货币作为纯粹商品

1947 · 文章 · 原文约 1860 词
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标题:作为纯粹商品的货币

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volume ss aVIl, ivo. 4, inay, 194/

volume ss aVIl, ivo. 4, inay, 194/

金钱如同纯粹的商品

MONEY AS PURE COMMODITY

本杰明·格雷厄姆 著

By BENJAMIN GRAHAM

纽约市

New York City

货币具有“纯粹商品”的一面,这取决于它本身是由一种或多种具有重大内在价值的商品构成,还是以这些商品作为背书。从最早的时候起,货币的全部或相当一部分价值,就来自它与货币商品(通常是黄金或白银)的物质或法律关系。相反,近年来出现的情况是,白银和黄金的相当一部分价值,恰恰来自它们作为货币金属的地位。后一个事实表明,货币技术可能进入一个新阶段,在这种阶段中,货币地位和纯粹商品价值可以相互惠及。也就是说,货币将受益于商品背书,而商品将受益于货币地位。从历史上看,货币与纯粹商品价值的认同经历了三个阶段:先是完全认同,然后是部分或按比例认同,最后是完全不认同。第一阶段以亚里士多德的论述为特征:“货币的实质应当是某种本身有用且易于用于生活之目的的东西——例如铁、银以及类似之物。”黄金作为主要货币商品的出现,及其对竞争对手的击败,在历史上似乎伴随着人们对其纯粹商品属性的逐渐淡化,以及它披上了 R. H. 布兰德所称的“某种神秘特质”。因此,历经沧桑,黄金似乎慢慢从纯粹的商品转变为纯粹的货币——从物质层面转变为形而上学层面。就在第二次世界大战之前,它几乎要失去与人类现实的所有联系——至少在西半球是这样。在第二阶段,所有形式的货币在法律上都可以兑换成黄金,但可用的黄金数量远少于它所代表的货币请求权。在联邦储备体系下,1934 年之前,我们纸币与黄金的关系,大约相当于我们活期存款与流通货币之间的关系。在这两种情况下,都存在法律上的完全可兑换性,但事实上的可兑换性取决于不发生大规模兑换的假设。在这一阶段,货币与纯粹商品之间的关系在几个方面变得模棱两可——包括不确定黄金和白银中究竟存有多少纯粹商品价值。¹《尼各马可伦理学》,第五卷。²《泰晤士报》(伦敦),1937 年 6 月 16 日。

Money has the aspect of "pure commodity" insofar as it consists of or is backed by one or more commodities with substantial intrinsic value. From the earliest times, money has derived either all or a good part of its value from its physical or legal relationship to monetary commodities, usually gold or silver. More recently it has appeared, conversely, that a good part of the value of both silver and gold is derived from their status as monetary metals. This latter fact suggests that a new stage in monetary technique may be appropriate, in which monetary status and pure commodity value are made reciprocally beneficial. That is, money will be benefited by commodity backing and commodities will be benefited by monetary status. Historically, money's identification with pure commodity values falls into three stages: being first complete, then partial or fractional, and then completely absent. The first stage is characterized by Aristotle's statement that "the substance of money should be something which is intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life—for example, iron, silver, and the like." The emergence of gold as the primary monetary commodity, and the defeat of its rivals, seems to be associated historically with a gradual loss of emphasis on its pure commodity aspects, and its assumption of what R. H. Brand called "a certain mystic quality.?' Thus through the ages gold appears to have transformed itself slowly from pure commodity into pure money-from the physical to the metaphysical. At a point just before World War II it threatened to lose all its contacts with human realities--at least in the Western World. In the second stage, all forms of money are legally exchangeable for gold, but the quantity of gold available is much less than the money claims against it. Under the Federal Reserve System, prior to 1934 the relationship between our paper money and gold was about the same as that between our demand deposits and currency. In either case complete convertibility existed de jure, but de facto convertibility depended on the absence of mass conversions. In this stage the relationship between money and pure commodity has become ambiguous in several respects-—including uncertainty as to how much pure commodity value resides in gold and silver. 1 Nicomachean Ethics. Book V. 3 The Times (London), June 16, 1937,

