2018 年致股东信

致股东信 · 原文约 7010 词
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伯克希尔·哈撒韦业绩 vs. 标普 500 指数:年度变化百分比

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500 Annual Percentage Change

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

年份 1965 …… 1966 …… 1967 …… 1968 …… 1969 …… 1970 …… 1971 …… 1972 …… 1973 …… 1974 …… 1975 …… 1976 …… 1977 …… 1978 …… 1979 …… 1980 …… 1981 …… 1982 …… 1983 …… 1984 …… 1985 …… 1986 …… 1987 …… 1988 …… 1989 …… 1990 …… 1991 …… 1992 …… 1993 …… 1994 …… 1995 …… 1996 …… 1997 …… 1998 …… 1999 …… 2000 …… 2001 …… 2002 …… 2003 …… 2004 …… 2005 …… 2006 …… 2007 …… 2008 …… 2009 …… 2010 …… 2011 …… 2012 …… 2013 …… 2014 …… 2015 …… 2016 …… 2017 …… 2018 …… 1965-2018 年复合年收益率 …… 1964-2018 年累计总收益率 ……

Year 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1979 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overall Gain – 1964-2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

伯克希尔每股账面价值的变化

in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire

伯克希尔每股市场价值的变化

in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire

标普 500 指数(含股息)的变化

in S&P 500 with Dividends Included

年度伯克希尔每股账面价值变动伯克希尔每股市场价值的年度百分比变化标普500指数含股息变动
196523.849.510.0
196620.3(3.4)(11.7)
196711.013.330.9
196819.077.811.0
196916.219.4(8.4)
197012.0(4.6)3.9
197116.480.514.6
197221.78.118.9
19734.7(2.5)(14.8)
19745.5(48.7)(26.4)
197521.92.537.2
197659.3129.323.6
197731.946.8(7.4)
197824.014.56.4
197935.7102.518.2
198019.332.832.3
198131.431.8(5.0)
198240.038.421.4
198332.369.022.4
198413.6(2.7)6.1
198548.293.731.6
198626.114.218.6
198719.54.65.1
198820.159.316.6
198944.484.631.7
19907.4(23.1)(3.1)
199139.635.630.5
199220.329.87.6
199314.338.910.1
199413.925.01.3
199543.157.437.6
199631.86.223.0
199734.134.933.4
199848.352.228.6
19990.5(19.9)21.0
20006.526.6(9.1)
2001(6.2)6.5(11.9)
200210.0(3.8)(22.1)
200321.015.828.7
200410.54.310.9
20056.40.84.9
200618.424.115.8
200711.028.75.5
2008(9.6)(31.8)(37.0)
200919.82.726.5
201013.021.415.1
20114.6(4.7)2.1
201214.416.816.0
201318.232.732.4
20148.327.013.7
20156.4(12.5)1.4
201610.723.412.0
201723.021.921.8
20180.42.8(4.4)
复合年化收益率 – 1965-201818.7%20.5%9.7%
整体收益——1964-20181,091,899%2,472,627%15,019%
Yearin Per-Share Book Value of BerkshireAnnual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshirein S&P 500 with Dividends Included
196523.849.510.0
196620.3(3.4)(11.7)
196711.013.330.9
196819.077.811.0
196916.219.4(8.4)
197012.0(4.6)3.9
197116.480.514.6
197221.78.118.9
19734.7(2.5)(14.8)
19745.5(48.7)(26.4)
197521.92.537.2
197659.3129.323.6
197731.946.8(7.4)
197824.014.56.4
197935.7102.518.2
198019.332.832.3
198131.431.8(5.0)
198240.038.421.4
198332.369.022.4
198413.6(2.7)6.1
198548.293.731.6
198626.114.218.6
198719.54.65.1
198820.159.316.6
198944.484.631.7
19907.4(23.1)(3.1)
199139.635.630.5
199220.329.87.6
199314.338.910.1
199413.925.01.3
199543.157.437.6
199631.86.223.0
199734.134.933.4
199848.352.228.6
19990.5(19.9)21.0
20006.526.6(9.1)
2001(6.2)6.5(11.9)
200210.0(3.8)(22.1)
200321.015.828.7
200410.54.310.9
20056.40.84.9
200618.424.115.8
200711.028.75.5
2008(9.6)(31.8)(37.0)
200919.82.726.5
201013.021.415.1
20114.6(4.7)2.1
201214.416.816.0
201318.232.732.4
20148.327.013.7
20156.4(12.5)1.4
201610.723.412.0
201723.021.921.8
20180.42.8(4.4)
Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-201818.7%20.5%9.7%
Overall Gain – 1964-20181,091,899%2,472,627%15,019%

注:数据按自然年度列示,以下情形除外——1965 和 1966 年度截至 9 月 30 日,1967 年度为截至 12 月 31 日的 15 个月。自 1979 年起,会计准则要求保险公司按市价计量所持权益证券,而非此前的成本与市价孰低法。本表中,伯克希尔 1978 年及以前的业绩已按新规重述,其余各项则沿用最初报告的数字。标普 500 指数的数据为税前口径,伯克希尔的数据为税后口径。假如一家公司(比如伯克希尔)只是简单持有标普 500 指数、照章缴税,那么在指数上涨的年份,其业绩会落后于指数;在指数下跌的年份,其业绩会跑赢指数。日积月累,税负成本会让累计落后幅度相当可观。

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

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伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东:

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

2018 年,按公认会计原则(即“GAAP”)计算,伯克希尔盈利 40 亿美元。这个数字由几部分构成:经营利润 248 亿美元;无形资产减值造成的非现金损失 30 亿美元(几乎全部来自我们持有的卡夫亨氏权益);出售投资证券实现的资本利得 28 亿美元;以及投资持仓中未实现资本利得减少所带来的 206 亿美元损失。最后这一项,是一条新的 GAAP 规则要求我们计入盈利的。正如我在 2017 年年报中所强调的,伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格和我都不认为这条规则合理。我们一直觉得,这种按市价计量的变动会给伯克希尔带来我所说的“底线数字上狂野而任性的起伏”。2018 年的季度业绩,正好印证了这个判断。第一和第四季度,我们报出的 GAAP 亏损分别是 11 亿美元和 254 亿美元;第二和第三季度,则报出 120 亿美元和 185 亿美元的利润。与这般剧烈摇摆形成鲜明对照的,是伯克希尔旗下众多企业——它们在每个季度都交出了稳定而令人满意的经营利润。全年算下来,这些利润比 2016 年创下的 176 亿美元高点还高出 41%。季度 GAAP 盈利的大起大落,今后仍会持续,无从避免。原因在于,我们那个庞大的股票投资组合——2018 年底市值近 1730 亿美元——单日价格波动动辄 20 亿美元甚至更多,而新规要求把这些波动统统即时计入底线。事实上,第四季度股价剧烈震荡,我们有好几天单日“盈利”或“亏损”都超过 40 亿美元。我们的建议?盯住经营利润,别太在意各种名目的收益或损失。这么说,丝毫不是要贬低投资对伯克希尔的分量。着眼长远,查理和我相信这些投资会带来可观回报,只是时点极不规律罢了。

Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings. A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.” The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of $1.1 billion and $25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of $12 billion and $18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of $17.6 billion by 41%. Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That’s because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly $173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of $2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a “profit” or “loss” of more than $4 billion. Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.

