每日新闻集团2015年股东大会——查理·芒格问答
查理·芒格 2015 年 《每日日报》股东大会 —— 第一部分
Charlie Munger's 2015 Daily Journal Annual Meeting - Part 1
伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东大会再过几周就要举行了,我想听听伯克希尔副董事长查理·芒格最近在想些什么,应该会很有启发。芒格也是 Daily Journal 公司(股票代码:DJCO)的董事长,这是一家总部在洛杉矶的法律类出版商,他们的股东大会在 2015 年 3 月 25 日举行。作为股东,我就顺道去看了看他们的版本现在是个什么状况。
这些笔记虽然详细,但远不是完整的会议记录。错误之处由我负责。
问:我想知道您能不能跟我们分享一下,您对 Journal Technologies 的愿景是如何演变的,另外,如果您方便的话,能否谈谈未来 24 个月内您希望实现的一些里程碑?
芒格先生:这大概是这个会议上有人问过的最好问题了。它关系到公司的整个未来。你创了一个纪录,做了一件最正确的事。
[笑声]
当然,我们所面对的现实是,我们处在一个技术和文化都在发生变化的行业。从历史上看,我们很大一部分收入,来自于为律师提供获取信息的唯一实用途径。这让我们年复一年地享有垄断地位,不断提价,而订阅量却持续攀升。我们拥有一份传统的印刷报纸,那是一门美妙的好生意。后来这种垄断消失了,因为律师们越来越多地依赖电子手段来获取信息。
With Berkshire Hathaway’s annual meeting showcasing in a few weeks, I thought it would be instructive to hear what was on Berkshire Vice-Chairman Charlie Munger’s mind these days. Munger is also chairman of the Daily Journal Corporation (ticker: DJCO), a legal publisher based in Los Angeles, and their annual meeting was held on 3/25/2015. As a shareholder, I just dropped in to see what condition their edition was in. These notes, while detailed, are far from a transcript. Errors are mine. Q: I wondered if you could share with us how your vision of Journal Technologies has evolved, and also if you’re at the liberty to discuss some milestones in the next 24 months that you’re hoping to achieve. Mr. Munger: That’s probably the best question anybody’s ever asked at this meeting. It involves the entire future of the company. You set a record for doing the right thing. [laughter] What’s happened, of course, is that we have a business where the technology and the culture is changing. A lot of the revenues, historically, came from giving lawyers the only practical way they had of getting information. That gave us a monopoly for years and years where we raised subscription prices, and circulation kept going up and up. We had a traditional print newspaper, which was a wonderful business. Then that monopoly went away, as lawyers more and more rely on electronic means for that information.
传统业务的另一个收入来源是公告广告,法律规定这类广告必须在报纸上刊登。当然,这些法律都是在互联网出现之前通过的。最终,公告广告也会像渡渡鸟一样走向灭绝。我们当时做的是一门正在走向消亡的生意。
很多报纸都面临过这个问题。很多报纸已经死了。还会死更多。还有很多在勉强支撑。我们当时的决定——现在看可能算不上多好——是尝试通过向法院和其他政府机构销售软件来替代我们的报纸业务。
这差不多就像一个只有一只手一条腿的人,却决定要去爬优胜美地国家公园的半穹顶。(笑声)
不管怎样,我们还是试了。幸运的是,我们赶上了一次法拍公告的大爆发,给我们带来了一大波临时收入。我们利用这个位置来发展软件业务,一部分靠收购,一部分靠自主研发。这件事成功概率非常低。有一种攀岩难度叫 5/11,意思是理论上不可能完成,但偶尔有人能做到——我们当时做的就是这个。不知道为什么,我们用一只手一条腿,竟然爬到了半穹顶的半山腰。
现在的情况比以往任何时候都好。我可以这么说,我们的前景跟去年这个时候相比,已经有了巨大改善。现在,这场游戏里我们会继续投入大量资金,在会计处理上会非常保守,尽量把能减记的东西都减记掉。但我想说,这事有成功的希望了。
就像我一再说的,这实际上是一种风险投资式的活动——我讨厌这种东西,它不是我活在这世上的目的。这是一种极其艰难的、靠诚实劳动谋生的方式。这不像在桶里射鱼那么轻松,而这才是我喜欢的方式。顺便说一句,我理解的桶里射鱼,是先把桶里的水放干。(笑声)
然后你再用一把大霰弹枪去射,那就真的很容易。我们这家公司做的可不是这种事。但现在看来,我们可能真的能做成。
如果我们成功了,这将是一个比法律报纸市场大得多的市场。法律报纸市场根本没有办法跨州复制,除非你去买别的本地报纸。而软件业务如果成功了,就可以覆盖全国,我们现在已经有大量业务遍布全国了。
这花掉了我们很多钱,花掉了我们很多精力,以后还会花掉我们很多精力,但我觉得势头正在起来。
你们这些以价值投资者身份进来的人,现在发现自己碰上了别的东西——一个该死风险投资式的投资。
我不想道歉,因为我自己也在承担同样的结果,而且这事看起来有可能成功。就算成功了,也是一个漫长而缓慢的煎熬过程,但它可能比印刷媒体业务的规模大得多。
我们现在已经跨过了一条线。软件业务的收入已经超过了传统业务。
花那么多钱这件事,我一点都不担心。这方面我挺像杰夫·贝佐斯的。(笑声)
我跟董事们说过:“如果你不能用财富去有效竞争,那有钱就没有意义。”
我认为这完全是个意外。它不是我一生中做过的那种事。你可以说伯克希尔·哈撒韦白手起家创造出的业务只有一次:再保险部门。那项业务价值连城,是我们亲手做起来的。
如果我们成功,不仅对股东好,对这个世界也好。政府使用的整个系统非常低效,需要大量自动化。软件非常复杂,服务也很复杂。这个机会之所以没被人抓住,其中一个原因就是它太难做了。像微软这样的公司讨厌这种业务。太难了。它们有自己的桶里射鱼方式。
我反而喜欢难度够大的事,因为如果你赢了,别人就很难把成果抢走。
The other branch of revenue from the traditional business was public notice advertising, where the laws require being published in the newspaper. Of course, those laws were all passed before there was any Internet. Eventually public notice advertising would go the way of the dodos. We had a business on the way to extinction. A lot of newspapers have faced that problem. A lot have died. A lot more will die, and a lot are limping along. Here, we decided, in what may not have been a terribly good decision at the time, to try and replace our newspaper business by selling software to courts and other government agencies. That was about like a guy who decided he wanted to climb Half Dome in Yosemite Park, despite of the fact he only had one arm and one leg. [laughter] We tried it anyway. Luckily, we had a great boom in foreclosure notices, which gave us a temporary flood of revenue. We used that position to develop this software business, partly by purchase, and partly by selfdevelopment. It was a very odds-against-us thing. There’s a name