停印!(2010年1月21日)
GMO 季度信函 2010 年 1 月 停止印报!(2010 年 1 月 21 日)杰里米·格兰瑟姆 好消息……和坏消息 沃尔克化极度极端:“又一个将载入史册的日子”在一项引人注目的进展中,政府提出了一项沃尔克计划,旨在实施“轻型格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案”。五位最高法院大法官今天宣布,不仅只有保罗·沃尔克,他是过去 30 年里唯一一位展现过真正骨气的金融管理者——顺便一提,布鲁克斯莉·伯恩也是——但如今,这个观点早已过时且极为丑陋——不仅如此,现在企业也是人,它们的钱属于言论自由,因此对于它们为影响政治结果而花费的金钱不应设限。如果企业真的是开国元勋们可能希望保护的、由人类组成的“民主协会”,这倒还说得过去。然而,它们实际上是高层管理的小型寡头集团。因此,大型石油和煤炭公司的高管可以决定他们想推动哪些政治结果,比如说,无限制的二氧化碳排放(他们的 CEO 显然都没有孙子!),完全不需要得到数百万实际所有者的决策批准。企业的金融力量此前已有可能压倒国会的民主进程,而现在这种损害可能变得无限,并且最高法院还为其盖上了批准的印章。所以,让我们把事情做得彻底一点,干脆改个名吧。美国合众国(U.C.A.)看起来很眼熟:美利坚合众国有限公司!
GMO QUARTERLY LETTER January 2010 Stop the Presses! (January 21, 2010) Jeremy Grantham The Good News … … and the Bad News Volckerization Supremely Extreme: Another “Day That Will Live in Infamy” In a remarkable development, a Volcker plan for GlassSteagall-lite has been proposed by the Administration. One Five Supreme Court justices today announced that not only minute Paul Volcker, the only financial administrator not are corporations people and that their money is free speech called Brooksley Born who has shown any real backbone – this is old hat and a very ugly hat at that – but now, there in the last 30 years, is so out in the cold that his toes must should be no limit to the money they spend to influence have frozen off, and the next – hey, Presto! – his ideas political outcomes. This would be one thing if corporations are put forward lock, stock, and barrel and Geithner and really were “democratic associations” of humans that the Summers are left scrambling to take some credit for the Founding Fathers may have wanted to protect. They are, plan and pretend they hadn’t been dissing Volcker up until instead, small oligarchies of top management. Thus, the eight seconds ago for what they thought were his antique top management of major oil and coal companies can and unnecessary ideas that were far too harsh on our poor decide what political outcomes they want to promote, banking system. Wow! Well, these new ideas are all say, unlimited production of carbon dioxide (none of their good stuff as far as I’m concerned, and entirely justified. CEOs apparently has grandchildren!), utterly without Everyone in Congress, and anywhere else for that matter, any approval of their decisions by the millions of actual knows prop desk trading (banks trading their own capital owners. The financial power of corporations was already like a hedge fund) is a conflict of interest. They may or in danger of overwhelming the democratic process in may not think it important or that it caused this or that Congress and this makes the damage potentially unlimited problem, but they know it’s a real conflict. Congressmen, and puts the Court’s seal of approval on it. So let’s do it in since when wasn’t conflict of interest and poor ethical style and have a name change. The U.C.A. has a familiar standards reason enough to change the law? But since we look: The United Corporations of America! bring it up, of course prop trading was indeed the rot at the heart of our financial problems (see last quarter’s Letter).
看着交易员揣着 2800 万美元的奖金回家,这向那些地位低下的资产抵押证券销售员和包装工发出了强有力的信号:出去干吧,狠狠冒一把险吧。这种腐朽之气一直蔓延到最顶层,没过多久,董事会主席们就开始敦促首席执行官们加杠杆,让自己看起来更像那些利润丰厚得多、活脱脱是个对冲基金而非投资银行的竞争对手。在这样的鼓励或恐吓之下,有些 CEO 一直跳着舞,直到摔下悬崖。让我们从这场险些酿成的大祸中汲取教训吧。沃尔克万岁!
Watching traders take home their $28 million bonus sent a powerful message to lowly salesmen and packagers of asset-backed securities, for example, to get out there and really take some risk. This rot spread to the very top, and pretty soon chairmen of boards were exhorting CEOs to leverage up and look more like some much more profitable rival that resembled a hedge fund rather than an investment bank. Thus encouraged – or intimidated – some CEOs just kept on dancing right off the cliff. Let’s learn from our near disaster. Viva Volcker!
GMO 季度信函 2010 年 1 月 这十年真够瞧的!
GMO QUARTERLY LETTER January 2010 What a Decade!
杰里米·格兰瑟姆《巴塔哥尼亚洞见》:相比经济上更幸运的 1990 年代和 2000 年代初期,崎岖不平(崎岖不平,但还不算灾难性)的 1970 年代反而表现更好。
Jeremy Grantham The Patagonia Insight the bumpy (bumpy, but not so disastrous) 1970s than the economically lucky 1990s and early 2000s.
