彼得·林奇谈在美国股市赚钱——国家新闻俱乐部讲座及问答
彼得·林奇:
我要谈谈自己当年还是业余投资者时、管理麦哲伦基金期间用过的几条理念,现在我还是在用。对这些想法,投资者可以琢磨其中道理。
Peter Lynch: I will speak about some of the ideas I used when I was an amateur, when I ran Magellan, and which I still use today. They can make sense for investors.
这是美国的一场悲剧:小散户被媒体——纸质媒体、广播、电视媒体——说服,以为自己没有机会。这些媒体巨头让许多小散户相信,他们无法与拥有计算机、学位和资金的大型机构竞争。这根本不是事实。当这种情况发生时,人们就会按这种想法行事。当他们相信这一点后,他们会买持有一周的股票,买入期权,这周买智利基金,下周又买阿根廷基金,然后得到与这种投资风格相匹配的结果。这让人烦恼。普通公众完全可以在股市中靠自己做得非常好。当今市场由机构主导,这反而对小散户是件好事。这些机构在通常的低点抛售股票,在通常的高点又买入。对于能够退后一步、有自己的判断、了解一些行业知识的人来说,这是个优势,不是劣势。所以这就是我想谈的话题。
It’s a tragedy in America that small investors have been convinced by the media – the print media, radio, television media – they don’t have a chance. These media giants have convinced many small investors they can’t compete with big institutions – with all their computers and degrees and money. It just isn’t true. When this happens, people act accordingly. When they believe it, they buy stocks for a week, and they buy options, and they buy the Chile fund this week. Next week it’s the Argentina fund, and they get results proportionate to that investing style. That’s bothersome. The public can do extremely well in the stock market on their own. The fact that institutions dominate the market today is a positive for small investors. These institutions push stocks on usual lows. They push them on usual highs. For someone that can sit back and have their own opinion and know something about the industry, this is a positive. It’s not a negative. So that’s what I want to talk about.
对我来说,股市里最重要的一件事,就是知道自己买的是什么。让我惊讶的是,那么多持有股票的人,却说不出自己为什么买它。你要是追问他们,他们会说:“我买这个,是因为这玩意儿要涨了。”这就是他们买的唯一理由。我是认真的。如果你不能在两分钟内跟一个 10 岁小孩解释清楚自己为什么持有一只股票,那你就不该持有它。持有股票的人群里,大约 80% 都是这种情况。
The single most important thing to me in the stock market for anyone is to know what you own. I’m amazed how many people who own stocks would not be able to tell you why they own them. If you press them, they’ll say, “The reason I own this is because the sucker’s going up.” That’s the only reason they own it. I’m serious. If you can’t explain to a 10-year-old in two minutes or less why you own a stock, you shouldn’t own it. That’s true of about 80% of people who own stocks.
人们喜欢持有这样的股票,人们也痴迷于拥有这样的公司。这类企业相对简单,生产一种狭窄且容易理解的产品。比如,它们制造一种 1 兆位、SRAM、CMOS、双极性风险、浮点数据 IO 阵列处理器,配备优化编译器、16 位双端口存储器、双扩散金属氧化物半导体单片逻辑芯片,加上等离子矩阵真空荧光显示屏、16 位双存储器、UNIX 操作系统、四个湿石兆浮点聚硅发射器,以及一条高带宽——这点很重要——6 千兆赫双金属化通信协议,具备异步向下兼容、外设总线架构、四路交错存储器、令牌环交换背板,而且这一切在 15 纳秒内完成。如果你持有这种垃圾股,你永远赚不到钱。总会有人拿着更多或更少的湿石、更大或更小的兆浮点过来,而你根本搞不清楚发生了什么。可人们却总是在买这种破烂货。
This is the stock people like to own. This is the company people adore owning. These are relatively simple companies, and they make a narrow, easy-to-understand product. They make a one-megabit, SRAM, CMOS, bi-polar risk, floating point data IO array processor, with an optimized compiler, a 16-bit dual-port memory, a double-defused metal oxide semiconductor monolithic logic chip with a plasma matrix vacuum fluorescent display with a 16-bit dual memory with a UNIX operating system, four whetstone megaflop poly-silicone emitter, a high bandwidth – that’s important – six-gigahertz double metallization communication protocol, an asynchronous backward compatibility, peripheral bus architecture, four-way interleaf memory, a token ring interchanging backplane, and it does it in 15 nanoseconds of capability. If you own a piece of crap like that, you will never make money. Somebody will come along with more whetstones or less whetstones, a bigger megaflop or a smaller megaflop. You won’t have the foggiest idea what’s happening, and people buy this junk all the time.
我在唐恩都乐(Dunkin' Donuts)上赚到了钱。我能理解它。经济衰退时,我不需要担心会发生什么。我去那里,人们依然在那里,我不用担心韩国低价进口产品的竞争。我能理解它。你们会笑。我在唐恩都乐上赚了 10 倍到 15 倍的收益。那些是我能理解的股票。如果你不理解它,那就不行。这是最最重要的一条原则。
I made money in Dunkin’ Donuts. I can understand it. When there were recessions, I didn’t have to worry about what was happening. I could go there, and people were still there, I didn’t have to worry about low-priced Korean imports. I can understand it. And you laugh. I made 10 or 15 times my money in Dunkin’ Donuts. Those are the stocks I can understand. If you don’t understand it, it doesn’t work. This is the single biggest principle.
有一件事让我很头疼:人们花自己的钱时本该谨慎,可实际上呢?买冰箱,他们会去查《消费者报告》;买微波炉,也这么做;买雷达测速仪或汽车,他们会问别人什么最好;租公寓,他们会做功课。去怀俄明州旅行,他们会带一本美孚旅行指南;去欧洲,他们会带米其林旅行指南。可要是在公交车上听到一个股票的小道消息,他们就能在日落之前把半辈子积蓄全砸进去,然后还纳闷自己为什么在股市里赔钱。赔了钱,他们把责任推给机构、推给程序化交易。这全是扯淡。他们自己根本没做任何研究。他们买的是垃圾货,连资产负债表都没看一眼,那就活该。这就是我们被推向的方向,而且这会自我应验。公众的投资方式极其糟糕,然后他们说自己没机会。这是因为他们的行为方式本身就是那样。我是在试图说服人们:是有方法的。股票上涨是有原因的。这是魔法。这是一个魔法数字,很容易记住:可口可乐现在的每股收益是 32 年前的 30 倍,股价也涨了 30 倍。伯利恒钢铁公司现在的每股收益比 30 年前还低,股价是 30 年前的一半。股票不是彩票。每只股票背后都有一家公司。如果公司干得好,股票就会涨。没那么复杂。
It bothers me that people are careful with their money. The public, when they buy a refrigerator, they go to Consumer Reports. They buy a microwave oven, they do that. They ask people what’s the best radar range or what car to buy. They do research on apartments. When they go on a trip to Wyoming, they get a Mobil travel guide. When they go to Europe, they get the Michelin travel guide. People hear a tip on a bus on some stock and they’ll put half their life savings in it before sunset, and they wonder why they lose money in the stock market. When they lose money, they blame it on the institutions and program trading. That is garbage. They didn’t do any research. They bought a piece of junk, they didn’t look at the balance sheet, and that’s what you get for it. That’s what we’re being driven to, and it’s self-fulfilling. The public invests terribly, and they say they don’t have a chance. It’s because that’s the way they’re acting. I’m trying to convince people there is a method. There are reasons for stocks to go up. This is magic. It’s a magic number, easy to remember. Coca-Cola is earning 30 times per share what they earned 32 years ago. The stock has gone up thirtyfold. Bethlehem Steel is earning less than they did 30 years ago. The stock is half its price of 30 years ago. Stocks are not lottery tickets. There’s a company behind every stock. If a company does well, the stock does well. It’s not that complicated.
人们太容易激动了。他们总想预测股票市场。这完全是浪费时间。没有人能预测股票市场。他们想预测利率。如果有人能连续三次准确预测利率,他早就成为亿万富翁了。显然,地球上没有那么多亿万富翁。我在波士顿学院读书时学过逻辑和三段论。如果真的有那么多人能预测利率,那世上就该有数不清的亿万富翁了,可没人能预测经济走势。我知道在座的不少人经历过 1981 年和 1982 年,当时基准利率高达 20%,两位数的通货膨胀,两位数的失业率。我不记得当时有谁在 1981 年告诉过我这些。我阅读,我研究所有这些东西。我不记得有谁告诉过我,我们将经历大萧条以来最严重的衰退。知道股市会怎么走确实有用。知道道琼斯指数一年后的点位,知道我们会爆发全面衰退,或者知道利率会达到 12%,那确实都是非常有用的信息。但你就是永远无法知道。你根本学不会这个。
People get too carried away. They try to predict the stock market. That is a total waste of time. No one can predict the stock market. They try to predict interest rates. If anybody can predict interest rates right three times in a row, they’d be a billionaire. Certainly, there’s not that many billionaires on the planet. I took logic, syllogism, when I studied at Boston College. There can’t be that many people who can predict interest rates because there’d be lots of billionaires, and no one can predict the economy. I know a lot of people in this room were around in 1981 and 1982 when we had a 20% prime rate with double-digit inflation, double-digit unemployment. I don’t remember anybody telling me in 1981 about it. I read. I study all this stuff. I don’t remember anybody telling me we’ll have the worst recession since the Depression. It would be useful to know what the stock market will do. It would be terrific to know the Dow Jones average a year from now, to know we’ll have a full-scale recession, or to know interest rates will be 12%. That’s useful stuff. You never know it, though. You just don’t get to learn it.
