2008 年 Emory University 学生问答
2008 年 2 月 25 日
February 25, 2008
2008 年 2 月 15 日与巴菲特会面纪要
Notes From Buffett Meeting 2/15/2008
注:埃默里大学戈伊苏埃塔商学院及得克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校麦库姆斯商学院的学生受邀拜访巴菲特先生,参与问答环节。这些笔记是我根据所听到的内容,结合自己和其他同学的笔记尽最大努力回忆再现的。无法保证与现场发言一字不差,但力求保留所谈内容的核心精神。祝阅读愉快。
Note: Students from Emory’s Goizueta Business School and McCombs School of Business at UT Austin were invited to come visit Mr. Buffett for a Q&A session. These notes were reproduced to the best of my ability as I heard and as I could recall them from a collection of mine and other students’ notes. There is no guarantee that this was exactly what was said, but the intent was to preserve the spirit of the message. Enjoy.
埃默里:
Emory:
随着《财富公式》和凯利准则的流行,价值投资圈子里关于分散与集中似乎争论不休。我知道您在这场讨论中站在哪边,但很想听听您能否多讲讲您在仓位大小或向下摊平方面的做法。
With the popularity of “Fortune’s Formula” and the Kelly Criterion, there seems to be a lot of debate in the value community regarding diversification vs. concentration. I know where you side in that discussion, but was curious if you could tell us more about your process for position sizing or averaging down.
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我对分散投资有两种看法。如果你是专业人士,而且有把握,那我主张高度集中。对其他人来说,如果这不是你的游戏,那就全面分散。经济长期来看会表现不错。确保自己不要在错误的价格或错误的时间买入。这是大多数人应该做的事——买一只便宜的指数基金,然后慢慢定投。如果你试图耍点小聪明,每周花一个小时搞投资,你很可能会变得极其愚蠢。
I have 2 views on diversification. If you are a professional and have confidence, then I would advocate lots of concentration. For everyone else, if it’s not your game, participate in total diversification. The economy will do fine over time. Make sure you don’t buy at the wrong price or the wrong time. That’s what most people should do, buy a cheap index fund and slowly dollar cost average into it. If you try to be just a little bit smart, spending an hour a week investing, you’re liable to be really dumb.
如果你懂这一行,分散投资就毫无意义。把钱投到第二十选择而非第一选择,简直是疯了。拿“勒布朗·詹姆斯”打个比方:如果你的队里有勒布朗·詹姆斯,别为了给别人腾位置就把他换下场。如果你有四十个女人的后宫,你根本不可能真正了解她们中的任何一个。
If it’s your game, diversification doesn’t make sense. It’s crazy to put money into your 20th choice rather than your 1st choice. “Lebron James” analogy. If you have Lebron James on your team, don’t take him out of the game just to make room for someone else. If you have a harem of 40 women, you never really get to know any of them well.
查理和我操作时,多数情况下只持有 5 个头寸。如果我管理的是 5000 万、1 亿、2 亿美元,我会把 80% 的资金放在 5 个头寸上,其中最大的一个占 25%。1964 年,我发现了一个我愿意重仓到 40% 的标的,我告诉投资者可以把钱撤回去,没人撤。那个标的是“沙拉油丑闻”后的美国运通。1951 年,我把大部分净资产投进了 GEICO。后来到 1998 年,长期资本管理公司陷入困境。当时 30 年期国债新券与老券之间存在利差,我乐意把组合的 75% 押进去。有好几次,我甚至愿意押到 75%,过去几年里也有。如果这是你的游戏,而且你确实懂自己的生意,那就该重仓。
Charlie and I operated mostly with 5 positions. If I were running 50, 100, 200 million, I would have 80% in 5 positions, with 25% for the largest. In 1964 I found a position I was willing to go heavier into, up to 40%. I told investors they could pull their money out. None did. The position was American Express after the Salad Oil Scandal. In 1951 I put the bulk of my net worth into GEICO. Later in 1998, LTCM was in trouble. With the spread between the on-the-run versus off-the-run 30 year Treasury bonds, I would have been willing to put 75% of my portfolio into it. There were various times I would have gone up to 75%, even in the past few years. If it’s your game and you really know your business, you can load up.
过去五六十年里,查理和我从没在任何一个头寸上永久性亏损超过个人财富的 2%。我们经历过报价上的损失,跌 50% 那种。这就是你绝不该借钱的原因。我们不想陷入那种能从脚下抽走地毯的境地。
Over the past 50-60 years, Charlie and I have never permanently lost more than 2% of our personal worth on a position. We’ve suffered quotational loss, 50% movements. That’s why you should never borrow money. We don’t want to get into situations where anyone can pull the rug out from under our feet.
在股市里,这是唯一一个东西打折时人们反而不高兴的地方。如果我喜欢一家企业,那么股价 20 美元时买进更多,比股价 30 美元时买进更有道理。如果麦当劳降价卖汉堡,我觉得这太好了。
In stocks, it’s the only place where when things go on sale, people get unhappy. If I like a business, then it makes sense to buy more at 20 than at 30. If McDonalds reduces the price of hamburgers, I think it’s great.
奥斯汀:
Austin:
21 世纪的下一个增长引擎会是哪个行业,你看到了什么来支持这个看法?
What industry will be the next growth driver in the 21st century and what do you see that supports that?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我们倒不怎么担心这个。回顾 20 世纪 30 年代,没人能预见汽车和飞机会让世界发生多大的变化。当时有 2000 家汽车公司,现在美国只剩下 3 家,还都勉强撑着。这对社会是巨大的进步,但对投资者却是灾难。投资者不仅得挑对正确的公司,还得选对时机。自奥维尔·莱特以来,航空业创造的净财富几乎为零。要是有个资本家在基蒂霍克把他击落下来,那可真帮了我们一个大忙了。再看看电视机制造商。市面上有数亿台电视机,RCA 和通用电气过去都生产,但现在美国已经没有电视机制造商了。
We don’t worry too much about that. If you’d look at the 1930s, nobody could have predicted how much the automobile and airplane would transform the world. There were 2000 car companies, but now only 3 left in the US and they are hanging on barely. It was tremendous for society, but horrible for investors. Investors would have had to not only identify the right companies, but also identify the right time. The net wealth creation in airlines since Orville Wright has been next to zero. If a capitalist had been at Kitty Hawk and shot him down, would have done us a huge favor. Or look at TV manufacturers. There are hundreds of millions of TV’s, RCA & GE used to produce them, but now there are no American manufacturers left.
