每日新闻集团2014年股东大会——查理·芒格问答

2014 · 会议 · 原文约 12098 词
译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文,也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。
打开来源正文

我是查理·芒格,每日邮报公司(DJCO)董事会主席,欢迎各位,包括那些铁杆粉丝……我们的新独立会计事务所也到场了。相比之前那家,我们更喜欢你们。这让我想起自己的个人经历:曾有人问我,谁是给我人生带来最多幸福的人,我说,“这简单——是我妻子的第一任丈夫。”诸位现在也处于类似的理想位置。

I’m Charlie Munger, Chairman of the Board of the Daily Journal Corporation (DJCO), and I welcome all of you, including the groupies….Our [new] independent accounting firm is here. We prefer you to our old one. You remind me of my own personal circumstances. They once asked me what one person accounted for most of my personal felicity in life, and I said, “That’s easy – that would be my wife’s first husband.” You have an ideal position of the same sort.

我简单谈谈审计的事,之后就不再讲这个话题了。

像《每日新闻报》这样拖到如此晚才发布审计报告的,绝对是闻所未闻。简直不可思议。就算是黑手党用世界上最恶劣的手段来管理公司,你也不会想到审计会拖这么久。这创造了世界历史上的新纪录。我们显然经历了一场地狱般的审计,问题在于,是什么造成的?我们的审计师会说,是我们内部控制方面的散漫导致的。天知道,我们确实有一些小毛病,但在我看来,这些毛病微不足道,对任何有判断力的人都没有实际影响。审计师会说,我们的困难真的很严重。他们被我们业务的复杂性搞糊涂了——天知道,这些业务确实令人困惑、困难重重——但那是外部现实。他们就像那种想通过摸腹股沟来治流鼻血的医生,还按小时收费。

这不是出于恶意。他们是一个庞大的官僚机构,给我们造成了巨大的伤害,就像一头大象穿过谷仓踩死鸡群一样。这只是现代生活的一部分,但[道琼斯董事会成员]彼得·考夫曼总是说,没有哪个场合,无论多么糟糕,是完全无用的。它总能成为一个有用的反面教材。我对这次审计就是这种感觉。

我们自己也做服务性业务。我们也是一个官僚机构,在这个复杂的软件业务中,我们完全有能力让某些信任我们的客户失望。我们把这次的审计当作一个警示,提醒自己永远不要对别人做类似的事:无意中干出愚蠢的事,造成巨大的伤害。

当然,在这场软件争夺战中,我们的主要竞争对手非常乐意看到我们因审计报告未能及时发布而上新闻。想想那些拿佣金的销售团队对此会作何反应。审计师等于在给我们的主要竞争对手输送大量“肉食”,然后找我们报销。这可不是审计史上最愉快的时刻。

我认为这件事在金融界对我们没有丝毫伤害。换任何一家普通公司,早就被钉在十字架上了,但我们有信任和声誉的储备,所以我认为对你们这样的人来说,这不算个事。我确实认为这件事伤害了我们与客户的关系。我们的审计师是否让我们损失了 500 万美元(算上机会成本),还是更多,我无法告诉你,但这无疑是一次重大的不愉快事件,而且——在我看来——完全没有必要。但我们并不觉得我们的审计师比“四大”中任何一家更差。我认为,当存在庞大的官僚机构,并且法律赋予了新的责任时,就会出现一些奇怪的状况。我们这种风险投资类的业务状况,几乎会让任何只做过审计工作的人感到困惑。这有点像人类自然流露的疯狂,并非出乎意料。

我认为正确的应对方法是明确的。宽恕并非始于耶稣。真正想通这个道理的是亚里士多德。他认为,把自己的时间花在因一些伤害而设法报复上是愚蠢的。你只能忍辱负重。我们支付了所有发票,包括额外的费用,这样他们就能对我们造成更大的伤害。我们不会再这样做了。我们的新审计师至少是本地公司,我们对他们来说,比我们对老审计师来说,是更大的客户。我们麻烦的一部分原因在于我们的业务情况很复杂,而且我确信,我们这个小公司吸引不到顶尖的人才。

我还认为,当坏事发生时,总有一部分是你自己的错。事后看来,我和格里[萨尔兹曼,道琼斯 CEO]都有错,我的错比格里严重得多,那就是,我们和信任和敬佩的人相处得非常融洽——这确实会产生一种近乎爱慕的感觉,我喜欢在生意和生活中这样——但对于我们不敬佩的人,我们俩都不太善于掩饰这种态度。我认为这件事就这样越来越糟,我不知道怎么改变像格里这样年纪的人,当然,我也老了,所以我们只能尽力坚持下去。希望新的审计师能更令人敬佩。很难想象他们会更差。对于满足客户来说,他们拥有世上最简单的工作之一。我们像亚里士多德那样对待这件事。考虑到竞争影响,它可能让公司损失了不少钱。他们不是故意的。他们完全是出于无意,丝毫没有意识到,他们一个月又一个月地拖延我们的审计报告,可能会在市场上伤害我们,让我们面对一个拥有大量拿佣金推销员的大竞争对手,四处散布“《每日新闻报》内部控制形同虚设,他们根本不中用”等等。关于审计,我就说这么多。

《每日新闻报》:业务

我们反复说过,我们的业务在萎缩。用印刷机提供信息内容的报纸业务,即使是法律类报纸,也在萎缩。黄金收入来自发布止赎公告。有一段时间我们赚了很多钱。这有点像在瘟疫期间当殡仪馆老板……

I’m going to talk briefly on accounting and then I’m not going to talk any more on the subject. To be as late in publishing an audit as the Daily Journal is absolutely unheard of. It’s unbelievable. Had the mafia been running the company with the worst excesses in the world you wouldn’t expect an audit to be this late. It set a new record in the history of the world. We obviously had an audit from hell, and the question is, what caused it? Our auditor would say it was our sloppiness in internal controls. God knows, we’ve had a few imperfections, but in my judgment they were trivial and of no practical consequence to anybody with any sense. The auditors would say that our difficulties were really serious. They were confused by the difficulties of our business, which God knows are confusing and difficult, but that’s external reality. They were like the doctor who wants to fix a nose bleed by feeling around in the groin, and charge for it by the hour. It wasn’t malevolent. They’re a big bureaucracy and they did us enormous damage, the way an elephant would do damage if it went through a barnyard and stomped the chickens. It just comes with modern life, but [DJCO Board Member] Peter Kaufman always says that no occasion, no matter how terrible, is totally un-useful. It can always serve as a useful bad example. That’s the way I feel about this audit. We are a service operation ourselves. We’re a bureaucracy, and we have plenty of power in this complicated software business of disappointing some customer who trusts us. We’re using our audit as an example of the kind of thing we never want to do to anybody else ourselves: just unwittingly do something stupid that does a lot of damage. Now of course our main competitor in this software struggle just loves our being in the headlines for not getting audits out on time. Just think of how a commissioned sales force reacts to that. The auditor was feeding our main competitor lots of red meat and billing us for it. It was not the happiest occasion in the history of auditing. I don’t think it hurt us at all in the financial community. Any ordinary company would have been crucified, but we have a reservoir of trust and reputation, so I think it was a non-event to people like you. I do think it hurt us with the customers. Whether our auditors hurt us five million dollars (counting opportunity costs) or some larger sum I cannot tell you, but it was a significant unpleasantness, and it was – in my judgment – totally unnecessary. But there is no feeling on our part that our auditor was any worse than any other member of the Big Four. I think when we have big bureaucracies and new responsibilities under the law you get some odd occasions. Our business situation being a venture capital-type situation would have confused practically anybody who was restricted to auditing experience. It was sort of a natural human craziness and it’s not unexpected. The right way to react to it I think is clear. Turning the other cheek didn’t start with Jesus at all. The real guy who figured that out was Aristotle. He just thought it was crazy to spend your time trying to get even based on some injury. You just suck up your gut. We paid all the invoices with the extra payments so they could hurt us more. We’re not going to do any more. Our new auditor at least is local and we’re a bigger client to it than we were to the old one. Part of our trouble was that our business situation was complicated and I’m sure we didn’t draw the top talent to our tiny little business. I also think that when something bad happens it’s always partly your own fault. With 20/20 hindsight both Gerry [Salzman, DJCO CEO] and I have a fault, and I have it way worse than Gerry, and that is we get along beautifully with people we trust and admire – it really causes something more like love, which I like in business and in life – but the people we don’t admire, neither of us is very good at disguising it. I think that this went from bad to worse, and I don’t know how to fix people as old as Gerry, and of course I’m old, so we just have to soldier on as best we can. Hopefully, the new auditors will be more admirable. It’s hard to imagine that they could be worse. They have one of the easiest jobs in the whole world in satisfying a client. We’re treating it like Aristotle. It may have cost the company quite a bit of money, counting its competitive effects. They did not do it on purpose. They did it utterly unwittingly, without the faintest idea that maybe if they delayed our audit report month after month after month it would hurt us in the market with a big competitor with a bunch of commissioned salesmen around spreading the happy news that the Daily Journal’s internal controls were non-existent and they were no good and so on. That’s all I’m going to say about auditing. Daily Journal: the Business As we have said over and over again, we have a declining business. The business of running a newspaper with information content delivered by printing presses, even when it’s a legal newspaper, is declining. The golden revenues were from publishing foreclosures notices. We made a lot of money for a while. It was sort of like being an undertaker during the

黑死病。在那两三年里,这生意好得不得了,欧洲人口减少了 40%。我们经历的就是那种情况。

我们保住了那笔钱。要我说,我们应对得非常出色,现在仍然占据着 90% 的公开止赎公告市场,但目前几乎什么公告都没有。银行、放贷机构全都收紧了标准,房价也回升了,自然止赎数量就接近于零。我们这门生意的本质就是在走下坡路。

如果纵观那些曾经赚了不少钱、略有盈余、但核心业务因技术发展而走向末路的公司,你会发现结果都很惨。通常的结果就是柯达(股票代码:KODK)。想象一下,一家像柯达这样的公司,一路走到破产。这才是常态:技术性淘汰。

世界历史上只有极少数的例外。其中之一是汤森路透(股票代码:TRI)。他们原本是一家报业公司,附带几家电视台,基本就是尽量榨取这些业务的利润,等时机合适以高价卖出,然后转行做在线信息服务,并且成功完成了转型。这确实极为罕见。

另一个罕见的例子,当然就是伯克希尔·哈撒韦。伯克希尔起步于三家失败的企业:新英格兰地区的一家纺织厂,是彻底没救的那种,因为纺织品本质上就是凝固的电力,而新英格兰的电价比田纳西河流域管理局所在地佐治亚州高出太多。一家彻底注定失败、必定倒闭的企业。我们还有巴尔的摩四家百货商店之一[霍克希尔德-科恩百货],铁定要破产,当然它后来也确实倒闭了;还有一家集邮公司[蓝筹印花],绝对干不出什么名堂,最终也确实一事无成。就是从这三家失败的企业里,诞生了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。这是世界历史上最成功的一次失败企业交易。我们不只拥有一家失败企业——我们有三家。

Black Death. For two or three years it was a wonderful business and the population of Europe declined by 40 percent. That’s what we went through. We kept the money. I would say that we handled our situation very well, and we still have a 90% share of the public notices in foreclosures, but there practically aren’t any right now. The banks, the lenders, have all tightened their standards and the real estate prices are back up, so of course the foreclosures are pretty close to zero. We have a declining business in its very nature. If you take the whole history of businesses that make a fair amount of money and have a little surplus but their basic business goes to hell based on technological developments, the results are lousy. The normal result is Kodak (ticker: KODK). Imagine having a business like Kodak and having it go all the way to bankruptcy. That’s the normal occurrence: technological obsolescence. There are few exceptions in the history of the world. One of them is Thompson Reuters (ticker: TRI). They were a newspaper company with a few television stations added and they basically milked them as long as they could, sold them for high prices, and went into a different business – online information – and they successfully made the transition. That is really rare. The other rare example, of course, is Berkshire Hathaway. Berkshire started with three failing companies: a textile business in New England that was totally doomed because textiles are congealed electricity and the power rates were way higher in New England than they were down in TVA country in Georgia. A totally doomed, certain-to-fail business. We had one of four department stores in Baltimore [Hochschild Kohn], absolutely certain to go broke, and of course it did in due course, and a trading stamp company [Blue Chip Stamps] absolutely certain to do nothing which it eventually did. Out of those three failing businesses came Berkshire Hathaway. That’s the most successful failing business transaction in the history of the world. We didn’t have one failing business – we had three.

