CNBC文字记录:《巴菲特与芒格:财富的智慧》贝基·奎克特别节目
播出时间美国东部时间 6 月 29 日周二晚上 8 点
WHENTuesday, June 29 th at 8pm ET
播出频道CNBC “巴菲特与芒格:财富的智慧”
WHERECNBC's "Buffett & Munger: A Wealth of Wisdom"
以下是 CNBC 一小时特别节目“巴菲特与芒格:财富的智慧”的非官方字幕稿。节目由亿万富翁投资者沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格,以及 CNBC 的贝基·奎克共同呈现,于今晚(6 月 29 日周二)首播。以下是 CNBC.com 上完整视频的链接:https://www.cnbc.com/live-tv/cnbc-originals/full-episode/buffett-munger-a-wealth-of-wisdom/1916406339994
Following is the unofficial transcript of CNBC's hour-long special, "Buffett & Munger: A Wealth of Wisdom," with billionaire investors Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger and CNBC's Becky Quick, which premiered tonight, Tuesday, June 29 th . Following is a link to the full video on CNBC.com: https://www.cnbc.com/live-tv/cnbc-originals/full-episode/buffett-munger-a-wealth-of-wisdom/1916406339994
所有引用必须注明来源为 CNBC。
All references must be sourced to CNBC.
PART I
PART I
[2015 年 5 月] 沃伦·巴菲特:我是沃伦,这是查理。他能听见,我能看见。我们一起合作。
[MAY 2015] WARREN BUFFETT: I'm Warren, this is Charlie. He can hear and I can see. We work together.
[2016 年 5 月] 查理·芒格:我经常引用沃伦的话,大家都很喜欢。你走你的阳关道,它很宽敞。
[MAY 2016] CHARLIE MUNGER: I constantly quote Warren and everybody always loves it, you take the high road and its uncrowded.
[2018 年 2 月] 巴菲特:我们知道我们算是天作之合,这么多年从来没有吵过架,我们都很固执。
[FEBRUARY 2018] BUFFETT: We knew we were sort of made for each other and we've never had an argument in this whole time, we are strong minded.
[2016 年 5 月] 巴菲特:得到好搭档的方法是成为一个好搭档,这些都是非常老派的观念,但效果出奇地好。
[MAY 2016] BUFFETT: The way to get a good partner is to be a good partner and these are very old-fashioned ideas and they just work so fabulously well.
贝基·奎克沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格,朋友超过 60 年,商业伙伴超过 50 年,共同执掌美国最大的公司之一——伯克希尔·哈撒韦。董事长兼首席执行官巴菲特,被誉为“奥马哈先知”,他在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的办公室里,通过运营这家集团企业、收购股票和公司,积累了超过 1000 亿美元的财富。副董事长芒格,在距离巴菲特不到一英里处长大,本是律师出身,实际却是投资者。两人在成年后芒格搬到了现在的家——洛杉矶——才相遇。相隔 1500 英里,这对搭档将伯克希尔·哈撒韦从一家单一的纺织厂,打造成了价值 6500 亿美元的巨头,旗下业务涵盖铁路运营商伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路(BNSF)、保险公司 GEICO,到 Fruit of the Loom、冰雪皇后(Dairy Queen)和克莱顿住宅公司,并管理着价值 3000 亿美元的投资组合,持有苹果、美国银行和可口可乐等公司的股票。今晚,我们为您讲述他们可能最伟大的成就——60 年的友谊,以及他们在这个过程中从彼此身上学到的商业和人生经验。90 岁的巴菲特,话很多;97 岁的芒格,话很少,但每句都更尖锐。
BECKY QUICKWarren Buffett and Charlie Munger, friends for more than six decades, business partners for more than five, together sitting atop one of the country's biggest companies, Berkshire Hathaway. Buffett, the Chairman and CEO, known as the oracle of Omaha, amassed a more than $100 billion fortune running the conglomerate, acquiring stocks and companies from his office in Omaha, Nebraska and Vice Chairman Munger, who grew up less than a mile from Buffett, a lawyer by training but an investor by practice. They met as adults after Munger had moved to his current home, Los Angeles. From 1,500 miles apart, the duo built Berkshire Hathaway from a single textile mill to a $650 billion powerhouse, running companies from railroad operator Burlington Northern Santa Fe and insurance company Geico to Fruit of the Loom, Dairy Queen and Clayton Homes and managing a portfolio of $300 billion in shares of companies like Apple, Bank of America and Coca Cola. Tonight, we bring you the story of perhaps their greatest accomplishment, sixty years of friendship and the lessons they've learned from each other along the way in business and life. 90-year-old Buffett, a man of many words, and 97-year-old Munger, a man of fewer, but his are more pointed.
[2004 年 5 月] 芒格:我宁愿把一条毒蛇扔进我的衬衫领口,也不愿去雇一个薪酬顾问。
[MAY 2004] MUNGER: I would rather throw a viper down my shirt front than hire a compensation consultant.
[2006 年 5 月] 芒格:对,嗯,我认为他疯了。
[MAY 2006] MUNGER: Yeah, well, I think he's demented
[2015 年 5 月] 芒格:你不能跟你的那个游手好闲、酗酒的姐夫建立商业伙伴关系。
[MAY 2015] MUNGER: You can't form a business partnership with your shriftless drunken brother in law.
奎克巴菲特和芒格直言不讳的性格,以及他们拒绝追逐脱离基本市场分析的热门市场趋势的做法,并不总能为他们赢得朋友——就像他们对比特币的看法。
QUICKBuffett and Munger's outspoken nature and their refusal to chase hot market fads that stray from fundamental market analysis don't always win them friends, like their take on Bitcoin.
[2019 年 5 月] 芒格:比特币毫无价值,是人工黄金。
[MAY 2019] MUNGER: Bitcoin is worthless, artificial gold.
[2019 年 2 月] 巴菲特:比特币构想巧妙,区块链也很重要,但比特币本身没有任何独特价值,它什么也生产不出来。你可以整天盯着它看,也不会有小比特币冒出来或类似的东西。它基本上是一种错觉。
[FEBRUARY 2019] BUFFETT: Bitcoin its ingenious and blockchain is important but bitcoin has no unique value at all it doesn't produce anything. You can stare at it all day and no little bitcoins come out or anything like that. It's a delusion basically.
[2021 年 5 月] 芒格:我想我应该谦虚地说,我认为这整个该死的发展令人作呕,并且违背了文明的利益。
[MAY 2021] MUNGER: I think I should say modestly that I think the whole damn development is disgusting and contrary to the interest of civilization
奎克尽管这对搭档在过去 45 年里,以伯克希尔的投资组合取得了超越市场的表现,但在过去 5 年和 10 年里,他们落后于标普 500 指数,这导致一些人质疑他们是否已经失去了往日的功力。他们对此并不担心。
QUICKAnd while the pair delivered market beating performances with the Berkshire portfolio for four and a half decades, they have lagged the S&P 500 for the last 5 and 10 years leading some to question whether they've lost their touch. They're not concerned.
[2021 年 5 月] 芒格:我持有伯克希尔非常安心。我认为我们的业务比市场上的平均水平要好。
[MAY 2021] MUNGER: I'm quite comfortable holding Berkshire. I think our businesses are better than the average on the market.
奎克我们请芒格和巴菲特谈谈他们对商界一些最新头条新闻的看法,这些事件可能对市场运作方式产生持久影响——首先是瑞士信贷因与 Archegos Capital Management 的业务往来而遭受的 55 亿美元损失。
QUICKWe asked Munger and Buffett their thoughts on some of the latest headlines in the business world, those that could have lasting impact on how markets operate beginning with Credit Suisse's five and a half billion dollar loss stemming from its business with Archegos Capital Management.
芒格想想那有多愚蠢。当然,原因是那个白痴付给你轻而易举赚到的钱,让你给一个混蛋做主要经纪商。但那个混蛋是个被判有罪的内幕交易者,来自对冲基金行业最疯狂的部分。他们通过提供不寻常的信贷来获取不寻常的利润。我是说,整个世界都在对他们大喊:“骗子,傻瓜。”他们就是不听。他们想:“这里才有轻松赚的钱——骗子加傻瓜。”
MUNGERThink of how massively stupid that was. And of course, it was the lure of the really easy money that the idiot was paying you, being the prime broker for a jerk. But he was a convicted insider trader that came out of the craziest part of the hedge fund industry. And they were getting unusual profits by extending unusual credit. I mean, it was just, the world was shouting at them, "Crook. Fool." And they didn't listen. They thought, "This is where the easy money is, crooks and fools."
巴菲特有一条规则——
BUFFETTThere's one rule--
芒格我们两个都不喜欢——
MUNGERWe don't like either of--
巴菲特我们很久以前就学到,你不能和一个坏人做成好交易。算了吧。如果你以为自己能拟定一份合同,用来对付一个坏人,那他们会赢。但有一件事,他们可能喜欢打官司。不过,伯克希尔·哈撒韦这个实体,或者我个人,或者其他任何东西,我们不想把一生都花在那类事情上。而且,坏人会赢。他们懂得更多花招。他们最终可能会输,但这不是度过一生的方式。
BUFFETTThat, that we learned a long time ago is that you can't make a good deal with a bad person. Just forget it. Now, if you think you can draw up a contract that, that is going to work against a bad person, they're gonna win. But one thing, they, they probably enjoy litigation but ah, Berkshire Hathaway as an entity, or me personally, or anything, we don't wanna spend our life, you know, doing that sort of thing. And, and besides, the bad guys win. They know more games. They may lose eventually in the but, but it's no way to spend your life.