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货币属性的变迁 305

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF MONEY 305

第二阶段纯商品本位中的部分储蓄比例,可以通过我们的黄金持有量与流通货币总量加上“调整后”活期存款的比率来说明。(本文余下部分所称“货币”均指这一总量。)1900 年该比率为 18%,1929 年为 16%,1940 年超过 50%,而目前又回到约 18%。我将提及但不详细讨论金本位下黄金作为内部信用体系与进出口流量调节器的额外作用。我认为,这些功能并非源于黄金作为商品的特质,而是源于正式的货币结构。众所周知,亚当·斯密和大卫·李嘉图曾将一国持有的货币性黄金和白银存量视为经济浪费。他们更倾向于“良好管理的纸币”,但也认识到有效管理需要以黄金即期兑付纸币的义务。因此,在古典理论中,金属储备应保持在保障可兑换性的最低必要水平。然而,世界无法将纸币维持“良好管理”,这不可避免地导致了一种普遍观点:一个国家持有的黄金越多越好。

The fractional aspect of pure commodity backing in the second stage may be illustrated by the ratio of our gold holdings to the total of currency outstanding plus "adjusted" demand deposits. (In the balance of this paper the word "money" will refer to this total.) The ratio was 18 per cent in 1900, 16 per cent in 1929, over 50 per cent in 1940, and again at about 18 per cent at the present time. I shall mention, but not dilate upon, the additional role of gold under the gold standard as regulator of both the internal credit system and the import-export flow. These functions arise, I believe, not from the quality of gold as commodity but from the formal monetary structure. As is well known, Adam Smith and Ricardo considered a nation's stock of monetary gold and silver as akin to economic waste. They preferred a "well-regulated paper currency"," but they recognized that effective regulation required the obligation to redeem paper money in gold on demand. Hence in classical theory the metal reserve should be held to the minimum necessary to guarantee convertibility. But the world's inability to keep its paper money "well regulated" led inevitably to the common view that the more gold a nation held the

假如我们把这一第二阶段的漫长历史回顾,可能会对银行存款和纸币成功取代金银感到惊讶。它们的唯一优势是便利;而它们最大的不足,则是缺乏实体形态,并且屡次被证明作为资产比等量的贵金属更差。在很长的时间里,我们每个人本可以轻松把所有的钱换成黄金持有,但我们却偏偏选择了银行存款和 10 美元钞票。显然,至少大多数美国人和英国人,从拥有乐趣的角度,对金银本身的商品属性几乎没什么兴趣。我们对它们的兴趣是出于自我保护或消极应对。我们想要黄金,只因为我们不信任纸币。每当我们重新信任纸币——而且常常是不明智地信任——我们就对黄金失去了兴趣。第三阶段,货币凭主观选择完全脱离商品支撑,可以说在 20 世纪 30 年代末的英国就已存在。英国不仅在经济压力下放弃了金本位——这种情况许多国家都经历过——而且此后明确否定了以黄金作为货币支撑的原则,认为它过时且本质上不可取。英国明确表示,即使有能力也不会回到金本位——对于《国富论》第四卷第一章,参见李嘉图《政治经济学及赋税原理》第八章:“一种货币最完美的状态是完全由纸币构成,但这种纸币的价值必须等于它所声称代表的黄金。”

If we view the history of this second stage over a long period, we may be surprised at the success with which bank deposits and paper money have gained acceptance in place of gold and silver. Their sole advantage has been convenience; their crying disadvantage has been that they lack physical substance, and that time after time they have proved a poorer asset than their equivalent in precious metals. For long periods each of us could have held all his money in gold just for the asking, but instead we have preferred bank deposits and $10 bills. It is clear that most Americans and Britishers, at least, have had very little interest in the pure commodity aspect of gold and silver from the standpoint of joy of possession. Our interest therein has been self-protective or negative. We have desired gold only as we mistrusted paper. Whenever we could trust paper again—and often unshrewdly—we lost interest in gold. The third stage, in which money is by choice completely divorced from commodity backing, may be said to have existed in Great Britain in the late thirties. Not only did England leave the gold standard under economic pressure-which has happened to many nations-but thereafter she definitely repudiated the principle of gold backing for her currency, as old-fashioned and inherently undesirable. Britain said clearly that she would not go back to gold even if she could-and for Wealth of Nations, Book IV, 1. Cf. also Ricardo, Princibles of Political Economy and Taxation, Ch. VIII: A curren a in is most perfect state wen consis toll ot paper money, but of paper money of an equal value with the gold which it professes to represent."

