Wesco金融董事长致股东信2001(伯克希尔·哈撒韦官方镜像)
WESCO FINANCIAL CORPORATION
致股东的信
各位股东:
2001 日历年的合并“经营”净收入(即下表列示的实现证券收益之前)从上一年的 7008.7 万美元(每股 9.84 美元)降至 5253.6 万美元(每股 7.38 美元)。合并净收入从上一年的 9.2247 亿美元(每股 129.56 美元)降至 5253.6 万美元(每股 7.38 美元)。
西科金融有四大子公司:(1)西科金融保险公司(“Wes-FIC”),总部位于奥马哈,主要经营再保险业务;(2)堪萨斯银行家担保公司(“KBS”),由 Wes-FIC 全资拥有,专门为中西部银行量身定制保险产品;(3)CORT 商业服务公司(“CORT”),总部位于弗吉尼亚州费尔法克斯,于 2000 年 2 月收购,主要从事家具租赁业务;以及(4)精密钢铁仓储公司(“Precision Steel”),总部位于芝加哥,从事钢铁仓储和特种金属产品业务。
最近两个年度的合并净收入明细如下(除每股金额外,单位均为千美元)(1):
| 截至 2001 年 12 月 31 日止年度 | 截至 2000 年 12 月 31 日止年度 | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 金额 | 每股西科(2) | 金额 | 每股西科(2) | |
| 经营收入 | 52,536 美元 | 7.38 美元 | 70,087 美元 | 9.84 美元 |
| 实现证券收益 | - | - | 852,383 美元 | 119.72 美元 |
| 合并净收入 | 52,536 美元 | 7.38 美元 | 922,470 美元 | 129.56 美元 |
WESCO FINANCIAL CORPORATION LETTER TO SHAREHOLDERS To Our Shareholders: Consolidated net ""operating'' income (i.e., before realized securities gains shown in the table below) for the calendar year 2001 decreased to $52,536,000 ($7.38 per share) from $70,087,000 ($9.84 per share) in the previous year. Consolidated net income decreased to $52,536,000 ($7.38 per share) from $922,470,000 ($129.56 per share) in the previous year. Wesco has four major subsidiaries: (1) Wesco-Financial Insurance Company (""Wes-FIC''), headquartered in Omaha and engaged principally in the reinsurance business, (2) The Kansas Bankers Surety Company (""KBS''), owned by Wes-FIC and specializing in insurance products tailored to midwestern banks, (3) CORT Business Services Corporation (""CORT''), headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia, purchased in February 2000 and engaged principally in the furniture rental business, and (4) Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. (""Precision Steel''), headquartered in Chicago and engaged in the steel warehousing and specialty metal products businesses. Consolidated net income for the two years just ended breaks down as follows (in 000s except for per-share amounts)(1): Year Ended December 31, 2001 December 31, 2000 Per Per Wesco Wesco (2) Amount Share Amount Share(2)
经营利润:
保险业务 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
CORT 家具租赁业务 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
精密钢铁业务 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
商誉摊销(3) ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
其他(4) ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
已实现净证券收益 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
西科合并净利润 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
Operating earnings: Insurance businesses ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ CORT furniture rental business ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ Precision Steel businesses ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ Goodwill amortization(3)ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ Other(4) ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ Realized net securities gains ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ Wesco consolidated net incomeÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
$45,254
13,076
(6,814)
52,536
Ì
$52,536
$45,254 13,076 (6,814) 52,536 Ì $52,536
$6.36
1.84
.05
(.96)
.09
7.38
Ì
$7.38
$6.36 1.84 .05 (.96) .09 7.38 Ì $7.38
$ 45,518
28,988
1,281
(5,867)
70,087
852,383
$922,470
$ 45,518 28,988 1,281 (5,867) 70,087 852,383 $922,470
$
$
6.39
4.07
.18
(.82)
.02
9.84
119.72
$129.56
6.39 4.07 .18 (.82) .02 9.84 119.72 $129.56
(1) 所有数字均为扣除所得税后的净值。
(2) 每股数据基于流通在外的 7,119,807 股计算。西科金融没有稀释性股本等价物。
(3) 根据财务会计准则委员会的一项新公告,自 2002 年起,西科金融不再需要摊销商誉。摊销要求已被一项新标准取代,该标准要求每年进行评估,以判断商誉价值是否发生减值,若减值,则根据情况对无形资产进行减记或冲销。
(4) 扣除利息及其他公司费用,以及与之前计入西科金融原互助储蓄贷款协会子公司的止赎房地产相关的成本和费用后。该收入来自西科金融总部办公楼的所有权(主要出租给外部租户),以及保险子公司以外持有的现金等价物和有价证券产生的利息及股息收入。
(1) All Ñgures are net of income taxes. (2) Per-share data are based on 7,119,807 shares outstanding. Wesco has had no dilutive capital stock equivalents. (3) In accordance with a new pronouncement of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Wesco will no longer be required to amortize goodwill beginning in 2002. The requirement for such amortization has been replaced by a standard that requires an annual assessment to determine whether the value of goodwill has been impaired, at which time the intangible would be written down or written oÅ, as appropriate. (4) After deduction of interest and other corporate expenses, and costs and expenses associated with foreclosed real estate previously charged against Wesco's former Mutual Savings and Loan Association subsidiary. Income was from ownership of the Wesco headquarters oÇce building, primarily leased to outside tenants, and interest and dividend income from cash equivalents and marketable securities owned outside the insurance subsidiaries.