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我们年报的老读者大概已经注意到,今年这封信的开头写法与往年不同。近三十年来,开篇第一段讲的都是伯克希尔每股账面价值的变化百分比。如今,是时候放弃这个做法了。事情很简单:伯克希尔账面价值的年度变化——它在第 2 页做最后一次亮相——这个指标已经不像当年那样有参考意义了。有三个原因。其一,伯克希尔正逐步从一家资产集中于可交易股票的公司,转变为价值主要来自经营性业务的公司;查理和我预计,这种转变还会以不规则的节奏继续下去。其二,我们的股权投资按市价计量,但会计准则却要求把旗下那批经营性公司以远低于其当前价值的金额计入账面,这个偏差近年来越拉越大。其三,展望将来,伯克希尔很可能大规模回购自家股票,回购价格会高于账面价值、但低于我们估算的内在价值。这类回购的账很好算:每一笔都让每股内在价值上升,同时让每股账面价值下降。两下一叠加,账面价值这张记分牌就与经济现实越离越远。

Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice. The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.

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往后汇报财务成果时,我们打算把重心放在伯克希尔的市价上。市场的脾气可以极其反复无常——看看第 2 页那 54 年的历史就明白了。但拉长时间看,伯克希尔的股价终究是衡量企业表现的最好尺子。

In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.

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在往下说之前,我想报个好消息——确实是好消息——而且它在财务报表里看不到。这跟 2018 年初的管理层调整有关:阿吉特·贾恩接管了全部保险业务,格雷格·阿贝尔则统管其余所有运营。这两步棋,本该早就落子。如今的伯克希尔,比我一个人盯着运营时管得好太多了。阿吉特和格雷格身怀罕见才干,血管里流淌着伯克希尔的血。现在,我们就来看看你们究竟拥有些什么。

Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins. Now let’s take a look at what you own.

只见森林,不见树木

Focus on the Forest – Forget the Trees

有些人评估伯克希尔,会一头扎进我们那些五花八门的业务细节里——打个比方,去数经济上的一棵棵“树”。这种分析很容易看得人头昏眼花,因为我们拥有的样本实在太多,从细枝到红杉应有尽有。其中有几棵树已经染病,十年后大概难觅踪影;但更多的树注定会长得愈发高大俊美。所幸,要粗估伯克希尔的内在商业价值,并不需要逐棵去掂量。因为我们这片森林里有五片举足轻重的“林区”,每一片都能相当准确地整体估值。其中四片,是容易看懂的企业与金融资产集群;第五片——我们那庞大而多元的保险业务——则以一种不那么显眼的方式为伯克希尔创造巨大价值,这一点我留到本信后面细说。在细看前四片林区之前,先容我重申我们运用你们资本时的首要目标:买入由能干管理层经营、拥有优良且持久经济特性的企业,全资或部分皆可。而且,买入价格必须合理。有时,我们能把符合标准的公司整体收入囊中;但更多时候,我们是在公开交易的公司身上找到中意的特质,通常买下 5% 到 10% 的股份。这种大额资本配置上左右开弓的做法,在美国企业界颇为少见,有时还能给我们带来重要优势。近些年,明智的路数一目了然:许多股票能用同样的钱买到远比整体收购更多的价值。正是这道价差,让我们去年买进约 430 亿美元的可交易股票,只卖出 190 亿美元。查理和我相信,我们投资的这些公司物有所值,远胜于并购交易所能提供的。尽管近来我们不断加码可交易股票,伯克希尔森林中最有价值的一片林区,仍是我们控股的那几十家非保险企业(通常 100% 持股,从不低于 80%)。这些子公司去年赚了 168 亿美元。而且,我们说“赚”,指的是扣除所有所得税、利息、管理层薪酬(无论现金还是股票)、重组费用、折旧、摊销及总部开销之后所剩下的钱。这种口径的盈利,与华尔街银行家和公司 CEO 们时常挂在嘴边的“调整后 EBITDA”相去甚远——后者往往把“盈利”重新定义,剔除掉一大堆再真实不过的成本。

Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic “trees,” so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty. Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter. Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices. Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage. In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about $43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only $19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions. Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire’s forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned $16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead. That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.

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举个例子。有些管理层会声称,公司的股权薪酬不该算作费用。(那它算什么——股东送的礼物吗?)再说重组费用吧。好,也许去年那种具体的重组安排明年不会重演,可各式各样的重组在商业中本就家常便饭——伯克希尔就走过几十回,成本从来都是股东在承担。亚伯拉罕·林肯当年抛出过一个问题:“如果你把狗尾巴叫作腿,那狗有几条腿?”接着又自己作答:“四条,因为把尾巴叫作腿,它也变不成腿。”亚伯要是到了华尔街,怕是会觉得孤单。查理和我确实主张,我们与收购相关的 14 亿美元摊销费用(详见 K-84 页)算不上真实的经济成本;无论评估非上市企业还是可交易股票,我们都会把这类摊销“成本”加回到 GAAP 利润里。反过来,伯克希尔那 84 亿美元的折旧费用,倒是低估了真实的经济成本——事实上,单是要在众多业务里维持竞争力,我们每年的实际投入就得超过这个数。除了这些“维护性”资本支出,我们还投下巨资去追求增长。总的算下来,伯克希尔去年在厂房、设备及其他固定资产上的投资创下 145 亿美元的纪录,其中 89% 花在美国本土。按价值排,伯克希尔森林里的第二片林区,是它持有的那批股票——通常是一家超大型公司 5% 到 10% 的股份。如前所述,年末我们的股权投资市值近 1730 亿美元,远高于成本。若按年末估值卖出,这笔收益要缴的联邦所得税约为 147 亿美元。这些股票,我们多半会长期持有;但一旦最终卖出,收益终究要按当时的税率纳税。去年,被投资公司给我们派发了 38 亿美元股息,这个数字 2019 年还会往上走。不过,比股息重要得多的,是这些公司每年留存下来的巨额利润。这里有一组数字权当参照,只涵盖我们最大的五只持仓。

For example, managements sometimes assert that their company’s stock-based compensation shouldn’t be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year’s exact rearrangement won’t recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so. Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: “If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?” and then answered his own query: “Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.” Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street. Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of $1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization “costs” to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks. In contrast, Berkshire’s $8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those “maintenance” capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record $14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America. Berkshire’s runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly $173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about $14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale. Our investees paid us dividends of $3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.