我刚从巴塔哥尼亚度了个长假回来。长途徒步给了我大量时间去思考人生——与预测难以捉摸的现实世界相比,以及死亡和伯南克。预测市场结果反倒相对简单明了。这是一个激发灵感的绝佳时机,我的确有了一个灵感。那就是:有时候,利润率与市盈率似乎总会穿越公允价值,前提是——这是一个很大的前提——你得足够耐心。无论处境如何、无论你多么努力,你都不会有灵感!这并非是说真知灼见不存在,只是说它们属于别人。你总是很容易说服自己有了某个洞见,然后去强行推动它。这可能会代价极其、极其高昂。
今天很容易让人困惑,因为这是一个极不寻常的时代。两年前我就说过,我们都身处一场精密的实验之中,实验的输入参数完全是全新的。所有资产类别的风险溢价都低到史无前例,同时充斥着大量新颖且令人难以理解的金融工具。这已经够糟糕的了,但难道现在的局面不是更复杂、更没有先例吗?我们有生之年从未见过像刚过去的那场金融和经济崩溃。我们从未在同一十年内经历两次巨大的资产泡沫破裂。我们从未像这次一样,在各类资产中抹去如此巨额的财富:据我们估算,最严重时高达 20 万亿美元。我们从未见过政府和美联储的资产负债表如此迅速恶化,也从未见过如此大规模的道德风险,救助计划满天飞。我们对于世界将如何从这一切中复苏、又会以何种方式被改变,又能抱有多大的准确预测希望呢?非常渺茫。
我对经济前景的看法一如既往地乏味:“七年艰困期”。我仍然认为,在刺激措施的初步效果消退后,我们将进入多年的逆风期,以消化我们极端的失衡问题。这很可能导致未来七年的 GDP 增长低于平均水平,并且我们会经历高于正常比例的低于平均水平的利润率与市盈率,因此感觉更像是
表 1:GMO 资产类别十年预测表现(1999 年 12 月 31 日至 2009 年 12 月 31 日)
| 资产类别 | GMO 十年预测排名 | 预测实际年化收益率 | 实际回报 | 实际排名 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 美国房地产投资信托 | 1 | 10.0% | 7.4% | 3 |
| 新兴市场股票 | 2 | 7.8% | 8.1% | 1 |
| 新兴国家债券 | 3 | 6.1% | 7.5% | 2 |
| 美国通胀保值国债 | 4 | 4.3% | 4.9% | 4 |
| 巴克莱资本美国政府债券 | 5 | 3.8% | 3.5% | 6 |
| 国际小盘股 | 6 | 3.4% | 3.5% | 7 |
| 外国债券 | 7 | 3.0% | 3.9% | 5 |
| 美国小盘股 | 8 | 2.5% | 2.3% | 8 |
| 美国国库券 | 9 | 2.1% | 0.3% | 9 |
| EAFE 指数 | 10 | 0.4% | -1.4% | 10 |
| 标普 500 指数 | 11 | -1.9% | -3.5% | 11 |
排名次序相关性:93.6%
随机选出相同或更好排名次序的概率:五十五万分之一
- 实际年复合实际回报率对应 1999 年 12 月 31 日至 2009 年 12 月 31 日期间。
正常情况是我们 7 年预测和以往 10 年预测所假设的常态。上一次十年我们做过一个预测,从 1999 年 12 月 31 日到 2009 年 12 月 31 日,表 1 已总结。当时我们预测,估值高得离谱的标普指数会跑输现金和其他一切资产——从 33 倍市盈率开始,你还能指望什么?——我们还假设新兴市场股票会表现极好,尽管它们与标普的相关系数高达 0.7,但原因就是它们太便宜了。那些有效市场信徒,显然会带着他们的信仰进坟墓,他们会说我们只是运气好,尽管我们正确的概率只有几十万分之一。“荒谬。高风险资产怎么可能连续十年跑输现金?”你能听到他们这么说。但我们只会说,这只是均值回归的正常碾压过程。从长期看,我们生活的世界其实非常正常。只有短期的上下波动才会让我们所有人发疯,而眼下,我们应该为近期危机和巨大政府反应带来的一些极其怪异且难以预测的短期市场效应做好准备。但更大的危险在于,美联储又在玩火!
玩火
每当美联储试图通过维持低利率和快速货币增长来刺激经济时,经济确实会做出反应,但反应勉强而迟缓;而资产价格却会热情高涨。根据我们对总统周期的研究,历史上,当温和的美联储刺激和少量道德风险在周期的第三年对经济几乎没什么影响时,它们
I just returned from a long vacation in Patagonia. I took long hikes that gave me lots of time to think about life In contrast to predicting the impossibly difficult real world, and death and Bernanke. It was an ideal time to have predicting market outcomes is relatively straightforward. an inspiration, and I had one. This is it: sometimes, Profit margins and P/E ratios always seem to pass through whatever the situation and however hard you try, you will fair value if, and it’s a big if, you can just be patient enough. not have an inspiration! This is not to say that insights Normalcy is what we assume in our 7-year forecasts and are not available, just that someone else is having them. in our old 10-year forecasts. We had one for the last There is always a great temptation to convince yourself decade, a 10-year forecast starting on December 31, 1999 that you have an insight, and then to push it. It can be and ending December 31, 2009, which is summarized in very, very expensive. Exhibit 1. We forecast then that the egregiously overpriced It is easy today to be confused, for this is a remarkably S&P would underperform cash and everything else – what complex time. I argued two years ago that we were all should you expect starting at 33 times earnings? – and we part of an elaborate experiment, the inputs to which were assumed that emerging equities would do extremely well completely new. We had an unprecedentedly low risk despite a 0.7 correlation with the S&P, because they were premium on every asset class and a stew of new and badly cheap. The efficient market people, who apparently will understood financial instruments. That was bad enough, take their faith with them to the grave, will say we were but isn’t the picture even more complicated and without lucky, in spite of the one in several hundred thousand precedent now? We have never in our lifetime seen a odds of being correct. “Preposterous. How can the risky financial and economic bust such as the one we just had. asset underperform cash for 10 years?” you can hear them We have never had two great asset bubbles break in the say. But we would say it was just the normal grinding of same decade. We have never wiped out so much wealth regression to the mean. It’s an awfully normal world we in all asset classes as we have this time: $20 trillion at its inhabit, in the long term. It’s only the short-term zigs and worst point, on our reckoning. We have never experienced zags that drive us all crazy, and right now we should brace such rapid deterioration in the government’s budget and ourselves for some very odd and unpredictable short-term in the balance sheet of the Fed, nor witnessed such moral market effects brought on by the recent crisis and the hazard, with bailouts flying around like this. What hope massive governmental response. But the bigger danger is do we really have in making accurate predictions of how that once again the Fed is playing with fire! the world will recover from all of this, and in what ways it will be changed? Very little. Playing with Fire My view of the economy’s future is boringly unchanged: Whenever the Fed attempts to stimulate the economy “Seven Lean Years.” I still believe that after the initial by facilitating low rates and rapid money growth, the kick of the stimulus, we will move into a multi-year economy responds. But it does so reluctantly, whereas headwind as we sort out our extreme imbalances. This is asset prices respond with enthusiasm. In our studies of the likely to give us below-average GDP growth over seven Presidential Cycle we have shown that, historically, where years and more than our share of below-average profit modest Fed stimulus and some moral hazard hardly move margins and P/E ratios, so that it would feel more like the dial on the economy in the third year of the cycle, they Exhibit 1 Performance of GMO Asset Class Forecasts for the Decade Dec. 31, 1999 to Dec. 31, 2009 GMO 10-Yr Forecast Dec-31-99 Actual Estimated (% Real 10-Yr Actual Asset Class Rank Return/Yr) Return* Rank U.S. REITs 1 10.0 7.4 3 Emerging Market Equities 2 7.8 8.1 1 Emerging Country Debt 3 6.1 7.5 2 U.S. TIPS 4 4.3 4.9 4 Barclays Capital U.S. Gov't. Debt 5 3.8 3.5 6 International Small Cap 6 3.4 3.5 7 Foreign Bonds 7 3.0 3.9 5 U.S. Small 8 2.5 2.3 8 U.S. T-Bills 9 2.1 0.3 9 EAFE 10 0.4 -1.4 10 S&P 500 11 -1.9 -3.5 11 Correlation of rank order: 93.6% Probability of picking same or better rank order randomly: 1 in 550,000 * Actual compound annual real returns are for the period 12/31/99 to 12/31/09.