奎克查理,被 Archegos 拖下水的不仅仅是瑞士信贷。很多公司都和 Archegos 有业务往来——
QUICKCharlie, it wasn't just Credit Suisse that got pulled in by that. There were a lotta firms that were doing business with Archegos and--
芒格是的。是的。它们都很愚蠢。但瑞士信贷成功地成为了所有人里最愚蠢的那个。
MUNGERYes. Yes. They were all foolish. But, but Credit Suisse has managed to be the biggest fool of all.
巴菲特嗯,贝基,如果你回顾——
BUFFETTWell, Becky, if you look back--
芒格争夺那个名次,竞争还很激烈——
MUNGERA lot of competition for that order--
巴菲特在 19——
BUFFETTIn nineteen--
MUNGERHonor.
MUNGERHonor.
巴菲特在 1934 年,大崩盘之后,嗯,1932 和 33 年他们举行了听证会。他们确定,异常高的杠杆率是 1929 年问题的原因之一。而且,它可能对整个经济构成危险。所以,他们赋予美联储委员会决定人们可以用股票借多少钱的权力,也就是保证金要求。比如当——
BUFFETTIn 1934, after the great crash well, 1932 and '33 they held these hearings. And they decided that unusual amounts of leverage were one cause of the problem in the 1929. And that, that it posed, it could pose dangers even to the economy. So, they gave the Federal Reserve Board the right to establish how much people could borrow against stocks, margin requirements. Like when--
芒格这是个非常好的主意。
MUNGERWhich was a very good idea.
巴菲特这是个绝妙的主意。他们——
BUFFETTIt was a terrific idea. And they--
芒格完全正确。
MUNGERTotally sound.
巴菲特美联储在 1934 年到 1973 年间,我想使用了那个权力 23 或 24 次。他们甚至把保证金提到 100%。但他们负责监管,判断过高的杠杆率是否可能带来系统性风险。然后,1973 年或 74 年的规定是 50%;今天的规则还是 50%。在过去的 40 多年里,前 40 多年,它变过 23 次。它到过 100%;也降到过,你知道,各种水平。它是对经济的一种信号之类的东西。而本质上,华尔街找到了绕过它的办法。
BUFFETTThe Federal Reserve, between 1934 and 1973, used that power I think 23 or 24 times. They even raised margins to 100%. But they were the regulators of determining whether excess leverage might have systemic problems associated with. And then and, and the rule in 1973 or '4 was 50%; the rule today is 50%. It has in the last, you know, 40+ years, first 40-some years, it, it had 23 changes. It went to 100%; it went down to, you know, all kinds. And it was the signal to the economy and all kinds of things. And essentially, Wall Street figured out how to get around that.
芒格他们通过游说,促使法律发生了变化。
MUNGERThey lobbied through changes in the law.
BUFFETTYeah.
BUFFETTYeah.
芒格这样他们就可以拥有无限的杠杆,把交易放在表外,并采用模糊的会计处理。
MUNGERSo, they could have unlimited leverage, and keep the transactions off the books and subject to murky accounting.
奎克银行会说,“我们挺过来了。我们自己消化了所有问题,我们中的许多,你知道的,甚至不会因此在资产负债表上遭受重大损失。” 你会——
QUICKThe, the banks would say, "We made it through this. We absorbed all the problems ourselves and, and many of us, you know, won't even take a substantial hit on the, on the balance sheet for it." What would—
芒格嗯,有个老故事,关于所有这些觉得自己干得很漂亮的银行。两个家伙在用剃刀打架。一个猛地一挥,另一个说:“你没砍到我。”那个家伙说:“等你摇头的时候再说。”
MUNGERWell, there's an old story about the all these banks that think they've done so well. These two guys are fighting with razors. One takes a big swipe and the other guy says, "You missed me." And the guy says, "Wait until you shake your head."
奎克那么,你今天会对监管者说什么?你会怎么做——
QUICKSo, what would you tell regulators today? What would you do--
芒格嗯,监管者不是,他们现在需要修改法律。但当然,如果你经营一个赌场,你会希望大玩家赌得更疯狂。这正是证券业所允许的。这是一个巨大的错误。它造成了无数痛苦,所有这些我们不想引诱人们赌掉他们根本承受不起的钱。你还涉及到清算,这里有清算风险。整个市场一片混乱。那些从这种不合理信贷扩张中赚钱的人在为其辩护,没有人站出来反对。上一次,我们之所以得到正确的监管,并让其在保证金债务方面长期有效,仅仅是因为我们经历英语世界历史上最严重的大萧条。这才能让政治家们稍微清醒一点。这一次呢?只是总收益互换而已。
MUNGERWell, the regulators aren't, they need to change laws now. But of course, if you're running a gambling parlor, you want the big players to gamble more furiously. And that's what the securities business allowed people to do. It was a big mistake. It created a lot of misery all this we don't wanna suck people into gambling for way more than they can afford. And you get into clearance, there were clearance risks in the thing. The whole market was in chaos. The people who are making money out of this unreasonable extension of credit argue for it, and nobody's speaking against it. And l, last time around, we got the correct regulation that came and stayed for a long time on margin debt only because we had the worst depression in the history of the English-speaking world. That's what it took to get a little sense into the politicians. This time around, it just total return swap.
奎克那么,怎么解决呢?我的意思是,有人建议需要更多——
QUICKSo what fixes it though. I mean, there have been suggestions that there needs to be more--
巴菲特嗯,我们解决过——
BUFFETTWell, we fixed it--
奎克透明度,确实需要严厉打击这种允许人们如此高杠杆的行为。什么,什么才是——
QUICKTransparency, there needs to be really a crackdown on allowing people to lever up like this. What, what's--
芒格正确的——
MUNGERThe correct--
奎克答案?
QUICKThe answer?
芒格答案就是一开始就不该允许这些东西出现。
MUNGERAnswer was never to have allowed most of this stuff to start.
巴菲特但我认为——
BUFFETTBut I think--
芒格如果你允许错误的东西出现,并且它失控了——
MUNGERIf you allow the wrong kinda stuff to start, and it runs on you--
巴菲特但这,这对一个监管者来说非常非常非常困难。去打击小玩意儿很容易。但要去追查那些大人物,你就是在攻击一个又一个一个机构的利润中心。
BUFFETTAnd but it's, it is tough to be very, very, very tough to it's a regulator. It's easy to, you know, to really go after the big stuff, you're attacking the profit center of institution after institution after institution.
芒格主要经纪业务,就其本质而言,意味着你专门借钱给,借钱给那些大玩家。当然,这很危险。他们违反的规则是,同一个人同时找四五个经纪商借钱。当然,他买股票是为了维持股价,防止追加保证金。一旦你开始那样做,你就走向一个丑陋的结局,当然它发生了。
MUNGERThe, the prime brokerage things, by very nature, means you're, you're specializing at lending, lending to the big swingers. And of course, it's dangerous. And rules they violated, the same guy was hitting up four or five brokers at once. And of course, he was buying stocks to keep them up to prevent margin calls. Once you start doing that, you're headed for a ugly ending, and of course it happened.
奎克但你认为,是不是需要像你提到的“大萧条”那样发生一次系统性崩溃,才会再次真正实施改革?
QUICKBut do you think that it would take a systemic breakdown before changes would actually get implemented again, like you reference with the Great Depression?
芒格嗯,上一次,我们经历了英语世界有史以来最严重的大萧条。那就是上次修正所付出的代价。我当然不希望那样。
MUNGERWell, I, the last time, it took the worst depression in the English-speaking world in all history. That's what it took to get the last correction. I certainly don't want that.
巴菲特现在,它——
BUFFETTNow, it--
芒格一个明智的监管者——
MUNGERA wise regulator--
巴菲特我们可以直接开始——
BUFFETTWe could just start--
芒格但一个明智的监管者会在这些东西开始之前就制止它。
MUNGERBut a wise regulator stops this stuff before it starts.
巴菲特不过要制止它很困难——
BUFFETTIt's very hard to stop though--
查理·芒格这个事让我觉得有意思的是,中国共产党正在做我支持的那些事。而我们自己这个美妙的自由企业经济体,却在任由所有这些疯狂的人搞出如此过度的乱象。那些在回避这种乱象的,恰恰是中国共产党人。他们会提前干预,制止投机行为。
MUNGERWhat, yeah, what interests me in this is that the communist Chinese behave the way I am talking in favor of. And our own wonderful free enterprise economy is letting all these crazy people go to this gross excess. People who are avoiding it are the communist Chinese. They step in preemptively to stop speculation.
贝基·奎克查理,你说中国共产党现在做的事,正是我们自己目前应该做的事。我忍不住想到他们对——
QUICKCharlie, you said communist China is doing all the things that we should be doing right now, and I, I can't help but think of what they're--
查理·芒格嗯,我有——
MUNGERWell, I have a--
贝基·奎克他们对马云做的那些事。
QUICKWhat they've done to Jack Ma.