for a certain kind of rock climbing – 5/11 – that means it’s not really possible, but occasionally somebody does it – and that’s what we tried to do here. For some strange reason we’re about halfway up Half Dome with our one arm and one leg. It looks better today than it’s ever looked. I would say the difference in our prospects between this time last year and now is enormously improved. Now, it’s a game where we’re going to continue to spend a lot of money, and we’re going to be very conservative about the accounting, and we’re going to write off everything we possibly can as we go, etc. But I’d say it has some prospect of working. It was really, as I’ve said again and again, a venture capital-type activity, which I hate and isn’t why I made my way in life. It’s a really difficult honest way to make a living. It wasn’t like shooting fish in a barrel, which is what I prefer. My idea of shooting fish in a barrel, by the way, is to drain the barrel first. [laughter] It’s really easy, then you shoot, preferably with a big shotgun. This is not what this company has done. But it looks like we may actually do it. If we’re successful it’s a much bigger market than the legal newspaper market, which had no way of transferring from state to state except by buying some other local paper. This software business, if it works, will spread over the whole country, and we have a lot of business now spread over the whole country. It’s cost us a lot of money. It’s cost us a lot of effort. It will cost us a lot of effort in the future, but I would say the momentum is gaining. You people who came in as value investors, you’ve got something else. You’ve got a damn venture capital type investment. I don’t want to apologize because I’m sharing the same outcome myself, and it looks like it may work. If it does work, it’ll be a long, slow grind, but it could be a way bigger business than the print business ever was. We have now crossed the line. We have more software revenues now than we have from our traditional business. The fact that it’s costing us a lot of money does not bother me at all. I think a lot like Jeff Bezos [AMZN] on that. [laughter] I said to the directors, “There’s no point in being rich if you don’t use it to compete effectively.” I regard it as a total fluke. It isn’t what I’ve done in life. You can argue that Berkshire Hathaway [BRK-A] has created a business from scratch once: the reinsurance department. It’s worth a fortune, and is something that we’ve done personally. If we succeed, it’s not only good for the shareholders, it’s good for the world. This whole system the government uses is very inefficient, and needs a lot of automation. The software is very complicated, and the service is complicated. One of the reasons the opportunity wasn’t available was it is very hard going. People like Microsoft hate this kind of business. It’s too hard. They have their own way of shooting fish in a barrel. I kind of like it if it’s so hard, because if you win it’ll be pretty hard to take away.
问:您说过,从达尔文身上学到的最重要一点是迫使自己去寻找反证。那从爱因斯坦身上您学到了什么重要东西?
查理·芒格:在爱因斯坦教我相对论之前,我对相对论一无所知。我没聪明到能自己想出来。
(笑声)
当然,我们确实在寻找反证。有位董事说得非常简单:我们应该列出一张清单,写上所有让顾客不满的地方,然后一个接一个地消除这些缺陷。当然,这就是在服务行业竞争的方式。这需要持续的狂热。
我们收购犹他州洛根那家小公司(New Dawn Technologies)的原因之一,就是我们喜欢那里的服务和精神气质,还有他们的招聘方式。当然,我们以前的那些会计,真见鬼——
(笑声)
——我们这么做的时候他们简直疯了。在他们看来,我们像是彻底丧失了理智。这东西怎么可能有价值?这让他们坐立不安,他们一连几个月冲我们大吵大闹,还把我们的报告搞迟了。如今我对那次收购感觉非常好。
这简直是个奇迹,因为我们本该失败的,但我一点也不确定我们会不会失败。当然,我们从进化中学习。你正在看到一个达尔文主义的完美例子:你看着一个行业在消亡,同时有人试图用另一个行业来取代它。几乎其他所有尝试这样做的报业公司都失败了。有些公司用利润买了其他生意,比如电视台,但大多数试图把报纸本身改造成别的东西的人,大多数都失败了。
这是常见的结果。我听比尔·盖茨说过,在科技领域,这种情况经常发生。就拿柯达(KODK)来说,它在银盐摄影领域称霸全球。它是世界上占主导地位的公司,是世界第二重要的商标。它拥有大批化学博士,他们对银盐摄影的了解超过世界上任何人。从大萧条时期就一直是一门极好的生意。典型的寡妇孤儿股。结果技术变革把股东灭掉了。正如比尔·盖茨所说,当技术变革足够大时,这种事一次又一次、一次又一次地发生。
我年轻时通用汽车(GM)是世界上最重要的汽车公司。它把股东灭掉了。你怎么从全世界最重要的汽车公司——第二名差得远——走到把股东灭掉的?这非常达尔文主义。外面很残酷。一些企业一直在消亡,新的企业不断涌现。
技术变革是世界上最难应对的事情之一,所以这么多人会在这方面失败。另一方面,IBM(IBM)从磅秤之类的东西起步,后来完全主导了早期计算机市场。当然,当其他变革来临时,IBM 也失败了很多次。当出现大的技术变革时,失败是很正常的。适应一个不同的世界很难。
真正奇怪的是,你看看上面这几位(每日期刊公司董事会)的年龄。我们拥有历史上最老的董事会。最年轻的 60 岁。
(笑声)
董事长(芒格)91 岁。难道我们该单臂单腿去爬半圆顶吗?
(笑声)
但我告诉你们,我们正在爬。而且我不懂计算机。
(笑声)
问:我想听听您对今年新闻里频频出现的激进投资者的看法。
查理·芒格:我从来不喜欢旧体制那种傲慢——董事会绝对永久,想干什么就干什么。但发生的事情,就是我身上常发生的那种:我对新体制喜欢得更少。
(笑声)
我不认为让一群最富有的人靠买入一批股票然后大肆叫嚷要变革——不管对股东有没有好处——就对文明是件好事。
我也不觉得旧体制完美,但这绝不能是治理文明的好办法。卡尔·伊坎是个很有能力的人,但他不应该来管理世界。
(笑声)
问:如果以您现在的见识来重新设计一套教育体系,知道什么是您人生中重要的东西,您会考虑纳入哪些理念,避免哪些理念?
