诺玛德投资合伙公司——中期信函(截至2011年6月30日)

2011 · 书信 · 原文约 2640 词
译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文,也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。
打开来源正文

Sleep、Zakaria and Company, Ltd.

Sleep, Zakaria and Company, Ltd.

1a, Burnsall Street London England SW3 3SR T: +44 (0) 20 7101 1960 F: +44 (0) 20 7101 1965 游牧投资合伙公司 中期信函 截至 2011 年 6 月 30 日的期间。

1a, Burnsall Street London England SW3 3SR T: +44 (0) 20 7101 1960 F: +44 (0) 20 7101 1965 Nomad Investment Partnership Interim Letter For the period ended June 30th, 2011.

截至 2011 年 6 月 30 日的累计业绩。Nomad 投资 MSCI 世界指数(净收益) 美元 回溯:一年 73.7% 30.5% 两年 139.9 43.8 三年 100.5 1.4 四年 64.0 -9.4 五年 112.5 12.4 六年 134.0 30.9 七年 195.3 44.1 八年 316.6 78.7 九年 412.5 74.3 自成立以来(2001 年 9 月 10 日) 487.5 64.7 自成立以来年化收益率:扣除业绩报酬前 20.9% 5.5% 扣除业绩报酬后 17.7 初始投入 1 美元的价值(费用前) $5.87 $1.65 以上数据未经审计,以累计百分比收益形式列示,且一如既往地为费用前数据。我们之所以这样列示,是因为 Nomad 的可退还业绩报酬及基于时间的业绩报酬门槛意味着,扣除所有费用后的结果会因申购日期不同而不同,也因投资者而异。因此,每位合伙人都会拥有自己独特的、在 Nomad 投资中扣除所有费用后的经历。作为参考,我们也从某个时间点(在此为自成立以来)列示了扣除所有费用后的结果。表格中使用了一个指数,以便将我们的业绩置于全球范围内广泛股价的背景之下。我们对自己所选指数的优劣并无强烈看法,合伙人或许希望使用其他指数。无论采用何种标尺,我们只要求对 Nomad 的业绩进行非常长期比较。下方以逐年单独增量的方式列示了相同的费用前结果。我们相信,在评估长期投资业绩时,上表可能最为有用。

Cumulative results to June 30th, 2011. Nomad Investment MSCI World Partnership Index (net) US$ Trailing: One year 73.7% 30.5% Two years 139.9 43.8 Three years 100.5 1.4 Four years 64.0 -9.4 Five years 112.5 12.4 Six years 134.0 30.9 Seven years 195.3 44.1 Eight years 316.6 78.7 Nine years 412.5 74.3 Since inception (Sept 10th 2001) 487.5 64.7 Annualized since inception Before performance fees 20.9% 5.5% After performance fees 17.7 Value of a dollar invested at inception (pre fees) $5.87 $1.65 The figures above are unaudited, presented on a cumulative, percentage gain basis and, as ever, are before fees. We present results in this way as Nomad’s refundable performance fee and time dependent performance fee hurdle mean that the net-of-all- fees results will vary with subscription date, and from investor to investor. Partners will, therefore, each have their own, unique, net-of-all fees experience of investing in Nomad. As a guide, we have also detailed the net-of-all-fees results from one point in time, in this case since inception. An index is used in the table to place our results in context with a broad swathe of share prices from around the world. We do not feel strongly about the merits of the index we have chosen, and partners may wish to use another. Whatever the yardstick, we ask only that Nomad be compared over the very long-term. Below, the same pre-fee results are presented in discrete annual increments. In our opinion, it is probably the upper table that is most useful in assessing long-term investment performance.

日历年度业绩:游牧投资合伙基金 摩根士丹利资本国际全球指数(净收益) 美元

2011 年(年初至今) 17.5% 6.3%

2010 年 43.9 11.8

2009 年 71.5 30.0

2008 年 -45.3 -40.7

2007 年 21.2 9.0

2006 年 13.6 20.1

2005 年 9.2 9.5

2004 年 22.1 14.7

2003 年 79.6 33.1

2002 年 1.3 -19.9

2001 年(成立于 2001 年 9 月 10 日) 10.1 3.6

截至 6 月 30 日,在成立时投资于游牧合伙基金的 1 美元,扣除费用前已增至 5.87 美元;而同一时期投资于上述指数所反映的平均股票的 1 美元,则仅值约 1.65 美元。换个角度说,净资产价值(即扣除费用后)的年复合增长率为 17.7%,而同期指数的年复合增长率仅为 5.5%。

