我们经历了一次相当糟糕的“走过头”,现在需要一些修正。不知怎的,长远来看,这艘船似乎以曲折的路线大致朝着正确方向前进。吉姆·格兰特这类人以及其他非常明智的人,连同通常的右翼怀疑论者,都会说监管增加的记录糟糕透顶,他们说得对。但完全不受监管的资本主义似乎也同样糟糕。我们将不得不在摸索中找到可接受的平衡,而我们唯一能肯定的是——它不会非常高效。但或许它能足够可接受,我们必须希望如此。

Also high up the list of silver linings and lessons learned is Another potential lesson learned might be our realization the Fed’s apparent change of heart on the topic of bubbles that capital markets don’t always work for the best. My in asset pricing. The breaking of the tech bubble set up friend and former partner Paul Woolley, now retired from the excess stimulus of 2001–03, which in turn created GMO, set up a center at the London School of Economics the housing bubble as surely as if a law had been passed a year ago bearing the tantalizing title: “The Woolley that all house prices had to be marked up 50%. And Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality.” now at last, there are signs of hope: signs that Bernanke (Fortunately for the title, his friend Wilde could not find is reconsidering: “Obviously, the last decade has shown the funding money.) I must confide that his investment that bursting bubbles can be an extraordinarily dangerous timing at GMO was seldom this perfect, for in one year and costly phenomenon for the economy (Ed.: the man’s he has gone from suspicious eccentric to enlightened indisputably a genius), and there is no doubt that, as we visionary, and long lines of luminaries are queuing up to emerge from the financial crisis, we will all be looking be involved. We have collectively had a touching faith at that issue and what can be done about it.” So all the that capitalism – just because it’s the only effective driving unnecessary suffering inflicted on us by short-sighted force behind economic growth – is basically flawless, and policies dictated by academic economists may not have any controls are bound to be counter-productive. Pure Ayn been entirely in vain! Rand capitalism obviously cannot deal with social issues of the tragedy of the commons variety, such as climate However it is definitely not a done deal. Few academics change. It cannot turn corruptible and greedy types into change their minds, and few scientific theories founder the reasonable and honest types that our readers represent. on the simple facts. “Science advances one funeral at a It cannot begin to address social justice. And apparently time” is how Max Planck expressed his belief in academic it does a lousy job at dealing with asset bubbles and the flexibility, but a suggestion that we use firing squads would ensuing economic and credit problems. Society’s attitude seem mean-spirited. Already, Fed members are making on this topic will change and, with a little luck, an increase the obvious point that interfering with investment bubbles in enlightened regulation will increase the public good. I as they grow by using the “blunt instrument” of raising for one am optimistic. The American ship of state (among rates would likely “in the short run curtail some economic many) appears to move forward by lurching too far in one growth!”1 direction and then like a super tanker with an amateur at But interfering with bubbles forming would not destroy the helm, overcorrecting. (And, oh my, have we had some growth, only postpone it, which is undesirable enough. real amateurs at the helm recently!) For the past eight Bubbles breaking, in contrast, reveal the destruction years, we have had a darned good lurch, and we need some of wealth produced by the extreme misallocation of correction. Somehow, in the long run, the ship seems to capital that has sucked so much investment into certain zigzag its way roughly in the right direction. The Jim areas – dotcom start-ups, overbuilding of housing, Grants of the world and other very sensible people, as well hiring multitudes of real estate agents, and designers of as the usual right-wing suspects, will say that increased elaborately structured financial notes, for example. And if regulation has a dismal record, and they are right. But so the bubbles precipitate a true credit freeze-up, then some does totally unregulated capitalism, apparently. We will inputs into really useful investments may be lost forever: have to muddle our way to an acceptable mix, and we can factories not built, education postponed indefinitely, and be sure of only one thing – that it won’t be highly efficient. man hours wasted in unemployment. If we collectively But it may be acceptable enough, and we must hope that become more leery of asset bubbles and their inevitable it is.