从那个微不足道的小生意里,我们把多余的资金抽出来投到别处,取得了前所未有的好成绩。事实上,我们最近在市值上超过了通用电气 [股票代码:GE],而通用电气是托马斯·爱迪生本人在 1892 年创立的,曾是世界最强大的公司之一。

这确实是个了不起的壮举。但正常情况下,结果更可能像柯达那样。

施乐 [股票代码:XRX] 是个有趣的案例。他们一度濒临灭绝,后来又挺过来了,但和当年的辉煌相比已经黯淡无光。实际上,别人靠施乐的发明赚了大钱,而施乐自己却失败了。比尔·盖茨对这个问题研究很深,他说通常的结果就是失败。想想通用汽车 [股票代码:GM] 吧,它破产了。你能想象我年轻的时候它在经济中是多么叱咤风云吗?它是最大、最有价值、最受尊敬的公司,结果股东却血本无归。

《每日日报》剩下的是一笔正在衰退的业务。它可能还能撑很久,但利润会少得可怜。我们的未来在软件业务上,我们非常看好这块。我们认为所有法院都应该实现自动化,应该有一个可配置的系统,放在云上,这些公共机构应该得到体贴、体面、忠诚的服务——这正是我们打算做的。至于那个让审计师非常担心的新曙光技术公司,我在进来之前问了他们一个问题:你们现有的客户里,有多少威胁要离开?他们有大约 400 个客户,他们只提到了一个。对我来说,我很喜欢这个结果,这就像一笔风投类型的投资。我喜欢那些人,喜欢那种精神,喜欢我们正在做的事情。这是一个巨大的市场。

大多数大型软件公司都讨厌跟政府打交道。IBM [股票代码:IBM] 非常擅长这一点,但其他公司都讨厌得要命。像微软 [股票代码:MSFT] 这样的公司,根本不需要去应付一堆请求建议书,那简直是折磨。而我们其实还挺喜欢这种折磨的。这些人确实需要更好的产品。谁知道呢,我们也许真能干成,但从客观证据看,我们在尝试做一件很少有人成功过的事:把一个成功的、但因竞争变化而遭受重创的业务,从灰烬中重新建立起一个相当不错的东西。这就是我们正在尝试的。

我觉得我们体面地干成的概率超过一半。我不认为这会是个大金矿,但我们对于“体面”的标准已经相当令人满意了。至于多余的资金,谢天谢地我们还有。大部分报业公司——大约一半已经破产或濒临破产,他们借了太多钱去收购其他报纸,因为在那些友好的投资银行家和顾问的帮助下,他们只知道这么干,结果在享受了多年的垄断之后,基本上把自家股东的钱都亏光了。这里的情况不是这样。我们的资产负债表上有这么多多余的钱,我们正在用这些钱来创建一家软件公司。

我想你们都会喜欢我们进来之前开的那个董事会。在我看来,那些人正直、聪明,并且对这一极其困难的业务——本质上充满了各种政府官僚机构,还有一群形形色色的顾问影响着客户——的挑战感到乐观。这绝非易事,充满了各种棘手的问题:要做什么,为什么要做,新系统能否运行,如果能,为什么?虽然我不太懂,但我还挺喜欢这种感觉。我觉得这个行业不会有太多新进入者。我们的主要竞争对手实力雄厚,但如果我来买产品,我会买我们的而不是他们的——这就是我对合理竞争的检验标准。

说了这些,现在我来回答问题……

Out of that little nothing, the excess capital that we took out and put somewhere else did better than anybody’s ever done. As a matter of fact, we recently passed General Electric [ticker: GE] in terms of market capitalization, and GE was founded by Thomas Edison himself in 1892, and one of the most powerful companies in the world. It was a considerable stunt. But the normal result is more like Kodak. Xerox [ticker: XRX] is an interesting case. They went to the brink of extinction and then came back, but they are a pale shadow of their former greatness. They actually invented most of the stuff other people made so much money out of, and they still failed. Bill Gates is a big student of this subject, and he says that the standard result is failure. Imagine General Motors [ticker: GM] who went bankrupt. Can you imagine how they towered over the economy when I was young? It was the biggest, more valuable, most admired company, and it took the shareholders to zero. What Daily Journal is left with is a declining business. It may last quite a while, but at really modest profits. The future is our software business and we really like that. We think all these courts should be automated, and it should be a configurable system and it should be in the cloud and these public agencies should be serviced lovingly and honorably and loyally, and that’s exactly what we plan doing. New Dawn Technologies, which so worried our auditors, I asked them a question today before we came in here: of your existing clients, how many are threatening to leave? They have about four hundred clients and they named one. As far as I’m concerned, I like the way that’s worked out, as a venture capital type of investment. I like the people and I like the ethos and I like what we’re trying to do. It’s a great big market. Most big software companies hate dealing with the government. IBM [ticker: IBM] got very good at it, but everybody else just hates it. You have a business like Microsoft [ticker: MSFT] and you don’t need a bunch of RFPs [Request For Proposals] – it’s just agony. We actually kinda like the agony. The people really need better products. Who knows, we may actually pull it off, but the objective evidence would be that we’re trying to do something that very few people have ever succeeded at: take a successful business, clobbered by a change in competition, and have it out of the ashes raise something that’s pretty damn good. That’s what we’re trying to do. I think the odds are better than even that we pull it off creditably. I don’t think it will be a super-bonanza, but our standards of creditable are pretty satisfactory. As to the surplus money, thank God we have it. Most of the newspaper businesses – about half of them went broke or nearly broke and they borrowed so much to buy other newspapers because that’s all they know how to do, with the aid of so many friendly investment bankers and consultants, that they basically took their own shareholders to zero after having long years of monopoly. That has not been the result here. We have all this extra money on the balance sheet and we’re using it to create a software business. I think you all would have liked the board meeting we had before we came in here. The people strike me as honorable, intelligent and cheerful about the difficulties of this very difficult business, which are a whole lot of bureaucracies, governmental in nature, with a whole lot of different consultants influencing the customer. It’s not a bit easy, with very difficult questions of what you do and why you should do it, whether the new system is going to work, and if so, why? I actually kind of like it even though I don’t understand it. I have the feeling that we’re not going to get a lot of new entrants into this business. Our main competitor is in a formidable place, but if I were buying the product, I’d buy ours and not theirs, and that’s my test of proper competition. With those remarks, I’ll take questions….

问:未来一年,您在工作上和个人生活中最期待的事情是什么?

芒格:这个问题听起来像是真正的铁杆粉丝问的。说到底,我过着一种非常受眷顾的生活。我有出色的伙伴。我遇到过的难题,凭我的能力也都能解决。面对一个问题却无力解决,那种感觉可不好受。幸运的是,我这辈子挑的都是相当简单的问题,而且我的成功率还不错。

我非常感激自己还活着,而且受到了如此多的眷顾。人很容易因为那些不对的事情而灰心丧气,却忘了那些正确的事情。眼下有很多发展动向我确实不喜欢。

我不喜欢合法赌博的大规模扩张,包括华尔街以衍生品交易等形式运作的合法赌博。这对国家没有好处。

我觉得一种合法毒品就够用了。社会不会因为有了两三种、甚至四种合法毒品就变得更好。回顾我这一生,95% 的人都能负责任地驾驭酒精,甚至可能还为他们的生活增添了一点点乐趣。但其余那 5% 的人造成的痛苦,足以抵消所有其他人享受到的快乐。据我回顾,每二十个人里至少有一个最终彻底沦为酒鬼,其中一半早逝,另一半康复了。这代价实在太大了。

我也不喜欢政府越来越倾向于为欺诈行为买单。要是我来管理这个世界,任何容易被伪造的东西我都不会去报销。教人们靠说谎从政府那里拿钱,这影响太坏了——每个人都去雇一个以胜诉付费的律师,说自己背疼,或者因为精神困扰导致生活适应性差。我觉得这简直骇人听闻。到底是哪种脑子不正常的家伙管理我们的政府,才会搞出这种欺诈?这太疯狂了——你这是在教人们当骗子,还付钱让他们去当骗子。

另一方面,回头看过去这 100 年,被解决的问题之多、普通人的生活改善之大,简直令人难以置信。我最近去哈佛参加了一个小型聚会,哈佛人真的认为他们快要能用干细胞制造出胰腺细胞了。考虑到糖尿病的普遍性,这要是能成,可真是个了不起的成就。有些这样的成果正在到来。就看看我们都开着的汽车吧。想想这背后是多么巧妙的工程,安全性提高了多少,等等。很多事情都做对了。

我有一个孙子在加州大学圣巴巴拉分校(UCSB)学计算机科学。这些年来,我家里餐桌上坐过一大批理工科学生。这让你对自己的国家感到欣慰。当然,UCSB 周边像伊斯拉斯维斯塔(Isla Vista)那种烂地方,也有很多社会底层的人,但他们没有被邀请来吃饭。总的来说,如果你想组织一场狂欢派对,我希望你去别处搞。

总的来说,我不像沃伦 [巴菲特] 那么乐观。我不知道还有谁能比沃伦更乐观。他对长期前景有一种真正的信念。我不像他那么热情高涨,但他说很多好事都在发生,这一点是对的。

看看中国从当初的样子变成今天的样子,世界历史上还没有过如此规模的成就。他们在很多我们失败的事情上做对了,我们不应该居高临下地看他们。想象一下,把一个经济形态从自给自足的农业,带到他们现在这样巨大的增长速度,而且不是靠向富裕世界借钱——我们美国当年就是这么干的——他们是靠攒钱做到的。他们当时很穷,却把收入的 45% 储蓄起来。他们自己给自己融资,现在还在借钱给我们。我们和中国似乎保持着合理的和平,关系处得不错。这一点非常重要。贸易往来对大家都有好处。

皮凯蒂先生 [《资本论》作者] 有点犯傻。记下来,我希望皮凯蒂家族的人别跟我家联姻。不是说他的某些数据不对,而是他根本没正确解读这些数据。当然,如果像中国这么大的一个国家,在制造业上变得极其出色,那确实会减少全世界每个行业的某些工会工作岗位。但他们有成功的权利。我们其他人应该有足够的成熟度去适应,而不是整天抱怨这个世界偶尔会比我们预想的要困难一些。当然,在经济中,总会有一些部门在二十年或四十年的时间里表现更好或更差。这不是什么恶意的结果。这是一种巨大的变化,从世界平等的角度来看,它极大地改善了状况。坐在一个每周工作 36 小时的富裕国家里,抱怨其他国家的人赶上来了,在我看来这可不是什么成熟或高尚的行为。

Q: What’s one thing that you are excited about in the next year, professionally and personally? Munger: That’s spoken like a true groupie. Basically, I lead a very favored life. I’ve got wonderful associates. I’ve had problems that my abilities were able to solve. Working on a problem and lacking the ability to solve it is unpleasant. Luckily, I have selected very easy problems all my life, and I have a reasonable batting average. I feel very thankful that I’m alive and that I’ve been so favored. It’s very easy to get discouraged by what’s wrong and forget what’s right. There are a whole lot of developments that I really don’t like. I don’t like the vast growth of legalized gambling, including the legalized gambling run by Wall Street in the form of derivatives trading and so on. It’s bad for the country. I think one legal drug is enough. I don’t think society is going to be better with two or three or four legal drugs. If I look back in my own life, 95% of the people have handled liquor responsibly. It may even have been a slight plus in their lives. The other 5% have created enough misery to counterbalance all the felicity of the others. As I look back, at least one person in twenty has ended in total alcoholism and half of them died young and half of them recovered. It was a lot of damage. I also don’t like the increasing tendency of governments to pay off fraud. If I were running the world I wouldn’t pay off anything that could be easily faked. It’s so bad for people to learn to lie to get money from the government — just to have everybody hire somebody on a contingent fee to say his back hurts or his life adjustment is bad because of a psychiatric difficulty. I find this appalling. What kind of nut cases running our government would create a fraud like this? It’s crazy – you’re teaching people to be crooks, you’re paying people to be crooks. On the other hand, if you look back over 100 years, it’s just fabulous what’s been solved and how much better off the average person is. I was recently at Harvard for a little bash, and Harvard really thinks they’re about to create pancreatic cells from stem cells. Considering the prevalence of diabetes, that would be a considerable stunt. Some of that stuff is coming. Just take the quality of the cars we all drive. Think of what clever engineering it is, how much the safety has been improved, etc. A lot is done right. I have this grandson who is at UCSB in computer science. I’ve had a whole bunch of the science and engineering students around my dinner table over the years. It makes you feel good about your country. Now, there are a lot of the people at the bottom of the pit around UCSB living in Isla Vista, but they weren’t invited. Basically, if you want to have an orgy, I want you to have it somewhere else. On balance, I’m not as optimistic as Warren [Buffett]. I don’t see how anybody could be more optimistic that Warren. He has this real faith in the long term. I’m not quite so enthusiastic, but he’s right that there’s a lot good that’s happening. If you take what China has done from what China was, there’s been no achievement on this scale in the entire history of the world. They’ve done a lot of things right at which we have failed, and we shouldn’t be looking down our noses at them. Imagine taking an economy from subsistence agriculture to what they have done at these enormous rates of growth, and doing it not by borrowing from the rich world – which is what we did in the United States – they did it by saving the money. They were poor, and they were saving 45% of their income. They financed themselves and they’re lending to us. We seem to have reasonable peace with China and are getting along. That’s very important. All the trade helps. Mr. Picketty [Capital] is a little daft. Put me down has hoping the Pickettys don’t marry into my family. It isn’t that some of his numbers aren’t correct, but he just doesn’t interpret them correctly. Of course if a place as big as China gets really good at manufacturing it’s going to reduce some union jobs in the rest of the world in every trade. But they have a right to succeed. The rest of us can be mature enough to adjust instead of bitching about the fact that the world is occasionally a little tougher than we would have chosen. Of course there are going to be parts of the economy that do better or worse over a twenty- or forty-year period. It’s not some malevolent outcome. It’s a huge change, and in terms of world equality it’s enormously improved. To sit in a very rich country with a 36hour week and complain about the fact that all the other people are coming up just doesn’t strike me as a very mature or noble way to behave.

查理·芒格(照片来源:维基百科)

Charlie Munger (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

问:《每日邮报》(代码:DJCO)在定价和其他竞争问题上有何应对?