查理·芒格:我见过一些世界上最聪明的人试图改进基础教育,但事实证明它对改进有惊人的抵抗力。
(笑声)
我目睹过大学在挣扎。我想说,在人文社科领域,有很多疯狂的东西,我也不太清楚为什么。
有很多嫉妒。很多非常聪明的人收入不高。他们主要的能力就是给学生一个 A 或者 C。按照我的标准,人文社科教授平均起来有点疯狂。我喜欢他们——我或许宁愿他们成为我的姻亲,而不是其他很多职业的人——但在当今世界,人文社科教授中有很多疯狂的疏离感。
我认为教育很难修补。我认为技术教育越来越好。他们不断把人逼得更狠。我认为这是世界的一大荣耀。我认为另一种教育也在变好,但它有一些非常恼人的缺陷。
问:考虑到您家里有这么多孩子,您是怎么完成所有阅读的?
查理·芒格:我的头脑是这样——当我想读某样东西时,我能屏蔽掉一切外界干扰。旁人就像不存在似的。事实上,我经常坐在房间里和死人交谈,而身边的活人感到恼火,所以我觉得你们不应该学我的方法。这方法对我来说管用是个奇迹。
(笑声)
我要这么说:我不知道哪个聪明人是不大量阅读的。我猜想你现在可以在电脑上阅读,从中获得很多好处,但我怀疑它能否像纸质阅读对我那样管用。
我认为那些多任务并行的人付出了巨大的代价。他们以为自己效率高了,但我认为当你做这么多任务时,你就没有时间深入思考任何事了,你这是给了世界一个你不该给的优势,而实际上几乎所有人都在犯这个错误。
专注在重要的事情上,不这样我就根本没法成功。我的人生不是靠聪明成功的。我成功是因为我有很长的专注时间。
问:美国在 2007 年的资产负债表是 9 万亿美元。现在大约是 6 万亿美元。在座各位有生之年,在信用经济下,它有可能回到 9 万亿美元吗?
查理·芒格:当然,我老得记得咖啡五分钱一杯,自助餐两毛五吃到饱,全新的汽车 600 美元一辆。在几十年跨度里,你可以指望民主制度导致货币贬值。由于人性使然,这会持续下去。甚至最终可能会加速。
Q: You have said that one of the most important things you picked up from Darwin was the value of forcing yourself to search for disconfirming evidence. What important thing did you pick up from Einstein? Mr. Munger: I didn’t know anything about relativity until Einstein taught me. I wasn’t smart enough to figure it out for myself. [laughter] Of course, we look for disconfirming evidence. One of the directors said very simply, we should make a list of everything that irritates a customer, and then we should eliminate those defects one by one. Of course, that’s the way to compete in a service business. It involves continued fanaticism. One of the reasons we bought the little company in Logan, Utah, [New Dawn Technologies] is that we liked the service and ethos of the place, and their recruitment methods. Of course, our past accountants, damn their souls – [laughter] – just went crazy when we did that. It looked to them like we’d gone stark raving mad. How could it be worth anything? It just bothered them, and they raised hell with us for months and months, and it made our reports late. I feel very good about that acquisition today. It’s a miracle, because we should have failed, but I’m not at all sure we will. Of course, we learn from evolution. You’re seeing a perfect example of Darwin: you’re watching one business die, while somebody tries to replace it with another. Almost everybody else in the newspaper business that’s tried to do that has failed. Some of them bought other businesses, like television stations, with the profits they had, but most of the people who just tried to take their newspaper and transform it into something else, most of them have failed. That’s the common result. I’ve heard Bill Gates say that in technology that’s often the case. Here was Kodak [KODK] that owned the world in silver-based photography. It was the dominant company in the world, the second most important trademark in the world. Armies of Ph.D. chemists, who knew more about silver-based photography than anybody in the world. Fabulous business right through the Great Depression. Total widow and orphan stock. It wiped out the shareholder with technological change. As Bill Gates said, it happens again, and again, and again, when technology changes enough. General Motors [GM] was the most important automobile company in the world when I was young. It wiped out its shareholders. How do you start from being the most important automobile company in the whole world, and number two is not close, and wiping out your shareholders? That’s very Darwinian. It’s tough out there. Some businesses are dying all the time and new ones come up. Technological change is one of the hardest things to cope with, which is why so many people fail at it. IBM [IBM], on the other hand, went from butchers’ scales and what not to totally dominate the early computer market. Of course when the other evolutions came along IBM has failed a lot. It’s normal to fail when there’s a big technological change. It’s hard to adapt to a world that’s different. What’s really weird about it, look at the age of these people up here [DJCO's Board of Directors]. We have the oldest board of directors in the history of the world. The youngest one is 60. [laughter] The Chairman [Munger] is 91. Should we be climbing Half Dome with one arm and one leg? [laughter] But I’m telling you we are. And I don’t understand computing. [laughter] Q: I wanted to get your opinion on activist investors that got a lot of play in the news this year. Mr. Munger: I never like the pomposity of the old system, where the board of directors was absolutely permanent and did as it pleased. But what’s happened is what usually happens to me. I like the new system even less. [laughter] I don’t think it’s a great thing for a civilization where the people who are getting richest are a bunch of people who buy a block of shares and howl for change that helps the shareholders no matter what. I didn’t think the old system was perfect, either, but it can’t be a great way to run a civilization. Carl Icahn’s a very able man, but he should not be running the world. [laughter] Q: If you were to redesign an education system, knowing what you know now about what’s been important in your life, what ideas would you consider it important to include and to avoid? Mr. Munger: I have watched some of the smarted people in the world try to improve primary education, and it’s proved amazingly resistant to improvement. [laughter] I’ve watched universities struggle. I would say in the liberal arts there’s a lot of craziness, and I don’t know exactly why. There’s a lot of envy. You have a lot of very bright people who aren’t paid very well. Their main power is to give some student an A or a C. Something makes the liberal arts professors, on average, a little crazy by my standards. I like them, and I probably prefer they marry into the family than people from a lot of other professions, but there’s a lot of crazy alienation in the liberal arts professors in the modern world. I think education is very hard to fix. I think the technical education keeps getting better and better. They keep driving people harder and harder. I think that’s one of the glories of the world. I think the other education is getting better, too, but it’s got some very irritating defects. Q: Given so many kids in your home environment, how did you do all your reading? Mr. Munger: I have the kind of mind that when I want to read something I can tune everything else out. The people aren’t even present. In fact, I frequently sit in a room and converse with dead people while the living people around me are irritated, so I don’t think you should try my methods. It’s a miracle they work for me. [laughter] I will say this: I know no wise person who doesn’t read a lot. I suspect that you can read on the computer now and get a lot of benefit out of it, but I doubt that it’ll work as well as reading print worked for me. I think people who multitask pay a huge price. They think they’re being extra productive, and I think when you multitask so much you don’t have time to think about anything deeply, you are giving the world an advantage you shouldn’t do, and practically everybody is drifting into that mistake. Concentrating hard on something that’s important, I can’t succeed at all without doing it. I did not succeed in life by intelligence. I succeeded because I have a long attention span. Q: The U.S. had a $0.9 trillion balance sheet in 2007. Now it’s about six trillion. In anyone’s lifetime in this room, will it ever go back to $0.9 trillion under the credit economy? Mr. Munger: Of course, I’m so old I remember coffee at five cents, and all-you-can-eat cafeterias at 25 cents, and brand new automobiles for $600. Over a span of many decades you can count on democracy to cause the money to deteriorate. That will continue because of human nature. It may even accelerate eventually.