1 Gary Stern.

1 Gary Stern.

GMO 10 季度信函,第二部分 – 2008 年 10 月 在元层面,我还想提出一个期望:由于我们当前的困境,我们将重新审视薪酬及其背后的制度结构。我们当然也会重新考虑,一个如此过度发展的金融行业——其企业利润占比从 1982 年的 10% 上升到去年的 27%——是否真的值得拥有。这些从业者中的一部分人——理想情况下是我那些更优秀的竞争对手——可以去做一些更有社会价值的事情。他们可以成为医生,或者,但愿不会如此,真的去当医生。

GMO 10 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 Still at the meta level, I would like to bring up the hope that remuneration and the structure that enables it. as a result of our current misfortunes we will re-examine Surely we will also reconsider the merits of having such an how we pick our leaders. It would seem for starters that a overdeveloped financial industry whose share of corporate lack of prejudicial bias would be helpful. If you’re looking profits had risen from 10% in 1982 to 27% last year. Some for an open mind, why would you pick Robert Rubin or of these people – ideally my better competitors – could find Hank Paulson for a job at Treasury that might, just might, something else to do with more redeeming social value. involve decisions on the life and death of their beloved They could be doctors or, perish the thought, actually Goldman Sachs?

至于保尔森,为什么偏偏选他——那位曾在证券交易委员会极力游说、反对为投行增加储备金的五大金融机构领袖之一?金融业(就像发情的房地产经纪人)一贯渲染的永久多头论调也已暴露无遗,我希望我们能等来一些严肃的反制。永久看多对客户没半点好处。自下而上的盈利预测中那种荒唐的乐观情绪,在严肃投资者眼里早就成了笑话,但我们仍屡见不鲜。为什么偏偏选一个像艾伦·格林斯潘那样的极端安·兰德派来当美联储主席——此人公开厌恶几乎所有形式的监管加码,并把不受约束的资本主义奉为至宝?难道一个思想开放的人不是更好吗?或者选本·伯南克也行,他的本能反应总是清清楚楚地相信市场有效性?

And in the case of Paulson, why pick one make something. of the five leaders of financial firms who lobbied hard at the SEC against increased reserves for investment banks? The permanently bullish spin put out by the financial Why would you pick an Ayn Rand extremist like Alan industry – like real estate agents in heat – has also been Greenspan to be the Fed Boss when he openly deplored revealed, and I hope we can expect some serious reaction. increased regulation in almost any form and thought Permanent bullishness does not serve the clients well. The untrammeled capitalism was the bee’s knees? Wouldn’t ridiculous bullishness of bottom-up earnings forecasts has an open mind be better? Or Ben B, whose reflex is so long been a joke among serious investors, but we still see clearly to believe in market efficiency?

他对此深信不疑,到处如此。看涨偏见深深渗透整个行业,以至于他预判了重要数据,比如保尔森和华尔街其他 CEO 们——过去几年极其危险的房地产泡沫。他估算,即使来自更老练的冷静派,比如国际货币基金组织的人,以及经济学家们普遍也在经济预测中不断下调预期,同时紧张地回头看:他们拼命避免过于领先群体,犯下凯恩斯所说的‘独自犯错’的关键大罪。因此,全球 GDP 增长估计仍为+3%,中国为+9.2%。

He believes it so them everywhere. The bullish bias pervades the industry profoundly that he prejudged important data such as the right up to Paulson and the other Wall Street CEOs. very dangerous housing bubble of the last few years. He Estimates even from more seasoned cool types, such as seemed to believe that since no such extreme inefficiency those at the IMF, and economists in general have their should exist, then it did not exist. Not a good idea. economic forecasts creeping downward while looking nervously over their shoulders: they are desperate to avoid On this same topic, why would we not insist on a proven getting too far ahead of the pack and committing Keynes’ record of excellence on a relevant topic for the really key crime of being wrong on their own. Thus, estimates important job? Ben B has an excellent record as an of global growth in GDP are still +3% for the world and academic economist, but has had little contact with the +9.2% for China.