我一直说,如果你每年花 14 分钟在经济学上,那其中 12 分钟就是浪费。不过,我得说句公道话。我指的是宏观层面的经济学——预测明年的衰退、复苏,还是 M1、M2、3B 这些货币指标。所有这些经济术语,对我来说还不如废铁价格有用。当我持有汽车股时,我想知道二手车价格发生了什么变化。二手车价格上涨,这是一个好指标。当我持有酒店股时,我想知道酒店入住率。当我持有化工股时,我想知道乙烯价格的变化。这些都是事实。如果铝库存连续五个月下降,那就值得关注。我能处理这种信息。当我持有房利美或房地产股时,我想知道住房可负担性。这些都是事实。经济事实和经济预测是两回事,而经济预测纯粹是浪费时间。艾伦·格林斯潘是个诚实的人。他会告诉你,他预测不了利率。他可以告诉你未来六个月的短期利率会怎样,但你要是追问他三年后的长期利率,他会说,“我毫无头绪。”那么,你作为投资者,连美联储主席都做不到的事,你怎么能预测利率呢?
I’ve always said if you spend 14 minutes a year on economics, you’ve wasted 12 minutes. Now, I must be fair. I’m talking about economics in the broad scale, predicting the downturn for next year, or the upturn, or M1 and M2, 3B. All of these economic terms are less useful to me than when you talk about scrap prices. When I own auto stocks, I want to know what’s happening to used car prices. When used car prices rise, it’s a good indicator. When I own hotel stocks, I want to know hotel occupancies. When I own chemical stocks, I want to know what’s happening to the price of ethylene. These are facts. If aluminum inventories go down five straight months, that’s relevant. I can deal with that. I want to know about home affordability when I own Fannie Mae, or I own a housing stock. These are facts. There are economic facts and there are economic predictions, and economic predictions are a total waste. Alan Greenspan is an honest guy. He would tell you he can’t predict interest rates. He can tell you what short rates will do in the next six months. Try and stick him on what the long-term rate will be three years from now. He’ll say, “I don’t have any idea.” So how are you, the investor, supposed to predict interest rates if the head of the Federal Reserve can’t do it?
你应该研究历史。历史会告诉你,市场会下跌,而且会大跌。道理很简单。本世纪一共 93 年,市场出现过 50 次跌幅达到或超过 10% 的下跌。93 年中有 50 次下跌,意味着市场大约每两年就会跌一次 10% 以上。我们管这叫“回调”,一个形容迅速亏大钱的委婉说法。在这 50 次下跌中,有 15 次跌幅达到或超过 25%,这被称为“熊市”。93 年里我们经历了 15 次至少 25% 的下跌,也就是说每六年市场就会跌一次 25%。这就是你需要知道的一切。你需要知道市场有时会下跌。如果你没准备好面对这一点,你就不该持有股票。
You should study history. History teaches you the market goes down. It goes down a lot. The math is simple. There have been 93 years this century. The market has had 50 declines of 10% or more. With 50 declines in 93 years, the market falls at least 10% about once every two years. We call that a “correction,” a euphemism for losing a lot of money rapidly. Of those 50 declines, 15 have been 25% or more. That’s known as a “bear market.” We’ve had 15 declines of at least 25% in 93 years, so every six years, the market has a 25% decline. That’s all you need to know. You need to know the market will go down sometimes. If you’re not ready for that, you shouldn’t own stocks.
市场下跌是好事。如果你喜欢一只股票,觉得 14 美元合理,它跌到 6 美元,那太棒了。你了解这家公司,你看过它的资产负债表,他们经营得不错。你希望它涨到 22 美元;从 14 美元涨到 22 美元已经很棒,从 6 美元涨到 22 美元更是超乎寻常,所以你要利用这些下跌。下跌总会发生,没有人知道它们何时发生。人们告诉你他们预测到了,可他们已经预测了 53 次。如果你了解自己持有的是什么东西,你就能利用市场的波动。这是关键所在。
It’s good when the market goes down. If you like a stock at $14 and it goes to $6, that’s great. You understand the company. You look at the balance sheet. They’re doing fine. You hope for $22; $14 to $22 is terrific, $6 to $22 is exceptional, so you take advantage of these declines. Declines happen, and no one knows when they’ll happen. People tell you they predicted it, but they predicted it 53 times. You can take advantage of the volatility of the market if you understand what you own. That’s a key element.
另一个关键因素是:你拥有充足的时间。人们总是急不可耐地要买股票。我举个例子,一家家喻户晓的公司:沃尔玛。它于 1970 年 10 月上市,当时已有 15 年的辉煌业绩,资产负债表也非常稳健。你是个保守的投资者,不确定沃尔玛能否成功,想再观察一下。你看到他们在小镇上经营,心里担心。他们只在七八个州站稳了脚跟,你想等他们拓展到更多州再说。于是你一直等。你可以等沃尔玛上市 10 年后才买进,仍然能赚到 35 倍的收益。如果你在它上市时就买入,你能赚 500 倍;但即使等上 10 年再买,你也能赚到 30 多倍。微软上市后,你也等了 3 年再买,照样赚了 10 倍。我对软件一窍不通。但如果你懂点软件,你会说:“这帮家伙有戏。我不管康柏、IBM 谁能赢,也不管日本电脑谁会胜出,我知道微软,MS-DOS 才是正道。”
Another key element is that you have plenty of time. People are in an unbelievable rush to buy a stock. I’ll give you an example of a well-known company. Walmart went public in October of 1970. It already had a great record with 15 years’ performance and a great balance sheet. You’re a conservative investor. You’re not sure if Walmart can make it. You want to check. You see them operate in small towns. You’re afraid. They make it in seven or eight states. You want to wait until they go to more states. You keep waiting. You could have bought Walmart 10 years after it went public and made 35 times your money. If you bought it when they went public, you would have made 500 times your money, but you could have waited 10 years after it went public and made over 30 times your money. You could have waited three years after Microsoft went public and made 10 times your money. I know nothing about software. If you knew something about software, you would have said, “These guys have it. I don’t care who’s going to win, Compaq, IBM. I don’t know who’s going to win, Japanese computers. I know Microsoft, MS-DOS is the right thing.
股票不是彩票。每只股票背后都有一家公司,你可以观察它。你有的是时间。人们总是急急忙忙地买入证券,打电话时都喘不过气来。你根本不用这么着急。
Stocks are not a lottery ticket. There’s a company behind every stock, and you can watch it. You have plenty of time. People are in an amazing rush to purchase a security. They’re out of breath when they call up. You don’t need to do this.
要赚钱,你也需要一点优势。人们明明有巨大的优势,却自己扔掉。我举个史克公司的例子。这家公司有种成功的药叫泰胃美。你不需要在泰胃美做临床试验时买史克,也不需要等它在《新英格兰医学杂志》或英国的《柳叶刀》上被讨论时买。你可以在泰胃美刚上市时买,甚至上市一年后再买。比如说,你家有人是护士、药剂师、或者开这些处方的医生。泰胃美治疗溃疡的效果好极了。它对公司来说是款绝妙的药,因为你如果停药,溃疡就会复发。它不是那种吃了就好的烂药,你花 1 美元买它,它一直有用。你可以在药品上市两年后买进,赚到 5 到 6 倍的钱。所有药剂师、护士,还有成千上万的人都见证了这款产品,但他们却跑去买石油公司或钻井平台。这种事经常发生。然后过三四年,葛兰素——一家规模更大的英国公司——推出了善卫得,当时是改进版产品。你可以看到它抢占市场份额、表现很好。你可以买葛兰素,赚三倍的钱。你一辈子只需要几只好股票。它们就在你自己的行业里。
You need an edge to make money, too. People have incredible edges and they throw them away. I’ll give you a quick example of Smith Kline. This is a stock that had the successful drug, Tagamet. You didn’t have to buy Smith Kline when Tagamet was doing clinical trials. You didn’t have to buy Smith Kline when Tagamet was talked about in the New England Journal of Medicine or in the British version, Lancet. You could have bought Smith Kline when Tagamet first came out or a year after it came out. Let’s say somebody in your family or you are a nurse, a druggist, or a physician writing all these prescriptions. Tagamet was doing an amazing job of curing ulcers. It was a wonderful pill for the company because if you had stopped taking it, the ulcer came back. It wasn’t a crummy product, you took it for a buck and then it went away. You could have bought it two years after the product was on the market and made 5 or 6 times your money. All the druggists, all the nurses, all the people, millions of people saw this product, but instead they’re out buying oil companies or drilling rigs. It happens. Then three or four years later Glaxo, an even bigger company, a huge company, a British company, bought Zantac which was, at that time, an improved product. You could have seen that take market share and do well. You could have bought Glaxo and tripled your money. You only need a few stocks in your lifetime. They’re in your industry.
如果你在汽车行业工作——假设你过去十年是个汽车经销商——你会看到克莱斯勒推出了小型货车。如果你是别克、丰田或本田的经销商,你会看到克莱斯勒的经销店里挤满了人。你可以在小型货车上市一年后买克莱斯勒,赚 10 倍的钱。福特推出了金牛座和黑貂,这是过去 20 年里最出色的汽车系列。福特靠金牛座和黑貂涨了 7 倍。所以,如果你是个汽车经销商,你每十年只需要买几只股票。到你生命终结时,你不需要很多只涨 5 倍的股票,就能用 1 万美元或 5000 美元赚到大钱。在自己行业里你会看到很多股票,这正是让我困扰的地方。好股票就在那里等着你。可人们就是不听,也不看。
If you’d worked in the auto industry – let’s say you have been an auto dealer for the last 10 years – you would have seen Chrysler come up with the minivan. If you were a Buick dealer, a Toyota dealer, a Honda dealer, you would have seen the Chrysler dealership packed with people. You could have made 10 times your money on Chrysler a year after the minivan came out. Ford introduced the Taurus Sable, the most exceptional line of cars in the last 20 years. Ford went up sevenfold on the Taurus Sable. So, if you’re a car dealer, you only need to buy a few stocks every decade. When your lifetime is over, you don’t need a lot of five-baggers to make a lot of money starting with $10,000 or $5,000. In your own industry you’ll see a lot of stocks, and that’s what bothers me. There are good stocks out there looking for you. People aren’t listening and they’re not watching.