回顾意大利、阿根廷和巴西的经历后,我对自己经历过的多次通胀感到相当意外。我原本预料的问题比实际发生的要多。
我这辈子,过去 50 年来,普通股平均回报(含股息)能达到税前每年约 10%。我不知道其中多少是实际收益,多少是通胀。假设 7% 是实际收益,3% 是通胀。我觉得这些数字好得令人难以置信。
像我这样年纪的人,经历的是世界历史上最好、最轻松的时期——死亡率最低、投资产出最高、大多数人生活水准的年增长率最大。战争等一切因素带来的净死亡率都在改善。史蒂芬·平克说得对。这是有史以来最了不起的时期。
如果你对自己过去 50 年得到的还不满意,那你对人生的判断可就大错特错了。现在已是最好,而且很可能变糟。为变糟做好准备总是明智的。令人惊喜的事容易应对,麻烦的是那些让你措手不及的坏事。
说到货币当局,你完全可以预期,钱的购买力会随时间推移而下降。你几乎可以肯定,未来 50 年的麻烦会比过去 50 年多得多。技术在变,所以少数几个疯子就能让世贸中心事件变得像野餐一样轻松。我们都该做好准备,去适应一个更艰难的世界。
问:你怎么看技术导致劳动力被替代、且这一进程加速所带来的社会变化?
芒格先生:这正是我所说的例子。如果你要搞自由贸易、更好的通讯、更高效的集装箱船之类,而来自那些被愚蠢政府体制和马尔萨斯陷阱压制已久、如今突然解放出来的、极有天赋的人的竞争,突然涌现出来——那么,这种竞争当然会伤害原先处于特权地位的人。这不是因为美联储做错了什么,或者政客们不公,或者富人虐待穷人。是世界变了。除非你要废除自由贸易、现代技术,以及那些在贫困的农业中劳作的人的解放——当然,这就会损害那些勤奋但教育水平有限的人的前景,事实也确实如此。很难解决。
人们还在说:“你只要修修补补政治,就能解决。”希腊就这么干的。希腊的解决方案是愚蠢的。我们要想繁荣,就必须工作。我们必须让人们受到大棒与胡萝卜的制约。要是把大棒拿掉,整个体系就不灵了。
你不能靠投票让自己变富。这是个愚蠢的想法。当然,成功的文明都有社会安全网。看看日本的情况。他们曾是亚洲的出口强国。然后中国和韩国崛起了,德国也变得更好了。突然间,他们又成了出口强国。
当你拥有一个绝妙的垄断地位,然后一些更有才华的人更拼命地工作,你自然就没那么富了。那些该死的经济学家不断地在日本的联邦储备系统或什么上找办法。想想多蠢。原因其实很明显:他们失去了优势。日本在质量控制等方面曾更胜一筹,但后来别人也学会了同样的玩法。
韩国人从汽车行业的零基础起步,每周工作 84 小时,没有加班费,持续了十多年。同时,每个韩国小孩从小学回家后,都在下午和晚上跟家教学整整四个小时,被这些虎妈虎爸逼着。
Considering the experiences in places like Italy and Argentina and Brazil, I have been pleasantly surprised after the many bouts of inflation we went through. I anticipated more trouble than we actually had. In my lifetime, over the past 50 years, the common stock averages (including their dividends) produced about 10 percent per annum pre-tax. I don’t know what percent of that is real gain, and how much is inflation. Let’s say it’s seven percent real gain and three percent inflation. I work out those figures as unbelievably good. Somebody my age has lived through the best and easiest period that ever happened in the history of the world, with the lowest death rates, the highest investment production, the biggest increases per annum that most people’s standard of living ever got. The net death rate from war, from everything is better. Steven Pinker is right. It’s the most fabulous period that ever happened. If you’re unhappy with what you’ve had over the last 50 years, you have an unfortunate misappraisal of life. It’s as good as it gets, and it’s very likely to get worse. It’s always wise to be prepared for it getting worse. Favorable surprises are easy to handle. It’s the unfavorable surprises that cause the trouble. In terms of monetary authorities, you can count on the purchasing power of money to go down over time. You can almost count on the fact that you’ll have way more trouble in the next 50 years than we had in the last. The technology is changing, so that a few nutcases could make the World Trade Center look like a picnic. We should all be prepared to adjust to a world that is harder. Q: What do you think about societal change, because of the labor displacement by technology and the accelerating of that. Mr. Munger: That’s an example of what I’m talking about. If you’re going to have free trade and better communication, more efficient container ships and so forth, and there’s all this new competition from very talented people who’ve been held down by stupid governmental systems and Malthusian traps and they’re suddenly unleashed, of course that competition hurts the people who formerly were in the privileged position. It isn’t because the Federal Reserve didn’t do something right, or the politicians are unfair, or the rich people are mistreating the poor. The world has changed. Unless you’re going to do away with free trade and modern technology and the liberation of these people who were working in penury on agriculture, of course that’s going to hurt the prospects of hard working people with limited education, and it has. It’s very hard to fix. The people are still going, “All you have to do is tinker with the politics and you can fix it.” That’s what they tried to do in Greece. The Greek solution is idiocy. If we’re going to prosper, we have to work. We have to have people subject to carrots and sticks. If you take away the stick the whole system won’t work. You can’t vote yourself rich. It’s an idiotic idea. Of course, the successful civilizations, they all have a social safety net. Look what happened in Japan. They were the export powerhouse of Asia. Up rose China and Korea, and Germany got way better. All of a sudden they’re the export powerhouse. When you have a wonderful monopolistic position, and then some more talented people work harder, of course you’re less rich. These damned economists keep looking for ways to handle the federal reserve system in Japan or something. Think how stupid that is. The solution is really obvious of why they lost. They got huge competition they didn’t formerly have when they were the export powerhouse. Japanese were better at quality control and so forth. Then other people learned to play the same game. Koreans came up from nothing in the auto business. They worked 84 hours a week with no overtime for more than a decade. At the same time every little Korean came home from grade school, and worked with a tutor for four full hours in the afternoon and the evening, driven by these Tiger
妈妈们。当你们输给那样的人时,会感到惊讶吗?除非你是个彻头彻尾的白痴。
[笑声]
提问者:有没有机会收购技术公司来扩充《每日邮报》的现有业务,还是你只是打算在未来通过有机方式发展?我知道你说过这不是迷你版的伯克希尔·哈撒韦,但如果有合适的“瓮中捉鳖”的机会,董事会会考虑吗?