查理·芒格这让我觉得挺好笑,你知道——
MUNGERThat amuses me, you know--
贝基·奎克他们对马云做的那些事呢?他基本上消失了——
QUICKWhat about what they've done to Jack Ma? He's kind of disappeared as--
查理·芒格嗯,是啊,但马云是那种“狂人”之一。所以,他们只是把他拿下,他们说的是:“滚蛋吧你。”他基本是在一次演讲里,对一个一党制国家说:“你们这帮人全是蠢货,根本不知道自己在干什么。而我知道自己在干什么,而且我会干得更好。”然后他就想闯进银行业,不受任何规则约束,想干什么就干什么。
MUNGERWell, yes, but Jack Ma is one of the swingers. So, they just cut his, they said, "To hell with you." He basically gave a speech when he said to a, to a one-party state, "Well, you guys are a buncha jerks, don't know what you're doing. And I know what I'm doing, and I'm gonna do it better." And he was gonna wade into banking and no rules and just do whatever he pleased.
贝基·奎克他还把——
QUICKHe also brought--
查理·芒格中国,中国——
MUNGERThe Chinese, the Chinese--
贝基·奎克把金融服务带给很多人——
QUICKBanking to a lot of people—
查理·芒格中国共产党做了正确的事。他们只是把马云叫来,说:“你不会搞这事的,小子。”而且我希望我们也有——我不是要全盘采用中国的体制,但我肯定希望自己国家能拥有其中的金融部分。
MUNGERCommunists did the right thing. They just called in Jack Ma and say, "You aren't gonna do it, sonny." And, and I wish we had a, I don't want the, all of the Chinese system, but I certainly would like to have the financial part of it in my own country.
贝基·奎克可在那之前,蚂蚁金服确实在把金融服务带给大量没有银行账户的人群。我是说,他们做的一些事——
QUICKAlthough Ant Financial was bringing banking to a huge un-banked population before. I mean, there were things that they were doing that--
查理·芒格我知道,但你不想让一个“狂人”来运作银行。银行有政府的隐形担保,你绝对不能让任何狂人来经营银行。让狂人们去干别的事。
MUNGERI know, but you don't want a swinger to run. The banks have the implicit guarantee of the government, and you don't, you don't want to let any swinger run a bank. Let the swingers do something else.
贝基·奎克那在这个国家,谁是狂人?
QUICKWho are the swingers here in this country?
查理·芒格嗯,我可不想开始点名谁是狂人。
MUNGERWell, I don't wanna start naming swingers.
沃伦·巴菲特他们会冒出来的。
BUFFETTThey'll, they'll appear.
贝基·奎克你知道,这件事的普遍说法是,中国共产党不想失去权力。而一些资本家,至少在中国共产党看来,可能获得了过多权力。
QUICKYou know, the way the story's kinda been painted is that it's the Chinese communists who don't wanna lose power. And some of the capitalists who have maybe gained too much power under, under at least what the communists might like to see.
查理·芒格两边都想要更多权力,而不是更少。但是——
MUNGERBoth groups want more power, not less. But--
沃伦·巴菲特这个国家的政客——
BUFFETTPoliticians in this country--
查理·芒格但是他,但是——
MUNGERBut he, but--
沃伦·巴菲特想要更多权力。富人想要更多权力。
BUFFETTWant more power. The rich want more power.
查理·芒格是,是。不是,这有什么不一样呢?在中国也一样。嗯,而且,但是,银行体系里的影子银行,我们国家也有。人们会说:“嗯,它是一家新银行。”不过,整个杠杆收购贷款业务,几乎全从银行跑到了我们国家的影子银行体系里。现在还没闹出什么大乱子。但要是它将来不出问题,我反倒会吃惊。
MUNGERYes, yes. No, what's so, what's so different in China? Yeah. And, and but, but the banking system take shadow banking, which we have in this country. People say, "Well, it's a young bank." But, well, whole leverage buyout lending practically left the banks and went to shadow banks in our own country. And it hasn't caused any big trouble yet. But I'll be amazed if it doesn't.
贝基·奎克嗯,杰米·戴蒙说过这个话。比如,“当心某些金融科技领域”,它们不是——
QUICKWell, Jamie Dimon has said that. Like, "Look out for the, some of the fintech areas," that they're not--
查理·芒格对,这点我同意杰米·戴蒙。我不认为允许世界上所有狂人把自己当成银行来行事是个好主意。
MUNGERYes, I agree with Jamie Dimon on that. I, I don't think allowing all the swingers in the world to act as though they're banks is a good idea.
贝基·奎克也许我们应该聊聊罗宾汉和某些领域——
QUICKWhich maybe we should talk about Robinhood and some of the areas that--
查理·芒格嗯,罗宾汉是令人不齿的。
MUNGERWell, Robinhood is beneath contempt.
QUICKWhy?
QUICKWhy?
查理·芒格嗯,它是一个伪装成正经生意的赌场。
MUNGERWell, it's a gambling parlor masquerading as a respectable business.
贝基·奎克对这个说法的反驳总是:“这是让普通人进入市场的一种方式,”人们——
QUICKAnd the pushback on that is always, "This is a way of getting average people into the markets," people--
查理·芒格嗯,你当然不想——
MUNGERWell, of course you don't want--
贝基·奎克那些以前没有渠道的人——
QUICKWho didn't have access--
查理·芒格说它是一个赌场,但它就是个赌场。
MUNGERTo say you're a, it's a gambling parlor, but it is a gambling parlor.
沃伦·巴菲特它不会鼓励人们去买一个非常非常低成本的指数基金并持有 50 年。我向你保证,你走进去,不会得到那样的建议。
BUFFETTIt's not encouraging people to buy a very, very, very low-cost index fund and hold it for 50 years. I will guarantee you that you will not walk in there, get that advice.
MUNGERNo.
MUNGERNo.
沃伦·巴菲特相反,你会得到如何交易期权的建议,而且他们会告诉你——
BUFFETTInstead, you'll get advice on how you can trade options and, and, and, and, and they'll tell you that--
查理·芒格而且它告诉人们他们不用付佣金,实际上佣金只是被隐藏在了交易里。它基本上就是一个肮脏、不名誉的生意。有趣之处在于,有些你乐意他们娶进你家门的正经人,却支持了它。
MUNGERAnd it's telling people they aren't paying commissions when the commissions are simply disguised in the trading. It's basically a sleazy, disreputable operation. And the interesting thing about it is that some good people you would be glad to have marry into your family and have backed it.
PART II
PART II
贝基·奎克在本·科恩和杰里·格林菲尔德、奥普拉·温弗瑞和盖尔·金、或者谢尔盖·布林和拉里·佩奇之前,有沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格。两人都出生在内布拉斯加州的奥马哈,都在巴菲特祖父的杂货店打过工,但他们直到巴菲特 29 岁、芒格 35 岁时才相遇。要理解商业史上最成功的一对搭档,最好从故事的开头讲起,以及他们第一次是怎么见面的。
QUICKBefore Ben and Jerry, Oprah and Gayle, or Sergey Brin and Larry Page, there was Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. Born and raised in Omaha, Nebraska, both worked at Buffett's grandfather's grocery store, but their paths didn't cross until Buffett was 29 years old and Munger was 35. To understand the most successful couple in business, it's best to start at the beginning and how they first met.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,你想讲这个故事吗?
BUFFETTWell, want to tell the story?
查理·芒格你来讲吧。
MUNGERGo ahead.
沃伦·巴菲特有一对医生夫妇,在奥马哈很有名,丈夫叫埃迪·戴维斯,妻子叫多萝西·戴维斯。实际上是戴维斯太太给我打的电话。一切都是她在操持。她说:“我们听说你在管理资金,我们有点兴趣,想听听你怎么做的,以及我们可以跟你怎么合作。”于是我过去跟他们谈。当时我特别自以为是,你懂的,那会儿我一说到股票就停不下来。多萝西·戴维斯非常聪明,她每个字都听进去了。医生则坐在角落里,好像在玩悠悠球什么的,根本没怎么注意听。我说完后,妻子看了看丈夫,说:“我要给他 10 万美元。”我当时管理的资金大约只有 50 万美元,所以这是一笔大买卖。我用一种很客气的口吻说:“戴维斯医生,”我说:“您刚才其实没怎么注意听我说什么。我有点想知道,您为什么愿意给我这 10 万美元。”我这话说得比这谦逊多了。戴维斯医生看着我,说:“嗯,”他说:“你让我想起了查理·芒格。”我说:“嗯,我不认识查理·芒格是谁,但我喜欢他。”他给了我这 10 万美元,然后他们跟我讲起了查理,说他年轻时怎么跑来问他们医学问题,还给他们上课,我的意思是,他们显然非常喜欢他。这差不多成了他们的一个使命,找机会把我和查理撮合到一块。所以,查理在 1959 年他父亲去世后回到奥马哈,他母亲还住在那里。戴维斯夫妇真的把我们弄到了一起。他们安排了一次晚餐。过了大约五分钟,查理就已经在地上打滚,为自己的笑话笑得喘不过气来,这跟我的举动一模一样。所以我心想:“这家伙,我再找不到第二个了。”我们一见如故。
BUFFETTThere was a doctor couple, very prominent in Omaha, and his name was Eddie Davis, her name was Dorothy Davis. And it was Mrs. Davis that called me, actually. She did everything. She said, "We've heard that you manage money and, and we'd be kind of interested in listening to your story about how ya, how you do it, and what we might do with you." So I went over and I talked to 'em. And I was all full of myself and like that's, you know, I couldn't talk fast enough about stocks in those days. And, and Dorothy Davis, very smart, and she listened to every word. And the doctor was kind of over in the corner, submitting a yoyo or something, and really not paying much attention. And, and I got all through and the wife looked over at the doctor and said, "I'm gonna give him $100,000." And I was managing about $500,000 at the time, so it was a big deal. And in a very nice way, I said, "Dr. Davis," I said "you know, you really haven't been paying much attention to what I've been saying and everything. I, I'd kinda like to know why you're giving me this $100,000," I said. But it was much more modest than that way I edged into it. And Dr. Davis looked at me and he said, "Well," he says, "you remind me of Charlie Munger." And I said, "Well, I don't know who Charlie Munger is, but I like him." And he gave me $100,000 and, and then they told me about Charlie and what young kid, how he would be over there asking 'em questions on medicine and giving 'em lectures or I mean, they, they clearly loved him. And it sorta became their mission that, that sometime they wanted to get me and Charlie together. So, so Charlie, in, in 1959, his dad died and he came back to Omaha. His mother lived there and the Davises really got us together. So they arranged the dinner. And about five minutes into it, Charlie was sort of rolling on the floor laughing at his own jokes, which is exactly the same thing I did. So I thought, "This, I'm not gonna find another guy like this." And we just hit it off.