人们比我强多了。他们在铝行业工作。我看到铝行业一直在下滑,库存连续六个月减少。我看到需求在改善。在今天的美国,想拿到环保局许可建个保龄球馆都难,更别提建铝冶炼厂。你知道铝什么时候会紧缺,而你根本不可能一下子建七座铝冶炼厂。当你看到这种趋势时,你可以说:“等等,我能赚点钱。”当一个行业从糟糕变到平庸,股价就上涨。从平庸变到良好,股价上涨。从良好变到极好,股价还是上涨。在自己行业里有很多赚钱的方法。你可以做行业里的供应商,也可以做客户。这种情况在造纸行业发生过,在钢铁行业也发生过。它不是每周都发生,但如果你在某个领域,你会看到它转变。你会看到出版业的一些情况。这些机会接踵而来,人们却把它们扔掉,真让人难以置信。
People have big edges over me. They work in the aluminum industry. I see the aluminum industry has been coming down; the inventory has declined for six straight months. I see demand improving. In America today, it’s hard to get an EPA permit for a bowling alley, never mind an aluminum smelter. You know when aluminum gets tight, and you just can’t build seven aluminum smelters. When you see this coming, you can say, “Wait a second. I can make some money.” When an industry goes from terrible to mediocre, the stock goes north. When it goes from mediocre to good, the stock goes north. When it goes from good to terrific, the stock goes north. There are lots of ways to make money in your own industry. You can be a supplier in the industry. You can be a customer. This thing happens in the paper industry. It happens in the steel industry. It doesn’t happen every week, but if you’re in some field, you’ll see it turn. You’ll see something in the publishing industry. These things come along, and it’s just mindboggling that people throw it away.
我想讲几条我觉得有用的规则。人们看到股票跌了就会买。他们问还能跌多少。我记得宝丽来从 130 美元跌到 100 美元时,人们说:“这家公司很伟大,业绩辉煌。要是跌到 100 美元以下,就把所有股票都买下。”它确实跌到了 100 美元以下,很多人据此买入,说:“你看,从 135 美元跌到 100 美元了。现在 95 美元了,多好的买入机会!”不到一年,宝丽来跌到了 18 美元。这家公司没有负债,只是当初被过度高估了,所以一路下跌。
I want to throw out a couple of rules I find useful. People buy when they see a stock has gone down. They ask how much further it can go down. I remember when Polaroid went from $130 to $100 and people said, “Here’s this great company, great record. If it ever gets below $100, just buy every share.” It did get below $100 and a lot of people bought on that basis saying, “Look, it’s gone from $135 to $100. It’s now at $95. What a buy!” Within a year, Polaroid was $18. This is a company with no debt. It was just so overpriced, it went down.
我入职富达的第一年或第二年也干过同样的事。凯撒工业从每股 26 美元跌到 16 美元。我说:“16 美元了,还能跌到哪去?”我想我们在 14 美元时买进了美国证券交易所历史上最大的一笔凯撒工业股票。我说:“从 26 美元跌到 16 美元,还能跌多少?”到了 10 美元,我给我妈打电话说:“妈,你该看看凯撒工业这只股票。还能跌多少?从 26 美元跌到 10 美元了。”结果它跌到 6 美元、5 美元、4 美元、然后 3 美元。还好这事发生得很快,否则我可能现在还在做球童或在 Stop & Shop 超市打工。它来得快,也压缩得紧。
I did the same thing in my first or second year in Fidelity. Kaiser Industries had gone from $26 a share to $16. I said, “How much lower can it go at $16?” I think we bought one of the biggest blocks ever probably on the American stock exchange of Kaiser Industries at $14. I said, “It’s gone from $26 to $16. How much lower can it go?” At $10, I called my mother and said, “Mom, you got to look at this Kaiser Industries. How much lower can it go? It’s gone from $26 to $10.” It went to $6. It went to $5. It went to $4, and it went to $3. I am fortunate this happened rapidly, or I would probably still be caddying or working at the Stop and Shop. It happened fast. It was compressed.
到了 3 美元,我意识到有问题了。凯撒工业拥有凯撒钢铁 40% 的股份,凯撒铝业 40% 的股份,凯撒水泥 32% 的股份,还有凯撒广播、凯撒砂石、凯撒工程。它还拥有吉普车。它拥有一家接一家的企业,而且没有负债。我早就学到这一点。这对你们有些人来说可能是个突破。没有负债的公司很难破产。整个公司,在 3 美元时,市值大约只有 7500 万美元。那时,这笔钱只够买一架波音 747。我说:“一家卖 7500 万美元的公司有问题。”我在 16 美元时有点太早了,但我说一切正常,最终会解决的。
At $3, I figured out there’s something wrong here because Kaiser Industries owns 40% of Kaiser Steel. They own 40% of Kaiser Aluminum. They own 32% of Kaiser Cement. They own Kaiser Broadcasting, Kaiser Sand and Gravel, and Kaiser Engineers. They own Jeep. They own business after business, and they had no debt. I learned this early. This might be a breakthrough for some of you people. It’s hard to go bankrupt if you don’t have any debt, and the whole company, at $3, was selling at a total market cap of about $75 million. At that point, it was equal to buying one Boeing 747. I said there’s something wrong with this company selling for $75 million. I was a little premature at $16, but I said everything’s fine, and eventually this will work out.
凯撒实际上把他们的股份都送给了股东。他们分发了凯撒水泥的股份,凯撒铝业的股份。他们把凯撒钢铁的公开股份也分掉了。他们卖掉了所有其他业务,最后每股分到大约 50 美元。但如果你不了解这家公司,只是因为它从 26 美元跌到 16 美元、又跌到 10 美元就买入,那当它跌到 9 美元时你会怎么办?8 美元呢?7 美元呢?这就是人们的问题。他们卖股票是因为当初不知道为什么买,它跌了又不知道该怎么办。扔硬币?转一圈?到底怎么办?到现在为止,精神病医生也没帮上忙。我没见过哪个精神病或心理基金向美国证券交易委员会提交文件,最后成为共同基金的。他们似乎没派上用处。我试过祈祷,也不管用。如果你不了解公司,股票下跌时就会遇到这个问题。最终,人们以为它总会涨回来。这种想法也行不通。人们以为 RCA 差不多能回到 1929 年的高点,结果被通用电气收购了。双面针织面料就再也没涨回来过。还记得那些好货吗?软盘、西联汇款,名单可以列很长。人们说“它会涨回来的”——但它不一定要涨回来。
Kaiser effectively gave away all their shares to their shareholders. They passed out shares at Kaiser Cement. They passed out shares in Kaiser Aluminum. They passed out the public shares in Kaiser Steel. They sold all the other businesses, and you got about $50 a share. But if you didn’t understand the company, if you were just buying on the fact the stock had gone from $26 to $16 and then it had gone to $10, what would you do when it went to $9? What would you do when it went to $8? What would you do when it went to $7? This is the problem people have. They sell stocks because they didn’t know why they bought it, then it goes down and they don’t know what to do. Do you flip a coin? Do you walk around the block? What do you do? Psychiatrists haven’t worked so far. I haven’t seen the psychiatric or psychological fund file with the SEC and make it through as a mutual fund. They haven’t seemed to help. I’ve tried prayer. That hasn’t worked. If you don’t understand the company, you have this problem when they go down. Eventually, they think it will always come back. This line of thinking doesn’t work, either. People think RCA just about got back to its 1929 high when General Electric took it over. Double knits never came back. Remember those beauties? Floppy disks, Western Union, the list goes on and on. People say it’ll come back. It doesn’t have to come back.
还有一种说法你经常听到。有人打电话给我说:“我想买这只 3 美元的股票。我能亏多少?”嗯,你可能需要拿张纸算算。如果你的邻居在 50 美元时投了 2 万美元,你在 3 美元时投了 2 万美元,如果它跌到零,你俩亏损的金额完全相同——全亏掉。如果有人说:“它才 3 美元,我能亏多少?”如果你投入 100 万美元,你就能亏掉 100 万美元。
Here’s another one you hear all the time. I’ve had people call me up saying, “I’m thinking of buying this stock at $3. How much can I lose?” Well, you may need a piece of paper for this, but if your neighbor put $20,000 at $50 into the stock and you put $20,000 in at $3 and it goes to zero, you lose exactly the same amount of money, everything. If people say, “It’s $3. How much can I lose?” If you put $1 million on it, you can lose $1 million.
这可能是个研究股票的理由。股票从 100 美元跌到 3 美元,并不意味着你应该买。事实上,做空者——那些靠股票赚钱的人——不会做空沃尔玛,不会做空家得宝,也不会做空强生这样的好公司。他们会做空那些从 80 美元跌到 7 美元的股票。他们本来想在 22 美元时做空,但发现在 7 美元时这家公司会归零。它只是还没完蛋而已。它要归零了,他们在 7 美元时卖空,在 6 美元、5 美元、4 美元、3 美元、2 美元、1.25 美元时继续卖空。你知道怎么样吗?如果你卖空,你需要有人买。总得有人买这破玩意儿!你就纳闷了,谁会买它呢?买家就是那些说“它才 3 美元,还能跌到哪去?”的人。
This may be a reason to research a stock. The fact a stock is down $3 from $100 doesn’t mean you should buy it. In fact, short sellers – people who make money in stocks – don’t short Walmart. They don’t short Home Depot. They don’t short the great companies like Johnson & Johnson. They short stocks down from $80 to $7. They’d like to short it at $22, but they figured out at $7, this company will go to zero. They just haven’t blown taps on this thing yet. It’s going to zero, and they’re selling short at $7. They’re selling short at $6, at $5, at $4, at $3, at $2, at $1.25. And you know what? If you sell something short, you need a buyer. Somebody must buy the damn thing! You wonder who’s buying this thing. The buyers are people saying, “It’s $3. How much lower can it go?”