Calendar Year Results: Nomad Investment MSCI World Partnership Index (net) US$ 2011 year to date 17.5% 6.3% 2010 43.9 11.8 2009 71.5 30.0 2008 -45.3 -40.7 2007 21.2 9.0 2006 13.6 20.1 2005 9.2 9.5 2004 22.1 14.7 2003 79.6 33.1 2002 1.3 -19.9 2001 (inception Sept 10th 2001) 10.1 3.6 A US dollar invested in Nomad at inception has grown to be worth $5.87 before fees, as of June 30th, whilst a dollar invested over the same period in the average share, as reflected in the index above, would be worth around $1.65. Put a slightly different way, net asset value (i.e. after fees) has compounded at 17.7% per annum, whilst the index has managed 5.5%.

关于思维捷径的一些观察 在哈佛大学肯尼迪政府学院理查德·泽克豪森教授的行为金融学课上,泽克豪森教授写下以下便条,递给了同组的另一位嘉宾——当时两人正主持一场面向投资专业人士的讨论会。

Some observations on mental shortcuts At Professor Richard Zeckhauser’s Behavioural Finance course at the JFK School of Government at Harvard University, the following note was scribbled by Professor Zeckhauser and passed to a fellow panelist, whilst both men hosted a discussion group with an audience of investment professionals.

泽克豪泽:我们的一位参会者正在买入津巴布韦证券,这些证券的价格仅为净资产的很小一个百分比。您会尝试跟他一起投资吗?

Zeckhauser: One of our participants is buying Zimbabwean securities, which are priced at a small percentage of Net Asset Value. Would you try to invest with him?

另一位小组成员:不!(感叹号为原文)天哪!我们怀疑这位小组成员在看见津巴布韦这个字眼的瞬间就已拿定主意,这个念头屏蔽了他对如此低价所能带来收益的思考。我们大家都有这种倾向。因为某个糟糕的联想就筛掉一个好主意,这实在太容易了。正如查理·芒格几年前在同一门课程演讲中打趣的那样:“人类的大脑很像人类的卵子”——一旦有一个精子进入,其他所有精子就都被挡在外面了。我们最近拜访的一家市场调研公司告诉我们,绝大多数汽车广告都是在消费者对购车做出决定之后才被阅读的!而且人们读广告只是为了搜集证据,好说服别人这个购买决定是理性的(“不,不,才不是因为这车外形性感——这车有十二个安全气囊,每英里碳排放才 170 克!”)。我们都做过这种事。人类的大脑有这些习得的偏见、捷径、恐惧、习惯和联想,就上面那位小组成员的例子而言,这些东西会阻止我们做出理性的决策。

Other panelist: No! (the exclamation mark is original) Oh dear! We suspect that the other panelist made up his mind the moment he saw the word Zimbabwe and that blocked his thinking of the gain that could be made from such low prices. We all do this to some extent. It is so easy to screen out a good idea because of a bad association. As Charlie Munger quipped at a speech given at the same course a few years earlier “the human mind is a lot like the human egg”: once one sperm has entered then all the other sperm are locked out. A market research company we visited recently told us that most car advertising is read after the purchase decision for the car has already been made! And it was read only then to gather information to convince other people the purchase decision was rational (“no, no it wasn’t the car’s sexy shape – this car has twelve airbags and emits 170g of carbon per mile!”) We have all done it. The human mind has these learnt biases, short cuts, fears, habits, and associations and, in the case of the panelist above, they can stop us from making rational decisions.

前几天我们脑子里冒出一个奇怪的问题:互联网零售商为什么增长得这么慢?传统零售业的增长受限于店面规模、地理位置和营业时间等物理约束,而互联网零售没有这些限制。打个比方,我们大家完全可以下个星期就决定把所有购物都转到线上,亚马逊等平台照样能接单。那么奇怪的地方就在于:主要互联网零售商的收入增长率,大体上来说,竟然与有形店铺受物理约束的零售商(比如沃尔玛)在其发展类似阶段所享有的增长率不相上下。所以,这到底是怎么回事?

An odd question popped into our heads the other day: why are internet retailers growing so slowly? Unlike traditional retailing, where growth is bounded by the physical constraints of a building’s size, location, and opening hours, internet retailing has no such constraints. We could all, for the sake of argument, decide to do all our shopping online next week, and Amazon et al would take the orders. Odd, then, that the growth rate in revenues at the main internet-based retailers is, very broadly, comparable to that enjoyed by a physically constrained retailer, say, Wal-Mart, at a similar stage in its development. So, what is going on?