过去预测的准确性,既不保证当前或未来预测的准确性——无论是关于资产类别在十年期内的排名、绝对回报率,还是更短时间内的结果。资产类别预测中的排名与回报率准确性,往往因时期而异。来源:GMO 推升股价至几乎每年比正常水平高出 15%,而冒险的行政当局开始意识到低利率对股价的助推力更强。这种效应在全球回荡,因为持有时间过长会催生资产泡沫,这极其彰显了美联储的影响力。然而,美联储一直对经济和金融体系构成危险。如今,它在科技和住房领域鲁莽地助长了快速资产繁荣。不过,真相逐渐浮出水面,我意识到美联储正在催生泡沫。众所周知,官方政策仍不自觉地甘愿冒第三次投机阶段的风险——其目的并非遏制资产泡沫,而是缓解泡沫破裂时的痛苦。这次极为危险,因为其武器库几乎空空如也,一旦资产价格反转,任何挫折带来的痛苦都难以消解。事实上,美联储声称从未确定泡沫是否存在,我对此并不感到后悔。非金融公司和财政部幸运的是,它们进入科技泡沫时财务状况良好,进入住房泡沫时也处于合理状态——除了过度借贷的消费者。但如今,在我们大规模刺激努力之后,美联储的资产负债表已糟糕到无法辨认,政府债务看起来简直像是重演了第二次世界大战。与此同时,消费者的杠杆率大约和以往一样糟,也就是说,处于历史最差水平。
The accuracy of past predictions does not guarantee that current or future predictions will be accurate either with respect to the ranking of asset classes over a 10-year period, the absolute levels of return, or results over shorter time periods. The accuracy of the forecast rankings and returns in the asset class forecasts generally varies from period to period. Source: GMO push stocks up almost 15% a year above normal and risky the Administration to begin to get the point that low rates stocks even more. This effect echoes around the world as held too long promote asset bubbles, which are extremely a tribute to the influence of the Fed. Yet the Fed has been dangerous to the economy and financial system. Now, reckless in facilitating rapid asset booms in the tech and however, the penny is dropping, and I realize the Fed is housing bubbles. As we know, the official policy remains unwittingly willing to risk a third speculative phase, which to avoid trying to contain asset bubbles, but to ameliorate is supremely dangerous this time because its arsenal now the pain of any setbacks should asset prices reverse course is almost empty. and collapse. Indeed, the Fed claims never to have been I do not regret the bailout, although half as much to sure that bubbles even exist. Non-financial corporations bankers and more to people with hammers insulating and the Treasury were lucky that they went into the tech roofs would have been better. With ships lining up by bubble in good financial shape and into the housing bubble the hundreds outside Singapore harbor, unloaded for want in reasonable shape, except for the overstretched consumer. of letters of credit and other basic financial services, our Now, though, after our massive stimulus efforts, the Fed’s financial leaders had better have acted fast. And they did. balance sheet is unrecognizably bad, and the government Not efficiently. Not fairly. And certainly not frugally. But debt literally looks as if we have had a replay of World War they thawed the global real world, which was freezing II. The consumer, meanwhile, is approximately as badly rapidly. leveraged as ever, which is to say the worst in history.
鉴于此,我们最好避免第三次重蹈覆辙——我曾以为,经历了如此痛苦的教训,大家总该有所领悟。我太天真了。国会很可能会继续与金融界同流合污,几乎不会做出什么有益的改变。投资者向来不愿在一代人的时间里连续两次被火烧得太狠,可眼下他们却排队买入风险资产、压低利差,仿佛迫不及待地想在这个十年里第三次吃苦头。科学家认为,某些持续受到捕食者威胁的野生动物会迅速忘记最可怕的遭遇,以免彻底陷于创伤而不敢再回去啃草。正常情况下,投资者的记忆力似乎比兔子要长一些,但这次不是!而美联储什么都没学到,依然在格林斯潘的神坛前顶礼膜拜。2000 年破裂时的过度刺激已经够痛苦了,2008 年更是极度痛苦,可美联储仍像第一次世界大战中的黑格元帅一样执迷不悟地推进其失败策略(“机枪被严重高估了”),继续执行旧策。
典型的救济性反弹。现在看来,标普 500 指数很可能突破 1200 点,甚至更高。然而,市场实际价值只有 850 点左右;因此,从这里上涨的任何幅度,都将使市场再次严重高估,尽管高质量成分股仍相对便宜。欧澳远东(EAFE)股票看起来略偏贵,新兴市场更贵,固收产品则严重高估,尤其是现金,简直糟透了。图表 2 显示了我们当前 7 年期的预测。
这里真正的陷阱——而且是一个老掉牙的陷阱——就是被现金的糟糕回报所诱惑,转而买入股票。股票市场几乎总是在利率低的时候见顶,因此,绝望地逃离低利率、冲进严重高估的股票,结局总是不妙。
Given this, we would be well advised to avoid a third go- I thought in return for the pain we had all learned some around in the bubble forming and breaking business. Up lessons. I was naïve. Congress will probably stay in the until the last few months, I was counting on the Fed and pocket of the financial world, and few useful changes will GMO 2 Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010 be made. Investors, traditionally reluctant to burn their typical relief rally. Now it seems likely to go through fingers badly twice in a generation, line up to buy risk and 1200 and possibly higher. The market, however, is worth bid down spreads as if eager to suffer for a third time in a only 850 or so; thus, any advance from here will make it decade. Scientists believe that some wild animals that are once again seriously overpriced, although the high quality threatened constantly by predators quickly forget the worst component is still relatively cheap. EAFE equities seem episodes lest they become so completely traumatized that a little overpriced, emerging markets more so, and fixed they dare not return to nibbling grass. Normally, investors income seems badly overpriced, especially cash, which is appear to have longer memories than rabbits, but not this awful. Exhibit 2 shows our current 7-year forecasts. time! And the Fed, having learned nothing, still worships at the Greenspan altar. Overstimulus was painful in the The real trap here, and a very old one at that, is to be 2000 break and extremely painful in 2008, but the Fed seduced into buying equities because cash is so painful. soldiers on with its failed strategy like Field Marshal Haig Equity markets almost always peak when rates are low, in World War I (“The machine gun is a much over-rated so moving in desperation away from low rates into weapon.”). substantially overpriced equities always ends badly.