在危机中,估算总是滞后于混乱的现实世界,直到现在依然如此。至于艾伦!他确实有积极的一面,但这无济于事。类似但更糟的是,他有可靠的历史记录。多年来已经证明他是一个非常平庸、轻量级的商业经济学家,而标普 500 指数的盈利估算荒谬地偏高,远低于席卷一切的危机所暗示的水平。例如,IBES 对标普 500 指数未来 12 个月的盈利估算仍为每股 98.5 美元。即使按正常利润率计算,也应为 71 美元;若利润率比正常水平低 20%,则会降至 56 美元。运气好的话,标准估算方法的有用性会大打折扣。

在等级制度的下层,我认为我们已经学会不要对 CEO 评价过高。

In a crisis, the estimates always lag on messy, real world until now. And as for Alan! He had a the upside, and this does not help. Similarly, but worse, proven record. It was proven for years that he was a very the earnings estimates for the S&P have stayed ludicrously mediocre, lightweight commercial economist. He sat on a higher than were likely given the rolling crisis. For example few politically connected committees, met the right people the IBES earnings estimate for the S&P over the next 12 a lot, and, hey presto, had the second most important job months is still $98.5 a share. At even normal margins it in the land. would be $71, and at margins 20% below normal it would Lower down on the pecking order, I think we have learned fall to $56. With any luck, the usefulness of standard not to value CEOs so highly.

我们已经看到了行业建议的局限性——当面临新的压力时,这些建议会被重新审视并常规调整;我们也审视了其先天看涨倾向。他们的奖励体系与自身才能的平凡性严重脱节。也许现在是时候重新审视固定资产配置方式了——我曾称之为“看着火车开来”效应。从理论上讲,敦促普通投资者在亏损时咬紧牙关、保持耐心是好的。但在现实世界中,许多完全正常的投资者在遭受巨额亏损后,根本无法让自己承受这种痛苦。

We have seen their limitations industry advice will be reconsidered and routinely adjusted when under novel stresses, and we have examined how for congenital bullishness. their reward system was out of kilter with the ordinariness Perhaps it is also time to reconsider the fixed asset of their talents. The boss of Lehman did an honorable allocation approach – what I used to refer to as the “watch and long service in my opinion, and I have no doubt he the locomotive coming” effect. It is fine in theory to urge tried hard. But frankly, Lehman even in its heyday was ordinary investors to grit their teeth in the face of losses a B player and, in its last few months, a D player. It is and show patience. But in the real world, many perfectly probably unfair to weigh too heavily his lack of skill down normal investors who take huge losses simply cannot bring the home stretch and the pain he inflicted on many by themselves to stand the pain.

坚守并等待,但等待太久也是问题。显然,他非常不走运,被挑中当了替罪羊——即便在雷曼兄弟崩盘之前,他真的该累积起 6.5 亿美元的持股吗?这些财富本应归于股东,而他每年还因一份基本上只是水平平平的工作拿到巨额报酬。我相信,社会将重新审视这种做法的合理性。让盈利追赶上来,需要 15 到 20 年——这对电脑来说是绝佳建议,但电脑不投资,而人类,非常人性化。他们通常会在接近低点时卖出,锁定巨大的痛苦。这是一个绝佳的机会,可以重新评估将更多资产——哪怕只是少量——从危险高估的资产类别转移到相对便宜的资产类别的好处,赶在熊市做出其惯常动作之前。

Holding firm and waiting the holding out too long. He was obviously very unlucky to 15 or 20 years for earnings to catch up is great advice for be picked out as a sacrificial lamb. But even before the a computer, but computers don’t invest, and humans are unraveling, did he really deserve to have accumulated a … well, very human. They will often sell out near lows $650 million holding in Lehman – all wealth that would and lock in enormous pain. This is a great opportunity otherwise have accrued to stockholders – in addition to to re-evaluate the merits of moving more assets – if only immense annual rewards for basically doing an average marginally – away from dangerously overpriced asset job? I believe society will reconsider the merits of such classes toward relatively cheap ones before the great bear Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 11 GMO markets do their usual thing.