以下是对原文段落的翻译输出:
这份补充性的盈利细分与遵循标准会计惯例的经审计财务报表中所用的分类方法略有不同。上文的补充性细分数据之所以提供,是因为它被认为对股东有所助益。当然,上述合并净利润总额与经审计财务报表中的总额完全相同。
保险业务
保险业务的合并经营利润,是其承保业绩与净投资收益的结合。以下是涉及所有保险业务(堪萨斯银行家担保公司除外,下文将单独讨论该公司的相关数据)的这些金额的汇总。
税前经营利润
2001 年
2000 年
This supplementary breakdown of earnings diÅers somewhat from that used in audited Ñnancial statements which follow standard accounting convention. The foregoing supplementary breakdown is furnished because it is considered useful to shareholders. The total consolidated net income shown above is, of course, identical to the total in our audited Ñnancial statements. Insurance Businesses Consolidated operating earnings from insurance businesses represent the combination of the results of their insurance underwriting with their net investment income. Following is a summary of these Ñgures as they pertain to all insurance operations except The Kansas Bankers Surety Company (""KBS''), which is separately discussed below. Pre-Tax Operating Earnings 2001 2000
承保亏损 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ (1240.3 万美元)
净投资收益 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ
6452.9 万美元
经营利润 ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ 5212.6 万美元
Underwriting loss ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ $(12,403,000) Net investment income ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ 64,529,000 Operating income ÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏÏ $ 52,126,000
$ (616,000)
53,412,000
$52,796,000
$ (616,000) 53,412,000 $52,796,000
税后
经营利润
2001
2000
After-Tax Operating Earnings 2001 2000
$(8,062,000)
44,001,000
$35,939,000
$(8,062,000) 44,001,000 $35,939,000
$ (400,000)
38,958,000
$38,558,000
$ (400,000) 38,958,000 $38,558,000
如上所示,经营利润中包含了相当可观的净投资收益,即从有价证券中获得的股息和利息收入。但经营利润中不包括已实现的证券净收益(已扣除所得税),2000 年该项收益为 8.531 亿美元,2001 年则没有此项收益。我们的讨论将集中于保险承保,而非投资业绩。2001 年,除去 KBS 之外的保险承保业绩,是我们自 1985 年进入保险业以来最糟糕的。
我们在 2000 年年报中大致描述了非 KBS 保险业务的性质。当时我们向股东报告说,我们目前并未积极从事巨灾再保险业务,也从未遭受过巨灾损失,但股东们应继续认识到,威斯科金融公司(Wes-FIC)出色的承保业绩之后,必然会在某个时候出现一次或多次惨重的承保亏损。
我们当时说这话时,想到的是自然灾害。但相反,我们却被 9 月 11 日发生的人为灾难击垮了——这一事件给保险行业带来了历史上最惨重的损失。幸运的是,我们因该事件只记录了 1000 万美元的税前损失(税后 650 万美元)。这 1000 万美元是个估计值,存在相当大的估算误差。要解决复杂的承保范围问题以及最终对承保损失做出准确估算,确实需要数年时间。不过,这 1000 万美元是我们 2001 年出现大额承保亏损的主要原因。
截至 2001 年底,我们从前与火险基金集团(Fireman's Fund Group)达成的再保险协议中,保留了约 1700 万美元的投资资产,这些资产由索赔准备金作为对冲。该协议于 1989 年 8 月 31 日终止。然而,所有索赔的结清需要很长时间,与此同时,威斯科金融公司多年来一直受益于投资“浮存金”所产生的收益以及有利的损失发展情况,这使其能够减少损失及损失相关费用的负债,从而在 2001 年和 2000 年每年为税后经营利润贡献 80 万美元。
我们还从事其他再保险业务,包括与我们之前与火险基金集团签订的再保险合同相似或不相似的大小比例分保安排,并且偶尔也涉足巨灾再保险业务,这些在之前的年报中都有详细描述,威斯科的股东们应该每年都重新阅读一遍。
在我们近年销售的大多数再保险中,我们拥有 80% 股权的母公司伯克希尔·哈撒韦的其他子公司,也以相同条款向相同客户销售了数倍于我们的再保险。在某些情况下,这些子公司会从我们这里收取一笔占保费 3% 的分保手续费,这笔保费是从它们那里流转到威斯科金融公司的。除了这笔分保手续费,威斯科金融公司在这些保单上几乎没有产生任何保险获取或管理费用。
KBS 于 1996 年被威斯科金融公司以约 8000 万美元现金收购,在 2001 年为保险业务的税后经营利润贡献了 930 万美元,2000 年贡献了 700 万美元。这些数字是按会计惯例每年摊销 80 万美元商誉之前的数字。KBS 的业绩已与威斯科金融公司的业绩合并,并包含在首页表格的“保险业务”类别中。
KBS 成立于 1909 年,旨在为堪萨斯州的银行承保存款保险。其办公地点位于堪萨斯州托皮卡。多年来,其服务不断适应银行业不断变化的需求。如今,其客户群主要由中小型社区银行组成,分布在 27 个州,主要集中在中西部。除了提供银行存单担保债券(为超出联邦存款保险公司承保范围的存款提供保险)外,KBS 还提供董事和高级职员赔偿保险、银行雇佣行为保险、银行年金和共同基金赔偿保险,以及银行保险代理人专业失误与疏忽赔偿保险。
KBS 从 1998 年起增加了保留业务量。此前,它将近一半的保费收入分保给了再保险公司。现在,它仅将约 5% 的保费进行再保险,其安排是伯克希尔的其他子公司承担 50%,无关联的再保险公司承担另外 50%。正如我们去年指出的,保留业务量的增加当然会带来收入流更大的不稳定性。