所以所有投资者都应做好准备,投机活动持续的时间可能会比六个月前看起来要长得多。这是一个两难境地。2010 年,价值纯粹主义者将会越来越难以应对美联储持续的市场刺激措施。为了控制真正风险——亏损的风险——他们将被迫承担不断增加的风险。
So all investors should brace for the chance that speculation So this is a dilemma. In 2010, value purists will have will continue for longer than would have seemed remotely to struggle increasingly with the Fed’s continued juicing possible six months ago. I thought last April that the of the markets. In order to control real risk – the risk of market (S&P 500) would scoot up to 1000 to 1100 on a losing money – they will be forced to take the increasing Exhibit 2 GMO 7-Year Asset Class Return Forecasts* As of December 31, 2009 Stocks Bonds Other 8% - Real Return (Asset Class Index) 6.5 % Long-term Historical U.S. Equity Return 6% Annual Real Return Over 7 Years 4% 6.8% 6.0% 4.7% 4.6% 2% 3.9% 2.1% 1.3% 1.1% 0.5% 0.8% 0% 0.3% -0.6% -2% U.S. U.S. U.S. high Int'l. Int'l. Equities U.S. bo nds Int'l. bo nds B o nds B o nds U.S. M anaged equities equities quality equities 2 equities 2 (emerging) (go v't.) (go v't.) (emerging) (inflatio n treasury Timber (large cap) (small cap) (large cap) (small cap) indexed) (30 Days to 2 Yrs.)
7 年年化回报率预估区间 ±6.5 ±7.0 ±6.0 ±6.5 ±7.0 ±10.5 ±4.0 ±4.0 ±8.5 ±1.5 ±1.5 ±5.5 *该图表反映的是几种资产类别的实际回报率预测¹。这些预测是基于 GMO 的合理判断做出的前瞻性声明,并非对未来业绩的保证。实际结果可能与上述预测存在重大差异。
Est. Range of 7-Yr. Annualized Returns ±6.5 ±7.0 ±6.0 ±6.5 ±7.0 ±10.5 ±4.0 ±4.0 ±8.5 ±1.5 ±1.5 ±5.5 *The chart represents real return forecasts1 for several asset classes. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Actual results may differ materially from the forecasts above.
1 长期通胀假设:每年 2.5%。2 国际股票回报预测不含日本。
1 Long-term inflation assumption: 2.5% per year. 2 Return forecasts for international equities are ex-Japan.
来源:GMO 季度信函——《多事之秋的十年!》——2010 年 1 月 GMO 的职业生涯和业务风险在于落后于上涨的市场。这种风险通常出现在:牛市后期,或者它们相对于市场其他部分相对便宜时,或者两者兼具。(量化角度看,优质股票在超过 40% 的上涨月份中表现优异,在相对非常便宜时——就像现在这样——大约 60% 的时间里也表现优异。)我们的选择——绝非“解决方案”——是仅略微低配全球股票,理由是在偏重优质股时,它们仍具有足够的回报潜力。我们还不得不咽下对将剩余资金配置在毫无吸引力的固定收益产品上的厌恶。如果未来六个月股市确实被推高——这与我去年夏天的看法不同,现在看起来至少是五五开——我们将非常缓慢地撤出股票:可以说是八次被咬,一次才怕,在这种情况下我们通常撤退得过于仓促和热情。如果我们确实在未来几个月看到市场大幅上涨,我们可能会表现不佳,但幅度可能不大。
然而,或许还有一线希望:风险股票已经被推至极度高估。进一步推高市场的尝试(可能并非刻意为之,但这重要吗?)可能会带来更广泛的上涨,届时优质股票应能守住阵地甚至胜出。信不信由你,它们在上涨中也能跑赢,而且是明显优于 2009 年的水平持稳。如果市场走势让我意外,在 2010 年就早早陷入回落,那么优质股票应该会大幅跑赢。导致市场早早回落的原因,可能是某些令人不快的七年疲软数据集中出现:一两周内冒出两三个坏消息就足以引发这种局面。这对我来说正合适——更便宜总是更好——但鉴于美联储的顽固态度,这似乎比进一步上涨的可能性要小。
长期来看,美国优质蓝筹股相对于美国其他股票的表现,在我看来是“几乎确定的”(我们 GMO 传统上将此定义为超过 90% 的概率)。
Source: GMO Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010 3 GMO career and business risk of lagging a rising market. times tend to be: later in bull markets, or when they are Our choice – by no means a “solution” – is to only very relatively cheaper than the rest of the market, or both. (More slightly underweight global equities on the grounds that, quantitatively, high quality stocks have outperformed in when tilted to quality, they are still adequate in terms of more than 40% of up months and approximately 60% of return potential. We also have to swallow our distaste the time when they were relatively very cheap, as they for parking the rest in unattractive fixed income. And if are now.) For the record, they also outperformed in 1929 the equity markets are indeed driven higher in the next and 1972, at the end of the first two great bull markets of six months, which, unlike my view of last summer, now the 20th century, and held level in 1999. In a continuing looks to be at least 50/50, we will very slowly withdraw rally, even level pegging for quality would be a great equities: eight times bitten, once shy, so to speak, for improvement over 2009. And, if the market surprises in these situations we typically beat a much too rapid me and goes into an early setback in 2010, then quality and enthusiastic retreat. If we do see a substantially stocks should outperform by a lot. What could cause higher market in the next few months, we will probably an early setback would be some random bunching up of underperform, but likely not by much. unpleasant seven-lean-years data: two or three bad news There is perhaps, though, one saving grace: the risky items in a week or two might do the trick. This would stocks have already been driven to extreme overpricing. suit me – cheaper is always better – but given the Fed’s Further attempts to drive the market higher (they may not intractability, it seems less likely than some further gains. be deliberate attempts, but does it matter?) will probably For the longer term, the outperformance of high quality result in a much broader advance in which high quality U.S. blue chips compared with the rest of U.S. stocks is, stocks should hold their own or even outperform. Believe in my opinion, “nearly certain” (which phrase we at GMO it or not, they can outperform on the upside, and these traditionally define as more than a 90% probability).
他们为什么总在折腾我们这套优秀的医疗体系?
Why Do They Keep Messing with Our Great Health Care System?