你不能对股票太痴情。你必须明白,股票背后有家公司。你不能像对待孙子那样对待它。你得面对股票说:“我了解这家公司。”如果基本面恶化,如果根本条件变了,你必须对它说再见。记住这条规则:股票不知道你拥有它。这是个突破。你必须了解它,说:“他们干得不错,只要他们干得好,我就继续持有。”我最好的股票都是持有到第五年、第六年、第七年才卖出的,而不是第五天、第六天、第七天。
You can’t get too attached to a stock. You must understand there’s a company behind it. You can’t treat this like your grandchildren. You must deal with the stock and say, “I understand the company.” If it deteriorates, if the fundamentals slip, you must say goodbye to it. Remember the rule that the stock does not know you own it. This is a breakthrough. You must understand it and say, they’re doing well and as long as they’re doing well, I’ll hold on to my position. My best stocks have been the stocks I owned in my fifth, sixth, and seventh years, not my fifth, sixth, or seventh day.
我来谈谈长期投机股。千万别碰长期投机股。我这辈子买了大概 30 只投机股,没有一只让我回本。我把那些糟糕的股票叫作“耳语股”。要是阿瑟·莱维特在场,他肯定能理解这些故事。那种时候,有人打电话给你说:“嗨,彼得,卡洛琳还好吗?孩子们怎么样?我想跟你聊聊国际布利维特公司。盈利会不太稳定,数额也不大,每股 3 美元。”他们一直压低声音说这些。你说了些什么?我根本搞不懂。要么是他们周围挤满了人,大家都想冲出去买这只股票,因为它太刺激了;要么是他们觉得证监会在偷听。他们可能会蹲更短时间的班房——在营地里待六个月,而不是两年。但耳语股根本不灵。
I’ll switch through to my long shots. Avoid long shots. I bought about 30 long shots in my life. I’ve never broken even on one of them. I call the bad ones “whisper stocks.” If Arthur Levitt were here, he’d appreciate these stories. These are the times that somebody calls you up and says, “Hi, Peter. How’s Carolyn? How are the kids? I’d like to talk to you about international blivit. Earnings will be unpredictable. They’ll be small. It’s $3 a share,” and they keep whispering all these things. What are you talking about? I don’t understand. Either they’re so surrounded by people that are going to run out and buy this stock because it’s so exciting, or they think the SEC is listening in. They’ll get a shorter term –they’ll get six months in the camp rather than two years in the camp. But whisper stocks don’t work.
最后我想说,如果你持有股票,总会有东西让你担心,你躲不开。上世纪 50 年代发生的事,人们当时就在担心。我们走出大萧条的唯一原因是第二次世界大战。50 年代初我们又经历了一次衰退。人们说我们马上要重新陷入大萧条。50 年代人们担心大萧条,还担心核战争。那时候,他们有的小弹头连西弗吉尼亚州的麦克莱恩,或者弗吉尼亚州查尔斯顿的麦克莱恩都炸不掉。现在所有那些以“斯坦”结尾的国家——从俄罗斯分出来的有九个“斯坦”国——都有足够炸毁世界的弹头,却没人担心。我小时候,人们建防辐射掩体。我们过去搞民防演习。还记得高中时的这个吗?你躲在书桌底下。即便在那个时候,我也从没觉得那是个特别好的办法。他们吹哨子,有人戴上帽子,我们都躲到书桌底下。但在 50 年代,人们就是不买股票。除了 80 年代,50 年代是本世纪股市最好的十年。50 年代人们不买股票,因为他们担心核战争,担心可能出现大萧条。
I want to conclude by saying there’s always something to worry about if you own stocks. You can’t get away from it. What happened in the 1950s, people were worried about. The only reason we got out of the Depression was World War II. We got another recession in the early 1950s. We said we’re going to go right back into a depression. People were worried about a depression in the 1950s, and they were worried about nuclear war. Back then, the little warheads they had then, they couldn’t blow up a McLane in West Virginia, or a McLane in Virginia or Charleston. All of these countries that end in -stan – there’s nine of these “-stan” countries that came out of Russia. They all have enough warheads to blow the world up and no one worries about it. When I was a kid, people built fallout shelters. We used to have civil defense drills. Remember this one in high school? You get under your desk. I never thought, even then, that was a particularly good thing to do. They’d blow a whistle, somebody would put on a hat, and we would all get under our desks. But in the 1950s, people wouldn’t buy stocks. Except for the 1980s, the 1950s was the best decade this century of the stock market. People wouldn’t buy stocks in the 1950s because they were worried about nuclear war and they were worried about a possible depression.
还记得石油从 4 美元涨到 40 美元,眼看要涨到 100 美元,我们就要陷入大萧条吗?大约三年后,那些说石油会涨到 100 美元的专家现在拿的薪水更高了,他们又说油价要跌到 4 美元,我们又要陷入大萧条了。
Remember when oil went from $4 to $40 and was headed for $100 and we were going to have a depression? About three years later, the same experts who said oil would go to $100 are higher paid now and they said it was headed for $4 and we’re going to have a depression.
还记得日本人要买下全世界,我们就要陷入大萧条吗?然后大约两年后,我们又都担心日本会崩溃。这是我听过最荒谬的事。这是一个储蓄率 20%、劳动力惊人、生产率惊人的国家,人们却说日本要崩溃了,我们就要陷入大萧条。在他们的祈祷清单上,把特蕾莎修女和残疾儿童都往后排了,晚上都在为日本祈祷。简直难以置信。
Remember how the Japanese were going to own the world, and we were going to have a depression? And then about two years later, we were all worried about Japan collapsing. This is the most absurd thing I’ve ever heard. This is a country with a 20% savings rate, incredible work force, incredible productivity, and people were saying we’re going to have a depression because Japan is going to collapse. In their prayer list, they’ve lowered Mother Teresa and crippled children and they’re praying for Japan at night. It’s unbelievable.
还记得发展中国家债务危机吗?大通银行把它的净资产全都借给了巴西、智利、秘鲁和其他那些国家。他们不准备还钱了,我们就要陷入大萧条了。最后总是归结到我们要陷入大萧条,或者我们要陷入大萧条。现在我明白这些国家的叫法了——以前叫“欠发达”国家。我们过去叫它们“不发达”国家。这些叫法都错了,政治上不正确。你得叫它们“新兴”国家。前几天我听到一个政治上正确的说法,形容那些超重的人:横向挑战者。总有什么值得担心的事。
Remember the LDC debt? Chase had lent their net worth to Brazil, Chile, Peru and those other countries. They were not going to pay it back and we were going to have a depression. It always ends in we’re going to have a depression, or we’ll have the Great Depression. Now, I understand what these are called – then, they were called “less developed” countries. We used to call them “underdeveloped” countries. Those are all wrong terms. Those are not politically correct. You must call these “emerging” countries. The other day I heard the politically correct term for somebody that’s overweight: laterally challenged. There is always something to worry about.
在股市里,你身体里最关键器官是你的胃,不是大脑。如果你能把 8 加 8 得出接近 16 的结果,那就只需要知道这个数学水平。你不需要知道曲线下的面积。还记得二次方程、积分和曲线下的面积吗?谁他妈的在乎曲线下面是什么?但你得学那个。在股市里你不需要这些。你只需要知道股市永远会让人害怕,总会有东西让你担心。你必须把这一切都抛到脑后。全部抛开,拥有好公司或者困境反转型公司。去研究它们,你会做得很好。
The key organ in your body in the stock market is your stomach. It’s not the brain. If you can add 8 and 8 and get reasonably close to 16, that’s the only level of math you need to know. You don’t need to know the area under the curve. Remember that quadratic equation and integral calculus and the area under the curve? Whoever cared what was under the damn curve? But you had to study this. You don’t need this in the stock market. All you must know is that it’ll always be scary, there will always be something to worry about. You must forget all about it. Cut it all out and own good companies or own turnarounds. Study them and you’ll do well.
以下是问答环节摘录:
The following are excerpts of the Q&A session:
门罗·卡明:
你在管理投资组合时,会关注国会和监管机构的动向吗?
Monroe Karmin: When managing a portfolio, do you pay attention to the activities of Congress and the regulators?
林奇:
我花零时间思考华盛顿这里在发生什么,只花很少时间思考俄罗斯或中国在发生什么。我只关注事实。经济下行,经济走错方向的时候,我能应对。但整个医疗改革法案把很多医药股打压到了低位。我可以对自己说:“强生 60% 的利润来自美国以外。”他们的制药业务全是专利药,没有专利到期的。只有一个产品——泰诺,占销售额的 5%,而且已经是非处方药了,还在海外增长。这只股票为什么从 58 美元跌到 36 美元?这些公司已经在日本和海外经营了。他们已经面对政府控制药价的情况了。他们应对过了。我只关注事实。今年他们可能——我以为他们会通过医疗法案。结果没通过。这打压了股价,但我觉得即使医疗法案通过了,这些股票也会反弹。我不关心国会发生了什么,或者未来会发生什么。我只关心经济现状,以及我打电话调查的那些公司的状况。
Lynch: I spend zero time thinking about what’s happening down here in Washington, and I spend only a little time thinking about what’s going on in Russia or China. I just deal with facts. When the economy’s going down, when economy’s going the wrong way, I can deal with that. But this whole healthcare reform bill drove a lot of drug stocks down to low levels. I could say to myself, “60% of Johnson & Johnson’s earnings are outside the United States.” Their pharmaceutical drug business is all patented and nothing’s coming off patent. They only have 5% of sales from one product, which is Tylenol, which is already an over-the-counter drug and it’s growing overseas. Why has this stock gone from $58 to $36? These companies are already dealing in Japan and overseas. They already have the government controlling pharmaceutical prices. They’ve dealt with them. I deal with facts. They might, this year – I thought it was likely they’d have a bill passed on healthcare. It didn’t happen. It drove the stocks down, but I think the stocks would have rebounded anyway even if the healthcare bill had passed. I don’t deal with what’s happening in Congress or what’s going to happen in the future. I just deal with what’s happening in the economy and what’s happening in the companies I call.