芒格:市场竞争激烈,结果并不确定。我相信我们的产品更好。我相信我们的经营方式也会更好。但我不认为我们想要的所有客户都会足够明智地选择我们。这将是永无止境的斗争。前面没有轻松的财富可赚。任何认为我们利用多余现金——正是这些现金创造了如此卓越的成果——是永久性的现象,认为这是一个迷你版的伯克希尔·哈撒韦,由一位九十岁的董事长再次领导重新开始,那是活在幻想世界里。我们做了一些非常精明的投资,而且这种投资每四十年才发生一次。我九十岁了。这不应该给你带来太多乐观。(笑声)

那些机会非同寻常。是那种千载难逢的机会,正好发生在我们像是镇上唯一一家殡仪馆而瘟疫爆发的时候。二加二让我们得到了这笔巨款。就算最坏的情况发生,股东们也不会像通用汽车的股东那样归零。我们或许真的能做成这件事,但绝非易事。

在伯克希尔·哈撒韦(代码:BRK-A)的整个历史中,我只能想到一项我们自己从总部创办的新业务,那就是再保险部门。现在,那是一门大生意,赚了巨额的钱。伯克希尔·哈撒韦,虽然取得了辉煌的成就,也只创办了一项新业务。其他一切都是我们买来的。另一方面,你不需要一大堆成就;你只需要几个就够了。

这是我们与其他人不同的地方之一。想象一下,有人觉得自己应该因为告诉别人应该把业务分成 200 个小块而获得高额报酬。有些成年人竟然认为他们应该因为给出这样的建议而得到报酬。这很奇怪。金融领域的疯狂程度甚至超过了性。这是一个很难理性对待的话题。

问:你对税收倒置有何看法?应该如何处理?

芒格:就拿我们伯克希尔上头条的那个来说吧。蒂姆·霍顿斯(代码:THI)比汉堡王(代码:BKW)更大。我们合并它们,收入更高的那家公司获得总部所在地,那就是加拿大,它几乎算是美国的一部分。任何认为这是一场大悲剧或大不公的人都是完全疯了。伯克希尔的税收实际上增加了不少。但一旦媒体抓住某个复杂的事情,它们就会发狂。

总的来说,在一个自由贸易的世界里,企业是流动的,你试图实行一个税率远高于世界其他地区的公司税制,就会付出沉重的代价。如果是我管理世界,我会实行低公司税,并通过其他方式——比如消费税——来满足对平等的渴望。我不在乎有人赚了很多钱然后像守财奴一样存着。大多数人都有巨大的消费倾向,而配偶和子女会助长这一点。

看看世界上公民生活得最好的地方——新加坡,低税率;香港,低税率——你是在用一堆左翼的嫉妒心理对抗现实。我认为嫉妒具有破坏性。我努力把它从自己的思维体系中清除出去,而且我做得相当不错。我希望我的同胞们少被它消耗,尤其是政客们。我并不认为我们的问题是由不平等引起的,尽管我确实认为让许多人通过合法赌博——尽管他们自称是资金管理者、衍生品交易员等等——致富是个错误。如果是我管理世界,我会把这个阶层削减约 90%。我花一个星期就能写出法律。这会彻底改变纽约的房地产市场。

另一件事:如果世界其他地方没那么愚蠢和官僚,我们也不会富有,你们(在座的各位)也不会富有。这个房间里充满了靠别人的愚蠢而获得舒适生活的人。同样是这些人,当他们看到这种愚蠢行为适得其反时,又想保留所有好处,让愚蠢消失。你们要求得太多了。事实是,如果你自己保持理性,世界的愚蠢会帮助你。只要他们不搞砸到世界大战或类似的地步——那是有界限的。

问:你如何对抗嫉妒?

芒格:嗯,你只要不在乎别人是否做得更好就行了。嫉妒是永远无法从中得到任何乐趣的七宗罪之一。它是彻头彻尾的输家:对国家不好,对你自己也不好。犹太人在《旧约》中把这些写进去是对的:不要嫉妒你邻居的驴,他的妻子……他们不停地强调,因为他们知道即使是一群牧羊人也需要理解这个道理。他们是对的。这是一种有害的东西。我在专业公司里看到过,每个人都多拿了 150% 的薪酬,但某个人某年比另一个人多拿了 1 万美元,而没拿到的那个人就发疯了。当你多拿了 150% 的薪酬,而别人只多拿了 1% 的三分之一时,这难道合理吗?但这种事就是会发生。

问:考虑到你对大型货币中心银行的投资,你如何看待政府对他们征收的高额罚款?

芒格:分两部分。第一部分是他们作为抵押贷款放贷方的恶劣、滥用行为。就像故意建一座他们知道会倒塌并杀死人的桥。道德尺度就是那样。做这些事的人还觉得自己完美无缺。正如迈蒙尼德曾经说过的:“每个人在自己的眼中都是正直的。”他们做了这些可怕的事,却还认为自己是在高尚地服务于资本主义,应该得到比现在更多的报酬。这非常非常令人遗憾。

我认为,如果行为恶劣到一定程度,就像安达信会计师事务所那样,即使安达信的个别成员受到了非常不公平的对待,我认为也必须有一些失败案例。目前的情况是,很少有个人因为恶劣行为而受到惩罚,而他们的公司却支付了非常巨额的罚款。这是否完全正确是一个很有趣的问题。

抵押贷款变成了一种肮脏的赚钱方式。你对那些无法驾驭信贷的人下手,通过滥用和鼓励他们的愚蠢来试图获得非常高的回报——这不是我想在银行业赚钱的方式。你应该通过向人们出售对客户有利的东西来赚钱。你永远不会看到伯克希尔购买赌场。尽管有利可图且合法,我们就是不会去那里。

美国企业界应该有一个大标准,那就是有些事虽然完全合法,但我们因为不屑于做而不去做。目前流行的标准是:“我们能把自己的道德标准降低到什么程度而仍然不惹麻烦?我们不想让竞争对手以某种方式赚钱而把我们排除在外。”这是一个巨大的错误。

顺便问一句,坚持这些想法伤害了查理·芒格吗?我需要通过某种肮脏的方式得到更多钱吗?(《每日邮报》董事会成员)彼得·考夫曼说了一句非常聪明的话:“如果所有这些骗子和鼓吹者知道诚实能赚多少钱,会有更多人选择这么做。”

拿伯克希尔来说。在世界历史上,有八次超过十亿美元的大型投资组合再保险交易。我们做成了全部八次。那是因为人们信任我们。他们认为我们会在三十年后说到做到。信任能赚钱。这个道理如此简单,然而每个人都争先恐后地投入所有看似有效的肮脏活动中。

我们的政客想通过引入合法赌博来解决他们的财政问题。在明尼苏达州的卡斯湖,有一个印第安人赌场。我年轻时卡斯湖没有当铺。现在有五家。所有这些靠养老金生活的人,他们只有一把椅子和一台电视机,然后他们进去,每个月把取暖费之外的所有东西都输光。

或者电视上的广告:想象一下,教普通人出人头地的方式就是每天积极交易证券。这是一个诚实的商品吗?这是一个合法商品,但光荣吗?你希望你的女婿做这个吗?嗯,也许有些人已经在做了……那是一个庞大的群体。

Q: What is the Daily Journal (ticker: DJCO) doing about pricing and other competitive issues? Munger: The market is competitive and the outcome is not certain. I believe our product is better. I believe our business methods will be better. I don’t think all the customers we want will be wise enough to choose us. It’s struggle forever. There’s no easy bonanza ahead. Anybody who thinks that our use of the surplus cash — which has caused such remarkable results — is a permanent occurrence, that this is a mini-Berkshire Hathaway starting again headed by a Chairman who is ninety years old, is living in fantasy land. We made some very shrewd investments and we did it once every forty years. I’m ninety. That shouldn’t give you a lot of optimism. (laughter) The opportunities were remarkable. They were the type that come along very rarely and they happened to coincide with a time when we were the only undertaker in a town with the plague. Two plus two gave us this chunk of money. If worse comes to worse, the shareholders are not going to go to zero like the shareholders of General Motors did. We may actually pull this thing off, but it isn’t a bit easy. In the whole history of Berkshire Hathaway (ticker: BRK-A), I can only think of one new business that we started by ourselves at headquarters, and that was the reinsurance department. Now, that is a huge business, and it’s made an enormous amount of money. Berkshire Hathaway, for all its glorious achievement, started one new business. Everything else we bought. On the other hand, you don’t need a whole lot of achievements; you just need a few. That’s one place where we’re different from everybody else. Imagine somebody who thinks he ought to be paid big sums for telling people they ought to divide their business into 200 individual pieces. There are grown-ups who think they ought to be paid for giving that advice. It’s weird. There is more dementia about finance than there is about sex. It’s a hard subject to be rational about. Q: What do you think about tax inversions and how they should be addressed? Munger: Take the one that we’re in headlines about at Berkshire. Tim Horton’s (ticker: THI) is bigger than Burger King (ticker: BKW). We merge it and the bigger company with the most income gets the headquarters, and it’s Canada, which is practically part of the United States. Anyone who thinks this is a great tragedy or great injustice is stark raving mad. Berkshire’s taxes go up a lot. But once the press goes off on something that’s complicated they go berserk. Generally speaking, in a world of free trade, where corporations are mobile, you pay a big penalty for trying to have a corporate tax system where your taxes are way higher than the taxes in the rest of the world. If I were running the world I would have low corporate taxes, and get at the yearning for equality some other way, like consumption taxes. I don’t care if somebody makes a lot of money and holds it like a miser. Most people have a vast propensity to spend, helped by spouses and children. If you take the places in the world where the citizens have done the best – Singapore, low tax rate, Hong Kong, low tax rate – you’re fighting against reality with a lot of left-wing envy. I think envy is destructive. I try to drive it out of my own system, and I’m pretty good at it, too. I wish my fellow citizens were less consumed by it, particularly the politicians. I don’t think our problems are caused by inequality, although I do think it’s a mistake to let a lot of people get rich out of legalized gambling, although they call themselves money managers and derivatives traders and so on. If I were running the world, I would whittle that class down by about 90%. It would take me a week to write the laws. It would totally change the real estate market in New York. Another thing: if the rest of the world weren’t so stupid and bureaucratic, we wouldn’t be rich, and you [the people in the room] wouldn’t be rich either. This room is full of people whose comfort has come from the stupidity of other people. The same people, when they see the stupidity acting counter-productively, want to keep all the benefits and have the stupidity go away. You’re asking too much. The truth of the matter is, if you stay rational yourself, the stupidity of the world helps you. As long as they don’t blunder into World War or something – there are limits. Q: How do you combat envy? Munger: Well, you just don’t care if somebody else does better. It’s one of the deadly sins out of which you can never have any fun. It’s a total loser: bad for the country and bad for you. The Jews were right to put those things in the Old Testament: don’t envy thy neighbor’s donkey, his wife…they kept laying it on because they knew it was important even for a bunch of herdsmen. They were right. It’s a pernicious thing. I see in professional firms, where everybody is overpaid by 150%, and some guy gets $10,000 more than somebody else in one year, and the guy who doesn’t get it goes berserk. Is this rational, when you’re overpaid by 150% and somebody gets 1/3 of 1% more? But it happens. Q: Given your investments in big money center banks, what do you think of the big fines the government is extracting from them? Munger: Two parts. Part one was their terrible, abusive behavior as mortgage lenders. It was like deliberately building a bridge they knew was going to collapse and kill people. It was morality on that scale. The people who did it thought they were perfect. As Maimodides once said, “Every man is straight in his own eyes.” They did these terrible things and thought they were nobly serving capitalism and ought to be paid even more than they were. That was very, very regrettable. I think if behavior is bad enough, as it was at [Enron's accounting firm] Arthur Anderson, even though the individual members of Arthur Anderson were very unfairly treated, I think you have to have some failure. The way it has worked out, very few individuals have been punished for ghastly behavior, and their companies have paid penalties that are very substantial. Whether that’s exactly right is a very interesting question. Mortgage lending became a dirty way to make money. You take people that can’t handle credit and try to make very high returns by abusing and encouraging their stupidity – that’s not the way I want to make money in banking. You should try to make money by selling people things that are good for the customer. You’ll never see Berkshire buy a gambling casino. Even though it’s profitable and legal we’re just not going to go there. There ought to be a big standard in corporate America of things that are perfectly legal but we don’t do because they are beneath us. The standard that prevails is, “How low can we make our ethos and still not get in trouble? We don’t want our competitor to be making money in some way that we are left out of.” That’s a huge mistake. By the way, has it hurt Charlie Munger to have these ideas? Do I need more money gotten in some scroungy way? [DJCO Board Member] Peter Kaufman says something very smart: “If all these crooks and promoters knew how much money there was in being honest, there’d be more people who did it.” Take Berkshire. There have been eight large portfolio reinsurance transactions of over a billion dollars in the history of the world. We’ve done all eight of them. That’s because people trust us. They think we’ll do what we say thirty years ahead. There’s money in being trusted. It’s such a simple idea, and yet everybody rushes into every scummy activity that seems to work. Our politicians want to solve their financial problems by bringing in legalized gambling. In Cass Lake, MN, they have an Indian Casino. When I was young there was no pawn shop in Cass Lake. Now there are five. All these people on pensions, they’ve got one chair and one television set, and they go in and lose 100% every month of everything they have above heating money. Or the advertisements on television: imagine teaching ordinary people the way to get ahead in life is to trade securities actively on a daily basis. Is that an honest product? It’s a legal product, but is it honorable? Would you want your son-in-law to do it? Well, maybe some of them are already doing it…it’s a big crowd.

问: 《每日新闻》(Daily Journal)的继任计划是怎样的?

查理·芒格: 我刚来加州的时候,有个花花公子,整天就知道酗酒、追电影明星。1950 年的时候,他手里有 1000 万美元——那是他在 1920 年代参与某种欺诈组织弄来的,别人都进了监狱,他跑到加州来,追着三流女明星、喝得烂醉。他的银行经理把他叫去,说对他的行为非常担心。他对银行经理说:“我告诉你:我的市政债券不喝酒。”《每日新闻》有很多资产,不会因为人走了就消失。我们不傻,也不会把股东的钱弄到零。目前,像你这样的人把股价炒到了一个我自己都不会买的价格。我什么都不做。我不卖,因为那不是我的本性。我对自己说,好吧,如果你有粉丝团,就会遇上这种疯狂行为。而且——你甚至可能是对的。如果软件业务做得不太好,那你就不会是对的。但我觉得今天全场没那么多《每日新闻》的股东。这是一群不同的人。没问题——我喜欢你们所有人,因为你们让我想起了我自己。谁不喜欢自己的形象盯着自己看呢?(笑声)

问: 大型银行有数万亿美元的衍生品合约。您怎么看这个规模以及交易对手风险?