公司

Company

美国运通 苹果 美国银行 可口可乐 富国银行 合计

American Express Apple Bank of America Coca-Cola Wells Fargo Total

年末持股比例 17.9% 5.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.8%

Yearend Ownership 17.9% 5.4% 9.5% 9.4% 9.8%

伯克希尔应占份额(单位:百万美元) 股息(1) 留存收益(2) 237 745 551 624 809

Berkshire’s Share in $ millions of Dividends(1) Retained Earnings(2) $ 237 745 551 624 809

$ 997 2,502 2,096 (21) 1,263
$2,966
$6,837
$ 997 2,502 2,096 (21) 1,263
$2,966
$6,837

(1) 基于当前年化股息率计算。(2) 基于 2018 年利润减去已付普通股及优先股股息计算。GAAP——它规定了我们对外报告的利润——不允许将被投资公司的留存收益计入我们的财务报表。但这些留存收益对我们价值连城:多年来,被投资公司(作为一个整体)留存的利润,最终为伯克希尔带来的资本利得,超过了这些公司替我们每留存一美元所带来的一美元。我们所有的主要持仓都拥有出色的经济特性,且多数会拿出一部分留存收益回购自家股票。对此我们非常乐见:只要查理和我认为某家被投资公司的股票被低估了,那么当管理层动用一部分利润来提高伯克希尔的持股比例时,我们只会感到欣喜。

(1) Based on current annual rate. (2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid. GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us. All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee’s stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire’s ownership percentage.

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就拿上表中的一个例子来说:过去八年,伯克希尔持有的美国运通股票未变。与此同时,由于该公司自身的回购,我们的持股比例从 12.6% 提高到了 17.9%。去年,美国运通赚取的 69 亿美元中,伯克希尔所占份额为 12 亿美元,约相当于我们当初购买这笔股份所付 13 亿美元的 96%。当利润上升且流通在外股份减少时,长期而言,股东通常都能获益。伯克希尔企业控制权的第三类是四家我们与其他方共同控制的公司。2018 年,这些公司归属于我们的税后经营利润份额——卡夫亨氏的 26.7%、Berkadia 与德克萨斯输电公司各 50%、Pilot Flying J 的 38.6%——合计约 13 亿美元。在我们的第四片林区,伯克希尔年末持有 1120 亿美元的美国国库券及其他现金等价物,另有 200 亿美元的各类固定收益工具。我们认为其中一部分是碰不得的,已承诺将始终持有至少 200 亿美元的现金等价物,以防外部灾祸。我们也已承诺避免任何可能危及维持这一缓冲垫的行动。伯克希尔将永远是一座金融堡垒。在管理中,我会犯下代价高昂的行动之错(commission),也会错失许多机会,其中一些本该是能明显看出的。当投资者争相逃离股市时,我们的股票也会随之下跌。但我绝不会拿现金短缺去冒险。未来几年,我们希望将大部分过剩流动性转移到伯克希尔将永久持有的企业中去。然而,其近期前景并不乐观:对那些拥有良好长期前景的企业来说,价格已高得惊人。这一令人失望的现实意味着,2019 年我们很可能将再次扩大有价证券的持仓。尽管如此,我们仍盼望着能有一笔大象级收购。即便在我和查理已经 88 岁和 95 岁——我是年轻的那个——这样的前景仍是我和查理心跳加速的原因。(光是写下发生巨额收购的可能性,就已让我脉搏飙升。)我预计我们将买入更多股票,这并非在预测市场。查理和我完全不知道股市下周或明年会怎么走。此类预测从来不是我们行事的一部分。我们的思考,更专注于计算一家有吸引力的企业的一部分,是否比它的市场价格更值钱。

Here’s one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire’s holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire’s portion of the $6.9 billion earned by American Express was $1.2 billion, about 96% of the $1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well. A third category of Berkshire’s business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about $1.3 billion in 2018. In our fourth grove, Berkshire held $112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another $20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least $20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer. Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash. In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects. That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.) My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.

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我认为,伯克希尔的内在价值可以近似地将我们四片资产丰厚的林区价值加总,再减去最终因出售有价证券而须缴付的适当税款来估算。你或许会问,如果我们出售某些全资拥有的企业,伯克希尔将产生巨额的税务成本,是否也该为此预留一笔准备金?打消这个念头吧:即使出售任何一家优秀公司无需缴税,我们将其出售也是愚蠢的。名副其实的好企业极其难觅。出售任何你有幸拥有的企业,都完全没有意义。我们所有债务的利息成本,在计算伯克希尔非保险业务的利润时,已作为费用扣除。除此之外,我们对前四片林区的大部分所有权,资金均来源于伯克希尔的第五片林区——一批非同寻常的保险公司。我们将这些资金称为“浮存金”,这是一种我们预期长期来看成本为零——甚至可能比零成本更好——的融资来源。我们将在后文阐述浮存金的特性。最后,一个至关重要且历久弥新的要点:伯克希尔的价值,正是通过我们将这五片林区组合成一个单一实体而得以最大化。这一架构使我们能够无缝且客观地配置大量资本,消除企业风险,避免固步自封,以极低成本为资产提供资金,偶尔利用税务效率优势,并将管理费用降至最低。在伯克希尔,整体远大于各部分之和。

I believe Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities. You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all. The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire’s fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds “float,” a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter. Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead. At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.

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回购与信息披露。我在前面提到,伯克希尔会不时回购自家股票。假设我们以低于伯克希尔内在价值的价格买入——这当然会是我们的意图——回购将令离场的股东和留守的股东双双受益。没错,对于离场者而言,回购带来的上行空间非常有限。这是因为我们审慎的买入操作,会将对伯克希尔股价的影响降至最低。但无论如何,市场上多了一个买家,对卖方总是有些好处的。对于留守的股东,优势则显而易见:如果市场对一位退出伙伴的权益,仅以每一美元九毛钱的价格定价,那么每伴随公司一次回购,留守股东的每股内在价值便会得到提升。显然,回购应对价格保持敏感:盲目买入高估的股票,是在损毁价值,而这一点,在不少好大喜功或永远乐观的 CEO 眼中,并不被当回事。当一家公司表示正考虑进行回购时,至关重要的是,所有股东伙伴都应获得做出明智价值估算所需的信息。提供这些信息,正是查理和我在这份报告中力求做到的。我们不希望任何一位伙伴,因为被误导或信息不充分,而将股票卖回给公司。然而,一些卖方可能会不认同我们对价值的计算,另一些人则可能找到了他们认为比伯克希尔股票更具吸引力的投资。这第二类人中的一部分将是正确的:毫无疑问,有很多股票会带来远超我们股票的涨幅。此外,某些股东只是单纯地觉得,是时候让他们自己或家人成为纯粹的消费者,而不是继续积累资本了。查理和我目前还没有兴趣加入这一行列。也许到了暮年,我们也会成为大手大脚花钱的人。

Repurchases and Reporting Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay. True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That’s because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire’s stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market. For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner’s interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is valuedestructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs. When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed. Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours. In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it’s time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.