贝基·奎克查理,他们第一次是怎么跟你介绍沃伦的?他们是怎么跟你形容他的?
QUICKCharlie, what did they first tell you about Warren? How did they describe him to you?
查理·芒格嗯,戴维斯夫妇对我来说就像第二父母。他们两家各有三个孩子,我父亲最好的朋友是埃迪·戴维斯,我母亲最好的朋友是戴维斯太太。我在他们家来来回回地住,就像芒格家的另一所房子。戴维斯太太还给了我一份特权,就是当我不乖的时候,她可以打我屁股,就像我真是她自己的孩子一样。
MUNGERWell, the Davises were like second parents to me. There were two sets of three children, my father's best friend was Eddie Davis and my mother's best friend was Mrs. Davis. I lived in that house back and forth as though it were an alternate house of the Mungers. And Mrs. Davis gave me the honor of switching my legs when I misbehaved, just as if I were one of her own.
沃伦·巴菲特你大概没少给她机会——
BUFFETTYou probably gave her plenty--
查理·芒格所以,戴维斯一家要我做什么,我都会照做。
MUNGERSo, so, anything the Davises asked me to do, I was gonna do.
贝基·奎克你第一次见到沃伦时,对他有什么看法?
QUICKWhat did you think of Warren when you first met him?
查理·芒格我们相处得很好。哦,嗯,我们——
MUNGERWe got along fine. Oh, well, we--
沃伦·巴菲特我们俩的妻子当时都想:“天哪,又来一个。”
BUFFETTBoth of our wives thought, "My god, another one."
查理·芒格我喜欢沃伦的一点是他那种玩世不恭。我们对所有装腔作势的文明领袖,不会自然而然地怀有敬意。
MUNGERWhat I like about Warren is the irreverence. We don't have automatic reverence for the pompous heads of all civilization.
贝基·奎克这是随着年龄增长才有的,还是你们俩——
QUICKIs that something that came with age or you, you guys--
查理·芒格我们一直都是这样的。
MUNGERWe were always that way.
贝基·奎克天生就这样——
QUICKWere born with that--
沃伦·巴菲特不,我们一直都是这样。我们只是有点更极端。我学乖了一点。查理真没怎么学乖。不过,你知道,我第一眼就知道查理是那种我会喜欢、并且会从他身上学到东西的人。但这不是什么计算好的决定。这是很自然的事。而且我们在一起除了开心,还是开心。
BUFFETTNo, we were kind of always that way. We were, we're a little more extreme. I've learned to behave a little bit better. Charlie really hasn't learned much better. They, but we, you know, I, I just knew instantly Charlie was the kinda guy that I was gonna like, and I was gonna learn from. But, you know, it wasn't anything calculated, a decision or anything like that. The, it was, it was natural. And, and we have had nothing but fun.
贝基·奎克作为朋友和商业伙伴都开心。在遇到芒格几年后,巴菲特(他的投资合伙已增长到超过 26 万美元)发现了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。他在 1962 年开始买入这家纺织厂的股票,并在 1965 年取得了控股权。大约在同一时间,芒格放弃了律师生涯,自己经营着一家投资公司。直到巴菲特说服他关掉公司,加入伯克希尔。
QUICKFun both as friends and business partners. A few years after meeting Munger, Buffett, who had grown his investment partnership into more than a quarter million dollars, found Berkshire Hathaway. He started buying stock in the textile mill in 1962 and took ownership of it in 1965. Around the same time, Munger had given up his career as a lawyer and had been running his own investment firm. That is, until Buffett convinced him to shutter it and join him at Berkshire.
贝基·奎克那么,你们的商业关系是怎么开始的?
QUICKSo how did the business relationship start?
查理·芒格嗯,沃伦瞧不起我谋生的方式,而且他是对的。我过了很久才明白,他谋生的方式比我更好。但他最终说服了我,我是在浪费时间。
MUNGERWell, Warren had scorn for my way of making a living, and he was correct in that. It took me a long time to wise up that he had, had a better way of making a living than I did. But he finally convinced me that I was wasting my time.
贝基·奎克作为律师?
QUICKAs a lawyer?
MUNGERYeah.
MUNGERYeah.
沃伦·巴菲特我告诉他,当个爱好还行,但不是真正值得花时间的事。他差不多决定在洛杉矶复制我在奥马哈做的事,这太棒了。我们之间就是这么合拍。我们会煲很久的电话粥,那时候长途电话还很贵。我不会坐在那里掐着沙漏计时,但跟查理通话时,我的意思是,我家人都能分辨出是查理打来的。然后我就会跟他聊很久很久。
BUFFETTI told him it was okay as a hobby, but not the real way to spend his time. He more or less decided to duplicate in Los Angeles what I was doing in, in Omaha, which was great. We just connected. And we, we talked a long time on, on the phone when it was expensive to talk a long time on the phone. I, I didn't sit there with an hourglass or, but with Charlie, I mean, my family could tell when Charlie was calling. I mean, and then I would, we'd go on for a long, long time.
查理·芒格早些年我们很开心,因为那就像狩猎远征。我们玩得很开心。
MUNGERAnd we had fun in the early days 'cause it was like hunting expeditions. And we had a lot of fun.
PART III
PART III
贝基·奎克在沃伦·巴菲特执掌伯克希尔·哈撒韦的六十六年里,他做了数百笔交易。但信不信由你,他称收购伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身是他这辈子最糟糕的一笔交易。
QUICKOver the sixty-six years Warren Buffett has run Berkshire Hathaway, he has made hundreds of deals. But believe it or not, he calls acquiring Berkshire Hathaway itself was his worst trade ever.
[CNBC, 2010] 沃伦·巴菲特:事实是,我当时把一大笔钱投进了一个糟糕透顶的生意。而伯克希尔·哈撒韦成了我后来几乎所有事业的根基。所以到了 1967 年,当一家不错的保险公司出现时,我就用伯克希尔·哈撒韦把它买了下来。其实我当时应该用一家新公司去买的。因为伯克希尔·哈撒韦身上拖着这个锚,所有那些纺织资产。所以一开始,全是些没用的纺织资产。然后,我们慢慢往上添了点别的东西。但始终,我们都拖着这个锚。我花了二十年跟纺织业务死磕,最后才放弃。要是当初没把钱投进纺织业务,直接用那笔钱从头开始做一家保险公司,伯克希尔现在的价值会是它的两倍。
[CNBC, 2010] BUFFETT: Truth is I had now committed a major amount of money to a terrible business. And Berkshire Hathaway became the base for everything pretty much that I've done since. So in 1967, when a good insurance company came along, I bought it for Berkshire Hathaway. I really should, should have bought it for a new entity. Because Berkshire Hathaway was carrying this anchor, all these textile assets. So initially, it was all textile assets that weren't any good. And then, gradually, we built more things onto it. But always, we were carrying this anchor. And for 20 years, I fought the textile business before I gave up. And instead of putting that money into the textile business originally, we just started out with the insurance company, Berkshire would be worth twice as much as it is now.
贝基·奎克从第一笔交易开始,巴菲特很快就有查理·芒格加入,两人继续买入被低估公司的股票。两人都说,他们常常从自己的错误中学到更多,就像巴菲特和芒格联手做的第一笔交易之一——蓝筹印花——那样。
QUICKFrom that first deal, Buffett, soon joined by Charlie Munger, continued to buy stock in undervalued companies. The two say they often learned more from their mistakes, as was the case from one of Buffett and Munger's first deals together, Blue Chip Stamps.
查理·芒格嗯,我们和另一个朋友里克·盖林一起买入了蓝筹印花。很快,我们三个人就持有了大部分股票。然后,事情一环接一环。蓝筹印花现在成了伯克希尔的一部分。当然,赠品券业务已经消失了。我们早期共同拥有的那些业务都消失了。
MUNGERWell, we bought into Blue Chip Stamps together with a third, we had a third friend there, Rick Guerin. And pretty soon, the three of us together had most of the stock. And, and one thing led to another. And, and Blue Chip Stamps is now a part of Berkshire. And of course, the trading stamp business has disappeared. All the early businesses that we owned together have disappeared.