(一组不时出现的、被低估的统计数据系列)
花钱最多……得到最少
全球健康总支出,经合组织人均预期寿命,
人均购买力平价(美元)出生时总人口(年)
7,000 美元 …… …… 84 …… ……
6,000 美元 82
5,000 美元 80
4,000 美元 / 78
3,000 美元 76
2,000 美元 74
1,000 美元 72
0 美元 …… …… 68 …… ……
(Part of an occasional series of unappreciated statistics) Spend the most . . . . . . get the least Total Expenditure on Health, OECD Life Expectancy, per Capita, US$ Purchasing Power Parity Total Population at Birth, Years $7,000 ... ... 84 ... ... $6,000 82 $5,000 $4,000 USD Years 76 $3,000 $2,000 $1,000 70 $0 ... ... 68 ... ...
土耳其 波兰 墨西哥 匈牙利 捷克共和国 美国 斯洛伐克共和国 挪威 卢森堡 瑞士 奥地利 美国 土耳其 匈牙利 墨西哥 中位数 韩国 意大利 波兰 捷克共和国 斯洛伐克共和国 瑞士 西班牙 中位数 日本 冰岛 当土耳其人、波兰人和捷克人决定减少吸烟、在医疗保健上多花点钱的时候,你可得当心了。点到为止。
Turkey Poland Mexico Hungary Czech Republic United States Slovak Republic Norway Luxembourg Switzerland Austria United States Turkey Hungary Mexico Median Korea Italy Poland Czech Republic Slovak Republic Switzerland Spain Median Japan Iceland Watch out when the Turks, Poles, and Czechs decide to cut back on smoking and spend a bit more on health care. Enough said.
数据来源:OECD Health Data 2009
GMO 第 4 季度信函——这十年!——2010 年 1 月
十年简要回顾
我们的旗舰策略也呈现类似模式,并在十年结束时以微弱优势跑赢基准(每年 +1.05%1)。这确实是最好的时代,也是最坏的时代。美国国会似乎走向功能失调,其他领导层——尤其是美联储——也是如此,而我们的声誉在海外大幅下滑。日本连续第二个十年不见起色,欧洲在多数方面——尤其是政治影响力——显得软弱无力。发达国家显露出中年危机:各地 GDP 增长率放缓,而它们在头八年被颂扬的对发展中国家的经济优越性,到十年结束时被证明是空洞的。发达国家在危险的气候问题上无力做出艰难决策,这一点在十年末也惊人地暴露出来;而整个十年间,最大的污染者美国是进程的拖累,而非急需的领导者。
发展中国家形成了惊人的反差:它们经历了有记录以来最辉煌的经济十年,尽管发达经济体增长放缓,它们仍将全球增长拉至非常强劲的水平。它们在各个方面都显得比以往的名声稳定得多。更令人生气的是,总体而言它们对银行业危机的应对远比我们所有人都好。而仅以中国为例,它开始在替代能源领域比我们行动更快,并在这个关键领域迈出了成为领导者的良好开端(这对我们不利)。
固定收益部门在金融危机中遭遇了惊人的问题,但在复苏中迅猛反弹,因为事实证明,几乎所有这些超三 A 级资产支持证券确实都是优质资产,而我们持有的几乎全部要么已兑付,要么看起来即将兑付。在 10 年维度上,我们的新兴市场债务策略表现最佳,其余固定收益策略则略微落后。不过总体而言,这十年对我们来说有些失望。我们在前二十年做得稍好一些,我们相信下一个十年可以做得更好。我相信,我们现在比十年前准备得更充分。即便如此,我们绝大多数策略仍跑赢了市场,这在零和世界中并不常见——在零和世界里,考虑到成本,投资者平均表现不佳。过去十年让我们深刻认识到这个行业变得多么艰难。我们新的十年决心是:从总体上良好的自上而下决策,转向更精细化的执行。我们相信,我们已经配备了足够的人手,并且——但愿——也足够明智,能够实现这一目标。我们肯定是少数几家利用了过去两年优秀投资人才异常可得的公司之一,从而大幅增加了员工数量——我希望,也增加了脑力。我们非常清楚,这个行业比 1999 年 12 月或 1989 年 12 月竞争激烈得多。
Data source: OECD Health Data 2009 GMO 4 Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010 A Brief Review of the Decade our flagship strategy, had a similar pattern, and ended the decade modestly up on the benchmark (+1.05% per It really was the best and the worst of times. The U.S. year1). Our fixed income division suffered a spectacular seemed to approach dysfunctionality in Congress and problem in the financial crisis, but came rocketing back other leadership, especially the Fed, and our reputation in the recovery, as it turned out that nearly all of those sank overseas. Japan was still missing in action for the super triple-A asset-backed securities really were money second decade in a row, and Europe seemed toothless good, and almost all of ours paid off or look as if they in most respects, but especially in political influence. will. On a 10-year basis, our Emerging Debt Strategy The developed world showed off its middle-age spread: was the very best, while the rest of the fixed income GDP growth rate slowed everywhere, and its financial strategies were moderately behind. All in all, though, the superiority over the developing world, which was exalted decade for us held some disappointments. We had done for the first eight years of the decade, was revealed as somewhat better in the previous two decades, and we are hollow by the end. The developed world’s lack of ability confident that we can do better in the next one. We are to make hard decisions on a dangerous climate situation better prepared now, I believe, than we were 10 years ago. was also stunningly revealed by the decade’s end, and for Even so, the great majority of our strategies outperformed, the whole decade the greatest polluter, the U.S., was a drag which is not all that common in a zero sum world where on the process rather than the leader that was so needed. on average investors underperform by costs. The past The developing countries, in extraordinary contrast, had decade leaves us impressed with just how difficult this their greatest economic decade ever recorded, and dragged business has become. Our new decade’s resolution is to global growth up to very strong levels despite the slowing move from generally good top-down decisions to better developed economies. They seemed far more stable in detailed implementation, and we believe we have staffed every respect than their previous reputation. To rub it in, up and, we trust, wised up enough to make this objective they survived the banking crisis in general far better than achievable. We are certainly one of the few firms that we all did. And China for one began to move faster than we has taken advantage of the unusual availability of good in developing alternative energy and in making a good start investment people to materially increase our headcount (bad for us) on becoming the leader in this critical area. and, I hope, brain count, in the last two years. We are very aware that this is a much more competitive industry than it was in December 1999 or December 1989.