想找一家伟大的企业,看看可口可乐。产品没变过,122 年后每天还能卖出 15 亿份 8 盎司装。它有护城河;你有一座城堡,就总会有人来打主意。
If you want a great business, take Coca-Cola. The product is unchanged, they sell 1.5 billion 8 ounce servings per day 122 years later. They have a moat; if you have a castle, someone’s going to come after you.
吉列占据了剃须刀片市场 70% 的份额,毛利率高达 80%,而且这个数字多年来一直如此。男人不会有多大变化。剃须可能是他们做的唯一一件有创意的事,就像画西斯廷教堂一样。
Gillette accounts for 70% of razor sales at 80% gross margins and it is the same over time. Men don’t change much. Shaving might be the only creative thing they do, like painting the Sistine Chapel.
士力架在过去 40 年里一直是排名第一的糖果棒。就算你给我 10 亿美元来取代士力架,我也做不到。这就是检验一家好公司的标准。你取代不了可口可乐或吉列。理查德·布兰森是营销天才,他推出维珍可乐时,我们都不确定这名字什么意思,也许能让你变回处男吧,但他也取代不了可口可乐。我们寻找的是经济城堡周围有宽阔护城河的公司。增长也不错,但我们更偏爱强大的经济特质。在即将发布的年报里,我专门写了一节叫“卓越、良好与糟糕”,里面会聊到这些。
Snickers has been the #1 candy bar for the past 40 years. If you gave me $1 billion to knock off Snickers, I can’t do it. That’s the test of a good business. You don’t knock off Coke or Gilette. Richard Branson is a marketing genius. He came in with Virgin Cola, we’re not sure what the name means, perhaps it turns you back into one, but he couldn’t knock off Coke. We look for wide moats around great economic castles. Growth is good too, but we prefer strong economics. In the upcoming annual report I have a section titled “The Great, the Good, and the Gruesome” where I talk about these.
埃默里:
Emory:
您如何定义幸福,您生活中什么事让您最幸福?当一笔投资进展顺利时,您是否会让自己兴奋地享受那份成功——反过来,投资表现不佳时,您是否也同样失望——还是说,您尽量在工作中摈除情绪?
How do you define happiness and what about your life makes you most happy? When you make good on an investment, do you allow yourself to enjoy that success by getting excited - and on the flip-side, when an investment turns down, do you find yourself equally disappointed - or do you try to remove emotion from your work, as much as possible?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我热爱我的工作,每天都是跳着踢踏舞去上班。我跟我喜欢的人一起,做着我热爱的事。唯一让我觉得花钱也愿意免去的事,就是解雇员工。我把时间用来思考未来,而不是过去。未来令人兴奋。就像伯特兰·罗素说的:“成功是得到你想要的东西,幸福是想要你得到的东西。”我从出生那天起就中了卵巢彩票,你们所有人也一样。我们都很成功、聪明、受过良好教育。盯着自己没有什么,是一个可怕的错误。以我们拥有的这些天赋,如果你还不快乐,那只能怪你自己。
I enjoy what I do, I tap dance to work every day. I work with people I love, doing what I love. The only thing I would pay to get rid of is firing people. I spend my time thinking about the future, not the past. The future is exciting. As Bertrand Russell says, “Success is getting what you want, happiness is wanting what you get.” I won the ovarian lottery the day I was born and so did all of you. We’re all successful, intelligent, educated. To focus on what you don’t have is a terrible mistake. With the gifts all of us have, if you are unhappy, it’s your own fault.
我认识一位八十多岁的老太太,一位波兰犹太妇女,她和家人一起被送进集中营,但并非所有人都活着出来。她说:“我交朋友很慢,因为我看人时,心里只有一个问题:他们会藏我吗?”等你到了我这个年纪,或者更年轻的时候,如果身边有很多愿意藏你的人,那你就能对自己这辈子过得怎么样感到相当满意。我知道《福布斯》400 富豪榜上有些人,他们的孩子可不会藏他们。“他在阁楼里,他在阁楼里。”有些人不断通过加入董事会或拿荣誉学位来补偿,但这改变不了事实:等他们走了,没人会真正在乎。世界上最强大的力量是无条件的爱。吝啬它是人生中一个巨大的错误。你越想把它给出去,你得到的就越多。在个人层面,确保对你重要的人,你也对他们重要,这件事至关重要。
I know a woman in her 80’s, a Polish Jew woman forced into a concentration camp with her family but not all of them came out. She says, “I am slow to make friends because when I look at people, I have one question in mind; would they hide me?” If you get to be my age, or younger for that matter, and have a lot of people that would hide you, then you can feel pretty good about how you’ve lived your life. I know people on the Forbes 400 list whose children would not hide them. “He’s in the attic, he’s in the attic.” Some of them keep compensating by joining board seats or getting honorary degrees, but it doesn’t change the fact that no one will give a damn when they are gone. The most powerful force in the world is unconditional love. To horde it is a terrible mistake in life. The more you try to give it away, the more you get it back. At an individual level, it’s important to make sure that for the people that count to you, you count to them.
假设你可以买下某位同学未来收入的 10%,你会怎么选?你不会挑智商最高、成绩最好的那些,而是选最有效率的人。你喜欢那些慷慨大方、愿意为别人多付出、做事直来直去的人。现在再想象一下,你可以做空某位同学未来收入的 10%。这一部分通常更有意思,因为你开始环顾四周。你不会挑成绩最差的,而是会找那些没人愿意接近的人——惹人讨厌、总爱抢功的那种。如果你有 500 马力的引擎,却只发挥出 50 马力,那你就会被一个只有 300 马力却能输出 250 马力的人打败。潜能和输出之间的差距,来自于人的品质。你可以列一份清单,写下你钦佩的品质和你鄙视的品质。反过来想一想:如果我对清单上的这些品质做出这样的反应,那世界也会以同样的方式对我做出反应。你可以学着去开启那些你想要的品质,关闭那些你想避免的品质。习惯的枷锁轻到毫无察觉,直到它重到无法挣脱。在 60 岁时你改不了,审视那份清单的时间就是现在。
What if you could buy 10% of one of your classmates and their future earnings? You wouldn’t buy the ones with the highest IQ, the best grades, etc, but the most effective. You like people who are generous, go out of their way, straight shooters. Now imagine that you could short 10% of one of your classmates. This part is usually more fun as you start looking around the room. You wouldn’t choose the ones with the poorest grades. Look for people nobody wants to be around, that are obnoxious or like to take all the credit. If you have a 500 HP engine and only get 50 HP out of it, you’ll be beat by someone else that has a 300 HP engine but gets 250 HP output. The difference between potential and output comes from human qualities. You can make a list of the qualities you admire and those you despise. To turn the tables, think if this is the way I react to the qualities on the list, which is the way the world will react to me. You can learn to turn on those qualities you want and turn off those qualities you wish to avoid. The chains of habit are too light to be felt until they are too heavy to be broken. You can’t change at 60; the time to look at that list is now.