查理·芒格: 如果你明智地交易衍生品,那就好比拿到了偷窃许可证,所以你能理解他们为什么都想这么干。当生活变得那么容易的时候,想控制自己是非常困难的,而银行总是有办法陷入巨大的麻烦,我觉得很多银行都会因为过度行为而失控。让每个人都跟别人赌博,到底有什么大好处?你可以说,因为人类心理的本性,这种事会一直存在,但我年轻时在一个赌博不多的世界生活了几十年,我更喜欢那样。我觉得对国家来说也更好。这就像有几千个职业扑克牌手。他们对谁有什么好处?

Q: What about succession planning at the Daily Journal? Munger: When I came out to California, there was this playboy and he spent all his time drinking heavily and chasing movie stars. In 1950 he had ten million dollars that he got by being part of a crooked pool of some kind in the 1920s and everybody else when to jail and he came out here and chased all these starlets and drank all this booze. His banker called him in and said that he was very nervous about his behavior. He told his banker, “Let me tell you something: my municipal bonds don’t drink.” The Daily Journal has a lot of assets that aren’t going away just because the people leave. We’re not stupid and we’re not taking the shareholders to zero. At the present time, people like you have bid out stock up to a price where I wouldn’t pay it myself. I don’t do anything about it. I don’t sell because it’s not my nature. I say to myself, well, if you have groupies, you’re going to get this crazy behavior. And – you might even be right. You won’t be right if the software business doesn’t work out very well. But I don’t think there are that many Daily Journal shareholders in the whole room. This is a different crowd of people. That’s all right – I like you all because you remind me of myself. Who doesn’t like his own image starring back at him? (laughter). Question: The major banks have trillions of dollars in derivative contracts. What do you think about this – the size and the counterparty risk? Munger: If you intelligently trade derivatives it’s like a license to steal, so you can understand why they all want to do it. Now, it’s very hard to control yourself when life is that easy, and banks have a way of getting into terrible trouble, and I think a lot of them will get carried away by excess. What’s the big plus of having everybody gamble with everybody else? Now you can say that it’s something that will always be with us because of the psychological nature of human beings, but I lived in a world with low gambling for decades when I was younger and I liked it better. I think it was better for the country. It’s like having thousands of professional poker players. What good are they doing for anybody?

如果我经营一家大型银行,我的爆雷风险会更低,而且我会用不同的方法来评估风险。我根本不会涉足衍生品业务,因为在我看来那是不上档次的事。我喜欢银行扮演企业可信赖合作伙伴的角色,向那些理应获得信贷的人提供贷款。这是最高尚的事业。我喜欢银行帮助人们购买汽车、洗衣机或卡车,然后给他们一份分期付款合同。美国银行(股票代码:BAC)很早就开创了这一切,这对全球商业活动来说是一项高尚的贡献。但我喜欢那种靠疯狂刷信用卡去度假的借贷行为吗?我知道德国似乎能避免这种事,而且他们发展得很好。我认为,当我们鼓励这种像吹气球一样膨胀的消费冲动时,我们是在与魔鬼共舞。刷爆每一张信用卡是一种病态。我年轻时,银行并不鼓励这种行为。当然,那时银行赚的钱也没那么多。

我们在伯克希尔拥有一家银行超过十年(伊利诺伊国民银行与信托公司,又称罗克福德银行)。我们的坏账损失是零。我们的资本回报率高于大多数银行。我们从未有过片刻担忧,对于那些理应获得信贷的人,我们很乐意以公平的价格满足他们的需求。你不需要因为从事银行业就变得疯狂,但很多人确实如此。

提问:您对标致汽车(BYD,中国电池与汽车公司,股票代码:BYDDY,是伯克希尔和芒格亚洲基金的投资标的)有何看法?

芒格:BYD 正被广泛认为处于一个绝佳的位置,这个世界将不得不转向更多的电动汽车、电动巴士和电动出租车,尤其是在中国。在北京,由于空气质量极差,导致平均寿命缩短了十年,孩子们都呼吸困难,他们必须停止燃烧汽油。到目前为止,他们只是把合同给了那些制造普通汽车的大型企业。这种情况不可能持续。中国正在认识到,当已经开始大量害死人的时候,就必须改变行为。BYD 是唯一一家致力于电动汽车的中国公司。

If I were running a major bank I would have less blowup risk, and I would use different methods of determining risk. I would not be in the derivative business at all because I would regard it as beneath me. I like the banks when they get to be the trusted partner of business and extend credit to people who deserve credit. That’s the most noble activity there ever was. I like it when the banks help somebody to buy a car or a washing machine or a truck and they give him an installment contract. Bank of America (ticker: BAC) pioneered all that stuff way early and it was a noble addition to the business activities of the world. But do I like this crazy borrowing on credit cards to finance vacations and so on? I know Germany seems to avoid it and they’re doing fine. I think we slept with the devil when we encouraged this ballooning readiness to consume. It’s a disease to max out every credit card. When I was young the banks didn’t encourage it. Of course, they didn’t make as much money, either. We owned a bank at Berkshire for over ten years [Illinois National Bank & Trust AKA Rockford Bank]. Our bad debt losses were zero. Our returns on capital were higher than most banks. We never worried for one second, and for anyone who deserved credit, we were glad to accommodate them at fair prices. You don’t have to go crazy because you are in banking, but a lot of people do. Q: What are your thoughts on BYD [Build Your Dreams, the Chinese battery & automotive company ticker: BYDDY an investment of both Berkshire and Munger's Asian fund]? Munger: BYD is getting widely recognized as being in some kind of a sweet spot in a world that’s going to have to go to way more electric cars, buses, and taxis, particularly in China. In Beijing, where the average longevity is foreshortened by ten years by air that’s so bad that children are gasping for breath, they have to stop burning gasoline. So far they just have given contracts to big employers who make ordinary automobiles. That can’t last. China is recognizing that when you start killing people in large numbers you have to change behavior. BYD is the only Chinese company that has worked on electrical cars.

有证据表明,比亚迪用磷酸铁锂解决锂电池火灾问题的方案非常安全。这有点反直觉,因为磷酸铁锂电池很重。那些试图减轻重量的人简直是疯了。想象一下,波音公司(股票代码:BA)为了节省两个行李箱的重量,就用一种非常难控制的锂电池。我不是工程师,但我足够聪明,绝不会干这种事。连工程师都会发疯。销售部说,客户想要那最后两磅。但最后那两磅恰恰是会要你命的东西。所以我认为比亚迪处于一个有利的位置,而且它很可能会聪明地抓住机遇。

问:你对货币扩张怎么看?

芒格:你到了我这个年纪,就会见过很多次通货膨胀。我记得小时候五分钱就能买个冰淇淋蛋筒或汉堡包。另一方面,经历了通胀之后,美国发展得非常好。当时那些忧天杞人基本上都被证明是错的;这个国家承受住了它所经历的通货膨胀。

另一方面,我不像保罗·克鲁格曼那么乐观,我经常读他的文章,因为他是我读过的最聪明的左派,而且他的标准英语写得非常好。如果德国当年没有为了支付一战赔款而让货币贬值,我认为就不会有希特勒。也就不会有纳粹大屠杀。我们可以避免很多事情。对于一个全世界都依赖其储备货币的先进文明,玩弄其货币贬值,我认为我们应该相当保守,而不能想当然地认为我们可以无限量地印钱,政客觉得印多少方便就印多少。我比保罗·克鲁格曼要担心得多,但到目前为止,现实证明他比很多批评他的人都正确。

问:你对房利美和房地美怎么看?

芒格:作为一个共和党人,我的态度有点特别。我认为,只要房利美和房地美不因为政客的压力而疯狂发放不良贷款,它们在现有体系下为国家服务得相当不错。我们后来介入接管这事纯属偶然,但这并不意味着它不是一个相当好的解决方案。考虑到我们经历过的危机和面对的风险,所有人的表现都还算不错,结果也不算糟糕。

上次我们放宽标准是因为别人都这么做。政客们讨厌它们(房两房),而且无法忍受别人都在次贷上赚钱。这是嫉妒,而且很愚蠢。当周围所有人都在失去理智时,你能保持头脑清醒,这没有任何错——吉卜林说得对。为什么房利美就不能说,我们只向值得获得信贷的人提供信贷?嗯,这不够平等——我们想把钱发给那些被剥夺了权利的人。问题在于,这样做会导致整个体系崩溃。看起来像个硬汉,其实是个软蛋。你不降低金融领域的工程标准,对全世界都更好。我们那次差一点儿就酿成了灭顶之灾。部分原因是两党政府,包括国会和总统,在巨大的压力下做出了基本完全正确的决定。我非常钦佩那些带领我们度过危机的人。我不太欣赏那些引发危机的人。他们有些人应该下十八层地狱——当然,我没有权力把他们送下去。

问:但是,当政府剥夺了这些企业的利润时呢?

芒格:它们当时是带有一些政府背景的私营公司,而且已经资不抵债了。我不认为这有什么不公。它们的行为太恶劣了。如果有人让你去做一件足够糟糕的事情,你可以干脆辞职不干,而不是去执行。房利美不必屈服。是那些天生就爱妥协的人在管理它。他们只是在寻找一个能为自己谋取私利而出卖公司的地方。他们这辈子就是这么干的。

我们希望有更多这样的人,他会说:“你是我的老板,如果你想这么干,那你就得另请高明了。我不干。”这样的人应该多得多。伊莱休·鲁特,大概是我们有过的最好的内阁部长,说过一句我最喜欢的话:一个人如果不愿意随时放弃公职,那他就不适合担任公职。当然,他是世界上最著名的律师,所以他一辞职就能功成名就,而其他政客,一旦离职就什么都不是了。如果能有更多像伊莱休·鲁特这样的人来做决策,这个国家会更好。

问:你打算怎么处理《每日新闻》的技术公司?有没有打算整合这三个品牌?

芒格:我们会以实际可行的最快速度进行整合。我们已经开始了。具体时间表我无法告诉你。其中一家,ISD,是一笔风险很低的交易,因为他们已有的合同可以让我们收回大部分资金。另一家(新黎明科技)则是一场真正的赌博:我们基本上花了 1500-1600 万美元,买了一家净资产几乎为零的公司。我们是按风险投资的方式做的。我现在感觉比当初做决定时好一些。那之后我也有过一两个不安的时刻,但现在我非常喜欢它现在的进展。我喜欢那些人,我喜欢他们的企业文化,我喜欢那些已经走的人(我的意思是我很高兴他们走了),我很高兴我们做了这笔交易。我想我比我们的会计师更了解它。

问:当你已经赚到足够过上优渥生活的钱之后,你个人承担了多少投资风险?

芒格:芒格家族的大部分钱——我不算《每日新闻》,那只是个小星号(笑声)——都投在伯克希尔·哈撒韦、好市多(股票代码:COST)和一个亚洲基金里。现在,你去问金融界的其他人,他们都觉得自己知道该怎么管钱,他们会说这完全不可思议,芒格根本不知道自己在干什么。这不符合我们的模型。但我是对的,他们是错的。

如果你足够精明,能选得好,那么持有三只股票——其中任何一只都足以永久地养活你的家人——提供的安全性就足够了。当你已经拥有了比你需要的多一千倍的钱时,别人某年涨了 10%,你跌了 5%,这又有什么区别呢?那些做出疯狂决策的人其实不是出于嫉妒:他们是因为如果拿不出和别人一样的结果,客户就会解雇他们。这是一个疯狂的系统。每个人都上了同一个旋转木马。我从来没什么兴趣。现在坐在这里,我的所有证券每天都在创新高。难道我这样做错了吗?