一家保险公司的综合成本率表示其承保损失和费用占保费收入的比例。KBS 的综合成本率远好于行业平均水平,2001 年为 55.1%,2000 年为 73.9%,我们继续预计,保留更多保险业务将带来波动但长期有利的影响。
KBS 由总裁唐纳德·托尔(Donald Towle)管理得非常出色,他手下有 15 名尽职尽责的高级职员和员工协助工作。
As shown above, operating income includes signiÑcant net investment income, representing dividends and interest earned from marketable securities. However, operating income excludes realized net securities gains, net of income taxes, of $853.1 million in 2000. There were no such gains in 2001. Our discussion will concentrate on insurance underwriting, not on the results from investments. Results for 2001 from insurance underwriting, other than at KBS, were the worst since we entered into the insurance business in 1985. The nature of our non-KBS insurance business was roughly described in our year 2000 Annual Report wherein we reported to shareholders that we were not currently active in super-catastrophe reinsurance and had never suÅered a super-catastrophe loss, but that shareholders should continue to realize that Wes-FIC's marvelous underwriting results were sure to be followed, sometime, by one or more horrible underwriting losses. When we said that, we had in mind a natural catastrophe. But, instead, we were clobbered by a man-made catastrophe on September 11 Ì an event that delivered the insurance industry its largest loss in history. Fortunately, we recorded a loss of only $10 million, before income taxes ($6.5 million, after taxes) in connection with that event. The $10 million is an estimate and is subject to considerable estimation error. It will literally take years to resolve complicated coverage issues, as well as to develop an accurate estimation of insured losses that will ultimately be incurred. That $10 million, however, was the principal cause of our substantial underwriting loss in 2001. At the end of 2001 we retained about $17 million in invested assets, oÅset by claims reserves, from our former reinsurance arrangement with Fireman's Fund Group. This arrangement was terminated August 31, 1989. However, it will take a long time before all claims are settled, and, meanwhile, Wes-FIC is being helped over many years by proceeds from investing ""Öoat'' and by favorable loss development, which has enabled it to reduce the liability for losses and loss-related expenses, beneÑting after-tax operating earnings in 2001 and 2000 by $.8 million each. We engage in other reinsurance business, including large and small quota share arrangements similar and dissimilar to our previous reinsurance contract with Fireman's Fund Group, and, from time to time, in super-cat reinsurance, described in detail in previous annual reports, which Wesco shareholders should re-read each year. In almost all recent reinsurance sold by us, other subsidiaries of our 80%-owning parent, Berkshire Hathaway, sold several times as much reinsurance to the same customers on the same terms. In certain instances, such subsidiaries have taken from us a 3%-of-premiums ceding commission on premium volume passed through them to Wes-FIC. Excepting this ceding commission, Wes-FIC has had virtually no insurance-acquisition or insurance administration costs with regard to those policies. KBS, purchased by Wes-FIC in 1996 for approximately $80 million in cash, contributed $9.3 million to the