1959 年度致合伙人信
1959 年致合伙人的信
1959 Letter
沃伦·E·巴菲特
WARREN E. BUFFETT
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市 Underwood 大街 5202 号
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
1959 年股市总览：
The General Stock Market in 1959:
道琼斯工业平均指数无疑是最常被援引的股市晴雨表，可它在 1959 年勾勒出的图景多少有些失真。这一年，该指数从 583 点升至 679 点，涨幅 16.4%；若把持有指数成分股本应收到的股息一并计入，1959 年的总回报便高达 19.9%。数字看上去是个强势市场，可当年纽约证券交易所里下跌的股票其实多过上涨的，比数为 710 对 628。道琼斯铁路平均指数和公用事业平均指数双双下跌。多数投资信托与工业指数一比，日子都不好过。全国最大的封闭式投资公司 Tri-Continental Corp.（总资产 4 亿美元），全年总回报仅约 5.7%。其总裁弗雷德·布朗不久前在证券分析师
The Dow-Jones Industrial Average, undoubtedly the most widely used index of stock market behavior, presented a somewhat faulty picture in 1959. This index recorded an advance from 583 to 679, or 16.4% for the year. When the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the average are added, an overall gain of 19.9% indicated for 1959. Despite this indication of a robust market, more stocks declined than advanced on the New York Stock Exchange during the year by a margin of 710 to 628. Both the Dow-Jones Railroad Average and Utility Average registered declines. Most investment trusts had a difficult time in comparison with the Industrial Average. Tri-Continental Corp. the nation's largest closed-end investment company (total asset $400 million) had an overall gain of about 5.7% for the year. Fred Brown, its President, had this to say about the 1959 marked in a recent speech to the Analysts
协会的一次演讲中，如此评说 1959 年的市场：
Society:
“尽管我们中意手上的组合，但 Tri-Continental 所持股票 1959 年的市场表现着实让我们失望。1959 年这样的市场，投资者的情绪与热情占了太重的分量，对我们这些以价值立身、着眼长线的基金经理而言，实在难以驾驭。或许是我们的太空靴还没调校妥当。不过我们相信，像 Tri-Continental 这样的投资机构，拿股东的钱去冒险总该有个限度；我们也相信，这个组合已为来年做好了准备。”全国最大的共同基金 Massachusetts Investors Trust，资产达 15 亿美元，当年总回报约 9%。你们多数人都清楚，好几年来我一直对股市的整体点位放心不下。到目前为止，这份谨慎都属多余。可若按旧有标准衡量，眼下“蓝筹股”的价格里掺着相当分量的投机成分，随之而来的便是亏损风险。或许一套新的估值标准正在成型，将永久取代旧标准。我不这么看。我很可能看错；但我宁愿吞下过度保守招来的苦果，也不愿信奉那套“新时代”哲学——以为大树真能长到天上去——最终酿成大错，甚至落个本金永久受损的下场。
"But, even though we like the portfolio, the market performance of Tri-Continental's holdings in 1959 was disappointing to us. Markets in which investor sentiment and enthusiasm play so large a part as those of 1959, are difficult for investment managers trained in values and tuned to investing for the long-term. Perhaps we haven't had our space boots adjusted properly. However, we believe that there is a limit to risks that an investing institution such as Tri-Continental should take with its stockholders' money, and we believe that the portfolio is in shape for the year ahead." Massachusetts Investors Trust, the country's largest mutual fund with assets of $1.5 billion showed an overall gain of about 9% for the year. Most of you know I have been very apprehensive about general stock market levels for several years. To date, this caution has been unnecessary. By previous standards, the present level of "blue chip" security prices contains a substantial speculative component with a corresponding risk of loss. Perhaps other standards of valuation are evolving which will permanently replace the old standard. I don't think so. I may very well be wrong; however, I would rather sustain the penalties resulting from over-conservatism than face the consequences of error, perhaps with permanent capital loss, resulting from the adoption of a "New Era" philosophy where trees really do grow to the sky.