查理·芒格:我们年迈的董事会确实能“瓮中捉鳖”,但我不认为我们会有太多这样的机会。我们在买入富国银行 [WFC] 股票时,价格是每股 8 美元多一点,那就是一次这样的机会。我不认为未来还会有很多类似的机会——我把那看作一次性的运气。
那次运气是我们应得的,因为我们从止赎潮中通过纪律和良好服务等积累下了资金。如果我们这次碰巧成功了(可能性不小),这次经历让我们觉得并不轻松,以至于我们不想再试一次。如果你踩着浮冰过河——掉进水里就会淹死——好不容易到了对岸,那里繁荣昌盛,你回头看看那条河,我不觉得你还会想再走回去试一次。所以我认为这种事不会再发生了。
我们想要一些能帮到现有业务的东西,但我们这把年纪不打算再做新的风险投资了。这活儿就算我们年轻时也没干过。我不知道为什么这次干了。这主要是 [DJCO 董事会成员] 约翰·盖林的主意。
[笑声]
提问者:你早上有没有什么固定的程序或习惯,可以用来解释你生活中那惊人的生产力?
Moms. Are you surprised when you lose to people like that? Only if you’re a total idiot. [laughter] Q: Are there other opportunities for acquisition of technology companies to add to the Daily Journal’s existing unit, or are you simply trying to grow that organically going forward? I know you stated that this is not a mini Berkshire Hathaway, but if there was the right opportunity to shoot fish in a barrel, would the board consider it? Mr. Munger: Our aged board is capable of shooting fish in a barrel, but I don’t think we’ll get many opportunities. We got an opportunity like that when we bought Wells Fargo [WFC] stock at eight and change. I don’t anticipate a lot of future opportunities like that one – I regard that as a one time fluke. Now it was a the fluke we earned the right to have, by accumulating money from discipline and good service and so forth out of the foreclosure movement. If we happen to succeed in this, which is more likely than not, the experience has not seemed so easy to us that we want to try it again. If you walk across a river from ice floe to ice floe — where if you fell in the water you’re going to die – then you reach the other side where there’s prosperity and you look back at that river, I don’t think you’d want to step back and try it again. So I don’t think it’s going to happen again. We would like something that would help what we’re already doing, but we’re not looking to be new venture capitalists at our present age. It’s an activity we didn’t do even when we were young. I don’t know why we did it. It was mostly [DJCO Director] John Guerin’s idea. [laughter] Q: Do you have any morning procedures or rituals that you use, to which you might attribute your tremendous productivity in life?
查理·芒格:我想吃什么就吃什么。我从来不在意自己的健康。我从不做任何我不想做的运动。如果说我取得过什么成功,那完全是因为我坚持把事情想透彻。我这辈子唯一擅长的事,就是拼命思考,努力找到正确答案,然后照着去做。别的我什么也没学会。
那些以为靠慢跑之类就能出人头地的人,祝他们好运。
\[笑声\]
问:您对新加坡李光耀先生的逝世有何评论?
查理·芒格:哦,有啊。老天,我就喜欢那些给我喂马屁球的人。说到李光耀的离世,我发现他去世时我犯了个错——我打算订制一尊李光耀的半身像,放在某个重要的地方。
他是世界历史上最重要的一位政府领袖,最伟大的国家缔造者。没有哪项成就能与李光耀那不可思议的功绩相提并论。
一片疟疾肆虐的沼泽,变成了一个现代化的文明强国,然后这个榜样又彻底改变并转变了中国。不止中国,还有越南。正是李光耀这个榜样,让北越人——偏偏是他们——也转向他,把越南变成了一个强国。
从来没有过像李光耀这样的职业生涯。他中学里有一个人比他更聪明,是个女的,比他大一岁。所以他娶了她。
\[笑声\]
这家伙极其理性,而别人追求的是曲线最丰满的美女。他的所有孩子都很成功,儿子成了新加坡总理。
他有着务实判断力。他上台时,周围全是仇视他的穆斯林。他没有资产,没有军队,什么都没有。他身处险境。他意识到,在他的新国家里必须有军队。他请求全世界帮他建立军队和防御体系。
全世界都拒绝了。毕竟,那是一片疟疾沼泽。只有一个国家说:“我们来帮你,”那就是以色列。他想,穆斯林恨以色列,而我周围全是恨我的穆斯林,我怎么能让以色列帮我?他看到了自己的难题。他接受了以色列的帮助,然后告诉所有人——那些以色列人是墨西哥人。
\[笑声\]
他彻底根除了贿赂。当他发起反腐运动时,第一个倒下的就是他最好的朋友之一。那人自杀后,妻子来找他说,自杀让家族丢尽了脸,我们能把自杀掩盖过去吗?他说:“我帮不了你任何忙。”李光耀在完成必须做的事情上极其强硬。新加坡曾经腐败透顶。他的榜样促使中国开始清理腐败,在我看来,这有超过 50% 的成功概率。这将是我在这一生中见过的,以结果衡量最令人钦佩之人的又一个难以置信的成就范例。
Mr. Munger: I eat whatever I want to eat. I have never paid any attention to my health. I’ve never done any exercise I didn’t want to do. If any successes has come to me, it came because I insisted on thinking things through. That’s all I was capable of doing in life, was thinking pretty hard about trying to get the right answer, and then acting on it. I never learned to do anything else. All these people who think they are going to get ahead by jogging or something, more power to them. [laughter] Q: Do you have any comments on the passing on of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew? Mr. Munger: Oh, yes. Boy, I like people who serve me puffballs. As far as Lee Kuan Yew’s going, I realized I made a mistake when he died. I’m going to commission a bust of Lee Kuan Yew and stick it somewhere important. That is the most important governmental leader, the most important nation builder who ever existed in the history of the world. There is no other record equal to Lee Kuan Yew’s unbelievable achievement. A malarial swamp turned into a modern civilized powerhouse, and then using that example to utterly change and transform China. Not only China, but Vietnam. It was the example of Lee Kuan Yew that the North Vietnamese of all people turned to, to turn Vietnam into a powerhouse. There’s never been a career like Lee Kuan Yew’s. There was one person in Lee Kuan Yew’s high school who was smarter than he was. It was a female, one year older. So he married her. [laughter] This guy is very rational and other people went for the lady with the most curvaceous whatever. All his children are successful, and his son is the prime minister of Singapore. He had this practical judgment. When he came to power, he was surrounded by Muslims who hated him. He has no assets, no army, no nothing. He’s in a dangerous position. He realizes that in his new nation he has to have an army. He asked the world to help him create an army and defense system. Everybody in the world declines. After all, it’s a malarial swamp. One country said, “We’ll help you,” and it was Israel. He thought, how can I have Israel help me when the Muslims hate Israel, and I’m surrounded by Muslims who hate me. He saw his problem. He accepted help from the Israelis, and he told everybody they were Mexicans. [laughter] He totally eliminated bribery. When he went on his anti-corruption kick, one of the first persons that succumbed was one of his best friends. When the guy committed suicide, the wife came to him and said, committing suicide is a loss of face for the family, can we cover the suicide up? He said, “I cannot help you in any way.” Lee Kuan Yew was very tough about getting done what had to be done. Singapore was a very corrupt place. His example has caused China to clean up, which looks to me like it’s better than a 50% bet. It will be one more unbelievable example of the achievements of the most admirable man – judging by consequences – of any with whom I’ve shared the planet.