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54 年来,我们在伯克希尔所做的管理决策,一直都从留守的股东,而不是从离场的股东的视角出发。正因如此,查理和我从来不会聚焦于当季业绩。伯克希尔,事实上,可能是《财富》500 强里唯一一家不编制月度盈利报表或资产负债表的公司。当然,我本人会定期审阅大多数子公司的月度财务报告。但查理和我是每个季度末才了解伯克希尔整体的盈利和财务状况。此外,伯克希尔没有全公司层面的预算(尽管我们的许多子公司觉得预算很有用)。我们缺少这样一件工具,意味着母公司从未有过必须达成的季度“数字”。摒弃这种目标设定,向我们为数众多的经理人传递了一个重要信息,也强化了我们所珍视的文化。多年来,查理和我见识过形形色色的不良企业行为,无论是会计上还是运营上,皆因管理层渴望迎合华尔街预期而起。一开始,只是为了不让“华尔街”失望而进行的“无伤大雅”的粉饰——比如,季度末压货、对日益增加的保险损失视而不见,或动用“饼干罐”储备——都可能成为迈向彻头彻尾造假的第一步。CEO 的本意或许确实是“仅此一次”地在数字上做点手脚,但最终结果却极少仅限于此。而且,如果老板作点小弊都无伤大雅,下属自然也很容易为自己的类似行为找到合理化的借口。在伯克希尔,我们的听众既非分析师,也非评论员:查理和我是在为我们的股东伙伴们工作。汇报到我们这儿的数字,就是我们原样呈送给你们的数字。

For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results. Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire’s overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis. Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize. Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior. At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

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非保险业务——从棒棒糖到火车头。现在,我们再仔细看看伯克希尔最有价值的那片林区——我们旗下那批非保险企业——同时记住,我们不愿把可能对竞争对手有用的信息白白透露出去。各家业务的更多细节,可参见 K-5 至 K-22 页和 K-40 至 K-51 页。作为一个整体,这些业务 2018 年实现了 208 亿美元的税前利润,较 2017 年增长 24%。我们在 2018 年所做的收购,对这一增长的贡献微不足道。在接下来的讨论中,我将一律使用税前数字。不过,2018 年这些业务的税后利润增幅要大得多——47%——这在很大程度上要归功于当年年初生效的企业所得税税率下调。我们不妨看看,这一影响为何如此巨大。先从一个经济现实说起:无论你喜欢与否,美国政府都“拥有”伯克希尔盈利的一部分权益,其份额由国会决定。实际上,我国财政部持有我们一种特殊的股票——姑且称之为 AA 股——每年从伯克希尔领取巨额“股息”(也就是税款)。2017 年,跟此前许多年一样,企业所得税税率是 35%,这意味着财政部靠它的 AA 股收益极佳。事实上,1965 年我们接手时,财政部这只“股票”一文不派,如今已演变为一项每年向联邦政府贡献数十亿美元的持股。但去年,随着企业所得税税率降至 21%,政府“所有权”的 40%(即 14/35)被无偿归还给了伯克希尔。由此,我们“A”股和“B”股股东所对应的盈利获得了大幅提升。这件事,实实在在地提高了你我手中伯克希尔股票的内在价值。此外,同样的机制也提高了伯克希尔持有的几乎每一只股票的内在价值。以上是主要情况。不过,还有其他几个因素抑制了我们的收益,需要一并考虑。例如,我们那家大型公用事业企业所获得的税收优惠,会转嫁给它的用户。同时,我们从国内公司收到的大额股息,适用的税率几乎没有变化,仍在 13% 左右。(这个较低的税率长久以来都有其合理性,因为被投资企业在向我们派发利润之前,已经为这些利润缴过税了。)但总体来看,新税法使我们的业务和我们持有的股票都大幅增值。这又引回到我们非保险业务的表现上。我们这片林区里有两棵参天红杉,分别是 BNSF 和伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司(持股 90.9%)。去年,两者合计税前盈利 93 亿美元,较 2017 年增长 6%。关于这些业务,你可以在 K-5 至 K-10 页和 K-40 至 K-45 页读到更多信息。我们接下来的五家非保险子公司,按盈利排名(但此处按字母顺序列出),包括克莱顿住宅、国际金属加工、路博润、马蒙集团和精密铸件公司,它们在 2018 年的税前利润合计为 64 亿美元,高于这些公司 2017 年的 55 亿美元。再往后的五家,按同样方式排名和列出(森林河房车、约翰斯·曼维尔、米泰克、Shaw 和 TTI),去年的税前利润为 24 亿美元,高于 2017 年的 21 亿美元。伯克希尔旗下其余的非保险业务——为数众多——2018 年的税前利润为 36 亿美元,2017 年则为 33 亿美元。

Non-Insurance Operations – From Lollipops to Locomotives Let’s now look further at Berkshire’s most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses – keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51. Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of $20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain. I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic. Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government “owns” an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large “dividends” (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s “stock,” which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government. Last year, however, 40% of the government’s “ownership” (14/35ths) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our “A” and “B” shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares. This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds. Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable. Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned $9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45. Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of $6.4 billion, up from the $5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017. The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned $2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from $2.1 billion in 2017. The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of $3.6 billion in 2018 vs. $3.3 billion in 2017.

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保险、“浮存金”与伯克希尔的资金来源

Insurance, “Float,” and the Funding of Berkshire

我们的财产/意外险(P/C)业务——我们的第五片林区——自 1967 年起便一直是推动伯克希尔成长的引擎。那一年,我们以 860 万美元收购了国民赔偿公司及其姊妹公司国民火灾海事保险公司。今天,按净资产衡量,国民赔偿公司是全球最大的财产/意外险公司。我们之所以被 P/C 业务吸引,原因之一在于这个行业的商业模式:P/C 保险公司先收保费,之后才付赔款。在极端情况下,比如因接触石棉或严重的工伤事故引发的索赔,赔付可能长达数十年。这种“先收钱、后付款”的模式,让 P/C 公司手里留下了大笔最终将付给别人的资金——我们称之为“浮存金”。与此同时,保险公司可以拿这笔浮存金为自己投资获利。尽管单张保单和单笔理赔来来去去,但一家保险公司持有的浮存金总量,相对于其保费规模通常相当稳定。因此,随着我们的业务增长,我们的浮存金也随之增长。而它的增长幅度有多大,如下表所示:

Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business – our fifth grove – has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth. One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

年份

Year

浮存金(单位:百万美元)*

Float (in millions)*

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018 *
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2018 *

$

$

39 237 1,632 27,871 65,832 122,732
39 237 1,632 27,871 65,832 122,732
  • 含来自寿险、年金和健康险业务的浮存金。

Includes float arising from life, annuity and health insurance businesses.

