李录访谈,格雷厄姆与多兹维尔

2013 · 访谈 · 原文约 7905 词
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格雷厄姆与多兹维尔:哥伦比亚商学院学生投资通讯 2013 年春季刊 第 18 期

本期内容:CSIMA 年会 第 3 页 普雷斯顿·阿瑟 李录 —— 奥马哈之旅 第 4 页 —— 持有赢家更久 不懂不做 文月奖 第 5 页 普雷斯顿·阿瑟 第 10 页 李录 第 24 页 李录 1996 届毕业生,是喜马拉雅资本的创始人,这是一家投资合伙企业,专注于亚洲和北美的公开及私募投资机会。李先生在中国长大,是 1989 年天安门广场抗议活动的学生领袖。在 1997 年创立喜马拉雅资本之前,李先生曾在投资银行业工作。他获得了哥伦比亚学院的经济学学士学位、哥伦比亚法学院的法学博士学位以及哥伦比亚商学院的工商管理硕士学位。

Graham & Doddsville An investment newsletter from the students of Columbia Business School Issue XVIII Spring 2013 Inside this issue: CSIMA Conference P. 3 Preston Athey Li Lu — Omaha Trek P. 4 — Holding Know What You Winners Longer Don’t Know Moon Lee Prize P. 5 Preston Athey P. 10 Li Lu ’96 is the founder of Himalaya Capital, an invest-Li Lu P. 24 ment partnership focused on both public and private opPershing Square portunities in Asia and North Finalist Pitches P. 36 America. Mr. Li grew up in China and was a student Li Lu Paul Isaac P. 46 leader in the 1989 Tianan-men Square protests. Prior to founding Himalaya Capital in 1997, Mr. Li worked in investment bank-ing. He earned his B.A. in economics from Columbia College, a J.D. from Columbia Law School, and Editors Preston Athey an M.B.A. from Columbia Business School.

杰伊·赫德斯特伦,CFA,MBA 2013 届。普雷斯顿·阿西是 T. Rowe 普莱斯集团副总裁(续第 24 页),杰克·卢贝尔,MBA 2013 届。自 1991 年以来,他一直管理着 80 亿美元的 T. Rowe 普莱斯小型价值基金。在此期间,该基金扣除费用后年化回报率接近 11.9%,在同业中表现优异。1978 年加入该公司之前,他曾在 Admiral H. G. 里科弗上将的参谋部担任合同管理员,服务于美国原子能委员会。普雷斯顿获得耶鲁大学经济学学士学位和斯坦福大学工商管理硕士学位。保罗·艾萨克——认识你的风格和价值。萨奇·特里维迪,MBA 2013 届。享受旅程。保罗·艾萨克是 Arbiter Partners 的创始人,这是一家总部位于纽约的对冲基金,他是著名价值投资者沃尔特·施洛斯的外甥。在 Arbiter Partners 之前,他曾是 Cadogan Management(一只基金中的基金)的首席投资官。艾萨克先生的职业生涯始于 Allied International-American Eagle Trading。理查德·亨特,MBA 2014 届。斯蒂芬·刘,MBA 2014 届。请访问我们的网站:www.csima.org

Jay Hedstrom, CFA MBA 2013 Preston Athey is a vice (Continued on page 24) president of T. Rowe Jake Lubel Price Group and has led MBA 2013 the $8 billion T. Rowe Paul Isaac — Know Your Style and Price Small-Cap Value Sachee Trivedi Fund since 1991. During Enjoy the Ride MBA 2013 that time, the fund has returned nearly 11.9% per Paul Isaac is the founder Richard Hunt year after fees, making it of Arbiter Partners, a MBA 2014 a superior performer New-York based hedge among its peers. Prior to fund and nephew of Stephen Lieu joining the firm in 1978, noted value investor MBA 2014 he was a contract Walter Schloss. Prior to administrator on Admiral Arbiter, he was the Chief H. G. Rickover’s staff at Investment Officer at the U.S. Atomic Energy Cadogan Management, a Visit us at: Commission. Preston fund of funds. Mr. Isaac www.csima.org earned a B.A. in began his career at the economics from Yale Allied International-University and an M.B.A. American Eagle Trading from Stanford University.

Corporation. He he 还以最高荣誉毕业于威廉姆斯学院特许金融分析师专业,获政治经济学最高荣誉,并担任托马斯·J·瓦特森基金会研究员。保罗·艾萨克是一位特许投资顾问。(续第 10 页)(续第 46 页)李录(续第 1 页)钱。”我当时并不确定这到底是怎么回事。我只是一出门就想着,这家伙真是聪明绝顶——他能把非常复杂的思想用如此简单的语言表达出来。我立刻就被价值投资吸引住了。

Corporation. He He has also earned the graduated from Williams Chartered Financial College with Highest Analyst designation and is Paul Isaac Honors in Political a Chartered Investment Economy and was a Counselor. Thomas J. Watson Foundation Fellow. (Continued on page 10) (Continued on page 46) Li Lu (Continued from page 1) money.” I wasn’t sure what through right out of the G&D: How did your it was all about. I just re- gate. And I thought this unique experience as a member thinking that there fellow was just so intelligent Tiananmen Square protest was a “buffet” involved. So I – he could put very com-leader lead you to where assumed that it was some plex ideas into such simple you are today, running kind of talk with a free terms. I was immediately Himalaya Capital? lunch! I said it was a good drawn to value investing.

通过结合——那场演讲里有个免费午餐,李录提到:我第一次听关于如何赚钱的讲座时,觉得这正是我想要的;我能做到。我刚到哥伦比亚大学时,穷得叮当响。我不是主动选择来这里的——我只是碰巧到了这儿,因为在天安门事件后逃离中国,我别无去处。我来到一个新国家,语言不通,谁也不认识,口袋里一分钱都没有。

By combination – a free lunch the time the lecture was Li Lu (LL): When I first plus a talk about how to over, I thought that this was came to Columbia Universi- make money. So I went. what I was looking for; I ty, I was dirt poor. I did not To my dismay there was no could do this. choose to come here – I Li Lu just ended up here because I At the time, I couldn’t really had nowhere else to go, start companies, and I didn’t having just escaped from want to work in a big com-China after Tiananmen. I pany because of the differ-was in a new country where “There are few ences in language and cul-I didn’t understand the lan- ture. Investing, on the othguage, didn’t know anybody, people that switch in er hand, sounded like it re-and didn’t have a penny to between or get it quired a lot of reading and my name.

所以当时我——数学、勤奋、绝望又害怕。事后看,[价值投资] 和正确的判断——这点很好,能激励人想办法赚钱!我只想知道怎么才能活下来。

头几年,我真的在语言上很挣扎,但后来就越来越自在了。我一直是什么都愿意试试。第一次我就能逐步做到这些事。价值投资的根本原则很吸引我——用便宜价格买好证券。就算错了也亏不了多少,对了就能赚一大笔。这跟我的性格和脾气非常合拍。

So I was desper- mathematics, hard work, ate and afraid. In retro- [value investing] and good judgment – I was spect, that is good inspira- confident that I could do tion for trying to figure out gradually. They those things well. And the how to make money! I just fundamental principles of wanted to know how to either get it right value investing appealed to survive. me – buy good securities at away or they don’t a bargain price. If you’re For the first couple of years, get it at all. I never wrong, you won’t lose a lot, I really struggled with the but if you’re right you’re language, but I eventually really tried anything going to make a lot. It fit became much more com- my personality and temperfortable. I always had this else. The first time I ament very well.

沃伦·巴菲特:过去我脑子里总有个担忧,他常说:“价值投资就像打疫苗——要么管用,要么不管用。”我完全同意他的看法。很少有人能在这两种思维之间切换,或者慢慢学会。他们要么立刻理解,要么永远不懂。我从来没试过其他方法。第一次听到这个说法时,我就觉得它说得太对了。

Warren fear in the back of my mind used to say, “Value investing of how I was going to make heard it, it just made is like an inoculation – ei-a living here. I didn’t even ther it takes or it doesn’t.” think about success at the sense; and I heard it I totally agree with him. time – I just wanted to pay from the best.” There are few people that my bills. I grew up in Com- switch in between or get it munist China and never had gradually. They either get it much money to my name, right away or they don’t get and then all of a sudden I it at all. I never really tried had giant student loans. So lunch. [laughs] There was anything else. The first time naturally I tried to make a just a guy with the name I heard it, it just made buck or two.