回顾 GMO 的这十年,同样是跌宕起伏。资产配置在两次泡沫破裂中大有可为。对配置者而言,这十年或许堪称史上最佳。因此,我们表现得很好,押对了大赌注(那些真正重要的决策),到 2010 年底,GMO 在 1999 年 12 月做出的预测与实际结果相差无几。在此助力下,GMO 的全部资产配置策略在过去十年均大幅跑赢基准。在国际股票策略中,我们在 2000 年科技股崩盘期间取得了一系列优异的年份,而最近几年,随着风险资产在 2006、2007 年和去年主导市场,我们经历了一些不那么顺遂的年份。不过,自 2000 年初以来,所有拥有 10 年业绩记录的国际股票策略都跑赢了各自的基准,发达市场大幅领先,新兴市场小幅占优。
迈入下一个十年,我们的起点是美国市场估值过高,因此不要被误导,以为每个糟糕的十年之后必定跟着一个不错的十年。历史上之所以会出现这种情况,是因为牛市顶峰时,市盈率通常只有 21 倍,因此一个糟糕十年的下跌总是会让市场变得廉价。但这并不适用于一个从 35 倍市盈率起步的十年!当起点如此昂贵时,即便十年表现糟糕(正如这次一样),仍可能让你停留在高价区域。
然而,我们确实曾非常接近地给出下一个十年的乐观预测:就在 9 个半月前,GMO 感受到了足够的痛苦,使得下一个十年的前景看起来非常光明——根据我们的 7 年期预测,几乎所有市场的年化回报率都将超过 10%(扣除通胀后)。(一项十年预测
Reviewing GMO’s Decade GMO’s decade was also full of ups and downs. Asset Postscript on the Decade’s Performance allocation, helped by two bubbles breaking, had a lot to get its teeth into. Perhaps for allocators, the decade proved Going into this next decade, we start with the U.S. to be about as helpful as it ever gets. Consequently we did overpriced, so do not be conned into believing that every well, we got the big bets right (the ones that mattered), and bad decade is followed by a good one. It happened our December 1999 forecasts came close to their marks historically because when bull markets peak at only 21 by the end of the decade. Helped by this, all of our asset times, a bad decade’s return will always make them cheap. allocation strategies outperformed their benchmarks well This does not necessarily apply to a decade that started at for the decade. In our international equity strategies, we 35 times! A decade’s poor performance can still leave you had a string of great years in the 2000 tech bust and some expensive (as this one has) when it starts so overpriced. not-so-good years more recently as risky stuff dominated We did, however, come close to having good numbers for in 2006, 2007, and last year. Since the beginning of 2000, the next decade: just 9½ months ago we had felt enough though, all of those international equity strategies with 10- pain to make the next decade’s prospects look very good year records beat their benchmarks, developed markets indeed, almost everywhere more than 10% (annualized) by a lot and emerging equities by a little. U.S. Core, plus inflation on our 7-year forecast. (A decade forecast 1 Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Returns are shown after the deduction of management fees, transaction costs, and other expenses. The returns assume the reinvestment of dividends and other income. A GIPS compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2009.
季度信函——多么非凡的十年!——2010 年 1 月 5
GMO 的表现也只稍逊一筹。)这一切都被一次迅猛的 65% 反弹所破坏,
这次反弹使我们的 7 年预测每年失准超过 7 个百分点!
两种经过时间考验的投资工具——价值(市盈率和市净率)和价格动量——如今的使用频率远高于过去,且不再像从 1977 年到 1997 年那样可靠。
Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010 5 GMO would be only a little less impressive.) All of this was The two time-tested investment tools, value (P/E ratios ruined by a rapid 65% rally, which took more than 7% a and P/B ratios) and price momentum, are now much year off our 7-year forecast! more heavily used and not so reliable as they once were, say from 1977 to 1997.
这十年学到的东西
■ 资产类别的定价在平均程度上确实比个股更加低效,因此提供了更大的增值和降险机会。
■ 美联储所掌握的金融影响力比我们原先认为的还要大得多。
Lessons Learned in the Decade Asset classes really are more inefficiently priced than The Fed wields even more financial influence than we individual stocks on average, and therefore offer greater thought. opportunities for adding value and reducing risk.
低利率对推升金融资产价格的作用,远大于其对推动实体经济的影响。
发达国家(包括美国)已过了发展巅峰期,而发展中国家尚处上升期:这的确是一种全新的世界秩序。
美联储与真实世界的脱节程度——“什么房地产泡沫?”——和教条主义倾向——“不,低利率对房地产毫无影响”——远超人们的想象。
教育和培训是可持续增加财富的关键,而美国正面临丧失其曾经巨大优势的风险。
Low rates have a more powerful effect on driving Developed countries, including the U.S., are past their financial assets than on driving the economy. prime compared with developing countries: it is indeed a new world order. The Fed is capable of being extremely out of touch with the real world – “what housing bubble?” – plus Education and training are the keys to increasing wealth more doctrinaire – “no, the low rates had no effect on on a sustainable basis and the U.S. is in danger of losing housing” – than anyone could have imagined. its once large edge here.
■ 国会近乎失灵,主要被大企业控制,且受制于参议院如今常规要求的绝对多数门槛。
■ 我们所有人都生活在一座岛屿上,如果不加小心,它可能被过度开发,变成荒芜的复活节岛。资源有限,生物多样性脆弱,两者都必须得到保护。碳排放是最大的单一威胁。
■ 政府行政部门可能长期无能。
■ 糟糕的领导力仅用十年就能真正损害一个国家来之不易的声誉。
■ 当全球警察代价高昂,介于困难和不可能之间。
■ 美联储从不吸取教训!
■ 奥巴马不是奇迹创造者!
■ 大企业的领导层在相当常规的情况下,常常极度缺乏洞察力和能力。
祝新的十年快乐富足。万事如意!
Congress is nearly dysfunctional, primarily controlled by We all live on an island, which can be overexploited large corporations, and hamstrung by the supermajority and turned into a barren Easter Island if we are not now routinely required in the Senate. careful. Resources are finite and biodiversity is fragile, and both must be protected. Carbon emissions are the Government administrations can be incompetent for single greatest threat. long periods. Being a global policeman is expensive, and somewhere Poor leadership can really damage a country’s hard-between difficult and impossible. won reputation in a mere 10 years. The Fed learns no lessons! Obama is not a miracle worker! The leadership of major corporations can be very Have a happy and prosperous new decade. All the best! lacking in insight and competence on a fairly routine basis.