提问者:我从印度来。能来到这里是我的荣幸。对于一位 20 岁、希望通过投资实现财务自由的年轻人,您有什么建议?
查理·芒格:在我这一生里,通过投资获得成功相当容易。如果你理性、自律,并且从精心挑选的股票中获得了平均每年 10% 的税前收益作为顺风,那可是一股强大的顺风。如果你存下钱,量入为出,再加上精明之类,那就足以照顾好自己了。在储蓄上稍加自律,加上时间的流逝,就能做到。
现在,如果未来指数能提供 10% 的回报,但我认为实际回报不会如此,那么想赚得更多已经证明相当困难。你们当中那些后来者会发现,如果只盯着大盘股,对大多数人来说几乎不可能。当事物几乎不可能时,也许你可以停止尝试。
这不是我的系统,但我不向所有人推荐我的系统。作为生活方式我确实推荐,但我不认为只要读读查理·芒格就能致富。如果那么容易,这个地方早变成足球场了。
(笑声)
萨尔茨曼先生,《每日新闻》CEO:查理说,致富的方法是在你的活期账户里保持 1000 万美元,以防出现好机会。
查理·芒格:顺便说一句,那是霍华德·阿曼森给一群挨饿的年轻毕业生的建议。
(笑声)
富人有时会有点傲慢。
提问者:您能谈谈您对浦项制铁 [PKX] 持仓的看法吗?
Q: I came to be here from India. It is an honor to be here. What is your advice to a 20yearold individual who wants to achieve financial freedom through investing? Mr. Munger: Achieving success through investments has been pretty easy in my lifetime. If you were rational and disciplined, and you had a tailwind of a 10 percent per annum on average from carefully selected stocks going for you, pre tax, that was a big tailwind. If you saved your money, and you lived within your means, were shrewd and so forth, that was enough to take care of you. A little discipline in saving, and the passage of time will do it. Now, if the world is going to get 10 percent out of indexes in the future, and I don’t think it will, in real terms, getting more has proven to be quite difficult. Some of you who come along later are finding that if you stay in the big stocks, it’s damn near impossible for most people. When things are damn near impossible, maybe you could stop trying. That was not my system, but I do not recommend my system to everybody. I do, as a way of life, but I don’t think all you have to do is read Charlie Munger and you’ll get rich. If it were that easy, this place would be a football stadium. [laughter] Mr. Salzman, Daily Journal CEO: Charlie says the way to get rich is to keep $10 million in your checking account in case a good deal comes along. Mr. Munger: By the way, that was the advice of Howard Ahmanson to a young bunch of starving graduates. [laughter] Rich people sometimes get a little pompous. Q: Would you give us your thoughts on the Posco [PKX] position in the
Daily Journal 投资组合?
查理·芒格:这其实是一个非常有趣的例子,它说明这个世界有多难。那是全球效率最高的钢铁公司,并且在很长很长时间里,几乎拥有整个国家的本地垄断地位。尽管如此,尽管他们拥有一些全世界其他企业都没有的极为重要的钢铁技术,浦项制铁(Posco)的股价却卖得就像一家普通的商品化钢铁公司。
在现代世界高强度的竞争中,很难避免被商品化。道氏化学(Dow Chemical)这样的公司,尽管拥有数千名博士级化学家,以及像创造浦项制铁的人一样才华横溢、聪明过人的员工,他们所有复杂的化工产品还是被商品化了,市场低迷、价格糟糕,等等。
这说明在商品化业务中赚钱有多难、多危险,也说明有多少你以前认为拥有巨大优势的企业可以被商品化。所以,你在这个股东大会上提出浦项制铁的例子,真是做了一件大好事。浦项制铁是值得每个人深思的绝佳案例。它真的显示了这有多难。
现场股东:你过去曾说过,私人抵押贷款保险的解决方案是有缺陷的。你能谈谈为什么你认为像房利美和房地美这样的现行保险体系有效吗?并谈谈把私人资本引入抵押贷款保险市场的一些问题。
查理·芒格:你还记得私人保险在美国上次大金融危机中做了什么吧。疯狂又不道德,这不是好的组合。他们还加上了第三点,他们对自己既疯狂又不道德这一点深感自豪。
因此,他们差点酿成大祸。做这些事的人有一个共同点,没有一个人有丝毫羞耻感。我从未见过任何一个用劣质承保、垃圾债券助长了大金融危机的人感到羞耻的。我从没见过任何一个促成此事的人对自己感到羞愧。总归是别人的错,或者说是政府的错。
现实就是如此。我们是偶然跌跌撞撞,然后才对危机做出反应。考虑到我们当时面临的严重问题,我们所做的一切都是极为有效的权宜之计,它多少还算在发挥作用。主要的风险在于,在政治压力下,政府会开始像所有人之前那样发疯,降低标准等等。
你们一直试图通过各种策略让公民投票给自己带来富裕,比如给那些不配获得信贷的人无限信贷,这确实是个愚蠢的主意。你会觉得人们现在应该明白了,但我不认为他们懂了。我对现行体系是满意的,前提是他们保持标准不降。
但当然,他们不想这么做,他们想尽快降低标准,而政客们会不断催促他们这样做。我认为这是个糟糕的主意。我不认为有一个像大萧条时期的联邦住房管理局(FHA)那样的、恰好涉及政府的保守体系有什么错。让私人机构和私人保险为所欲为?我们已经看到了那样做的结果有多好,我们那些不受监管、了不起的金融界精英们。我宁愿相信某些病原体。
Daily Journal Portfolio? Mr. Munger: It’s a very interesting example, as a matter of fact, that shows how hard the world is. That is the most efficient steel company in the world, and it had pretty close to a local monopoly of a whole country for a long, long time. In spite of that, in spite of having some very important steel technology they have that nobody else in the world has, Posco is selling like an ordinary commoditized steel company. It’s very hard to avoid being commoditized in high powered competition in the modern world. In places like Dow Chemical [DOW], have all our complex chemical products commoditized in spite of the fact they’ve got thousands of PhD chemists, and people as talented and brilliant as the people who created Posco just find the markets low and the prices bad and so forth. It shows how hard and dangerous it is to make money in a commoditized business, and how many businesses that you formerly thought