“巴菲特。” 的道理,而且我是从最厉害的人那里听到的。我猜,这比免费午餐还划算。大约在我到那里的两年后,我的一个知道我问题的朋友说:“如果你真想赚钱,就得听这个人的。他确实知道怎么赚钱。” 我听了那场演讲,觉得他说得特别有道理。简直像给了我眼睛一拳。我好像刚刚醒来,灯就亮了。他的坦诚…… G&D:你的投资思路和巴菲特的有什么不同?(转第 25 页) 第 18 卷 第 25 页 李录(接第 24 页) 面对最聪明对手的最强反驳。 LL:哦,太多了。我们有一个根本的共识…… LL:投资游戏的一部分,就是要挑战最聪明的对手的最有力反驳。

“Buffett.” sense; and I heard it from the best. I guess it turned One day, about two years Mr. Buffett really made a lot out better than a free lunch. after I arrived, a friend of of sense during that talk. It mine who knew my issues was like a punch in my eyes. G&D: How did your in-said, “If you really want to It was like I had just woken vesting process develop make money you have to up and a light had switched differently from Buffett’s? listen to this fellow. He on. His honesty came (Continued on page 25) truly knows how to make Volume XVIII Page 25 Li Lu (Continued from page 24) against the best counterar- LL: Oh, there are so many. LL: Part of the game of gument of the smartest op- We share a fundamental investing is to come into ponent.”

他关于人生理念的想法是对的,你也必须找到适合自己的那一套。在投资这件事上,你要找到一种完全契合你性格的方式,因为投资就是预测未来,而未来本质上是无法预测的。我在个人行为上也学着这么做,因为在投资中,即便不是更多,也多少存在一些零和博弈的成分。

He is right about ethos about life and about your own. You must find that. approaching investing. So I some way that perfectly fits learn more about how to your personality because Investing is about predicting conduct myself personally as there is some element of a the future, and the future is much, if not more, than zero sum game in investing. inherently unpredictable. investing.

如果你买入,就必然有人卖出。而当你卖出时,也必然有人买入。你们不可能都对。要做到这一点,唯一的方法就是评估所有事实,真正清楚自己知道什么、又知道什么不知道。

If you buy, somebody else Therefore the only way you has to sell. And when you “There is some can do it better is to assess G&D: How would you sell, somebody has to buy. all the facts and truly know define your circle of compe- element of a zero You can’t both be right. what you know and know tence?

你真正需要确认的,是你不知道什么。这是一个买方就有人得卖出的竞争性游戏,你会碰到很多非常聪明、勤奋的家伙。要想获得概率优势,唯一的办法就是比交易对手掌握更充分的信息、推理更严谨。没有什么是百分之百确定的,但如果你只在胜率远超对手时才挥棒,长期来看,你会做得非常好。

You really want to be sure what you don’t know. sum game in that you are better in- That’s your probability edge. LL: I let my own personal formed and better reasoned Nothing is 100%, but if you interests define my circle of investing. If you than the person on the oth- always swing when you have competence. Obviously I er side of the trade. It is a an overwhelmingly better know something about Chi-buy, somebody else competitive game, so you’re edge, then over time, you na, Asia, and America – going to run into a lot of has to sell. And will do very well. those are things that I am very intelligent, hardworking really familiar with. I have when you sell, fellows. G&D: How did you be- also over the years expand-come friends with Charlie ed my horizon [in terms of somebody has to The only way to gain an Munger?

你是通过长期友谊以及与沃伦·巴菲特的合作而获得分析企业优势的吗?我一开始是寻找廉价证券。你无法两者兼顾。做你热爱的事,这样你就会自然而然地投入,即使是在放松时,甚至是在公园散步时,也会一直思考它。久而久之,如果你真正擅长这件事,就能积累巨大的优势。

查理和我有一些非常亲密的共同朋友。随着时间的推移,我们开始谈论生意,后来这发展成了牢固的情谊。

Do you have a analyzing businesses]. edge is through long and friendship with Warren Buf- buy. You can’t both hard work. Do what you fett as well? I started out looking for love to do, so you just natu- cheap securities. When you be right. You really rally do it or think about it LL: Charlie and I have start out, you really have no all the time, even if you are want to be sure some very close mutual choice. You don’t have relaxing, and even if you’re friends. Over time, we enough experience, and you that you are better just walking in the park. started talking about busi- don’t want to lose money, Over time, you can accumu- nesses, and then it evolved so what do you do? You informed and better late a huge advantage if it into a strong bond.

我认为天生就有这种买廉价股能力的投资者,把他视为导师、老师、证券合伙人与朋友是件很自然的事。不过,随着时间的推移,如果你对企业的兴趣超过了对证券本身的兴趣,你就会逐渐成为企业研究的学生。最终,事物会相互关联,你开始了解不同的企业。你会掌握企业的 DNA。投资的游戏是一个发现过程:发现你是谁,你对什么感兴趣。查理·芒格:我同意。我和沃伦的交情也不错(指芒格与沃伦·巴菲特),但不如我和查理那么亲近,因为沃伦在奥马哈。我通过他的著作和言行了解到的他,比通过人际交往了解到的更多。我钦佩他。芒格回:交易的另一方是凭自己风格和自然性情行事的人,这种人会有很大优势。

I view end up buying dirt-cheap comes naturally to you like him as a mentor, teacher, securities. But over time, if reasoned than the this. The ones who really partner, and friend, all in you are interested in busi-figure out their own style one. I am also friendly with nesses in addition to securi-person on the other and stick to it and let their Warren, but not nearly as ties, you begin to become a natural temperament take side of the trade.” close as with Charlie be- student of businesses. over will have a big ad- cause Warren is in Omaha. vantage. I admire him, and I learn Eventually, one thing leads more about him from his to another and you begin to The game of investing is a writings and deeds than learn different businesses. process of discovering: who through interpersonal inter- You learn the DNAs of you are, what you’re inter- actions.

我和查理有很多交流,深入了解他的为人,也通过他的文字和实际行动了解他。我看过他如何投资、如何看待企业进步、以及它们为何如此强大。久而久之,我深深爱上了强大的企业。我从寻找便宜货,转变为以低廉价格寻找强企业。我身上仍然留着查理·芒格所说的“我不会自认为有资格持有观点,除非我能成功地为反对观点辩护”的那股劲。

I have a lot of in- businesses, how they proested in, what you’re good teraction with Charlie, so I gress, and why they are so at, what you love to do, know him both as person strong. Over time, I really then magnifying that until and through his writing and fell in love with strong busi-you gain a sizable edge over personal deeds. nesses. I morphed into find-all the other people. When ing strong businesses at bar-do you know you are really G&D: Do you have a fa- gain prices. I still have a better? Charlie Munger al- vorite Charlie Munger streak in me that favors ways said, “I would not feel quote? finding really cheap securi-entitled to a view unless I (Continued on page 26) could successfully argue Li Lu (Continued from page 25) the people who bought the ty.

我们很快就发现,领带生意——我就是忍不住要说这个!——我们没法真正和彭博竞争。不过随着时间的推移,我更倾向于寻找那些天生优秀、竞争力更强、更容易预测、且有强大管理团队的伟大企业。我就是对二级市场不太满意。正如我说过的,有一个方面…… 我喜欢双赢的局面。我不会抱怨过早卖出 Capital IQ。那笔投资我们赚了很多,也做出了很大贡献。我和创始人仍然是朋友。那个方面给了我巨大的快乐。

G&D:你不做空喜马拉雅基金,对吗?

LL:对,一点都没有。那个改变是九年前发生的。做空曾经是我们的一部分策略。唯一能获得优势的方法就是……

We learned quickly that ties – I just can’t help it! business from us. we couldn’t really compete But over time, I’ve become with Bloomberg. more attracted to looking I like win-win situations. I for great businesses that are do not complain about sell- G&D: You don’t short inherently superior, more ing Capital IQ too early. stocks at Himalaya, correct? competitive, easier to pre- We made a lot of money on dict, and with strong man- that investment, and we LL: That’s right; not any “The only way to agement teams. I’m just not contributed a great deal. I more. That change oc-quite satisfied with the sec- remain friends with the curred nine years ago. gain an edge is ondary market. As I said, founders. That aspect gave Shorting was one of the there is an aspect of the me enormous pleasure.