after-tax operating earnings of the insurance businesses in 2001 and $7.0 million in 2000. These Ñgures are before goodwill amortization under accounting convention of $.8 million each year. The results of KBS have been combined with those of Wes-FIC, and are included in the table on page 1 in the category of ""insurance businesses.'' KBS was chartered in 1909 to underwrite deposit insurance for Kansas banks. Its oÇces are in Topeka, Kansas. Over the years its service has continued to adapt to the changing needs of the banking industry. Today its customer base, consisting mostly of small and medium-sized community banks, is spread throughout 27 mainly midwestern states. In addition to bank deposit guaranty bonds which insure deposits in excess of FDIC coverage, KBS also oÅers directors and oÇcers indemnity policies, bank employment practices policies, bank annuity and mutual funds indemnity policies and bank insurance agents professional errors and omissions indemnity policies. KBS increased the volume of business retained eÅective in 1998. It had previously ceded almost half of its premium volume to reinsurers. Now it reinsures only about 5% under arrangements whereby other Berkshire subsidiaries take 50% and unrelated reinsurers take the other 50%. As we indicated last year, the increased volume of business retained comes, of course, with increased irregularity in the income stream. The combined ratio of an insurance company represents the percentage that its underwriting losses and expenses bear to its premium revenues. KBS's combined ratio has been much better than average for insurers, at 55.1% for 2001 and 73.9% for 2000, and we continue to expect volatile but favorable long-term eÅects from increased insurance retained. KBS is ably run by Donald Towle, President, assisted by 15 dedicated oÇcers and employees.
CORT 商务服务公司(“CORT”)
2000 年 2 月,西科以 3.86 亿美元现金收购了 CORT 商务服务公司(“CORT”)。
CORT 是一家历史悠久的公司,是美国租赁家具行业的领导者,这些家具的承租方压根没打算买下来。业内把 CORT 的业务叫做“租—租”,以区别于“租购”业务——后者本质上就是分期付款卖家具。
不过,就像赫兹作为短期汽车租赁公司必须精通二手车销售一样,CORT 也必须、而且确实精通二手家具销售。
CORT 在 2001 年自然年的总收入为 3.95 亿美元,而 2000 年我们持有它的十个月期间收入为 3.61 亿美元。其中,家具租赁收入分别为 3.29 亿美元和 3.06 亿美元,家具销售收入分别为 6600 万美元和 5500 万美元。CORT 在 2001 全年为西科的合并营业利润贡献了 1310 万美元,而 2000 年十个月为 2900 万美元。这些数字均未扣除:(1)2001 年的 600 万美元和 2000 年的 510 万美元商誉摊销,以及(2)2000 年 70 万美元的已实现证券亏损。
CORT 在 2000 年整个自然年的税后营业利润(商誉摊销前)为 3340 万美元,而 2001 年仅为 1310 万美元,下降了 61%。
当我们在 2000 年初收购 CORT 时,其家具租赁业务正在快速增长,这反映了强劲的美国经济、惊人的业务扩张、以及首次公开募股和高科技行业的爆发式增长。然而,从 2000 年末开始,CORT 的新业务开始下滑。随着互联网泡沫的破灭、经济的持续疲软和 9·11 事件,CORT 的业务在 2001 年遭受重创。
此外,CORT 在当年还启动了一家新的子公司——搬迁中央公司(Relocation Central Corporation),其 1200 万美元的费用远超 100 万美元的收入。该子公司的经营业绩已合并计入上述 CORT 的报告数据中。搬迁中央公司建立了一个虚拟呼叫中心,开展基于互联网的家具和公寓租赁线索业务(www.relocationcentral.com),并已开始向房地产投资信托基金(许多大型公寓社区的所有者)推销 CORT 的家具租赁服务。CORT 希望,通过搬迁中央公司,它最终能成为公寓行业家具租赁的主要来源。
我们希望在未来适时报告 CORT 的所有业务都已变得更加令人满意,但 2002 年的前景并未让我们感到振奋。不过,有好消息也有坏消息。CORT 的现金流为正。在 2001 年,它偿还了 3200 万美元的信用额度债务,并通过收购几家小企业额外投入了 2000 万美元用于业务扩张。当我们在商业周期的低谷期,通过以合理价格进行现金收购来扩张业务,从而将其转化为我们的优势时,我们乐于忍受这种糟糕的局面。我们仍然相信,在家具租赁行业的“租—租”领域,无论未来经济衰退有多深,CORT 的业务都将保持盈利。
当西科为 CORT 支付 3.86 亿美元时,购买价格中约有 60% 是商誉,这是一项无形的资产负债表资产。
西科的合并资产负债表目前包含约 2.64 亿美元的商誉(其中包括 1996 年西科收购 KBS 产生的 2700 万美元)。西科的报告收益因 2001 年约 700 万美元和 2000 年 600 万美元的商誉摊销而减少,其中大部分摊销不可抵税。财务会计准则委员会近期通过了一项规则,从 2002 年起不再要求自动摊销收购产生的商誉。因此,我们未来报告的收益将更接近于我们评估的微观经济现实。