如果弗兰克·卡普拉说得对,“直觉是创造力试图告诉你什么”,那么我们的直觉是:在线零售的增长率正受到消费者心理偏见的抑制。我们所有人都是习惯的动物,绝大多数人相当不情愿放弃舒适区。因此,接受新方式需要时间,比如说,从本地书店买书转向在网上买书。也许,在习惯了网上买书之后,我们才会去尝试别的——比如运动鞋、杂志订阅、花盆、自行车座垫或食品杂货。这个过程需要良好的零售体验(价格、便利、选择等)、建立信任,还常常靠个人推荐(社会认同)来推动,早期采用者甚至能获得炫耀资本。这个过程更像缓慢的漂移,而非瞬间的顿悟。我们的直觉是,在线零售的增长率并非受制于物理产能——尽管那也可能是一个限制因素——而更多取决于我们以更理性的行为取代既有习惯和关联的速度。

If Frank Capra is right that “a hunch is creativity trying to tell you something” then our hunch is that the growth rate in online retailing is held back by consumers’ psychological biases. We are all creatures of habit, and most of us give up comfort blankets quite reluctantly. It therefore takes time for a new regime to be adopted and, for instance, to buy books online instead of buying them at the local store. Perhaps then, after we have become comfortable with buying books online, we may experiment with something else, trainers say, or magazine subscriptions, or plant pots, or bike saddles or grocery. The process requires a good retail experience (price, convenience, selection etc.), the building of trust, and is often fanned with personal recommendations (social proof) and even bragging rights for the early adopters. The process is more of a drift than epiphany. Our hunch is that the growth rate in online retailing is regulated, not by physical capacity, although that can be a limiting factor, but more by the rate at which our own incumbent habits and associations are replaced with more rational behaviour.

我们使用的模型未必是正确的。在大型零售业中,我们可以大致估算出每家公司在下一年的收入增长:它是同店销售增长率加上新开门店数量的乘积。对这两个数字我们可能都无法精确预测,但其范围是有边界的,因此我们可以做出合理、“大致正确”(而非“精确错误”)的估算。当投资者思考一家企业的未来时,他们通常会假设增长率会随时间放缓,因为竞争会逐渐侵蚀优势,市场也会趋于饱和。因此,估值模型中使用的预测收入增长率(通常)开始时较高,最终趋于较低。对于已经相当庞大的企业来说,这一点尤为如此。

The models we use may not be the right ones In high street retailing we can estimate, broadly, what revenue growth for each firm will be next year: it is a product of same store sales growth plus any new stores. We might not be precisely correct about either number, but the range is bounded and so we can make a reasonable, “generally-right” (as opposed to “precisely wrong”) estimate. When investors think about the future of a business, they often have in mind the assumption that growth rates slow with time, as competition ekes away advantages and market places become saturated. Predicted revenue growth rates (used in valuation models) therefore start high and end low. This is especially true for firms that are quite large already.

然而,如果互联网零售业的增长率是态度(而非资产)的产物,那么一家公司已经规模庞大,并不一定意味着其增长速度注定放缓。那种普遍认为分析师一提笔、均值回归就启动的假设,很容易因此判断失误。举个例子:如果一家公司连续两年实现 40% 的收入增长,那么在 24 个月内收入就会翻番,而基于均值回归的估值判断就会偏差将近两倍!这根本用不了多久。换句话说,尽管一些互联网零售公司可能规模已经很大,但它们可能还很年轻。在我们看来,正是这种认识,部分推动了近几年来互联网零售商的重新估值。

However, if the rate of growth in internet retailing is a product of attitude, rather than assets, then, the fact that a firm is quite large already does not necessarily tell you that its growth rate is set to slow. The widely held presumption that regression to the mean begins the moment the analyst picks up their pen, risks being wrong footed as a result. Two years of forty percent revenue growth, for example, will result in revenues doubling in twenty-four months and regression to the mean based estimates would be out by almost a factor of two! That did not take long. In other words, although some online retailing firms may be quite large, they may also be quite young. In our opinion, it is this realisation that has partially driven the revaluation of internet retailers these last few years.