沃伦·巴菲特它们不是消失了,是失败了。
BUFFETTThey didn't disappear, they failed.
查理·芒格对,失败了。
MUNGERThey failed, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特对,没错。
BUFFETTYeah, right.
查理·芒格但是,在它们失败之前,我们从里面捞了那么多出来,所以对我们来说结果还是不错的。
MUNGERBut, but we took so much out of them before they failed that we, it still worked out fine for us.
沃伦·巴菲特我们让它们进化了。我是说,但,说实话,那三个基础业务最后都完蛋了。它们,你知道的,都倒闭了。确实,从某种意义上说,它们不再适应社会了。而且实际上,我们合伙做的第一笔、第一笔交易是一个叫多元化零售的公司,在巴尔的摩。我们在那里买了一家百货商店。桑迪·戈特斯曼有 10%,查理有 10%,在他的合伙公司里他有 10%,在我的合伙公司里我有 80%,我们三个。我们一直把它当,你知道,我可能有 80%,但我们是一视同仁的合伙人。我们往里面投了 600 万美元。我们管它叫多元化零售,但其实只有一家百货连锁店。不过我们玩得很开心。但我们很快也发现,我们进去没多久,这家百货公司就——
BUFFETTWe evolved them. I mean, but, but literally, the, the three base businesses all ended up disappearing. They, you know, they went outta business. They did, they no longer fit into the society, in a sense. And actually, the, the first, the very first deal that, that we joined in on was something called diversified retailing which was in Baltimore. We bought a department store there. And we had Sandy Gottesman had 10%, Charlie had 10%, and, and in his partnership, he had 10%, and I had 80% in our partnership, the three of us. And we always treated as, you know, we may have had 80, but we were equal partners. And, and we put $6 million into that. We called it diversified retailing, but we only had one department store chain. But we had, and we had a lotta fun with that. But we also saw, after we were in a little while, department this department store was--
查理·芒格墨迹还没干呢,我们就发现犯了个大错。没过多久就明白了。
MUNGERAs the ink dried, we dried, we realized we had made a big mistake. It didn't take very long.
BUFFETTYeah.
BUFFETTYeah.
贝基·奎克为什么?发生了什么?
QUICKWhy? What happened?
查理·芒格嗯,你听过那个老故事,“放我出这个陷阱。我决定我不喜欢这块奶酪。”我们就是想明白了,我们买进的是一个极其难做的生意,卖家做了个好决定,我们做了个坏决定。
MUNGERWell, you heard the old story, "Let me outta this trap. I've decided I don't like the cheese." We just wised up to the fact that it was one tough business we'd bought into, and that the sellers had made the good decision and we'd made a bad one.
沃伦·巴菲特我们当时有几个非常出色的人在帮我们打理,他们实际上是桑迪妻子的亲戚。而且——
BUFFETTWe had, we had some terrific people who were running it for us that were actually related to Sandy's wife. And--
查理·芒格特别正派的人。
MUNGERExceptionally honorable people.
沃伦·巴菲特确实正派的人。聪明。如果你在一个生意里——
BUFFETTReally honorable people. The smart. If you're losing--
MUNGERYes.
MUNGERYes.
沃伦·巴菲特跟一个聪明正派的人一起亏钱,你知道,那我们就遇到问题了。我的意思是,问题出在生意本身。把那个聪明正派的人用到别处去,把资本也挪到别处去。
BUFFETTMoney in a business with a smart, decent person, you know, it, we got a problem. I mean, that's the business. Use the smart, decent person and move 'em over some other place and move the capital some other place.
查理·芒格那家公司还没开始亏钱,但我们能看出来,很快就意识到它要亏钱了。
MUNGERThe, the company was not yet losing money, but we could see, we soon realized it was about to lose money.
沃伦·巴菲特对。所以,我们就把那家百货商店卖了。它在 1983 年倒闭了,但 Hutzler's,那家高档百货商店,它是在,我不确定,1985 年还是 86 年倒闭的。现在都没了。那里的人,很自然的,想再多开几家分店。但你不该把钱再投进一个注定失败的生意里。我们在里面投了 600 万美元的资本,那是个愚蠢的决定,等等。但那 600 万美元,现在能值多少,查理?按,它们相当于零点四股。
BUFFETTYeah. And, and so we, we sold the department store. It went outta business in 1983, but Hutzler's, which was the silk-stocking department store, they went outta business in, I don't know, 1985 or '6. They're, they're gone. And, and the people there, quite understandably, wanted to build more branch stores. But you don't wanna put more money into a business that's destined for failure. Now, we put $6 million of capital in that, and it was a dumb decision and everything. But that $6 million, what would it be worth now, Charlie? At, they got four-tenths of a share.
查理·芒格好多个亿了。
MUNGERGreat many billions.
沃伦·巴菲特哦,是,几百亿。
BUFFETTOh, it's, tens of billions.
MUNGERYeah.
MUNGERYeah.
沃伦·巴菲特现在,要是那家百货商店成功了,我们当时就有了个不错的小生意。每年给我们寄张不错的小支票来。但正因为它失败了,我们赚了 250 多亿,从那个失败里,虽然当时看不出来。
BUFFETTNow, if the department store had succeeded, we'd have a nice little business then. Send us a nice little check, but because it failed, we've made 25, well, we made more than $25 billion in that, didn't look like it at the time, though.
贝基·奎克那么,当你意识到这是个错误的时候,你是怎么做的?你是怎么处理它的?
QUICKSo, when you realized it was a mistake, what did you do? How, how did you address it?
沃伦·巴菲特我们让桑迪——我们当中最会推销的人——去把它卖了。然后就卖掉了。我们把钱投进了伯克希尔。
BUFFETTWe asked Sandy, who was the best salesman among us, to go sell it. And, and we sold it. And we put the money into Berkshire.
查理·芒格我们拿回了大约 95% 的本金。
MUNGERWe got about 95% of our money back.
沃伦·巴菲特对。而且我们当时还借了 600 万美元进去,所以现在我们有了钱,就买了伯克希尔的股票,买了蓝筹印花的股票,最后把它们全都整合到一起。那时候看起来像一盘意大利面,很不好,因为太复杂了。所以我们就把它们合并了。你知道,我现在还拿着股票,查理也还拿着从多元化零售出来的股票,我的一些合伙人也是。从过去遗留下来的。发生在我们身上最好的事情就是这块地方失败了,显然是个失败。
BUFFETTYeah. And we'd borrowed $6 million in there, so now we had, so we bought Berkshire stock and we bought Blue Chip Stamp stock and eventually put it all together. It looked like a plate of spaghetti at one time, which was not good, as it was complicated. And so, we, we put 'em all together. And, you know, I've still got stock and Charlie's still got stock that came out of retailing, as do a number of my partners. But from the old days. Best thing that happened to us was that this place failed obviously was a failure.
贝基·奎克为什么?你们学到了什么?
QUICKWhy? What did you learn?
沃伦·巴菲特你说什么——
BUFFETTPardon me--
查理·芒格赶快离开。
MUNGERTo leave quickly.
沃伦·巴菲特对。并且把资本挪到别处去。
BUFFETTYeah. And, and move the capital someplace else.
查理·芒格我们学到的一点是,如果明确某件事是个错误,就要赶紧改。拖下去也不会变好。
MUNGEROne thing we've learned is, if it's clear that something is a mistake, is to fix it quickly. It doesn't get better while you wait.
PART IV
PART IV
[2016 年 5 月] 查理·芒格:我学会了干 10 个小时的活儿挣 2 美元有多难。
[MAY 2016] MUNGER: I learned how hard it is to work for 10 hours for $2.
[2016 年 5 月] 沃伦·巴菲特:我们在商店周围的车道上铲又湿又深又重的雪。我看着我的祖父,他说:“我该付你们哥俩多少钱?一毛钱太少,一块钱太多。”我们从杂货店里学到的最主要的东西是:我们不想在杂货店里干活了。
[MAY 2016] BUFFETT: We shoveled wet, deep, heavy snow from these driveways around the store. I looked at my grandfather who said, "What should I pay you boys? A dime is too little and a dollar is too much. The main thing we learned from the grocery store is we didn't want to work in a grocery store.
贝基·奎克沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格都认为,他们的人生观很大一部分来自中西部成长经历。他们把成功归功于深厚的价值观,这种价值观让他们在整个职业生涯中保持脚踏实地,在生意和生活中与好人交往,并且在商业交易中走正路。
QUICKWarren Buffett and Charlie Munger agree, a lot of their outlook on life comes from their midwestern upbringing. They credit their success to a deep sense of values, which have kept them grounded throughout their careers, associating with good people, in business and in life, and to taking the high road in business transactions.
查理·芒格如果走正路利润高得多,那你选这条路就该得到多少赞誉吗?真正该得到赞誉的是那些即使走正路很痛苦也依然坚持的人。
MUNGERIf the high road is way more profitable, do you deserve a lotta credit for choosing it? People who get the credit are the people that take it even when it's painful.
贝基·奎克两人都说,这些价值观是幼年时由他们生命中各自的关键人物灌输的。
QUICKBoth say these values were instilled at a young age thanks to a key figure in each of their lives.