但我犯过最严重的错误。在长期的证券行业里,创投这一面确实很难做。这是个零和游戏。规模摆在那里,你必须投入大量精力。所以,久而久之,我逐渐转向了不同的方式。即使是在公开证券领域,你仍然可以非常有帮助、有建设性。这就是我的本性。我仍在学习,渴望以建设性的方式帮助他人。

But worst mistakes I’ve made. through long and securities business that is the venture side is hard to hard work. Do zero-sum. And that’s the scale; you must put in a lot G&D: Is your lack of a area in which I don’t feel of effort. So, over time, I short book due to your what you love to entirely comfortable. I’m gradually moved into helping desire to be a constructive more interested, by my na- in a different way. Even in third-party for companies do, so you just ture, in win-win situations. public securities, you can and their management still be very helpful and con- teams? naturally do it or I want to create wealth to- structive. So, that’s who I gether with the business am. I’m still learning, and LL: Yes.

但话说回来,你也可以想想,所有运营商和员工我仍然感兴趣。我仍然百分百正确,而且你永远有时间,即使在我投资的时候。所以,这让我年轻时,仍然难以置信地可能把自己搞破产。这促使我去冒险做企业。我依然充满好奇。所以,谁知道呢?做空这方面让我非常沮丧!你试图应用智能投资的原则,希望我能继续逐步拓宽我的能力圈。放松……但实际上,我可以贡献很多,所以这变成了双赢局面。关于做空有三点:随着时间的推移,你可以积累大量优势,但这会变成一门痛苦的生意。做多的时候,你有 100% 的下行风险,却有无限的上行空间。在我的职业生涯中,我享受过建立 Capital IQ 这样的成就感。

G&D:你是如何看出 Capital IQ 会如此成功的?

But also, you can think about it all operators and employees I’m still interested. I’m still be 100% right, and you the time, even if when I invest. So that led young, and still incredibly could still bankrupt yourself. me to venture businesses. I curious. So, who knows? That aspect of shorting just you are try to apply the principles of Hopefully, I will continue to frustrated me too much! intelligent investing there, gradually expand my circle [laughs] relaxing...Over but I actually can contribute of competence. quite a bit, so it becomes a Three things about shorting time, you can win-win situation. G&D: How were you able make it a miserable busi-accumulate a huge to figure out that Capital IQ ness. On the long side, you Over my career, I’ve had would become so success- have 100% downside but advantage if it the satisfaction of building a ful? unlimited upside.

关于做空的不同尝试,你天生就能 100% 理解企业。有些公司最初有无限上涨和下行空间,后来变得极为成功,即使在我们卖出之后也是如此。你可能觉得我们卖得太早了!我是 Capital IQ 的第一个投资者,然后看看后来发生了什么。如果我们当初一直持有,我们会富有得多!比如 Bloomberg,我们想创造一个类似 Bloomberg 的东西,过程中我们越来越欣赏 Bloomberg,因为竞争太难了。后来我们意识到这个投资……

On the number of different venture short side, you have 100% comes naturally to businesses. Some of them LL: In the beginning it was upside and unlimited downbecame enormously suc- Bloomberg. We wanted to side. I do not like that you like this.” cessful, even after we sold create something just like math. Second, the best them. You could say we Bloomberg, and in the pro- short has some element of sold them too early! I was cess, we grew to appreciate fraud. However, a fraud can the first investor in Capital Bloomberg much more be- be perpetrated for a long IQ, and then look at what cause it was so hard to time. Of course you bor-happened. If we would have compete with them. Then row to short, so they could kept it, we would have been we realized the investment really just wear you down. far richer!

银行这边倒不是说我们没有完全渗透市场,这就是为什么我可以在完全正确的同时破产,却又在这笔投资上没赚到多少钱。但我们确实赚了。只不过,你知道 [笑] 但我就喜欢这样。所以我基本上把我们学到的关于彭博的东西,先破产那就破产吧!我喜欢创造一些人人都觉得有用的东西。我们创造了就业,创造了一个可持续发展的漂亮产品,大家都赚了很多钱,最后,这会搞乱你的思维。做空就是会抓住你的脑袋,让你没法集中精力去做那些真正需要专注的事情。

It’s not like we banking side was not fully That’s why I could be 100% didn’t make a lot of money penetrated. right and bankrupt at the in that investment. We did. same time. But, you know [laughs] But I like it that So we basically applied what what, you go bankrupt first! way. I like to create some- we learned about Bloom- Lastly, it screws up your thing that everybody finds berg and created a similar mind. Shorts just grab your useful. We created employ- product for the investment mind and take away from ment, and we created a banking side. Over time, we the concentrated effort that beautiful product that’s sus- also penetrated different is required to do proper tainable, and everybody businesses like private equi- (Continued on page 27) made a lot of money, even Volume XVIII Page 27 Li Lu (Continued from page 26) bunch of different problems. feel comfortable with.

他们做多。所以,这些就是——你得承认,他们那 110 亿美元投入 IBM 的业绩确实令人印象深刻。我可以说 IBM 是一家科技公司。但我可以肯定,他们不是那样思考问题的。这跟它是不是科技股无关。

我做过几年空头,那是个错误。我不会因为别人做空做得很好就否定他们——只是我本人不适合做空。他们恰好身处正确的行业和正确的环境,得到了政府正确的支持。图片说明:戴维斯投资顾问公司的克里斯托弗·戴维斯在 2013 年 CSIMA 会议上。他们的工程文化始终展现出其能力。

They long investing. So, those are So you have to admit the have that $11 billion invest-the three reasons why I just record is impressive. They ment in IBM, which, I can stay away from shorting. also happen to be in the argue, is a technology com-right industry and the right pany. But I can guarantee It was a mistake on my part. environment, and they get that’s not how they think I shorted for a couple of the right support from the about things. It has nothing years. I don’t discard peo- Pictured: Christopher Davis government. Their engi- to do with whether it’s a of Davis Advisors at the ple who are really doing neering culture consistently technology stock or not. 2013 CSIMA Conference. well at shorting – it’s just demonstrates its ability to not me.

如果我想解决一个棘手的大问题。G&D:巴菲特在第四个理由中承认,这方法行得通。所以很难不被他 2009 年《财富》杂志文章中的记录所打动,当时他坦白说自己其实并不了解比亚迪。经济整体一直在以复利方式增长,持续了两三百年,自现代科技时代开始以来便是如此。所以,自然而言,经济趋势倾向于做多而非做空。

但你不可能一辈子不犯错。每次我犯错,都能学到些东西。

If I want to add a tackle big, difficult problems. G&D: Buffett admitted in a fourth reason, it is that the It works. So it’s hard not to 2009 Fortune article that he economy overall has been be impressed by the record doesn’t really understand really growing at a com- the guy has. At the time we BYD. pounding rate for 200-300 invested, we had quite a bit years, ever since the mod- of a margin of safety. LL: That is true. Warren ern science technology era. and Charlie have a great So, naturally, the economic partnership and Charlie trend favors long positions knows more about BYD rather than short. than Warren. But I would not bet against the collec-But you cannot live life tive track record of those without making a mistake. “...you cannot live two. It’s not that they don’t Every time I make a mistake make errors from time to I learn something. life without making time.

每个人都会犯错。在我的长期投资生涯中,我犯过一些错误,但极少极少。不过每犯一次错,都能学到东西。

G&D:考虑到伯克希尔·哈撒韦通常回避科技公司,你是怎么让查理·芒格对比亚迪(一家中国公司,生产汽车、电池、电子产品及太阳能设备)感兴趣的?

LL:这家公司是一台学习机器。想想看——他们直到 10 年前才真正进入这个行业。8 年前才生产出第一辆汽车。他们在充满无限可能的大市场里竞争。

G&D:你觉得比亚迪的汽车品质在提高吗?

Everybody is capable a mistake. Every of doing that. They have a G&D: How were you able few, but very, very few over to get Charlie Munger inter- time I make a a long investment career. ested in a company like BYD [a Chinese company mistake I learn G&D: Do you see the which manufactures electric quality of BYD cars improv-cars, batteries, electronics something.” ing? and solar equipment] given that Berkshire Hathaway LL: This company is a typically shies away from learning machine. Think technology-oriented compa- about it – they really didn’t nies? get into industry until 10 years ago. They didn’t proLL: I don’t think that War- They play in a big field with duce their first car until ren and Charlie are ideolog- open-ended possibilities and eight years ago. They are in ical.