我并非建议像某些战术资产配置者那样,天天在市场里上蹿下跳。我推荐的做法是,在牛市和熊市的两端,对极端事件偶尔做出重大回应。这当然会带来巨大的职业或业务风险。但,生活本就如此。

研究科学界无疑在松了一口气,因为他们的“一线希望”是:有望再次招募到一些最顶尖的博士——这些人之前排着队去为高盛或对冲基金工作(甚至,我必须承认,有些去了 GMO)。在那里,他们设计了那些被格林斯潘如此推崇的巧妙重新包装的抵押贷款证券,或者开发了量化股票模型和“统计套利”。现在,他们又将把时间浪费在重新设计核设施上。

如果我们能消除产业巨头——尤其是金融界的产业巨头——身上那些镀金时代的过度行为,那也将是一线希望。

I don’t mean to recommend The research science world is no doubt sighing with relief racing around on a day-to-day basis as some tactical asset at their silver lining: the prospect of once again recruiting allocators do. What I do recommend is an occasional some of the best PhDs who had been lining up to work for significant response to outlier events both at the bull and Goldman or a hedge fund (and even, I must admit, a few bear ends of the spectrum. This, of course, runs into major for GMO). There they designed the cleverly repackaged career or business risk. But, that’s life. mortgage paper so admired by Greenspan, or developed It will also be a silver lining if we get rid of some of the quant equity models and “stat arb.” Now they will have gilded-age excess on the part of the titans of industry, to waste their time once again designing nuclear facilities especially in the financial world.

他们本该坚守阵地,低调行事(参见《黑石之巅》与《群虫翻身的真正教训》,2007 年 7 月),但显然并没有。他们高调冒头,招摇过市,结果自然被盯上了。现在,他们无疑会为此付出代价——以某种形式的敌意立法来买单。而最大的亮色之一,将是家庭储蓄率的上升。

另一个教训该从“咱们都学耶鲁”的潮流中吸取(参见《不道德的风险》,2008 年 4 月)。没错,在其他条件相同的情况下,多元化是个好主意;但如果需求热得过头,以至于要么压垮小型资产类别的流动性,要么耗尽对冲基金、私募股权等领域的人才储备,那么挤过那道门总难免出问题。

They should have kept and second generation biomass projects. Oh well. their heads below the trench (see The Blackstone Peak and A real lesson will also have been learned on the “Let’s all the Turning of the Worms, July 2007), and they certainly look like Yale” front. (See Immoral Hazard, April 2008.) did not. They jumped way up, begging for a sharpshooter Yes, diversification is a great idea other things being equal, to notice them, and they were indeed noticed. It will now but if the demand is so trendy that it overwhelms either the surely cost them in hostile legislation in some form or liquidity of small asset classes, or the talent involved in other. hedge funds, private equity, and other fields, then there is One of the biggest silver linings will be in increased always likely to be a problem squeezing through the door household savings.

现在很清楚了,财富的增加只是暂时的。那是建立在严重高估资产之上的纸面财富——而且这还是在有人高喊“着火啦!着火啦!”之前的事。那些渴望效仿大型捐赠基金的基金带来的巨大买入压力,让二流的、定价过高的私募股权交易变得容易达成。(见 2007 年 7 月《信件附录第十二章:评估私募股权经理的有用性》)由于这些交易在过去三年里通常定价过高,必须使用过高的杠杆才能勉强得到体面回报的可能性。损失的弥补将不得不通过延迟满足——降低消费、增加储蓄——这条艰难道路来实现。悲剧在于,既然超过 10 年的正常储蓄都被牺牲给了纸面财富的宏大幻觉,那些损失的储蓄或许永远无法完全弥补。人们将蒙受损失。

Now it is clear that the increased together. And that’s before someone shouts, “Fire! Fire!” wealth was only temporary. It was paper wealth based The great buying pressure from funds aspiring to look on very overpriced assets. The losses will have to be like the great endowment funds facilitated second-rate, repaired the hard way by deferred gratification – lower overpriced private equity deals. (See Appendix to Letters consumption and higher savings. The tragedy here is that XII: Evaluating the Usefulness of Private Equity Managers, since more than 10 years of normal savings were sacrificed July 2007.) Because these deals were typically overpriced to the grand illusion of paper wealth, it is unlikely that in the last three years, excessive leverage had to be used all of the lost savings can ever be made up. People will to even tease out the possibility of a decent return.