The evidence is that the iron phosphate solution BYD has to the lithium battery fire problem is a very safe one. It’s counter-intuitive, because it’s heavy. The people who tried to be light were out of their minds. Imagine Boeing [ticker: BA], to save the weight of two suitcases, going to a lithium battery that was very difficult to control. I’m not an engineer but I would have been smart enough to avoid that one. Even engineers go crazy. The customers want the last two pounds, says the sales department. But the last two pounds are the ones that finally kill you. So I think BYD is in a privileged position and I think it’s likely to be intelligent in adapting to its opportunities. Q: What do you think of the monetary expansion? Munger: When you’re as old as I am, you have seen a lot of inflation. I remember buying ice cream cones and hamburgers for a nickel. On the other hand, after inflation the country has done wonderfully. A lot of the people who were the Jeremiahs of that age basically have been proven wrong; the country could stand as much inflation as it got. On the other hand, I’m not as optimistic as Paul Krugman, whom I always read because he’s the smartest leftist I’ve ever read and he uses the King’s English very well. If Germany had not debauched its currency in response to the reparations following World War I, I don’t think we would have had Hitler. We wouldn’t have had the holocaust. We would have avoided a lot. Flirting around with the debauch of the currency of an advanced civilization on which the whole world depends for its reserve currency, I think we ought to be pretty conservative and not just assume we can print all we want forever, whatever amounts our politicians think is convenient. I was way more afraid than Paul Krugman, but so far he’s been proven more right than a lot of his critics. Q. What do you think of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Munger: I have a peculiar attitude for a Republican. I think Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, when they don’t go crazy making lousy loans in response to the demands of politicians, are serving the country pretty well, the way the system is now configured. The fact that we came into it by accident doesn’t mean that it isn’t a pretty good solution. Considering the crisis we had and the risks we faced, everybody behaved pretty well and the result is not awful. Last time we loosened standards because everybody else was. The politicians hated them, and they couldn’t stand that everybody else was making money on the subprime loans. This was envy and it was stupid. There is nothing wrong with keeping your head when all about you are losing theirs — Kipling was right. Why couldn’t Fannie Mae say, we extend credit to people who deserve credit? Well, it’s not egalitarian enough – we want to shovel money at the people who were deprived. The trouble with that is the whole system blows up. What looks like hardheadedness is really soft-headedness. The whole world is better when you don’t reduce engineering standards in finance. We skipped a total disaster by a hair’s breadth. Partly because both Democrats and Republican administrations, both Congress and the President, made decisions that were pretty much exactly right and did it under terms of terrible pressure. I’m a big fan of the people who took us through the crisis. I’m not a big fan of the people who caused the crisis. Some of them deserve to be in the lowest circle of Hell – not that I have any power to put them there. Q: But what about when the government stripped away the profits of these enterprises? Munger: They were private corporations with a little bit of government image and they were insolvent at the time. I don’t think it was unjust. They had behaved terribly. If somebody asks you to do something that’s bad enough, you can give up your damn job rather than do it. Fannie Mae did not have to cave. It was run by people who were cavers by nature. They were just looking for a place to sell out for personal advantage. That’s what they did in life. We want more people who say, “You’re my boss, and if that’s what you want to do, you’ll have to get a different errand boy. I’m not going to do it.” There ought to be way more of that. Elihu Root, probably the greatest cabinet officer we ever had, said one of my favorite comments: No man is fit to hold public office who isn’t perfectly willing to leave it at any time. Of course, he was the most famous lawyer in the world so he could immediately leave to success, whereas the other politicians, if they left, were nothing. The country would be better off if we had more people like Elihu Root making the decisions. Q: What are you going to do with the technology companies at Daily Journal? Is there some thought to integrate the three brands? Munger: We’re going to integrate them as fast as reasonably practical. We’ve already started. Exactly what the timetable will be I can’t tell you. One of them, ISD, was a very low risk transaction because they had contracts in place that would give us back most of our money. The other [New Dawn Technologies] was a real gamble: we basically paid $15MM$16MM for a company with a net worth of about zero. We did that on a venture capital basis. I feel better about it now than when we did it. I’ve had an uneasy moment or two between then and now but now I really like the way it’s working out. I like the people, I like the ethos, I like the people who are gone (I mean I like them being gone), and I’m glad we did it. I think I know more about it than our accountants do. Q. How much investment risk did you take personally once you had made enough money to live well? Munger: Most of the Munger money – I don’t count the Daily Journal, it’s just a little asterisk (laughter) — is in Berkshire Hathaway, Costco (ticker: COST), and an Asian fund. Now, you could go to the rest of finance, they think they know how to handle money, and they’d say it’s totally unthinkable, Munger doesn’t know what the hell he’s doing. Doesn’t fit our models. But I’m right and they’re wrong. If you’re shrewd enough to choose well, three holdings – any one of which would support your family in perpetuity — is enough security. What difference does it make if somebody else in some year goes up 10% and you go down 5%, when you’ve got 1000 times more than you need anyway? The people who make these crazy decisions don’t actually have envy: what they have is clients who will fire them if they don’t get the same results as everybody else. That is a crazy system. Everybody gets on the same merry-go-round. I never had any interest. As I sit here, all my securities are making new highs every day. Am I doing it wrong?

问:《每日新闻》如果出价合适,会不会考虑把自己卖给竞争对手,还是会保持独立公司?

芒格:一般来说,我们喜欢把公司卖给我们喜欢和敬佩的人。不是所有人都能归入这个类别。我们在尽力经营这家公司,让任何一个聪明人都想买下它。我在管理《每日新闻》及其科技业务时的态度是,谷歌要是没买它才怪呢。不过,他们还得花好几年才能想明白这一点。

问:去年你谈到贝尔里奇石油,以及你当初有机会却没有多买进犯下的错误。能谈谈你的投资过程吗?

芒格:那时候,贝尔里奇是场外交易公司,价值极高。它拥有一片巨大的油田,那块地甚至都没租出去,他们什么都有:拥有土地、拥有油田、拥有一切。它的清算价值远高于每股价格——大概是 3 倍。那是一片不可思议的油田,生产期会持续很长时间,而且具有非常有趣的二次和三次开采可能,他们拥有整片油田,想怎么开发都行。这种情况也很罕见。

我当时为什么拒绝了我被递过来第二笔股票?只能怪我脑子进了不该进的地方。所以,我才做了那个决定。那简直太蠢了。所以,如果你们中有谁做过什么蠢事,尽可以放宽心。犯几个错误也能挺过去。那是一个不作为的错误,不是作为的错误,但可能让我损失了 3 亿到 4 亿美元。我跟你们讲这个故事,就是为了让你们对自己生活中遇到的投资失误感觉好受点。我从来没找到能完全避免所有失误的办法。

Q: Would Daily Journal consider selling itself to a competitor if the offer was right, or is it going to remain an independent company? Munger: Generally speaking, we like selling to people we like and admire. Not everybody would fit that category. We’re trying to run it so that any intelligent person would want to buy it. My attitude in running the Daily Journal, with its technology thing, is that Google would be out of its mind not to buy it. It’s going to take years for them to figure that out, though. Q: Last year you talked about Belridge Oil and how you made a mistake not buying more when you had the chance. Can you talk about your investment process? Munger: In those days, Belridge was a pink-sheet company. It was very valuable. It had a huge oil field, it wasn’t even leased, they owned everything, they owned the land, they owned the oil field, everything. It had liquidating value way higher than the per share price — maybe three times. It was just an incredible oil field that was going to last a long time, and it had very interesting secondary and tertiary recovery possibilities and they owned the whole field to do whatever they wanted with it. That’s rare, too. Why in the hell did I turn down the second block of shares I was offered? Chalk it up to my head up a place where it shouldn’t be. So, that’s why I made that decision. It was crazy. So if any of you made any dumb decisions, you should feel very comfortable. You can survive a few. It was a mistake of omission, not comission, but it probably cost me $300 – $400 million. I just tell you that story to make you feel good about whatever investment mischances you’ve had in your own life. I never found a way of avoiding them all.

问:凭借你们积累的智慧,如今你们知道哪些事,是当初刚开始投资股票时就希望知道的?

芒格:像沃伦 [巴菲特] 一样,我年轻时也四处摸索,什么方法管用就用什么。我能找到那种极小的、默默无闻的公司,因为它们在粉单市场上交易而价格极低,诸如此类的事干了不少。随着钱越来越多,我决定不再喜欢那种四处刨坑的方式。我当时在想一些自己根本不想去想的事情。我想敬佩那些经营企业的人。我想敬佩那门生意,认为它身处好位置,而且会干得不错。所以,到了晚年,我逐渐转向了这个领域——好的人、好的公司,我发现这舒服多了,而且我的回报也没下降太多。这挺了不起的。

问:如今你会建议一个年轻人每天读些什么?

芒格:你得有一份经过编审筛选的主要出版物,因为你不可能读 500 页。《华尔街日报》,经过它的编辑处理,对我来说非常方便,我敢打赌你们所有人也都读它。谁不读《华尔街日报》?不读的请举手。

Q: Given your accumulated wisdom, what do you know today that you wish you knew when you were first started investing in stocks? Munger: Like Warren [Buffett], when I was young I scrambled around doing anything that would work, and I could get a tiny little obscure company that was too cheap because they were on the pink-sheets, and all kinds of things. As I got more money, I decided I didn’t like all that scratching around. I was thinking about things I didn’t want to think about. I wanted to admire the people who were running the business. I wanted to admire the business, think it well-placed, and going to do well. So, I drifted into this, good people, good company field in my old age, and I found it much more comfortable, and my returns haven’t gone down that much. It’s remarkable. Q: What would you tell a young man today about what he should be reading on a daily basis? Munger: You’ve got to have a main publication that’s using some editorial discretion because you can’t read 500 pages. The Wall Street Journal, with its editing, is a very convenient thing for me, and I’ll bet all of you read it, too. Who doesn’t read the Wall Street Journal? Raise hands if you don’t read it.

(现场一只手举了起来)

查理·芒格:你为什么不念出来?

现场股东:这是一本我还没拿到的刊物。

查理·芒格:你生活在哪个星球上?

现场股东:我住在玛丽安德尔湾。

查理·芒格:嗯,这也许能解释你的问题。(笑声)我认为《华尔街日报》是一本必读刊物。我不认为它失去了基本诚信。我觉得这是一份相当令人钦佩且有价值的出版物。它的社论我一直觉得有点疯。你知道,早年间。它们太右派、太纯粹了。但在我看来,现在的社论更理智些了。

提问:密歇根大学的芒格研究生宿舍楼,你在建筑上遇到了哪些挑战?

查理·芒格:这挺有意思的。把来自不同学科的大量研究生集中在一栋大建筑里,地理位置特别好,离什么都近,公共设施也特别棒,再请来一批访问教授和一批研究员(有点像哈佛的洛厄尔研究员),我觉得对密歇根大学来说,这是一件非常有益的事。在建筑上有趣的地方在于,要在那块不可替代的地块上容纳那么多人,我们不得不把大多数卧室的窗户取消掉。这可不是一个能轻易被接受的主意。

我当时所做的,因为我知道它行得通,就是做了一个模型。要是没这么做,密歇根大学绝不会接受它(芒格为这栋建筑捐赠的 1.1 亿美元)。这听起来太糟糕了。卧室没窗户?大约 80% 的卧室没有窗户。这就是我们能在那块地上容纳这么多人的办法。带窗户的卧室每月要多花 100 美元。我能从这样的小事中学习。在建筑行业里,这种能力通常很缺乏。尤其是在大学环境中,他们非常传统。但密歇根大学很聪明:他们看出了这是对的。这不会有什么问题。如果有人对卧室有窗户有执念,我们也为有执念的人准备了一些带窗户的房间。

提问:你会推荐什么书?

查理·芒格:像你这样的人给我寄了那么多书,我都没时间自己买了。昨晚有个人来吃晚餐,一位著名的基金经理。给我带了 3 本书。我保证,我会喜欢这些书的。我收到像潮水般涌来的免费书籍。我是个受赠对象。我确实喜欢很多书,因为人们相当了解我。所以我生活在一个非常受宠的世界里,人们送我免费的书。我的人生目标并非要走到这个位置上,但它发生了,我倒是挺享受的。

当然,我非常挑剔,有时会浏览一下。有时我读一章,有时我会把该死的东西读两遍。我人生中的经验是,只要不断思考、不断阅读,你就不必工作了。

提问:你最近提到你喜欢罗恩·彻诺那本关于约翰·D·洛克菲勒一世的传记。

查理·芒格:哦,非常喜欢。如果你们谁还没读过那本书,应该读一读。那是一本精彩的传记(《泰坦》,罗恩·彻诺著)。它展示了那个人作为商业伙伴是多么出色。他可能对竞争对手很严厉,但作为合伙人,他是历史上最令人钦佩的人物之一。而作为慈善家——你可以实际追踪他的慈善事业取得了什么成就——这是整个慈善史中最了不起的事情之一。

我举一个例子。在中国,以前每年有数百万人死亡。妇女试图生二胎,她们的骨盆却无法让胎儿顺利出生。所以这些年轻女性死得可怕又悲惨,数以百万计。洛克菲勒派医生去那里,医生们发现,经过 4,000 年的高强度农耕,土壤里某种这些女性骨骼所需的物质被冲走了。把它补回去还挺便宜的。你瞧,他做了诸如此类的各种事情。只花少量的钱,就带来了巨大的好处。看看那些由洛克菲勒基金会资助的人。非常令人钦佩的人,30 年代的物理学家等等。他用 5,000 万美元彻底改变了美国的医学教育。他真的彻底改变了世界的医学教育。如果你还没读过那本书,你应该读一下。

那本书没有充分涉及他的慈善事业。但它充分描述了他对待合伙人的方式。他会做这样的事,比如:“我知道这件事让你很困扰,而且有风险,但我觉得我们必须这么做。我会承担所有资金,如果失败了,我承担损失。如果成功了,你可以按成本价从我这里买断,这样你就获得了好处。”当他这么做时,其他合伙人——也都是有钱的老头子——会说:“该死,约翰,如果你对此感觉那么强烈,我拿出我那份钱。”

这才是正确的方式。我们在伯克希尔也遇到过这样的人。那位卖给我们犹他州家具公司(R.C. Willey 家居用品)的善良摩门教绅士。他想进入拉斯维加斯,并且周日不营业。这可不是一个凭直觉能做出的决定。他说:“我要求你为我的宗教信仰做一件非常奇特的事。我会承担所有资金,我会承担所有风险。如果成功了,你按成本价买断它;如果失败了,我承担损失。”

我们不像洛克菲勒。我们接受了这笔交易。(笑声)这种行为如此罕见、如此高尚,你不应该扼杀它。

提问:我是《华尔街日报》的贾森·茨威格。谢谢你的免费广告。如果你愿意,我可以问问鲁珀特(默多克)是否愿意为《每日期刊》做个回礼。本·格雷厄姆晚年曾说过,在他看来,没有理由认为一个思考正确的个人投资者不能超越机构。你觉得相对竞争环境改变了吗?个人投资者今天拥有更大还是更小的优势?

