超越表现的过程：组织投资成功的思考
2002 年 3 月 26 日 第 1 卷 第 6 期
March 26, 2002 Volume 1, Issue 6
一个跑赢市场的流程——关于为投资成功搭建组织架构的思考
A Process for Outperformance Thoughts on Organizing for Investing Success
你读得越多，知道的东西就越多。
The more that you read, the more things you will know.
你学得越多，能去的地方就越多。
The more that you learn, the more places you’ll go.
苏斯博士《闭着眼睛也能读！》
Dr. Seuss I Can Read With My Eyes Shut!
蚂蚁大脑 2000 年秋天，我们召集了一小群顶尖投资者，聆听多位金融、战略和商业领域知名人士的演讲。这些演讲者总体上都非常出色，但没有哪一位能赢得“制造最大话题”的奖项。这份殊荣落到了洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室科学家诺曼·约翰逊（Norman Johnson）头上。他的开场白看似并不起眼：“我被请到这里来，是要以一位专家的身份，谈谈专家有什么问题——而我所要谈论的领域，金融，恰恰是我几乎一无所知的东西。”
Ant Brain In the fall of 2000, we gathered a small group of leading investors to hear from various finance, strategy, and business luminaries. While these presenters were terrific on balance, none got the award for creating the most buzz. That honor went to Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist Norman Johnson, who opened his talk in a seemingly inauspicious way: “I’ve been asked here to talk about what’s wrong with experts—as an expert in this area—in a subject area, finance, 1 that I know almost nothing about.”
约翰逊说了什么，让这些聪明的投资者纷纷身体前倾、坐直了身子？简单来说，他展示了各类“普通”群体共同行动时，解决问题比专家更出色。约翰逊通过讨论包括蚂蚁和蜜蜂在内的社会性昆虫的行为，阐述了他的观点。正是这些昆虫令人难以置信的表现，尤其激发了听众的想象力。
What did Johnson say to cause these smart investors to slide forward in their chairs? Simply put, he showed how diverse groups of “average” people, acting together, solve problems better than experts do. Johnson illustrated his point by discussing the behavior of social insects, including ants and bees. It was the incredible performance of these insects, above all, that sparked the imaginations of the listeners.
约翰逊的论述主要集中在宏观层面，即集体如何解决问题。这对于理解市场效率如何形成有两个明显的关联。我们在此聚焦于微观层面，即作为个体的投资者应当如何组织起来以实现投资成功。虽然分析的单位不同，但信息是一致的：多元化的信息和视角能够帮助改善投资业绩。
Most of Johnson’s talk was at the macro level, or how the collective solves problems. This has 2 obvious relevance for understanding how market efficiency arises. Our focus here is on the micro level or how investors, as individuals, should organize for investment success. While the unit of analysis is different, the message is the same: diverse information and perspectives can Michael J. Mauboussin help improve investment performance.
212-325-3108 [email protected] 现在，请花一点时间仔细审视你的信息来源。你是否总在翻阅同一家报纸、与同一群人交谈、反复阅读同一类研究报告？还是你会抽出时间来接触新想法，哪怕冒着在某些思路的死胡同里浪费时间的风险？有充分证据表明，许多领域的顶尖思考者——不仅仅是投资领域——都受益于输入来源的多样性。
212-325-3108 [email protected] Now think carefully for a moment about your information sources. Do you read the same Kristen Bartholdson newspapers, talk to the same people, and review the same type of research reports over and 212-325-2788 over? Or do you allocate time to entertain new ideas, even at the risk of wasting time on [email protected] intellectual cul-de-sacs? There is strong evidence to suggest that the leading thinkers in many fields—not just investing—benefit from input diversity.
在我们聚焦于个人之前，先来展示多样性如何带来更优的答案，而缺乏多样性又如何造成低效。约翰逊用一个迷宫问题演示了：群体比普通个人表现更出色——
A-Mazing Before we dwell on the individual, we would like to show how diversity leads to better answers and how a lack of diversity can create inefficiencies. Johnson demonstrates how the collective is better than the average individual with a maze problem:
首先，他让能力相同的个体去解决一个迷宫问题。由于这些个体对问题没有全局概念，他们只是不断探索，直到找到出路。
• First, he asks individuals of identical capabilities to solve a maze. Because the individuals have no global sense of the problem, they simply explore until they find a solution.