were hugely advantaged can be commoditized. So, you’ve done a wonderful service to this meeting by raising the case of Posco. Posco’s an excellent example for everybody to think about. It really shows how hard it is. Q: You have said in the past, the private mortgage insurance solution is flawed. Can you talk about why you think the current insurance system like Fannie and Freddie works, and talk about some of the problems with bringing private capital to the mortgage insurance market? Mr. Munger: You remember what private insurance did in the big financial crisis in the United States. Crazy and immoral, that is not a good combination. They added a third, they were deeply full of pride about the fact that they were crazy and immoral. And so, they damn near caused a catastrophe. The people who did it have one thing in common, not one has any shame at all. I’ve never seen anybody who contributed to the creation of the great financial crisis with shoddy underwriting, lousy bonds — I’ve never met anybody who contributed to it who was ashamed of himself. It’s always somebody else’s fault, or maybe the government’s fault. That’s just the way it is. We’ve stumbled by accident, and reacted to a crisis. All the things we did were great expedients, given the terrible problems we had, and it’s working after a fashion. The main risk is, given the political pressures, the government will start going crazy the way everyone did, in reducing the standards and so forth. You keep trying to enable your citizens to vote themselves rich by various stratagems, like unlimited credit to people who don’t deserve credit, which is really a dumb idea. You’d think people would know that by now, but I don’t think they do. I’m satisfied with the current system provided they keep the standards up. But of course, they don’t want to do that, they want to lessen them as fast as they can, and that’s what the politicians will keep urging them to do. I think it’s a terrible idea. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with having a conservative system, like the FHA was in the Great Depression, that happened to involve the government. Letting private agencies and private insurance do as they please? We’ve shown how well that works, our unregulated, wonderful people in finance. I’d rather trust some pathogens.
问:我想听听您对美国运通(AMEX)的看法。您觉得它的护城河最近变窄了吗?
查理·芒格:我觉得它丢掉了与好事多(COST)的合同,这个结果并不理想。这再次说明了资本主义有多残酷。显然,有人愿意以更低的价格提供服务。这件事正好表明,在现代资本主义中,一个看似固若金汤的地位可以变得有多脆弱。它让一切事情都变得困难。
对于那些已经有些钱的人来说,我觉得现实就是这样;美国运通已经经历了一段非常辉煌的成就和繁荣时期。我认为它们未来仍会有很多好日子,但看起来不像过去那么轻松了。当然,它们的老大会说,这从来都不容易,他一直都在拼命战斗——但我们这边同样也在拼命划船,可《每日新闻》的印刷业务又给我们带来了什么好结果呢?我们划得跟疯了一样,对吧,格里?
格里·萨尔兹曼:我们确实尽力了。但真的很艰难。
Q: I’d like to get your thoughts on American Express [AMEX]. Do you think its moat has narrowed recently? Mr. Munger: I don’t think it was desirable that it lost its contract with Costco [COST]. Again, that’s an example of what tough capitalism is. Obviously, other people are willing to do it cheaper. It just shows how tough a position that looks impregnable can be in modern capitalism. It’s what makes everything difficult. To those who already have some money, I think that’s just the way it is, and American Express has had a long period of very extreme achievement and prosperity. I think they’ll have a lot of prosperity in the future, but it doesn’t look quite as easy as it once did. Now, the head guy would say it’s always been hard, he’s been battling hard, but we paddled hard here too, and what good did it do us in Daily Journal’s print business? We paddled like crazy, didn’t we Gerry? Mr. Salzman: We tried. It was hard.
查理·芒格:是啊,实际情况就是你一直在衰退,一直在衰退。欢迎来到成人世界。
(笑声)
提问者:我最近在 YouTube 上看了一段埃隆·马斯克的访谈,他说他跟您吃过午饭,您当时给了他各种理由,说明特斯拉为什么会失败。
(笑声)
您能不能好心给我们讲讲,您当时为什么认为特斯拉会失败,比亚迪又能从中吸取什么教训?
查理·芒格:我认为汽车行业非常艰难,竞争极其激烈,而且每个人都将造出很棒的车。每个厂商都已经拥有巨大的规模和财富。所以,我把它看作一门艰难的生意。埃隆·马斯克是个天才,所以如果有人有机会做成这件事,那很可能就是他了。
但在伯克希尔有句老话:当一个以天才著称的人,接手一个以经营条件艰难著称的行业时,最终胜出的往往是行业的声誉。没有政府的帮助,让电动汽车起步真的非常困难。在中国,这比在美国顺利得多,因为他们的空气更差。
埃隆·马斯克真正需要的,是整个国家发生一场灾难性的、导致大量死亡的雾霾袭击。除非发生那样可怕的事情,否则我认为会很困难。他是个天才,但也不得不如此。
提问者:我想请问您是如何阅读的,以及如何记住并运用那些信息的?您有存档系统吗?