查理·芒格:在像现在这么大的市场上,任何愿意寻找少数几个拥有真正优势的领域的精明人,总是会做得很好。在这么大的市场上,总会有一些方法,让一些聪明人能想出办法,以不寻常的速度赚钱,仅仅因为他们更聪明、更勤奋。这永远不会消失。

我不认为会有一个普遍的、简单的解决方案让人们都能做到这一点。如果你大量买入大盘股,现在的美国市场确实很难跑赢。我认为这是一个相当有效的市场,我不是说做不到,我只是觉得非常困难。证据是压倒性的,即使有数不清的人尝试过,通常的结果是他们并不成功。

我个人会讨厌这份工作,比如说,在美国投资 200 只不同的股票,每只 10 亿美元,还要跑赢指数。我会恐惧地退缩。彼得·考夫曼前几天对我说了一些有趣的话。他经营着一家非常赚钱的公司(Glenair, Inc.),资本回报率非常高。他说:“你知道,如果有人以 3 倍销售额买下我的公司,我就不再经营它了,因为很难凭我所能做的事来证明那个价格的合理性。”他已经很有钱了,为什么要做那么困难的事?他不必做。

我认为这就是美国正在发生的情况。人们知道自己的生意很糟糕。他们知道另一门生意好得多。但如果要为此支付 30 倍市盈率,那它就不算好。事情变得如此困难,以至于行不通。我明白了这一点,但顾问和投资银行家们仍在兜售同样的灵药:你可以通过支付 30 倍于你希望拥有——而非你实际拥有的——那种生意的市盈率来拯救自己。

伯克希尔是一个巨大的例外。在今年的年报中,沃伦打算大量讨论:为什么伯克希尔会发生这一切?它还会继续吗?我们已经达到了这个规模,而且这个记录足够有趣,所以这些都是非常重要的问题。如果世界其他地方像我一样聪明,他们会带着极大的兴趣来看这份报告。

我们所做的一部分事情,其他公司也应该做,但他们没有。存在巨大的机构压力迫使人们采用不同的做法。这还会继续吗?我认为伯克希尔的表现会继续比大多数人想象的好得多。好得多。而且我们已经拥有的东西有如此大的力量。我们能有不错的记录,部分原因是我们挑选容易的事情。其他人觉得自己非常聪明,可以承担真正困难的事情,而事实证明这很危险。

你必须非常有耐心,你必须等待某个东西出现——以你支付的价格来说,它是容易的。这与人性相违背,整天坐在那里什么都不做,只是等待。对我们来说很容易,我们有很多其他事情要做。但对于一个普通人来说,你能想象只是坐上 5 年什么都不做吗?你觉得自己不够活跃,觉得自己没什么用,于是你做了点蠢事。

你会发现今年伯克希尔的年报非常、非常有趣。三家失败的企业一起创造了伯克希尔·哈撒韦。现在的流通股数量几乎和那时一样多。我想不出在如此规模上还有类似的事情。你会以为人们会比现在更关注它。我觉得它看起来太奇特了,以至于他们无法应对。

我曾经读过一位著名人士写的一篇文章。我非常喜欢它(这是 25 年前的事了),以至于我在不支付赠与税的情况下,把我能寄的东西寄给了他。我寄给了他 2 万美元,并说:“我真的很喜欢你的文章,这是我的一点敬意。”他把钱退了回来。于是我打电话给他,说:“你为什么把钱退给我。我不在乎你是把它给你的清洁女工,还是给你手下工作的研究生。看在上帝的份上,你留着这该死的钱吧。”于是,他收了我的钱,把它给了某个研究生。他的基本态度是,如果事情那么容易,那一定有什么问题。

(One hand in the room goes up) Munger: Why don’t you read it? Audience member: It’s a publication I haven’t picked up yet. Munger: What planet do you live on? Audience Member: I live in Marina Del Ray. Munger: Well, that may explain it. (laughter) I regard The Wall Street Journal as a must-read publication. I don’t think it’s lost its basic integrity. I think it’s a pretty admirable and useful publication. The editorials I always thought were a little nuts. You know, going way back. They were so right wing and so pure. But, it seems to me that the editorials are saner now. Q: What architectural challenges did you have for the Munger Graduate Residence Hall at the University of Michigan? Munger: That was interesting. The idea of getting a whole lot of graduate students from multiple disciplines in one big building, which was exceptionally well-located, close to everything, with exceptional common facilities, and to get a bunch of visiting professors and a bunch of fellows (who were sort of equivalent to the Lowell fellows at Harvard), struck me as a very useful thing to do for Michigan. What was architecturally interesting about it was to get that many people on that irreplaceable site, we had to take the windows out of most of the bedrooms. That was not an automatic sale. What I did, since I knew it would work, is I mocked-up a model. If it hadn’t done that, Michigan never would have accepted it [Munger’s $110 million donation for the building]. It just sounded awful. No windows in the bedrooms? About 80% of the bedrooms have no windows. That’s how we got so many on the site. It costs a hundred dollars more a month to have a windowed bedroom. I’m capable of learning from a little episode like that. In the architectural profession, that ability is usually lacking. Particularly in a university setting where they’re very traditionbound. But, Michigan was smart: they saw it was right. It’s going to be a non-event. Somebody has a fetish about a window in the bedroom, we’ve got some for fetishists. Q: What books would you recommend? Munger: People like you send me so many books, I don’t have time to buy my own. Man came to dinner last night, a famous money manager. Brought me three books. I will like the books, I guarantee you. I have a torrent of books coming to me free. I’m a charity case. I actually like a lot of the books because the people have figured me out pretty well. So, I’m living in a very favored world and people give me free books. It was not my ambition in life to get into this position, but it happened, and I rather enjoy it. Of course, I’m very selective, I sometimes skim. Sometimes I read one chapter and I sometimes read the damn thing twice. It’s been my experience in life, if you just keep thinking and reading, you don’t have to work. Q: You mentioned recently that you enjoyed Ron Chernow’s book on John D. Rockefeller, Sr. Munger: Oh, hugely. If any of you haven’t read that book, you should read it. That’s a wonderful biography. [Titan, by Ron Chernow] It shows how high grade that man was as a business partner. He may have tough on competitors, but as a partner, he was one of the most admirable people who have ever lived. And as a philanthropist — you can actually chart what his philanthropy has accomplished — some of the most remarkable things in the whole history of philanthropy. Let me give one example. In China, they had deaths by the millions every year. Woman tried to have a second child and their bones just wouldn’t enable the child to be delivered. So the terrible, horrible deaths all these young women died, millions of them. Rockefeller sent doctors over there and they figured out that in 4,000 years of intense farming, they bleached something out of the soil that these women’s bones needed. It was pretty cheap to put back. Lo and behold, he did all kinds of things like that. Just for small amounts of money, doing huge amounts of good. Look at the people who were financed by the Rockefeller Foundation. Very admirable people, the physicists in the 1930′s and so on. He totally revolutionized medical education in the United States with 50 million dollars. He really revolutionized medical education in the world. If you haven’t read that book you ought to read it. It doesn’t deal adequately with his philanthropy. But it deals adequately with the way he handled his partners. He would do things like say, “I know this bothers you and it’s risky, but I think we have to do it. I’ll put up all the money and if it fails, I’ll take the loss. If it works, you can buy me out at my cost, so you’ll get the benefit.” When he did that, the other partners, who were also rich old men, would say, “Hell, John, if you feel that strongly about it, I’ll put up my share.” Which is the right way. We had a person do that at Berkshire. The nice Mormon gentleman who sold us the furniture company in Utah [R.C. Willey Home Furnishings]. He wanted to go into Las Vegas and not open on Sunday. Which is not an intuitive decision. He said, “I’m asking you to do something very peculiar for my religion. I’ll put up all the money, I’ll take all the risk. If it works, you buy it out at my cost, and if it fails, I’ll take the loss.” We weren’t like Rockefeller. We took the deal. (laughter) That behavior is so rare, so noble, you shouldn’t squelch it. Q: I’m Jason Zweig from The Wall Street Journal. Thanks for the free ad. If you want I can ask Rupert [Murdoch] if he’d like to reciprocate for the Daily Journal. Late in his life, Ben Graham said that in his opinion there was no reason to imagine that an individual investor who thought appropriately couldn’t outperform institutions. Do you think the relative playing field has shifted? Do individuals have a greater or a lesser advantage today? Munger: In markets as big as this, some shrewd guy who’s willing to search out a few places where he has a real advantage will always do well. There’s always going to be ways in markets this big for some smart people to figure out something where they’ll make money at an unusual rate, just because they’re smarter and more diligent. That will never go away. I don’t think there will ever be a universal easy solution where people can do that. The American market is tough now to outperform if you’re buying big stocks in big quantities. I think it’s a pretty damned efficient market, and I don’t say it can’t be done, but I just think it’s plenty difficult. The evidence is overwhelming that even though there are zillions of people who have tried, the ordinary result is that they don’t succeed. I would hate the job, personally, of investing, say, in positions of a billion dollars each in 200 different stocks in America and outperforming the averages. I would shrink from that with horror. Peter Kaufman said something interesting to me the other day. He runs a very profitable company [Glenair, Inc.] that has very good returns on capital. He said, “You know, if somebody bought my company for three times sales, I wouldn’t run it anymore, because I’d have a hard time justifying that price with anything I could do.” He’s already rich, why should he do something that difficult? He doesn’t have to. I think that’s what happened in America. People know their own business is lousy. They know another business that is way better. But it’s not better if you have to pay thirty times earnings for it. It gets so difficult that it doesn’t work. I figured this out, but the consultants and investment bankers keep selling the same nostrum that you can save yourself by paying thirty times earnings for the kind of business you wish you had, instead of the one you’ve got. Berkshire has been a huge exception. In this year’s annual report Warren intends to deal extensively with: Why did it happen at Berkshire? Will it continue? We’ve reached a size and the record is interesting enough that those are very important questions. If the rest of the world is as smart as I think it is, it will look at this report with great interest. Part of what we did should be done by others, but it isn’t. There are vast institutional pressures on people to do it differently. Will it continue? I think Berkshire’s going to continue way better than most people think. Way better. But there’s so much power in what we already have. Part of the reason we have a decent record is that we pick things that are easy. Other people think they’re so smart, they can take on things that are really difficult, and that proves to be dangerous. You have to be very patient, you have to wait until something comes along, which, at the price you’re paying, is easy. That’s contrary to human nature, just to sit there all day long doing nothing, waiting. It’s easy for us, we have a lot of other things to do. But for an ordinary person, can you imagine just sitting for five years doing nothing? You don’t feel active, you don’t feel useful, so you do something stupid. You’ll find that this year’s Berkshire annual report very, very interesting. Three failing businesses together created Berkshire Hathaway. There are about the same number of shares outstanding now as they were then. I can’t think of anything like it at this scale. You’d think people would be paying more attention to it than they do. I think it looks so peculiar that they can’t handle it. I read an article once by a famous man. I liked it so well (this was twentyfive years ago) that I sent him whatever I could send him without paying gift tax. I sent him $20,000 dollars and said, “I really liked your article, here’s a token of my respect.” He sent the money back. So, I called him and said, “Why are you sending it back to me. I don’t care if you give it to your charwoman or the graduate student who works under you. For God sake’s, keep the damn money.” Whereby, he took my money and gave it to some graduate student. His basic attitude was, if it was that easy, there must be something wrong with it.

我觉得这正是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的问题所在。它看起来太特么容易了,人们觉得这肯定有毛病。那里的人没那么拼命工作。他们都有各种业余爱好——沃伦每周打十二个小时桥牌(笑声)。他们就这么一直转着,一直赢着,看起来实在太轻松了。所以这让人困惑。这里面肯定有猫腻。(笑声)

I think that’s part of the trouble with Berkshire Hathaway. It looks so damned easy, they think there must be something wrong with it. The people there don’t work that hard. They have all these outside interests – Warren’s playing bridge twelve hours a week (laughter). They just keep spinning and winning and it just looks too easy. So it’s confusing. There must be something wrong with it. (laughter)

Q: 你对埃隆·马斯克(特斯拉、SpaceX、SolarCity 的 CEO)和他正在做的事有什么看法?

芒格:我认为埃隆·马斯克是个天才,我不是随便用这个词的。而且他还是有史以来最胆大包天的人之一。你记下我的话,我一直害怕那种 IQ 高达 190 却以为自己是 250 的人。我总觉得埃隆身上有那么一点这种风险。他确实是个天才。

Q: 你有哪些日常习惯值得推荐?

芒格:任何我没有强烈兴趣的事情,我基本上都没怎么成功过。如果你没法让自己对某件事产生浓厚兴趣,就算你挺聪明,我也不觉得你能有多大成就。我认为,对一件事情有深沉的兴趣,这本身就是成败的关键。如果你唯一的兴趣是中文书法,那你就只能干这个。我实在想不通,一个人只对书法感兴趣,怎么可能在天体物理学上成功。

Q: 如果你要再创办一个伯克希尔,你会选择什么形式或结构?是合伙制还是普通公司?

芒格:这是个非常聪明的问题。伯克希尔是碰巧搞出来的。一家公司里放了一大堆可流通证券,每次收益都要交 35% 的税——没有任何投资工具会主动选择这种结构。这简直是疯了。我们只是误打误撞走进去的。后来我们确实把它做成了,但这仍然是个巨大的劣势。它只是说明,古怪的事情确实会发生。大黄蜂按理说飞不了那么好,但它偏偏就飞了。

我们买了很多东西就一直持有,其中包括一大批私人公司,所以那里没有资本利得税。也没有股息税。我们还买了很多可流通证券,也是拿着不动。我不是说我们不交很多税,但在资产负债表上,我们累积了大量未实现的资本利得税,实际上还没交。

我们确实把这事做成了,但这算一个明智的系统吗?不,这很荒唐。正确的系统应该是合伙制。这个问题太简单了,你居然会问,让我挺意外的。也许你自己就在推合伙制,而且早知道我会怎么回答吧。(笑声)

Q: 你能讲讲你的做法吗?