我和您一样。关键在于你真正懂多少。比亚迪的故事其实很简单。创始人是一位极为出色的工程师,仅凭 30 万美元贷款白手起家,在上市前没再追加过一分钱资金。他白手起家创造了一家营收 80 亿美元的公司。查理对该公司同样印象深刻,这最终促成了投资。伯克希尔并非在意识形态上排斥科技公司。这个市场有相当的机会——每个国际大品牌都在全力竞争,因为市场实在太大了。所以它们从来没有过任何主场优势,因为中国汽车市场从一开始就是完全开放的,所有人都在同场竞技。正如我说的,没有十拿九稳的事,但在我看来,这机会跟其他任何机会一样好。

Neither am I. It’s real- have a reasonable chance of a market where every single ly how much you know. being successful. As I said, international major brand is The story of BYD is rela- nothing is a sure thing, but competing, with an all-out tively simple. This guy, who this strikes me as having as effort, because it’s such a is a really terrific engineer, good of a chance as any. big market. So they never started the business from Charlie was equally im- had any home advantage just a $300,000 loan with no pressed by the company, whatsoever because China’s additional money until the which then led to the in- auto market started out IPO. He created a company vestment. Berkshire is not completely open with every-with $8 billion in revenue ideologically against technol- body competing.

然而,这家公司拥有 17 万名员工,还涉足科技股。不过,还有一家小型汽车公司,凭借极少的资金,在不到 10 年时间里,年销量便超过 50 万辆,为自己占据了一席之地。你必须承认,这个成绩相当不错,其中必有门道。他们还拥有数万名工程师,解决了整套难题。李录(接第 27 页)李录:嗯,无论企业本身是好是坏,管理层始终对成功有着巨大影响。管理层始终是公司成功方程式中不可或缺的一部分,因此管理质量永远重要。

Yet and 170,000 employees and ogy stocks. They’re just there’s a little car company tens of thousands of engi- against anything they don’t (Continued on page 28) neers. He solved a whole Li Lu (Continued from page 27) tomers, suppliers, and man- LL: Well, management with very little money, and, agement? always has a big influence on in less than 10 years, it’s your success, no matter selling more than half a mil- LL: All of them. I don’t how good or how bad the lion cars a year and has talk to as many investors – business is itself. Manage-carved out a position for very few. I am more inter- ment is always part of the itself. You have to say, the ested in talking to people equation of making the record is not too bad, and who are actually running company successful, so the so there’s something to it. businesses and entrepre- quality of management al-They also have an engineer- neurs or CEOs or just good ways matters.

“要评估企业文化和管理层的实干精神,这并不容易。如果你无法评估管理层的素质,可能仍需要做出投资决策——这只是过程的一部分。所以你必须寻找其他途径,比如观察企业本身的品质、估值,或者其他能够支撑你建仓的依据。‘好想法是可以通过大量阅读和持续研究来识别的。’”

G&D:能否谈谈您的投资流程?

“我们投资 G&D 时,读遍了所有主要报纸的相关报道。这些企业家始终展现出他们能解决极其复杂的工程问题,并以比其他多数人更快、更便宜、更优的方式提出非常实用的解决方案。这是制造业经济中的一项优势。”

But to assess ing culture and a can-do businessmen. I read all of that quality is not that easy. spirit. They consistently the major newspaper publi- If you can’t assess the quali-demonstrate that they’re ty of management, you may able to tackle really com- have to make a decision in plex engineering problems spite of that. That’s just and come up with very part of the process. So you practical solutions faster, “You can recognize have to figure out other cheaper, and better than ways such as looking at the most other people. That is good ideas by quality of the business, the an advantage in the manu- valuation, or something else facturing economy. reading a great deal until you can justify an in-vestment. G&D: Can you talk about and also by studying your investment process?

如果你有办法评估一家公司的管理团队质量——要么因为你是一位洞悉人类心理的敏锐观察者,要么因为你与管理层有特殊关系——那么你当然会把这一点纳入考量。为什么不呢?管理团队是成就一家公司的重要因素。不过,这并不容易做到。

If you do have a way to as-a lot of companies sess the quality of the manLL: Ideas come to me from and constantly agement team, either be-all sources, principally from cause you’re an astute stu-reading and talking. I don’t learning from dent of human psychology, discriminate how they or you have a special rela-come, as long as they are intelligent people – tionship with the people, good ideas. You can recog- then you’ll take that into nize good ideas by reading a hopefully more consideration. Why would-great deal and also by study- n’t you? The management ing a lot of companies and intelligent than you team is part of what really constantly learning from are, especially in makes a company. intelligent people – hopeful-ly more intelligent than you their field.” But, it’s not that easy.

评估管理层并不容易,尤其是在他们自己的领域里。要想对其有深入、扎实的了解很难。很少有人能做到这一点。我很佩服那些说“嘿,听着——不管信息是什么,不管他们怎么做介绍,我永远不会比这更深入地了解管理层了”的人。

我尽可能多读。我会研究所有有趣且优秀的企业,也会与许多聪明人交流。你知道吗?我还会阅读行业龙头企业的年报和其他文件。从这些阅读和对话中,我获得了大量灵感。有些想法一下子就会击中你。然后你再做更多研究,慢慢就觉得踏实了,或者就放弃了。

It’s are, especially in their field. not that easy to have an in-I try to read as much as I depth, solid understanding can. I study all of the inter- of the management team. esting and great companies, Very few people are able to and I talk to a lot of intelli- cations and annual reports do that. I admire people gent people. You know of the leading companies. I that say, "Hey, look. What-what? In some of those get a lot of ideas out of ever the information, what-readings or conversations, those too. ever the kind of presenta-ideas just click. Then you tion they make, I will never do more research and then G&D: How do you assess be able to learn about man-you get comfortable or you if the management is being agement beyond that.

我跟你说实话吧,这对我来说就是一场秀,所以跟投资人聊天的价值不大,我干脆就当它不存在。G&D:你认为这些人是管理层吗?我尊重这一点。你跟同行投资人的交流(接第 29 页),还是他们更像是定制客户?第十八卷第 29 页 李录(接第 28 页)机会成本。这就是我的目标,因此基金的报酬结构也体现了这一点。随着时间的推移,我转向了我知道的业内最佳的报酬结构,也就是最初的模式。投资讲的是诚实的智力活动。你想知道自己知道什么,更重要的是,你想知道自己不知道什么。如果理解管理层就能解决问题,那投资就太简单了。

G&D:你的基金对新投资者开放吗?

LL:基金已经对新的投资者关闭了九年。

I don’t get comfortable. forthright with you? How know it’s a show for me, so useful is it to speak with the I might as well just discard G&D: Are the people that management? it." I respect that. you talk to fellow investors (Continued on page 29) or are they people like cus- Volume XVIII Page 29 Li Lu (Continued from page 28) tunity cost. That’s my goal, and there-fore the compensation Investing is about intellectu- G&D: Is your fund open to structure of the fund re-al honesty. You want to new investors? flects that. Over time, I know what you know. You switched into the best com-want to know, mostly, what LL: The fund has been pensation structure I knew you don’t know. If under- closed to new investors for in the industry, the original standing the management nine years.

但是,我们“巴菲特合伙公式团队”不会这么做,今年会稍微放开一点。我们不收任何管理费。我们为投资者免费提供 6% 的回报,然后超过部分收 25%。我的钱全投在基金里,不投任何其他东西。所以这是真正的合伙关系——普通合伙人和有限合伙人之间几乎没有利益冲突。

However, we “Buffett partnership formu-team is not in the cards, it’s will open it up a bit this la”. We don’t take any not in the cards. year. We have more op- management fee. We proportunities than we have vide a 6% return for free to G&D: What is your do- money around, but that’s our investors and then take mestic versus international 25% after that. I don’t in-allocation? vest anything outside of the “That way we’re all fund. I put all of my investLL: I don’t have a precon- ment capital into my funds. ceived notion about alloca- So it’s a true partnership. in the same game tion. I let the opportunity There are very few conflicts dictate where I end up. I together. … That between the general part-just happen to have more ners and the limited part-interest in Asia and the U.S., ethos is what makes ners. so that’s where I end up.