306 美国经济学会

306 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

第二次世界大战前几年,她无疑本可以回归金本位。如今,英国已通过布雷顿森林体系接受了本国货币与黄金挂钩。这一承诺中并未表明英镑将在国内获得有效的黄金支持,或与任何纯粹的实物商品价值建立直接联系。实际上,英镑可以在公开市场上兑换成黄金,就好比美国国债可以换一块金表——但这绝不是我们一直在讨论的那种“纯商品”属性。我们还可以补充一点:自 1933 年以来,美国一直处于货币发展第二阶段与第三阶段之间的灰色地带。从法律上讲,我们现在仅承诺维持美元在对外汇兑中的黄金等值——这与英国在布雷顿森林体系下承担的义务大致相同。但更明确地说,美国财政部被指示在必要时以每盎司 35 美元的价格出售黄金,以保障美元的汇兑价值。战时货币债权空前膨胀,本可预期会增加美国人对实物黄金相对于信用纸币的偏好。我的调查得出的结论是,尽管黄金可以通过多种方式被囤积,但并没有出现明显的囤积行为。在我们所有黑市中,从未听说过美国有黄金黑市——尽管国外这种黑市盛行。在我看来,这一事实非同寻常。这说明,在不到一代人的时间里,公众对黄金的态度已发生了一场革命。街上的普通人很可能赞同《商业周刊》近期的说法:“实际上,今天的黄金是从美元中获得价值的。” 而不久前,每个人都相信,美国的货币价值主要来源于其黄金背书。®

白银的历史则与黄金相反。白银在货币地位上趋于下降,同时在工业用途上却有所提升。英国刚决定放弃其延续千年的白银货币体系,并熔化所有银币,这主要是为了满足国家对该金属的工业需求。* 上次世界大战期间,美国财政部被迫出借大量货币白银用于工业用途——约 3 万吨,其中近一半流向了原子弹项目。” 相比之下,黄金在战争中的工业用途微不足道。* 《商业周刊》,1946 年 11 月 2 日,第 10 页。 “参见 1946 年 8 月纽约国民城市银行信函中关于国外黄金溢价的相关讨论。我们篇幅有限,无法讨论出现在落后国家和货币贬值国家的“黄金溢价”。8 《金融时报》(伦敦),1946 年 9 月 18 日,第 1 页。

some years prior to World War II she could undoubtedly have returned to gold. England has now accepted a link between her currency and gold, via Bretton Woods. There is no indication in this undertaking that the pound will be given an effective gold backing at home, or that it will have any direct tie to pure commodity values. The pound may be in fact exchangeable for gold in the open market, just as a United States government bond can be exchanged for a gold watch-—but this would in no sense be a "pure commodity" aspect such as we have been discussing. We may add that since 1933 the United States has been in twilight zone between the second and third stage of monetary development. Legally we are now committed only to maintaining the gold equivalent for the dollar in foreign exchange-which is about the same kind of obligation as England assumes under Bretton Woods. But more explicitly, the Treasury is directed to sell gold at $35 per ounce when necessary to secure the exchange value of the dollar. The unparalleled expansion of monetary claims during the war might well be expected to have increased the preference of Americans for physical gold as against fiduciary paper. My inquiries lead to the conclusion that there has been no appreciable hoarding of gold, although the latter was feasible in various ways. Amid all our black markets, we have never heard of a black market for gold in this country-despite its prevalence abroad. To my mind this fact is extraordinary. It indicates that within not more than a generation there has been something of a revolution in the popular attitude toward gold. The man in the street probably subscribes to the recent statement in Business Week that "actually gold derives its value from the American dollar today.'' Not so long ago it was everyone's belief that the money of the United States derived its value chiefly from being backed by gold.® The history of silver has been the opposite to that of gold. Silver has tended to lose in monetary status while it gained in industrial utility. Great Britain has just decided to abandon its thousand-year silver currency, and to melt down all its silver coins, largely in order to supply the nation's industrial needs for the metal.* During the last war the United States Treasury was compelled to loan out a huge amount of its monetary silver for industrial use-some 30,000 tons, of which nearly half went to the atomic bomb project." By contrast, the industrial uses of gold in the war were negligible. * Buriness Week. November 2, 1946, p. 10. " See discussions of gold premiums abroad in the August, 1946, letter of the National City Bank of New York. We have not space to discuss the "gold premiums" appearing backward countries and those with depreciating currencies. 8 Financial Times (London), September 18, 1946, p. 1.