GMO 季度信函 —— 如此十年!—— 2010 年 1 月 附录“警惕金融工业复合体”
先从投资行业这一部分说起。在这个行当里,很明显这是一场零和游戏。我们集体不创造任何价值,只增加成本。我们不生产任何实物产品;我们只是在宇宙级的扑克游戏中,重新洗牌所有股票和债券的现有价值。每年年底,投资行业整体落后市场约 1% 的成本,个人投资者落后 2%。而成本还在稳步增长。从 1989 年到 2007 年,尽管行业资产增长了十倍,并且存在巨大的规模经济效应,但每美元资产的手续费也在增长。与传统理论相反,这里并没有费用竞争。为什么?
a. 代理问题 —— 我们管理的是别人的钱,
b. 信息不对称 —— 代理人掌握的信息远超客户。
客户很难区分出能力、运气还是风险承担。这是一场不公平的较量,远非标准经济学假设的那种公平竞争。随着我们不断推出新产品、期权、期货、CDO、对冲基金和私募股权,每美元资产的总费用也在上升。随着费用层级和代理人层级的增加,产品也变得更加复杂和不透明,反而让客户更加依赖我们。
在过去,总费用增加了 0.5%,我们这些代理人基本上就是把客户资产负债表里的那 0.5% 掏出来,转换成了收入和 GDP。神奇!但这样做,我们却使储蓄和投资率降低了 0.5%。
GMO 6 Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010 Appendix “Beware the Financial Industrial Complex” Let’s start with the Investment Industry component. It It is not often one gets the opportunity to debate a Nobel is so obvious in this business that it’s a zero sum game. Prize winner, but Richard Bookstaber and I went to Wall We collectively add nothing but costs. We produce no Street to debate Myron Scholes and Robert Reynolds widgets; we merely shuffle the existing value of all stocks (Putnam’s CEO) on a very topical topic: “Financial and all bonds in a cosmic poker game. At the end of each Innovation Boosts Economic Growth.” There are no year, the investment community is behind the markets in prizes for guessing which side opposed the proposition. total by about 1% costs and individuals by 2%. Richard Bookstaber, by the way, is an experienced quant And the costs have steadily grown. As our industry’s who, despite that, wrote an excellent book, A Demon of assets grew tenfold from 1989 to 2007, despite huge Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils economics of scale, the fees per dollar also grew. There of Financial Innovation – a title so superb you might think was no fee competition, contrary to theory. Why? it unnecessary to read the book, but do. a. Agency problems – we manage the other guy’s money, We squared off using the Oxford-style debate rules: and 5-minute alternating presentations, 2 minutes each to rebut, 20-minutes of give and take with the audience, and b. Asymmetric information – the agent has much more 1 minute each to summarize. The audience voted at the information than the client. beginning and again at the end of the debate. The opening Clients can’t easily distinguish talent from luck or risk poll from the 200 attendees (each of whom had forked over taking. It’s an unfair contest, nothing like the fair fight $1,500 to attend a special 2-day The Economist Magazine assumed by standard Economics. As we add new products, conference in November graced by Summers, Geithner, options, futures, CDOs, hedge funds, and private equity, and other illuminati) was, not surprisingly, in favor of aggregate fees per dollar rise. As the layers of fees and innovation to the tune of 80% to 20%. Bookstaber and layers of agents increase, so too products become more I were thrilled at this vote, as it gave us a good base for complicated and opaque, causing clients to need us more. improvement. Modesty compels me not to divulge the final tally, even though the swing to a dazzling 20% to As total fees in the past grew by 0.5%, we agents basically 80% the other way would surely justify yet more sales of reached into the clients’ balance sheets, snatched the 0.5%, Bookstaber’s book (good name for a writer). and turned it into income and GDP. Magic! But in doing so, we lowered the savings and investment rate by 0.5%.
我得坦白交代:在辩论这件事上,任何下三滥的招数我都使得出来。为了证明这一点,我打算在这里重述自己的论点,稍作修饰。¹(这样既省得在年底临近时费劲搞创意——这段时间创意成本高着呢——还能趁机露一露脸,也许能显得没那么谨慎。)事实是,虽然牛津辩论规则鼓励唇枪舌剑,但我对这个话题是真的在乎:那些几乎不受监管的新型金融工具,实实在在地把我们整趴下了!
我在辩论中的立场
我想论证的观点是:我们的经济患上了金融业过度膨胀的顽疾。
于是,我们得到了短期的 GDP 提振,代价却是更低的长期增长。
整个金融体系都是如此。这么说吧,到 1965 年——那是美国历史上最好的十年之一——我们的金融服务已经相当完善了。当然,完善的工具至关重要。但问题不在这里。我们辩论的是过去 10 到 15 年的那些花里胡哨的把戏。1965 年,金融业占 GDP 的 3%;现在高达 7.5%。这是实体经济多背上的 4.5% 的负荷。金融体系正在过度吸食实体经济,并拖慢其发展。这就像你背上趴着一个又大又重、还在痛苦地不断滋长的吸血鬼在跑步。它只会让你慢下来。
I should reveal here that no cheap trick is beneath my So, we got a short-term GDP kick at the expense of lower contempt when it comes to debating. To prove it, I am long-term growth. going to reproduce my argument here with some modest editing.1 (This saves on the attempt at creative thought This is true with the whole financial system. Let us say so close to year-end, always at a premium, and allows that by 1965 – the middle of one of the best decades in U.S. me to show, perhaps, a less discreet side.) The truth is history – we had perfectly adequate financial services. Of that, although Oxford debating rules encourage polemic, course, adequate tools are vital. That is not the issue here. I really do care about this topic: largely unregulated new We’re debating the razzmatazz of the last 10 to 15 years. instruments really did bring us to our knees! Finance was 3% of GDP in 1965; now it is 7.5%. This is an extra 4.5% load that the real economy carries. The My Part in the Debate financial system is overfeeding on and slowing down the real economy. It is like running with a large, heavy, and I will try to make the case that our economy has a painfully growing bloodsucker on your back. It slows you down. overdeveloped financial sector.
真正好吃的人仍可通过点击下方链接观看辩论视频:记住,你可以快进。
1 Real gluttons can still catch a video of the debate by clicking on the link below: Remember, you can fast forward.
季度信函——多么精彩的十年!——2010 年 1 月 7 日 GMO
过去 100 年,GDP 这个巨舰以 3.5% 的速度增长。(即便像大萧条这样出格的破坏性因素,也未能改变这一趋势。)但 1965 年之后,剔除金融业的 GDP 年增长率降至 3.2%。1982 年之后进一步降至 3.1%,而 2000 年之后更是降至 2.5%——所有这些数据均截至 2007 年,远在当前危机爆发之前。
一分钟摘要
Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010 7 GMO For 100 years the GDP Battleship grew at 3.5%. (Even a rogue element, and that the overmatched clients have the Great Depression did not change that trend.) But after allowed the agents to move toward accruing all the rents 1965 the GDP growth rate ex-finance fell to 3.2% a year. or benefits of new financial instruments. After 1982 it fell to 3.1%, and after 2000 to 2.5%, with all of these measurements to the end of 2007 before the One-minute Summary current crisis.