再谈委托代理冲突与信任缺失……虽然扎克和我确实享受解决投资问题的过程——可以说这就是我们的乐趣所在,但对投资行业的基调,尤其是行业治理的现状,我们实在提不起热情。监管规则、会计准则和“尽职调查”中嵌入的那些条条框框,出发点或许不坏,也看似因过去基金经理的流氓行为(我们这行确实不乏“精选”的流氓!)而显得合情合理,但执行和遵守这些规则的过程,简直要把无辜者的生命力榨干,连约伯那样的耐心都会被挑战。同样令人沮丧的是,从业者根本无法通过良好行为来摆脱这种过度治理的枷锁。信任——这个曾经构成行业基石、并衍生出单位信托、投资信托、受托人等词汇的概念——几乎已经荡然无存。这真是莫大的遗憾。

More on the principal agent conflict, and the lack of trust… Whilst Zak and I do enjoy solving the investment problem, as it were, we are less enraptured with the tone of the investment industry, especially the state of industry governance. The rules embedded in regulation, accounting and “due diligence” may be well meaning and appear justified by past fund managers’ rogue behaviour (and our industry has some choice rogues!), but their enforcement and adherence drains the life out of the innocent and would challenge the patience of Job. Just as sapping is that it is impossible for practitioners to earn their way out of over-bearing governance through good behaviour. Trust, once the cornerstone of the industry and derivation of words such as unit trust, investment trust, trustee and so on, has been all but lost. It is a great shame.

愤世嫉俗也许根深蒂固,但它绝不是智慧的替代品。我们喜欢听一位基金管理行业的明星人物转述他与一位分析师的对话,这里稍作改编:分析师说:“你近期的业绩无人能及,但如果过去几年你没有持有 X 公司和 Y 公司,你的业绩就只能算作中等水平。”

The cynicism may be endemic, but it is no substitute for wisdom. We enjoyed the following paraphrased exchange related to us by one of the fund management industry’s stars of a conversation he had had with an analyst: Analyst: your performance is without peer in recent times, but if you did not own company x and company y over the last few years your performance would have been only average.

明星基金经理:但问题就在这,我确实做到了啊!

Star fund manager: but that’s the point, I did!

这个行业处理事务的心态,并不总是展现人性最美好的一面,有时候甚至会把人性中最坏的部分勾出来。我们认为,当务之急是在参与者之间重建一张值得拥有的信任之网。我们希望“游牧者”模式——以耐心、互信和冷静为特征——是朝着正确方向迈出的一小步。令人相当欣慰的是,这也是一种在财务上有利可图的行事方式。

The spirit in which the industry conducts its affairs is not always mankind at its best, and sometimes it does not bring out the best in people. What is required, in our opinion, is the rebuilding of a web of deserved trust between participants. We hope that the Nomad model, with its patience, reciprocated trust, and calm, is a small step in the right direction. It is rather wonderful that it is also a financially profitable way to behave.

有很多值得庆祝的事。

There is a lot to celebrate.

在银河队总部,值得庆祝的事可不少。也许是天气转好了,也许是总部屋顶的蜜蜂带来了蜂蜜大丰收(我没开玩笑,去问扎克),也许是诺玛德的表现(但我可不这么认为)。未来几个月里,我们有很多值得感恩的事:我们要庆祝睡眠公司、扎卡里亚公司成立五周年,诺玛德成立十周年,以及我们每个人在行业内打拼的二十周年。我们很庆幸能走到今天,也明白我们的起步相当独特(谢谢你,杰里米)。我们还拥有一群非常特别的投资者:感谢你们在诺玛德生态中扮演的信任而明智的角色。等丰收季到了,我们会举杯(蜂蜜茶!)敬各位。

There is a lot to celebrate at Galactic HQ. It might be that the weather has turned, it might be the bumper honey harvest from the bees on HQ roof (I kid you not, ask Zak), it might be Nomad’s performance (but I don’t think so). In the next few months we have lots to be grateful for: we celebrate five years of Sleep, Zakaria and Company, ten years since Nomad’s formation and twenty years for each of us in the industry. We are grateful to be here, and we recognise that our genesis was pretty unique (thank you, Jeremy). We also have a pretty special group of investors: thank you for the trusting and wise role you play in the Nomad ecosystem. We shall raise a glass (of honey tea!) to you all when the crop is in.

