致合伙人信(1969-05-29)

合伙人信 · 原文约 1527 词
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巴菲特合伙有限公司

BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.

610 KIEWIT PLAZA

610 KIEWIT PLAZA

奥马哈,内布拉斯加州 68131

OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131

电话:042-4110

TELEPHONE 042-4110

1969 年 5 月 29 日

May 29th, 1969

致我的合伙人:

To My Partners:

大约十八个月前,我曾写信给各位,谈到环境与个人层面的一些变化,促使我调整了未来的业绩目标。我当时谈及的投资环境(此后在其他几封信里我也屡有议论),随着时间推移变得愈发严峻、也愈发令人沮丧。或许这不过是我思维不够灵活罢了。(有人评论年过四十的证券分析师时说:“他们知道太多早已不再成立的道理。”)不过在我看来:(1)过去二十年间,那种偏重定量因素的分析师所能把握的投资机会一直在稳步枯竭,如今已几近绝迹;(2)我们 1 亿美元的资产规模,又进一步剔除了这个本就贫瘠的投资天地中的一大块——单笔低于约 300 万美元的投资,对我们的整体业绩起不了实质作用,这就几乎把市值低于约 1 亿美元的普通股公司统统排除在外;(3)对投资业绩日渐狂热的追捧,催生出一个愈发短期化、在我看来也愈发投机的市场。1967 年 10 月 9 日那封信里说过,在促使我调整目标的诸多因素中,个人考虑是最重要的一条。我当时表示,希望卸下那份(自己强加的)必须 100% 扑在 BPL 上的负担。可这一关,过去十八个月里我彻底没能闯过。那封信里我写道:我希望有限的目标能换来有限的付出。事实却并非如此。只要我还“站在台上”——按期公布业绩、为众多合伙人几乎全部的净资产扛着管理之责——我就永远无法把持续的精力投向 BPL 之外的任何事情。既然要公开下场,我就免不了争强好胜。我很清楚,自己不愿一辈子都被“追赶投资这只兔子”的念头牢牢缠住。想慢下来,唯一的办法就是停下来。因此,年底之前,我打算依规向所有有限合伙人正式发出通知,表明我退休的意向。解散合伙企业自然牵涉不少税务与法律上的难题,但我最挂心的,是拿出一套能实现以下目标的方案:1. 最要紧的一条是,对那些不愿自己打理资产的众多合伙人,我要能为他们指出一条资金管理上的出路。当然,有些合伙人自有其信得过、也觉得合适的安排。但对其余的人,我绝不会撂下一句“祝你好运”就把钱交出去了事。我打算推荐一位接手的资金管理人,我会把自己亲属以及其他那些我终生负有财务责任之人的资金,一并托付给他。此人既有操守,也有本事,日后的表现很可能与我不相上下,甚至更胜一筹(尽管无论他还是我,都难以再现过去的战绩)。他会对每一位合伙人敞开大门,绝不会因账户规模太小而给各位中的任何人添麻烦。今后我仍会大致留意他的动向,但只是偶尔过问,我的意见也多半止于提个醒式的否定性建议。2. 我希望所有合伙人都能有权选择领取现金,或许还包括易于变现的证券(大概只有一种情形会涉及这一条)——那是我既看好其前景、也认可其价格,而且

About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives. The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”) However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our $100 million of assets further eliminates a large portion of this seemingly barren investment world, since commitments of less than about $3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stock at market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market. The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn't worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly. I can't help being competitive. I know I don't want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop. Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire. There are, of course, a number of tax and legal problems in connection with liquidating the Partnership, but overall, I am concerned with working out a plan that attains the following objectives: 1. The most important item is that I have an alternative regarding money management to suggest to the many partners who do not want to handle this themselves. Some partners of course, have alternatives of their own in which they have confidence and find quite acceptable. To the others, however, I will not hand over their money with a "good luck". I intend to suggest an alternative money manager to whom I will entrust funds of my relatives and others for whom I have lifetime financial responsibility. This manager has integrity and ability and will probably perform as well or better than I would in the future (although nowhere close to what he or I have achieved in the past). He will be available to any partner, so that no minimum size for accounts will cause any of you a problem. I intend, in the future, to keep in general touch with what he is doing, but only on an infrequent basis with any advice on my part largely limited to a negative type. 2. I want all partners to have the option of receiving cash and possibly readily marketable securities (there will probably be only one where this will apply) where I like both the prospects and price but which