这反过来又保证了一旦利润率受到挤压,所有利润都将消失。潮水般的资金还让一流的对冲基金获得了过度融资,并催生了数千家二流基金。真正的投资才能向来稀缺,绝不会仅仅因为有巨大需求就从地里冒出来。核物理学家不会因为手握大笔资金就立刻变成投资天才。有人会指出,储蓄率提高会在短期内抑制消费、拉低 GDP 增长。这种短视思维正是过去布什等人公开鼓励消费、进而鼓励个人债务的逻辑。但从长远来看,哪个经济体增长最快:储蓄率达 40% 的中国,还是个人储蓄率为负的美国与英国?简单来说,这只会让人们比原本可能的情况更早地变穷。

This, simply retire poorer than they might have done. in turn, guaranteed that in a profit margin squeeze all the It will be pointed out that increased savings will depress equity would be lost. The flood of money also allowed for consumption and lower GDP growth in the near term. over-funding of first-rate hedge funds and the start-up of This short-termism has been the logic in the past behind thousands of second-rate funds. Real investment talent has Bush and others who overtly encouraged consumption always been scarce, and does not jump out of the ground and therefore personal debt. But in the long term, which just because there’s a massive demand. Nuclear physicists economies grow the fastest: China with 40% savings, or do not immediately become investment talents even with the U.S. and U.K. with negative personal savings?

智商高达 150。问题在于——为什么所有主意都要拿他说事?对股市来说,降低储蓄率和投资率当然会刺激增长,而我们若想拥有健康的经济,就必须承受过去过度消费带来的短期负面影响。最近的信贷和资产危机是一记耳光,一剂刺耳的警醒,我们终将走向更平衡的局面。问题在于时机。尽管从长期看,我们需要将调整转向更高的储蓄,但如果转得太快——因为对冲基金行业只是我们整个人类活动的一个延伸——它就是个零和博弈的放大版。它整体上不创造任何价值,只是对现有财富池进行重新洗牌,且还要扣除高额费用。在鼎盛时期,它主要提供的并非真正的附加值(即阿尔法),而是一种依赖资产价格上涨、利率下降或信贷宽松而模拟出来的阿尔法。

High IQs of 150. savings and investment rates, of course, encourage growth, The hedge fund industry is just an extension of our larger and we have to absorb the short-term negative effects of zero sum game. It adds collectively no value, it just what had become over-consumption if we want to be a reshuffles the existing pool of wealth minus the higher healthy economy. The recent crisis in credit and assets fees. Last year, in its prime, it offered mainly in place is a slap in the face, a rude wake-up call, and we will move to a better balance. The problem here is the timing. of real value added, or alpha, a simulated alpha that was Although we need this re-adjustment to greater savings dependent on rising asset prices, falling interest rates, or for the long term, if we get there too quickly – since one easy credit.

三者兼而有之。现有阿尔法群体多出的储蓄,实为另一群体意料之外的损失,这些损失并未因需求增长而增加,但很可能表现为营收下滑——我们面临陷入竞争性收缩向下螺旋的风险,这种萎缩一旦发生,就会击垮市场信心。这正是 1930 年代凯恩斯整夜辗转难眠的噩梦。因此,必须缓慢进行,才能让这种虚假的阿尔法显现出持久稳定的假象,在此水平上,额外的资本支出和徒有其表的增长,本质上是在恢复更加正常的市场条件。新增工业产能终将自我抵消。天知道,根本没必要在市中心广场上如此仓促地当众裸奔!命运有时确实残酷无情。

All three in many cases. The existing alpha person’s extra saving is another person’s unexpected loss did not increase to meet the increased demand but probably of top-line revenue – we risk getting caught in a downward shrank under the competition, and then the shrunken alpha spiral that breaks animal spirits. This is the nightmare that was spread more thinly over more capital. And all that kept Keynes up at night in the 1930s. So it has to be slow was needed for this phony alpha to be seen as wearing and steady, at which level the extra capital spending and no clothes was a steady return to more normal conditions. increased industrial capacity creates its own offsetting Lord knows, it did not need to be stripped naked in the city stimulus. square so abruptly! Fate really can be cruel.