我并不觉得对查理和我本人来说……我们都在欧洲那边。我也不觉得我们处在同一场游戏里。我人在非洲,但我的思路很特别。他们对接受新事物没有丝毫动力——我是为了钱而追求钱,想以开放心态寻找最好的公司、最低的价格、最好的人来经营,并且在我寻找时恰好能拿到手。这些条件并不总能同时满足,所以时间站在我这边,我必须能找到值得做、能做得更好的事情。我不相信为了拿新钱而拿新钱,因为我本质上不从中抽成。新钱一到账,就开始以年化 6% 的速度复利增长。这就是为什么,尽管他们的规模巨大,我还能找到机会。你一上来就得先守住。

I do not feel that interest in Charlie and Warren That way we’re all in the Europe. I do not feel that in same game together. I have Africa. But I approach it so special. They zero incentive to take new with an open mind. I want money for the sake of taking believe in to really find the best com- new money because I don’t pany at the best price, run fundamentally take things off the top. The by the best people and avail- minute that new money able to me at the time I am earned success. arrives, it begins to com-looking. Those don’t neces- pound 6% on an annual basis sarily always meet, and it’s That’s why, despite against me, so I better be OK. able to find something that their enormous is worthwhile and doing You start out by holding better.

当我投资不成功时,没有人会赚钱,这让我觉得那是我应得的。而好的机会成本——别人很少批评这一点,因为它不会下降——当我的投资者赚钱时,那是他们应得的。这只是一种更好的商业结构——你感觉每个人的成功都是应得的。这种理念正是查理和沃伦如此特别的原因。他们从根本上相信,只要找到一个投资机会,它就必须是在整体风险调整基础上的改进。你可能会发现一些非常有趣的东西,然后你就有了一篮子少数有趣的证券加上现金。这种机会很少见。我通常不想扩大我们的规模。我的野心从来都不是经营最大的基金。我从来都不想从一只基金里赚到最多的钱。

When I make mon-success, nobody cash, and that is a pretty ey, I feel like I earn it, and good opportunity cost, be- criticizes them very when my investors make cause it doesn’t go down. money, they earn it. It is So any time you find an in- much.” just a better way to struc-vestment, it has to be an ture a business – you feel improvement on an overall rare. I usually don’t want to that everybody’s success is risk-adjusted basis. You increase our size. My ambi- deserved. That ethos is may find some very interest- tion has never been to run what makes Charlie and ing things, and now you’ve the largest fund. I never Warren so special. They got a basket of a few inter- wanted to earn the most believe in fundamentally esting securities plus cash. money out of a fund.

我刚刚赢得了成功。这就是为什么,这是个相当不错的机会——我希望在我职业生涯结束时,能拥有风险调整后最佳业绩记录之一。尽管他们取得了巨大成功,但几乎没有人批评他们。当你为所有人创造了数千亿美元的财富时,你每次加入另一只证券时,最好是让投资组合比现有组合更好。你只是不断改进你的机会成本。(续第 30 页)

李录 (续第 29 页):十年后呢?大多数企业如果长期存在都会面临变化,而那些能够自我革新并应对变化的企业才是真正优秀的公司。

I just earned success. That’s why, That is a pretty good oppor- wanted to have, by the time despite their enormous suctunity cost, and the next I finished my career, one of cess, nobody criticizes them time you add another secu- the best track records on a very much. When you crerity, it better make the risk-adjusted basis. ate the hundreds of billions portfolio better than the If I achieve that, I will feel in wealth for everybody existing one. You just con- very good about myself. (Continued on page 30) stantly improve your oppor- Li Lu (Continued from page 29) 10 years from now? panies are the ones that are while taking a salary of capable of reinventing them-$100,000 per year for more LL: Most businesses are selves and dealing with than 40 years, it’s hard to subject to change if you stay change.

以英特尔为例。整个行业每 18 个月就彻底变一次。这样的企业,你没法长期跟它过日子。

Take the example criticize them. with them long enough. of Intel. The whole business There’s not a single business changes every 18 months.

G&D有没有哪些行业你会完全避开?

巴菲特:我知道有些行业永远不会变。商业最迷人的地方就在于此。不与时俱进会导致相当大的劣势,但有些企业却能基于这种变化建立起自己的文化。

看看三星——他们早期的存储芯片业务每周降价 1%,但他们却培养出一种文化,精准应对这种变化。所以当他们把这种能力应用到其他领域时……

查理·芒格:我在意识形态上没有偏见,我反对任何意识形态。[笑]

有很多事情我不知道。我会第一个承认这点。但这并不意味着我不会时不时地感到好奇。

G&DAre there industries that I know of that will nev- Failure to change leads to that you completely stay er change. That’s the fasci- quite a substantial disad-away from? nating thing about business. vantage and yet they’re able Successful businesses have to build their culture based LL: I’m not ideologically some combination of things on that change. opposed to anything. I am against any ideology. Take Samsung – their early [laughs] memory chip business de-creased in price by 1% every There are lots of things I “I think you want to week, and yet they really don’t know. I’ll be the first developed a culture that one to admit. But it doesn’t avoid wrong precisely deals with that mean that I’m not curious decisions as much change. So when they apply from time to time.

也许我们对某些领域的了解比你看到的更多,比如手机的故事。但文化确实在那些变化较快的环境中扮演着重要的角色。如果你能避免错误的决策,从长远来看你可能会过得不错。那些小细节会很快发挥作用,甚至可能构成投资的一部分。我不知道,也不排除这种可能。但我可以说,当你给我一个想法时,我能在几分钟内迅速判断它是不是“否”。查理基本上有三个篮子:“是”、“否”或“太难”。大多数东西都落在“太难”这个篮子里。

Maybe I the same culture to some-know some aspect of the or more than you thing like a cell phone, they story. That little aspect get ahead very quickly. might even constitute the want to get it Now they’re outselling Ap-investment. I don’t know. I ple. So culture really plays don’t want to rule it out, approximately an important role in those but I can say that when you faster-changing environ-present me an idea, I can right. If you avoid ments, enabling certain quickly tell you whether it’s the wrong decisions, companies to always surge a “no” within a few minutes. ahead of everybody else. you’ll probably There are basically three G&D: Do you need to buckets that Charlie has. come out okay over understand the technology “Yes”, “no”, or “too hard”. on an engineering level to Most of the things fall in time.” have a good sense of the "too hard."

有人会问有没有风险/回报比?快速回答“有”或“没有”,但如果太难,那就算了。到最后你其实做不了多少事,而是真正把精力集中在那些你确实有时间和精力、能比任何人都更充分理解的想法上。

G&D:你如何判断……

这当然是个加分项,但并不强制要求。如果你在产品上真的是一位出色的工程师,那当然是加分项。但在今天这个时代,每家公司某种程度上都是科技公司,但科技未必是核心竞争力。能够让企业比别人更好地适应变化,这确实是个优势。不过每种情况都不一样,这绝对不是必要条件,因为无论你在某个领域多强,在其他领域你未必同样出色。

Some get a risk/reward? quick “yes” or “no”, but if it’s too hard, it’s too hard. LL: It certainly is a plus, So you end up not doing a that enable them to adapt but not a must. If you were lot. You end up really con- to changes better than any- really a great engineer in the centrating on the ideas one else. In each situation, product the business is sell-where you truly have the it’s slightly different. ing, obviously it’s a plus. time and energy to fully But it’s certainly not a must understand the situation Every company in today’s because no matter how better than anybody. age is a technology company good you are at a certain somehow, but the technolo- area, you’re not so good in G&D: How to you get gy may not be on the cut- other areas.

变化的速度之快,以至于无论你现在专精于什么,都会变得过时。但这并不妨碍你对比亚迪这样的高科技公司做出判断——它正经历相当快速的技术变革,你对比亚迪未来的样貌有很好的把握吗?你对比亚迪的风险/回报节奏感到舒适,而高风险公司可能在整个业务成败中扮演重要角色,但这并不排除你做出判断。

成功的科技公司(续第 31 页)

第 18 卷 第 31 页

李录(续第 30 页)

那些看起来不太稳定的东西,实际上结果却是稳定的。

我认为你应该避免在以下三种情况下做出卖出决策。

李录:卖出决定应该基于三种情况之一。

The pace of comfortable with the risk/ ting edge, and may not play change is such that whatev-reward of a high tech com- an important role in the er you are now specialized pany like BYD that is under- success or failure of the in will become obsolete. going pretty rapid techno- overall business. But that doesn’t disqualify logical change? Do you you from making a judgment think you have a good sense Successful technology com- (Continued on page 31) of what BYD will look like Volume XVIII Page 31 Li Lu (Continued from page 30) that don’t appear to be very your sell decisions? on how a company can de- stable actually turn out to velop a culture to deal with be. LL: One should make sell that. Successful companies decisions on one of three are able to deal with change I think you want to avoid occasions.