有关 CORT 的更多详细信息,请参阅本年度报告全文,敬请仔细阅读。
CORT 长期以来由 55 岁的保罗·阿诺德(Paul Arnold)领导,他是一位明星级高管,他在 CORT 长期担任 CEO 的出色记录就是有力的证明。我们非常高兴能拥有保罗和 CORT 成为西科的一部分,尽管 2001 年出现了不利情况,我们对他领导下的 CORT 业绩感到满意,并希望在未来看到 CORT 的业务和收益有可观的增长。
精密钢铁仓储公司(“精密钢铁”)
西科旗下的精密钢铁子公司总部位于伊利诺伊州芝加哥郊区富兰克林帕克,2001 年为西科的净营业利润贡献了 40 万美元,低于 2000 年的 130 万美元和 1999 年的 250 万美元。如果不是后进先出法(LIFO)存货会计调整,精密钢铁在 2001 年将报告没有任何收益,而 2000 年税后收益为 170 万美元。
去年我们曾报告,美国钢铁行业在 2000 年总体上是一场灾难,精密钢铁遭受的影响比以往美国钢铁行业普遍衰退时更为严重。2001 年情况更糟。在 LIFO 调整影响之前,精密钢铁 2001 年营业利润的缺失,主要源于钢铁需求的显著下降,加上竞争比前一年的激烈程度更为加剧。这导致产品销售磅数下降了 29.7%。销售收入下降了 25.6%。
我们不认为 LIFO 会计调整导致的收益变化(无论增减),对于预测未来盈利能力具有实质性意义。
特里·派珀(Terry Piper)在 1999 年底成为精密钢铁的总裁兼首席执行官,他在带领精密钢铁渡过困难时期方面做得非常出色。
CORT Business Services Corporation (""CORT'') In February 2000, Wesco purchased CORT Business Services Corporation (""CORT'') for $386 million in cash. CORT is a very long established company that is the country's leader in rentals of furniture that lessees have no intention of buying. In the trade, people call CORT's activity ""rent-to-rent'' to distinguish it from ""lease-to-purchase'' businesses that are, in essence, installment sellers of furniture. However, just as Hertz, as a rent-to-rent auto lessor in short-term arrangements, must be skilled in selling used cars, CORT must be and is skilled in selling used furniture. CORT's revenues totaled $395 million for calendar 2001, versus $361 million for the ten months that we owned it in the year 2000. Of these amounts, furniture rental revenues were $329 million and $306 million, and furniture sales revenues were $66 million and $55 million. CORT contributed $13.1 million to Wesco's consolidated operating income for the entire year of 2001, versus $29.0 million for the ten months of 2000. These Ñgures are before (1) goodwill amortization of $6.0 million for 2001 and $5.1 million for 2000, and (2) realized securities losses of $.7 million in 2000. CORT's after-tax operating income (before goodwill amortization) for the entire calendar year 2000 was $33.4 million compared to only $13.1 million for 2001, a decline of 61%. When we purchased CORT early in 2000, its furniture rental business was rapidly growing, reÖecting the strong U.S. economy, phenomenal business expansion and explosive growth of IPOs and the high-tech sector. Beginning late in 2000, however, new business coming into CORT began to decline. With the burst of the dot-com bubble, continued weakness in the economy and the events of September 11, CORT's operations were hammered in 2001. Moreover, CORT started up a new subsidiary during the year, Relocation Central Corporation, whose $12 million in expenses far exceeded its $1 million in revenues. The results of its operations have been consolidated with those reported for CORT, shown above. Relocation Central has developed a virtual call center which carries out an internet-based furniture and apartment leads operation (www.relocationcentral.com), and it has begun marketing CORT's furniture rental services to real estate investment trusts, owners of many major apartment communities. CORT is hopeful that, through Relocation Central, it will ultimately become the principal source of rental furniture to the apartment industry. We hope to report