“归还借入白银的计划” ——《商业与金融纪事报》,1946 年 11 月 14 日

"Plans to Return Borrowed Silver " "Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 14, 1946.

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货币性质的变化 现在我想谈谈货币商品属性的第四个可能阶段——在这个阶段中,纸币与一篮子基础商品之间建立起双向兑换关系。有人可能认为,这等于回到了第一阶段早期(多种不同商品充当货币)与第二阶段(货币数量超过商品货币数量)的组合。不过在我看来,商品储备货币方案在货币领域标志着一个新起点。其目标与其说是赋予货币以商品价值,不如说是给予商品以货币价值。让我们的货币部分得到基础商品支撑——“适用于生活用途的物品”——应该带来真正的好处,因为无担保且不可兑换的纸币历史总体糟糕,这说明实物支撑和可兑换性是货币的理想属性。但商品储备方案的新颖货币之处在于,它旨在让原材料生产商作为一个群体,享受到目前金银生产者所享有的经济优势:即以固定价格无限量吸纳平衡产出的市场。作为衍生效果,它旨在保护整个经济免受基础商品市场价格反复大幅波动的有害影响。未来的货币不能再完全与纯粹的商品价值等同,但可以而且应该与这些价值相关联。某些关键商品应在商品世界与货币世界之间架起一座宽阔的桥梁。这些关键商品进出货币状态的过程,可以为整个经济提供重要的均衡因素,或称平衡轮。正如哈耶克指出的那样,黄金本身已不再足够重要到能充分扮演这一角色;未来货币与纯粹商品之间的关系,应建立在比贵金属更广泛的基础上。如果只有相对少量的纯粹商品作为货币背后的担保,究竟能给当今庞大的货币结构带来什么好处,很难绝对断言。未来人们对美元的信心,一部分取决于被公认为稳健的政府政策,另一部分则取决于群体心理。本发言者认为,将一定数量的基础商品置于我们货币背后将是稳健的政策,而这些商品的存在将有助于形成一种对货币的信心心理。参见本杰明·格雷厄姆《世界商品与世界货币》(纽约,1944 年);弗里德里希·A·哈耶克《商品储备货币》,《经济学杂志》1943 年 6-9 月号;等等。哈耶克,同前引书,第 177-178 页。

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF MONEY I should like now to refer to a possible fourth stage in the commodity aspect of money—one in which a two-way exchange is established between paper money and a composite group of basic com-modities. It may be thought that this would amount to returning to a combination of the early part of stage 1—in which many different commodities functioned as money-and stage 2, in which more money exists than monetary commodities. In my view, however, the proposal for commodity reserve currency® marks a new departure in the monetary field. Its object is not so much to give commodity value to money as to give monetary value to commodities. There should be a real advantage in having our money backed in part by basic commodities-"objects applicable to the purposes of life"—for the generally bad history of unsecured and inconvertible paper money suggests that physical backing and convertibility are desirable attributes of money. But the novel monetary aspect of the commodity reserve idea is that it is designed to benefit the producers of raw materials by giving them as a group the economic advantages now enjoyed by producers of gold and silver; namely, an unlimited market at a level price for balanced production. As a derived effect, it is designed to protect the entire economy from the baleful results of recurrent wide fluctuations in the market price of basic commodities. The money of the future cannot again be fully identified with pure commodity values, but it can and should be related to such values. Certain key commodities should form a broad connecting bridge between the world of goods on the one hand and the world of money on the other. The flow of such key commodities into and out of monetary status can supply an important factor of equilibrium, or balance wheel, for the entire economy. As Hayek pointed out," gold is no longer important enough intrinsically to perform this role adequately; and the relationship between money and pure commodi-ties should rest in the future on a broader base than the precious metals. It is difficult to state categorically what advantage will accrue to the huge monetary structure of today if a relatively small amount of pure commodities are placed behind it as security. Future confidence in the dollar will depend in part on government policies recognized as sound, and in part on mass psychology. In this speaker's opinion, the placing of a quantity of basic commodities behind our money will be sound policy, and their presence will contribute to a psychology of confidence in our currency. "See B. Graham, World Commodities and World Currency (New York. 1944): F. A. Hayek, "A Commodity Reserve Currency." Economic Journal, Tune-September. 1943; etc. "Hayek, loc. cit., pp. 177, 178.