未来,我们的浮存金可能会缩水。如果真这样,缩水也将非常缓慢——至多每年不超过 3%。我们保险合约的性质决定了,我们永远不会面临即期或短期的、金额对我们的现金资源举足轻重的支付要求。这一结构是刻意设计的,也是我们保险公司无与伦比的财务实力中的一个关键组成部分。这份实力,永远不会被削弱。如果我们的保费收入超过了费用和最终赔付的总和,我们的保险业务就会产生承保利润,叠加在浮存金带来的投资收益之上。一旦赚到这样的利润,我们便享用了免费的资金——而且,更妙的是,还有人付钱让我们持有这笔钱。遗憾的是,所有保险公司都渴望实现这一美好结果,这引发了激烈的竞争,其激烈程度有时会导致整个 P/C 行业出现严重的承保亏损。这一亏损,实际上就是整个行业为持有浮存金而付出的代价。竞争的动态几乎注定了,尽管行业内所有公司都享有浮存金收入,整个保险业在有形净资产上赚取低于正常水平的回报这一惨淡记录,仍将继续,与美国其他行业相比更是如此。不过,我很看好我们自己的前景。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力,让我们在投资浮存金时所拥有的灵活性,远远超过一般 P/C 公司。我们能选择的投资途径众多,这始终是一个优势,偶尔还会带来重大机会。当其他保险公司束手束脚时,我们的选择反而更多了。此外,我们的 P/C 公司有着出色的承保记录。在过去 16 年里,伯克希尔有 15 年实现了承保盈利,唯一的例外是 2017 年,那年我们的税前亏损高达 32 亿美元。纵观这 16 年,我们的税前收益总计达 270 亿美元,其中 20 亿美元是在 2018 年实现的。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or nearterm demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised. If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand. Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was $3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27 billion, of which $2 billion was recorded in 2018.

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这份记录绝非偶然:严守纪律的风险评估,是我们保险经理人每天工作的重中之重——他们深知,浮存金的好处随时可能被糟糕的承保结果所吞噬。这话所有保险公司都会挂在嘴上。但在伯克希尔,它是一种信仰,旧约风格式的信仰。

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

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在大多数情况下,企业的资金来源有两个——债务和权益。在伯克希尔,我们的箭袋里还多出两支箭可以谈,但让我们先说说这两个常规的部分。我们对于债务的使用极为克制。需要指出的是,许多管理者不会认同这一策略,他们主张,大量债务能放大股东回报。而且在大多数时候,这些更敢于冒险的 CEO 会是正确的。然而,在那些罕见且不可预测的时刻,信贷会凭空消失,债务会变成财务上的致命毒药。一个俄罗斯轮盘赌式的算式——通常赢,但偶尔会死——对那些只分享公司上行收益,却不必分担下行风险的人来说,在财务上或许是说得通的。但对伯克希尔而言,这种策略是疯狂的。理性的人不会拿自己拥有并且需要的东西,去博取自己没有、也不需要的东西。你在我们合并资产负债表上——见 K-65 页——看到的大部分债务,都归属于我们的铁路和能源子公司,这两家都是重资产公司。在经济衰退期间,这些业务产生的现金依然充裕。它们所使用的债务,既适合其业务经营,也不由伯克希尔提供担保。我们的权益资本水平则是另一回事:伯克希尔那 3490 亿美元的净资产,在全美企业界无可匹敌。通过长年累月留存全部收益,并任由复利施展其魔力,我们积累起了资金,使我们得以收购并发展前文所述的那几片宝贵林区。如果我们当初采取的是 100% 派息的策略,我们到现在大概还只能靠 1965 财年起步时那 2200 万美元来运作。除了利用债务和权益,伯克希尔还在极大程度上受益于两种不那么常见的企业资金来源。其中较大的一项是前述的浮存金。到目前为止,尽管这些资金在资产负债表上被记录为一笔巨大的净负债,但它们对我们的效用,已超过等额的权益。这是因为,它们通常伴有承保利润。实际上,在大多数年份里,我们一直是因为持有和使用别人的钱而收到钱。和往常一样,我要强调:这一愉快的结果远非板上钉钉:评估保险风险时一旦犯错,损失可能是巨大的,并且可能要过很多年才会浮出水面。(想想石棉。)一场会让飓风卡特里娜和迈克尔都相形见绌的重大灾难,终将发生——也许是明天,也许是几十年后。“大事件”可能源自传统因素,如飓风或地震,也可能是一个完全的意外,比如一场网络攻击,其灾难性后果超出了当今保险公司所能想象的一切。当这样的巨灾降临时,我们将承担我们应负的损失,而且数额会很大——非常大。不过,与许多其他保险公司不同,第二天,我们会着手拓展业务。最后一种资金来源——伯克希尔同样拥有非同寻常的规模——是递延所得税。这些是我们终将支付、但在此期间不计利息的负债。如我之前所述,我们在 505 亿美元的递延所得税负债中,约有 147 亿美元来自我们持股的未实现收益。这些负债在我们的财务报表中,按当前 21% 的企业税率计提,但将在我们出售投资时按届时适用的税率缴纳。从现在到那时,我们实际上拥有了一笔免息的“贷款”,这让我们能有比原本更多的钱在股市中为我们工作。

In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources – debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let’s first address the conventional components. We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time. At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russianroulette equation – usually win, occasionally die – may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company’s upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don’t risk what they have and need for what they don’t have and don’t need. Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet – see page K-65 – resides at our railroad and energy subsidiaries, both of them asset-heavy companies. During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses remains bountiful. The debt they use is both appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our level of equity capital is a different story: Berkshire’s $349 billion is unmatched in corporate America. By retaining all earnings for a very long time, and allowing compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable groves earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100% payout policy, we would still be working with the $22 million with which we began fiscal 1965. Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefitted in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That’s because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding and using other people’s money. As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy outcome is far from a sure thing: Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years to surface. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a megacatastrophe strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, we will be looking to add business the next day. The final funding source – which again Berkshire possesses to an unusual degree – is deferred income taxes. These are liabilities that we will eventually pay but that are meanwhile interest-free. As I indicated earlier, about $14.7 billion of our $50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings. These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the current 21% corporate tax rate but will be paid at the rates prevailing when our investments are sold. Between now and then, we in effect have an interest-free “loan” that allows us to have more money working for us in equities than would otherwise be the case.

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另有 283 亿美元递延所得税,来自我们在计算当期应缴税款时,对厂房、设备等资产加速计提折旧的做法。这笔前期省下的税,日后会在往后的年份里逐步回补。不过,我们会源源不断地添置新资产。只要现行税法不变,这个资金来源就应当一路走高。着眼长远,伯克希尔的资金基础——也就是资产负债表的右侧——理应不断壮大,主要靠我们留存的盈利。而我们的活儿,就是把留下来的钱用在表的左侧、添置有吸引力的资产上。

A further $28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as plant and equipment in calculating the tax we must currently pay. The front-ended savings in taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years. We regularly purchase additional assets, however. As long as the present tax law prevails, this source of funding should trend upward. Over time, Berkshire’s funding base – that’s the right-hand side of our balance sheet – should grow, primarily through the earnings we retain. Our job is to put the money retained to good use on the left-hand side, by adding attractive assets.

