1960 年度致合伙人信

合伙人信 · 原文约 2512 词
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1960 年致合伙人的信

1960 Letter

沃伦·E·巴菲特

WARREN E. BUFFETT

内布拉斯加州奥马哈市安德伍德大道 5202 号

5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska

1960 年股市概况:

The General Stock Market in 1960:

一年前,我曾评论过 1959 年道琼斯工业平均指数所呈现的图景有些失真:该指数从 583 点上涨至 679 点,涨幅 16.4%。尽管当年几乎所有投资公司都实现了正收益,但其中仅有不到 10% 能够追平或超越工业指数的表现。道琼斯公用事业指数微幅下跌,铁路指数则跌幅显著。1960 年,情况出现了逆转。工业指数从 679 点下跌至 616 点,跌幅 9.3%。即便将持有该指数本应获得的股息加回去,整体仍亏损 6.3%。另一方面,公用事业指数录得了不错的涨幅,虽然目前尚未拿到全部数据,但我估计约有 90% 的投资公司跑赢了工业指数。大多数投资公司在年末的整体业绩似乎落在 ±5% 的区间内。在纽约证券交易所,全年共有 653 只普通股下跌,404 只上涨。

A year ago, I commented on the somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which had advanced from 583 to 679, or 16.4%. Although practically all investment companies showed gains for that year, less than 10% of them were able to match or better the record of the Industrial Average. The Dow-Jones Utility Average had a small decline and the Railroad Average recorded a substantial one. In 1960, the picture was reversed. The Industrial Average declined from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average still left it with an overall loss of 6.3%. On the other hand, the Utility Average showed a good gain and, while all the results are not now available, my guess is that about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the Industrial Average. The majority of investment companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in the range of plus or minus 5%. On the New York Stock Exchange, 653 common stocks registered losses for the year while 404 showed gains.

1960 年业绩:

Results in 1960:

我在管理合伙基金时的一贯目标,是实现长期跑赢工业指数的业绩记录。我相信,拉长到若干年看,该指数的表现大体会与领先的投资公司相当。除非我们确实取得了这种超越,否则这些合伙基金便没有存在的理由。不过,我已经指出过,即便我们能够取得优异的业绩,也不应指望它会表现为相对于指数持续稳定的优势。相反,如果真能实现这种优势,更可能的情形是:在平稳或下跌的市场中,我们的表现优于指数;而在上涨的市场中,我们的表现与指数持平,甚至可能更差。在我看来,一个我们下跌 15% 而指数下跌 30% 的年份,要远胜于一个我们和指数同涨 20% 的年份。长期来看,好年景与坏年景总会交替出现;为它们到来的先后顺序而激动或沮丧,毫无益处。要紧的是打出低于标准杆;在三杆洞打四杆,不如在五杆洞打五杆,而指望我们分不到三杆洞和五杆洞的份额,也是不现实的。因为今年我们迎来了不少新合伙人,我想确保他们了解我的目标、我对目标达成情况的衡量尺度,以及我自知的一些局限,所以才说了上面这番道理。了解了这个背景,1960 年是我们表现高于平均水平的一年也就不足为奇了。与工业指数整体下跌 6.3% 相比,全年运作的七个合伙基金实现了 22.8% 的收益。扣除了费用,但未扣除有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成之前,我们四个完整年度的合伙业务业绩如下:年份 1957 1958

My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve a long-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more or less parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships. However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets. I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the Average 30% to be much superior to a year when both we and the Average advanced 20%. Over a period of time there are going to be good and bad years; there is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed about the sequence in which they occur. The important thing is to be beating par; a four on a par three hole is not as good as a five on a par five hole and it is unrealistic to assume we are not going to have our share of both par three's and par five's. The above dose of philosophy is being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known limitations. With this background it is not unexpected that 1960 was a better-than-average year for us. As contrasted with an overall loss of 6.3% for the Industrial Average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating throughout the year. Our results for the four complete years of partnership operation after expenses but before interest to limited partners or allocation to the general partner are: Year 1957 1958

全年运作的合伙基金数量 3 5

Partnerships Operating Entire Year 3 5

合伙基金收益率 10.4% 40.9%

Partnership Gain 10.4% 40.9%

道琼斯指数涨跌幅 -8.4% 38.5%

Dow-Jones Gain -8.4% 38.5%

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1959 1960
6 7
25.9% 22.8%
19.9% -6.3%
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1959 1960
6 7
25.9% 22.8%
19.9% -6.3%

需再次强调,上述为合伙基金层面的净结果;有限合伙人各自的净收益,将取决于他们所选择的合伙协议。整体盈亏按逐日盯市法计算。在考虑了期间数据的追加和提取后,该方法得出的结果基于年初清算合伙基金将实现的金额,与年末清算将实现的金额之比——这自然与我们的税务结果不同,后者以成本对证券计价,且仅在证券实际卖出时才确认损益。

It should be emphasized again that these are the net results to the partnership; the net results to the limited partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they had selected. The overall gain or loss is computed on a market to market basis. After allowing for any money added or withdrawn, such a method gives results based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the partnership at the beginning, of the year and what would have been realized upon liquidation at year end and is different, of course, from our tax results, which value securities at cost and realize gains or losses only when securities are actually sold.