奥斯汀:
Austin:
为什么你觉得,尽管你把自己的方法公之于众,却没几个人能复制你的成功?
Why do you think that despite making your methods publicly available, that relatively few people have been able to emulate your success?
沃伦·巴菲特:
Buffett:
我问过格雷厄姆同样的问题。哥大商学院的学生都上过他的课。他用当时最新的案例来讲,一学期下来你手里就有个能赚钱的投资组合了。格雷厄姆一生都在分享。他要是只顾攒钱,可能钱会更多,但正因为分享,他活得更快乐。钱不过是纸面上的数字,也许他去世时会有 8600 万美元而不是 4200 万,但那真的不重要。上过他课的人,90% 后来都改了行。
I asked Graham the same question. Everyone took his class at Columbia Business School. He used current examples, and by the end of the semester you would have a portfolio that would’ve made you money. Graham lived a life of sharing. He may have had more money hoarding, but lived happier because of it. The money’s just a figure in the paper, perhaps he would’ve died with 86 million instead of 42 million, but it doesn’t really matter. 90% of the people that took his class ended up doing something else.
我 11 岁就开始投资,买了三股城市服务优先股。我把奥马哈图书馆里所有关于投资的书都读了一遍。当时我对图表和技术分析相当痴迷,特别喜欢,但没从中赚到过一分钱。19 岁时,我读到格雷厄姆的《聪明的投资者》,那本书改变了我的世界。本因为我看他的书而亏钱了吗?也许我们相互竞争,他赚得少了点,但那对格雷厄姆来说并不重要。
At age 11 I started investing, purchasing three shares of Cities Service Preferred. I had read every book on investing in the Omaha library. I was really into charting and technical analysis. I loved it, but didn’t make any money from it. At 19 I read Graham’s “The Intelligent Investor” and it changed my world. Did Ben lose because I read his book? Maybe we competed and he made less money, but it didn’t matter to Graham.
这个理念要么立刻接受,要么永远都接受不了。说到底,根源在性情。人们想快速赚钱,但现实不是那样走的。格雷厄姆的理念对很多人来说承诺不够多。你不知道机会何时降临,只能在能力圈内等着那些绝佳机会。这远不如去猜第二天股价涨跌来得刺激。投资互联网公司的大多数人连市值都不清楚。他们买进只是因为觉得股价会涨,可如果你让他们写“我愿意花 60 亿美元买下 XYZ 公司,因为……”,他们连一半都写不完。这就是经典的龟兔赛跑,长期来看必然奏效。查理和我给竞争对手上了课,不过大多数对手并不跟我们抢。没关系,我们的钱已经多到花不完。
The philosophy either takes immediately or it doesn’t at all. The reason gets down to temperament. People want to make money fast, but it doesn’t happen that way. Graham’s philosophy doesn’t promise enough for many people. You don’t know when it will happen, but you just wait for the fat pitches within your circle of competence. It’s not as exciting as guessing whether the stock price will go up the next day. Most investors in internet companies didn’t know the market cap. They were buying because they thought the stock would move, but if you asked them to write “I would buy XYZ company for $6 billion because”, they wouldn’t get halfway through the sentence. It’s the classic tortoise versus hare, bound to work over time. Charlie and I have educated competitors. Most don’t compete with us, though. It’s fine, we have more than enough money.
埃默里:
Emory:
您觉得,卓越的领导者身上有哪些特质让他们脱颖而出——或者说,在“硬技能”和“软技能”之间,您如何找到那个恰当的平衡点?
What qualities in managers set them apart as great leaders, in essence, where do you find the right balance between “hard” and “soft” skills?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我们有 45 位经理人。有些人我们一年沟通一次,有些人一个月一次,有些人每天沟通。我通常每个月跟布拉姆金一家吃顿饭,还会一起度假,因为我们是朋友。我们选经理人时,看重的是他们对生意的热忱。他们通常是主动来找我们的。我从来没从金融卖家手里买过公司。我们自己不会经营企业,所以我指望他们规规矩矩;我们之间几乎没什么合同约束。生意在我把支票交过去之后,得跟之前一模一样地继续运转。我最大的问题是,他有了 5 亿美元身家,还会不会照样早上 6 点起床,继续把钱往奥马哈寄。我得看着他的眼睛,判断他到底是爱生意,还是爱钱。爱钱没问题,但他必须更爱生意才行。我为什么每天早上 7 点来上班,迫不及待地开始工作?因为我可以在自己的画布上作画,而且我喜欢掌声。
We have 45 managers. Some of them we communicate with once a year, some once a month, some everyday. I usually have dinner with the Blumkins every month, and we go on vacation, because we’re friends. What we look for in managers is a passion for the business. They usually come to us. I’ve never bought from a financial seller. We can’t run the business so I am counting on them to behave well; we have very little in the form of contracts. The business needs to continue just the same after I hand them the check as before. My big question is whether he will still get up at 6 AM just the same with $500 million, and continue to send money to Omaha. I have to look them in the eye and decide whether they love the business or they love the money. It’s fine if they love the money, but they have to love the business more. Why do I come in at 7 every morning, can’t wait to get to work. It’s because I get to paint my own painting and I like applause.
我们买下了一家珠宝公司,本·布里奇(Ben Bridge)。这是一家第四代家族企业,有 100 多家门店。他们只想卖给我们。这个家族不想卖给其他人,员工也不想。我从没见过他本人。他也不想卖,但家族需要变现。
We bought a jeweler, Ben Bridge. It was a 4th generation company, with over 100 stores. They were only interested in selling to us. The family didn’t want to sell to others, the employees didn’t want it. I never met him. He didn’t want to sell either, but the family needed it.
在波仙珠宝(Borsheims),我们有一位来自津巴布韦的女员工。她甚至连工商管理硕士(MBA)的加持都没有。我们不看简历,不看成绩,也不看人力资源部的推荐,我们找的是有热忱的人,而且我们会公平付酬,因为我们不想因不公平而招来怨恨。我们要的是那种不管怎样都会好好干活的人。
At Borsheims we have a woman from Zimbabwe. She didn’t even have the benefit of an MBA. We didn’t look at a resume, or grades, or HR recommendations, but were looking for passion and we’ll pay fairly because we don’t want the resent that comes with unfairness. We want people that will work regardless.