你真诚的,尼古拉斯·斯利普

我们的免责声明

据说,在印度某个火车站有个售票亭,窗口上方挂着块牌子,写着:“此处无坑蒙拐骗”。我们正是本着同样精神写下这些警示之语。免责声明归根结底就是一句话——如果你选择相信这里面的任何内容,那后果自负。哎呀!我们自己也很难逃脱这个结论,对我们来说,除了声明对错误、遗漏不承担责任,不提供任何保证之外,做其他事都毫无意义——请核实我们说的每一句话,发现错了就告诉我们,原谅我们的失误。我们向你保证这一点:我们是人,我们会犯错,但我们的错误是诚实的。虽然我们无意误导,但我们也不能保证这些信函中的信息完全准确,也不能保证我们的一些想法不会被以我们未曾预料的方式解读。作为投资者,我们尽力做到最好,我们真诚地写下这些信函,目的是在合伙基金的背景下,向合伙人告知并教育我们的行动和想法。我们希望它们能被以与撰写时同样的精神来阅读。

Yours sincerely Nicholas Sleep Our Footnotes There is, we are told, a ticket kiosk at a railway station somewhere in India with a sign above the window that reads, “No Bamboozlement Here”. It is in the same spirit that we attempt these cautionary words. Disclaimers boil down to the following statement – if you choose to believe any of this, then you are on your own. Yikes! It will be hard for us to escape this conclusion too, and it makes little sense for us to do anything but disclaim liability for errors, omissions and offer no warranties – please, check everything we say, let us know when we are wrong and forgive our errors. We do promise you this: we are human, we make mistakes, but our mistakes are honest ones. Although we do not intend to mislead, we also cannot guarantee the information in these letters, or that some of our ideas may be interpreted in ways we do not intend. As investors we are trying to do as good a job as we can and we write these letters in good faith to inform and educate partners on our actions and thinking in the context of the Partnership. We hope that they will be read in the same spirit in which they are written.

常识告诉你,股票的价格和价值可能差异巨大,虽然我们并不刻意追求这一点,但也承认资本永久性损失是可能发生的。我们的合伙基金集中在相对较少的投资上,可能比许多其他基金更为集中,因此我们的业绩波动会比许多同行更大。诺玛德也是一家非常长期的合伙基金。我们认为它不适合投资期限短于五年的投资者。我们同样认为,诺玛德不适合那些对委托代理问题过度纠结的投资者。如果你有任何不安,那么我们认为,诺玛德不适合你。

Common sense tells you that the price and value of shares can vary greatly, and whilst we do not aim for this, we also recognize that permanent impairment of capital is possible. Our Partnership is concentrated in relatively few investments, perhaps more concentrated than many others, and as such our results will be more volatile than many of our peers. Nomad is also a very long-term Partnership. We do not think it is suitable for investors with time frames less than five years. We also do not think Nomad is suitable for investors overly conflicted with principal-agent issues. If you are at all uncomfortable then, we suspect, Nomad is not for you.

Nomad 投资合伙公司先后有过两家普通合伙人:2001 年成立至 2006 年 9 月期间是马拉松资产管理公司(Marathon Asset Management),2006 年 9 月至今是斯利普-扎卡利亚公司(Sleep, Zakaria and Company)。自合伙公司成立以来,扎克(Zak)和我就一直负责投资决策,最初是以马拉松公司员工的身份,后来则是在我们自己的公司——这家公司正是为管理 Nomad 而设立的。

The Nomad Investment Partnership has had two General Partners, Marathon Asset Management for the period from inception in 2001 to September 2006, and Sleep, Zakaria and Company from September 2006 until the present day. Zak and I have been responsible for the investment decisions of the Partnership since inception, formerly as employees of Marathon and then at our own firm, which was set up for the purpose of managing Nomad.

这场冒险还在继续……关于年度大会的一些注意事项(后排别打瞌睡啊!)

The adventure continues… Some Notes on Housekeeping (stay awake at the back!)

这是中期信件,与一月份寄给投资者的年度信函一起,构成了我们与合伙人沟通的主要形式。在这些信中,我们力求诚实而全面地提供所有信息——如果角色互换,我们是另一家基金的投资人,也会希望看到这些信息。我们持股时间很长,深知更频繁或更详尽的报告可能没有必要,甚至适得其反。我们的代表作——完整的《信件合集》,可向银河总部的阿曼达索取([email protected])——需要大量咖啡提神。游牧者合伙人也每六个月会收到一份完整的投资清单,详细列出我们的所有投资。此外,春季您将收到由安永审计的游牧者年度账目。每月,游牧者的管理方(不是我们!)——爱尔兰都柏林的凤凰金融服务公司——会向您寄送账户报表。如有关于报表的疑问,请致电加文·格雷及其团队(+353 18 450 8161)。应税的美国投资者也请直接联系他们,因为加文及其团队也会准备您的税务凭证(1099 表格)。