• 接着，他让这些人再次解决问题。凭借已学到的信息，他们的表现往往会有所改善。
• Next, he asks the individuals to solve the problem again. With some learned information, they tend to improve.
• 最后，他构建每个人经验的线性组合，并用同样的规则找出一个集体解决方案。
• Finally, he constructs a linear combination of each individual’s experiences and uses the same rules to find a collective solution.
由于每个个体的初始搜索是随机的，一群个体便汇聚了多样化的经验（迷宫 3 个区域）、偏好（优先路径）和表现（路径长度）。因此，这个集体说白了不过是一个拥有超级信息的普通个体。正是因为有这样多样化的信息，集体的解决方案才远远优于普通个体的平均解决方案。（见图 1。）
Because each individual’s initial search is random, a collection of individuals reflects diverse experience (maze 3 regions), preferences (preferred paths), and performance (path lengths). So the collective is really just a normal individual with super information. Because of this diverse information, the collective solution is vastly more robust than average individual solution. (See Figure 1.)
图 1 集体战胜个体
Figure 1 The Collective Beats the Individual
图中插入部分展示了演示迷宫。主图显示了两种不同随机数集下，随着更多人贡献于集体解决方案，集体解的变化效果。集体的步数已通过贡献于集体解的个体平均步数进行了归一化处理。
The insert in the figure shows the demonstration maze. The main figure shows the effect on the collective solutions as more individuals contribute to the collective solution, for two different sets of random numbers. The number of steps of the collective is normalized by the average number of steps of the individuals contributing to collective solution.
来源：诺曼·L·约翰逊。参见 http://www.ishi.lanl.gov/symintel.html。
Source: Norman L. Johnson. See http://www.ishi.lanl.gov/symintel.html.
这种集体效应的力量，自然界并未忽视。这就是约翰逊讲述蚂蚁故事的意义所在。
The power of this collective effect has not been lost on nature. This is where Johnson’s stories about ants come in.
蚂蚁是怎么做到的？工蚁离开蚁巢外出觅食时，心里只有一个任务：找到食物并带回来。它们还有能力留下并追踪化学信息素痕迹。起初，它们随机分散开来。当找到食物的蚂蚁返回蚁巢时，会留下一条化学信息素痕迹，其他蚂蚁就能循迹跟上。研究表明，这一过程能让蚂蚁始终找到通往食物的最短路径。
How do the ants do it? Foraging ants depart the nest with one job in mind, to find and retrieve food. They also have the ability to leave and follow chemical trails. At first, they disperse randomly. When the ants that find food come back to the nest, they leave a chemical trail that their sisters can follow. Studies show that this process 4 allows ants to consistently find the shortest path to the food.
研究者们了解到蚂蚁的这种集体能力后，决定捉弄一下它们。在受控环境中，科学家们将两个食物源放置在距离蚁巢完全相同的路径长度上。结果发现，蚂蚁最终只使用其中一条路径，至于选择哪一条则是随机的。为什么呢？因为它们遵循化学轨迹——只要多几只蚂蚁走上某条路径，就会吸引其他蚂蚁跟随，从而引发正反馈循环。因此，蚂蚁找到的并非最优解，而是一条拥挤不堪的路径和一条距离相等却空无一人的路径。
Once researchers understood this collective ability, they decided to play a trick on the ants. In a controlled setting, the scientists placed two food sources at identical path lengths from the nest. As it turned out, the ants ended up using just one of the paths, although which one they chose was random. Why? Because they follow chemical trails, a couple more ants going down one path will attract other ants, triggering a positive feedback loop. So instead of finding an optimal solution, the ants have one crowded path and an equidistant, empty path.
然而，令人惊叹的是，大自然同样预见到了这个问题。结果发现，蚂蚁会定期脱离主路径，重新开始随机搜索过程。蚂蚁的内在程序设定了一种平衡：既利用已知的食物来源，又探索下一个食物来源。（见图 2。）约翰逊将这种选择称为“野头发”方案。蚂蚁天生就追求多样性。
Amazingly, though, nature anticipated this problem as well. As it turns out, ants periodically break from the main path and begin a random search process again. The ants are programmed to strike a balance between exploiting a known food source and exploring for the next food source. (See Figure 2.) Johnson calls this the “wild hair” alternative. The ants are hard-wired to seek diversity.