in due course that all CORT operations have become more satisfactory, but prospects for 2002 do not thrill us. However, there is good news along with bad. CORT operates at a positive cash Öow. During 2001 it reduced its line-of-credit debt by $32 million and invested an additional $20 million in business expansion through acquisitions of several small businesses. We happily tolerate a poor part of the business cycle when we turn it to our advantage by expanding business through cash acquisition at sound prices. We continue to believe that CORT's operations will remain proÑtable in any likely recession-related decline in the rent-to-rent segment of the furniture business. When Wesco paid $386 million for CORT, about 60% of the purchase price was attributable to goodwill, an intangible balance sheet asset. Wesco's consolidated balance sheet now contains about $264 million in goodwill (including $27 million from Wesco's 1996 purchase of KBS). Wesco's reported earnings were reduced by about $7 million of mostly-non-tax-deductible amortization of goodwill for 2001 and $6 million for 2000. The Financial Accounting Standards Board has recently adopted a rule that will no longer require automatic amortization of acquired goodwill beginning in 2002. Thus, earnings we report in the future will more closely reÖect microeconomic reality as we appraise it. More details with respect to CORT are contained throughout this annual report, to which your careful attention is directed. CORT has long been headed by Paul Arnold, age 55, who is a star executive as is convincingly demonstrated by his long record as CEO of CORT. We are absolutely delighted to have Paul and CORT within Wesco, are pleased with CORT's performance under his leadership, despite adverse developments in 2001, and we hope to see a considerable expansion of CORT's business and earnings in future years. Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. (""Precision Steel'') The businesses of Wesco's Precision Steel subsidiary, headquartered in the outskirts of Chicago at Franklin Park, Illinois, contributed $.4 million to Wesco's net operating earnings in 2001, down from $1.3 million in 2000 and $2.5 million in 1999. Had it not been for LIFO inventory accounting adjustments, Precision Steel would have reported no income at all for the year 2001, versus $1.7 million, after taxes, for 2000. Last year we reported that the U.S. steel industry was generally a disaster in 2000, and that Precision Steel suÅered worse eÅects than occurred for it in previous general declines in the U.S. steel business. The year 2001 was much worse. The absence of Precision Steel's operating earnings for 2001, before the eÅect of the LIFO adjustment, was due principally to a signiÑcant reduction in demand for steel, combined with intensiÑed competition above the Ñerce level encountered in the prior year. This resulted in a 29.7% decrease in pounds of product sold. Sales revenues declined 25.6%. We do not regard earnings changes from LIFO accounting adjustments, up or down, as material in predicting future earning power. Terry Piper, who became Precision Steel's President and Chief Executive OÇcer late in 1999, has done an excellent job in leading Precision Steel through diÇcult years.