GMO 季度信函第 2 部分——2008 年 10 月

所有这些新兴的、近期颇具吸引力的另类投资领域,都即将被重新审视:它们的流动性不足,以及它们那种“在蒸汽压路机前面捡五分钱”的倾向,都将被充分考量。风险价值(V.A.R.)作为一项可靠的风险度量指标,有希望被摒弃,并遭彻底唾弃。简而言之,我们将生活在一个更加现实、虽然不那么激动人心的世界里。

我们对公允价值有相当准确的把握。对于标普 500 指数,我们认为公允价值在 975 点左右,上下浮动 25 点。和往常一样,这是通过简单的技术方法计算得出的:假设在公平价格下,我们会有一个正常的市盈率,并且利润率也将恢复正常。我们还在两周前展示了,巨大的泡沫通常在严重过头方面是多么典型。

GMO 12 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 All of these new, recently sexy alternative investment How Low Is Low? areas will now be re-evaluated: their illiquidity and their We have a pretty good fix on fair values. For the S&P tendency to pick up nickels in front of steam rollers will 500 we believe it is about 975 ±25. This is calculated, be fully taken into account. Value at risk (V.A.R.) as a as always, by the simple technique of assuming that at reliable measure of risk will hopefully be taken out and fair price we will have a normal P/E ratio, and that profit shot at dawn. In short, we will all live in a more realistic, margins will also be normal. We also showed two weeks if less exciting, world. ago how typical it is for great bubbles to overrun badly.

通常我们不会一次性把所有资金押注在估算的可能高估程度上,而是缓慢地投入资金,并希望走运。毕竟,如果股票很有吸引力,而你却因为没买而错过上涨,那你不仅看起来像个傻瓜,你就是个傻瓜。这段经历也毫不意外地强化了我对均值回归的信念——即所有泡沫都会破灭,最好研究数据、自己做出判断,并屏蔽大众意见。它还强调了与合适的人共事的重要性:我从未意识到,在我们的商业中竟散布着那么多明智之人。在令人神经紧张的时刻,他们的意见和鼓励的确让我们心怀感激。人永远不会有足够的信心。那个小小的声音总是在那里,暗示既然有这么多人都这么认为,他们的论点或许真有道理。于是你做多日元、做空金融股,但远远不够。我们被深深地提醒,一些最好的机会非常技术性,需要专业帮助。所以我们寻求了帮助,雇了优秀的人才,但速度太慢了,一生难遇的机会从指缝间溜走,只留给我们还算不错的利润。我们学到,未来必须在全球资本主义体系的几乎每一个方面都具备专业知识——或至少是中等的能力。这并不容易,但我们通过艰难的方式——那些稍纵即逝、不会等待我们的错失良机——学到了,这是必要的。最重要的是,我们学到永远、永远不要相信政府官员的能力。

金色曙光

给这丑陋的一年所有抵消性优点画上句号的,是廉价资产的出现。我们太容易忘记,只有拥有廉价资产,才能快速实现复利增长。对于那些眼光长远的人来说,资产价格下跌总是更好,这样复利回报才会更高。在全球股市,尤其是美国股市,已经持续高估了无与伦比的 20 年之后,廉价资产的到来无异于一线曙光。