图 2 荒诞不经的另类方案
Figure 2 The Wild Hair Alternative
插图由 Sente Corporation 提供。www.senteco.com
Illustration by Sente Corporation. www.senteco.com
获得多元化学位 迷宫和蚂蚁与充满挑战的理财工作有什么关系？事实证明，关系很大。
Getting a Diversity Degree What do mazes and ants have to do with the challenging job of managing money? A lot, as it turns out.
生理学家霍勒斯·巴洛说过，智能的本质在于做出一种猜测，从而发现某种新的潜在秩序。这包括解决一个问题、理解一个论证的逻辑，或是找到一个恰当的类比。那么，投资智慧从何而来？
Physiologist Horace Barlow says that intelligence is all about making a guess that discovers some new underlying 5 order. This includes solving a problem, seeing the logic of an argument, or finding an appropriate analogy. Where does investment intelligence come from?
这里诺曼·约翰逊的观点对投资者至关重要。在定义清晰的系统中，专家之所以有用，是因为他们能提供基于规则的解决方案。但当系统变得复杂时，一群个体往往比单个个体——哪怕是专家——能更好地解决问题。这意味着股市在大多数时候很可能比大多数人更聪明，这一点已被实证数据所证实。
Here is where Norman Johnson’s message is so important for investors. In well defined systems, experts are useful because they can provide rule-based solutions. But when a system becomes complex, a collection of individuals often solves a problem better than an individual—even an expert. This means that the stock market is likely to be smarter than most people most of the time, a point the empirical facts bear out.
他接着说，要在一个像股市这样复杂的系统中成为专家，你需要两个核心要素。首先，你必须在脑海中构建一个“模拟器”，让你能够构思并选择策略。对传奇对冲基金经理乔治·索罗斯的一段描述就说明了这一点：
To be an expert in a complex system like the stock market, he continues, you need two essential features. First, 6 you must be able to create a “simulation” in your head, allowing you to conceive and select strategies. A description of the legendary hedge fund manager George Soros illustrates the point:
“[加里] 格拉德斯坦与索罗斯密切共事了十五年，他形容自己老板的运作方式近乎玄妙，将索罗斯的专业能力与他想象全球资金与信贷流动的能力联系在一起。‘他拥有整个世界的宏观视野。他吸收所有信息，将其全部消化，然后从中得出自己对事情将如何解决的看法。他会看图表，但他处理的大部分信息是文字性的，而非统计性的。’”
"[Gary] Gladstein, who has worked closely with Soros for fifteen years, describes his boss as operating in almost mystical terms, tying Soros's expertise to his ability to visualize the entire world's money and credit flows. 'He has the macro vision of the entire world. He consumes all this information, digests it all, and from there he can come out with his opinion as to how this is going to be sorted out. He'll look at charts, but most of the information he's 7 processing is verbal, not statistical’."
第二，你必须在自己的心智体系中填入来自不同源头的信息。虽然模拟能力很大程度上是天生的（不过你可以在这方面提升自己的技能），但主动汲取多样化的想法则完全在你的掌控之中。
Second, you must populate your mental system with information from diverse sources. While the ability to simulate may be largely hard-wired (although you can improve your skills in this area), the pursuit of diverse ideas is within your control.
心理学家唐纳德·坎贝尔用类似的语言描述了这一状况，将创造性思维的过程称为“盲目变异与选择性保留”。换言之，创造性思考者会搜寻各种想法，但只会挑选那些在当前目标下有用的部分。
Psychologist Donald Campbell describes the situation in similar terms, referring to the process of creative thinking as “blind variation and selective retention.” In other words, creative thinkers seek a variety of ideas, but only choose those that are useful given their current goals.
想法多样性让你能捕捉到约翰逊所说的“微弱信号”。一个微弱信号可能是偏离主流路径的趋势起点（比如新技术或新开发），也可能是来自意想不到来源的恰当时机的正确信息。事实上，最近一项研究表明，非正式学习能满足某些组织内部高达 70% 的学习需求。我们往往很难知道下一个有益的想法会来自哪里。
Idea diversity allows you to find what Johnson calls “weak signals.” A weak signal may be the start of a trend that’s away from the dominant path (think new technology or development), or the right piece of information at the right time from an unexpected source. In fact, a recent study suggests that informal learning fulfils up to 70% of learning 8 needs inside some organizations. It’s often difficult to know where the next beneficial idea will come from. The
证据表明，接触多样化的信息来源可以提高找到有用创意的可能性。
evidence suggests that exposure to diverse information sources can improve the likelihood of finding a useful idea.