储蓄与贷款时代的遗留尾巴
如今,西科金融之外、但仍在西科内部,因西科此前卷入共同储蓄(Mutual Savings)——西科长期持有的储蓄与贷款子公司——而遗留的,只剩下一个小型房地产子公司 MS 物业公司。该公司持有一些房地产资产的遗留尾巴,账面净值约 580 万美元,主要包括位于帕萨迪纳市中心的一栋九层商业办公楼,西科的总部就设在那里。MS 物业公司的经营业绩,相对于西科目前的规模而言微不足道,已包含在第 1 页“其他经营利润”项下的利润分类中。
其他经营利润
2001 年,其他经营利润(扣除已付利息和一般公司费用后)为 60 万美元,2000 年为 20 万美元。其来源包括:(1)租金(2001 年毛租金 320 万美元),来自西科位于帕萨迪纳的办公楼物业(几乎全部租给外部客户,包括加州联邦银行(California Federal Bank)作为一楼租户);(2)利息和股息,来自保险子公司以外持有的现金等价物和有价证券,减去(3)一般公司费用及涉及遗留房地产的小额费用。
已实现证券净收益
西科储蓄与贷款时代的主要遗留尾巴,是对房地美(Freddie Mac)普通股的投资。共同储蓄当初以 7200 万美元购入这些股票,当时房地美股票只能由储蓄与贷款协会合法持有。这批股票在 1999 年底西科的资产负债表上,市值为 14 亿美元,于 2000 年全部出售,从而产生了西科在 2000 年实现的 8.524 亿美元税后证券收益中的主要部分,而 2001 年则没有任何已实现收益或亏损。
尽管这笔已实现收益对西科 2000 年的报告利润产生了重大影响,但对西科股东权益的影响却非常微小。因为该已实现收益中的绝大部分此前已经反映在西科股东权益的未实现收益部分中,这次操作只是将这笔金额从未实现收益转至留存收益——股东权益的另一个组成部分。
合并资产负债表及相关讨论
如所附财务报表所示,按照会计师的惯例计算,西科的净资产从 2000 年底的 19.8 亿美元(每股西科股票 278 美元)降至 2001 年底的 19.1 亿美元(每股 269 美元)。
上述每股 269 美元的账面价值,大致相当于假设西科所有非证券资产(税后)均按账面价值清算时的清算价值。也许这个假设过于保守。但我们的清算价值计算,大幅度偏低的可能性并不大,因为(1)西科合并房地产持有的清算价值(目前其中几乎全部有趣潜力都体现在西科在帕萨迪纳办公楼物业中的权益,该物业仅有 12.5 万净可租平方英尺),以及(2)其他资产可能存在的未实现增值,相对于西科的总体规模而言,都不可能大到足以显著改变整体税后清算价值的计算结果。
当然,只要西科不清算,也不出售任何已增值的证券,它实际上就拥有一笔来自政府的无息“贷款”,金额等于其未实现收益上的递延所得税,在计算净资产时已经扣除。2000 年出售房地美股票,是这笔无息“贷款”从 1999 年底的 7.05 亿美元降至 2001 年底的 1.99 亿美元的主要原因。这笔来自政府的无息“贷款”目前正在为西科股东创造价值,2001 年底时每股西科股票对应约 28 美元。
然而,未来的某一天,随着证券被出售,这笔无息“贷款”的更多部分可能会被消除——就像 2000 年出售房地美股票时发生的那样,消除幅度很大。因此,西科股东并不拥有一份能永久为其创造每股 28 美元价值的优势。相反,西科股东所获优势的现值,在逻辑上必然远低于每股 28 美元。
综合考虑所有因素,西科目前的业务质量和人员素质,与伯克希尔·哈撒韦相比仍相差甚远。西科并非一个同等优秀但规模更小、且因规模小而使增长更容易的伯克希尔的缩小版。相反,西科每一美元的账面价值所提供的内在价值,显然远低于伯克希尔·哈撒韦同样的一美元账面价值。而且,近年来,账面价值内在品质上的这种差距,还在继续向有利于伯克希尔的方向扩大。
话虽如此,我们并不会试图根据当前股市报价来评判西科与伯克希尔股票的投资相对吸引力。要从目前这一点出发,以令人满意的速度进步,西科显然需要更多有利的投资机会,且这些机会必须能被其管理层识别,最好是像 CORT 那样的整家公司,但也可以是供西科保险子公司购买的有价证券。
关于 2001 年,最应该引起西科股东兴趣的事情是:我们没有为保险公司找到任何新的普通股可买。我们对普通股的整体前景并不感到兴奋。
董事会最近将西科的常规股息从每股 31.5 美分提高到每股 32.5 美分,将于 2002 年 3 月 6 日支付给 2002 年 2 月 6 日营业时间结束时登记在册的股东。
Tag Ends from Savings and Loan Days All that now remains outside Wes-FIC but within Wesco as a consequence of Wesco's former involvement with Mutual Savings, Wesco's long-held savings and loan subsidiary, is a small real estate subsidiary, MS Property Company, that holds tag ends of real estate assets with a net book value of about $5.8 million, consisting mainly of the nine-story commercial oÇce building in downtown Pasadena, where Wesco is headquartered. MS Property Company's results of operations, immaterial versus Wesco's present size, are included in the breakdown of earnings on page 1 within ""other operating earnings.'' Other Operating Earnings Other operating earnings, net of interest paid and general corporate expenses, amounted to $.6 million in 2001 and $.2 million in 2000. Sources were (1) rents ($3.2 million gross in 2001) from Wesco's Pasadena oÇce property (leased almost entirely to outsiders, including California Federal Bank as the ground Öoor tenant), and (2) interest and dividends from cash equivalents and marketable securities held outside the insurance subsidiaries, less (3) general corporate expenses plus minor expenses involving tag-end real estate. Realized Net Securities Gains The main tag end from Wesco's savings and loan days was an investment in Freddie Mac common stock, purchased by Mutual Savings for $72 million at a time when Freddie Mac shares could be lawfully owned only by a savings and loan association. Those shares, carried on Wesco's balance sheet at yearend 1999 at a market value of $1.4 billion, were sold in 2000, giving rise to the principal portion of the $852.4 million of after-tax securities gains realized by Wesco in 2000, versus no gains or losses realized in 2001. Although the realized gain had a material impact on Wesco's reported earnings for 2000, it had a very minor impact on Wesco's shareholders' equity. Inasmuch as the greater portion of the realized gain had previously been reÖected in the unrealized gain component of Wesco's shareholders' equity, the amount was merely switched from unrealized gains to retained earnings, another