Usually we don’t invest our money on estimated likely What I Learned overruns, but instead filter our money in slowly and hope This experience has, not surprisingly, reinforced my faith to get lucky. After all, if stocks are attractive and you in mean reversion – that all bubbles break and that it is best don’t buy and they run away, you don’t just look like an to study the data, make up your own mind, and screen out idiot, you are an idiot. Still we are informed by our work general opinion. It has underlined the importance of mixing on overruns. So where are we this time? History says a with the right people: I never realized how many sensible 50%+ overrun has characterized the aftermath of the three people there were sprinkled through our business. We important equity bubbles. I believe we could also come are certainly grateful for their input and reinforcement in at this from a very different angle: We could work out nerve-wracking times. One never has enough confidence. what we think the likely range of profit margins is going That little voice is always there suggesting that, since to be in a severe recession, and then look at what multiples there are so many of them, there may be something to their have historically been applied to earnings that are equally arguments. So you go long the Yen and short the financials depressed. but never enough. It was rammed home to us that some In a rational world, low profit margins would be multiplied of the best bets were very technical and we needed help. by a high P/E and vice versa to normalize for the economic So we got help and we hired good people, but much too cycle. In a Bernanke/French and Fama world, the slowly, while opportunities of a lifetime slipped through correlations would be -1. High margins would always our fingers, leaving us with merely a decent profit. We be exactly offset by low P/Es and vice versa, so that the have learned that in the future we need to have expertise – market would always sell at fair value or replacement or at least moderate competence – in almost every aspect cost. The market would thus always be efficient, and that of the global capitalist system. It’s not easy, but we have chunk of the financial establishment that urges the buying learned the hard way – missed opportunities that did not and holding of index funds regardless of price would last long and would not wait for us – that it is necessary. unarguably be correct. In the crazy real world, in contrast, Above all, we learned to never, ever trust the competence we can’t even get the correlation sign right: it is positive of government officials. .32, which means that high margins are multiplied by high P/Es and vice versa. Remarkably, this is particularly The Gold Lining true at the extremes where the correlation rises. Thus in Topping off all of the offsetting virtues of this ugly last 2000, the equity bubble that Alan could not see forming year is the arrival of cheap assets. All too easily we forget sold at the highest P/E in history (35) multiplied by the that you can compound wealth rapidly only by having highest margins in history! 1982, in contrast, sold at 8 cheap assets. For those with a long horizon, it is always times depressed margins. This double counting makes better to have assets fall in price so that the compounding the market far more volatile than it needs to be by driving returns are higher. For an unparalleled 20 years, global prices far above and far below efficient price levels. equities, especially U.S. equities, have been overpriced.

附件 1 展示了美国利润率的历史序列。这是一个相当可靠的均值回归序列,因此你可以非常有信心地认为利润率将回归正常水平。但容易被遗忘的是,当然,它们有一半时间低于正常水平。在我们预期的全球环境下,标普 500 指数的利润率应该会跌破其正常水平。然而,如果利润率能以上行方向维持,结果当然会远不那么严重。不过,我们的结论是,标普 500 指数很可能在未来两年内触底于 600 到 800 点区间,不幸的是,从历史角度看,这并不算特别悲观。如今,它们终于变得便宜了,而且很可能还会更便宜。我相信,这很可能将营造出一个千载难逢的投资机会(或者说在漫长的职业生涯中可能出现两次)。《季度信函,第二部分——2008 年 10 月》GMO 附件 1 标普 500 利润率 8.5% 至 7.5%

Exhibit 1 shows our series on U.S. profit margins. This Now, finally, they are cheap and likely to get cheaper. is a pretty dependable mean reverting series so you can Likely, I believe, to set up a once-in-a-lifetime investing be extremely confident that margins will come back to opportunity (or maybe twice in a long career). normal. What is easy to forget is that, of course, they spend half their time below normal. In the global conditions that we expect, S&P margins should fall below their normal Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008 13 GMO Exhibit 1 upside, however, and somehow profit margins hang in, the Profit Margins for the S&P 500 result would of course be far less severe. Our conclusion, though, that the S&P is likely to bottom out in the 600 8.5% to 800 range within the next two years can unfortunately be seen as not particularly pessimistic from a historical 7.5% perspective.