创造性与投资 在一篇经典文章中，美林资产管理公司前总裁亚瑟·塞克尔提出，卓越的投资业绩要求公司内部的关键人员具备创造性。他指出，富有创造性的人具备以下特质：
Creativity and Investing In a classic article, former Merrill Lynch Asset Management president Arthur Zeikel argued that superior 9 investment performance requires key personnel within the firm to be creative. He suggested that creative people are:
• Intellectually curious
• Intellectually curious
• 保持灵活，对新信息持开放态度
• Flexible and open to new information
• 能够识别问题，并清晰且准确地定义它们
• Able to recognize problems and define them clearly and accurately
• 能够以多种不同方式整合信息，以得出解决方案
• Able to put information together in many different ways to reach a solution
• 反权威且不拘一格
• Antiauthoritarian and unorthodox
• 精神上永不安分，专注投入，且动力十足
• Mentally restless, intense, and highly motivated
• Highly intelligent
• Highly intelligent
• Goal-oriented
• Goal-oriented
多元性是许多自然和认知过程的燃料。如果投资者的投资方法或信息来源过于狭窄，就可能错过多元性的力量。当然，不利的一面是，接纳多元的想法意味着要筛选大量可能毫无用处的信息。但总体而言，多元性似乎能丰富有思想的投资者的投资业绩——以及他们的生活。
Diversity is the fuel for many natural and cognitive processes. Investors that have investment approaches, or information sources, that are too narrow risk missing out on the power of diversity. The downside, of course, is that entertaining diverse ideas means sorting through lots of potentially useless input. But on balance diversity seems to enrich the investment performance —and the lives—of thoughtful investors.
注瑞信第一波士顿银行在过去三年内，可能曾担任上述任一或所有公司证券公开发行的主承销商或联合主承销商，或者为这些公司的证券做市。
N.B.CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON CORPORATION may have, within the last three years, served as a manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for or makes a primary market in issues of any or all of the companies mentioned.
1 Michael J. Mauboussin，“思想领袖论坛：连接创意前沿”瑞士信贷第一波士顿股票研究，2001 年，64-81 页。
_____________________________ 1 Michael J. Mauboussin, “Thought Leader Forum: Connect to the Idea Frontier” Credit Suisse First Boston Equity Research, 2001, 64-81.
2 迈克尔·J·莫布森，《重新审视市场有效性：股票市场作为复杂适应系统》，《应用公司金融杂志》，第 14 卷，第 4 期，2002 年冬季，第 8-16 页。
2 Michael J. Mauboussin, “Revisiting Market Efficiency: The Stock Market As A Complex Adaptive System” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 14, 4, Winter 2002, 8-16.
3 Norman L. Johnson，“分散化系统中的多样性：促进自组织解决方案”，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室，LA-UR-99-6281，1999。更多内容，请参阅 http://ishi.lanl.gov。
3 Norman L. Johnson, “Diversity in Decentralized Systems: Enabling Self-Organizing Solutions, LANL, LA-UR-99-6281, 1999. For more on this, see http://ishi.lanl.gov.
4 James Kennedy 和 Russell C. Eberhart，《群体智能》（加州旧金山：Morgan Kaufmann 出版社，2001 年），第 105 页。
4 James Kennedy and Russell C. Eberhart, Swarm Intelligence (San Francisco, CA: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, 2001), 105.
5 William H. Calvin “智能的涌现”《科学美国人》特刊，第 9 卷第 4 期，1998 年 11 月，第 44-51 页。http://www.sciam.com/1998/1198intelligence/1198quicksummary.html 6 Gary Klein，《力量的源泉：人们如何决策》（剑桥，马萨诸塞州：麻省理工学院出版社，1998 年）。
5 William H. Calvin "The Emergence of Intelligence" Scientific American Presents, 9, 4, November 1998, 44-51. http://www.sciam.com/1998/1198intelligence/1198quicksummary.html 6 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
7 Michael T. Kaufman，《索罗斯：一个救世主式亿万富翁的生活与时代》（纽约：Knopf，2002 年），第 141 页。8 参见 http://www.learning-org.com/98.01/0331.html.
7 Michael T. Kaufman, Soros: The Life and Times of a Messianic Billionaire (New York: Knopf, 2002), 141. 8 See http://www.learning-org.com/98.01/0331.html.