我收到森林河公司(Forest River)的皮特发来的传真,说这是我会想拥有的那类生意。他不想担心自己明天突然去世,撇下妻女。我们达成交易后,一起吃了晚饭,我提起了薪资的话题。我告诉他,想要多少自己说,支票我来签。他问我拿多少薪水。我说 10 万美元,他说不想比我挣得多,于是我们定在了 10 万美元。皮特昨天打来电话,说他想出价收购另一家公司。我们聊了五分钟,我给了他一些建议,不过我确实给了他们非常大的自由度。我花了 17 亿美元买下这家公司,但自己从没去看过,至少我希望它确实在那儿。
I got a fax from Pete at Forest River saying this is the type of business you would like to own. He didn’t want to worry about if he died tomorrow, and left his wife and daughter behind. After we made the deal, we had dinner and I brought up the topic of salary. I told him to name whatever number he wanted and I would sign the check. He asked me what I made. I told him $100,000 and he said he didn’t want to make more than me, so we settled on $100,000. Pete called yesterday, and said he wanted to make an offer for another business. We talked for five minutes, I gave him some advice, but I really give them a lot of freedom. I’ve spent $1.7 billion and I’ve never even been to the company, at least I hope it’s there.
我没法看着眼前这群人,就告诉你哪三位会成为出色的经理人。只有等他们干上一阵子,我才能看出来。看看 B 夫人吧。她有一个儿子参与了生意,三个女儿没有参与。她想找个办法公平地分配生意的收益,这解决了她的问题。她一直工作到 103 岁,104 岁去世。她住的地方离商店只有两个街区。她会在自己家里的家具上留着价格标签,因为这让她感觉更自在,就像在店里一样。她离开俄罗斯,在爱荷华州的道奇堡落脚。她攒了 16 年钱,存下 500 美元,才创办了这家拥有全美排名前两位家具店的企业。这种人,你无论付多少钱都请不到。我们很幸运,自 1965 年以来,从来没有一位经理人被竞争对手挖走。有些人退休了,有些人被解雇了,但我们给了他们在自己画布上作画的机会。
I can’t look at this group and tell you which 3 are going to be great managers. I can see it after they’ve been doing it for a while. Look at Mrs. B. She had one son involved in the business and 3 daughters not involved. She wanted a way to fairly distribute the proceeds of the business and this solved her problem. She worked until she was 103, and died at 104. She lived two blocks from the store. She left price tags on the furniture at her home because it made her feel more comfortable, like she was in the store. She left Russia and landed in Fort Dodge, Iowa. She saved $500 for 16 years to start this business that has the top 2 furniture stores in the nation. You can’t hire those kinds of people, no matter what you pay them. We’ve been lucky that we’ve never lost a manager to competitors since 1965. Some retire, some were fired, but we give them the opportunity to paint their own canvas.
奥斯汀:
Austin:
如果可以和一位素未谋面的人共进午餐,你会选谁,为什么?
If you could have lunch with one person you have never met, who would it be and why?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我想我会说是艾萨克·牛顿或本杰明·富兰克林。我见过很多有意思的人,也见过一些无聊的人。这两个人比常人对他们所处的世界有着更深刻的把握。不过,要是能跟索菲亚·罗兰共进午餐,我也不会拒绝这个机会。
I would have to say Isaac Newton or Benjamin Franklin. I’ve met a lot of interesting people and some uninteresting ones, too. The two men had a bigger grasp of the world they lived in. But I don’t think I would pass up an opportunity with Sophia Loren.
埃默里:
Emory:
巴菲特先生,你是否认为美联储在助长道德风险,从而导致资本错配和随后的资产泡沫?如果是这样,长期风险有哪些?
Mr. Buffett, do you believe that the Federal Reserve is fostering moral hazard thereby leading to the misallocation of capital and subsequent asset bubbles? If so, what are the long term risks?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
每当政府决定为公共利益而采取行动,而非任由某一方倒闭时,总会引入一定程度的道德风险。救助长期资本管理公司(LTCM)就存在道德风险,当前局势也带有这方面的因素。但这一点很难衡量,因为其后果要在 15 到 20 年后才会显现。1987 年股灾期间,格林斯潘刚上任,还不确定接下来会发生什么。当时的专家经纪商制度受到冲击,大部分专家经纪商只靠极少的资本运营,已经破产。美联储为他们提供了更多资本。这会改变未来的行为吗?也许吧,但在当时,这是一个正确的决定。这也催生了“大而不倒”的信条。大型银行、房地美和房利美认定美国政府不会让它们倒闭,这些公司的管理层也清楚这一点。我不太愿意事后批评美联储,他们掌握更多信息,也在努力做正确的事。
There is always some introduction of moral hazard when government decides to act in favor of the common good versus letting someone fail. There was moral hazard with the bailout of LTCM and there is some aspect of that with the current situation. But it’s hard to measure because the consequences are 15-20 years out. During the 1987 market crash, Greenspan was new to the job and unsure of what would happen. The specialist system got hit, most of them operated on very little capital and were broke. The Fed provided them with more capital. Will that change future behavior? Maybe, but at the time it was the right call. It’s also resulted in the “Too Big to Fail” doctrine. The big banks, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae figured the US Government wouldn’t allow them to fail and the managements of those companies knew that. I would be disinclined to second guess the Fed, they have more information and are trying to do what’s right.
奥斯汀:
Austin:
凭借你的商业成就、巨额财富和名人地位,你是如何保持如此脚踏实地、如此谦逊的?在你的一生中,有没有遇到过某些特定的人,或学到过某些道理,让你能一直保持这种心态?
Given your business success, your immense fortune, and your celebrity status, how do you stay so down to earth and humble? Are there specific people or lessons you have learned throughout your life that enable you to maintain this outlook?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我很幸运,拥有正确的榜样。告诉我是谁是你的英雄,我就能说出你会变成什么样的人。人生中最重要的任务之一就是养育孩子。他们从你身上学到的东西,比从研究生院学到的还要多。我父亲对我影响巨大,后来格雷厄姆也出现了。此外,我的榜样从未让我失望过。
I was lucky to have the right heroes. Tell me who your heroes are and I’ll tell you how you’ll turn out to be. One of your most important jobs in life will be raising your children. They will learn more from you than they will in graduate school. My father was a huge influence, and later on Graham came along. I was also never let down by my heroes.