我会努力论证一个观点:我们的经济体系拥有一个过度膨胀的金融部门,从社会角度来看,这额外多出的 4.5% 负担,其作用就像劫掠或地震一样。两者都会通过替代效应推高短期 GDP,但代价是消耗资本。所有多余的金融从业者,实际上等同于靠其他劳动者养活的退休人员或孩童,但他们要昂贵得多,昂贵得多。经济学家从未研究过金融业的最优规模。事实上,一家顶级金融期刊最近拒稿了一篇相关论文,理由是“金融学无权评论社会效用”。这或许恰恰解释了,为什么金融业的社会效用如此之低!
- 警惕金融-工业复合体:它们正在蚕食你的午餐。(老实说,我自己吃的份额已经超标了。那顿午餐确实美味。)
- 不要低估那些花哨的新工具,以及市场有效信念,所共同酿成的灾难规模。这场灾难是宇宙级的,而且可能还未结束。信心流失之严重,以至于如果任由市场自行运转——真正的资本主义——那么破产的将远不止花旗银行和美国银行。
I will try to make the case that our economy has a painfully From society’s point of view, this additional 4.5% burden overdeveloped financial sector. works like looting or an earthquake. Both increase short-1) Beware the financial-industrial complex: they are term GDP through replacement effect, but chew up capital. eating your lunch. (And to be honest, I’ve eaten more All of the extra financial workers might as well be retirees than my fair share. It was a good lunch.) or children, in that they are supported by the rest of the workforce, but they are much, much more expensive. 2) Do not underestimate the scale of the disaster caused Economists have not studied the optimal size for finance. by the fancy new instruments combined with the belief Indeed, a leading finance journal recently rejected a paper in market efficiency. It was cosmic and may indeed on this topic, saying “Finance cannot comment on social not be over yet. There was such loss of confidence utility.” That is perhaps why it has so little! that, left to our own devices – real capitalism – more than Citi and Bank of America would have failed.
近期危机的根本问题在于一场真实的银行挤兑——摩根士丹利和数十家其他银行几乎必定会迅速倒下,或许连高盛也难逃此劫(让我们任由一家真正庞大的摩根大通摆布?)。这背后是对资本主义的一种盲信。这种信念建立在过去 50 年占据统治地位的经济理论之上,令人震惊的是,该理论并非基于事实,而是基于未经证实的假设:理性预期和有效市场假说(EMH)。如果你相信这些,你就无需监管新金融工具,甚至什么都不用管。资本主义会自己照顾好自己。正因如此,格林斯潘、鲁宾、萨默斯以及美国证券交易委员会的莱维特才能压住布鲁克斯利·伯恩,当她胆敢提议监管这些新工具时。而客户世界之所以愿意付出高昂代价,恰恰因为被不必要的复杂性蒙蔽了双眼——而新型金融工具所提供的,正是混乱、疑虑和蒙蔽,这不过是其诸多负面特性之一。
The underlying problem in the recent crisis was a This was a real run on the banks; Morgan Stanley and touching faith in capitalism. This faith was based on 50 dozens of other banks would almost certainly have years of a dominant economic theory that was shockingly gone quickly, perhaps even Goldman Sachs (leaving not based on facts but rather on unproven assumptions: us at the mercy of a truly giant J.P. Morgan?). rational expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Believe them and you don’t have to regulate new 3) The client world pays up precisely in proportion to instruments or, indeed, anything. Capitalism will look how bamboozled it is by unnecessary complexity and after itself. So Greenspan, Rubin, Summers, and Levitt of this, among other negatives, is what the fancy new the SEC could beat back Brooksley Born when she dared instruments were offering: confusion, doubt, and to suggest regulating the new instruments. bamboozlement.
但正如凯恩斯在 1934 年就已明白的,市场是行为性的。至于我们的反对者:学者们如此急切地想让他们的理论领地受到变幻莫测的“动物精神”冲击,以至于他们假定这些理论是正确的,结果却打乱了最周详的计划。这是一个充斥着代理问题与“选美比赛”的世界。有效市场假说已被证明是金融史上最被严重错误设定的理论,也是最昂贵的理论。没有它,我们本应早就认识到市场的功能失调,并实施更多控制措施来帮助遏制金融业的野蛮扩张。我们本可以轻松避开由科技和美国房地产领域的三西格玛(百年一遇)泡沫——正是这些泡沫导致了当前的危机。我们甚至可能根本就不会讨论这个话题。
But as Keynes knew by 1934, markets are behavioral 4) As for our opponents: academics so badly want their jungles wracked by changing animal spirits that can mock theories to be right that they assume them to be so, the best laid plans. It is a world of agency problems and and with no proof. They assume not only that market the “beauty contest.” The EMH has proven to be the most participants are efficient and well-informed, but also wildly mis-specified theory in the history of finance, and that they are good and worthy citizens. But they’re the most expensive. Without it, we would have recognized all self-serving, and many are slightly wicked. As for market dysfunctionality and instituted more controls to mutual funds: they need complexity coupled with help limit the wild expansion of the financial business. We a client’s lack of confidence, or more clients would might easily have steered clear of the three-sigma (100- invest on their own. So, for them, the status quo is year) bubbles in tech and U.S. housing that led to our just fine. Finally, I urge you to vote the spirit of this present crisis. We might not even be debating this topic. issue and not the letter of the rather badly worded proposition.
时机恰到好处,我的朋友兼前合伙人保罗·伍利在伦敦政治经济学院创办了一个“资本市场功能障碍”研究中心。他们最近用大量数学公式、以学术语言得出结论:金融世界的增长已经变得(说实话,我本来想提一下保罗·沃尔克的观点,他认为过去 20 年里这个国家唯一有用的金融创新是自动取款机,但在那场辩论时他还没提出这个有力的论点)。
With perfect timing, my friend and former partner, Paul Woolley, started a center for the study of “Capital Market PS: I would have mentioned Paul Volcker’s opinion that Dysfunctionality” at the London School of Economics. the only financial innovation useful to the country in the They have recently concluded in academese, with lots of last 20 years is the ATM, but at the time of this debate he math, that the growth of the financial world has become hadn’t made that compelling point.
免责声明:本文所述观点为杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2010 年 1 月 25 日所持观点,并可能随时根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文不构成对任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被理解为上述行为。文中提及的具体证券及发行人仅作说明之用,不应被视为或解读为买入或卖出此类证券的建议。
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending January 25, 2010, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
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GMO 第 8 期季度信函——多么非凡的十年!——2010 年 1 月
GMO 8 Quarterly Letter – What a Decade! – January 2010