卡明:
一般日报上的财务报告对你有多大用处?对普通投资者应该有多大用处?
Karmin: How useful is the financial reporting in the general daily press to you? And how useful should it be to investors in general?
林奇:
不仅媒体,公司报告的质量也大幅提高了。十年前,公司没有中期资产负债表。我猜他们一年只给你看一次资产负债表。现在他们每季度分享一次。他们报告存货、应收账款和其他有用信息。在主要报纸上,他们甚至列出了基金的类型。纽约证券交易所有大约 2500 家公司。但有多达 5000 多种不同的共同基金,是股票数量的两倍。至少在报纸上,他们会对基金做些解释。
Lynch: It has improved dramatically not just in the press but also company reporting. Ten years ago, companies didn’t have interim balance sheets. I’d imagine they only gave their balance sheet to you annually. Now they share it quarterly. They report inventories, receivables, and other useful information. In the major newspapers, they even show types of funds. There are around 2,500 companies in the New York Stock Exchange. There are over 5,000 different mutual funds, twice as many mutual funds as stocks. At least in the paper, they explain something about the fund.
如果你持有汽车股,你不应该看报纸的财经版。很多地方报纸每周会花整整四个版面来报道汽车。他们谈论新车型,对汽车发表看法。如果你持有汽车股,那是汽车股持有者应该看的报纸版块。
If you own auto stocks, you shouldn’t be reading the financial part of the newspaper. Many local newspapers devote a whole four pages on automobiles weekly. They talk about new models and offer opinions about automobiles. If you own auto stocks, that’s the part of the newspaper automobile stock owners should look at.
你不应该一天给你的经纪人打四次电话问股价。这没用。早上起来看看你的股票昨天表现如何,也没用。所有这些纯粹是浪费时间。如果你在计算你的股票值多少钱,那是绝对浪费时间。你应该在收到季度报告时研究公司。
You shouldn’t be calling your broker four times a day to get stock quotes. It doesn’t work. Getting up in the morning to see how your stock did yesterday is not useful, either. All this stuff is just a waste of time. If you’re adding up how much your stocks are worth, it’s an absolute waste of time. You should be looking at the company when you get the quarterly reports.
如果你在零售业或餐饮业,你会看到像塔可钟、麦当劳和玩具反斗城这样的公司。你会看到所有这些公司都表现得极其出色。你会看到 Bombay、Radio Shack 和它的 Tandy 品牌。你会看到 Radio Shack 在全美遍地开花,直到每个大城市都有 25 家分店。你会说它们没什么增长空间了,但它们已经辉煌了 20 年。这就是你要处理的东西。你不是在处理今天的琐碎细节。你是在处理这家公司两年、三年、四年、五年后会做什么。如果你在投资周期股,业务正在好转,你就等业务放缓的迹象。看到迹象后,就转向其他东西。
If you were in the retailing industry or if you were in the restaurant industry, you would have seen companies like Taco Bell, McDonald’s, and Toys “R” Us. You would have seen all these companies do terrifically well. You would have seen Bombay and Radio Shack and its Tandy. You would have seen Radio Shack roll across the country until there were 25 Radio Shacks in every major city. You said there’s not much room for them to grow, but they had a great 20-year run. That’s what you’re dealing with. You’re not dealing with the minutiae of today. You’re dealing with what this company is doing two years, three years, four years, five years from now. If you’re dealing with a cyclical and business is turning around, you wait for signs that business is slowing down. When you see it, you move on to something else.
卡明:
你担心当今金融市场的波动吗?你觉得需要采取什么措施来降低波动吗?
Karmin: Are you concerned about the volatility in the financial markets today? Do you think something needs to be done to reduce it?
林奇:
我爱波动。我记得 1972 年市场大幅下跌。塔可钟从 14 美元跌到 1 美元。它没有债务,从未关闭过一家餐厅。我在 7 美元开始买入,但一直跟踪,它跌到了 1 美元。1978 年,百事可乐以 42 美元收购它时,它是我管理的麦哲伦基金的最大持仓。如果百事没收购它,它本可以涨到 400 美元。波动太棒了。这些电话调研很重要。我不认为市场一天涨 80 点、一天跌 80 点对公众来说是好事。但我觉得所有这些电话调研和其他抑制每日波动的措施很重要,但市场总会上涨和下跌。
Lynch: I love volatility. I remember the market went down dramatically in 1972. Taco Bell went from $14 to $1. It had no debt. It never closed a restaurant. I started buying at $7, but I kept on it and it went to $1. It was the largest position in Magellan in 1978 when Pepsi-Cola bought it out at $42. It would have gone to $400 if Pepsi hadn’t bought it out. Volatility is terrific. These calls are important. I don’t think the market going up 80 points one day and down 80 the next is a good thing for the public. But I think all these callers and all these other things to keep the volatility down each day is important, but the market is going to go up and down.
人类本性在 25000 年里没什么大变化。某件意想不到的事会突然冒出来,市场会下跌或上涨。波动会发生,市场会继续有这些起伏。如果人们能理解自己拥有什么,这就提供了巨大的机会。如果他们不理解自己拥有什么,他们可以持有共同基金,并持续追加投资。历史上,企业基本利润每年增长约 8%。企业利润大约每九年翻一番。股市也应该大约每九年翻一番。今天市场大约在 3800 点。我确信接下来的 3800 点会是上涨的。它不会下跌。在那之后——接下来的 500 或 600 点——我不知道它们会往哪个方向走。市场应该在接下来八九年翻一番,再接下来的八九年再翻一番,因为利润会增加 8%,然后股票会下跌。就是这样。
Human nature hasn’t changed a lot in 25,000 years. Some event will come out of left field and the market will go down or the market will go up. Volatility will occur, and the markets will continue to have these ups and downs. That presents a great opportunity if people can understand what they own. If they don’t understand what they own, they can own mutual funds and keep adding to their mutual funds. Basic corporate profits have grown about 8% per year historically. Corporate profits double about every nine years. The stock market ought to double about every nine years, too. The market is about 3,800 today. I’m convinced the next 3,800 points will be up. It won’t be down. After that – the next 500 or 600 points – I don’t know which way they’ll go. The market ought to double in the next eight or nine years and double again in the eight or nine years after that because profits will go up 8%, then stocks will fall. That’s all there is to it.
卡明:
现在是十月了。要当心十月,股市的巫月。你对这个月的走势怎么看?道琼斯指数什么时候能上 4000 点?
Karmin: We’re in the month of October. Beware of the month of October, the witching month of the stock market. What do you see as the outlook for this month? And when do you think the Dow will hit 4,000?
林奇:
十月一直是个特别的月份。1987 年的时候,我深信市场没出问题,也没太担心。卡洛琳和我计划了一趟去爱尔兰的高尔夫假期,打算逛一个球场、住一个小屋、再去另一个球场,沿着爱尔兰西海岸一路打球。我们周四晚上出发。那天市场跌了 55 点,不算太妙。第二天我们到了爱尔兰,因为时差,我们已经过完了一天。我回到酒店打电话回去,周五市场又跌了 112 点。我跟卡洛琳说:“我觉得如果周一市场再跌,我们就得回去了。”我们在那儿过了周末,周一市场暴跌 508 点。我的基金从大约 120 亿美元缩水到 80 亿美元左右。两个交易日,这玩意儿就让你心惊肉跳。我说到这周末,我的基金就归零了。
Lynch: October’s always been a special month. In 1987, I was convinced the market was not in trouble and I didn’t worry about things. Carolyn and I planned this great golf vacation to Ireland. We planned to visit one course and stay at a little house and visit another and go all along the west coast of Ireland and play golf. We left on a Thursday night. The market went down 55 points that day, which was not too good. The next day, we got to Ireland. Because of the time difference, we had completed our day. I got back to the hotel and called in. The market had gone down 112 on Friday. I said to Carolyn, “I think if the market goes down on Monday, we’re going to have to go back.” We stayed there for the weekend, and on Monday, the market went down 508 points. My fund went from around $12 billion to around $8 billion. That gets your attention – two working days. I said by the end of this week, I’d have no fund.
我也没什么能做的。周一那天,因为市场没开盘——爱尔兰中午时纽约才早上 7 点。我们那天还是照常,玩了玩,多打了会儿高尔夫,然后换了个地方看市场崩盘。我最后还是回家了,这事儿我也没法子。但我估计我的股东们可不这么想。他们打电话问:“林奇在干嘛?”有人说:“他在第六洞。现在平标准杆,但掉进了沙坑。这搞不好要三柏忌,这局可大了。”我觉得这可不是股东们想听的,但我也改变不了这该死的市场。所以,我回家跟大家一起扛。我始终如一。我管麦哲伦基金的 13 年里,市场跌了 9 次。每次市场跌,麦哲伦也跟着跌。我九战九败。
There wasn’t a lot I could do. Here it was Monday, because the market didn’t open – by 12:00 in Ireland it was still 7:00 in New York. We did spend that day, and we played around and golfed more, and then we went somewhere instead to watch the market deteriorate. I did return home. There was nothing I could do about it. But I think my shareholders thought differently. They called up and asked, “Well, what’s Lynch doing?” They said, “He’s on the sixth hole. He’s even par now, but he’s in a trap. This could be a triple bogey here. This could be a big inning.” I don’t think that’s exactly what shareholders wanted to hear, but it’s not like I could do something about this damn thing. So, I came back home and suffered with everybody else. I was consistent. When I ran Magellan, in 13 years the market went down nine times. Every time the market went down, Magellan went down. I was nine for nine.