我的成功跟我本人没什么关系。我父亲是一名证券经纪商,大崩盘之后他根本没客户可联系。正因如此,我于 1930 年出生在美国,正赶上资本市场最繁荣的时期之一。我天生就具备资本资产配置的禀赋,而且在恰当的时间拥有了这份禀赋。这种禀赋很大程度上来自我的性情,我天生就擅长这件事,后来又不断从反馈中磨砺得更好。这没什么值得骄傲的。盖茨说过,要是我出生得早一些,可能早就成了某种动物的午餐了。我跑不快,也不会爬树。我大概会坐在那里大谈资本配置,而那头动物会想:“这种猎物味道最好。”你们所有人都是中了卵巢彩票。没必要为此感到内疚。
I had nothing to do with my own success. My father was a securities broker and after the Great Crash, he had no one to call. Consequently, I was born in 1930 in the United States during the time of one of the greatest capital markets. I was born with the wiring for capital asset allocation. I had the right wiring at the right time. Temperament is a large part of my wiring. I was naturally good at it, and I used some feedback to develop it better. There is nothing to be arrogant about. Gates says if I had been born earlier, I would’ve been some animal’s lunch. I can’t run, I can’t climb. I’d be talking about allocating capital and the animal would think, “Those are the kind that taste the best.” You have all won the ovarian lottery. There is no reason to feel guilty about it.
我从未捐出过一毛钱,能对我的生活方式产生任何影响。有些人去教堂,往奉献盘里投钱,那些钱确实会改变他们自己怎么过日子、吃什么、给孩子们买什么礼物。你对自己无法控制的事情没什么好趾高气扬的。
I have never given away a dime that has any meaning on how I live. There are people that go to church and they put money in the offering plate that truly makes a difference in how they will live their lives, what they will eat, what presents they will buy for their children. There’s no reason to get puffed up over things you didn’t control.
埃默里:
Emory:
由于信贷危机以及随之而来的大规模减记,银行让健康的企业更难获得资本用于提高效率、扩大业务、启动新项目等,从而可能成为限制增长的主要因素。您如何看待市场中的流动性,以及它是否有可能导致经济衰退?此外,您是否看到目前不从事贷款业务的金融机构有可能介入,利用资本供应减少的机会?
Due to the credit crisis and consequently large write-downs, banks have made it more difficult to lend healthy businesses capital for increasing efficiency, expansion, new projects, etc., thereby potentially becoming the primary agents restricting growth. What are your thoughts on liquidity in the marketplace and the possibly of it contributing to a recession? Also, do you see a potential for financial institutions not currently in the lending business stepping in to take advantage of the reduced supply of capital?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我们现在看到的是一场大规模的风险重新定价和评估,在纠正过去的问题。我不知道有哪笔优质信贷项目被搁置了。对于合理的交易,市场上有很多廉价的信贷——我说的合理交易,不包括过去 12 到 18 个月里发生的那些事。很多不合逻辑的东西正在被清洗出系统。糟糕的决策当然要付出痛苦的代价。相比之下,这算不上信贷紧缩。1982 年,最优惠利率达到 22%,资金非常昂贵。60 年代末,我们想做一笔靠谱的交易都找不到钱。现在的情况不是那样。美联储已经打开了窗口,利率也在下降。但这并不意味着不会出现严重衰退。
What we are seeing is a huge repricing and evaluation of risk, correcting for problems of the past. I don’t know of good credit propositions that are going unfulfilled. There’s lots of cheap credit for sensible deals, which I don’t define as anything that happened over the last 12, 18 months. A lot of things that didn’t make sense are being washed out of the system. It is painful for bad decisions. Comparatively, this is not a credit crunch. In 1982 the prime rate was 22% and money was very expensive. In the late 60’s, we made a sound deal there wasn’t any money to be had. That’s not the case now. The Fed has opened the window, and rates are down. It doesn’t mean there won’t be a major recession.
奥斯汀:
Austin:
你最大的错误或遗憾是什么?
What are some of your biggest mistakes or regrets?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我们犯过很多错误,但它们不困扰我。我们没有任何遗憾。我们做的事情是做大量决策,难免会有错误。有些 100 亿美元的遗漏性错误没人知道;它们不会出现在账面上。1994 年我们花了价值 400 美元的伯克希尔股票收购了一家鞋业公司。现在这家公司一文不值,但那些股票价值 35 亿美元。所以现在,我很乐意看到伯克希尔股价下跌,因为那会缩小我的错误规模。1973 年汤姆·墨菲把 NBC 以 3500 万美元的价格卖给我们,但我们拒绝了。那是一个巨大的遗漏性错误。
We’ve made lots of mistakes, but they don’t bother me. We’ve had no regrets. We are in the business of making many decisions and there are bound to be mistakes. There are $10 billion mistakes of omission that no one knows about; they don’t show up in the accounting. In 1994 we paid $400 worth of Berkshire stock for a shoe company. The company is now worth 0, but the stock is worth $3.5 billion. So now, I’m happy to see Berkshire go down since it reduces the size of my mistake. In 1973 Tom Murphy offered us NBC for $35 million, but we turned it down. That was a huge mistake of omission.
在我个人生活中,总有事情本可以换种做法。但发生的好事太多了,在坏事上纠结根本不值得。找到合适的配偶占了 90%。如果你在健康上运气好,在配偶上运气也好,离幸福就不远了。被哈佛商学院拒绝是我遇到过的最好的事情之一——坏运气也能变成好事。
In my personal life, there are always things I could’ve done differently. But so many good things have happened. It just doesn’t pay to dwell on the bad things. Finding the right spouse is 90% of it. If you are lucky on health and lucky on your spouse, you are a long way home. Getting turned down by HBS was one of the best things that could have happened to me, bad luck can turn out to be good.
埃默里大学:
Emory:
您能否谈谈目前中东和亚洲主权财富基金的崛起,以及它们在企业融资中扮演着越来越大的角色?这些资金来源对企业现金流的竞争,是否影响了您的投资策略或机会?