沃伦·巴菲特很久很久以前,人们甚至不知道这事,我们在伯克希尔有两家小保险公司,它们都破产了,只是我们没让它们破产。我的意思是,换句话说,我们本可以一走了之,把钱留在那儿,因为它们是独立的公司。但我们没有走。而且,我们一辈子也没花时间琢磨怎么赖账,或是在契约里搞名堂,然后像现在那些人一样,你知道,用信用违约互换什么的,想方设法占贷款人的便宜。那不是我们的作风。如果我们欠了钱,我们就一定会还。
BUFFETTLong, long ago, people don't even know about this, but we owned two small insurance companies at Berkshire that both went broke except we didn't let 'em go broke. I mean, in other words, we coulda walked away from 'em and left the money because they were separate companies. And we didn't walk away. And we haven't spent our lifetime, you know, working at things to try and figure out ways to walk away from debts, or have things in indentures then play games like they have, you know, with, with credit default swaps and, you know, figure out ways to take advantage of the, the lenders. I, it's just not our game. If we owe money, we're gonna pay it back.
贝基·奎克你刚才说,你们俩都意识到那其实是更赚钱的方式。但这肯定不一定是大多数生意人的想法。
QUICKYou, you said that it's, it would occur to both that it was the more profitable way. But that's certainly not necessarily how the majority of people in business think.
沃伦·巴菲特这就是我们各自父亲的想法。天知道你的价值观到底是从哪儿来的,但基本上,你一生中会有那么几个人,是你的老师,虽然不是正式的老师。最重要的肯定是你的父母。而且,你知道,我这辈子从没听我父亲说过一句:“你一定要把债都还清。”但我就是看他怎么活的。你希望生活中有某些你不想让他们失望的人。你会好好表现,你知道,你想有那些人,他们能让你变成比原来更好的人。查理现在就扮演这个角色,但早年是我父亲。而且,我想我不认识他的父亲,但据我所知的一切,他的父亲,你知道,他也有同样的经历。
BUFFETTIt's the way our dads thought, in both cases. Who the hell knows where you get your values from exactly, but basically, you know, you have a few people that are teachers to you in life and are not formal teachers. And the most important people are your, definitely are your parents. And, and, you know, I never, I never heard my dad say to me in my life, you know, that, "Be sure you pay all your debts." But I just watched how he lived and, and you wanna have certain people in life that you don't want to disappoint. You'll behave, you know, you wanna have people that, that make you a better person than you otherwise would be. And Charlie does that for me now, but my dad did it for me early on. And, and I think I didn't know his dad, but from everything I've heard about his dad, you know, he had the same experience.
贝基·奎克查理,再多跟我说说你父亲。
QUICKCharlie, tell me more about your dad.
查理·芒格嗯,我父亲是个律师,他本人是另一个律师的儿子,那个律师后来成了内布拉斯加州林肯市(也是州首府)唯一的联邦法官。芒格祖父是个了不起的人,也是个很棒的家庭男人。我身边都是高级别的人,我父母的好朋友也都是高级别的人。所以在人际交往方面,我的生活非常优越。事实上,我后来来到洛杉矶并在生活中取得成功,还遇到了很大的麻烦。我常常觉得,我再也找不到像父亲在小奥马哈结交的那种好朋友了。最后我意识到,他在奥马哈的那帮朋友确实非常不寻常。那只是历史的一个奇特巧合,我恰好被一群高级别的人包围着。这完全不是我的功劳,我只是被迫去模仿对的人。
MUNGERWell, my father was a lawyer and he was the son of the, another lawyer who became the only federal judge in Lincoln, Nebraska, was is Nebraska's capital city. And grandfather Munger was a marvelous guy and, and a great family man too. I was surrounded by high-grade people, and my parents had good friends who are high-grade people. So, I had a very privileged life in terms of my associations. In fact, I had terrible trouble by coming out to Los Angeles and succeeding in life. I frequently thought I couldn't ever get, group of friends that were any as good as my father had gotten in little Omaha. And I finally realized that they had a very unusual bunch of friends in Omaha. And it was just a peculiar accident of history so I was surrounded by a buncha high-grade people. I deserve no credit at all for, I was just forced to imitate the right people.
巴菲特我和查理一生都喜欢和年长的人聊天。我七八岁的时候就喜欢和老人聊天。现在的问题是,已经没有比我更老的人了。所以,这个群体我找不到了。但你知道吗,如果我走过邓迪长老会教堂,去参加儿童合唱团之类的活动,回家的路上,我会顺便去四五户人家和家庭主妇聊聊天。我会坐下来和她们聊。我一直很喜欢和年长的人聊天,我想查理也是这样。
BUFFETTBoth Charlie and I, we, we like talking to older people all our lives. I mean, I liked when I was seven or eight years old talking to older people. And now of course the problem is there aren't any older people. So, I've run outta that constituency. But, but I, you know, if I would go over to the Dundee Presbyterian Church to sing in the kids' choir or something like that, walking home, I'd drop in at four or five houses where I'd talk to housewives. So, I'd sit and talk to 'em. I've always enjoyed talking to older people and I think Charlie was the same way.
芒格当然。我娶了帮我建造这所房子的女人后,她的一个亲戚见到我后说:“这是我见过的最老的年轻人,不,是我认识的最老的小伙子。”
MUNGER'Course. When I married the woman that helped me build this house, one of her relatives said, after meeting me, she said, "That is the oldest young man I've ever, man I've even known."
巴菲特但我觉得同样——
BUFFETTBut I think the same--
芒格我年轻时就总表现得像个百岁老人。
MUNGERI always behaved like I was 100 years old, even when I was young.
巴菲特但现在我们是你们见过的最年轻的老人了——
BUFFETTBut now we're the youngest old men that you'll--
奎克查理,你和你父亲的关系也很特别。
QUICKCharlie, just the relationship that you had with your dad too.
芒格哦,那是段美妙的关系。那真是天大的福气,能有这么好的母亲和父亲,他们还有一群很棒的朋友。我只能说,我非常幸运。
MUNGEROh, a marvelous relationship. And, and that, that's a great blessing, to have a wonderful mother and a wonderful father and they have a bunch of wonderful friends. It was just it's, I was very lucky.
巴菲特我们一生中都能和自己真正喜欢的人交往。嗯,这是人生的奢侈之一。
BUFFETTWe've been able to associate with people that we really like in life. Well, that's one of the luxuries of life.
芒格而且我们还在这样做。
MUNGERAnd we're still doing it.
巴菲特是的,我们还在这样做。我们赚了很多钱。但我们真正想要的是独立。自从我们相识后不久,我们在经济上就有能力只和自己想交往的人来往了。如果我们和混蛋打交道,那是我们自己的问题。但我们不必那样。我们已经享受这种奢侈差不多 60 年了。这比拥有 25 个房间的房子、六辆车之类的东西强多了。真正美好的事情是,你能在人生中做自己想做的事,和自己想交往的人交往。我们俩一直都有这种精神。
BUFFETTAnd we're still doing it, yeah. We made a lot of money. But what we really wanted was independence. And we have had the ability since pretty much a little after we met financially we could associate with people who we wanted to associate with. And if we had, if we associated with jerks, that was our problem. But we didn't have to. We've had that luxury now for, you know, 60 years or close to it. And, and that beats 25-room houses and, you know, six cars or that stuff is, what really is great is if you can do what you want to do in life and associate with the people you want to associate with in life. And, now, it, it's and, and we both had that, that spirit all the way through.
奎克你们能多快判断出一个人是不是你想交往的人?
QUICKHow quickly can you figure out if somebody is someone you want to associate with?
芒格我们判断得奇快,而且犯的严重错误极少,这很惊人。
MUNGERIt's amazing how quickly we do it, and how few bad mistakes we've made.
奎克那你们看什么?怎么看出来的?
QUICKSo, what do you look for? What do you know?
芒格我确切地说不上来。
MUNGERI don't know exactly.
巴菲特是啊,我是怎么知道查理的呢?你知道吗,我在餐厅见到查理后,几分钟之内就知道,这家伙会永远出现在我的生命中。我是说,我们会一起玩得很开心,一起赚钱,互相启发,两个人都会因为认识对方而变得更好。
BUFFETTYeah, how did I know Charlie? You know, I knew when I met Charlie, you know, after a few minutes in the restaurant that, that you know, this guy was gonna be in my life forever, you know. I mean it, it, we were gonna have fun together. We were gonna make money together. We were gonna get ideas from each other. We were gonna both behave better than if we didn't know each other.
PART V
PART V
奎克每年五月的第一个星期六,从 1970 年代到 2019 年,沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格都会出现在这里,在内布拉斯加州奥马哈的舞台上。
QUICKOn the first Saturday in May, from the 1970s to 2019, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger could be found here, on stage in Omaha, Nebraska.
[2019 年 5 月] 巴菲特:早上好,欢迎来到伯克希尔·哈撒韦!
[MAY 2019] BUFFETT: Good morning and welcome to Berkshire Hathaway!
奎克被誉为“资本主义伍德斯托克”的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会,规模从国民赔偿公司餐厅里的大约 20 人,发展到超过 4 万人挤进奥马哈最大的会议中心,直到新冠疫情迫使会议像其他所有活动一样改为线上。2020 年,这意味着巴菲特在没有芒格的情况下主持了会议。
QUICKDubbed Woodstock for capitalists, the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting grew in size from about 20 people in the National Indemnity Lunchroom to more than 40,000 crowing into Omaha's biggest convention center until the COVID-19 pandemic forced the meeting, like everything else, to go virtual. In 2020, that meant Buffett ran the meeting without Munger.