第一,如果你一直通过雇佣错误的人或做出错误的决策来搞砸事情,那就要尽快纠正,即使这意味着要卖掉你本想尽快做大的东西,哪怕它有着基本正确的文化。如果犯了错误,就及时改正。我说的“改正错误”是什么意思?投资是一场概率游戏。假设你进入一个情况,有 90% 的把握事情会按某种方式发展,10% 的可能走向另一种结果,而那 10% 的不可预测性始终存在——这正是让竞争对手望尘莫及的关键所在。这就是真正让他们成功的方面。而且那是企业可预测的一面。

Number one, if consistently by hiring the wrong decisions as much or you make a mistake, sell as right people, building the more than you want to get fast as you can, even if it’s a right culture, and staying it approximately right. If correct mistake. What do I Pictured: Mason Hawkins of ahead of their competitors. you avoid the wrong deci- mean by a correct mistake? Southeastern Asset Manage-That’s the aspect that really sions, you’ll probably come Investing is a probability ment at the 2013 CSIMA makes them successful. And Conference. game. Let’s say you go into that’s kind of a predictable a situation with 90% confi-aspect of businesses. dence that things will work out one way and a 10% There is always a certain “The most chance they work out an-element that is unpredicta- other way, and that 10% ble.

而有件重要的事情会发生,就是你得把它卖掉。其中有些因素是可预测的。我们的业务还有一个错误在于,你的分析完全错了。你需要一点两者兼顾。但总体而言,我认为要讲理性诚实。你本以为是这样,结果却是那样。一旦你意识到这一点,就尽快卖出。希望亏损不要太大,但即使亏损也无所谓——你必须卖掉它。在一个快速变化的行业里,做出可靠的预测要困难得多。这点毫无疑问。但这并不意味着投资者不能做出一些预测,表明概率对自己有利。我的意思是四件不同的事情:知道自己知道什么,知道自己不知道什么。

And there is a certain important thing in event happens. You sell it. element that is predictable. our business is Then there’s a mistake that You want to have a little of your analysis is completely both. But overall, I think intellectual honesty. wrong. You thought it was you’re right. In a business 99% one way but it was that is subject to rapid What I mean is four actually 99% the other way. change, it is a lot more diffi- When you realize that, sell cult to make a reliable fore- different things: as fast as you can. Hopeful-cast. There is no question ly at not too much of a loss, about that. But it doesn’t know what you but even if it is a loss it mean an investor cannot know, know what doesn’t matter – you have make a few predictions that to sell it. could indicate that the odds you don’t know, are in your favor.

你想在第二次卖出,那是在估值偏离到极端时。当你感觉胜算非常有利时就该出手,很多情况下,你不需要确切知道这是对的,只需在长期持有一家公司后,判断时机到了就卖出。我从不因为证券略微高估就卖掉它,但如果市场陷入过度狂热到离谱的程度,我就会卖出。你不必事事皆知,只要在典型稳定的行业里发现突然变化时抓住机会就行。

拿伊士曼柯达为例。它曾是数一数二的好公司;它发明了摄影技术。

You want The second time you want to play when you feel very know what you to sell is when the valuation comfortable that the odds swings way too much to the are in your favor. Many don’t have to know, other end of the extreme. I times, that’s searching don’t sell a security because among typically stable busi-and realize that it’s a little overvalued, but if nesses where something has there is always a it is way overboard on the changed all of a sudden. other side into euphoria, possibility that ‘you then I will sell it. If you are Take Eastman Kodak for right and hold a company example. It used to be one don’t know that you for a long time, you have of the best companies; it accumulated a large amount invented photography.

但我不知道。”这是基于未实现收益做出的判断。他们现在的状况如何?那些未实现收益中有很大一部分就像是从政府那里借来的钱一样,长期来看没问题。但,我同意你的观点,这并不容易,也根本不是一门精确的科学。希望随着时间的推移能有所提高。想想贝尔实验室和 AT&T。他们曾经真的拥有所有的权力。他们拥有垄断业务。现在他们在哪?只是个名字而已。这就是残酷资本主义的本质。这就是商业的本质。那些看似可预测和稳定的东西,其实并不稳定。当你卖出那个头寸时,你利用了所有的杠杆,你抽走了一大笔资本,所以你的净资产收益率就变得……(未完,接第 32 页)

But don’t know.’” of unrealized gains. A big look at where they are now. portion of those unrealized Take Bell Labs and AT&T. gains act like borrowings They used to really have all from the government inter-the power. They had mo- out okay over time. But, I est free and legally. So nopoly businesses. Where agree with you, it’s not easy when you sell that position, are they now? Just a name. and it’s not precise or a you take all the leverage and That is the nature of brutal science at all. Hopefully one you take a bunch of the capitalism. It’s the nature of improves overtime. capital out, so your return the business. Things that on equity has just become a appear to be predictable G&D: How do you make (Continued on page 32) and stable are not.

Things Li Lu (接第 31 页) 的可能性是“你不知道自己不知道”。整个国家都可能崩溃!每个人都一直处于危机模式。所有平时你不关心、不注意的事情都会冒出来。

那四件事截然不同。危机中会出现考验你在全部四个类别上能力的事情。

举例来说,平时你会觉得:“那个跟我投资这家公司没关系。”

第三次让你卖出的时机,是当你发现更好的东西时。本质上,就像我说的,投资组合就是机会成本。你作为投资组合经理的工作,就是不断优化你的投资组合。

Things Li Lu (Continued from page 31) possibility that “you don’t the whole country could go little less. know that you don’t know.” down!” Everyone was con-Those four things are dis- stantly in crisis mode. All of The third occasion when to tinctly different. In a crisis, the things come out that sell is when you find some- things emerge that test you you don’t normally care thing that is better. Essen- on all four categories. about and normally don’t tially, a portfolio as I said is pay attention to. Normally Pictured: Tom Russo of opportunity cost. Your job Gardner Russo & Gardner For example, during the you think, “Well, that has as a portfolio manager is to nothing to do with my in-and Timothy Hartch of constantly improve on your vestment in this company.”

布朗兄弟哈里曼公司在 CSIMA 会议上的发言篮子。你从一个很高的标准开始。然后突然间,2013 年 2 月。很高的标准。你希望把标准提得越来越高。你是通过不断提高机会成本来做到这一点的;你会找到更好的东西。这就是我卖出的三个原因。

我们业务中最重要的是智力上的诚实。我的意思是四个不同的东西:知道自己知道什么,知道自己不知道什么。

”最常说,“哦老天,这跟我的公司完全有关。”好吧,你要么对要么错。那场危机会把这些问题付诸检验。

这就是为什么人们在危机中会僵住。人们僵住是因为他们以前从未在智力上诚实过。他们从未把某些问题或议题区分清楚,并放进合适的篮子里。

你在 16 年的喜马拉雅运营中经历过三次重大的金融危机:1997 年的亚洲金融危机、2000 年互联网泡沫破裂。

Brown Brothers Harriman at the CSIMA Conference basket. You start with a Then all of the sudden, you in February 2013. high bar. You want to in- “The most say, “Oh Jesus, it has every-crease the bar higher and thing to do with my compa-higher. You do that by con- important thing in ny.” Well, you are right or stantly improving the oppor- you are wrong. That crisis tunity costs; you find some- our business is will put those questions to thing better. Those are the intellectual the test. three reasons that I would sell. honesty. What I That’s why people freeze in the midst of a crisis. People G&D: In your 16 years mean is four freeze because they were running Himalaya, you’ve not intellectually honest experienced three major different things: before. They never quite financial crises: the Asian distinguished certain issues financial crisis of 1997, the know what you or questions and put them dot com bubble burst in know, know what into the appropriate basket.

2000 年和 2008 年的金融危机。作为基金经理,您是如何应对这些危机的,又从中吸取了什么教训?