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合伙人日后若有意,也能随时自由变现的证券。3. 不过,我同样希望所有合伙人都能选择保留自己在两家控股公司(多元零售公司与伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司)以及另一只小型“受限”持股中的按比例权益。由于这些证券将由我单方面按公允价值估值,我认为,只要各位愿意,就理应能按此估值保住自己的比例权益。可问题在于,这些证券无法自由上市流通(SEC 对“控股”股票及未注册股票设有种种限制),而且在相当长一段时间内很可能既不能转让、也不产生任何收益。因此,在清算之中,我希望各位可以两条路任选其一——要么继续持有这些受限证券,要么拿走等值现金。对经营我们各家控股企业的这批人,我打心底里欣赏(今年早些时候由伯克希尔·哈撒韦收购的伊利诺伊州罗克福德市伊利诺伊国民银行及信托公司也已加入其中,这是一家资产逾 1 亿美元、经营极为出色的银行),也盼着这份情谊能维系终生。仅仅为了卖个好价钱,就把一家由我所欣赏、所敬重之人经营的优质控股企业脱手,这样的事我绝无兴趣去做。当然,某些特定情况下,也可能在某个时点促成某一经营单元的出售。我相信,我们会有一套清算方案来达成上述目标。这方面的操作,不会给各位 1969 年的税务筹划带来任何变动。还有一个我极想达成、却注定无法实现的目标——那就是漂漂亮亮地收场。我着实不愿以糟糕的一年画上句号,可 1969 年偏偏就会是这样一年。我最乐观的估计是:到年底,即便计入控股公司价值的大幅增长(除我之外,所有合伙人都可选择就此拿现金),我们 1969 年在向合伙人支付任何月度款项之前,业绩也只是勉强打平。哪怕从现在到年底市场大涨一场,结果依然如此,因为我们并未持有任何足以让我们分享多少上行空间的重要头寸。今年我们在套利交易上的遭遇糟糕透顶——这段日子里,我觉得自己活像那只稀里糊涂飞进羽毛球赛场中央的鸟。有此遭遇的并非我们一家,可它偏偏撞上了我们此类投资历史上仓位占比逼近上限的当口。把自己的糗事一桩桩记下来,本就不是件痛快的事。而在我看来,“选择性汇报”更令人作呕。今年这番糟糕表现,100% 是我的过错。它怨不得运气不好,而是我对一股来势极猛的政府政策走向判断失误。说来矛盾,长久以来我一直认为,政府本就该做它最终所做之事(就其针对的问题而言——手段未必如此)——换句话说,从大局来看,那项让我们蒙受巨额损失的举措,其总体目标于社会有益,这一点我鼓吹已久。可我偏偏没料到它真会落地。做决策时,我从不主张把“我认为(于社会而言)应当发生的事”与“我认为将会发生的事”混为一谈——而这一回,倘若我真那么做了,倒能让我们多赚上几百万美元。坦白说,尽管前几页列出了种种缘由,可只要我手上真有几个头等的好点子,1970 年、乃至 1971 年,我还是会把合伙基金继续经营下去。这并非我心向往之,而单单是因为,比起以坏年景收场,我实在更愿以好年景谢幕。然而,我确实看不到任何机会,能让我有几分合理的把握去博得这样一个好年景;我也不愿揣着别人的钱四处摸索,指望着“撞大运”。当前的市场环境与我格格不入,我更不愿为了博一个英雄般的收场,就去玩一场自己并不懂的游戏,把一份体面的成绩糟蹋掉。因此,我们将在这一整年里逐步清算持仓,最终只留下几家控股公司、那只“投资通讯”类证券、那只长期前景看好的可流通证券,