这儿还有个数字你得记下来:如果你在一只股票上投 1000 美元,最多也就亏 1000 美元。我干过好几回这事。但如果你看对了,你能赚 5000 美元、10000 美元、20000 美元。在这行,你不需要每两次就对一次。你可以四次只对一次。很多时候你看对了,知道公司干得好、成绩出色,你还加仓,或者至少没卖掉,结果反而成了悲剧。你可以在上涨时赚更多钱。我就是这么念叨的。现在我要抛硬币,告诉你市场今年还是明年上 4000 点。正面是涨,但这枚硬币两面都是正面。我抛了硬币,市场明年会涨。就这样。我对股市就知道这么多。
Here’s another one of these numbers you must write down: If you put $1,000 in a stock, all you can lose is $1,000. I’ve done that several times. But if you’re right, you make $5,000, $10,000, $20,000. In this business, you don’t have to be right one out of two times. You can be right one out of four. A lot of the times you’re right, you know the company’s doing well, you know they’re doing a great job, and you add to it or at least you don’t sell it, which is a tragedy. You can make more money on the upside. I just roll those out. I will now flip a coin to tell you whether the market will go to 4,000 this year or next year. Heads means it goes up, but it’s a two-headed coin. I flipped the coin and the market will go up in the next year. That’s it. That’s all I ever know about the stock market.
卡明:
可以想象,我们收到很多问题,问大家该把钱投到哪儿。我把它分成两部分,你分别谈谈。第一个问题:有人打算每年往 4 岁女儿的教育基金里投 1000 美元。该投到什么地方?另一个问题涵盖所有人:你目前看好哪些市场标的,为什么?
Karmin: As you can imagine, we have many questions about where people should put their money. I’ll divide it into two parts, and you can address it. This questioner intends to put $1,000 yearly into their four-year-old daughter’s education fund. Where should it be invested? The other question covers everybody else: What are some of your current market favorites and why?
林奇:
第一个问题——无论你是给 4 岁、14 岁还是 74 岁的人投资,这都很重要——你必须问自己:“市场下跌时我该怎么办?”我在这种场合问过观众:“在座有多少人是短线投资者?”从来没人举手。全世界的人都是长线投资者,直到市场跌下来。我记得 1990 年,那比 1987 年还吓人。1987 年市场就是单纯下跌。你打电话给公司,他们说:“我们生意好极了。我们马上要宣布股票回购计划。已经在回购了。生意很棒,我们搞不懂怎么回事。”但 1990 年不同。伊拉克入侵科威特。银行体系摇摇欲坠,真的快完了。你打电话给公司,他们说业务在放缓。
Lynch: On the first one – and this is important whether you’re investing for a four-year-old, a 14-year-old, or a 74-year-old – you must ask, “What am I going to do when the market goes down?” I’ve had audiences like this, and I’ve asked, “How many people in the room are short-term investors?” I’ve never had anybody raise their hand. Everybody in the world is a long-term investor until the market goes down. I remember 1990, a scarier year than 1987. In 1987, the market just fell. You call up companies, and they say, “Our business is terrific. We’re about to announce a stock buyback. We’re already buying back stock. Business is great, and we can’t figure this out.” But 1990 was different. Iraq invaded Kuwait. You had the banking system on the ropes, I mean close. You call up a company and they say their business was slowing down.
我们派了 50 万军队去沙特,准备跟人们认为是世界第四大军队作战。有人说他们是世界上最凶狠的军队。那会是一场可怕的战争,我们应该坐观其变。还记得那个大理论吗?很多人在这个城市里说我们应该等他们耗下去。那我们到现在还得在 120 度高温下等,50 万人。我觉得布什基于得到的情报,做出了极其勇敢的决定——打进去,把他们干掉,不然我们现在还在那儿。但那是个糟糕的时期,很吓人。有些人从 1987 年学到了教训,他们挺过了那段日子,说:“我对未来 5 年、10 年、15 年的这个国家有信心,”然后坚持住了。
We sent 500,000 troops to Saudi, and we’re about to fight what people thought was the fourth largest army in the world. Some said they were the toughest army in the world. This was going to be a terrible war, and we ought to sit them out. Remember the big theory? A lot of people in this city said we ought to wait them out. We’d still be waiting for them in 120 degrees, about 500,000 people. I think Bush made an incredibly brave decision on the information he was getting to go in there and knock them out or we’d still be there. But that was an ugly time, and that was scary. Some people learned from 1987 and they stood throughout that and said, “I’m confident about the next 5, 10, 15 years in this country,” and they hung in there.
如果你想买一只小盘成长基金或股债平衡基金,每年投入一笔钱,那就每年多投一些。10 年、20 年、30 年后你会很满意。股票会跑赢货币市场基金,也会跑赢债券。你这么想:像麦当劳、万豪这样的大公司,永远不会聚在一起说:“我们干得不错。要不我们把债券的利率提一提?那些债券持有人一直很忠诚。我们给了 8%,为什么不提到 9%?”像自动数据处理公司(Automatic Data Processing)这种做工资单的公司,一家非常平常的公司,连续 32 年盈利增长,连续 32 年两位数增长。我们经历过衰退、战争、国会换届、最高法院调整,但它仍然 32 年盈利增长。这就是你依赖的东西;强生(Johnson & Johnson)连续 30 年盈利增长,通用零件(General Parts)连续 42 年,艾默生电气(Emerson Electric)连续 38 年。你在世界其他地方看不到这样的公司。你买基金买的就是这些——一堆好公司。
If you want to buy a small growth fund or a balanced fund that’s part bonds and part stocks and you put so much money in, then you should put more in every year. You’ll be pleased in 10, 20, or 30 years. Stocks will beat the hell out of money markets. They’ll beat the hell out of bonds. Think of it this way: Great corporations like McDonald’s, Marriott, or any other will never get together and say, “We’re doing well. Why don’t we raise the coupon on our bonds? Those bond holders have been loyal. We’ve been given 8%. Why don’t we raise it to 9%?” Companies like Automatic Data Processing – it does payrolls, an amazing prosaic company, 32 years of higher earnings, 32 years of double-digit earnings growth. We’ve had recessions. We’ve had wars. We’ve had changes in Congress, changes in the Supreme Court, but it’s had 32 years of up earnings. That’s what you’re relying on; Johnson & Johnson has 30 years of up earnings, General Parts 42 years of up earnings, Emerson Electric 38 years of up earnings. You don’t see companies like this in other parts of the world. That’s what you buy when you buy a fund. You buy a bunch of good companies.
至于个股,金融领域一直很有吸引力。像化学银行(Chemical)、旅行者(Traveler’s)、花旗银行(Citicorp)、奥斯汀银行(Bank of Austin)、房利美(Fannie Mae)、房地美(Freddie Mac)这些股票都跌了。它们的生意很好,资产负债表改善了,估值只有市场平均水平的一半或三分之一。周期性股票也迎来了久违的机会——钢铁、造纸、铝业、化工。轮到它们上场了。拉美经济似乎在复苏。巴西正在好转。这些都是事实。印度也在改善。欧洲经历了自大萧条以来最严重的衰退。西欧目前有 1800 万人失业,经济正开始缓慢复苏。日本已经触底。我觉得你会看到需求增长。
As for the stocks, the financial area has been attractive. Stocks like Chemical, or Traveler’s, or Citicorp, or Bank of Austin, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, these stocks have all come down. Their businesses are terrific. They’ve improved their balance sheets. They’re selling at multiples half or 1/3 lower than the general market. We have a chance for the cyclicals for the first time in a long time – the steels, papers, aluminums, chemicals. It’s their turn to come to the plate. We seem to have an economy recovering in Latin America. Brazil is turning around. These are facts, again. Things are improving in India. Europe had the worst recession since the Depression. There are 18 million people out of work in Western Europe right now, and the economy is starting to slowly turn. Japan has bottomed. I think you’ll see demand.
大宗商品价格看起来有吸引力。铝价跌到了 30 年低点。铝锭价格几乎翻了一番。纸板也会一样。周期性股票将迎来好时光,我认为汽车股也极其便宜,只有四五倍市盈率。这可不是什么特别景气的时候。房价可负担。虽然不如两年前那么便宜,但以 20 年来看,房价还是负担得起的。汽车可负担。耐用消费品也可负担。
Commodity prices look attractive. Aluminum prices reached a 30-year low. Ingot has almost doubled. You’ll see the same thing with linerboard. We’ll see a good time for cyclical stocks, and I think the auto stocks are also extremely cheap at four or five times earnings. These are not extraordinary times. Housing is affordable. It’s not as affordable as it was two years ago, but on a 20-year basis, housing is affordable. Automobiles are affordable. Consumer durables are affordable.