平均: 5.6% 6.5% 21% 最后,针对高于政府 5.5% 平均利润的利润率给一条建议:对于近些年来一有衰退苗头就浮出水面的各方歇斯底里——以及拿出公共资金往经济里乱扔的恐慌——我从来都不以为然。温和衰退有若干长期优势,在以往的致股东信中讨论过,但近些年来,我们似乎已对长期失去了兴趣。

Average: 5.6% 6.5% 21% Finally, a Single Piece of Advice for the Profit Margin above Government 5.5% average profit I have never been a fan of the hysteria that has surfaced on margins all sides in recent years at a hint of recession, and the panic 4.5% to throw public money at the economy. Mild recessions have several long-term advantages discussed in earlier 3.5% Letters, but in recent years we seem to have lost interest in the long term.

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2.5% 12 月 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06 然而,这次不一样。这次是如假包换的危机,我们必须欢迎能获得的一切刺激措施。不过,很容易最终让人去修建只有一点点用处的公园,或者,按日本风格,去修建近乎无用的、不知通向何处的桥梁。政府刺激措施长期来看能产生体面(甚至高达 20% 到 40% 的回报)。1982 年和 1974 年,两者都是相当严重的衰退,利润率分别比正常水平低了 36% 和 39%。这绝对不必是一系列劳民伤财的工程。让我提议,这次的关键词不是“塑料”,而是“替代能源”。在能源上的大规模支出,更好的还是在节能上的支出,将创造就业、刺激经济、产生良好的长期经济回报、减少对正在枯竭的中东石油的依赖、抑制二氧化碳排放,并且,有史以来第一次,为其他国家树立一个真正的榜样。从最简单的——更好的隔热和更高效的机器——到新的替代能源——太阳能、风能和第二代生物质能——再到潜在的巨额投资,如新建核电站和高效输电系统,这总体上可能成为美国在经济和更广泛层面上的一个长期宝藏。这样的计划能够抵消日本式长期衰退的风险。它可能是一个划时代的变革,就像马歇尔计划一样,未来几代人或许会为之自豪。

2.5% Dec-58 62 66 70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 06 However, this time it’s different. This is the Real McCoy Source: GMO, Standard & Poor's As of 9/30/08 crisis, and we must welcome all the stimulus we can get. It is easy, though, to end up employing people to build mildly useful parks or, in the Japanese style, nearly useless bridges to nowhere. Government stimulus can have a decent (even levels by 20% to 40%. In 1982 and 1974, which were high) return in the long run. It absolutely doesn’t have to respectively quite severe recessions, profit margins fell by be a series of boondoggles. Let me suggest that the magic 36% and 39% below normal. word this time is not “plastics” but “alternatives.” Massive Given the extreme current difficulties in the financial spending on energy and, better yet, energy savings will and economic scene, margins 36% to 39% below normal create jobs, stimulate the economy, produce a good long-would not seem especially Draconian, but let’s be slightly term economic return, reduce dependence on depleting friendly and predict only a 28% overrun this time. These Middle Eastern oil, curtail carbon dioxide emissions, and diminished margins have typically been reflected in a below set, for once, a real example for other countries. From the average P/E as discussed above. The historical expected simplest – better insulation and more efficient machines P/E for profit margins depressed by 28% would be 15% – through the new alternatives – solar, wind power, and to 20% below average; let us assume 17% below. This second generation biomass – to the potentially massive would give us a market selling at 83% of its normal P/E on investments in new nuclear plants and efficient energy profit margins that would be at 72% of their normal. This transmission, this could be in total a long range bonanza computes (.83 x .72) to be almost exactly 60% of fair value. for the U.S. in economic and broader respects. Such a Our current fair value estimate for the S&P 500 of 975 program could offset the risks of a Japanese-style drawnmodified by a likely overrun of 40% would yield a price out recession. It would be potentially an epoch-defining of about 585 in an environment of a quite severe economic change, and one of which, like the Marshall Plan, future and profit recession. If the global economy surprises on the generations might be proud.

免责声明:本文观点仅代表杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2008 年 10 月 24 日的看法,并可能随时根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文不构成对任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被视为此类要约或招揽。文中提及特定证券及发行人仅作说明之用,无意也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending October 24, 2008, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

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GMO 第十四期季度信函,第二部分 – 2008 年 10 月

GMO 14 Quarterly Letter, Part 2 – October 2008