GEICO 与托尼·奈斯利

GEICO and Tony Nicely

这个标题已道尽一切:公司与人,密不可分。托尼 1961 年加入 GEICO,那年他 18 岁;我则在 1970 年代中期结识了他。当时,GEICO 在保持了四十年高速增长和出色承保业绩之后,忽然发现自己濒临破产。刚上任不久的一届管理层,严重低估了 GEICO 的赔付成本,结果把产品定价定低了。账上那些亏本的保单——足足 230 万份——要等好几个月才陆续到期、才能重新定价。而这期间,公司的净资产正飞速逼近零。1976 年,杰克·伯恩被请来当 CEO,临危受命拯救 GEICO。他到任不久,我见了他,断定他正是这活儿的不二人选,于是开始大手笔买进 GEICO 的股票。几个月里,伯克希尔拿下了公司约三分之一的股份,后来这个比例又涨到大约一半——而我们没再掏一分钱。这般惊人的增持之所以发生,是因为 GEICO 恢复元气后,一直在回购自家股票。算总账,这半个 GEICO 花了伯克希尔 4700 万美元,也就是你今天在纽约买一套顶级公寓的价钱。现在,让我们快进 17 年,来到 1993 年,托尼·奈斯利升任 CEO。那时,GEICO 的声誉和盈利能力都已恢复——唯独增长没有跟上。事实上,1992 年底公司账上只有 190 万份汽车保单,远低于危机前的高点。论销量,GEICO 在全美汽车保险公司里只排第七,实在平平无奇。1995 年底,等托尼把 GEICO 重新盘活,伯克希尔出价 23 亿美元,买下公司剩下的 50% 股份——差不多是我们当年买头一半所付价钱的 50 倍(还有人说我从不肯加价呢!)。这笔报价谈成了,为伯克希尔带来一家优秀却尚未充分施展的公司,还有一位同样优秀的 CEO——他把 GEICO 推向了连我做梦都不敢想的高度。如今,GEICO 已是全美第二大汽车保险公司,销量比 1995 年增长了 1200%。自我们收购以来,承保利润累计 155 亿美元(税前),可供投资的浮存金则从 25 亿美元涨到 221 亿美元。据我估算,托尼对 GEICO 的经营,为伯克希尔的内在价值增添了逾 500 亿美元。不止如此,他还是一位管理者该有样子的典范,帮着手下四万名同事发掘并磨亮他们连自己都没察觉的才能。去年,托尼决定卸下 CEO 一职,6 月 30 日把位子交给了他多年的搭档比尔·罗伯茨。比尔干活的样子,我看了几十年,托尼这一步又走对了。托尼继续担任董事长,余生都会为 GEICO 出力——他也做不到少出一分力。所有伯克希尔股东都欠托尼一声谢,而我,排在这份名单的头一个。

That title says it all: The company and the man are inseparable. Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the age of 18; I met him in the mid-1970s. At that time, GEICO, after a fourdecade record of both rapid growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly found itself near bankruptcy. A recently-installed management had grossly underestimated GEICO’s loss costs and consequently underpriced its product. It would take many months until those loss-generating policies on GEICO’s books – there were no less than 2.3 million of them – would expire and could then be repriced. The company’s net worth in the meantime was rapidly approaching zero. In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and began to aggressively buy GEICO shares. Within a few months, Berkshire bought about 1⁄ 3 of the company, a portion that later grew to roughly 1⁄ 2 without our spending a dime. That stunning accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its health, consistently repurchased its shares. All told, this halfinterest in GEICO cost Berkshire $47 million, about what you might pay today for a trophy apartment in New York. Let’s now fast-forward 17 years to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO. At that point, GEICO’s reputation and profitability had been restored – but not its growth. Indeed, at yearend 1992 the company had only 1.9 million auto policies on its books, far less than its pre-crisis high. In sales volume among U.S. auto insurers, GEICO then ranked an undistinguished seventh. Late in 1995, after Tony had re-energized GEICO, Berkshire made an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for $2.3 billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half (and people say I never pay up!). Our offer was successful and brought Berkshire a wonderful, but underdeveloped, company and an equally wonderful CEO, who would move GEICO forward beyond my dreams. GEICO is now America’s Number Two auto insurer, with sales 1,200% greater than it recorded in 1995. Underwriting profits have totaled $15.5 billion (pre-tax) since our purchase, and float available for investment has grown from $2.5 billion to $22.1 billion. By my estimate, Tony’s management of GEICO has increased Berkshire’s intrinsic value by more than $50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn’t realize they possessed. Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June 30th he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I’ve known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He’s incapable of doing less. All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.

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投资

下面列出的,是截至年末我们市值最大的十五只普通股持仓。其中不含卡夫亨氏——3.25442152 亿股——因为伯克希尔身处控股集团之列,必须对这笔投资采用“权益”法核算。资产负债表上,伯克希尔按 138 亿美元的 GAAP 数值列示卡夫亨氏持仓,这个金额已因我们分摊了卡夫亨氏 2018 年那笔巨额无形资产减记而下调。年末,我们这笔卡夫亨氏持仓的市值为 140 亿美元,成本基础为 98 亿美元。

Investments Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write-off of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018. At yearend, our Kraft Heinz holding had a market value of $14 billion and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.

12/31/18
12/31/18

股份*

Shares*

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

151,610,700 255,300,329 918,919,000 84,488,751 6,789,054 400,000,000 65,535,000 18,784,698 50,661,394 24,669,778 47,890,899 21,938,642 146,346,999 43,387,980 449,349,102
151,610,700 255,300,329 918,919,000 84,488,751 6,789,054 400,000,000 65,535,000 18,784,698 50,661,394 24,669,778 47,890,899 21,938,642 146,346,999 43,387,980 449,349,102

持股比例

Percentage of Company Owned

公司

Company

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

美国运通公司……苹果公司……美国银行……纽约梅隆银行……特许通讯公司……可口可乐公司……达美航空公司……高盛集团……摩根大通公司……穆迪公司……西南航空公司……联合大陆控股公司……合众银行……USG 公司……富国银行……其他……按市价列示的普通股合计

American Express Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apple Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bank of America Corp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. . . . . . . . . . . Charter Communications, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Coca-Cola Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Delta Air Lines, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JPMorgan Chase & Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moody’s Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Southwest Airlines Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United Continental Holdings Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Bancorp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USG Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wells Fargo & Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total Common Stocks Carried at Market . . . . . . . .