我们总听到就业增长。在衰退中,我们损失了 180 万个工作岗位,现在增加了 580 万个,过去 19 个月里增加了 450 万个。我们损失了 180 万,又补回了 580 万。净增 400 万。难处在于我们丢掉了大约 60 万个制造业岗位,只找回了 10 万个制造业岗位。但总体上更多人有了工作,我认为这个趋势会延续下去。这是关键。你从报纸上、电视上听到的就是这些。1980 年代,最大的 500 家公司裁掉了 300 万个岗位,但 1980 年代诞生了 210 万家新企业。就算每家企业只雇 10 个人,那也是 2100 万个岗位。我们美国这台就业机器真是不可思议。
We hear about job growth. In the recession, we lost 1.8 million jobs, and now we’ve added 5.8 million, 4.5 million in the last 19 months. We lost 1.8 million and we’ve added 5.8 million back. We’re 4 million to the good. The tough part of it is we dropped about 600,000 manufacturing jobs and we only brought back 100,000 manufacturing jobs. But there are a lot more people working, and I think that trend will continue. This is key. This is what you hear from the press. This is what you hear from TV. In the decade of the 1980s, the 500 largest companies eliminated 3 million jobs, but there were 2.1 million businesses started in the 1980s. If they just have 10 people each, that’s 21 million jobs. It’s an incredible job machine we have in America.
这就是 1980 年代发生的事。那 210 万家企业创造了所有就业岗位。1990 年代,前 500 强还会再裁掉 300 万个岗位,你听到的永远是 X 公司在哈特福德裁员 5000 人,Y 公司在罗切斯特裁员 5000 人。亚利桑那州斯科茨代尔有人因为读到东北部的裁员新闻,就不买沙发了。这就是规律。这些公司必须裁员才能保持竞争力。这是我们的商业模式。过去两年半里,有 1750 家公司上市,融资超过 1000 亿美元。纽约证券交易所一共只有 2500 家公司。它们会把融来的资本投入研发,投入更多工厂和更高效的设备。这对这些公司来说是件大好事。我认为形势非常好。
That’s what happened in the 1980s. These 2.1 million businesses created all the jobs. In the decade of the 1990s, the top 500 companies will eliminate another 3 million jobs, and all you ever hear about is company X lays off 5,000 people in Hartford, and company Y lays off 5,000 people in Rochester. Somebody doesn’t buy a sofa in Scottsdale, Arizona because they read about layoffs in the Northeast. That’s the nature. These companies must make these layoffs to stay competitive. That’s our business. We’ve had, in the last 2.5 years, 1,750 companies become public. They raised over $100 billion. There are only 2,500 companies on the New York Stock Exchange. They’ll put the capital they raised into research and development. They’ll put it into more plants and more efficient equipment. This is a fantastic thing for these companies. I think the situation is excellent.
今天的银行体系在资产负债表的左侧有更多投资——包括它们持有的政府债券、抵押贷款支持证券,还有自 1951 年以来首次出现的贷款。它们只赚 50、20、30 个基点,它们说:“我们得放贷了。”银行体系的股本与资产比率是 45 年来最高的。银行体系准备就绪,流动性充裕。我不明白为什么有人对就业持续增长这么悲观。我真搞不懂。我从未见过哪个银行家或商人喜欢衰退。我至今没找到这种人。
The banking system today has more investments on the left side of the balance sheet. We’re talking about the governments they own, the mortgage-backed securities they own, then they have loans for the first time ever since 1951. They’re only making 50, 20, 30 basis points and they said, “We’ll have to make loans.” The banking system has the highest equity-to-assets in 45 years. The banking system is ready to go. There’s lots of liquidity to run. I don’t know why some people are so depressed about people getting hired all the time. I can’t quite figure this out. I’ve never met a banker or anybody in business that likes recession. I’ve yet to find these people.
卡明:
说到银行,你担心银行被允许销售共同基金,以及这给投资者带来的混乱——他们分不清银行存款是否有保险?你担心放松管制的整个问题吗?
Karmin: Speaking of banks, are you concerned about banks being allowed to offer mutual funds and the confusion that creates among investors over whether bank deposits are insured or not? Are you concerned about the whole question of deregulation?
林奇:
我认为银行获准销售共同基金是好事,因为它们很可能会卖大量富达的共同基金。这很重要。不过说真的,我认为重要的是让人们明白,当他们持有债券基金时,债券的价格也会涨跌。债券的波动性几乎和股票一样大。如果他们持有一只 30 年期债券基金,就算那是国债,也可能迅速损失掉 25% 到 30% 的资金。人们必须明白这一点。
Lynch: I think it’s positive that banks will be allowed to sell mutual funds because they’ll probably sell a lot of Fidelity mutual funds. That’s important. No, but seriously, I think it’s important that people understand when they own a bond fund that bonds can go up and down. Bonds are just about as volatile as stocks. If they own a 30-year bond fund, then you can lose 25%, 30% of your money fast even if they’re government bonds. People must understand this.
我们公众的金融素养低得惊人。他们听到的总是百时美施贵宝今天涨了 2 美元或 3 美元,道琼斯指数怎么样了。他们对美国企业一无所知。接近退休的人,比如说,拿到 45 万美元作为提前退休金。他们没有经验。他们不知道债券是什么。他们不知道股票是什么。他们必须在 30 天或 60 天内做出决定,否则会有巨大的税务后果。这些人根本没有学习股市的经历。这是场悲剧。我认为任何能教育公众的事情,如果你能说服人们,如果他们理解了股市的波动性 —— 我不是说每个人都该买股票。我只是说,如果你买入一只股票,你必须做某些事情。如果你没准备好做这些事情,你就应该把钱存在银行里。把钱放在货币市场基金里。
There’s an incredible rate of illiteracy in our public. All they ever hear about is what happened today to Bristol-Myers going up $2 or $3, what happened to Dow Jones. They don’t get to learn anything about America. People near retirement are given, say, $450,000 as early retirement. They have no experience. They don’t know what a bond is. They don’t know what stocks are. They must make decisions in 30 or 60 days, or they’ll have a big tax consequence. These people have no experience learning about the stock market. It’s a tragedy. I think anything we can do to educate the public, if you can convince people, if they understand the volatility of the stock market – I’m not saying anybody should buy a stock. I’m just saying if you purchase a stock, you must do certain things. If you’re not ready to do those things, you should keep your money in the bank. Keep your money in a money market fund.
有些人不去做功课,他们承受不了这个。他们应该远离股市。他们把一半的毕生积蓄投进股市,对谁都没有好处。他们好不容易攒了 5 万或 6 万美元供孩子上大学,而孩子一年后就要入学了。他们却要把所有钱都投进一只权益类共同基金,只打算持有一年。这对谁都没好处。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)正在努力向人们解释这些产品的性质。如果他们理解了,他们会做得更好。信息越多越好。
Some people don’t do their homework, they don’t have the stomach for it. They should stay out. They’re not doing anybody any good by taking half their life savings and putting it in the stock market. They’ve been lucky enough to save $50,000 or $60,000 to send their kids to college, and one is going to start in a year. They’re going to take all that money and put it in an equity mutual fund with a one-year horizon. That’s doing no one any good. The SEC is working hard on explaining to people the nature of these products. If they understand them, they’ll do better with it. The more information, the merrier.
富达正在启动一项关于退休的重大研究。研究结果将在今年年底公布。我们将对 1600 人、300 多位专家进行调查。我们会做一项重大研究,向人们解释退休的本质,以及他们如何最好地理解应该如何投资自己的资产。我们不会提富达 —— 也许潜意识里会提!我们在努力帮忙。SEC 在这方面也做了巨大推动,我认为这是积极因素。
Fidelity is launching a major study on retirement. It will be out by the end of this year. We’ll do it over 1,600 people, over 300 experts. We’ll do a major study and explain to people the nature of retirement and how they can best understand how they should invest their assets. We won’t mention Fidelity – maybe subliminally! We’re trying to help. There’s been an incredible push by the SEC to do this, and I think it’s a positive element.
卡明:
关于这一点有几个问题。你对 SEC 要求共同基金采用量化风险评级体系的提案怎么看?另外,你认为新的股东权利提案 —— 要求更开放的信息披露和沟通 —— 对公司及市场有什么影响?
Karmin: A couple of questions about that. What do you think of the SEC’s proposal to require mutual funds to adapt a quantitative ratings scale for riskiness? Also, what effect do you feel the new shareholder rights proposals for more open disclosure and communication are having on companies and the market?
林奇:
我对 SEC 的提案不太熟悉。关于新的股东权利提案,我认为在决定我们应该如何参与公司管理这件事上要非常谨慎。应该披露高管薪酬以及他们持有多少股份。但我不认为我们应该决定他们是否要收购这家公司,或者是否要扩建这家工厂。当你插手公司的运营时,事情会变得复杂。很多伟大的公司做了很多你从未听说过的决策,因为它们决定不做什么,所以它们最好的决策就是不做某些事。如果他们在股东的压力下决定该做什么、不该做什么,就会分心,无法经营好业务。那些表现好的公司会看得远,通常是五、六、七年。它们做出的一些决策可能对下一年不是最有利的,但对未来几年却是正确的。我们这些局外人越是盯着它们的一举一动,不断评论,公司就会被一个庞大的委员会管理,最终得到的是委员会式的平庸结果。我认为这对任何人都没好处。但披露相关事实,比如高管有多少期权,期权是否按市价授予,以及他们的薪酬 —— 我认为这很重要。
Lynch: I’m not too familiar with the SEC proposal. Concerning the new shareholder rights proposals, I think you must be careful crossing the bridge on how much we get involved in managing companies. There should be a disclosure about people getting paid and a disclosure on how many shares they own. But I don’t think we should decide whether they should make this acquisition or whether they should expand this plant. When you get too involved in running a company, it’s complex. A lot of great companies have made a lot of decisions you haven’t heard about because they decided not to do something, so the best decision they didn’t do is to not do something. If they’re under all this pressure from shareholders of what to do and what not to do, they’ll take their eye off the ball and won’t be able to run the business. The companies that do well look out five, six, or seven years. Some of the decisions they make might not be the right thing for the next year, but they are the right thing for years later. The more we concentrate on what they’re doing and we keep commenting on it as outsiders, it’s going to be run by an enormous committee and we’ll get committee results. I don’t think that’ll help anybody. But disclosure of relevant facts like how many options people have, whether the options are at the market, and what they’re paid – I think that’s important.