按复利累计,累计业绩如下:

On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:

年份 1957 1958 1959 1960

Year 1957 1958 1959 1960

合伙基金累计收益 10.4% 55.6% 95.9% 140.6%

Partnership Gain 10.4% 55.6% 95.9% 140.6%

道琼斯指数累计涨跌幅 -8.4% 26.9% 52.2% 42.6%

Dow-Jones Gain -8.4% 26.9% 52.2% 42.6%

四年时间实在太短,不足以从中推断出结论,但现有证据指向的趋势,倾向于证实这样一个命题:我们的业绩在温和下跌或横盘市场中应当相对更好。如果这一点成立,那就说明我们的投资组合虽然明显不那么因循常规,但配置可能比持有“蓝筹股”更为保守。当蓝筹股迎来强劲上涨的市场时,我们要想匹配它们的表现,或许确实会有相当大的困难。

Although four years is entirely too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence there is points toward confirming the proposition that our results should be relatively better in moderately declining or static markets. To the extent that this is true, it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively, although decidedly less conventionally, invested than if we owned "blue-chip" securities. During a strongly rising market for the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching their performance.

合伙基金数目繁多:

Multiplicity of Partnerships:

前面那张表说明,这个大家庭正在壮大。没有哪一个合伙基金的业绩长期高于或低于整体均值,但每年总有些参差——尽管我一直力求“让所有合伙基金持有相同的证券、比例也大致相当”。要消除这种参差,把现有各个合伙基金并成一个大合伙基金即可,顺带还能省去大量琐务和一笔不小的开支。坦白说,我很希望未来几年能朝这个方向做点事。难处在于,不同合伙人对不同的合伙安排各有偏好。未经全体合伙人一致同意,我不会有任何动作。

A preceding table shows that the family is growing. There has been no partnership which has had a consistently superior or inferior record compared to our group average, but there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to "keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in about the same proportions. This variation, of course, could be eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate much detail and a moderate amount of expense. Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the next few years. The problem is that various partners have expressed preferences for varying partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without unanimous consent of partners.

预付款项:

Advance Payments:

有几位合伙人问起能否在年中向合伙基金追加资金。我们虽破例办过一次,但只要某个合伙基金的有限合伙人来自不止一个家庭,年中改动协议就太过棘手。因此在这类混合合伙基金里,新增权益只能等到年底认购。年中我们确实接受预付的合伙权益款,自收到之日起至年底按 6% 计息。到了年底,在合伙人同意修改协议的前提下,本金连同利息一并计入合伙资本,此后照常参与盈亏分配。

Several partners have inquired about adding money during the year to their partnership. Although an exception has been made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements during mid-year where we have more than one family represented among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed partnerships an additional interest can only be acquired at the end of the year. We do accept advance payments during the year toward a partnership interest and pay interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the end of the year. At that time, subject to amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus interest is added to the partnership capital and thereafter participates in profits and losses.

桑伯恩地图公司:

Sanborn Map:

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去年我提到过一笔投资,它在我们净资产中占比高得异乎寻常(35%),当时我还说,希望这笔投资能在 1960 年了结。这个愿望实现了。这样一笔大手笔投资的来龙去脉,或许你们会有兴趣。

桑伯恩地图公司做的是绘制美国所有城市的极详尽地图,并持续修订。以奥马哈为例,一整套地图册大概重达五十磅,每一栋建筑都标注得纤毫毕现。修订采用贴片覆盖的办法,用来标示新建的房屋、变更的用途、新增的消防设施、改换的结构材料等等。这类修订大约每年做一次;等到进一步贴片已无从下手,便每隔二三十年出一版新地图。对奥马哈的客户来说,每年更新地图的花费在 100 美元上下。这些资料细到街道底下水管的直径、消防栓的位置、屋顶的材质,主要供火灾保险公司使用。保险公司的核保部门坐镇总部,就能据此评估全国各地代理人报来的业务。所谓一图胜千言,凭这套评估便能判断风险定价是否合理、某一区域的火灾连烧隐患有多大、该采取怎样的再保险安排,如此种种。桑伯恩的业务大头来自约三十家保险公司,此外地图也卖给保险业以外的客户,比如公用事业公司、抵押贷款公司和税务机关。七十五年来,这门生意大体处于垄断地位:年年盈利,几乎不受经济衰退波及,更无需费什么力气去推销。生意早年,保险业担心桑伯恩利润太丰,便把好几位业界头面人物塞进桑伯恩董事会,充当看门狗。