  • **
  • **

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

17.9 5.4 9.5 8.8 3.0 9.4 9.6 4.9 1.5 12.9 8.7 8.1 9.1 31.0 9.8
17.9 5.4 9.5 8.8 3.0 9.4 9.6 4.9 1.5 12.9 8.7 8.1 9.1 31.0 9.8

成本**

Cost**

$

$

市场价值

Market

(百万)
151,610,700美国运通公司17.9$ 1,287$ 14,452
255,300,329苹果公司5.436,04440,271
918,919,000美国银行集团9.511,65022,642
84,488,751纽约梅隆银行公司8.83,8603,977
6,789,054特许通讯公司3.01,2101,935
400,000,000可口可乐公司9.41,29918,940
65,535,000达美航空9.62,8603,270
18,784,698高盛集团4.92,3803,138
50,661,394摩根大通公司1.55,6054,946
24,669,778穆迪公司12.92483,455
47,890,899西南航空公司8.72,0052,226
21,938,642United Continental Holdings Inc8.11,1951,837
146,346,999美国合众银行9.15,5486,688
43,387,980USG Corporation31.08361,851
449,349,102富国银行公司9.810,63920,706
其他16,20122,423
按市价计量的普通股总计$ 102,867$ 172,757
(in millions)
151,610,700American Express Company17.9$ 1,287$ 14,452
255,300,329Apple Inc5.436,04440,271
918,919,000Bank of America Corp9.511,65022,642
84,488,751The Bank of New York Mellon Corp8.83,8603,977
6,789,054Charter Communications, Inc3.01,2101,935
400,000,000The Coca-Cola Company9.41,29918,940
65,535,000Delta Air Lines, Inc9.62,8603,270
18,784,698The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc4.92,3803,138
50,661,394JPMorgan Chase & Co1.55,6054,946
24,669,778Moody’s Corporation12.92483,455
47,890,899Southwest Airlines Co8.72,0052,226
21,938,642United Continental Holdings Inc8.11,1951,837
146,346,999U.S. Bancorp9.15,5486,688
43,387,980USG Corporation31.08361,851
449,349,102Wells Fargo & Company9.810,63920,706
Others16,20122,423
Total Common Stocks Carried at Market$ 102,867$ 172,757
$ 102,867
$ 172,757
$ 102,867
$ 172,757
  • 不含伯克希尔子公司养老基金所持股份。** 这是我们的实际买入价,也是我们的计税成本基础。

Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries. This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.

上面列出的这 1728 亿美元,查理和我可不把它看成一堆股票代码——不是那种会因“华尔街”下调评级、美联储的预期动作、可能的政治风向、经济学家的预测,或别的什么当日热门话题,就随手了结的金融调情。我们在这些持仓里看到的,是一批我们部分持有的公司;按加权计算,它们经营业务所需的净有形权益资本回报率约为 20%。而且,这些公司赚取利润时,并没有背上过重的债务。

Charlie and I do not view the $172.8 billion detailed above as a collection of ticker symbols – a financial dalliance to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour. What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

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大型、成熟又通俗易懂的企业,无论在什么情形下都能拿出这样的回报,已属难得;若拿它跟过去十年许多投资者甘于接受的债券回报一比——比如 30 年期美国国债 3% 甚至更低的收益率——更是令人瞠目结舌。偶尔,为某只股票付出高得离谱的买价,会把一家出色的企业变成一笔糟糕的投资——就算不是永远,至少也会难受好长一段时间。但拉长看,投资回报终会向企业本身的表现靠拢。而正如我接下来要细说的,美国企业的整体表现一直非同凡响。

Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared against the return that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 3% or less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example. On occasion, a ridiculously-high purchase price for a given stock will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment – if not permanently, at least for a painfully long period. Over time, however, investment performance converges with business performance. And, as I will next spell out, the record of American business has been extraordinary.

美国的顺风

The American Tailwind

3 月 11 日,将是我第一次投资美国企业满 77 周年的日子。那是 1942 年,我 11 岁,倾其所有押了上去——投进了从 6 岁起一点点攒下的 114.75 美元,买下三股城市服务公司的优先股。我成了一名资本家,感觉真好。现在,让我们回溯这次投资之前的两个 77 年。这样一路往回数,就落到了 1788 年——乔治·华盛顿就任美国首任总统的前一年。那时,有谁能想象,他们这个新国家会在短短三个 77 年的人生跨度里成就出怎样的一番天地?在 1942 年之前的那两个 77 年里,美国已从四百万人口——约

On March 11th, it will be 77 years since I first invested in an American business. The year was 1942, I was 11, and I went all in, investing $114.75 I had begun accumulating at age six. What I bought was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist, and it felt good. Let’s now travel back through the two 77-year periods that preceded my purchase. That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George Washington’s installation as our first president. Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would accomplish in only three 77-year lifetimes? During the two 77-year periods prior to 1942, the United States had grown from four million people – about

占当时世界人口的 0.5%——成长为地球上最强大的国家。可 1942 年的那个春天,它却撞上了

1⁄ 2 of 1% of the world’s population – into the most powerful country on earth. In that spring of 1942, though, it faced

一场危机:美国和盟国在一场我们刚刚参战三个月的战争中节节失利,坏消息天天来。尽管头条触目惊心,在那个 3 月 11 日,几乎所有美国人都相信这场战争终将打赢。而他们的乐观还不止于这场胜利。撇开天生的悲观主义者不谈,美国人相信,自己的子女乃至更远的世世代代,日子会比他们自己过得好得多。当然,国民也心知肚明,前路不会一帆风顺——从来就没有一帆风顺过。立国之初,美国就经受了一场内战的考验,这场战争夺去了全美 4% 男性的性命,也逼得林肯总统公开自问:一个“如此孕育、如此奉献的国家,究竟能否长久存续”。到了 1930 年代,美国又熬过了大萧条,那是一段大规模失业的艰辛岁月。可即便如此,在 1942 年我买入股票时,全国仍预期战后会有增长——事后证明,这份信念很有根据。事实上,这个国家的成就,只能用“叹为观止”来形容。让我们把这一论断换成数字:假如当年我那 114.75 美元投进一只不收费的标普 500 指数基金,且全部股息都再投资,那么到 2019 年 1 月 31 日(本信付印前可获取的最新数据),这笔钱(税前)已滚到 606,811 美元,翻了 5,288 倍。与此同时,当年一家免税机构——比如养老基金或大学捐赠基金——投下的 100 万美元,会长成约 53 亿美元。再让我加一笔账,相信会让你大吃一惊:假如这家假想的机构每年只将资产的 1% 付给投资经理、顾问等各路“帮手”,它的收益就会被拦腰砍去一半,缩至 26.5 亿美元。这就是 77 年里,标普 500 实际取得的 11.8% 年回报率一旦按 10.8% 复利重算所带来的结果。