partners will be able to freely convert to cash if they wish. 3. However, I also want all partners to have the option of maintaining their proportional interests in our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) and one other small "restricted" holding. Because these securities will be valued unilaterally by me at fair value, I feel it is essential that, if you wish, you can maintain your proportionate interest at such valuation. However, these securities are not freely marketable (various SEC restrictions apply to “control” stock and non-registered stock) and they will probably be both non-transferable and non-income -producing for a considerable period of time. Therefore, I want you to be able to go either way in our liquidation - either stick with the restricted securities or take cash equivalent. I strongly like all of the people running our controlled businesses (joined now by the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, a $100 million plus, extremely well-run bank, purchased by Berkshire Hathaway earlier this year), and want the relationship to be life long. I certainly have no desire to sell a good controlled business run by people I like and admire, merely to obtain a fancy price. However, specific conditions may cause the sale of one operating unit at some point. I believe we will have a liquidation program which will accomplish the above objectives. Our activities in this regard should cause no change in your tax planning for 1969. One final objective, I would like very much to achieve (but which just isn't going to happen) is to go out with a bang. I hate to end with a poor year, but we are going to have one in 1969. My best guess is that at yearend, allowing for a substantial increase in value of controlled companies (against which all partners except me will have the option of taking cash), we will show a breakeven result for 1969 before any monthly payments to partners. This will be true even if the market should advance substantially between now and yearend, since we will not be in any important position which will expose us to much upside potential. Our experience in workouts this year has been atrocious - during this period I have felt like the bird that inadvertently flew into the middle of a badminton game. We are not alone in such experience, but it came at a time when we were toward the upper limit of what has been our historical range of percentage commitment in this category. Documenting one's boners is unpleasant business. I find "selective reporting" even more distasteful. Our poor experience this year is 100% my fault. It did not reflect bad luck, but rather an improper assessment of a very fast-developing governmental trend. Paradoxically, I have long believed the government should have been doing (in terms of the problem attacked – not necessarily the means utilized) what it finally did - in other words, on an overall basis, I believe the general goal of the activity which has cost us substantial money is socially desirable and have so preached for some time. Nevertheless, I didn't think it would happen. I never believe in mixing what I think should happen (socially) with what I think will happen in making decisions - in this case, we would be some millions better off if I had. Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don't see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to "get lucky" with other people's money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don't want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don't understand just so I can go out a hero. Therefore, we will be liquidating holdings throughout the year, working toward a residual of the controlled companies, the one "investment letter" security, the one marketable security with favorable long-term prospects,

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以及总价值不大的那些零零碎碎的“尾巴”,凡此种种,在套利这一类别里都还得花上好几年才能清理干净。这封信我写得比往年的年中信稍早了些。既然决心已定,我就想尽早让各位知晓。我也想在各位收到信后的一段时间里留在奥马哈,好把信中可能令人费解之处一一说清。七月里,我预计会在加州。有些人或许会问:“那你打算做什么?”这个问题我答不上来。但我明白,人到 60,所要追求的个人目标,理当与 20 岁时的头等大事有所不同。因此,倘若我不趁现在就从这桩几乎耗尽我成年后头十八年全部时间与精力的营生中抽身,日后恐怕就难以开创出契合新境遇的种种事业。今年秋天,大约在十月,我们还会发出一封信,就清算流程、投资顾问建议等事宜细加说明。顺致问候,沃伦·E·巴菲特 WEB/glk

and the miscellaneous "stubs", etc. of small total value which will take several years to clean up in the Workout category. I have written this letter a little early in lieu of the mid-year letter. Once I made a decision, I wanted you to know. I also wanted to be available in Omaha for a period after you received this letter to clear up anything that may be confusing in it. In July, I expect to be in California. Some of you are going to ask, "What do you plan to do?" I don't have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years. We will have a letter out in the Fall, probably October, elaborating on the liquidation procedure, the investment advisor suggestion, etc… Cordially, Warren E. Buffett WEB/glk

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