进入 1950 年代初,一种名为“卡片化”的竞争性核保方法开始蚕食桑伯恩的生意。地图业务的税后利润,从 1930 年代末年均逾 50 万美元,跌到 1958、1959 两年的不足 10 万美元。考虑到这一时期经济整体向上,这几乎等于把原本可观而稳定的盈利能力抹得一干二净。不过早在 1930 年代初,桑伯恩就已着手积累投资组合。这门生意本身不占用资本,留存收益尽可投向这一用途。日积月累,大约投进了 250 万美元,债券股票各占一半。于是,尤其是最近这十年,投资组合枝繁叶茂,地图主业却日渐凋零。这两者的分道扬镳有多极端,我举个例子便知。1938 年,道琼斯工业指数在 100 至 120 点之间,桑伯恩股价为每股 110 美元;1958 年,指数已升至 550 点附近,桑伯恩股价却只有每股 45 美元。可就在这同一段时间里,桑伯恩投资组合的价值,却从每股约 20 美元涨到每股 65 美元。这实际上意味着:1938 年买入桑伯恩股票的人,是在生意与股市双双低迷的年份,给地图业务估出了每股 90 美元的正值(110 美元减去与地图业务无关的投资价值 20 美元);而到 1958 年,在经济活力旺盛得多的氛围下,同样的地图业务反被估成负 20 美元——买家连投资组合都不愿按面值买单,只肯出七毛买一块,地图业务则白饶。这怎么会发生?1958 年的桑伯恩和 1938 年一样,握有一批对保险业价值连城的资料。要把它们多年积攒的详尽信息重新做一遍,得花上数千万美元。哪怕“卡片化”当道,仍有逾 5 亿美元的火灾保费,是由那些

Last year mention was made of an investment which accounted for a very high and unusual proportion (35%) of our net assets along with the comment that I had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960. This hope materialized. The history of an investment of this magnitude may be of interest to you. Sanborn Map Co. is engaged in the publication and continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of the United States. For example, the volumes mapping Omaha would weigh perhaps fifty pounds and provide minute details on each structure. The map would be revised by the paste-over method showing new construction, changed occupancy, new fire protection facilities, changed structural materials, etc. These revisions would be done approximately annually and a new map would be published every twenty or thirty years when further pasteovers became impractical. The cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha customer would run around $100 per year. This detailed information showing diameter of water mains underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of roof, etc., was primarily of use to fire insurance companies. Their underwriting departments, located in a central office, could evaluate business by agents nationally. The theory was that a picture was worth a thousand words and such evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the degree of conflagration exposure in an area, advisable reinsurance procedure, etc. The bulk of Sanborn's business was done with about thirty insurance companies although maps were also sold to customers outside the insurance industry such as public utilities, mortgage companies, and taxing authorities. For seventy-five years the business operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort. In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry became fearful that Sanborn's profits would become too great and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn's board of directors to act in a watch-dog capacity. In the early 1950’s a competitive method of under-writing known as "carding" made inroads on Sanborn’s business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over $500,000 in the late 1930's to under $100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power. However, during the early 1930's Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted. Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at $110 per share. In 1958 with the Average in the 550 area, Sanborn sold at $45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about $20 per share to $65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of $90 per share on the map business ($110 less the $20 value of the investments unrelated to the map business) in a year of depressed business and stock market conditions. In the tremendously more vigorous climate of 1958 the same map business was evaluated at a minus $20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing. How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would have cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite “carding” over $500 million of fire premiums were underwritten