[2020 年 5 月] 巴菲特:这是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东大会。它看起来不像股东大会,感觉也不像。
[MAY 2020] BUFFETT: This is the annual meeting of Berkshire Hathaway. It doesn't look like an annual meeting, it doesn't feel exactly like an annual meeting.
奎克但今年,两人在芒格的家乡洛杉矶举行的线上会议上重新同台。会议结束后,我们在芒格的后院和他们坐了下来。他们谈到了疫情对商业的影响,以及他们自己远程工作的经历。
QUICKBut this year, the two were back together on stage at a virtual meeting held in Munger's hometown of Los Angeles. We sat down with them after the meeting in Munger's backyard. They reflected on the pandemic's impact on business and on their own experiences working remotely.
奎克过去一年,你们的生活都因疫情发生了巨大变化。查理,我听说你非常擅长 Zoom。
QUICKThe last year, you both had your lives change pretty dramatically from the pandemic. Charlie, I hear you're, you're pretty adept at Zoom.
芒格哦,嗯,我爱上了 Zoom。
MUNGEROh, well, I have fallen in love with Zoom.
奎克你每天在 Zoom 上和人聊多久?
QUICKHow often do you talk to people on Zoom?
芒格至少一天三次。我在澳大利亚谈成了一笔交易。我认为 Zoom 会一直存在下去。它带来了极大的便利。
MUNGERAt least three times a day. I made a deal in Australia. I, I think Zoom is here to stay. It's, it just adds so much convenience.
巴菲特嗯,特别是当你 97 岁时,出门走动不容易。但查理和我显然从疫情开始后就聊了很多。我们还没在 Zoom 上聊过。我是说,它——
BUFFETTWell, particularly if you're 97, it, and getting around. But Charlie and I have talked a lot obviously, since the pandemic started. We haven't talked on Zoom yet. I mean, it, it--
芒格嗯,但那不是因为——
MUNGERWell, but it's not because--
巴菲特我不是个 Zoom 爱好者。
BUFFETTI'm, I'm just not a Zoom guy.
奎克你为什么不喜欢 Zoom?
QUICKWhy don't you like Zoom?
巴菲特嗯,我看不出它有什么好处。我试过一两次,屏幕上一大堆人,我觉得它并没有增加什么体验。我宁愿把脚搁在桌子上,我觉得电话就是个很令人满意的工具,真的。
BUFFETTWell, I don't see any plus to it, particularly, I like to I did it once or twice, and they had a whole screen of people that, that it, I just didn't figure it was adding to the experience. I'd rather have my, you know, feet on the desk, and, and I, I find the telephone a very satisfactory instrument, I mean.
奎克那么疫情之后生活如何改变?工作如何改变?又会如何恢复常态?我想,你认为会发生什么——
QUICKSo how does life change post-pandemic? How does work change? And, and how does it's, go back to normal? I guess, what, what do you think happens—
芒格嗯,我认为很多商务旅行将永远不会恢复。一个又一个公司决定,每年一次、两次面对面会议,其余全部 Zoom。我认为这一点会持续下去。当然,办公需求的变化,想想现在这个领域的痛苦吧。很多人发现他们不需要在那里。我认为各种事情都会发生,我们不会回到以前的样子了。
MUNGERWell, I think a lot of business travel will never come back. Just corporation after corporation deciding one meeting a year, two meetings a year in person, and the rest Zoom. And I think that's here to stay. And, of course, what's happened to office demand is just think of the agonies in that field now. And a lot of people have found they don't need to be there. I think all kinds of things are gonna happen that, that we'll be, we don't go back to what we did before.
巴菲特我们的一些业务会改变很多,一些几乎完全不变。但这会很有趣。我想说的是,就整个疫情而言,无论是预测经济还是市场行为应该如何,它在很多方面都让我们吃惊。最终,我们仍然不知道。我们对这个了解很多,但还有很多事情我们不知道。如果你看看它如何冲击不同国家的图表,你就会明白,一个经济非常发达的世界,如何被某种东西以你身在其中都无法预测的方式所扰乱。经济影响极不均匀。我不知道具体数字,但有成千上万甚至数百万的小企业受到了严重打击,但绝大多数大公司都表现得非常好,除非它们恰好是邮轮公司、酒店之类的。
BUFFETTSome, some, some of our businesses will change a lot, and some of 'em won't change hardly at all. But it'll be interesting. I, I would say this, in terms of the, the whole pandemic, in terms of predicting both the economic and how the wires should behave, you know, it, it surprised us in a lot of ways. It surprised our, you know, at the end, we still don't know. We know a lot about this, but there's a lot of things we don't know yet. And, and, and, if you look at the graphs of, of how it's hit different countries and everything, it, it, it just shows you how a very advanced economically world can get disrupted by something that in, in ways that, even when you're in it, you can't predict. And the economic impact has been this extremely uneven thing where I don't know how many but many hundreds of thousands or millions of small businesses have been hurt in a terrible way, but most of the big, big companies have overwhelmingly have done fine, unless they happen to be in cruise lines or, you know, or hotels or something.
芒格但有些人做得比我们好。再说一次,中国这个威权国家,他们就是简单地封锁了全国六周。结果证明这是完全正确的做法。他们不允许任何接触。你从公寓的一个盒子里取杂货,那就是六周里你和所有人的全部接触。当一切结束后,他们基本上恢复了工作。碰巧的是,他们做得完全正确。
MUNGERBut, but some people did better than we. Again, the Chinese simply totalitarian state, they simply shut down the country for six weeks. And that turned out to be exactly the right thing to do. And they didn't allow any contact. You picked up your groceries in a box in the apartment and that's all the contact you had with anybody for six weeks. And, when it was all over, they kind of went back to work. It happened they did it exactly right.
巴菲特但在其他方面,比如封锁措施,他们以为那是模范案例,但现在他们正在经历问题。然后你还有别的国家,比如——
BUFFETTBut a lot about, but, in other cases, they're shutdowns, and the shutdowns really they'd, they thought they were model examples, and then, now, they're experiencing problems. And then you had other countries, you know, like--
芒格是啊。不,这仅仅——
MUNGERYeah. No, it's just--
巴菲特你还有别的国家,比如瑞典。瑞典说:“我们不封锁。”一开始看起来效果不错。然后,这事儿就变得非常、非常、非常难以预测——
BUFFETTYou had other countries like Sweden, Sweden says, "We're not gonna do it." And that seemed to be working fine for a while. And then it, this has been very, very, very unpredictable--
芒格是的,非常困难。没错。
MUNGERYeah, very difficult. Yeah.
巴菲特而且事情还没结束。我是说,从不可预测性来说。从经济上来说,它也非常难以预测,但对大多数人和大多数企业来说,结果比人们预想的要好。而有些人,完全不是他们的错,他们的希望就被彻底摧毁了。而那些,我们希望政府应该帮助——
BUFFETTAnd it's not over. I mean, in, in terms of the unpredictability. And in terms of the economic, it's been very unpredictable, but it's worked out better than people anticipated for most people and most businesses. And it's just, for no fault of their own, it's just decimated all kinds of people in their hopes. And that, and, and those we want to, you know, the government should be helping--
芒格但对一些企业来说——
MUNGERBut, for some businesses--
巴菲特我们很繁荣。
BUFFETTWe're prosperous.
芒格它带来的不仅仅是回归常态。它创造了他们没有预料到的惊人成功。汽车经销商正在疯狂赚钱,要不是疫情,他们根本赚不到。
MUNGERIt didn't create just a return to normal. It created fabulous success they didn't anticipate. The auto dealers are coining money that they wouldn't have had except for the pandemic.
巴菲特我们所有有合伙人的经销商,他们都真心觉得,在 3 月和 4 月会面临巨大的麻烦。有些人可能想去申请政府援助,但我们不允许,因为他们有个富爸爸。但他们当时真的相信会那样。我们也真的相信。我们不知道 NetJets 公务航空的需求会如何。而结果,你知道,就是和很多人想的不一样。银行在 3 月中旬吓坏了。他们看到每个人都动用了信贷额度。但为什么人们会在不需要的时候动用信贷额度?因为他们担心下周就没了。如果足够多的人相信银行里下周会没钱,那在没有美联储的情况下,下周就真的会没钱。
BUFFETTAnd all of the dealers that we have partners in each dealership, they very sincerely felt that, that they were gonna have one helluva problem in, in March and April. And some might have wanted to go in for the assistance from the government, but we wouldn't let 'em, because they had a rich parent. But, they honestly believed it. We honestly believed it. We, we didn't know what was gonna happen with NetJets in terms of the demand. And it has been, you know, it's been, just been different than a lot of people thought. The banks were scared stiff in the middle of March. I mean, they, they saw everybody taking down their lines of credit. But why do people take down their lines of credit when they don't need it? Because they're afraid it won't be there next week, you know. And, if you get enough people believing something won't be there next week in banking, it won't be there next week absent the Federal Reserve.
奎克过去一年最让你意外的是什么?你学到了什么?