1959 年的业绩：
Results in 1959:
以往几封信里，我一再提到一条衡量业绩的准绳：在股价下跌或走平的时段里做出相对不错的成绩（同大盘指数和领先的投资信托相比），而在快速上涨的市道里，成绩则相对平淡。1959 年，我们有幸取得了尚属不错的结果。全年运作的六家合伙企业，整体净收益率从 22.3% 到 30.0% 不等，平均约 25.9%。眼下这些合伙企业的组合已有约 80% 趋于一致，只是因证券与现金到位的时点不同、向合伙人支付款项等缘故，仍存些许差别。这几年里，从没有哪家合伙企业的业绩会年年霸榜或垫底，而且随着各组合渐趋相近，这种差异正在收窄。
There has been emphasis in previous letters on a suggested standard of performance involving relatively good results (compared to the general market indices and leading investment trusts) in periods of declining or level prices but relatively unimpressive results in rapidly rising markets. We were fortunate to achieve reasonably good results in 1959. The six partnerships that operated throughout the year achieved overall net gains ranging from 22.3% to 30.0%, and averaging about 25.9%. Portfolios of these partnerships are now about 80%comparable, but there is some difference due to securities and cash becoming available at varying times, payments made to partners, etc. Over the past few years, there hasn't been any partnership which has consistently been at the top or bottom of performance from year to year, and the variance is narrowing as the portfolios tend to become comparable.
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整体净收益，是以年初和年末的市值为准算出的，并已就向合伙人支付的款项或收到的出资做过调整。它不看当年实际落袋的利润，而意在衡量该年度清算价值的变化。这一数字，是在向合伙人计付利息（若合伙协议有此约定）和向普通合伙人分配任何利润之前得出的，但已扣除运营开支。头号运营开支是内布拉斯加州无形资产税，几乎所有证券都要按市值缴纳 0.4%。去年是这项税第一次被切实征收，自然也就把我们的业绩拖累了 0.4%。
The overall net gain is determined on the basis of market values at the beginning and end of the year adjusted for payments made to partners or contributions received from them. It is not based on actual realized profits during the year, but is intended to measure the change in liquidating value for the year. It is before interest allowed to partners (where that is specified in the partnership agreement) and before any division of profit to the general partner, but after operating expenses. The principal operating expense is the Nebraska Intangibles Tax which amounts to .4% of market value on practically all securities. Last year represented the first time that this tax had been effectively enforced and, of course penalized our results to the extent of .4%.
当前持仓：
The present portfolio:
去年我提到过一笔新投资，约占各合伙企业资产的 25%。眼下，这笔投资的占比已升至约 35%。这个比例高得不寻常，但背后自有充分理由。说到底，这家公司本身就有几分像投资信托，手里握着三四十种高品质证券。我们的买入价，连同至今的账面计价，都远低于其资产价值——这一估值既参照了所持证券的市价，也对其经营业务做了保守评估。我们是这家公司遥遥领先的第一大股东，另外两位大股东也认同我们的主张。在最终脱手之前，这笔投资的表现极可能强于大盘，我盼着今年就能了结。余下 65% 的仓位，配在我认为遭低估的证券和套利机会上。只要条件允许，我就继续设法把资金投向那些至少能部分不受大盘牵动的标的。这条路子，理应在熊市里跑出优异成绩，在牛市里则与大盘持平。头一个预判今年或许就要接受检验——写这封信时，道琼斯工业指数已回吐了 1959 年一半以上的涨幅。倘若您有任何疑问，或觉得我哪里没讲清楚，我都非常乐意听您来信。沃伦·E·巴菲特 1960 年 2 月 20 日
Last year, I mentioned a new commitment which involved about 25% of assets of the various partnerships. Presently this investment is about 35% of assets. This is an unusually large percentage, but has been made for strong reasons. In effect, this company is partially an investment trust owing some thirty or forty other securities of high quality. Our investment was made and is carried at a substantial discount from asset value based on market value of their securities and a conservative appraisal of the operating business. We are the company’s largest stockholder by a considerable margin, and the two other large holders agree with our ideas. The probability is extremely high that the performance of this investment will be superior to that of the general market until its disposition, and I am hopeful that this will take place this year. The remaining 65% of the portfolio is in securities which I consider undervalued and work-out operations. To the extent possible, I continue to attempt to invest in situations at least partially insulated from the behavior of the general market. This policy should lead to superior results in bear markets and average performance in bull markets. The first prediction may be subject to test this year since, at this writing, the Dow-Jones Industrials have retraced over half of their 1959 advance. Should you have any questions or if I have not been clear in any respect, I would be very happy to hear from you. Warren E. Buffett 2-20-60
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