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那些使用“地图”的公司承保的。然而,桑伯恩推销和包装其产品——即信息——的方式,多年以来一成不变,最终这份惰性反映到了盈利上。恰恰是投资组合表现极为出色这一事实,使大多数董事看轻了重振地图业务的必要性。桑伯恩年销售额约 200 万美元,持有的可流通证券价值约 700 万美元。投资组合带来的收入相当可观,公司毫无财务上的后顾之忧,保险公司对地图的价格感到满意,股东们也仍会收到股息。可就是这些股息,八年里被削减了五次,而我却始终找不到任何关于削减薪酬或董事和委员会津贴的动议记录。在我进入董事会之前,十四位董事里有九位是保险业的显赫人物,他们合计只持有 105,000 股流通在外的股票中的 46 股。尽管这几位都在规模非常庞大的公司身居高位,按理说至少拿得出做一笔适度投资所需的财力,但这群人里持股最多的也不过十股。其中几例,这些人所管理的保险公司确实持有少量股票,但相较于其所在投资组合的规模,不过是象征性的点缀。过去十年,保险公司在任何涉及桑伯恩股票的交易中都只是卖方。第十位董事是公司律师,持有十股。第十一位是一位银行家,持有十股,他看出了公司的症结所在,主动指出问题,后来还增持了股票。接下来两位是桑伯恩的最高管理层,两人合计持股约 300 股。这两位高管有能力,也认识到业务上存在的问题,却被董事会压得抬不起头来。我们这个阵容的最后一位成员是桑伯恩已故总裁的儿子。总裁的遗孀持有约 15,000 股。1958 年底,这位儿子对业务的走向不满,要求获得公司的最高职位,被拒后递交了辞呈,董事会接受了辞呈。此后不久,我们向他母亲出价购买她那批股票,她接受了。当时还有另外两笔大额持股,一笔约 10,000 股(分散在一家经纪公司的客户手中),另一笔约 8,000 股。这些股东对现状相当不满,希望将投资组合从地图业务中剥离出去,这一点与我们想法一致。随后,我们(连同联合投资人)通过公开市场买入,将持股增至约 24,000 股,上述三个群体的持股合计增至 46,000 股。我们希望把这两项业务拆开,兑现投资组合的公允价值,并着手重振地图业务的盈利能力。看来确实存在一个机会,可以利用桑伯恩丰富的原始素材,并结合电子手段将这些数据转换成对客户最实用的形式,从而使地图业务利润翻上几倍。董事会对任何形式的变革都相当抵触,尤其是当变革由外人发起时——尽管管理层完全赞同我们的方案,而且博思艾伦(Booz, Allen & Hamilton,管理咨询专家)此前也曾推荐过类似方案。为避免陷入代理权之争(这种争斗很可能不会发生,即便发生我们也稳操胜券),也为了避免因桑伯恩大量资金被套在我本人以当时市价并不看好的蓝筹股上而白白耗费时间,我们制定了一项方案,让所有想退出的股东都能按公允价值兑现离场。美国证券交易委员会(SEC)裁定该方案公平。最终,约 72% 的桑伯恩股票(涉及 1,600 名股东中的 50%)按公允价值换成了投资组合中的证券。留给地图业务的,是逾 125 万美元的政府债券和市政债券作为储备基金,同时一笔逾 100 万美元的潜在公司资本利得税也得以免除。留下来的股东,其对应的资产价值略有增厚,每股收益大幅提高,股息率也随之上调。

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by “mapping” companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn’s product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings. The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about $2 million per year and owned about $7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director's and committee fees. Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had been only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock. The tenth director was the company attorney, who held ten shares. The eleventh was a banker with ten shares who recognized the problems of the company, actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings. The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn who owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware of the problems of the business, but kept in a subservient role by the Board of Directors. The final member of our cast was a son of a deceased president of Sanborn. The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock. In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business, demanded the top position in the company, was turned down, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares (dispersed among customers of a brokerage firm) and one of about 8,000. These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a separation of the investment portfolio from the map business, as did we. Subsequently our holdings (including associates) were increased through open market purchases to about 24,000 shares and the total represented by the three groups increased to 46,000 shares. We hoped to separate the two businesses, realize the fair value of the investment portfolio and work to re-establish the earning power of the map business. There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply map profits through utilization of Sanborn's wealth of raw material in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to the most usable form for the customer. There was considerable opposition on the Board to change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider, although management was in complete accord with our plan and a similar plan had been recommended by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Management Experts). To avoid a proxy fight (which very probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would have been certain of winning) and to avoid time delay with a large portion of Sanborn’s money tied up in blue-chip stocks which I didn’t care for at current prices, a plan was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock, involving 50% of the 1,600 stockholders, was exchanged for portfolio securities at fair value. The map business was left with over $l,25 million in government and municipal bonds as a reserve fund, and a potential corporate capital gains tax of over $1 million was eliminated. The remaining stockholders were left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially higher earnings per share, and an increased dividend rate.

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上述这出小小的情节剧,自然只是对这笔投资操作极其简略的描述。不过,它确实点出了我们在投资组合操作上必须守口如瓶,也点出了用一年这种短期尺度来衡量我们的业绩是何等徒劳。这类控股情形可能极为罕见。我们安身立命的常规生意,仍是买入低估的证券、待低估被纠正后卖出,同时参与那些利润系于公司行为、而非市场行为的特殊情形投资。随着合伙基金规模继续增长,“控股情形”中的机会也可能会有所增加。审计师应能在大约一周内将你的财务报表和税务资料寄出。无论针对他们的报告还是这封信,如有任何疑问,务请告知。沃伦·E·巴菲特 1961 年 1 月 30 日

Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated description of this investment operation. However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring our results over a short span of time such as a year. Such control situations may occur very infrequently. Our bread-and-butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action. To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is possible that more opportunities will be available in “control situations.” The auditors should be mailing your financial statement and tax information within about a week. If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or this letter, be sure to let me know. Warren E. Buffett 1-30-61

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1960 年信函

1960 Letter