首席执行官在年报中致辞,这种做法还算新鲜。那是一份有价值的信息。你不会意识到这些公司在致辞上花了多少时间。这是一份严肃的文件,对股东很有帮助。季度股东报告也很棒。此外,美国每个人都可以联系一家公司。访问权不限于富达、铂金和德雷福斯这些大机构。如果你持有 100 股,你可以给公司打电话,会有人跟你聊。人们没有利用这一点。这些公司愿意对话。
Comments in a letter by the Chief Executive in the annual report are fairly new. It is a valuable piece of information. You don’t realize these companies spend a lot of time on this letter. It’s a serious document, and it’s helpful to shareholders. Quarterly shareholder reports are excellent. Also, everybody in America can contact a company. Access is not limited to Fidelity and Platinum and Dreyfus. If you own 100 shares, you can call a company, and somebody will talk to you about it. People don’t take advantage of that. These companies are willing to talk.
关于这些定量和定性的风险评级,我认为如果可能做到的话,或许可行。我对此有点困惑。我不太了解最新情况。但我认为人们应该明白,某些股票基金、新兴成长基金、小盘股基金,以及销售额 5000 万美元的投资公司,比买入大型优质蓝筹成长公司波动更大。同样,长期债券比中期债券波动更大,而中期债券又比一年期债券波动更大。这些事情应该向人们解释清楚。人们应该像在霍华德·约翰逊餐厅那样拿到一份菜单。
On these quantitative and qualitative risk ratings, I think if it could be done, I think it might be possible. I’m a little confused about it. I’m not that current on it. But I think people should understand that certain stock funds, emerging growth funds, small cap funds, and investment companies with $50 million of sales are more volatile than when you’re buying major quality blue chip growth companies. Also, long-term bonds are more viable than medium-term bonds, which are more volatile than one-year bonds. These are things that should be explained to people. People should get a menu like you get at Howard Johnson’s.
卡明:
有几位听众问,你怎么看当前的房利美股票和期权?
Karmin: Several people in the audience asked how you view Fannie Mae’s stocks and options today.
林奇:
我会把房地美也包括进去。这两家公司都拥有非常出色的业务。人们研究国际象棋。但这对于研究股市来说不是一个好游戏。在国际象棋中,一位杰出棋手可以连续 1000 次击败一位好棋手。棋盘上的一切都在你面前。所有走法都是已知的。全是技术。然而,在扑克和桥牌中,存在很多不确定性。你可能会精确地打一手牌却输掉。你可以说,“嗯,我打得没错。如果再来一次,哪怕是一晚上、一个月……”,这不是股市。股市比任何其他游戏都更接近扑克,我认为知道这一点很重要。
Lynch: I’d include Freddie Mac in that, too. Both companies have great businesses. People study chess. This would not be a good game to study for the stock market. In chess, an outstanding player beats a good player 1,000 times in a row. Everything’s in front of you. All the moves are known. It’s all technique. However, in poker and bridge, there are many uncertainties. You can play a hand exactly right and lose. You can say, “Well, I played it right. If I do it again, over a night, over a month….” That’s not the stock market. The stock market is closer to poker than to any other game, and I think that’s the important thing to know.
房利美就像一场 27 张牌的梭哈游戏。牌一张张翻开。大约十年前,我们在休斯顿做得并不好 —— 那里很多人持有 5% 首付的抵押贷款。人们为了工作搬到那里,带着配偶。工作没了,他们对社区没有归属感,就离开了。在俄克拉荷马或阿拉斯加也是如此。当那张牌翻开时,局面很难看。他们一天亏损 100 万美元。这很容易记住。那不太愉快。他们最终明白我们有一个好业务。我们成本极低。如果我们能匹配负债和资产,即使成本很低也能获得一点利差,我们就可以拥有一个相当不错的业务。然后一张牌又会翻开,比如加州房地产价格开始下跌。东北部也开始下跌。那时你会说,“哦,我最好继续看看止赎情况怎么样。”如果你一直关注这个故事,每年都有机会再次买入它。总会有事情发生。人们担心利率会下降。股票因为利率下降而下跌。现在利率上升了,股票又因为利率上升而下跌。房地美和房利美仍然表现很好,我认为它们会是出色的股票。它们不会翻四倍,但现在大约被低估了 25%。它们是值得持有五年的好股票。
Fannie Mae has been like a 27-card stud poker game. Cards keep getting turned over. We were not doing so well in Houston – this was 10 to 12 years ago – with these 5% downs that a lot of people had in mortgages. People moved there for jobs. They brought their spouses along. The job left. They had no ties to those communities and they left. It was the same in Oklahoma or in Alaska. When that card turned over, it was ugly. They were losing $1 million a day. That was easy to remember. That wasn’t too pleasant. They finally figured out we have a good business. We’re extremely low cost. If we can match our liabilities and assets, make a small spread even when we have low cost, we can have a pretty good business. Then a card would turn over like when real estate prices started to go down in California. They started to go down in the Northeast. Then you’d say, “Oh, I better keep checking to see what foreclosures were like.” If you keep watching the story, every year you get a chance to buy this again. Something will come up. People are worried rates would go down. Stocks went down because rates went down. Now that interest rates are going up, the stocks are going down because interest rates are going up. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are still doing great, and I think they’ll be terrific stocks. They won’t quadruple, but they’re about 25% undervalued now. They’d be good stocks to own for five years.
卡明:
下一个问题来自一位有真正困难的家伙。他说如果你成功的真正秘诀是跟着女儿去商场找选股灵感,那我们这些单身汉该怎么办?
Karmin: This next question is from a fellow with a real problem. He says if the real secret of your success is following your daughters to the shopping mall for stock tips, what do we bachelors do?
林奇:
我认为人们如此沮丧的原因之一是他们远离了孩子。周末他们读所有那些杂志,需要报纸,然后他们变成了经济学家,变得非常沮丧。如果他们在周一带着午餐去上班,他们就会看涨。你需要周末租一个 12 岁的孩子。他们不知道臭氧层消失的问题,也不知道我们一直想着并因此沮丧的那些可怕的事情。他们不知道二垒手和游击手能拿 400 万美元却连球都传不到一垒。你需要找一个 12 岁的孩子,周末租下来,跟着这个男孩或女孩,看他们去哪儿购物。
Lynch: I think one of the reasons people get so depressed is they get away from children. On the weekends they read all these magazines, they need the newspapers, and they’d become economists and get so depressed. They’re bullish if they take that lunch to work on Monday. You need to rent a 12-year-old on the weekend. They don’t know about the problem of the ozone layer disappearing and all these terrible things we think of all the time and we get so depressed about. They don’t know about how second basemen and shortstops get paid $4 million and they can’t throw to first base on a bounce. You need to find a 12-year-old and rent him for the weekend and follow this boy or girl around and see where they’re shopping.
我们的孩子喜欢美体小铺(Body Shop)。我买了它,我认为它会是一只好股票。我们的大女儿玛丽喜欢安·泰勒(Ann Taylor)。她暑假在一家咨询公司工作时需要穿正装上班。她觉得安·泰勒价格合理、质量不错,这是一个很好的选股点子。我妻子卡罗琳是个非常会购物的人。她几乎拿到了购物的黑带。因为孩子们,她没能完全拿到,但她是个好购物者。她也给了我一些很棒的建议。我认为你要么用你的配偶,要么自己出去逛。
Our kids love Body Shop. I bought it, and I think it will be a good stock. Our oldest daughter, Mary, likes Ann Taylor. She had to dress up to go to work when she was working a summer in a consulting firm. She thought Ann Taylor’s prices were good and the quality was good, and it was a great stock pick. My wife, Carolyn, is an extremely good shopper. She almost got a black belt in shopping. Because of the children, she didn’t quite finish that, but she’s a good shopper. She’s given me some great tips, too. I think either you must use your spouse, or you must go out on your own.
我的基金曾持有最大仓位是 恒适(Hanes),它旗下拥有 塑形丝袜(L’eggs)。这是一只巨盘股。联合食品(Consolidated Foods)最终收购了它。恒适对塑形丝袜有垄断地位,而塑形丝袜是一家大公司。我知道迟早会有人推出新品。凯泽-罗斯(Kayser-Roth)推出了“别扯淡”(No Nonsense)。我担心这“别扯淡”的东西更好,又搞不太清楚怎么回事。我跑去超市买了 62 双“别扯淡”,不同颜色、不同款式都买了。店员肯定纳闷这顾客是从哪个怪房子跑出来的。我把它们带回办公室,逢人就发——不分男女,谁想要就拿一双。告诉他们全拿走,然后告诉我感受如何。大约三周后他们回话说:不如原版。这就是研究。就这点事。我继续持有恒适,那只股票后来涨成了巨盘股。解读市场,不过如此。
Once the biggest position in my fund was Hanes, which owned L’eggs. It was a huge stock. Consolidated Foods eventually bought it. Hanes had a monopoly on L’eggs, and L’eggs is a big company. I knew somebody would come along with a new product. Kayser-Roth introduced “No Nonsense.” I was worried this “No Nonsense” thing was better, and I couldn’t quite figure out what was going on. I went to the supermarket and bought 62 pairs of “No Nonsense.” I bought different colors, different shapes. They must have wondered what house I came from. I brought them into the office and passed that to anybody, male or female, who wanted one of these things. Just take them all and tell me how it is. They came about in about three weeks and said it’s not as good. That’s what research is. That’s all it was. I held on to Hanes, and the stock was a huge stock. That’s what it’s about.