芒格:让我演示一下我的系统是怎么运作的。昨天,一笔钱莫名其妙地进了我的账户,是某个老旧的退休账户一类的东西。我接到一个电话:这里有 12 万美元,你想怎么办?这钱我自己都忘了。你猜我这个了不起的投资人是怎么说的?“给我你的电话号码,我回头打给你。”我想把这笔钱投到美国证券里去。可我绞尽脑汁也想不出一个闭着眼睛就能买的证券。我有不少还不错的投资选项,但没有一个是我能闭着眼睛就投的。

我觉得现在大股票都挺难下手。拿好市多(股票代码:COST)来说。好市多值 25 倍市盈率吗?我觉得值。那我准备卖出好市多吗?不卖。我会在 25 倍市盈率时再买入更多好市多吗?我很可能判断错了,但我宁愿在 25 倍市盈率时买好市多,也不买 90% 的其他股票。可我太挑剔了,让我在 25 倍市盈率时买任何东西都很难。

没什么规矩说我不能有自己的怪癖。我不需要完全理性。我们不都这样吗?事实上,我们可能就应该这样。有一种怪癖特别有用,那就是说:这个对我来说太难了,我不打算去搞懂它。

Q: What are your thoughts about Elon Musk [CEO of Tesla, SpaceX, SolarCity] and what he’s doing? Munger: I think Elon Musk is a genius and I don’t use that word lightly. I think he’s also one of the boldest men that ever came down the pike. Put me down as saying I’ve always been afraid of the guy whose IQ is 190 and he thinks it’s 250. I like to think there’s a little of that risk with Elon. He is a certified genius. Q: What daily habits would you recommend practicing? Munger: I have never succeeded very much in anything in which I was not very interested. If you can’t somehow find yourself very interested in something, I don’t think you’ll succeed very much, even if you’re fairly smart. I think that having this deep interest in something is part of the game. If your only interest is Chinese calligraphy I think that’s what you’re going to have to do. I don’t see how you can succeed in astrophysics if you’re only interested in calligraphy. Q: If you were to start another Berkshire, in what form or structure would establish this. A partnership or a Ccorp? Munger: That’s a very intelligent question. Berkshire happened by accident. Having a lot of marketable securities inside a corporation with 35% taxes on every gain: No investment vehicle chooses that. It’s insane. We just stumbled into it. Now we made it work, but it’s a huge disadvantage. It just shows that odd things can happen. The bumble bee shouldn’t have been able to fly as well as it did, but it did. We bought a lot of things that we just held, including a whole lot of private companies, so no capital gains taxes there. No dividend taxes. And, buying so many marketable securities that we just sat on. Not that we don’t pay a lot of taxes, but we have a lot of capital gains taxes that are accrued but not paid on the balance sheet. We made it work, but is it an intelligent system? No, it’s insane. The correct system is to have a partnership. That is such an easy question, I’m surprised you asked it. Maybe you’re promoting private partnerships and you knew what my answer would be. (laughter) Q: Can you tell us about your method? Munger: Let me show you how my system works. Floated into my account yesterday, some old retirement IRA or something. I got a call: there’s 120 thousand lying here, what do you want to do with it? Something I had forgotten about it. You know what I said, the great investor? “Give me your number and I’ll call you back.” I wanted to invest this money in U.S. Securities. I couldn’t think of a no brainer security in my whole brain. I have plenty of things I can do that are okay, but I don’t have a big no-brainer. I think it’s hard on the big securities, now. Take Costco [ticker: COST]. Is Costco worth 25 times earnings? I think: Yes. Am I ready to sell any Costco? No. Would I buy more Costco at 25X earnings? I’m probably wrong, but I’d certainly rather buy Costco at 25X earnings than 90% of the other stocks. But I’m so spoiled it’s hard for me to buy anything at 25X earnings. There’s no rule I can’t have crochets [crochet: a highly eccentric or individual opinion or preference, perhaps akin to ‘heuristic’ - PD]. I don’t have to be totally rational. Don’t we all do that? We probably should, as a matter of fact. Certainly a crochet that says this is too hard for me, I’m not going to try to understand it. That’s a very useful crotchet.

问:您提到美国存在学术和金融知识匮乏的问题。教育系统似乎不太愿意开始教授这些原则。有哪些可能的解决办法?

芒格:我认为,如果你期待人类或人类机构做到完全理性,那你期待的是一件不会发生的事。真正有点令人惊讶的是,学术界能愚蠢到什么程度。资本资产定价模型竟然被当作福音来传授。

如果你是个基督徒,我能理解你拿《圣经》当福音来教,但为什么资本资产定价模型要像个物理定律一样被传授?教那些东西,还让学生像做代数题一样实际计算。当然是胡扯。经济学里有太多蠢话了。

举个简单的例子。日本,一个现代化国家,用尽了所有凯恩斯主义和货币主义的花招。他们疯狂印钞。在日本,你在山路边都找不到一个坑,因为他们刺激政策多得不得了。他们经历了 25 年的停滞。世界上每个经济学家都会说那是不可能的。他们用了我们教给他们的所有伎俩,他们玩着我们的把戏,结果却困惑不已。他们试图在别人教给他们的那个狭隘框架里解决自己的问题。

Q: You mentioned the academic and financial illiteracy in the U.S. There seems to be a reluctance to begin teaching these principals in the education system. What are the possible solutions? Munger: I think if you expect totally rationality either in humans or human institutions, you’re expecting what’s not going to happen. What is a little surprising is how stupid academia could be. The capital assets pricing mode is taught as gospel. I could understand teaching the Bible as Gospel if you’re a Christian, but why is the capital asset pricing model taught as if it were a principle of physics? To teach that stuff and have students actually work out problems, the way they would in algebra. Of course it’s twaddle. There’s a lot of silliness in economics. Take a simple case. Japan, a modern nation, tried every Keynesian and monetary trick. They print money like crazy. You can’t find a pothole in Japan on the side of a mountain, they’ve got so much stimulus. They had 25 years of stasis. Every economist in the world would have said that’s impossible. They have all these tricks we taught them, they’re playing our tricks, and they’re befuddled. They’re trying to solve their problem within this little narrow construct that somebody taught them.

实际情况是,日本崛起为出口强国。紧随其后的,是一大批原本在自给农业中勉强维生的人,他们把日本从自己的市场中挤了出去。日本跟韩国竞争有趣吗?跟中国竞争呢?当然,日本的日子变得更难了。但当然,经济学家们想不通。他们只盯着经济学入门课本看。如果你是个成功的商人,街对面开了一家强悍的竞争对手,这对你有好处吗?这没那么复杂,你只需要保持开放的心态,审视所有的可能性。

问:您认为一个投资组合里持有多少家公司是务实的数字?

芒格:我不认为有唯一的答案。完全看情况。显然,如果你运营一只指数基金,靠收取管理费赚钱,那你可以拥有无限多的公司。这是一门相当不错的生意。他们配得上所获得的成功,因为他们的表现超过了那些使用传统方法的人。

不久前,我跟一位非常聪明的基金经理聊过。我通常不和基金经理聊天。我跟这个人见面,是因为他在几乎所有事情上都同意我的看法,所以他一定非常聪明。(笑声)他告诉我,他对美国股票做指数化投资,而在其他所有地方,他聘请基金经理来管理。他认为,美国的大市值市场如此艰难,以至于他最好还是直接指数化投资。他在世界其他地区发现了更多效率低下的市场。我认为这是一个非常明智的回应。

问:您对最近乐购 [股票代码:TESO] 的麻烦有什么看法吗?

芒格:乐购统治世界很长一段时间。看起来势不可挡。伯克希尔买了一些。我想最初是卢·辛普森买的,沃伦又补了一些。他们有一个确实奏效的公式。然后有一天,它不再那么好用了。部分原因是傲慢。他们自以为非常聪明,能做一些既新颖又容易的难事,以及类似的一些冒险举动,结果发现那些事要难得多。

What happened was that Japan rose as an export powerhouse. Right behind them were a bunch of people who were starving in subsistence agriculture and crowded them out of their own market. Think it’s fun for Japan to compete with Korea? And China? Of course it got harder in Japan. But of course, the economists can’t figure it out. They’re looking only at Economics 101. If you’re a prosperous businessman and some tough competitor opens across the street, is that good for you? It’s not very complicated, you just have to keep an open mind and examine all the possibilities. Q: What do you think is a pragmatic number of companies to own in a portfolio? Munger: I don’t think there’s any one answer to that. It all depends. Obviously if you run an index fund and are scraping money off the top, there’s no limit to what you can own. That is a pretty good business. They deserve the success they’ve had because they outperform people who use the conventional methods. I talked to a very smart money manager not long ago. I ordinarily don’t talk to money managers. I met with this guy because he agrees with me on practically everything, so he must be very smart. (laughter) He told me that he indexes the U.S. equities and he hires managers to work everywhere else. He regards the big time U.S. market as so tough that he’s better off just indexing it. He finds more inefficient markets in other parts of the world. I think that’s a very intelligent response. Q: Have you had any thoughts on the recent troubles at Tesco [ticker: TESO]? Munger: Tesco owned the world for a long time. It looked inevitable. Berkshire bought some. I think Lou Simpson bought it originally, and Warren bought some more. They had a formula that really worked. Then one day it stopped working so well. Partly it was hubris. They thought they were so smart, they could do something difficult that was fresh and easy, and some other adventures like that they found were way harder.

然后,本土市场变得艰难了,就像日本在身后冒出了日本和韩国之后遇到麻烦一样。特斯拉(Tesla)也遇到麻烦了,因为阿尔迪(Aldi)从一边杀进来,其他人从另一边杀进来。竞争变得激烈了。有多少大公司能永远保持巅峰?也许箭牌口香糖(Wrigley’s Gum)算一个。基本上,特易购(Tesco)遭遇的就是正常结果。听着,阿尔迪是个难缠的竞争对手。无情地压低成本,品类有限,全是自有品牌。它极其高效。你觉得好市多(Costco)对其它杂货店是好事吗?山姆会员店(Sam’s Club)呢?外面的世界竞争激烈。总会有人不断搞出新花样。即使是那些品牌商品制造商,他们看起来辉煌了四十年不可战胜。竞争的自然进程就是越来越残酷。那些期望一切都永远一帆风顺的人才是疯了。

问:你能谈谈你和沃伦·巴菲特的合作关系吗?

芒格:两个人在一起这么久了一般不会离婚。我们已经磨合好了。(笑声)要是我们想离婚,早就离了。我想,从我这边来说,诚实的答案是相当谦虚的。爱因斯坦也需要有人聊聊天。(笑声)就算他那么牛,也需要一个谈话的陪衬。我偶尔也在其它方面帮上点忙,但基本上,你不会想一个人呆在家里独自做决策。如果爱因斯坦都做不到,我觉得你也不该尝试。

现场股东:爱因斯坦有妻子,她是个物理学家。

芒格:她水平不怎么样。

问:你怎么看奥巴马医改?

芒格:我以为你要问个难题呢。你不过是想知道我们有没有解开奥巴马医改的谜团。我做不到。如果你是个又老又有钱的人,就可以说些不合时宜的话。如果我是美国的仁慈独裁者,我会搞单一支付方医疗体系,让人们可以选择退出,自己购买私人医疗服务,要么从凯萨医疗(Kaiser)这样的机构买,要么从个体医生那里买。我认为,跟那些没有把这笔巨大成本嵌入制造业的其它国家相比,我们处于巨大的竞争劣势。而且,我认为按项目为所有老人支付医疗费用导致了很多不必要的治疗。在这个国家,这浪费了大量金钱,也加速了很多人的死亡。纯粹为了钱而进行的医疗干预,是国家的耻辱。

现在我差不多把每个人都得罪了。这把我最糟糕的一面逼出来了。我基本上认为现有的体制是疯狂的。

问:你认为这个国家大多数人的生活水平提高的趋势会持续下去吗?

芒格:我认为会变得更难——就像日本在那些人口众多、日益繁荣的强大邻国面前,难以维持昔日繁荣,被它们抢走生意一样。如果你的体系里,很多人曾在制造业中致富,而你实行自由贸易,面对中国、越南、墨西哥等正在崛起的国家,那么那些在旧体系下拥有高薪工会制造业工作的人,日子当然会更难过。

有些人上升、有些人下降,这是事物的本性。而政客的天性就是找到那些正在走下坡路的人,让他们觉得自己受了天大的委屈,然后利用这种焦虑从中渔利。但有些焦虑,最好的解决办法就是咽下苦水,自己挺过去。换句话说,我认为你不能靠消除不同群体之间财富的起落来治理一个国家。我认为这就是生活的常态。

我们能怎么办?我们生活在同一个世界里。中国崛起了。中国的崛起对美国工会里的纺织工人来说不是好事。现在,中国连纺织品都做不了,那活儿跑到越南去了。这种起落流动是自然的,而生产力正是来自人们在资本主义的创造性破坏中所承受的痛苦。所以当这种该死的流动落到自己头上时,他们就不喜欢了。但总体而言,这种流动正在让整艘船上升,而船永远不会让每个群体都完全同步地上升,这是不可避免的。就算政府控制一切,他们也会操纵体制,让一些人上去,一些人下去。你就把我记成是不太为这些现代废话担心的人好了。

问:你和沃伦如何平衡对简洁性的需求,与需要充分理解这些复杂思想之间的关系?