9 阿瑟·泽克尔，《为创造力而组织》，《金融分析师杂志》，第 39 期，1983 年 11/12 月刊，第 25–29 页。
9 Arthur Zeikel, “Organizing for Creativity” Financial Analyst Journal, 39, November/December 1983, 25-29.
原件此处是表格，PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失，下面只剩按列读出的数字，行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
| 阿姆斯特丹 | 31 20 5754 890 | 吉隆坡 | 603 2143 0366 | 旧金山 | 1 415 836 7600 |
| 亚特兰大 | 1 404 656 9500 | 伦敦 | 44 20 7888 8888 | 圣保罗 | 55 11 3841 6000 |
| 奥克兰 | 64 9 302 5500 | 马德里 | 34 91 423 16 00 | 首尔 | 82 2 3707 3700 |
| 巴尔的摩 | 1 410 223 3000 | 墨尔本 | 61 3 9280 1888 | 上海 | 86 21 6881 8418 |
| 曼谷 | 62 614 6000 | 墨西哥城 | 52 5 283 89 00 | 新加坡 | 65 212 2000 |
| 北京 | 86 10 6410 6611 | 米兰 | 39 02 7702 1 | 悉尼 | 61 2 8205 4433 |
| 波士顿 | 1 617 556 5500 | 莫斯科 | 7 501 967 8200 | 台北 | 886 2 2715 6388 |
| 布达佩斯 | 36 1 202 2188 | 孟买 | 91 22 230 6333 | 东京 | 81 3 5404 9000 |
| 布宜诺斯艾利斯 | 54 11 4394 3100 | 纽约 | 1 212 325 2000 | 多伦多 | 1 416 352 4500 |
| 芝加哥 | 1 312 750 3000 | 帕洛阿尔托 | 1 650 614 5000 | 华沙 | 48 22 695 0050 |
| 法兰克福 | 49 69 75 38 0 | 巴黎 | 33 1 53 75 85 00 | 华盛顿 | 1 202 354 2600 |
| 休斯顿 | 1 713 220 6700 | 帕萨迪纳 | 1 626 395 5100 | 惠灵顿 | 64 4 474 4400 |
| 香港 | 852 2101 6000 | 费城 | 1 215 851 1000 | 苏黎世 | 41 1 333 55 55 |
| 约翰内斯堡 | 27 11 343 2200 | 布拉格 | 420 2 210 83111 |
AMSTERDAM............... 31 20 5754 890 KUALA LUMPUR.........603 2143 0366 SAN FRANCISCO...... 1 415 836 7600 ATLANTA ......................1 404 656 9500 LONDON ...................44 20 7888 8888 SÃO PAULO ............ 55 11 3841 6000 AUCKLAND.....................64 9 302 5500 MADRID .....................34 91 423 16 00 SEOUL ....................... 82 2 3707 3700 BALTIMORE..................1 410 223 3000 MELBOURNE .............61 3 9280 1888 SHANGHAI............... 86 21 6881 8418 BANGKOK..........................62 614 6000 MEXICO CITY ..............52 5 283 89 00 SINGAPORE ................... 65 212 2000 BEIJING.......................86 10 6410 6611 MILAN .............................39 02 7702 1 SYDNEY ..................... 61 2 8205 4433 BOSTON........................1 617 556 5500 MOSCOW....................7 501 967 8200 TAIPEI ...................... 886 2 2715 6388 BUDAPEST .....................36 1 202 2188 MUMBAI......................91 22 230 6333 TOKYO ....................... 81 3 5404 9000 BUENOS AIRES..........54 11 4394 3100 NEW YORK.................1 212 325 2000 TORONTO.................. 1 416 352 4500 CHICAGO ......................1 312 750 3000 PALO ALTO................1 650 614 5000 WARSAW................... 48 22 695 0050 FRANKFURT ....................49 69 75 38 0 PARIS........................33 1 53 75 85 00 WASHINGTON........... 1 202 354 2600 HOUSTON .....................1 713 220 6700 PASADENA ................1 626 395 5100 WELLINGTON.............. 64 4 474 4400 HONG KONG..................852 2101 6000 PHILADELPHIA ..........1 215 851 1000 ZURICH ....................... 41 1 333 55 55 JOHANNESBURG..........27 11 343 2200 PRAGUE ...................420 2 210 83111
版权所有：瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行及其附属机构和关联公司，2002 年。保留所有权利。
Copyright Credit Suisse First Boston, and its subsidiaries and affiliates, 2002. All rights reserved.