Could you comment on the current rise of sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East and Asia and how they are playing an increasing role in how corporations raise capital. Is competition from these sources for the cash flows of corporations affecting your investment strategies or opportunities?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
任何竞争都是竞争。主权财富基金的情况挺有意思。这里面有很大一部分是抨击中国、抨击欧佩克,刚好落进政客的口袋里。今天,美国从全世界买进的东西,会比全世界从我们这儿买的多 20 亿美元。作为交换,我们给他们一些小纸片,而他们必须去买资产。只要我们消费的比生产的多,我们就得让世界其他地方来投资我们。是我们制造了主权财富基金,而且那 20 亿美元还会生息。美国的基金觉得能从这些外国投资者那里拿到最优厚的条件,最近还引诱他们买入股票。中国曾想收购优尼科(Unocal),一家三流石油生产商,在海外比如印度有些产量。美国国会暴跳如雷,395 名众议员联署了一份反华决议,把交易拦下了。一百年来,美国公司满世界买资产、贿赂官员,却对中国人说他们不能买优尼科。中国人忍了,但他们心里很不痛快。我们一边在买外国资产、塞给他们小纸片,一边又告诉他们那笔钱不能拿来干什么,这没道理。是我们造出了这些主权基金,我对它们没有反对意见。我建议这些主权财富基金买指数基金。这能让它们参与美国市场,同时又不会被推销烂生意的销售员忽悠。在经济学里,你永远要追问一句:“然后呢?”
Any competition is competition. The situation of sovereign wealth funds is interesting. A lot of it is China bashing, OPEC bashing and plays right into politician’s hands. Today, the US will buy $2 billion more from the world than they buy from us. In exchange we give them little pieces of paper and they have to buy assets. As long as we consume more than we produce we have to let the rest of the world invest in us. We created sovereign wealth funds and that $2 billion gains interest. US funds feel they can get the best terms from these foreign investors and lately, enticed them into buying equity. China wanted to buy Unocal, a 3rd rate oil producer with production overseas in places like India. US Congress went ape and 395 representatives signed an anti-Chinese resolution to block the deal. For 100 years the US companies went around buying the world’s assets and bribing officials, but told China they couldn’t buy Unocal. The Chinese took it, but they didn’t like it. It doesn’t make sense that we are buying foreign assets, and giving them pieces of paper and then telling them what they can’t do with that money. We have created them and I have no objection to them. I recommend an index fund for these sovereign wealth funds. It gives them exposure to the US market, but they won’t get taken by salespeople with bad deals. In economics you always want to say “And then what?”
奥斯汀:
Austin:
考虑到市场上庞大的机构与对冲基金数量,个人投资者究竟有没有能力评估证券的风险性?
Is the individual investor even capable of assessing the riskiness of securities given the large number of institutions/hedge funds in the market?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我不觉得现在有太多被忽略的机会,但我只能盯着大东西看。这就是你们相对于我的优势。几年前有位朋友提醒我该看看韩国。我们以税后盈利 3 到 4 倍的价格买进了浦项制铁(Posco)。我还找到另外 20 家公司,市盈率只有 2 到 3 倍,资产负债表也很坚实。我做了分散投资,因为我对韩国市场没那么熟。我们寻找的是极不寻常的东西。证券市场偶尔会出现非同一般的机会。我喜欢在桶里打鱼,但我得先确认桶里的水已经排干了。
I don’t think there is much being overlooked now, but I’m forced to look at big things. That’s the advantage you have over me. A few years ago a friend of mine mentioned that I should look at Korea. We bought Posco for 3-4 times post-tax earnings. I found 20 other companies selling at 2-3 times earnings and strong balance sheets. I diversified because I didn’t know the Korean market as well. We are looking for the very unusual. Occasionally things will happen in a securities market that are extraordinary. I like shooting fish in a barrel, but I like to make sure the water’s drained out.
几年前我们就遇到过这种情况,30 年期国债和 29 年半国债之间出现了价差。因为流动性较差,非新发国债的收益率要低 30 个基点,换算成本金就是 3% 的差价。长期资本管理公司最初以 10 个基点的价差进场,但杠杆加得太高,最后被迫平仓。如果你做多/做空这对组合,确实能很快赚到钱。
We had that situation a few years ago with the 30 year versus 29 ½ year Treasury bonds. Because of less liquidity, the off-the-run bonds were selling for 30 basis points less, which translates into 3% of principal value. LTCM entered the trade at 10 basis points originally, but they overleveraged and were forced to unwind the position. If you went long/short you could make money really quickly.
市场在大多数时候、关于大多数事情是有效的。但这类机会,没人会送到你面前。它们不会上 CNBC,也不会出现在券商报告里。你必须自己去寻找。1951 年,我毕业后,用穆迪手册和标普手册作为信息来源。我一页一页地翻。我就像个篮球教练在寻觅 7 英尺的大个子。我还得看他动作协不协调、能不能留得住校。但要是一个 5 英尺 6 英寸的人凑过来说“等你看了我控球再说”,我会说“不了,谢谢”。在穆迪手册第 1443 页,我找到了西部保险证券公司(Western Insurance Securities)。它两年前每股盈利 21.66 美元,去年每股盈利 29.09 美元。过去一年,这只股票的交易价格在每股 3 美元到 13 美元之间。我仍需要做功课,确认这些盈利是真实的。市场最终会回归正确。但机会就在那里摆着。你不用找太多。一辈子找到 10 个这样的机会,就能让你富得不得了。但你绝不能犯错,一个都不能有。一串大数字乘以零,结果还是零。你没法退回“起点”。
Markets are efficient most of the time about most things. But for these opportunities, nobody will tell you about them. They won’t be on CNBC and they won’t be in brokerage reports. You have to go find them yourself. In 1951, after I graduated from school, I used Moody’s and S&P manuals as my sources of information. I went through them page by page. I was like a basketball coach looking for 7-footers. I still have to find out if he’s coordinated, and can stay in school. But if someone comes up to me that’s 5’6″ and says, “Wait ’til you see me handle the ball”, I say “No thanks”. On page 1443 of Moody’s, I found Western Insurance Securities. It had earned $21.66 per share 2 years ago, and earned $29.09 last year. Over the past year the stock was selling for between $3 and $13 per share. I still had to do the work to make sure the earnings were valid. The markets will get it right eventually. But they are there. You don’t have to find too many. Finding 10 of these opportunities in your lifetime will make you so rich. But you can’t be wrong. You can’t have any zeroes. A list of big numbers multiplied by zero will equal zero. You can’t go back to “Go”.
埃默里:
Emory:
您怎么看待运用大规模基础设施投资来刺激经济?
What do you think of aggregate infrastructure investment to stimulate the economy?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我认为刺激经济最好的办法是把钱给穷人。他们会花掉的。别给像我这样的人。基础设施投资本身是有道理的,但我们好一阵子没做了,而且它在未来 6 到 12 个月内不会起什么作用。相对于 GDP,基础设施的体量并不大。我们是一个消费驱动的社会,花去了产出的 106%。
I think the best way to stimulate the economy is to give money to the poor. They will spend it. Don’t give it to guys like me. Infrastructure investment makes sense, but we haven’t done it in a while and it won’t do anything for the next 6-12 months. Infrastructure is not big relative to GDP. We are a consumer-driven society, spending 106% of production.