LL:这个问题问得很好。你知道,每次发生这种情况,人们总是把它渲染成“百年一遇”,但就我经历而言,这些重大事件每五年就来一次。[笑] 有趣的是,如果你对整体情况做出判断,比如美国经济在长期内经历起伏会表现如何,并且你明白可能会发生更糟糕的事情,哪怕概率很小,但只要发生就是大事。这时候问题就变成了:“这是一个未知的未知(unknown unknown),还是你知道自己不知道?”——你不需要知道所有细节,只需要知道有些事你无法知道,并且意识到你没必要知道。

2000, and the financial crisis If you make an overall judg-of 2008. How have you you don’t know, ment, for example, of how navigated these crises as a the U.S. is going to perform fund manager, and what know what you over time through ups and have you learned from downs, and you go into it them? don’t have to knowing that there is a pos-know, and realize sibility something much LL: That’s an excellent worse could happen. Maybe question. You know every it’s small, but when it hap-that there is always time that that happens, they pens, it happens. At that always bill it as “once in a a possibility that time, the question becomes century,” except these ma- “Is it an unknown unjor events happen every five “you don’t know known,” or do you know years in my case. [laughs] that you don’t have to What is interesting about that you don’t know?

你绝对会被问到那个问题。危机对你智识诚实度的考验在于,你是否会说“我不知道”。金融系统可能出问题。是的,亚洲金融危机时,突然间全世界都在问:“这些公司到底有多少债务?!”哦天哪,他们居然欠了那么多债!我的上帝啊——我想如果生活继续,我的生意也会在那里,不管它最终会变成什么样。所以问题就变成:“我是否必须知道全球市场会如何替我的生意解决金融系统的问题?”许多不同的东西:知道你所知道的,知道你所不知道的,知道哪些事你不必知道,并意识到总有一种力量——商业都需要融资,但我们的生意是智识诚实。我指的是什么?我们的全球市场会因为其体量和所处路径而具有某种力量。中美两国将共同使太平洋地区成为类似大西洋环绕欧洲和美国那样的经济中心。在金融危机来临之前,那就是你想要回答的问题。

You absolutely will crisis is that it puts your be asked that question. intellectually honesty to the know.” test. So the financial system might be in trouble. Yes, a The most important thing in Asian financial crisis, all of business needs financing, but our business is intellectual the sudden the world was I suppose if life goes on, my honesty. What I mean is saying, “how much debt do business will be there, how-four different things: know these companies have?! Oh ever it will end up. So the what you know, know what my goodness, they really question then becomes, you don’t know, know what have that much of a depend- “Do I have to know how you don’t have to know, and ence on debt! Oh my God, (Continued on page 33) realize that there is always a Volume XVIII Page 33 Li Lu (Continued from page 32) force in our global market- China and the U.S. together the financial system will sort places because of the sheer would make the Pacific Ba-out its problems for me to size of it and the path that sin somewhat of an eco-predict my business?” they’re on. nomic center the same way That’s the question and that the Atlantic Ocean was that’s the question that you China is on a historic path around Europe and the U.S. want to answer before a of continuing to grow into a A lot of opportunity will financial crisis hits. modern economy.

它们会涌现。但这并不意味着这是一条单行道或一帆风顺。各种意外都可能发生。也不意味着你保证能赚钱。但它在当前时刻确实提供了巨大的机遇,能够应对这种发展的人将从中获益。中国的重要性不容忽视。

克里斯托弗·戴维斯的祖父曾说过,你在金融恐慌中能赚到最多的钱——只是当时你不会知道。情况总是如此。不聪明的投资者会被淘汰,聪明的投资者总是头脑清醒。

G&D:你对中国的房地产泡沫有什么担忧吗?

They emerge. That doesn’t mean that it’s a one-way street or If you can answer that ques- a smooth pass. All sorts of tion honestly and correctly, things could happen. It you will do more after the doesn’t mean you’re going financial crisis. Christopher “China is so big. It to make money guaranteed. Davis’s grandfather used to But it does offer a tremen-say that you make the most has all sorts of dous amount of opportunity money out of a bear market to those who can navigate financial panic – you just extreme this development. The im-don’t know it at the time. phenomena. Yes, portance of China cannot be It’s always the case. Less ignored. intelligent investors will be there are ghost sorted out. Intelligent in- G&D: Do you have any vestors are the ones who towns, but there concerns on a real estate are always intellectually bubble in China?

我们看到了诚实。他们能清楚地区分——他们知道自己知道什么,或者知道自己不知道什么,并且知道自己不知道什么,而且中国存在“未知的未知数”。如果你能真正把事物正确归入这些类别,你就会通过考验。否则,你就会给自己惹上麻烦。中国太大了,它拥有各种极端现象。是的,有鬼城,但也有完全、完全拥挤的城镇。我是说,每个空间都被占用了,还有那些看似凭空出现的城镇,拥有大量高楼大厦,全部住满了人。这就像一场关于中国鬼城的《60 分钟》报道,非常触目惊心。中国就是如此庞大,它存在各种极端现象。是的,有鬼城,但也有完全、完全拥挤的城镇。我是说,每个空间都被占用了,还有那些看似凭空出现的城镇,拥有大量高楼大厦,全部住满了人。这就像一场关于中国鬼城的《60 分钟》报道,非常触目惊心。这始终是一个矛盾,而且将永远如此;你总会找到两者的证据。

We saw a honest. They can distinctly are also towns that 60 Minutes piece about the know whether they know ghost cities in China, and it or they don’t know, and are utterly, utterly was very striking. know what they don’t have crowded … China to know, and that there China is so big. It has all exist unknown unknowns. is a case of sorts of extreme phenome-If you can really put things na. Yes, there are ghost into those categories cor- contradiction, as it towns, but there are also rectly, you will pass the test. towns that are utterly, ut-Otherwise, you will have has always been, terly crowded. I mean, eve-gotten yourself in trouble. ry space is occupied, and and will always be; there are towns seemingly G&D: In 2010 panel at you’ll always find out of nowhere that have an Columbia Business School, enormous number of high you mentioned that Asia’s evidence of every rises that are all occupied.

如今,我在这方面的角色正变得越来越重要……毕竟,全球金融体系在二十年前就已被视为日益关键的角色。你能想象吗?当年浦东还被看作一片半鬼城,而今天,你不得不为那里的经济活力所折服。

I role in the global financial remember, twenty years system is becoming increas- theory you want to ago that Pudong was viewed ingly important. Can you as a semi-ghost town. To-talk about this view for our prove.” day, you cannot help but be readers? impressed by the economic vibrancy there.

李录亚洲将成为重要的经济力量,但这条路还很长。我们住在曼哈顿,但不必只从金融角度考虑问题——不过他们确实从起点走了很远。想想看:上海有 10000 栋超过 30 层的高楼,是曼哈顿的许多倍——这规模惊人。曼哈顿可能是全世界摩天大楼最密集的城区,仅次于上海。可怕的是中国还没完。所以说,中国一直是一个矛盾体,过去如此,未来也如此;你总能找到证据来证明你想证明的任何理论。

格林布拉特:你怎么看待当今股票的整体吸引力?

李录:我也把这个问题归入“太难”和“我知道自己不需要知道”的范畴。我只从宏观趋势中寻找信心,希望它们是顺风而非逆风。亚洲的经济表现是衍生品。亚洲,特别是中国,正在成长为更大的经济力量。由于中国的体量庞大,它将对亚洲和世界其他地区产生巨大影响。所以李录(接第 33 页)有些事让我担忧。能源是下一个大革命。你在电池技术和比亚迪方面做了很多研究,那么除了电池之外,你是否还思考过其他方面?你认为能源革命会是什么样子?

李录:我会关注这些,希望它们能成为顺风而非逆风。

LLAsia will become an important economic force, still have a long way to go, We live in Manhattan, but not necessarily just in a fi- but they have come a long think about it: there are nancial sense. The financial way from the starting point. 10,000 high rises in Shanghai part is a derivative of Asia’s Because of the enormity of that are taller than thirty overall economic perfor- the size of China, it will have floors, multiple times that of mance. Asia, and particular- a huge impact in Asia and Manhattan – that is enor-ly China, is shaping up to the rest of the world. So (Continued on page 34) become a bigger economic Li Lu (Continued from page 33) things to worry me. energy is the next big revo-mous. Manhattan probably lution. You’ve done a lot of has the highest concentra- G&D: How do you view work on battery technology tion of high rises in the the overall attractiveness of and BYD, so is that some-whole world other than equities today? thing that you think about Shanghai. The scary part is beyond batteries? What do that China’s not done. So, I LL: I also put that into "too you think the energy revolu-say China is a case of con- hard" and "I know I don’t tion will look like? tradiction, as it has always have to know." I only think been, and will always be; LL: I pay attention to those you’ll always find evidence macro trends only in the of every theory you want to hope that I can have com-prove. fort that they’re a tailwind as opposed to a headwind.