a crisis: The U.S. and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war that we had entered only three months earlier. Bad news arrived daily. Despite the alarming headlines, almost all Americans believed on that March 11th that the war would be won. Nor was their optimism limited to that victory. Leaving aside congenital pessimists, Americans believed that their children and generations beyond would live far better lives than they themselves had led. The nation’s citizens understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth ride. It never had been. Early in its history our country was tested by a Civil War that killed 4% of all American males and led President Lincoln to openly ponder whether “a nation so conceived and so dedicated could long endure.” In the 1930s, America suffered through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive unemployment. Nevertheless, in 1942, when I made my purchase, the nation expected post-war growth, a belief that proved to be well-founded. In fact, the nation’s achievements can best be described as breathtaking. Let’s put numbers to that claim: If my $114.75 had been invested in a no-fee S&P 500 index fund, and all dividends had been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth (pre-taxes) $606,811 on January 31, 2019 (the latest data available before the printing of this letter). That is a gain of 5,288 for 1. Meanwhile, a $1 million investment by a tax-free institution of that time – say, a pension fund or college endowment – would have grown to about $5.3 billion. Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will shock you: If that hypothetical institution had paid only 1% of assets annually to various “helpers,” such as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have been cut in half, to $2.65 billion. That’s what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual return actually achieved by the S&P 500 is recalculated at a 10.8% rate.

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那些老因政府预算赤字而大唱末日论的人(正如我本人多年来也一直如此),不妨留意一事:在我上段提及的 77 年人生的后段,我们国家的国债规模膨胀了大约 400 倍。那是 40,000%!假设你当年预见到这一增长,被赤字失控、货币一文不值的前景吓得惊恐万分。为求“自保”,你或许会避开股票,转而用那 114.75 美元买进 3.25 盎司黄金。而这份所谓的保护,又能带来什么结果?你现在拥有的资产大约值 4,200 美元,还不到简单、无人打理地投资美国企业所能实现的 1%。这神奇的金属,终究敌不过美国人的精神。我们国家这近乎不可思议的繁荣,是以两党合作的方式取得的。自 1942 年以来,我们有过七位共和党总统和七位民主党总统。在他们任内,美国在不同时期要应付长时期的恶性通胀、21% 的优惠贷款利率、几场争议不断且代价高昂的战争、一位总统的辞职、房价的全面崩盘、一次令人瘫痪的金融恐慌,以及一大堆其他问题。桩桩件件都曾闹出吓人的新闻标题;如今,它们全成了历史。圣保罗大教堂的建筑师克里斯托弗·雷恩,就安葬在这座伦敦教堂之内。他的墓旁刻着这样一段(由拉丁文译出的)铭文:“若你想寻我的纪念碑,请环顾四周。”那些对美国经济这套打法心存疑虑的人,该好好听听这句话。回到我们的起点 1788 年:那时这里其实没什么,除了一小群雄心勃勃的人,和一套尚处雏形、旨在将他们的梦想变为现实的治理框架。而今天,美联储估算我们的家庭财富已达 108 万亿美元,一个几乎令人无从理解的数字。还记得在本信前面,我怎样把留存收益描述为伯克希尔繁荣的关键吗?美国同样如此。在国家会计层面,与之对应的科目叫“储蓄”。而储蓄,我们确实一直在存。倘若先辈们把生产出来的东西悉数消费掉,就不会有投资,不会有生产率的提高,也不会有生活水平的跃升。

Those who regularly preach doom because of government budget deficits (as I regularly did myself for many years) might note that our country’s national debt has increased roughly 400-fold during the last of my 77-year periods. That’s 40,000%! Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency. To “protect” yourself, you might have eschewed stocks and opted instead to buy 3 1⁄ 4 ounces of gold with your $114.75. And what would that supposed protection have delivered? You would now have an asset worth about $4,200, less than 1% of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged investment in American business. The magical metal was no match for the American mettle. Our country’s almost unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner. Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven Democrats. In the years they served, the country contended at various times with a long period of viral inflation, a 21% prime rate, several controversial and costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a host of other problems. All engendered scary headlines; all are now history. Christopher Wren, architect of St. Paul’s Cathedral, lies buried within that London church. Near his tomb are posted these words of description (translated from Latin): “If you would seek my monument, look around you.” Those skeptical of America’s economic playbook should heed his message. In 1788 – to go back to our starting point – there really wasn’t much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at $108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend. Remember, earlier in this letter, how I described retained earnings as having been the key to Berkshire’s prosperity? So it has been with America. In the nation’s accounting, the comparable item is labeled “savings.” And save we have. If our forefathers had instead consumed all they produced, there would have been no investment, no productivity gains and no leap in living standards.

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查理和我欣然承认,伯克希尔的成功,很大一部分不过是来自我认为应该称之为“美国顺风”的产物。美国企业也好,个人也罢,若吹嘘自己“全凭一己之力”,那已不光是傲慢。诺曼底那一排排整齐而朴素的白色十字架,理应让如此吹嘘的人感到羞愧。世界上还有许多其他国家,同样拥有光明的前景。对此,我们应当感到欣喜:唯有各国都兴旺,美国人才会更加繁荣,也更加安全。在伯克希尔,我们希望能在全球范围做出可观的投资。不过,在未来的 77 年里,我们收益的主要来源,几乎可以确定,仍将是那股美国顺风。我们是幸运的——幸运得无比——身后能有这股力量推动我们前行。

Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire’s success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have “done it alone.” The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims. There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders. Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky – gloriously lucky – to have that force at our back.

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股东大会

伯克希尔 2019 年股东大会将于 5 月 4 日(星期六)举行。如果你在考虑参加——查理和我都希望你能来——请查看 A-2 至 A-3 页的详细信息。那里列的还是我们沿用多年的日程安排。如果你无法亲赴奥马哈,可以通过雅虎的网络直播参加。安迪·瑟沃和他的雅虎团队做得极为出色,无论是全程转播大会,还是采访众多伯克希尔经理人、名流、金融专家以及来自美国和世界各地的股东。自从雅虎加入,全世界对每年 5 月第一个星期六奥马哈所发生之事的了解,已大为增进。它的直播报道从美国中部夏令时间上午 8:45 开始,并提供普通话翻译。

The Annual Meeting Berkshire’s 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May 4th. If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we’ve followed for some years. If you can’t join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo’s webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world’s knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.

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54 年来,查理和我一直热爱我们的工作。每一天,我们做着自己觉得有意思的事,与我们喜欢并信任的人共事。而如今,我们新的管理架构让我们的生活更加愉快。整套班底齐备——也就是说,由阿吉特和格雷格主管运营、一大批出色的企业、如尼亚加拉瀑布般源源不断的现金流、一支才华横溢的经理人队伍,以及坚如磐石的文化——无论未来如何,你们这家公司都处于极佳状态来应对。

For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable. With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.

2019 年 2 月 23 日

February 23, 2019

沃伦·E·巴菲特

董事会主席

Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board

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