component of shareholders' equity. Consolidated Balance Sheet and Related Discussion As indicated in the accompanying Ñnancial statements, Wesco's net worth, as accountants compute it under their conventions, decreased to $1.91 billion ($269 per Wesco share) at yearend 2001 from $1.98 billion ($278 per Wesco share) at yearend 2000. The foregoing $269-per-share book value approximates liquidation value assuming that all Wesco's non-security assets would liquidate, after taxes, at book value. Perhaps this assumption is too conservative. But our computation of liquidation value is unlikely to be too low by any large percentage because (1) the liquidation value of Wesco's consolidated real estate holdings (where interesting potential now lies almost entirely in Wesco's equity in its oÇce property in Pasadena containing only 125,000 net rentable square feet), and (2) possible unrealized appreciation in other assets cannot be large enough, in relation to Wesco's overall size, to change very much the overall computation of after-tax liquidating value. Of course, so long as Wesco does not liquidate, and does not sell any appreciated securities, it has, in eÅect, an interest-free ""loan'' from the government equal to its deferred income taxes on the unrealized gains, subtracted in determining its net worth. The sale of the Freddie Mac shares in 2000 was principally responsible for the reduction of that interest-free ""loan'' from $705 million as of yearend 1999 to $199 million as of yearend 2001. This interest-free ""loan'' from the government is at this moment working for Wesco shareholders and amounted to about $28 per Wesco share at year end 2001. However, some day, additional parts of the interest-free ""loan'' may be removed as securities are sold, as happened to such a large extent with the sale of Freddie Mac stock in 2000. Therefore, Wesco's shareholders have no perpetual advantage creating value for them of $28 per Wesco share. Instead, the present value of Wesco's shareholders' advantage must logically be much lower than $28 per Wesco share. Business and human quality in place at Wesco continues to be not nearly as good, all factors considered, as that in place at Berkshire Hathaway. Wesco is not an equally-good-but-smaller version of Berkshire Hathaway, better because its small size makes growth easier. Instead, each dollar of book value at Wesco continues plainly to provide much less intrinsic value than a similar dollar of book value at Berkshire Hathaway. Moreover, the quality disparity in book value's intrinsic merits has, in recent years, continued to widen in favor of Berkshire Hathaway. All that said, we make no attempt to appraise relative attractiveness for investment of Wesco versus Berkshire Hathaway stock at present stock-market quotations. To progress from this point at a satisfactory rate, Wesco plainly needs more favorable investment opportunities, recognizable as such by its management, preferably in whole companies like CORT, but, alternatively, in marketable securities to be purchased by Wesco's insurance subsidiaries. The thing that should interest Wesco shareholders most with respect to 2001 is that we found no new common stocks for our insurance companies to buy. We are not excited by general prospects for common stocks. The Board of Directors recently increased Wesco's regular dividend from 311/2 cents per share to 321/2 cents per share, payable March 6, 2002, to shareholders of record as of the close of business on February 6, 2002.
这份年报包含已提交给美国证券交易委员会的 Form 10-K 表格,其中详细介绍了西科金融及其子公司,并附有经过审计的财务报表及大量脚注。一如既往,恳请您对这些内容予以仔细关注。
This annual report contains Form 10-K, a report Ñled with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and includes detailed information about Wesco and its subsidiaries as well as audited Ñnancial statements bearing extensive footnotes. As usual, your careful attention is sought with respect to these items.
查理·T·芒格
董事会主席
2002 年 3 月 5 日
Charles T. Munger Chairman of the Board March 5, 2002