但总体而言,经济还有很长一段路要走。他们仍然觉得这是他们的时代。我不知道宏观经济趋势究竟能带来多大助力(如果是顺风的话),或者造成多大伤害(如果迎面而来)。但我不希望这些趋势挡在我面前,而是希望它们在我身后。我对宏观经济趋势的了解程度仅限于此。他们并非没有问题;他们的麻烦不少,但美国也一样,过去 200 年美国同样如此。作为关心国家命运的公民,我对宏观经济抱有求知欲。

But overall, the economy Now, how much they can still has a long way to go. “I pay attention to help if they’re a tailwind, or They still have a sense that those macro trends how much they can hurt if this is their time. It doesn’t they’re in my face, I don’t mean that they don’t have only in the hope know. But I want such mac-problems; they have an ro trends to be behind me enormous amount of prob- that I can have rather than in front of me. lems, but so does America, So that’s the extent that I and so did America over the comfort that want to know mega trends. last 200 years. they’re a tailwind as But as a concerned citizen, If you go through the Amer- opposed to a I’m intellectually curious ican Civil War, the country about it.

但逆风并不会消灭人口中的 2%。我无法确切知道某一地区的发展究竟能走多远,不仅重建了,而且是以惊人的速度推进。实际上,这先后经历了两次世界大战。二战后,如果你认为日本和德国已经完蛋了,天哪,那你就大错特错了。

因此,如果我们身处自由市场,有数百万参与者为了自身利益而动,这种顺逆风会带来帮助或造成多大伤害,也难提前预测。事实上,我们不知道,而这正是好事。你不需要有预知未来的能力。

G&D:您是否认为,房地产市场已经有点超前,需要一次回调,还是说需求终究会跟上?

But it doesn’t killed two percent of its headwind. Now, mean that I’ll be able to population. And yet, not know for sure how a given only was it rebuilt, but it how much they can development is going to was rebuilt at a furious pace. come about. In fact, we And it went through two help if they’re a don’t know, and that’s why great world wars. After the free market with mil-World War II, if you tailwind, or how lions of participants acting in thought Japan and Germany much they can hurt their own self interests will were doomed, boy were figure out a way. To predict you wrong. if they’re in my ahead of time is not easy, and the good thing is that G&D: Do you think real face, I don’t know.” you don’t have to be able to estate has gotten a little do that. ahead of itself where there would be a need for a cor- If such trends are at your rection, or do you think back, that’s fabulous, espe-that demand will just catch about it when things go to cially if you don’t need them up? an extreme.

我不认为自己会拖你后腿。如果那会成为一种逆风——如果走到极端,无论哪一边——我都把它归入“太难”的篮子。我也把“我知道我不知道”放进那个篮子。这确实是一个“我不知道”的问题,但我也知道我不必非得知道!我不想非得知道那些。

李录(续第 34 页)

经历过从理解一家业务的角度——就像你拥有该业务 100% 那样——去审视财务、管理层如何决策、它如何与竞争对手比较、它如何适应环境、如何配置多余现金、以及如何安排融资,这种训练是非常有价值的。

G&D:很多聪明人都相信可再生能源……

(续第 35 页)

……人类文明终将在某个时点不得不找到化石燃料之外的替代品。我们没有足够的化石燃料,而且需要为了农业和粮食安全而保留它们。

I don’t foresee to be at your back. If that as going to the ex- they’re really a headwind, LL: I put that in the "too treme, either way. In that you do want to examine hard” basket. I also put in case, I know I don’t have to them a little more. So that the basket of "I know I don’t know. is how I view this renewable have to know." It certainly energy issue. I know that at is “I don’t know”, but I also G&D: A lot of smart peo- some point, human civiliza-know that I don’t have to ple believe that renewable (Continued on page 35) know! I don’t want those Volume XVIII Page 35 Li Lu (Continued from page 34) gone through the discipline finances, how management tion will have to find some- of understanding one busi- makes its decisions, how it thing other than fossil fuels. ness as if you own 100% of compares to the competi-We don’t have enough fossil that business is very valua- tion, how it adjusts to the fuels, and we need to pre- ble. environment, how it invests serve them for agricultural extra cash, and how it fi-and food security reasons.

首先,拿一个容易理解的生意来说。我们也不必非要去理解那些本质上复杂的生意。正如芒格和我说的那样,我们无法在一场比赛还没结束时就知道谁会赢。我们得有那种确定性。“不确定性”对投资经理来说是个很好的词,但对投资者来说却是个很糟的词。如果我们对一个问题没有确定性,我们就会跳过它,继续看下一个。这种自律就能让你成为更好的投资者。

To start, take an easy-to- nances the business. We also can’t afford to have understand business. It the weather deteriorating could be a tiny business – a You should understand eve-the way it has been over the ry aspect of one business as last few decades. Eventually if you own 100% but you it will catch up to us. don’t actually run it. This “Start learning from causes you to be desperate So for multiple reasons I the best — to understand every aspect understand why we need to to protect your investment. figure out alternatives to listening, studying That will give you a sense of fossil fuels. But am I quali- a disciplined approach. fied to make an informed and reading. But That’s how you truly under-investment decision based stand business and investing. on that now?

可能不会。沃伦常说,最重要的是,如果恰好有一位优秀的投资者站在我身后,嘿,那我求之不得。要成为一名优秀的投资者,你需要理解商业;要成为一名优秀的商人,你需要从资本配置的角度成为一名优秀的投资者。

G&D:你对那些有意投身投资管理的学生有什么建议?尤其对那些无法在午休时间去听沃伦·巴菲特演讲的读者来说。

LL:如果你有机会见到巴菲特先生,我要是你,就会赶紧跑去见他。

没有什么能替代实际行动。从彻底理解一个你能掌控的事物开始,这是一个极好的起点。如果你从这个基础出发,你基本上就走在成为优秀投资者的正确方向上了。

Probably not. the most important Warren always says that to But if that one happened to be a good investor, you be at my back, hey I’m all thing in need to be a good business-for it. understanding the man, and to be a good businessman, you need to be a G&D: Do you have any investment business good investor in terms of advice for students who are capital allocation. interested in getting into is by doing it. investment management, Start by understanding one especially for those readers There is no thing within your control who can’t go and listen to that you can understand Warren Buffett speak during substitute for inside and out. That is a their lunch break? actually doing it. terrific starting point. If you start from that basis, you LL: If you do get a chance The best way to do are fundamentally in the to meet Mr. Buffett, I’d run right direction of becoming to it if I were you.

我甚至会——研究一家伟大的证券分析师,用不着坐飞机,我直接跑到奥马哈!彻底搞懂一个企业的内部运作。G&D:李(Li)先生,很高兴和您交谈[笑]。学习的起点是向最优秀的人学习——通过倾听、研究和阅读。但理解投资行业最重要的事,是通过实践。没有什么能取代亲身实践。最好的方法就是选一个生意,把它里里外外研究透——为做出最佳投资而研究。哪怕是一个小杂货店、一家餐厅,或者一家小型上市公司都可以。弄懂一个生意,搞清楚它真正运转的机理:它怎么赚钱,怎么组织架构——就算你最终没投进去也没事。可一旦你彻底弄懂了一个生意……

I would- it is to study one a great security analyst. n’t even take an airplane; I would just run to Omaha! business inside and G&D: It was a pleasure [laughs] speaking with you, Mr. Li. out for the purpose Start by learning from the of making the best – listening, studying, and reading. But the most investment.” important thing in under-standing the investment business is by doing it. little concession store, a There is no substitute to restaurant, or a small public-actually doing it. The best ly traded company. It way to do it is to study one doesn’t matter. Understand business inside and out for one business and what really the purpose of making the makes it tick: how it makes investment – you may not money, how it organizes its actually invest. But having