本报告并非针对或意图分发给任何司法管辖区的公民、居民或位于该地区的任何个人或实体，也不允许其在任何司法管辖区内进行分发、出版、提供或使用，若此类行为违反该管辖区的法律或法规，或会使瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行或其子公司及关联公司（合称“CSFB”）受到该司法管辖区内的任何注册或许可要求的约束。除非另有明确说明，本报告中呈现的所有材料均受 CSFB 版权保护。未经 CSFB 事先书面许可，不得以任何方式修改任何材料、其内容或其任何副本，也不得将其传输、复制或分发给任何其他方。本报告中使用的所有商标、服务标志和标识均为 CSFB 的商标、服务标志或注册商标、注册服务标志。
This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse First Boston or its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "CSFB") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CSFB. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CSFB. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CSFB.
本报告中所提供的信息、工具和材料仅供您参考之用，不应被视为或用作出售、购买或认购证券或其他金融工具的要约或要约邀请。CSFB 可能未采取任何措施来确保本报告中提及的证券适合任何特定投资者。本报告的内容不构成对任何人的投资建议，CSFB 也不会因接收方收到本报告而将其视为客户。本报告中呈现的信息和观点来源于 CSFB 认为可靠的来源，但 CSFB 对其准确性或完整性不作任何陈述，除非因特定法规或法规而承担此类责任，否则 CSFB 对因使用本报告中材料而产生的损失不承担任何责任。本报告不得替代独立判断。CSFB 可能发布过其他与本报告信息不一致且得出不同结论的报告。这些报告反映了编制这些报告的分析师不同的假设、观点和分析方法。
The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CSFB may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. The contents of this report does not constitute investment advice to any person and CSFB will not treat recipients as its customers by virtue of their receiving the report. Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by CSFB to be reliable, but CSFB makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness and CSFB accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report unless such liability arises under specific statutes or regulations. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CSFB may have issued other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them.
在法律允许的范围内，CSFB 可能参与或投资于与本报告中提及证券的发行人进行的融资交易，为此类发行人提供服务或招揽业务，和/或持有证券或其期权的头寸或进行相关交易。此外，CSFB 可能对本报告中所述材料中提及的证券进行做市。CSFB 可以在材料发布之前，在法律允许的范围内，依据或使用本报告中呈现的信息或观点，或据此进行的研究或分析。CSFB 在过去三年内，可能担任过本报告中提及的任何一家或所有公司公开发行证券的牵头经办人或联席经办人，或者目前可能对这些公司的证券进行一级市场做市。可根据要求提供更多信息。
CSFB may, to the extent permitted by law, participate or invest in financing transactions with the issuer(s) of the securities referred to in this report, perform services for or solicit business from such issuers, and/or have a position or effect transactions in the securities or options thereon. In addition, it may make markets in the securities mentioned in the material presented in this report. CSFB may, to the extent permitted by law, act upon or use the information or opinions presented herein, or the research or analysis on which they are based, before the material is published. CSFB may have, within the last three years, served as manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities for, or currently may make a primary market in issues of, any or all of the companies mentioned in this report. Additional information is available on request.
研究中提及的某些投资将仅由单一实体提供，某些情况下仅由 CSFB 或 CSFB 的关联公司提供。过往业绩不应被视为未来业绩的指标或保证，且未就未来业绩作出任何明示或暗示的陈述或保证。本报告中包含的信息、观点和估计反映了 CSFB 在其原始发布日期时的判断，并可能发生变化。本报告中提及的任何证券或金融工具的价格、价值和收益均可能下跌或上涨。证券和金融工具的价值受汇率波动的影响，这可能会对此类证券或金融工具的价格或收益产生积极或消极的影响。投资于诸如美国存托凭证（ADR）等受货币波动影响价值的证券的投资者，实际上承担了此风险。结构性证券是复杂的工具，通常涉及高度风险，仅面向能够理解并承担所涉风险的成熟投资者销售。任何结构性证券的市场价值可能受到经济、金融和政治因素（包括但不限于现货和远期利率及汇率）、剩余期限、市场条件与波动性以及任何发行人或参考发行人的信用质量变化的影响。任何有兴趣购买结构性产品的投资者，应自行对该产品进行调研和分析，并咨询其专业顾问了解进行此类购买所涉及的风险。
Some investments referred to in the research will be offered solely by a single entity and in the case of some investments solely by CSFB, or an associate of CSFB. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgement at its original date of publication by CSFB and are subject to change. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR’s, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk. Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase.