QUICKOne thing that maybe surprised you most? Something you learned the last year?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我学到的是,人们其实并不像自己以为的那么懂。但最大的收获是,疫情迟早会发生,而这根本不是什么最糟的情况。而且,我们所有人,整个社会在应对那些概率虽小、但可能发生、迟早会发生的事情时,表现非常糟糕。还会有下一场疫情,这我们知道;我们知道还有核威胁、化学威胁、生物威胁,现在又多了网络威胁。我们,你知道,每一类都藏着可怕的后果。我们确实做了一些事,但社会似乎就是没法完全正视这些威胁。网络威胁,你知道,我们才刚刚开始应对,但看看已经造成的破坏。查理和我在很多方面都走运得不像话。但最幸运的事,其实是生对了时代、待对了地方。而且我们还面临着这样的问题:世界上有 200 多个国家、超过 75 亿人口,彼此间矛盾重重,各种问题,体制各异,政府选择也不同,等等。我们到底该怎么做,才能让人类在 50 年、100 年、200 年后,享受到本可以享受的、好得难以想象的生活,同时又不把它搞砸?
BUFFETTWell, I learned that people don't know as much as they think they know. But the biggest thing you learn is that the pandemic was bound to occur, and this isn't the worst one that's imaginable at all. And, we all, society has a terrible time preparing for things that are remote but are possible and will occur sooner or later. There'll be another pandemic, we know that, we know there's a nuclear, chemical, biological, and now cyber threat. And we, you know, it has, each one of those has terrible possibilities. And we do some things about it, but it's just not something that society seems particularly capable in fully coming to grips with. The cyber threat, it, you know, it, we've just started, and, and look at the damage that's already been done. Charlie and I have been ungodly lucky in many ways. But the luckiest thing was actually being around at this time and place. And we also have these problems in how 200 countries with over seven-and-a-half billion people, and a lot of tensions between them and all sorts of things, and different systems, and selected governments, and all that. And how do we actually do this so that mankind, 50 and 100 and 200 years from now, should enjoy the incredibly better life that could be enjoyed while not screwing it up?
PART VI
PART VI
贝基·奎克按市值算,伯克希尔·哈撒韦是全球十大公司之一。36 万员工分布在全球各地的办公室。但这个庞大的商业帝国,总部却设在奥马哈一栋大楼里租用的两层楼,管理团队只有区区 24 人。之所以如此特别,是因为坐在顶层的两个人:沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格。
QUICKIt's one of the 10 biggest companies in the world, by market capitalization. It's 360,000 employees work in offices around the globe. But Berkshire Hathaway's sprawling operations are headquartered here, from two floors leased in a building in Omaha, managed by a staff of just two dozen people. It's different because of the two men at the top, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.
查理·芒格我们无意中创造了一个非常有趣的实验:一个规模非常大的机构,在极度非官僚化、极度分权的状态下,究竟能运转得多好。我们就像一块试金石,测试着放权的极限能走到哪一步。我得说,到目前为止,效果相当不错。这种放手式的管理,给我们带来的好处远多于坏处。
MUNGERWe have accidentally created a very interesting experiment in how well a really big place can be run on a very non bureaucratic basis with extreme decentralization. We're like a test case for how extreme you can make it. And I would say so far, that it's worked better. We get more advantages than disadvantages out of our hands-off management.
沃伦·巴菲特确实如此。
BUFFETTThat's true.
查理·芒格你不同意吗?
MUNGERDon't, don't you agree with that?
沃伦·巴菲特确实如此。很少有人想模仿我们,但是——
BUFFETTThat's true. We get very few people who wanna copy us, but--
查理·芒格对,没人想模仿我们,但是,如果——
MUNGERNo, nobody wants to copy us, and, and yet, if--
沃伦·巴菲特它管用。
BUFFETTIt works.
查理·芒格人们研究我们,会发现至少我们这种干法,效果要好得多。
MUNGERPeople, people study us, they'd find it at least the way we're doing it, it works way better.
沃伦·巴菲特没错。它也有某些缺点——
BUFFETTYeah. It has certain disadvantages--
MUNGERYes.
MUNGERYes.
沃伦·巴菲特我们想信任别人。偶尔信任会被滥用,但总的来说,它管用。
BUFFETTThat we want to trust people. Occasionally trust is misused. But net, it's worked.
查理·芒格这是我们做的一个有用的实验。我很有信心地预测,总有一天,会有人发现,某些愚蠢的官僚机构是可以被裁掉的,那样我们会过得更好。就像我们发现有些商务旅行可以取消一样,我们也会发现,美国公司里有些愚蠢的官僚作风是可以被清除的。
MUNGERIt's a useful experiment that we've done, and I confidently predict that someday, well, somebody will find out that some of this dumb bureaucracy could be eliminated, we'll be better off. Just as we found we can eliminate some business travel, we're gonna find we can get rid of some dumb bureaucracy. In American corporations.
沃伦·巴菲特它在规模很大的时候也管用,但它不能产生那种非常高的回报。它就像我们拥有某种能产生非凡回报的东西,但按照那种方式运作,它也可以成为一个规模可观、相当体面的生意。
BUFFETTIt works at large scale, but it doesn't work to produce the kind of returns that, that it is like we've got something that produces extraordinary returns, but, but it can be a very decent business at scale, operating that way.
查理·芒格你不觉得,如果当年我们照搬了中央集权式的管理体系,做得肯定不如现在好吗?
MUNGERDon't you think we've done better than we woulda been if we'd copied the centralized management system?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我反正不会,我不想在那种地方工作。我是说,你会吗?
BUFFETTWell, I wouldn't have been, I wouldn't have wanted to work there. I mean, would you?
查理·芒格我当然不会,当然不会。
MUNGERI know no, no, of course not.
沃伦·巴菲特我会辞职。或者被开除。不,我宁愿待在一间囚室里,身边有几个有意思的人,你知道,再配上足够的读物。那也比——
BUFFETTI'd resign. Or been fired. No, I would, I'd rather be in a jail cell with a few people who are interesting. You know, and plenty of reading material. Then, then--
查理·芒格不,你的意思是,我们之所以这么做,之所以创造了这种分权模式,可能因为它符合我们的天性。
MUNGERNo, what you're saying is, we may have done it, we may have created the decentralization, 'cause it suited our nature.
BUFFETTAbsolutely.
BUFFETTAbsolutely.
查理·芒格但我们无意中创造了——
MUNGERBut we've accidentally created--
沃伦·巴菲特但它管用。
BUFFETTBut it worked.
查理·芒格创造了这个实验,并且证明了它可以在大规模下运转。我相信,最终它会证明自己的价值。
MUNGERCreated an experiment, and demonstrated can, can work on a big scale. That will eventually prove useful, I think.
贝基·奎克你们两位做朋友已经超过 60 年了,对方身上哪一点你最欣赏?
QUICKYou two have been friends for over 60 years, what's one thing that you really admire about the other?
查理·芒格嗯,我喜欢他的幽默感,诸如此类的,但可靠真的非常重要。
MUNGERWell, I like the humor, and all that, but dependable is really important.
贝基·奎克沃伦,你欣赏查理的哪一点?
QUICKWarren, what do you admire about Charlie?
沃伦·巴菲特真的,就是他是一个什么样的人。我是说,他对他接触的每一个人,还有对社会,都做出了贡献,这远远不止是买一只股票然后高价卖出。他设计宿舍楼,还帮忙建造。他在医院里工作,去了解怎么让医院变得更好,服务更多人,同时成本更低。你知道,这始终是一场逆水行舟的战斗,但查理一直在解决大问题,而他本不必这么做。而且查理跟我说的每一件事,你知道,从我们认识开始,从来没有粉饰过,从来没有用一种跟现实不同的方式说给我听。他从来没有做过任何我认为是自私自利的事,作为合伙人也好,在任何方面也好。他,他让我变得比我本来会更好。我不想让他失望。
BUFFETTReally, just the kinda person he's been. I mean, he is, he has contributed given individuals, and also to society, I mean, and it, it goes well beyond buying a stock and selling it higher. He's designed dormitories and helped build them. He's, he's worked at hospitals and to understand how they can be made better and serve more people and do it at less cost. You know, it's, it's an uphill fight all the time, but Charlie's worked on big problems, and he's, and he doesn't need to. And Charlie has never shaded anything he's told me, you know, since we met, in terms of presenting it to me in a different way than reality, or he's never, he's never done anything I've seen that's self-serving, in terms of being a partner, or in any kind of way. He, he's, he makes me better than I would otherwise be. I don't wanna disappoint him.
查理·芒格但你也一样,反过来也是。
MUNGERBut you've had the same thing, in reverse.
沃伦·巴菲特对,它,嗯,它确实是这样。我的意思是,跟比你更好的人交往,会让自己变得更好。我是说——
BUFFETTYeah, it, well, it works, it does work that way. I mean it's better to associate with people who are better than you are. I mean--
查理·芒格确实如此。真的,这真的很有帮助。
MUNGERIt really is. It's, it's so, it's, it really helps.
贝基·奎克超过半个世纪的商业伙伴。沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格是终身的老师,是以一种非传统方式领导的企业高管,他们的做法无疑会被后人研究很多年。但两人加起来将近 190 年的人生阅历中,或许更经得起时间考验的,是他们在友谊中共同分享的人生智慧。
QUICKBusiness partners more than half a century. Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger are lifelong teachers, corporate executives who lead in an unconventional manner and who will certainly be studied for generations to come. But with almost 190 years of experience between them, it's the lessons in life they've shared through their friendship that may be more lasting.