This is the interim letter and, combined with the annual letter sent to investors in January, is the main format we use to communicate to our partners. In these letters we have tried to honestly and thoroughly provide all the information we would seek if the tables were turned and we were investors in someone else’s fund. We own shares for very long periods and we are conscious that more frequent or detailed reporting may be unnecessary and even counterproductive. A copy of our magnum opus, the full Collection of Letters, is available upon request from Amanda at Galactic HQ ([email protected]). Lots of coffee required. Partners in Nomad will also receive a full copy of our Schedule of Investments by separate post, every six months, which lists all of our investments in detail. In addition, in the Spring you will receive Nomad’s annual accounts, audited by Ernst and Young. Each month statements of account are sent to you by Nomad’s administrator (not us!), Phoenix Financial Services in Dublin, Ireland. Please call Gavin Gray and his team (+353 18 450 8161) with your statement queries. As should taxable US investors as Gavin and his team prepare their tax certificates (1099s) as well.

合伙人应始终知晓,扎克和我随时可以接听电话,我们那(略显寒酸的)前门也向访客敞开。我们固然欢迎诸位到访,但若我们说不出太多新东西,还望不必太失望——我们希望那些内容早已写在前面的信件里了。

Partners should always consider Zak and me to be available at the end of the phone and our (somewhat shabby) front door open to visitors. And whilst we welcome your company, please don’t be too disappointed if we don’t have much that is new to say: we hope it is in the letters already.

以下是该段落的译文:

法律附注:业绩数据由 Nomad 基金的行政管理机构 Phoenix Fund Services 编制,并经过安永会计师事务所年度审计——该审计是在我们的信件发布后进行的。

Legal Footnotes Performance numbers are produced by Phoenix Fund Services, Nomad’s administrator, and are audited by Ernst and Young in their annual audit, which follows publication of our letters.

在我们的信件中,我们把合伙企业的有限合伙人以及 Nomad 投资公司(母基金)的普通股东都称为“合伙人”。这样做是为了表达我们期望建立的一种关系:我们的投资者是共享经历与命运的伙伴,而且他们也有自己可以贡献的东西。我们并不是要暗示,在严格的法律意义上,母基金的股东与 Nomad 公司或 Sleep、Zakaria and Company, Ltd. 之间存在合伙关系。

In our letters we refer to both limited partners in the Partnership, and common shareholders in the Nomad Investment Company (feeder fund) as “Partners”. We do this to convey a relationship we seek in which our investors are partners in a shared experience and destiny, in which they too have something to contribute. We do not mean to suggest that there is a partnership, in the strict, legal, sense of the word, between the shareholders in the feeder fund and Nomad, or Sleep, Zakaria and Company, Ltd.

本文件由 Sleep, Zakaria and Company, Ltd. 签发,该公司已获英国金融服务管理局(FSA)授权并受其监管(注册号:451772)。本文件仅发送给有意接收的人士,不得转发。本通讯仅面向并针对以下对象:(a) 英国境外人士;(b) 《2000 年金融服务与市场法案(2005 年金融推广令)》(以下简称“该法令”)第 19(5) 条所定义的投资专业人士;或 (c) 该法令第 49(2) (a) 和 (d) 条所述的高净值公司、非法人组织及合伙企业、高价值信托的受托人,以及该法令第 49(1) 条范围内其他依法可接收本通讯的人士。

This document is issued by Sleep, Zakaria and Company, Ltd., which is authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Auth ority (FSA) (No. 451772). This document is only sent to people who have an interest in receiving it and is not for onward distribution. This communication is being made only to and is directed only at: (a) persons outside the United Kingdom; (b) investment professionals, as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the "Order"); or (c) high net worth companies, unincorporated associations and partnerships and trustees of high value trusts as described in Article 49(2) (a) and (d) of the Order, and other persons to whom it may otherwise lawfully be communicated, falling within Article 49(1) of the Order.

游牧投资合伙(Nomad Investment Partnership)不属于《2000 年金融服务与市场法》(FSMA)认可的合规计划。鉴于游牧投资合伙的投资者群体性质,向英国金融服务管理局(FSA)及金融服务补偿计划(Financial Services Compensation Scheme)寻求追偿的途径可能受到限制。

The Nomad Investment Partnership is not a recognized scheme under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”). Given the nature of Nomad’s investor base, recourse to the FSA and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme may be limited.