Austin:
Austin:
你认为谁有潜力成为下一位最伟大的投资者,以及你会不会偏爱那些投资风格跟你相似的人?
Who do you think will be one of the next greatest investors and are you partial to favoring someone with a similar investment style as yours?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我们刚刚完成了一轮寻找。董事会目前有 3 名候选人可以接替我担任 CEO,另有 4 名候选人可以接替我担任投资负责人。他们现在在各自的位置上都做得很好,但都愿意降薪加入伯克希尔。
We just finished looking for someone. The Board has 3 candidates to replace me as CEO and 4 candidates to replace me as investor. They are all doing fine where they are, but they would be willing to come over to Berkshire for less pay.
1969 年,我清算了合伙公司,当时必须帮投资人另找人打理资金。我推荐了红杉基金(Sequoia Fund)的比尔·鲁安、桑迪·戈特斯曼——他现在是伯克希尔的董事——还有我在《格雷厄姆-多德村的超级投资者》里写到过的沃尔特·施洛斯。他们绝不可能失手。
In 1969, I wound up my partnership and I had to help people find someone to manage their money. I recommended Bill Ruane of Sequoia Fund, Sandy Gottesman, who is currently on the board at Berkshire, and Walter Schloss, who I wrote about in “The Superinvestors of Graham and Dodds-ville”. There’s no way they could miss.
但新生代的投资者,我大多数不认识,他们不是我同时代的人。光看业绩记录是不够的,那东西没有预测力,而且总会有少数人表现不错。我认识一些人,管 500 万美元能做到年化 50%,管 10 亿美元就做不到了。那些业绩出色的人问题在于,他们会吸来太多资金,反而把自身的优势给抹掉了。要找出这样的人很难,更难的是敲定一笔安排,阻止他们再去吸纳别的资金。这就像押一匹 12 岁的马,靠的是它 3 岁时的赢绩。还有很重要的一点,要避开使用杠杆的管理人。这就是太多智商 160 的投资者最终翻车的原因。
But I don’t know many of the newer investors, they’re not my contemporaries. It’s not enough to just look at track records. They aren’t predictive and there will always be a few people that do well. I know guys who can make 50% a year with $5 million, but not with $1 billion. The problem with guys that do well is they attract so much money that it neutralizes their advantage. It’s hard to identify them, and even harder to make a deal to keep them from attracting other capital. It’s like betting on a 12 year old horse that won at 3 years old. It’s also important to avoid managers who use leverage. It’s the reason that investors with 160 IQs flame out.
埃默里:
Emory:
在去年西科金融的股东大会上,查理说过,“获得成功的最好方式就是配得上成功。” 你回想一下,在你的经历里,有没有哪个例子最能说明你是怎么让自己配得上成功的?对于学生来说,要怎样才能让自己也配得上成功,你有没有什么建议?
At the Wesco annual meeting last year, Charlie said, “The best way to get success is to deserve success”. Do you recall anything from your experience which best demonstrates how you were able to position yourself to deserve success, and do you have any advice for students on how they can position themselves to deserve success as well?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
行为端正占了很大一部分。毕业后我主动提出为格雷厄姆免费打工,他说我定价过高了。我努力让自己对他有用、让他看得见我。我给他推荐股票,一直跟他保持联系。几乎总是这样——好事源于好行为。人生别记账。汤姆·墨菲不计较谁欠谁。他为我做了 20 件事,我只能指望找机会回报。在婚姻里计较是灾难,在生意上计较同样是灾难。我会换位思考,站在卖方的立场想问题。多数人都有强烈的报恩心理——你帮了他们,他们就会还你两倍的好处。午餐时间还在工作、每天第一个到办公室,这种事有多罕见?你多做一点额外的事,就会被人注意到。愿意在得不到表扬的时候搭把手,这是个好习惯。查理和我 1959 年就合伙了。我俩总觉得自己是对的。我们意见不合,但从来没吵过架。而且我们从不拿对方过去的错误说事。我推荐读《穷查理宝典》。那本书太棒了,卖了 5 万册,到现在还是独立销售。
Behaving decent is a large part of it. Out of school I offered to work for Graham for free and he said I was overpriced. I tried to be useful and visible to him. I gave him stock tips and kept up with him. Almost always good things come from good behavior. Don’t keep score in life. Tom Murphy does not keep score. He keeps doing 20 things for me and I can only hope to return the favor. Keeping score is terrible in marriage and terrible in business. I put myself in the seller’s shoes. With most humans there is a great desire to reciprocate. If you do something for them, they will do 2X for you. How rare is it to work during lunch hours and be the first one there in the morning. You’ll get noticed if you do something extra. It’s good to have a willingness to pitch in when you aren’t going to get credit for it. Charlie and I partnered up in 1959. We always both think we’re right. We disagree but we’ve never fought. And we’ve never held past mistakes over each other’s heads. I recommend reading “Poor Charlie’s Almanack”. It’s amazing, has sold 50,000 copies and it’s still sold independently.
Austin:
Austin:
在你的职业生涯中,有没有出现过你一度想偏离自己策略的情况?如果有,你是怎么应对的?
Have there been instances in your career where you have been tempted to deviate from your strategy and if so, how did you handle that?
沃伦·巴菲特:
Buffett:
我不是那种人。我不靠什么自律,我天生就只想做有道理的事。在个人生活里也一样,别的富人怎么过,我根本不关心。我不会因为别人有条 400 英尺的船,就非要弄条 405 英尺的。我有些朋友拥有大游艇,55 个人伺候 14 位客人。那 55 个人里,有人会偷你东西,有人会互相乱搞,我不想掺和这些麻烦。朋友们有船,那我就当个终极蹭船客。我不需要好几套房子。如果想干点荒唐疯狂的事,我也不是做不到,但安娜·妮可·史密斯已经不在了。这让我想起一个故事:有个 60 岁老头娶了个 25 岁的姑娘。朋友问他怎么做到的,他回答说:“我告诉她我 90 岁了。”
I’m not that type. I’m not disciplined. I just naturally want to do things that make sense. In my personal life too, I don’t care what other rich people are doing. I don’t want a 405 foot boat just because someone else has a 400 foot boat. Some of my friends have big boats where 55 people are serving 14. Of those 55, some will be stealing from you, some will be sleeping with each other, and I just don’t want to deal with that. My friends have the boats, so I’m the ultimate freeloader. I don’t need multiple houses. If I wanted to do something wild & crazy I could do it, but Anna Nicole Smith is gone. Reminds me of the story of the 60 year old man that got a 25 year old to marry him. When his friends asked how he did it, he replied, “I told her I was 90.”
埃默里:
Emory:
看来全球的趋势是企业税率在走低。您是否认为,如果美国维持当前的企业税率,有丧失竞争力的风险?
It seems that the worldwide trend is towards lower corporate tax rates. Do you think that the US risks becoming less competitive if it maintains its current corporate tax rate?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
相对于 GDP,政府税收占 18.5%,支出占 20%,差额靠借债来填补。国债不该是个吓人的话题,只要它与 GDP 成比例增长,就没问题。那 18.5% 的税收从哪来?政府收入共 2.7 万亿美元,其中 2.2 万亿来自个人,而这里面不到 1% 来自遗产税。个人所得税贡献 1.1 万亿,工资税 9000 亿,但工资税只对前 10 万美元的工资征收。我们需要一个能鼓励更大繁荣的税收体系,但它也必须照顾好每个家庭。
Relative to GDP, government taxation is 18.5% and spending is 20%, so we borrow the balance. The national debt should not be a scary topic and the fact that it’s gone up is fine as long as it’s proportional to GDP. Where do we get that 18.5%? There’s 2.7 trillion in government revenues. 2.2 trillion comes from individuals, and less than 1% of that comes from the estate tax. 1.1 trillion comes from income taxes, with payroll taxes consisting of 900 billion, but it’s capped at the first $100,000 of salary. We want a tax system that encourages greater prosperity, but it needs to take care of the family.
我们做了个非正式的办公室调查,比了比总的税务负担和总收入。我挣了 4600 万美元,税率是 17.5%。我的税率是最低的,平均税率是 33%,我的清洁工缴了 40%。这个体制是偏向富人的。福布斯 400 富豪榜总净资产从 2200 亿美元涨到了 1.54 万亿美元,涨了 7 倍。你在议会里会看到,有钱有势的人在遗产税、私募股权投资的附带权益这些问题上拼命游说。我们需要拉平所得税和工资税,年收入 3 万美元以下的人不应该再被折腾。
We did an informal office survey by looking at the total tax footprint versus the total income. I earned 46 million and paid a tax rate of 17.5%. My rate was the lowest, the average was 33%, and my cleaning lady paid 40%. The system is tilted towards the rich. The Forbes 400 total net worth has gone from 220 billion to 1.54 trillion, an increase of 7-to-1. You see in legislature that there is lobbying carried on by the powerful over issues such as the estate tax and carried interest for private equity investments. We need to flatten income and payroll taxes, and those making under $30,000 shouldn’t be bothered.
假设在你出生前的 24 小时,一个精灵来到你面前,让你设计一套社会和经济体系。唯一条件是,你设计好体系后,要从一个桶里抽出一张纸,纸条会决定你的出身。你会追求什么样的目标?你需要设计一套能创造繁荣的体系。它必须是一个精英体制,把合适的人放到合适的位置。它需要有强大的教育体系,产出大量的商品和服务。它还不能歧视女性或少数族裔。尽管人均 GDP 是 4.7 万美元,但仍有 20% 的人口收入低于 2 万美元。我们需要消除人们对疾病或衰老的恐惧。税法是一个国家价值观的成文体现。但你绝不能杀掉繁荣这只金鹅。
Let’s imagine that 24 hours before you are born, a genie comes to you and tells you devise a social and economic system. The only catch is that after you designed the system, you would choose a paper from a barrel which would determine your demographics. What objectives would you want? You need to devise a system that creates prosperity. It needs to be a meritocracy, to put the right people in the right place. It needs to have a strong education system, and throw off lots of goods and services. It also needs to not discriminate against women or minorities. Even though the per capita GDP is $47,000, 20% of the population makes less than $20,000. We need to eliminate that fear of sickness or old age. A tax code is the codification of a country’s values. But you can’t kill the golden goose of prosperity.
奥斯汀:
Austin:
总有人提到,你们之所以没被华尔街的狂热冲昏头脑,有一部分原因是因为人住在奥马哈——对你来说,工作与生活的平衡有多重要?你又是怎么保持这个平衡的?
There is always mention that some of your success could be attributed to not buying in to the Wall Street mania b/c you are in Omaha—what importance do you give to balance as it pertains to work and life and what do you do to maintain your appropriate balance?
巴菲特:
Buffett:
我从中获得了无穷的乐趣,根本算不上工作。我想做什么就做什么,想去哪儿就去哪儿——在船上也行,随便哪里。我妻子负责养育孩子。我俩对这样的安排都没有意见,从亚当·斯密“分工论”的角度看,这也合情合理。对女性来说,选择会艰难得多,而且永远都有点不平等。在我自己的生活中,凡是不想参加的社交活动或会议,我几乎一个都没去过。在我成年后的职业生涯里,我从来不需要在事业和个人生活之间做取舍。我享受简单的乐趣。每周我在网上打 12 个小时桥牌。比尔和我一起打,他的网名叫“chalengr”,我是“tbone”。
I have so much fun that it’s not work. I get to do what I want, where I want - on a boat, wherever. My wife was responsible for bringing up the children. Neither of us had problems with that arrangement, and it made sense from an Adam Smith “division of labor” perspective. It will be a much tougher choice for women, and always be somewhat unequal. In my own life I did virtually no social functions or meetings that I didn’t want to do. In my adult business life I have never had to make a choice of trading between professional and personal. I have simple pleasures. I play bridge online for 12 hours a week. Bill and I play, he’s “chalengr” and I’m “tbone”.
在哈佛做完一场演讲后,我告诉他们,要去为自己最敬佩的人工作,结果这样一来,他们都成了个体户。去为你敬佩的人或组织工作,这件事很重要。我没见过多少男性面临艰难的抉择。但女性才是身处棘手处境的人。
After a talk at Harvard, I told them to work for who they admired the most, so they all become self-employed. It’s important to go to work for someone or some organization you admire. I’ve not seen many males having to make tough choices. But women are the ones who have tough situations.
http://undergroundvalue.blogspot.com/2008/02/notes-from-buffett-meeting-2152008_23.html
http://undergroundvalue.blogspot.com/2008/02/notes-from-buffett-meeting-2152008_23.html