芒格:伯克希尔有意思的地方在于,成果是惊人的,但取得这些成果的人并不是天才。不是天才的人怎么取得了惊人的成果?这是个非常有趣的问题,我希望我们在年报里好好谈一谈。答案是:你有一些稍微好一点的方法。有一件事绝对至关重要:你知道自己能力的边界。这确实很有帮助,可以替代很多智商点数。你知道自己知道什么,不知道什么,然后据此行事。我一直有这个理念。你学会了避开什么。我的一个习惯是,我会立刻把那些不用动脑的事情从桌上清掉。否则桌子会变得一团糟。有些人就是不停地往桌上堆东西,然后彻底失灵。全世界我几乎找不出第二个比杰里·萨尔兹曼(Jerry Salzman,每日日报 CEO)更擅长这个的人。没有这一个窍门,他这辈子根本干不出现在的成就。他做出决定,也许会是错的,但他的成功率非常高,而且决策时间几乎为零。这就是一个值得掌握的绝招。

另一件我们做的事,如果问题真的很难又很重要,我们就反复琢磨它。你不停地钻研它,反复回头思考它,等等。你有很多时间去这样做,因为你避开了其他人在做的很多事情。我们就是有几个小窍门,它们效果非常好,但模仿的人不多。

你们中有些人会被困住。我讨厌呆在一个地方,为了应付日常工作和讨论,不得不假装相信所有我不信的东西。我刚才描述的是几乎所有人的工作状态。但沃伦不是,查理也不是。当然,有几个话题我们认为算是禁忌,但大多数时候,我们可以直面现实,它是什么样就是什么样。如果你替某家大公司工作,那里有教条,有各种被禁止的行为。如果你在学术界,也有各种各样的东西约束着你。

问:我今天去了圣塔菲一号(One Santa Fe,一座靠近每日日报总部的新房产开发项目),我很好奇你是否会把它变成开发用地。

芒格:我们已经把我们拥有的所有地产都开发完了。我认为我们买这些地块的时候相当便宜,然后建了这些非常漂亮、高效的建筑,我们现在拥有的空间已经超过了我们的需求。我们的业务在萎缩。我们最不想要的就是开发了。如果你想租我们剩下的空间,会后联系格里(Gerry)吧。(笑声)

问:我想听听你对伯克希尔内在价值相对于其账面价值的看法?

芒格:我认为沃伦的想法非常连贯,也非常适合伯克希尔。在这点上我和沃伦没有分歧。当然,到某个价格,我们会回购。但只要我们现在做得这么好,我们也不介意买别的东西。我们不介意我们做的所有这些补强收购。如果你问我,伯克希尔未来十五年,光是它的公用事业业务,能精明地花掉多少钱,那将是一笔极其巨大的金额。我们在这个业务上得不到良好回报的概率几乎为零。我认为两年后,我们将成为美国最大的公用事业公司。

我们对资产的打理,至少会和大多数人一样好,很可能更好。我们将拥有巨大的机会。我喜欢这种感觉。我们年轻又穷的时候,在一个州就能找到回报率 12% 的生意,现在也许我们只能以 9% 或 10% 的回报率投资公用事业,可能用的是成本为零的浮存金,那也还行。我们只是稍微慢了一点。(笑声)在利率几乎为零的情况下还能有这些机会,我们非常受眷顾。创造更多电力和输电设施之类的东西,并获得有保障的投资回报,这真是个相当有利的条件。

问:技术进步如何影响了竞争的自然进程?

芒格:伯克希尔当然是有意识地避开了快速的技术淘汰。我们拥有一家铁路公司,一大堆公用事业公司,几家大型保险公司。淘汰正是发生在《每日日报》身上的事。我们在这里曾拥有一座金矿好多年。律师们需要的判例汇编,在判决做出六周后才出版。我们有一台大印刷机。我们可以每天出版那些内容,律师们都必须订阅,而我们每年都大幅提高订阅价格。那时候太棒了。我们看起来像天才。然后,技术变了。现在律师们通过互联网获取资料。情况糟糕多了,世界就是这样。所以我们不喜欢这些技术变革。但在伯克希尔,我们尽量躲避它们。

即使在我们看起来技术含量很高的领域,比如硬质合金切削刀具(伊斯卡,Iscar),我们是全球领先者之一,而且它很复杂。这是一门好生意,我不介意在我们完全或近乎主导的领域存在技术复杂性。我们不解决技术过时的问题,我们躲避它。我在《每日日报》这里让你们失望了。我很抱歉。

当然,伯克希尔在很多地方也失败了。我们遭遇过各种各样的事情。我们没能救活新英格兰的那些纺织厂。我们的珠宝店创不了什么纪录:珠宝店太多了,这行太难了。我们并没有找到什么奇迹般的豁免权,可以不受自然法则的约束。我们只是躲开了很多别人愿意接手的问题。

沃伦说过:“我们没有学会跳过七英尺高的栅栏。我们找到了一种方法,跨过小泥坑,去抓那边大块大块的金子。”你看,另一边有金子的泥坑并不多,但刚好够我们用的。我们努力去找。

问:为什么你在经济低迷的最低谷时,对买入富国银行(Wells Fargo,股票代码:WFC)感到放心?

芒格:它太便宜了,而我们手里有钱。事实上,我们在触底的前一天买入了,所以那非常了不起。你可以说我在这件事上有点运气。但是,认识到某样东西便宜并不难。

问:你很难让我们相信你在《每日日报》上失败了。

芒格:这是个有趣的故事。我们花了 270 万美元买下了《每日日报》。大约三四年后,我们就收回了那 270 万美元。现在这里的一切都是利润。从这个意义上说,这是个不错的记录,但它不是伯克希尔那样的记录。对于一个正在衰落的生意来说,这已经相当不错了。(笑声)

问:保持低期望有什么好处?

芒格:持续超过自己的期望,比不断失望要有趣得多。人类幸福的秘诀不是胸怀大志,而是低期望。你最需要这个的地方是你的配偶。(笑声)

就凭这句话,我准备结束了。(掌声)

Then the home market got tougher, just as the Japanese had trouble when behind them rose Japan and Korea. Tesla got in trouble when Aldi came in one side and other people came in on the other. It got tougher. How many big companies stay totally on top forever? Maybe Wrigley’s Gum. Basically, the normal result is what happened to Tesco. Listen, Aldi is a tough competitor. Ruthlessly low cost, limited assortment, all private label. It’s terribly efficient. You think Costco’s any good for the rest of the grocery stores? And Sam’s Club? It’s a competitive world out there. Somebody is always starting something. Even for the branded goods makers, who looked so invincible for forty years. The natural course of competition is that it gets tough. It’s the people who expect everything to just keep going wonderfully who are nuts. Q: Can you tell us about your partnership with Warren Buffet? Munger: People don’t normally get a divorce after they’ve been together for this long. We’ve adjusted to it. (laughter) If we were going to get a divorce we would have done it earlier. I think the honest answer is pretty modest on my part. Einstein needed somebody to talk to. (laughter) As good as he was, needed a talking foil. I’ve occasionally helped in some other ways, but, basically, you would not want to sit home alone by yourself making the decisions. If Einstein couldn’t do it, I don’t think you should try it. Audience member: Einstein had his wife, who was a physicist. Munger: She was not very good. Q: What do you think of Obamacare? Munger: I thought you were going to ask a hard question. All you want to know is have we unraveled the mysteries of Obamacare. I can’t do that. If you’re an old rich man you can say impolitic things. If I were the benevolent despot of the United States, I would have single payer medicine that people were able to opt out of and buy their own forms of private care, either from places like Kaiser or from individual doctors. I think we’re at a big competitive disadvantage to other countries that don’t have this big cost built into their manufacturing. And, I think that paying for medicine per item for all the old people causes a lot of unnecessary treatment. It wastes a lot of money and hastens a lot of death in this country. The medical interventions that are made purely for money are a national disgrace. Now I’ve practically offended everybody. Brings out the absolute worst in me. I basically think the existing system is crazy. Q: Do you think the increases in the standard of living that we’ve seen in this country for most people are likely to continue? Munger: I think that it gets harder — just as Japan has troubles being as prosperous as it was against these powerful neighbors with these big populations getting more prosperous and eating Japan’s lunch. If you have a system where a lot of people prospered in manufacturing, and you get free trade in rising countries like China, Vietnam, Mexico, and so forth, of course it’s going to be harder for the people who had high-paying union manufacturing jobs under the old system. It’s in the nature of things that some people are going up and some people are going down, and it’s the nature of politicians to identify anybody who is going down and try to make them feel terribly abused, and to profit personally by exploiting the angst. But there’s some angst where the best solution is just to suck it up and cope. In other words, I don’t think you can run a country that eliminates up and down distributional changes between groups. I think that’s the flux of life. What are we going to do about it? We live in one world. China comes up. The rise of China has not been good for American unionized textile workers. Now, China can’t even make textiles; that’s going to Vietnam. That kind of flux is just is natural, and the productivity comes from the fact that people suffer all the creative destruction of capitalism. So they don’t like the damn flux when it happens to catch them. But the flux in total is making the whole boat go up, and the fact that the boat never goes up with every group going up exactly the same all the time is inevitable. Even if the government controlled everything, they’d still rig the system so some people went and others went down. Just put me down as not too worried about a lot of this modern clap trap. Q: How do you and Warren balance the need for simplicity with the need to fully understand these complex ideas? Munger: The interesting thing about Berkshire is that the results are prodigious and the people who are getting the results aren’t prodigies. How did non-prodigies get prodigious results? This is a very interesting question that I hope we deal with in the annual report. The answer is: You’ve got a little better methods. One thing is absolutely essential: You know the edge of your own competency. That really helps and substitutes for a lot of IQ points. You know what you know and what you don’t know, and you work it. I’ve had that concept down. You learn what to avoid. One of my habits is, I get the no-brainers off my desk immediately. Otherwise it gets cluttered. Some people just pile up the desk and then get totally dysfunctional. I hardly know another human being in the world who’s better at this than Jerry Salzman [Daily Journal CEO]. He would have been unable to do what he’s done in life without that one trick. He makes a decision, maybe it’ll be wrong, but his batting average is very high and the time span is approximately zero. That is just a huge trick to master. The other thing we do if the problem is really hard and important, we rag it. You keep working at it and going back to it and so forth. You have a lot of time to do that because of all the things you avoid that other people do. We just have a few tricks, and they work so well, but they’re not copied so much. Some of you will get imprisoned. I would hate to be in a place where I had to pretend to believe all the things I don’t believe in order to handle my daily work and discussions. I just described the working lives of practically everybody. But not Warren, not Charlie. Sure, there are a few subjects we’d consider taboo, but mostly we can approach reality the way it is. If you work for some big company there are catechisms, there are all kinds of behaviors that are forbidden. If you’re in academia there are all kinds of things constraining you. Q: I went through One Santa Fe today [a new real estate development close to the Daily Journal HQ], and I’m curious about if you might turn this into a development site . Munger: We already developed all the property we own. I think we bought these parcels fairly cheaply and we built these very nice, efficient buildings, and we have more than we need. Our business is shrinking. The last thing we’re thinking about is developing. If you’d like to rent what we have, contact Gerry after the meeting. (laughter) Q: I’m interested in your thoughts about how you think about Berkshire’s intrinsic value relative to its book value? Munger: I think Warren’s ideas are pretty coherent and pretty right for Berkshire. I’ve got no disagreement with Warren on that. At a certain price, of course, we’d buy. But as long as we’re doing as well as we are, we don’t mind buying other things. We don’t mind all these bolt-on acquisitions we have. If you ask me how much Berkshire’s going to be able to spend intelligently, in just its utility business over the next fifteen years, it’s a perfectly enormous amount of money. The chance we won’t have a good return on that business is about zero. I think two years from now we will be the biggest utility company in the United States. We’ll deal with our assets at least as well as most people, probably better. We’ll have huge opportunities. I like it. The fact that in one state, when we were young and poor, we could find things that paid 12%, and now we may have to make utility investments at 9% or 10%, probably with float that cost us nothing, that’s okay. We’re slowing down a little. (laughter) We’ve very favored to have these opportunities when interest rates are approximately zero. The idea to create more power and transmission and so on and get a guaranteed return on the investment is quite a favorable one to have. Q: How did the advances in technology affect the natural course of competition? Munger: Berkshire, of course, has consciously avoided rapid technological obsolescence. We own a railroad, we own a bunch of utilities, we own big insurance companies. Obsolescence is what’s happened to the Daily Journal. We had a gold mine here for years. The advance sheets that lawyers need were published six weeks after the decisions were made. We had a big printing press. We could publish those daily, and the lawyers all had to subscribe, and we raised the subscription prices every year, substantially. It was wonderful. We looked like geniuses. Then, the technology changed. Now the lawyers get their stuff over the internet. It’s way worse, and that’s just the way the world is. So we don’t like these technological changes. But at Berkshire we have tried to avoid them as much as we can. Even where we look highly technical, like in carbide cutting tools [Iscar], we’re one of the leaders in the whole world, and it’s complicated. It’s a good business, and I don’t mind the technological complexity where we totally dominate, or pretty close to it. We don’t solve the problem of technological obsolescence, we avoid it. I’ve failed you here at the Daily Journal. I’m sorry. And, of course, Berkshire’s failed in a lot of places. There are all kinds of things that happened to us. We couldn’t fix the textile companies in New England. Our jewelry stores are not going to set any records: there are too many jewelry stores, it’s just too tough. We haven’t found some miracle exemption from the laws of nature. We have ducked a lot of the problems other people have willingly taken on. Warren said, “We have not learned to jump over seven-foot fences. We found a way to step over little mud puddles and seize chunks of gold on the other side.” You see, there aren’t enough mud puddles with gold on the other side, but there have been just enough for us. We work at it. Q: Why did you feel comfortable grabbing Wells Fargo (ticker: WFC) in the depths of the downturn? Munger: It was too cheap and we had the money. As a matter of fact, we bought it within one day of the bottom tick, so that was remarkable. You can say I was a little lucky on that. But, it wasn’t hard to realize that something was cheap. Q: . You’re going to have a hard time convincing us that you failed at Daily Journal. Munger: That’s an interesting story. We bought Daily Journal for 2 million 7. We took the 2 million 7 back about three or four years later. Everything that’s here now is profit. In that sense it’s a good record, but it’s a not record like Berkshire. It’s pretty good for a failing business. (laughter) Q: How does having low expectations help? Munger: It’s much more fun constantly exceeding your expectations instead of being disappointed. The secret of human felicity is not vast ambition, it’s low expectations. Where you really need it is in a spouse. (laughter) On that comment I’m going to end. (applause)