研究中讨论的某些投资可能具有高波动性。高波动性投资可能会突然大幅贬值，在实现该投资时造成损失。这些损失可能与您的初始投资额相等。对于某些投资，潜在损失可能超过初始投资金额，在这种情况下，您可能需要支付更多资金来弥补这些损失。投资的收益可能会波动，因此，用于进行投资的初始资本可能被用作该收益的一部分。
Some investments discussed in the research may have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. In the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment, in such circumstances you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and in consequence initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield.
某些投资可能不易变现，且可能难以出售或变现，同样，您可能难以获得有关此类投资所面临的价值或风险的可靠信息。本报告中包含或提及的投资和服务可能不适合您，如果您对这些投资或投资服务有疑问，建议您咨询独立的投资顾问。本报告中的任何内容均不构成投资、法律、会计或税务建议，也不代表任何投资或策略适合或适用于您的个人情况。本报告中的任何内容均不构成对您的个人建议。CSFB 不就投资税务后果提供建议。建议您联系独立的税务顾问。请注意，税基和税率可能会发生变化。
Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed. The investments and services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you, it is recommended you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about those investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice nor a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances. Nothing in the report constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CSFB does not advise on the tax consequences of investments. You are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note the bases and levels of taxation may change.
本报告可能包含指向网站的超级链接。CSFB 未审查链接网站，且对其内容不承担任何责任。该链接仅为方便您获取信息而提供，链接网站的内容不以任何方式构成本文件的一部分。通过本报告或 CSFB 网站上的链接访问，风险自负。本报告在欧洲由瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行（欧洲）有限公司发行，该公司在英国受证券与期货管理局（“SFA”）监管。本报告在欧洲由瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行（欧洲）有限公司分发，在美国由瑞士信贷第一波士顿公司分发，在瑞士由瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行分发，在加拿大由瑞士信贷第一波士顿证券加拿大公司分发，在巴西由 Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse Boston Garantia S.A. 分发，在日本由瑞士信贷第一波士顿证券（日本）有限公司分发，在亚洲其他地区由瑞士信贷第一波士顿（香港）有限公司、瑞士信贷第一波士顿澳大利亚股票有限公司、瑞士信贷第一波士顿新西兰证券有限公司、瑞士信贷第一波士顿（泰国）有限公司、CSFB 研究（马来西亚）有限公司、瑞士信贷第一波士顿新加坡分行分发，在世界其他地区由授权的关联公司分发。由瑞士信贷第一波士顿台北分行制作的关于台湾证券的研究报告，已由注册的高级业务人员准备和/或审查。
This report may contain hyperlinks to websites. CSFB has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. The link is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of the linked site does not in any way form part of this document. Following the link through this report or CSFB’s website shall be at your own risk. This report is issued in Europe by Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Securities and Futures Authority (“SFA”). This report is being distributed in Europe by Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited, in the United States by Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse First Boston; in Canada by Credit Suisse First Boston Securities Canada, Inc.; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse Boston Garantia S.A; in Japan by Credit Suisse First Boston Securities (Japan) Limited; elsewhere in Asia by Credit Suisse First Boston (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston Australia Equities Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston NZ Securities Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston (Thailand) Limited, CSFB Research (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse First Boston Singapore Branch and elsewhere in the world by an authorised affiliate. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse First Boston, Taipei Branch has been prepared and/or reviewed by a registered Senior Business Person.
在 CSFB 尚未注册或获发证券交易牌照的司法管辖区，交易将仅根据适用的证券法规进行，各司法管辖区的法规可能有所不同，并可能要求交易根据适用的注册或许可要求豁免进行。除非适用法律另有规定，否则非美国客户如欲进行交易，应联系其在当地司法管辖区的 CSFB 实体。美国客户如欲进行交易，应仅通过联系美国瑞士信贷第一波士顿公司的代表进行。
In jurisdictions where CSFB is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CSFB entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation in the U.S.
请注意，本研究报告最初由 CSFB 编写并发布，分发给其市场专业和机构投资者客户。不属于 CSFB 市场专业或机构投资者客户的接收方，在根据本报告做出任何投资决定或就本报告内容寻求任何必要解释之前，应咨询其独立财务顾问。
Please note that this research was originally prepared and issued by CSFB for distribution to their market professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor customers of CSFB should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents