2017 年致股东信
伯克希尔业绩对比标普 500 指数:年度变动百分比
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
年份 1965 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1966 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1967 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1968 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1969 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1970 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1971 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1972 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1973 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1974 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1975 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1976 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1977 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1978 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1979 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1980 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1981 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1982 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1983 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1984 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1985 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1986 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1987 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1988 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1989 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1990 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1991 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1992 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1993 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1994 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1995 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1996 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1997 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1998 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1999 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2000 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2001 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2002 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2003 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2004 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2005 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2006 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2007 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2008 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2009 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2010 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2011 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2012 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2013 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2014 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2015 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2016 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 2017 ………………………………………………………………………………………… 1965-2017 年复合年化收益 …………………………………………………………………… 1964-2017 年总收益 ………………………………………………………………………………
Year 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overall Gain – 1964-2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
伯克希尔每股账面价值的变动
in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire
伯克希尔每股市场价值的变动
in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire
计入股息后的标普 500 指数
in S&P 500 with Dividends Included
| 年度 | 伯克希尔每股账面价值变动 | 伯克希尔每股市场价值的年度百分比变化 | 标普500指数含股息变动 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | 12.0 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.4 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 6.5 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | (6.2) | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | 4.6 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 8.3 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | 6.4 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 10.7 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 23.0 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 复合年化收益率 – 1965-2017 | 19.1% | 20.9% | 9.9% |
| 整体收益——1964-2017 | 1,088,029% | 2,404,748% | 15,508% |
| Year | in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | 12.0 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.4 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 6.5 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | (6.2) | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | 4.6 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 8.3 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | 6.4 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 10.7 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 23.0 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2017 | 19.1% | 20.9% | 9.9% |
| Overall Gain – 1964-2017 | 1,088,029% | 2,404,748% | 15,508% |
说明:数据按日历年统计,以下情形除外——1965 年和 1966 年截至 9 月 30 日,1967 年为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月。自 1979 年起,会计规则要求保险公司按市价而非此前的成本与市价孰低法来计量所持权益证券。本表中,伯克希尔 1978 年以前的业绩已按新规重新列报;其余各项则一律沿用最初报告的数字。标普 500 指数的数据为税前口径,伯克希尔的数据为税后口径。假如某家公司像伯克希尔这样只是简单持有标普 500 指数、并计提相应税款,那么在指数上涨的年份,它的业绩会落后于标普 500 指数;而在指数下跌的年份,反而会跑赢标普 500 指数。年深日久,税款成本累积下来,整体落后的幅度会相当可观。
Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
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伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦股份有限公司全体股东:
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
伯克希尔 2017 年的净资产增长了 653 亿美元,A 类股和 B 类股的每股账面价值都随之增长了 23%。过去 53 年间(也就是现任管理层接手以来),每股账面价值从 19 美元一路增长到 211,750 美元,年复合增长率达到 19.1%。* 开头这一段的写法,已经沿用了 30 年。但 2017 年绝非寻常年份:这笔增长中很大一部分,并不出自伯克希尔自己的努力。话虽如此,这 653 亿美元的增长实实在在——这一点请诸位放心。只是其中仅有 360 亿美元来自伯克希尔的运营,剩下的 290 亿美元,是 12 月国会重写美国税法时送到我们手上的。(伯克希尔这笔税务收益的细节,见第 K-32 页和第 K-89 至 K-90 页。)交代完这些财务事实,我本想立刻转入伯克希尔运营的话题。但这里还得插一段:我必须先向诸位说明一项新的会计规则——一项公认会计原则(GAAP)——它会在今后的季度和年度报告中严重扭曲伯克希尔的净利润数字,也常常会误导评论人士和投资者。新规则要求,我们所持股票的未实现投资损益的净变动,必须计入我们向诸位报告的每一项净利润数字。这一要求会让我们 GAAP 口径下的最终利润出现一些剧烈、毫无章法的起伏。伯克希尔持有价值 1700 亿美元的上市股票(不含所持的卡夫亨氏股份),这些持股的市值在一个季度报告期内轻轻松松就能波动 100 亿美元甚至更多。把这种量级的震荡计入报告净利润,会把真正描述经营业绩的重要数字彻底淹没。就分析而言,伯克希尔的“最终利润”将毫无参考价值。多年来,会计规则一直强制我们把已实现的收益(或亏损)计入净利润,本就给我们的沟通添了不少麻烦,如今这条新规更是雪上加霜。在过去的季度和年度新闻稿里,我们一再提醒诸位不要盯着这些已实现收益,因为它们和未实现收益一样,都是随机波动的。原因主要在于:我们卖出证券,是因为那样做在当下看来明智,而不是想借此影响利润数字。结果就是,有时投资组合整体表现平平(或正好相反),我们却在同一时期报出了大额已实现收益。
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2017 was $65.3 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 23%. Over the last 53 years (that is, since present management took over), pershare book value has grown from $19 to $211,750, a rate of 19.1% compounded annually.* The format of that opening paragraph has been standard for 30 years. But 2017 was far from standard: A large portion of our gain did not come from anything we accomplished at Berkshire. The $65 billion gain is nonetheless real – rest assured of that. But only $36 billion came from Berkshire’s operations. The remaining $29 billion was delivered to us in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code. (Details of Berkshire’s tax-related gain appear on page K-32 and pages K-89 – K-90.) After stating those fiscal facts, I would prefer to turn immediately to discussing Berkshire’s operations. But, in still another interruption, I must first tell you about a new accounting rule – a generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) – that in future quarterly and annual reports will severely distort Berkshire’s net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors. The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be included in all net income figures we report to you. That requirement will produce some truly wild and capricious swings in our GAAP bottom-line. Berkshire owns $170 billion of marketable stocks (not including our shares of Kraft Heinz), and the value of these holdings can easily swing by $10 billion or more within a quarterly reporting period. Including gyrations of that magnitude in reported net income will swamp the truly important numbers that describe our operating performance. For analytical purposes, Berkshire’s “bottom-line” will be useless. The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had in dealing with the realized gains (or losses) that accounting rules compel us to include in our net income. In past quarterly and annual press releases, we have regularly warned you not to pay attention to these realized gains, because they – just like our unrealized gains – fluctuate randomly. That’s largely because we sell securities when that seems the intelligent thing to do, not because we are trying to influence earnings in any way. As a result, we sometimes have reported substantial realized gains for a period when our portfolio, overall, performed poorly (or the converse).
*本报告采用的所有每股数字均针对伯克希尔 A 股。B 股的对应数字为 A 股所列数值的 1/1500。
*All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for the A shares.
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关于未实现收益的新规,进一步放大了原有已实现收益准则造成的扭曲。为此,我们每个季度都会不厌其烦地讲清楚:诸位要读懂我们的数字,需要做哪些调整。可是电视上对财报的评论,往往在报告一发布就脱口而出,报纸头条也几乎总盯着 GAAP 净利润的同比变化。于是媒体报道有时会突出某些数字,平白吓着或鼓舞了不少读者和观众。为缓解这个问题,我们会一如既往地把财务报告安排在周五收盘后的深夜、或周六清晨发布。这样诸位就有最充裕的时间去分析,投资专业人士也来得及在周一开盘前给出有见地的评论。即便如此,对那些视会计如天书的股东,我料想仍会有不少困惑。在伯克希尔,最要紧的是正常化每股盈利能力的增长。我和多年的老搭档查理·芒格盯的正是这个指标——也希望诸位一样。以下是我们 2017 年的成绩单。
With the new rule about unrealized gains exacerbating the distortion caused by the existing rules applying to realized gains, we will take pains every quarter to explain the adjustments you need in order to make sense of our numbers. But televised commentary on earnings releases is often instantaneous with their receipt, and newspaper headlines almost always focus on the year-over-year change in GAAP net income. Consequently, media reports sometimes highlight figures that unnecessarily frighten or encourage many readers or viewers. We will attempt to alleviate this problem by continuing our practice of publishing financial reports late on Friday, well after the markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That will allow you maximum time for analysis and give investment professionals the opportunity to deliver informed commentary before markets open on Monday. Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language. At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That metric is what Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on – and we hope that you do, too. Our scorecard for 2017 follows.
收购
Acquisitions
有四块基石能为伯克希尔增添价值:(1)大规模的独立收购;(2)与现有业务契合的补强型收购;(3)旗下众多不同业务的内生销售增长与利润率改善;(4)来自我们庞大股票和债券组合的投资收益。本节要回顾的是 2017 年的收购动向。物色新的独立业务时,我们看重这样几项关键素质:持久的竞争优势;能干且正派的管理层;经营该业务所需净有形资产能带来良好回报;有以诱人回报率实现内生增长的空间;最后,还得有一个合理的买入价。正是最后这一条,几乎把我们 2017 年看过的所有交易都挡在了门外——因为那些还算体面、却远谈不上出色的业务,价格都创下了历史新高。说实话,在一大群乐观的买家眼里,价格几乎无关紧要。这股收购狂热从何而来?部分原因在于,首席执行官这个位子天生就偏爱“能干”型的人。要是华尔街分析师或董事会成员撺掇这类首席执行官去琢磨收购,那有点像叮嘱正值青春期的孩子别忘了过正常的性生活。首席执行官一旦对某笔交易上了心,就永远不缺能为收购背书的预测。下属会一片叫好,憧憬着地盘扩大、以及通常随公司规模水涨船高的薪酬。嗅到巨额佣金的投资银行家,也会跟着鼓掌。(别去问理发师你是不是该理发了。)如果目标公司的历史业绩撑不起这笔收购,那就预测出巨大的“协同效应”好了。电子表格从不让人失望。2017 年,超低价债务大量涌现,又给收购添了一把火。毕竟,只要用债务融资,哪怕价格偏高的交易通常也能抬高每股收益。而伯克希尔恰恰相反,我们一律按全股权口径来评估收购:我们对整体负债的偏好极低,把大笔债务硬摊到某一项具体业务上,一般都是站不住脚的(个别例外除外,比如专门用于克莱顿贷款组合的债务,或投向受监管公用事业固定资产的债务)。我们也从不把协同效应算进去,况且往往也找不到。多年来,对杠杆的排斥拖低了我们的回报。可我和查理睡得安稳。我们俩都认为,为了得到自己并不需要的东西,去拿已有且不可或缺的东西冒险,实在是疯狂之举。50 年前,我们各自打理一家投资合伙企业、靠几位信任我们的亲友出资时,就抱定了这个看法。如今大约一百万名“合伙人”加入伯克希尔,我们依旧如此。
There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: (1) sizable stand-alone acquisitions; (2) bolt-on acquisitions that fit with businesses we already own; (3) internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many and varied businesses; and (4) investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds. In this section, we will review 2017 acquisition activity. In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price. That last requirement proved a barrier to virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent, but far from spectacular, businesses hit an all-time high. Indeed, price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic purchasers. Why the purchasing frenzy? In part, it’s because the CEO job self-selects for “can-do” types. If Wall Street analysts or board members urge that brand of CEO to consider possible acquisitions, it’s a bit like telling your ripening teenager to be sure to have a normal sex life. Once a CEO hungers for a deal, he or she will never lack for forecasts that justify the purchase. Subordinates will be cheering, envisioning enlarged domains and the compensation levels that typically increase with corporate size. Investment bankers, smelling huge fees, will be applauding as well. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.) If the historical performance of the target falls short of validating its acquisition, large “synergies” will be forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint. The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchase activity. After all, even a high-priced deal will usually boost per-share earnings if it is debt-financed. At Berkshire, in contrast, we evaluate acquisitions on an all-equity basis, knowing that our taste for overall debt is very low and that to assign a large portion of our debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious (leaving aside certain exceptions, such as debt dedicated to Clayton’s lending portfolio or to the fixed-asset commitments at our regulated utilities). We also never factor in, nor do we often find, synergies. Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need. We held this view 50 years ago when we each ran an investment partnership, funded by a few friends and relatives who trusted us. We also hold it today after a million or so “partners” have joined us at Berkshire.
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尽管近来收购一直闹“旱情”,我和查理仍相信,伯克希尔时不时总会碰上大手笔收购的机会。在此之前,我们会守住一条简单的准则:别人行事越不审慎,我们自己就越要审慎。
Despite our recent drought of acquisitions, Charlie and I believe that from time to time Berkshire will have opportunities to make very large purchases. In the meantime, we will stick with our simple guideline: The less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own.
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去年,我们做成了一笔合情合理的独立收购——买下 Pilot Flying J(简称 PFJ)38.6% 的合伙权益。这家公司年营业额约 200 亿美元,是全美遥遥领先的旅行服务中心运营商。PFJ 从创立之初就交由了不起的哈斯拉姆家族打理。60 年前,“大吉姆”哈斯拉姆揣着一个梦想和一座加油站起家;如今,他的儿子吉米管着遍布北美约 750 个网点的 2.7 万名员工。伯克希尔已通过合同约定,2023 年把在 PFJ 的合伙权益增持到 80%,届时哈斯拉姆家族保留其余 20%。能与他们做合伙人,伯克希尔深感荣幸。诸位开车走州际公路时,不妨拐进去看看。PFJ 既卖汽油也卖柴油,餐食也不错。要是这一天跑得辛苦,也别忘了——我们的网点还配了 5200 间淋浴房。
We were able to make one sensible stand-alone purchase last year, a 38.6% partnership interest in Pilot Flying J (“PFJ”). With about $20 billion in annual volume, the company is far and away the nation’s leading travel-center operator. PFJ has been run from the get-go by the remarkable Haslam family. “Big Jim” Haslam began with a dream and a gas station 60 years ago. Now his son, Jimmy, manages 27,000 associates at about 750 locations throughout North America. Berkshire has a contractual agreement to increase its partnership interest in PFJ to 80% in 2023; Haslam family members will then own the remaining 20%. Berkshire is delighted to be their partner. When driving on the Interstate, drop in. PFJ sells gasoline as well as diesel fuel, and the food is good. If it’s been a long day, remember, too, that our properties have 5,200 showers.
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现在说说补强型收购。其中有些是小额交易,就不一一细说了。不过有几笔较大的收购,交割时间横跨 2016 年底到 2018 年初,这里作个交代。2017 年,克莱顿住宅收购了两家传统住宅建造商,一举把我们在这个三年前才涉足的领域里的规模扩大了一倍有余。有了这两笔收购——科罗拉多州的 Oakwood Homes 和伯明翰的 Harris Doyle——我预计 2018 年我们现场建造住宅的销售额将突破 10 亿美元。
Let’s move now to bolt-on acquisitions. Some of these were small transactions that I will not detail. Here is an account, however, of a few larger purchases whose closings stretched between late 2016 and early 2018. Clayton Homes acquired two builders of conventional homes during 2017, a move that more than doubled our presence in a field we entered only three years ago. With these additions – Oakwood Homes in Colorado and Harris Doyle in Birmingham – I expect our 2018 site built volume will exceed $1 billion. Š
不过,克莱顿的重心仍是活动房屋,涵盖建造与融资两端。2017 年,克莱顿通过自有零售渠道售出 19,168 套,另向独立零售商批发 26,706 套。合计下来,克莱顿去年占据了活动房屋市场 49% 的份额。这个行业第一的份额,约为最接近的竞争对手的三倍,与 2003 年(克莱顿并入伯克希尔那一年)的 13% 相比,已是天壤之别。克莱顿住宅和 PFJ 都落户诺克斯维尔,克莱顿家族和哈斯拉姆家族在当地是多年的老朋友。凯文·克莱顿向哈斯拉姆家族道出与伯克希尔联手的种种好处,又向我盛赞哈斯拉姆一家,这些都为促成 PFJ 那笔交易添了砝码。2016 年底,我们旗下的地板业务 Shaw Industries 收购了 U.S. Floors(简称 USF)——一家增长迅猛的豪华乙烯基地板分销商。USF 的管理者 Piet Dossche 和 Philippe Erramuzpe 出手就快,2017 年销售额猛增 40%,同年他们的业务也与 Shaw 完成了整合。收购 USF,我们显然既得到了出色的人才,也得到了优质的资产。
Clayton’s emphasis, nonetheless, remains manufactured homes, both their construction and their financing. In 2017 Clayton sold 19,168 units through its own retail operation and wholesaled another 26,706 units to independent retailers. All told, Clayton accounted for 49% of the manufactured-home market last year. That industry-leading share – about three times what our nearest competitor did – is a far cry from the 13% Clayton achieved in 2003, the year it joined Berkshire. Both Clayton Homes and PFJ are based in Knoxville, where the Clayton and Haslam families have long been friends. Kevin Clayton’s comments to the Haslams about the advantages of a Berkshire affiliation, and his admiring comments about the Haslam family to me, helped cement the PFJ deal. Near the end of 2016, Shaw Industries, our floor coverings business, acquired U.S. Floors (“USF”), a rapidly growing distributor of luxury vinyl tile. USF’s managers, Piet Dossche and Philippe Erramuzpe, came out of the gate fast, delivering a 40% increase in sales in 2017, during which their operation was integrated with Shaw’s. It’s clear that we acquired both great human assets and business assets in making the USF purchase. Š
Shaw 的首席执行官 Vance Bell 一手发起、谈判并完成了这笔收购,使 Shaw 2017 年的销售额升至 57 亿美元,员工增至 22,000 人。拿下 USF 之后,Shaw 作为伯克希尔一处重要而持久的利润来源,地位更加稳固。HomeServices 是我们不断壮大的房地产经纪业务,我先前几次向诸位提起过它。伯克希尔是 2000 年“误打误撞”进入这一行的——那年我们收购了中美能源公司(现更名为伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源)的多数股权。当时中美能源的业务主要集中在电力公用事业领域,我起初对 HomeServices 并没太上心。
Vance Bell, Shaw’s CEO, originated, negotiated and completed this acquisition, which increased Shaw’s sales to $5.7 billion in 2017 and its employment to 22,000. With the purchase of USF, Shaw has substantially strengthened its position as an important and durable source of earnings for Berkshire. I have told you several times about HomeServices, our growing real estate brokerage operation. Berkshire backed into this business in 2000 when we acquired a majority interest in MidAmerican Energy (now named Berkshire Hathaway Energy). MidAmerican’s activities were then largely in the electric utility field, and I originally paid little attention to HomeServices. Š
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但年复一年,这家公司不断招揽经纪人,到 2016 年底,HomeServices 已是全美第二大经纪机构——尽管与龙头老大 Realogy 相比,仍落后很远。可到了 2017 年,HomeServices 的扩张骤然爆发。我们收购了行业排名第三的 Long and Foster、排名第十二的 Houlihan Lawrence,以及 Gloria Nilson,一举增加 12,300 名经纪人,把总数抬到了 40,950 人。如今 HomeServices 的住宅成交量已逼近全国第一,2017 年参与的交易额(含三笔收购的备考数据)达到 1270 亿美元的“单边交易额”。解释一下这个说法:每笔交易都有买卖两“边”,如果我们同时代理买方和卖方,这笔交易的金额就会被计两次。尽管刚做完这些收购,HomeServices 在 2018 年全国住宅经纪业务中的占比预计也不过 3% 左右,还剩 97% 的空间等着我们。只要价格合理,我们会在这个最基础的行当里继续增添经纪人。最后,靠一连串收购做大的精密铸件公司(Precision Castparts)买下了德国的 Wilhelm Schulz GmbH——一家生产耐腐蚀管件、管道系统和相关部件的厂商。请容我省去更多说明。房地产经纪、住宅建造或卡车服务站这些行当,我还能弄懂几分,可制造业就不在我的能力范围之内了。
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But, year-by-year, the company added brokers and, by the end of 2016, HomeServices was the second-largest brokerage operation in the country – still ranking, though, far behind the leader, Realogy. In 2017, however, HomeServices’ growth exploded. We acquired the industry’s third-largest operator, Long and Foster; number 12, Houlihan Lawrence; and Gloria Nilson. With those purchases we added 12,300 agents, raising our total to 40,950. HomeServices is now close to leading the country in home sales, having participated (including our three acquisitions pro-forma) in $127 billion of “sides” during 2017. To explain that term, there are two “sides” to every transaction; if we represent both buyer and seller, the dollar value of the transaction is counted twice. Despite its recent acquisitions, HomeServices is on track to do only about 3% of the country’s homebrokerage business in 2018. That leaves 97% to go. Given sensible prices, we will keep adding brokers in this most fundamental of businesses. Finally, Precision Castparts, a company built through acquisitions, bought Wilhelm Schulz GmbH, a German maker of corrosion resistant fittings, piping systems and components. Please allow me to skip a further explanation. I don’t understand manufacturing operations as well as I do the activities of real estate brokers, home builders or truck stops. Š
好在这一回我不必亲自出谋划策:精密铸件的首席执行官 Mark Donegan 是位非凡的制造业高手,凡是归他掌管的业务,都注定有出色表现。押注于人,有时比押注于有形资产更靠得住。现在转到运营,先从财产/意外险(简称“财险”)说起——这个行当我确实懂,51 年来它一直是驱动伯克希尔增长的引擎。
Fortunately, I don’t need in this instance to bring knowledge to the table: Mark Donegan, CEO of Precision, is an extraordinary manufacturing executive, and any business in his domain is slated to do well. Betting on people can sometimes be more certain than betting on physical assets. Let’s now move on to operations, beginning with property-casualty (“p/c”) insurance, a business I do understand and the engine that for 51 years has powered Berkshire’s growth.
保险
Insurance
在谈 2017 年的保险业绩之前,请容我提醒诸位,我们当初是如何、又为何踏入这一行的。故事始于 1967 年初:我们以 860 万美元收购了国民赔偿公司和它一家规模较小的姊妹公司。随这笔收购到手的,是 670 万美元有形净资产;按保险业务的特性,这笔钱我们可以投向有价证券。要把这个组合调整为我们本来就会在伯克希尔层面持有的证券,并不费事。实际上,就成本中对应净资产的那部分而言,我们做的只是“美元换美元”。伯克希尔多付的 190 万美元净资产溢价,换来了一家通常能带来承保利润的保险公司。更要紧的是,这项保险业务还附带 1940 万美元的“浮存金”——这笔钱属于别人,却由我们两家保险公司代为持有。从那以后,浮存金对伯克希尔一直举足轻重。当我们动用这些资金投资时,由此产生的全部股息、利息和收益都归伯克希尔所有。(当然,若投资亏了,账也算在我们头上。)浮存金在财险公司里主要通过几条途径积累:(1)保费一般由客户先行付清,赔付却分布在整个保单期内,通常为半年或一年;(2)有些损失(比如汽车维修)很快就能赔付了结,另一些损失(比如接触石棉造成的伤害)却可能拖上许多年才浮现,评估和结案则更费时;(3)赔付有时会摊到几十年——比方说,我们某位工伤险保单持有人的雇员落下终身残疾,此后需要一辈子昂贵的护理。
Before I discuss our 2017 insurance results, let me remind you of how and why we entered the field. We began by purchasing National Indemnity and a smaller sister company for $8.6 million in early 1967. With our purchase we received $6.7 million of tangible net worth that, by the nature of the insurance business, we were able to deploy in marketable securities. It was easy to rearrange the portfolio into securities we would otherwise have owned at Berkshire itself. In effect, we were “trading dollars” for the net worth portion of the cost. The $1.9 million premium over net worth that Berkshire paid brought us an insurance business that usually delivered an underwriting profit. Even more important, the insurance operation carried with it $19.4 million of “float” – money that belonged to others but was held by our two insurers. Ever since, float has been of great importance to Berkshire. When we invest these funds, all dividends, interest and gains from their deployment belong to Berkshire. (If we experience investment losses, those, of course, are on our tab as well.) Float materializes at p/c insurers in several ways: (1) Premiums are generally paid to the company upfront whereas losses occur over the life of the policy, usually a six-month or one-year period; (2) Though some losses, such as car repairs, are quickly paid, others – such as the harm caused by exposure to asbestos – may take many years to surface and even longer to evaluate and settle; (3) Loss payments are sometimes spread over decades in cases, say, of a person employed by one of our workers’ compensation policyholders being permanently injured and thereafter requiring expensive lifetime care.
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浮存金通常随保费规模的扩大而增长。此外,有些财险公司专攻医疗事故、产品责任之类的险种——业内术语叫“长尾”业务——这类业务产生的浮存金,远多于汽车碰撞险和房主险,后者要求保险公司几乎在第一时间就向索赔人支付维修款。多年来,伯克希尔一直是长尾业务的领头羊。我们尤其擅长承接巨额再保险保单,把其他财险公司已经发生的长尾损失揽到自己身上。正因专注于这类业务,伯克希尔的浮存金增长格外惊人。按保费规模计,我们如今是全美第二大财险公司,而论浮存金,则遥遥领先,稳居第一。
Float generally grows as premium volume increases. Additionally, certain p/c insurers specialize in lines of business such as medical malpractice or product liability – business labeled “long-tail” in industry jargon – that generate far more float than, say, auto collision and homeowner policies, which require insurers to almost immediately make payments to claimants for needed repairs. Berkshire has been a leader in long-tail business for many years. In particular, we have specialized in jumbo reinsurance policies that leave us assuming long-tail losses already incurred by other p/c insurers. As a result of our emphasizing that sort of business, Berkshire’s growth in float has been extraordinary. We are now the country’s second largest p/c company measured by premium volume and its leader, by far, in float.
以下是历年记录:
Here’s the record:
(单位:百万美元) 年份 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2017
(in $ millions) Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2017
保费规模 $
Premium Volume $
39 185 582 19,343 30,749 60,597
39 185 582 19,343 30,749 60,597
浮存金 $
Float $
39 237 1,632 27,871 65,832 114,500
39 237 1,632 27,871 65,832 114,500
2017 年,一笔巨额交易把我们的保费规模抬得很高:我们为 AIG 已经发生的长尾损失提供了最高达 200 亿美元的再保险。这份保单的保费为 102 亿美元,创下世界纪录,而且我们不会再有接近这个数字的机会了。因此,2018 年保费规模会有所回落。浮存金则至少在未来几年里大概仍会缓慢增长。等到它终有一天开始下滑,幅度也会很温和——任何单个年份最多也就 3% 上下。与银行存款、或附带退保权的人寿保单不同,财险浮存金无法被随时抽走。这意味着,即便在金融普遍承压的时候,财险公司也不会遭遇大规模“挤兑”——这一特性对伯克希尔至关重要,我们在投资决策中会把它考虑进去。我和查理绝不会让伯克希尔的运营,去指望陌生人的善意,甚至也不指望那些自身可能正为流动性发愁的朋友。2008 至 2009 年危机期间,我们乐得手握国库券——大把大把的国库券——它让我们无须依赖银行授信额度或商业票据这类资金来源。我们有意把伯克希尔打造成这样一副样子:即便遭遇经济中断,哪怕是市场长期停摆这样的极端情形,它也能从容扛过去。
Our 2017 volume was boosted by a huge deal in which we reinsured up to $20 billion of long-tail losses that AIG had incurred. Our premium for this policy was $10.2 billion, a world’s record and one we won’t come close to repeating. Premium volume will therefore fall somewhat in 2018. Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When we eventually experience a decline, it will be modest – at most 3% or so in any single year. Unlike bank deposits or life insurance policies containing surrender options, p/c float can’t be withdrawn. This means that p/c companies can’t experience massive “runs” in times of widespread financial stress, a characteristic of prime importance to Berkshire that we factor into our investment decisions. Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers – or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills – loads of Treasury Bills – that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.
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浮存金的不利一面在于,它伴随着风险,有时是汪洋般的风险。保险业里看似可以预料的事,往往完全出人意料。以声名远播的劳合社保险市场为例,它足足三个世纪都业绩不俗。可到了 1980 年代,几个长尾险种潜藏的巨大问题在劳合社集中爆发,一度险些葬送它那段传奇。(我得补一句,如今它已彻底复原。)伯克希尔的保险经理人都是稳健审慎的承保人,身处一种长期看重这些品质的文化之中。这种自律,让我们在多数年份都实现了承保利润;遇上这样的年份,我们的浮存金成本还低于零。换句话说,持有前面那张表里累计的那么大一笔资金,我们非但不花钱,反倒还有进账。不过我也早已提醒过诸位:近些年我们运气不错,而保险业所处的那段灾害稀少的时期,绝非什么新常态。去年 9 月就把这个道理钉得死死的——三场重大飓风接连袭击了得克萨斯、佛罗里达和波多黎各。
The downside of float is that it comes with risk, sometimes oceans of risk. What looks predictable in insurance can be anything but. Take the famous Lloyds insurance market, which produced decent results for three centuries. In the 1980’s, though, huge latent problems from a few long-tail lines of insurance surfaced at Lloyds and, for a time, threatened to destroy its storied operation. (It has, I should add, fully recovered.) Berkshire’s insurance managers are conservative and careful underwriters, who operate in a culture that has long prioritized those qualities. That disciplined behavior has produced underwriting profits in most years, and in such instances, our cost of float was less than zero. In effect, we got paid then for holding the huge sums tallied in the earlier table. I have warned you, however, that we have been fortunate in recent years and that the catastrophe-light period the industry was experiencing was not a new norm. Last September drove home that point, as three significant hurricanes hit Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico.
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我眼下的猜测是,这几场飓风造成的保险损失约在 1000 亿美元上下,不过这个数字可能与实际相去甚远。绝大多数超级巨灾都有一个规律:最初的损失估算往往偏低。正如知名分析师 V.J. 道林所指出的,保险公司的损失准备金好比一场自己给自己打分的考试。无知、一厢情愿,偶尔还有彻头彻尾的欺诈,都可能让一家保险公司的财务状况在很长时间里都以失真的数字示人。我们目前估计,伯克希尔在这三场飓风中的损失为 30 亿美元(税后约 20 亿美元)。倘若这个估算、连同我对全行业 1000 亿美元损失的估算都八九不离十,那么我们在行业损失中的占比大约是 3%。我相信,往后美国若再逢超级巨灾,这个比例也大体就是我们可以合理预期的损失份额。值得一提的是,这三场飓风带来的 20 亿美元净损失,只让伯克希尔 GAAP 口径的净资产缩水了不到 1%。而在再保险行业的其他公司里,不少净资产损失介于 7% 到 15% 以上。它们的处境本可能糟得多:假如飓风艾尔玛的路径只需再往东偏一点、穿过佛罗里达,保险损失很可能还要多出 1000 亿美元。我们估计,美国在一年内发生一场造成 4000 亿美元及以上保险损失的超级巨灾,概率约为 2%。当然,没人知道确切概率。但我们确知一点:随着易受灾地区建筑物数量和价值的增长,这个风险会与日俱增。论为一场 4000 亿美元的超级巨灾做好财务准备,没有哪家公司比得上伯克希尔。我们在这样一场损失中的份额大约是 120 亿美元,远低于我们预期从非保险业务中赚到的年度利润。与此同时,财险行业的大半——甚至绝大多数——公司恐怕都会停摆。正是这份无与伦比的财务实力,解释了为什么别的财险公司在自己需要为遥远将来可能背上的巨额赔付购买大额再保险时,会来找伯克希尔——而且只找伯克希尔。2017 年以前,伯克希尔已连续 14 年实现承保利润,税前累计 283 亿美元。我一再告诉诸位:我预计伯克希尔在多数年份会有承保利润,但也难免不时亏损。这句提醒在 2017 年成了现实——当年我们的承保业务税前亏损 32 亿美元。关于我们各项保险业务的大量补充信息,都收在本报告末尾的 10-K 文件里。这里我只补一点:在我们各家财险公司里,为诸位效力的是一批出类拔萃的经理人。这一行没有商业机密、没有专利、也没有区位优势,靠的就是头脑和资本——头脑由我们各家保险公司的经理人贡献,资本由伯克希尔提供。
My guess at this time is that the insured losses arising from the hurricanes are $100 billion or so. That figure, however, could be far off the mark. The pattern with most mega-catastrophes has been that initial loss estimates ran low. As well-known analyst V.J. Dowling has pointed out, the loss reserves of an insurer are similar to a self-graded exam. Ignorance, wishful thinking or, occasionally, downright fraud can deliver inaccurate figures about an insurer’s financial condition for a very long time. We currently estimate Berkshire’s losses from the three hurricanes to be $3 billion (or about $2 billion after tax). If both that estimate and my industry estimate of $100 billion are close to accurate, our share of the industry loss was about 3%. I believe that percentage is also what we may reasonably expect to be our share of losses in future American mega-cats. It’s worth noting that the $2 billion net cost from the three hurricanes reduced Berkshire’s GAAP net worth by less than 1%. Elsewhere in the reinsurance industry there were many companies that suffered losses in net worth ranging from 7% to more than 15%. The damage to them could have been far worse: Had Hurricane Irma followed a path through Florida only a bit to the east, insured losses might well have been an additional $100 billion. We believe that the annual probability of a U.S. mega-catastrophe causing $400 billion or more of insured losses is about 2%. No one, of course, knows the correct probability. We do know, however, that the risk increases over time because of growth in both the number and value of structures located in catastrophe-vulnerable areas. No company comes close to Berkshire in being financially prepared for a $400 billion mega-cat. Our share of such a loss might be $12 billion or so, an amount far below the annual earnings we expect from our non-insurance activities. Concurrently, much – indeed, perhaps most – of the p/c world would be out of business. Our unparalleled financial strength explains why other p/c insurers come to Berkshire – and only Berkshire – when they, themselves, need to purchase huge reinsurance coverages for large payments they may have to make in the far future. Prior to 2017, Berkshire had recorded 14 consecutive years of underwriting profits, which totaled $28.3 billion pre-tax. I have regularly told you that I expect Berkshire to attain an underwriting profit in a majority of years, but also to experience losses from time to time. My warning became fact in 2017, as we lost $3.2 billion pre-tax from underwriting. A large amount of additional information about our various insurance operations is included in the 10-K at the back of this report. The only point I will add here is that you have some extraordinary managers working for you at our various p/c operations. This is a business in which there are no trade secrets, patents, or locational advantages. What counts are brains and capital. The managers of our various insurance companies supply the brains and Berkshire provides the capital.
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多年来,这封信一直在讲述伯克希尔旗下众多其他业务的动向。可这样写下去,既显啰嗦,又和信后那份 10-K 里例行披露的信息有所重复。因此今年,我只给诸位一个简要总结,概述我们数十家非保险业务。更多细节可查阅第 K-5 至 K-22 页和第 K-40 至 K-50 页。若把它们看作一个整体、并扣除投资收益,我们保险以外的业务 2017 年贡献了 200 亿美元税前利润,比 2016 年增加了 9.5 亿美元。2017 年利润中约有 44% 来自两家子公司:我们的铁路公司 BNSF,以及伯克希尔哈撒韦能源(我们持股 90.2%)。这两家业务的详情,可参阅第 K-5 至 K-10 页和第 K-40 至 K-44 页。顺着伯克希尔那份长长的子公司名单往下看,按利润排名紧随其后的五家非保险业务(这里改按字母顺序排列)——克莱顿住宅、国际金属加工公司、路博润、马蒙、精密铸件——2017 年税前利润合计 55 亿美元,与这五家公司 2016 年赚到的 54 亿美元相差无几。再往下的五家(同样按利润排名、按名称列出:Forest River、Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw、TTI)去年赚了 21 亿美元,高于 2016 年的 17 亿美元。
For many years, this letter has described the activities of Berkshire’s many other businesses. That discussion has become both repetitious and partially duplicative of information regularly included in the 10-K that follows the letter. Consequently, this year I will give you a simple summary of our dozens of non-insurance businesses. Additional details can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-50. Viewed as a group – and excluding investment income – our operations other than insurance delivered pretax income of $20 billion in 2017, an increase of $950 million over 2016. About 44% of the 2017 profit came from two subsidiaries. BNSF, our railroad, and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (of which we own 90.2%). You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-44. Proceeding down Berkshire’s long list of subsidiaries, our next five non-insurance businesses, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically) Clayton Homes, International Metalworking Companies, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts had aggregate pre-tax income in 2017 of $5.5 billion, little changed from the $5.4 billion these companies earned in 2016. The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.1 billion last year, up from $1.7 billion in 2016.
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伯克希尔旗下其余的业务——数量众多——税前利润变化不大:2017 年为 37 亿美元,2016 年为 35 亿美元。这些非保险业务的折旧费用合计 76 亿美元,资本支出为 115 亿美元。伯克希尔一向在寻找扩张业务的门路,经常性的资本支出也远超折旧费用。我们近 90% 的投资都投在美国,这片经济土壤依旧肥沃。摊销费用另有 13 亿美元。我认为,这一项在很大程度上并非真正的经济成本。而与这个好消息部分相抵的是:BNSF(和其他所有铁路公司一样)计提的折旧费用,远不足以覆盖把铁路维持在一流状态所需的常规开支。伯克希尔的目标,是大幅提升非保险业务板块的盈利。要做到这一点,我们得完成一笔或几笔巨额收购——论资源,我们当然不缺。年末,伯克希尔手握 1160 亿美元现金和美国国库券(平均期限 88 天),高于 2016 年底的 864 亿美元。这份超乎寻常的流动性只能带来一点微薄收益,也远超我和查理希望伯克希尔持有的水平。等把这些多余的资金重新配置到更能创造价值的资产上,我们的笑容才会更灿烂。
The remaining businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – recorded little change in pre-tax income, which was $3.7 billion in 2017 versus $3.5 billion in 2016. Depreciation charges for all of these non-insurance operations totaled $7.6 billion; capital expenditures were $11.5 billion. Berkshire is always looking for ways to expand its businesses and regularly incurs capital expenditures that far exceed its depreciation charge. Almost 90% of our investments are made in the United States. America’s economic soil remains fertile. Amortization charges were an additional $1.3 billion. I believe that in large part this item is not a true economic cost. Partially offsetting this good news is the fact that BNSF (like all other railroads) records depreciation charges that fall well short of the sums regularly needed to keep the railroad in first-class shape. Berkshire’s goal is to substantially increase the earnings of its non-insurance group. For that to happen, we will need to make one or more huge acquisitions. We certainly have the resources to do so. At yearend Berkshire held $116.0 billion in cash and U.S. Treasury Bills (whose average maturity was 88 days), up from $86.4 billion at yearend 2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to have. Our smiles will broaden when we have redeployed Berkshire’s excess funds into more productive assets.
投资
Investments
下面列出我们年末市值最大的十五只普通股投资。其中不含所持的卡夫亨氏股份——共 325,442,152 股——因为伯克希尔属于一个控制集团,必须按“权益法”核算这笔投资。资产负债表上,伯克希尔对卡夫亨氏持股的 GAAP 账面价值为 176 亿美元;这些股份年末市值为 253 亿美元,成本基础为 98 亿美元。
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $17.6 billion. The shares had a yearend market value of $25.3 billion, and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.
12/31/17
12/31/17
股份*
Shares*
持股比例
Percentage of Company Owned
公司
Company
成本**
Cost**
市值
Market
| 151,610,700 美国运通公司 | 17.6 | $ 1,287 | $ 15,056 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 166,713,209 苹果公司 | 3.3 | 20,961 | 28,213 |
| 700,000,000 美国银行公司 | 6.8 | 5,007 | 20,664 |
| 53,307,534 纽约梅隆银行公司 | 5.3 | 2,230 | 2,871 |
| 225,000,000 比亚迪股份有限公司 | 8.2 | 232 | 1,961 |
| 6,789,054 特许通信公司 | 2.8 | 1,210 | 2,281 |
| 400,000,000 可口可乐公司 | 9.4 | 1,299 | 18,352 |
| 53,110,395 达美航空公司 | 7.4 | 2,219 | 2,974 |
| 44,527,147 通用汽车公司 | 3.2 | 1,343 | 1,825 |
| 11,390,582 高盛集团 | 3.0 | 654 | 2,902 |
| 24,669,778 穆迪公司 | 12.9 | 248 | 3,642 |
| 74,587,892 Phillips 66 | 14.9 | 5,841 | 7,545 |
| 47,659,456 西南航空公司 | 8.1 | 1,997 | 3,119 |
| 103,855,045 美国合众银行 | 6.3 | 3,343 | 5,565 |
| 482,544,468 富国银行 | 9.9 | 11,837 | 29,276 |
| 其他 | 14,968 | 24,294 | |
| 按市价计量的普通股总计 | $ 74,676 | $ 170,540 |
| 151,610,700 American Express Company | 17.6 | $ 1,287 | $ 15,056 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 166,713,209 Apple Inc | 3.3 | 20,961 | 28,213 |
| 700,000,000 Bank of America Corporation | 6.8 | 5,007 | 20,664 |
| 53,307,534 The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation | 5.3 | 2,230 | 2,871 |
| 225,000,000 BYD Company Ltd | 8.2 | 232 | 1,961 |
| 6,789,054 Charter Communications, Inc | 2.8 | 1,210 | 2,281 |
| 400,000,000 The Coca-Cola Company | 9.4 | 1,299 | 18,352 |
| 53,110,395 Delta Airlines Inc | 7.4 | 2,219 | 2,974 |
| 44,527,147 General Motors Company | 3.2 | 1,343 | 1,825 |
| 11,390,582 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc | 3.0 | 654 | 2,902 |
| 24,669,778 Moody’s Corporation | 12.9 | 248 | 3,642 |
| 74,587,892 Phillips 66 | 14.9 | 5,841 | 7,545 |
| 47,659,456 Southwest Airlines Co | 8.1 | 1,997 | 3,119 |
| 103,855,045 U.S. Bancorp | 6.3 | 3,343 | 5,565 |
| 482,544,468 Wells Fargo & Company | 9.9 | 11,837 | 29,276 |
| Others | 14,968 | 24,294 | |
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 74,676 | $ 170,540 |
不含伯克希尔子公司养老基金所持股份。这是我们的实际买入价,也是计税基础;由于 GAAP 规则要求的减记,个别情形下 GAAP“成本”与此不同。
Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries. This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
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表中部分股票由托德·库姆斯或泰德·韦施勒负责,两人与我一同打理伯克希尔的投资。他们各自独立管理的资金都超过 120 亿美元;他们做的决策,我通常是看月度投资组合摘要时才知道的。两人合计管理的 250 亿美元里,有 80 多亿美元是伯克希尔某些子公司的养老金信托资产。如前所述,养老金投资并未计入上文伯克希尔持股的汇总表。
Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently of me, manages more than $12 billion; I usually learn about decisions they have made by looking at monthly portfolio summaries. Included in the $25 billion that the two manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.
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我和查理把伯克希尔持有的上市普通股看作企业权益,而非凭“走势图”形态、分析师“目标价”或媒体名嘴的看法来买卖的股票代码。我们只是笃信一点:只要被投资企业经营成功(我们相信多数会如此),我们的投资也会成功。有时回报不过尔尔,偶尔则收银机响个不停;有时候,我还会犯下代价不菲的错误。但总体而言,拉长了看,我们应该能拿到不错的结果。在美国,股票投资者是顺风而行的。从我们的股票组合——不妨把这些持股称作我们在一批多元化上市公司中的“少数股权”——伯克希尔 2017 年收到了 37 亿美元股息。这个数字既计入了我们的 GAAP 报表,也计入了我们在季报和年报里提到的“经营利润”。然而,这个股息数字远远低估了我们持股所产生的“真实”盈利。几十年来,我们在“与所有者相关的经营原则”第 6 条(第 19 页)中一直申明:我们预期被投资企业的未分配利润,日后至少会以等额资本利得的形式回报给我们。我们确认资本利得(或亏损)的节奏并不均匀,尤其是在新的 GAAP 规则强制我们把未实现损益持续计入利润之后。不过我有信心:只要把被投资企业作为一个整体来看,它们留存下来的利润,终会随时间转化为伯克希尔相应的资本利得。我刚刚描述的这种价值累积与留存收益之间的联系,在短期内是无从察觉的。股价忽涨忽跌,看上去与其内在价值逐年的积累毫不相干。可时间一长,本·格雷厄姆那句常被引用的箴言便会应验:“短期看,市场是一台投票机;长期看,它则是一台称重机。”
Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses, not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on their “chart” patterns, the “target” prices of analysts or the opinions of media pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be) our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall – and over time – we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back. From our stock portfolio – call our holdings “minority interests” in a diversified group of publicly-owned businesses – Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends in 2017. That’s the number included in our GAAP figures, as well as in the “operating earnings” we reference in our quarterly and annual reports. That dividend figure, however, far understates the “true” earnings emanating from our stock holdings. For decades, we have stated in Principle 6 of our “Owner-Related Business Principles” (page 19) that we expect undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings by way of subsequent capital gains. Our recognition of capital gains (and losses) will be lumpy, particularly as we conform with the new GAAP rule requiring us to constantly record unrealized gains or losses in our earnings. I feel confident, however, that the earnings retained by our investees will over time, and with our investees viewed as a group, translate into commensurate capital gains for Berkshire. The connection of value-building to retained earnings that I’ve just described will be impossible to detect in the short term. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to any year-to-year buildup in their underlying value. Over time, however, Ben Graham’s oft-quoted maxim proves true: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, however, it becomes a weighing machine.”
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伯克希尔自身,就为“短期价格的随机波动如何掩盖长期价值增长”提供了鲜活的例证。过去 53 年,公司靠着把盈利再投资、让复利施展魔力,一步步累积价值,年复一年稳步前行。然而,伯克希尔的股价却经历过四次
Berkshire, itself, provides some vivid examples of how price randomness in the short term can obscure longterm growth in value. For the last 53 years, the company has built value by reinvesting its earnings and letting compound interest work its magic. Year by year, we have moved forward. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four
相当严重的重挫。以下是那几段惨烈的细节:
truly major dips. Here are the gory details:
时段
Period
最高价
High
最低价
Low
跌幅
Percentage Decrease
1973 年 3 月至 1975 年 1 月 1987/10/2 至 1987/10/27 1998/6/19 至 2000/3/10 2008/9/19 至 2009/3/5
March 1973-January 1975 10/2/87-10/27/87 6/19/98-3/10/2000 9/19/08-3/5/09
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
93 4,250 80,900 147,000 38 2,675 41,300 72,400 (59.1%) (37.1%) (48.9%) (50.7%)
93 4,250 80,900 147,000 38 2,675 41,300 72,400 (59.1%) (37.1%) (48.9%) (50.7%)
要论我能拿出的、反对借钱炒股最有力的论据,这张表就是。股票在短期内究竟能跌到什么地步,根本无从预料。哪怕你借得不多、仓位一时也不至于被暴跌的市场逼到墙角,那些吓人的头条和上气不接下气的评论,仍很可能扰乱你的心神。而心神一乱,就做不出好决定。
This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks. There is simply no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if your borrowings are small and your positions aren’t immediately threatened by the plunging market, your mind may well become rattled by scary headlines and breathless commentary. And an unsettled mind will not make good decisions.
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未来 53 年里,我们的股票(以及别家的股票)还会经历类似表中的下跌。这些下跌何时到来,谁都说不准。信号灯随时可能由绿直接跳成红,中间连黄灯都不停。但当大幅下跌真的发生时,对那些不为债务所累的人来说,它反而是千载难逢的机会。
In the next 53 years our shares (and others) will experience declines resembling those in the table. No one can tell you when these will happen. The light can at any time go from green to red without pausing at yellow. When major declines occur, however, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those who are not handicapped
到了那种时候,正该把吉卜林《如果》里的这几句记在心上:
by debt. That’s the time to heed these lines from Kipling’s If:
“倘若身边众人都乱了方寸,你却能保持清醒……倘若你能等待,且不因等待而心焦……倘若你能思考,却不把思考本身当作目的……倘若众人都怀疑你时,你仍能信任自己……那么,这片大地和其间的一切,都将属于你。”“那场赌局”已经结束,并带来一堂意料之外的投资课。去年,在赌局进行到 90% 时,我曾就 2007 年 12 月 19 日立下的一场十年赌约,向诸位作过详细汇报。(去年年报中的完整讨论,重印于第 24 至 26 页。)如今我拿到了最终结果——从好几个方面看,都令人大开眼界。我当初打这个赌,出于两个理由:(1)用我 318,250 美元的本金,去撬动一笔不成比例的更大资金——若一切如我所料,这笔钱会在 2018 年初捐给奥马哈的女孩公司(Girls Inc. of Omaha);(2)宣扬我的一个信念——我所选的标的,一只几乎零成本、被动跟踪标普 500 的指数基金,长期而言会跑赢绝大多数投资专业人士,不论那些“帮手”名头多响、激励多足。这个问题事关重大。美国投资者每年向顾问支付的费用高得吓人,往往还要层层叠加地承担其他相关成本。整体来看,这些投资者花的钱值不值?说得更直白些,整体而言,他们的这笔支出到底换回了什么?我的对赌方 Protégé Partners 挑了五只“基金中的基金”,指望它们跑赢标普 500。这可不是个小样本——这五只基金中的基金,又持有 200 多只对冲基金的权益。说到底,Protégé 这家谙熟华尔街门道的咨询公司,挑出了五位投资高手,这五位又雇了几百位投资高手,各自打理着自己的对冲基金。这支队伍堪称精英,头脑、干劲和自信一样不缺。那五只基金中的基金的经理还有一层额外优势:在这十年里,他们可以——也确实——不断重排手中的对冲基金组合,把资金投向新“明星”,同时撤出那些经理手感已失的基金。Protégé 一方的每个角色都被高度激励着:基金中的基金的经理,连同他们挑中的对冲基金经理,都能从收益里分到相当大的一块——哪怕这收益不过是市场普遍上行带来的。(自我们接管伯克希尔以来的 43 个十年期里,标普 500 上涨的年份 100% 多于下跌的年份。)需要强调的是,这些业绩激励,只是一块巨大而可口的蛋糕上再撒的一层糖霜:即便这些基金在这十年里让投资者亏了钱,经理们照样能富得流油。个中缘由在于,基金中的基金的投资者每年都要缴纳一笔固定费用,平均高达资产的 2.5% 左右——其中一部分归五只基金中的基金的经理,其余则流向背后那 200 多只对冲基金的经理。
“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs . . . If you can wait and not be tired by waiting . . . If you can think – and not make thoughts your aim . . . If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you . . . Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it.” “The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave you a detailed report on a ten-year bet I had made on December 19, 2007. (The full discussion from last year’s annual report is reprinted on pages 24 – 26.) Now I have the final tally – and, in several respects, it’s an eye-opener. I made the bet for two reasons: (1) to leverage my outlay of $318,250 into a disproportionately larger sum that – if things turned out as I expected – would be distributed in early 2018 to Girls Inc. of Omaha; and (2) to publicize my conviction that my pick – a virtually cost-free investment in an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund – would, over time, deliver better results than those achieved by most investment professionals, however well-regarded and incentivized those “helpers” may be. Addressing this question is of enormous importance. American investors pay staggering sums annually to advisors, often incurring several layers of consequential costs. In the aggregate, do these investors get their money’s worth? Indeed, again in the aggregate, do investors get anything for their outlays? Protégé Partners, my counterparty to the bet, picked five “funds-of-funds” that it expected to overperform the S&P 500. That was not a small sample. Those five funds-of-funds in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge funds. Essentially, Protégé, an advisory firm that knew its way around Wall Street, selected five investment experts who, in turn, employed several hundred other investment experts, each managing his or her own hedge fund. This assemblage was an elite crew, loaded with brains, adrenaline and confidence. The managers of the five funds-of-funds possessed a further advantage: They could – and did – rearrange their portfolios of hedge funds during the ten years, investing with new “stars” while exiting their positions in hedge funds whose managers had lost their touch. Every actor on Protégé’s side was highly incentivized: Both the fund-of-funds managers and the hedge-fund managers they selected significantly shared in gains, even those achieved simply because the market generally moves upwards. (In 100% of the 43 ten-year periods since we took control of Berkshire, years with gains by the S&P 500 exceeded loss years.) Those performance incentives, it should be emphasized, were frosting on a huge and tasty cake: Even if the funds lost money for their investors during the decade, their managers could grow very rich. That would occur because fixed fees averaging a staggering 2 1⁄ 2% of assets or so were paid every year by the fund-of-funds’ investors, with part of these fees going to the managers at the five funds-of-funds and the balance going to the 200-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds.
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以下是这场赌局的最终成绩单:
Here’s the final scorecard for the bet:
年份
Year
基金中的基金 A
Fund-ofFunds A
基金中的基金 B
Fund-ofFunds B
基金中的基金 C
Fund-ofFunds C
基金中的基金 D
Fund-ofFunds D
基金中的基金 E
Fund-ofFunds E
标普 500 指数基金
S&P Index Fund
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 -16.5% 11.3% 5.9% -6.3% 3.4% 10.5% 4.7% 1.6% -3.2% 12.2% -22.3% 14.5% 6.8% -1.3% 9.6% 15.2% 4.0% 2.5% 1.9% 10.6% -21.3% 21.4% 13.3% 5.9% 5.7% 8.8% 18.9% 5.4% -1.7% 15.6% -29.3% 16.5% 4.9% -6.3% 6.2% 14.2% 0.7% 1.4% 2.5% N/A -30.1% 16.8% 11.9% -2.8% 9.1% 14.4% -2.1% -5.0% 4.4% 18.0% -37.0% 26.6% 15.1% 2.1% 16.0% 32.3% 13.6% 1.4% 11.9% 21.8%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 -16.5% 11.3% 5.9% -6.3% 3.4% 10.5% 4.7% 1.6% -3.2% 12.2% -22.3% 14.5% 6.8% -1.3% 9.6% 15.2% 4.0% 2.5% 1.9% 10.6% -21.3% 21.4% 13.3% 5.9% 5.7% 8.8% 18.9% 5.4% -1.7% 15.6% -29.3% 16.5% 4.9% -6.3% 6.2% 14.2% 0.7% 1.4% 2.5% N/A -30.1% 16.8% 11.9% -2.8% 9.1% 14.4% -2.1% -5.0% 4.4% 18.0% -37.0% 26.6% 15.1% 2.1% 16.0% 32.3% 13.6% 1.4% 11.9% 21.8%
最终收益 年均收益
Final Gain Average Annual Gain
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
21.7% 42.3% 87.7% 2.8% 27.0% 125.8% 2.0% 3.6% 6.5% 0.3% 2.4% 8.5%
21.7% 42.3% 87.7% 2.8% 27.0% 125.8% 2.0% 3.6% 6.5% 0.3% 2.4% 8.5%
脚注:
Footnote:
根据我与 Protégé Partners 的约定,这些基金中的基金的名称从未对外披露过。不过,我一直从 Protégé 那里收到它们的年度审计报告。基金 A、B、C 的 2016 年数据,较去年最初披露时略有修订。基金 D 已于 2017 年清算,其年均收益是按它运作的九年来计算的。
Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, have received their annual audits from Protégé. The 2016 figures for funds A, B and C were revised slightly from those originally reported last year. Fund D was liquidated in 2017; its average annual gain is calculated for the nine years of its operation.
这五只基金中的基金开局迅猛,2008 年每一只都跑赢了指数基金。可随后屋顶就塌了:接下来九年里,这些基金中的基金作为一个整体,年年都跑输指数基金。我要强调,这十年间股市的表现并无任何反常之处。倘若在 2007 年底对投资“专家”做一次调查,请他们预测普通股的长期回报率,他们的猜测大概平均会落在 8.5% 附近——而这正是标普 500 实际交出的成绩。在那样的环境里赚钱本该轻而易举。事实上,华尔街那帮“帮手”确实赚得盆满钵满。可就在这群人财源滚滚之际,他们的许多投资者却经历了一个失去的十年。业绩来来去去,费用却从不打折。
The five funds-of-funds got off to a fast start, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a whole trailed the index fund. Let me emphasize that there was nothing aberrational about stock-market behavior over the ten-year stretch. If a poll of investment “experts” had been asked late in 2007 for a forecast of long-term common-stock returns, their guesses would have likely averaged close to the 8.5% actually delivered by the S&P 500. Making money in that environment should have been easy. Indeed, Wall Street “helpers” earned staggering sums. While this group prospered, however, many of their investors experienced a lost decade. Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.
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这场赌局还照亮了另一条重要的投资心得:市场总体上是理性的,但偶尔也会干出疯狂的事。要抓住那时冒出来的机会,用不着过人的智力、经济学学位,也不必熟悉 alpha、beta 之类的华尔街行话。投资者真正需要的,是既能无视群体的恐惧或狂热,又能盯住少数几条简单基本面的本事。此外还有一样必不可少:甘愿在相当长一段时间里显得毫无想象力,甚至甘愿显得愚蠢。起初,为凑齐这最终 100 万美元奖金各自的那一份,Protégé 和我分别买入了面值 50 万美元的零息美国国债(有时被称作“strips”)。这些债券让我们每人花了 318,250 美元——略低于面值的六成四——约定十年后兑付 50 万美元。顾名思义,我们买的这种债券不付利息,但(因为买入时是折价的)持有到期便有 4.56% 的年化回报。Protégé 和我起初只打算逐年记录收益率,等 2017 年底债券到期,再把 100 万美元交给胜出的慈善机构。
The bet illuminated another important investment lesson: Though markets are generally rational, they occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look unimaginative for a sustained period – or even to look foolish – is also essential. Originally, Protégé and I each funded our portion of the ultimate $1 million prize by purchasing $500,000 face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds (sometimes called “strips”). These bonds cost each of us $318,250 – a bit less than 64¢ on the dollar – with the $500,000 payable in ten years. As the name implies, the bonds we acquired paid no interest, but (because of the discount at which they were purchased) delivered a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity. Protégé and I originally intended to do no more than tally the annual returns and distribute $1 million to the winning charity when the bonds matured late in 2017.
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不料买入之后,债券市场却出了些怪事。到 2012 年 11 月,我们那批债券——离到期还有大约五年——的售价已达面值的 95.7%。以这个价格算,它到期的年化收益率不到 1%,准确地说,是 0.88%。回报如此可怜,相较于美国股票,我们这批债券已经沦为一项愚蠢——极其愚蠢——的投资。长期来看,标普 500 指数——它按市值适当加权,映照出美国商业的一大横切面——在股东权益(净资产)上的年回报率远超 10%。2012 年 11 月,就在我们权衡这一切时,标普 500 的股息现金回报率是每年 2.5%,大约是我们那批美国国债收益率的三倍。而这些股息几乎必定还会增长。除此之外,构成这 500 家的公司还留存了大笔资金,它们会用留存收益来扩张业务,还常常回购自家股份。无论哪条路,随时间推移都会大幅抬高每股收益。而且——正如 1776 年以来的一贯情形——不管眼下有什么麻烦,美国经济总归会向前走。2012 年底,面对债券与股票之间这种非同寻常的估值错配,Protégé 和我商定:卖掉五年前买入的那批债券,用所得款项买入 11,200 股伯克希尔“B”股。结果是:奥马哈的女孩公司上个月拿到的不是当初期望的 100 万美元,而是 2,222,279 美元。需要强调的是,自 2012 年那次替换以来,伯克希尔的表现算不上耀眼。可耀眼本就不必要:说到底,伯克希尔的涨幅只需跑赢那 0.88% 的债券基准即可——这实在称不上什么惊天壮举。把债券换成伯克希尔,唯一的风险在于 2017 年底恰逢股市异常疲软。Protégé 和我都觉得这种可能(它始终存在)极低。两个因素决定了这一判断:一是 2012 年底伯克希尔价格合理,二是在赌局结算前剩下的五年里,伯克希尔几乎必定会大幅累积资产。即便如此,为了替慈善机构彻底消除这次替换的所有风险,我还是许诺:若 2017 年底卖出这 11,200 股伯克希尔股票所得不足 100 万美元,差额由我补齐。
After our purchase, however, some very strange things took place in the bond market. By November 2012, our bonds – now with about five years to go before they matured – were selling for 95.7% of their face value. At that price, their annual yield to maturity was less than 1%. Or, to be precise, .88%. Given that pathetic return, our bonds had become a dumb – a really dumb – investment compared to American equities. Over time, the S&P 500 – which mirrors a huge cross-section of American business, appropriately weighted by market value – has earned far more than 10% annually on shareholders’ equity (net worth). In November 2012, as we were considering all this, the cash return from dividends on the S&P 500 was 2 1⁄ 2% annually, about triple the yield on our U.S. Treasury bond. These dividend payments were almost certain to grow. Beyond that, huge sums were being retained by the companies comprising the 500. These businesses would use their retained earnings to expand their operations and, frequently, to repurchase their shares as well. Either course would, over time, substantially increase earnings-per-share. And – as has been the case since 1776 – whatever its problems of the minute, the American economy was going to move forward. Presented late in 2012 with the extraordinary valuation mismatch between bonds and equities, Protégé and I agreed to sell the bonds we had bought five years earlier and use the proceeds to buy 11,200 Berkshire “B” shares. The result: Girls Inc. of Omaha found itself receiving $2,222,279 last month rather than the $1 million it had originally hoped for. Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey – hardly a Herculean achievement. The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that yearend 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low. Two factors dictated this conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur at Berkshire during the five years that remained before the bet would be settled. Even so, to eliminate all risk to the charities from the switch, I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the 11,200 Berkshire shares at yearend 2017 didn’t produce at least $1 million.
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投资就是这样一种活动:放弃今天的消费,去争取日后能有更多消费。“风险”就是这一目标可能落空的可能性。以此为尺度,2012 年那些号称“无风险”的长期债券,反倒是比长期投资普通股风险大得多的投资。当时,哪怕 2012 年到 2017 年间年通胀率只有 1%,也会侵蚀 Protégé 和我卖出的那种政府债券的购买力。我要赶紧承认:在未来的任何一天、一周乃至一年里,股票的风险都会大于——远远大于——短期美国债券。可是,随着投资者的持有期拉长,只要股票是以相对当时利率而言合理的市盈率买入的,一个分散化的美国股票组合,其风险就会逐步降到债券之下。对持有长期视野的投资者——其中包括养老基金、大学捐赠基金和有储蓄意识的个人——而言,用组合里债券与股票的比例来衡量投资“风险”,是个天大的错误。很多时候,投资组合中的高等级债券反倒会加大它的风险。
Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained. By that standard, purportedly “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a longterm investment in common stocks. At that time, even a 1% annual rate of inflation between 2012 and 2017 would have decreased the purchasing-power of the government bond that Protégé and I sold. I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier – far riskier – than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates. It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons – among them, pension funds, college endowments and savings-minded individuals – to measure their investment “risk” by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.
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这场赌局还留下最后一课:抓住那些重大而“简单”的决策,别热衷于频繁操作。十年赌局里,那 200 多位对冲基金经理几乎肯定做出了成千上万次买卖决定。他们中的绝大多数无疑都对自己的每一个决定深思熟虑过,笃信每一步都会带来好处。在投资过程中,他们研读 10-K 报告、约谈管理层、翻阅行业期刊,还和华尔街分析师切磋。
A final lesson from our bet: Stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity. During the ten-year bet, the 200-plus hedge-fund managers that were involved almost certainly made tens of thousands of buy and sell decisions. Most of those managers undoubtedly thought hard about their decisions, each of which they believed would prove advantageous. In the process of investing, they studied 10-Ks, interviewed managements, read trade journals and conferred with Wall Street analysts.
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与此同时,Protégé 和我这十年里,既不靠研究,也不靠洞见或才智,只做了一个投资决定:我们以超过 100 倍盈利的价格(售价 95.7 除以收益率 0.88)卖出手中的债券——而那份“盈利”在往后五年里根本无法增长。卖掉它,是为了把钱挪进唯一的一只证券——伯克希尔,而伯克希尔自身又拥有一批多元、稳健的业务。在留存收益的驱动下,即便碰上一个不温不火的经济环境,伯克希尔的价值增长也不太可能低于每年 8%。做完这套幼儿园般的分析,Protégé 和我便完成了替换,然后安心等待,深信长远来看,8% 必将跑赢 0.88%——而且是大幅跑赢。
Protégé and I, meanwhile, leaning neither on research, insights nor brilliance, made only one investment decision during the ten years. We simply decided to sell our bond investment at a price of more than 100 times earnings (95.7 sale price/.88 yield), those being “earnings” that could not increase during the ensuing five years. We made the sale in order to move our money into a single security – Berkshire – that, in turn, owned a diversified group of solid businesses. Fueled by retained earnings, Berkshire’s growth in value was unlikely to be less than 8% annually, even if we were to experience a so-so economy. After that kindergarten-like analysis, Protégé and I made the switch and relaxed, confident that, over time, 8% was certain to beat .88%. By a lot.
股东大会
The Annual Meeting
股东大会定于 5 月 5 日举行,仍将由雅虎进行网络直播,网址是 https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。直播于美国中部夏令时上午 8:45 开始。会前及午间休息时,雅虎会采访董事、经理、股东和知名人士。采访与会议都将同步译成普通话。我们与雅虎的合作始于 2016 年,股东们反响热烈。去年,实时观看人次增长 72%,达到约 310 万,短片段回放总计达 1710 万次。对于亲临现场的诸位,CenturyLink 中心的大门将于周六上午 7:00 开启,方便大家在上午 8:30 播放的股东电影之前先行购物。问答环节从上午 9:15 开始,一直进行到下午 3:30,正午有一小时午餐休息。最后,下午 3:45 我们将召开正式的股东会议,通常持续 15 到 45 分钟。购物于下午 4:30 结束。5 月 4 日周五,我们在 CenturyLink 中心的伯克希尔展位将从正午 12:00 开放到下午 5:00。这段额外的购物时间是我们 2015 年增设的,认真的购物者非常喜欢。去年周五开放的那五小时里,约有 12,000 人到场。诸位购物的场地,是紧挨会场、面积 194,300 平方英尺的大厅,我们数十家子公司的产品都将在此发售。(你们的董事长不鼓励白拿赠品。)请向许多亲自坐镇各自展位的伯克希尔经理们问声好,也别忘了去看看那套精彩绝伦的 BNSF 铁路模型,它向我们的所有公司表示了致敬。我们的跑鞋公司 Brooks 又将在会上推出一款特别的纪念跑鞋。买上一双,周日就穿着它参加我们第六届“伯克希尔 5 公里”跑步赛——比赛于上午 8 点从 CenturyLink 中心起跑。参赛的完整细则,会列明在随参会证件一并寄给诸位的《访客指南》里。参赛者会发现,跑在身边的有不少伯克希尔的经理、董事和同事。(不过,我和查理会睡个懒觉;就算穿上 Brooks 跑鞋,我们的成绩也拿不出手。)5 公里跑的参与人数年年见涨,请助我们再创新高。购物区会设一个 GEICO 展位,由公司来自全国各地的多位资深顾问坐镇。去年大会上,我们的保单销量创下纪录,较 2016 年增长 43%。所以不妨过来讨一份报价。多数情况下,GEICO 能给诸位一份股东折扣(通常为 8%)。在我们经营的 51 个司法辖区里,有 44 个允许这项特别优惠。(补充一点:若诸位已符合另一项折扣的条件,比如某些团体折扣,这项折扣不可叠加。)请带上现有保险的详细信息,来比一比我们的价格。我们能替不少人省下真金白银。省下的钱就花在别的伯克希尔产品上吧。也请务必光顾 Bookworm。这家奥马哈本地的书商将备有 40 多种图书和 DVD,其中还有几种新书。伯克希尔股东是书商梦寐以求的顾客:几年前《穷查理宝典》(没错,就是我们那位查理)首度亮相时,我们在会上卖出了 3,500 本。那本书重 4.85 磅。算笔账就知道——那天我们的股东离场时,带走了大约 8.5 吨查理的智慧。
The annual meeting falls on May 5th and will again be webcast by Yahoo!, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 8:45 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo! will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both the interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin. Our partnership with Yahoo! began in 2016 and shareholders have responded enthusiastically. Last year, real-time viewership increased 72% to about 3.1 million and replays of short segments totaled 17.1 million. For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:15 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting, which usually runs from 15 to 45 minutes. Shopping will end at 4:30. On Friday, May 4th, our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink will be open from noon until 5 p.m. We added that extra shopping time in 2015, and serious shoppers love it. Last year about 12,000 people came through the doors in the five hours we were open on Friday. Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. (Your Chairman discourages freebies.) Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies. Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our sixth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; even with Brooks running shoes, our times would be embarrassing.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record. A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 43% from 2016. So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products. Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry more than 40 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Berkshire shareholders are a bookseller’s dream: When Poor Charlie’s Almanack (yes, our Charlie) made its debut some years ago, we sold 3,500 copies at the meeting. The book weighed 4.85 pounds. Do the math: Our shareholders left the building that day carrying about 8 1⁄ 2 tons of Charlie’s wisdom.
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随本报告附上的代理材料里,有一份附件说明诸位如何领取入场证件——凭它既能参加大会,也能参加其他活动。请记住,大多数航空公司都会在伯克希尔周末大幅抬高票价。若诸位远道而来,不妨比一比飞往堪萨斯城和飞往奥马哈的成本。两城之间开车约需 2.5 小时,飞堪萨斯城说不定能替诸位省下一笔可观的钱。一对夫妇省下的钱可能有 1000 美元甚至更多。就把这笔钱花在我们这儿吧。内布拉斯加家具城(NFM)坐落在 72 街上、道奇街与太平洋街之间一块 77 英亩的地块上,届时又将推出“伯克希尔周末”折扣价。要在 NFM 享受伯克希尔折扣,诸位须在 5 月 1 日周二到 5 月 7 日周一(含首尾两天)之间选购,并出示参会证件。去年,这一周里门店的销售额高达 4460 万美元,着实惊人——实体店在 NFM 依旧生机勃勃。这段特价甚至适用于好几家声名显赫的制造商的产品,它们平日对折扣有着铁一般的禁令,却本着我们股东周末的精神,为诸位破了例。我们感谢它们的配合。“伯克希尔周末”期间,NFM 周一至周六营业时间为上午 10 点到晚上 9 点,周日为上午 11 点到晚上 8 点。周六下午 5:30 至 8:00,NFM 会举办一场野餐会,诚邀诸位光临。NFM 还会把股东折扣延伸到我们的堪萨斯城和达拉斯门店。5 月 1 日至 5 月 7 日期间,凡向这两家 NFM 门店出示参会证件、或其他伯克希尔持股证明(比如券商对账单)的股东,都可享受与奥马哈门店相同的折扣。在波仙珠宝,我们又将举办两场股东专属活动。第一场是 5 月 4 日周五晚 6 点到 9 点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是压轴的盛大晚会,定于 5 月 6 日周日上午 9 点到下午 4 点举行。周六我们营业到下午 6 点。记住,买得越多,省得越多(至少每次陪我逛店时,我女儿都这么说)。整个周末,波仙珠宝都会人潮汹涌。为方便诸位,股东价将从 4 月 30 日周一一直延续到 5 月 12 日周六。这期间,请出示参会证件、或显示诸位持有我们股票的券商对账单,以表明股东身份。周日下午,在波仙珠宝上层,我们请来了两位世界顶尖的桥牌高手鲍勃·哈曼和莎伦·奥斯伯格,与股东们对局。要是他们提议赌两把,请赶紧岔开话题。阿吉特、查理、比尔·盖茨和我大概也会顺道过去。我的朋友邢延华(Ariel Hsing)周日也会在商场里迎战乒乓球挑战者。我认识她时她才九岁,那时我就连她一分都赢不下来。邢延华曾代表美国参加 2012 年奥运会。诸位若不怕当众出丑,下午 1 点起可以去和她过过招。去年比尔·盖茨跟邢延华打得还不错,所以他这回大概又想再挑战一次。(我的建议是:押邢延华赢。)我只在一旁充当参谋。Gorat's 牛排馆将于 5 月 6 日周日专为伯克希尔股东开放,营业时间从正午 12 点到晚上 10 点。要在 Gorat's 订位,请于 4 月 2 日(但不要提前)拨打 402-551-3733。点一份配薯饼的丁骨牛排,好让人看出诸位是老练的食客。大会问答环节,仍由那三位金融记者主持,向我和查理发问——问题都是股东们通过电子邮件提交给他们的。三位记者及其邮箱如下:卡罗尔·卢米斯,她那个时代最杰出的商业记者,邮箱 [email protected];CNBC 的贝基·奎克,邮箱 [email protected];以及《纽约时报》的安德鲁·罗斯·索金,邮箱 [email protected]。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that most airlines substantially increase prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2 1⁄ 2 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us. At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1st and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. Last year, the one-week volume for the store was a staggering $44.6 million. Bricks and mortar are alive and well at NFM. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 11 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited. NFM will again extend its shareholder’s discount offerings to our Kansas City and Dallas stores. From May 1st through May 7th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to those NFM stores will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store. At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store). We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock. On Sunday afternoon, on the upper level above Borsheims, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. Ajit, Charlie, Bill Gates and I will likely drop by as well. My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.) I will participate on an advisory basis only. Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, serving from 12 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 2nd (but not before). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns. We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at [email protected]; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at [email protected]; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at [email protected].
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从收到的问题中,每位记者会各挑出他或她认为对股东最有趣、最重要的六个。记者们告诉我,如果你的问题简洁、不要拖到最后一刻才发、与伯克希尔相关且每封邮件不超过两个问题,被选中的概率就最大。(在邮件里,请告诉记者:如果你的问题被提到,你是否希望被点名。)另有一组配套问题,由三位跟踪研究伯克希尔的分析师提出。今年的保险专家是 Dowling & Partners 的加里·兰塞姆;有关非保险业务的问题,则由 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的乔纳森·布兰特和晨星公司的格雷格·沃伦提出。既然我们办的是股东大会,我们希望分析师和记者们提的问题,能增进所有者对其投资的理解和认识。将抛向我们的问题,我和查理事先一个字的提示都不会得到。有些肯定会很棘手——而这正合我们的心意。多环节的连环问不许提;我们想让尽可能多的提问者有机会向我们发问。我们的目标是,诸位离场时对伯克希尔的了解比来时更深,也在奥马哈度过一段愉快的时光。算下来,我们预计至少会有 54 个问题,其中每位分析师和记者各 6 个,另有 18 个来自现场观众。第 54 个之后,所有问题都由现场观众提出。到下午 3:30,我和查理常常已经答过 60 多个问题了。现场观众中的提问者,将通过 11 次抽签选出——抽签于大会当天上午 8:15 举行。会场和主分会场里装设的 11 支麦克风,可以说,每支都对应一场抽签。既然说到我们所有者增长见识,请容我提醒诸位:我和查理都认为,所有股东都应同时获知伯克希尔发布的新信息,而且若有可能,还应在任何交易发生之前,有充裕的时间去消化和分析这些信息。正因如此,我们尽量把财务数据安排在周五深夜或周六清晨发布,也是因此,我们的股东大会总在周六举行(这一天还能缓解交通和停车的难题)。我们不搞那种与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一密谈的惯常做法,而是像对待其他所有股东一样对待他们。对我们来说,没有谁比那些资力有限、却把相当大一部分积蓄托付给我们的股东更重要了。日复一日经营这家公司时——写这封信时也一样——浮现在我脑海里的,正是这样一位股东的身影。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.) An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment. Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. After the 54th, all questions come from the audience. Charlie and I have often tackled more than 60 by 3:30. The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing. While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze that information before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems). We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day – and as I write this letter – that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.
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我经常盛赞我们运营经理们的功绩,这是有充分理由的。他们个个是名副其实的全明星,打理起自家业务,就像那是家族拥有的唯一一份资产。我还相信,就股东导向思维而言,我们这些经理人在大型上市公司群体中也堪称翘楚。他们中的大多数早已不必为生计而工作。打出商业“本垒打”的乐趣,对他们而言与薪水同等重要。如果经理们(或董事)持有伯克希尔股票——很多人确实持有——那要么是他们从公开市场买入的,要么是把自家企业卖给我们时换来的股份。但没有谁能只享所有权的上行收益,而不担下行风险。我们的董事和经理,与诸位风险共担。我们总部依旧有一支了不起的团队。这支团队高效地应对着名目繁多的 SEC 及其他监管要求,报送一份 32,700 页的联邦所得税申报表,督办 3,935 份州税申报表的报送,回复数不清的股东与媒体问询,赶制年报,筹备全美规模最大的年度股东大会,统筹董事会的各项事务,核实这封信里的内容——这份清单还能一直列下去。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck. If managers (or directors) own Berkshire shares – and many do – it’s from open-market purchases they have made or because they received shares when they sold their businesses to us. None, however, gets the upside of ownership without risking the downside. Our directors and managers stand in your shoes. We continue to have a wonderful group at headquarters. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 32,700-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,935 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter – and the list goes on and on.
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所有这些业务事务,他们都办得开开心心、效率高得惊人,让我的日子过得轻松又舒心。他们的付出还不止于严格意义上和伯克希尔相关的事务:譬如去年,他们接待了 40 所大学(从 200 家申请者中选出)派来奥马哈、与我共度问答日的学生。他们还处理我收到的各式请托,安排我的行程,甚至替我张罗午餐的汉堡和薯条(当然,浇满了亨氏番茄酱)。此外,年会上他们也乐呵呵地搭把手,哪里需要就顶到哪里。他们以在伯克希尔工作为荣,我则以他们为傲。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help at the annual meeting in whatever way they are needed. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.
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我把最好的留到了最后。2018 年初,伯克希尔董事会推选阿吉特·贾恩和格雷格·阿贝尔为公司董事,并分别任命二人为副董事长。如今阿吉特主管保险业务,格雷格统领其余各项业务,我和查理则专注于投资与资本配置。有阿吉特和格雷格为我们效力,诸位和我一样幸运。二人都已在伯克希尔待了几十年,伯克希尔的血液早已流淌在他们的血脉里。两人的品格都配得上各自的才干——这就道尽了一切。5 月 5 日,请来奥马哈——这座资本主义的摇篮——见一见伯克希尔大家庭。我们全体都盼着诸位的到来。
I’ve saved the best for last. Early in 2018, Berkshire’s board elected Ajit Jain and Greg Abel as directors of Berkshire and also designated each as Vice Chairman. Ajit is now responsible for insurance operations, and Greg oversees the rest of our businesses. Charlie and I will focus on investments and capital allocation. You and I are lucky to have Ajit and Greg working for us. Each has been with Berkshire for decades, and Berkshire’s blood flows through their veins. The character of each man matches his talents. And that says it all. Come to Omaha – the cradle of capitalism – on May 5th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to your visit.
2018 年 2 月 24 日
February 24, 2018
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board
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