查理·芒格:没有,我从不做笔记;上学时我也从不记笔记。我只是想读什么就读什么,想什么时候读就什么时候读,想怎么想就怎么想。这就是我的系统。
Mr. Munger: Yeah, what happened is you just keep receding and receding. Welcome to adult life. [laughter] Q: I recently watched an Elon Musk interview on YouTube, in which he said he had lunch with you and you had given him all sorts of reasons why Tesla would fail. [laughter] Would you be kind enough to educate us why you thought Tesla would fail, and what BYD [ticker: BYDDF] can learn from this? Mr. Munger: I think the auto business is very difficult, very competitive, and everybody is going to make wonderful cars. Everybody already has enormous size and wealth. So, I regarded it as a tough business. Elon Musk is a genius, and so if anybody has a chance to do it, he probably is the man. But we have a saying at Berkshire that when a man with a reputation for genius takes on a business with a reputation for tough operating conditions, it’s the reputation of the business that’s likely to prevail. Without government help, getting electric cars off the ground is really hard. In China, it works a lot better than it does here, because their air is worse. What Elon Musk really needs is for the whole country to have a disastrous smog attack that kills a lot of people. Short of something terrible like that, I think it’s going to be difficult. He’s a genius, but is going to have to be. Q: I’d like to ask you how you read, and how you retain and incorporate that information? Do you have a filing system? Mr. Munger: No, I’ve never taken notes; I never kept notes when I was student. I would just read what I pleased when I felt like reading it, and I think what I think when I feel like thinking it. That’s my system.
[ laughter ]
我觉得这方法不是谁都适用,但对我们来说,足够混下去了。
问:我的问题是关于所谓的“机器人理财顾问”。您怎么看这个?
查理·芒格:机器人的基金就是指那些大型指数基金。你几乎想不出比指数基金更“机器人”的基金了。当然,长期来看,它们跑赢了很大一部分主动管理型基金,尤其是那些管理着几十上百亿美元资金的经理。我只感谢上帝,没让我接那个管理 2000 亿美元还要跑赢指数的活儿。我可不想接这个挑战。那些在投资上还有价值的人,是愿意在效率较低的市场里勤奋、聪明地工作的人。我觉得手里管着 2000 亿美元还想做优秀的价值投资者,太难了。建仓要花很长时间,清仓也要花很长时间,别人还会跟着复制你的交易,非常困难。
问(菲尔·德穆斯):近年来,金融经济学家重新发现,高利润、高品质的公司是比其他公司更好的投资标的。他们想搞清楚这个想法从哪来的,一路追溯到巴菲特,然后巴菲特又指向芒格。但这是你在 1950 年代,或者可能是 1960 年代初期,还当律师的时候就想明白的。你是怎么悟出这个道理的?那时候你还不是“查理·芒格”呢。
[ laughter ]
查理·芒格:有点脑子的人都知道,有些公司就是比其他公司好。难点在于,它们卖得也贵,相对资产、盈利什么的都贵,这就把乐趣给搞没了。如果只需要搞清楚哪些公司更好,傻子都能赚大钱。可它们不断把价格抬上去,直到赔率变得不一样。
[laughter] I don’t think it’s the right system for everybody, but it seems to have worked well enough for to get by. Q: My question is about so called ‘robo advisors’. What are your thoughts on the subject? Mr. Munger: The robo funds are the index funds, the big ones. You can hardly imagine more of a robo fund than an index fund. Of course, they’re beating a large percentage of actively managed money over a long period of years, particularly the people who are managing billions. I just thank God that they didn’t give me the assignment of managing $200 billion and beating the indexes. I would not have welcomed that challenge. The people who still have value in investing are people who are willing to work very diligently and intelligently in less efficient markets. I think it is hard to be a great value investor with $200 billion under management. It takes a long time to buy in, a long time to sell out, other people copy your trades, it’s very difficult. Q (Phil DeMuth): Financial economists in recent years have rediscovered that highly profitable, high quality companies are better investments than other companies. They try to figure out where this idea came from, it takes them back to Buffett, and then Buffett points to Munger. But this is an insight you had in the 1950s, or maybe the early 1960s, when you were an attorney. How did you come upon this idea? You weren’t even Charlie Munger then. [laughter] Mr. Munger: Everybody with any sense at all knows that some companies are better than others. What makes it difficult is they sell at higher prices in relation to assets, and earnings and so forth, and that takes the fun out of the game. If all you had to do was figure out which companies were better than others, an idiot could make a lot of money. But they keep raising the prices to where the odds change.
我一直知道这一点。他们教我的同事们说股票市场非常有效,没人能战胜它。但我认识一些在奥马哈赛马场靠比其他人更懂马而战胜了同注分彩系统的人。我知道那是胡扯。年轻时我从未靠近过商学院,所以没被那些疯狂言论污染。
(笑声)
我从来不信那一套。我从来不信伊甸园里有会说话的蛇。我天生就能识别废话,这没什么了不起。我并没有别人没有的奇妙洞察力。我只是比其他人更持续地避免了愚蠢。别人总想显得聪明,而我只想做到不愚蠢。我发现,要在人生中领先,你所需要做的就是保持不愚蠢,并活得很长。保持不愚蠢比大多数人想象的要难。
问:作为一家大型医院的主席,您能跟我们谈谈奥巴马医改吗?
芒格先生:这是地球上最复杂的话题之一。当然,美国发展出的医疗保健体系有很多问题。另一方面,它也有很多好的地方——所有的新药、新设备、新手术。
医学在我一生中取得的进步,比整个人类历史上取得的进步还要多。已经取得的成就是如此惊人,其中很多是显而易见且简单的,比如给儿童接种疫苗预防小儿麻痹症,刮掉牙结石以免你在 55 岁时戴上假牙,等等。
人们现在认为这些益处是理所当然的,但我生活在一个很多孩子会死去的世界,每个城市都有结核病疗养院,一半得结核病的人都死了。医学的成效真是令人惊叹。另一方面,与美国可能达到的最好水平相比,它的制度又相当奇特。
I always knew that. They were teaching my colleagues that the stock market was so efficient that nobody could beat it. But I knew people who beat the pari mutuel system in Omaha by knowing more about horses than other people. I knew it was bull. When I was young I never went near a business school so I didn’t get polluted by the craziness. [laughter] I never believed it. I never believed there was a talking snake in the Garden of Eden. I had a gift for recognizing twaddle, and there’s nothing remarkable about it. I don’t have any wonderful insights that other people don’t have. I just avoided idiocy slightly more consistently than others. Other people are trying to be smart; all I’m trying to be is non-idiotic. I’ve found that’s all you have to do to get ahead in life, be non-idiotic and live a long time. It’s harder to be non-idiotic than most people think. Q: As chairman of a major hospital, can you speak to us about Obamacare? Mr. Munger: That’s one of the most complex subjects on Earth. Of course, the system of medical care that’s evolved in the United States has much wrong with it. On the other hand, it has much that’s good about it, all new drugs, the new devices, the new operations. Medicine has taken more territory in my lifetime than it took in the whole previous history of mankind. It’s just amazing what’s been done, and a lot of it has been obvious and simple, like inoculating children against infantile paralysis, scraping the tartar off your teeth so you don’t wear plates when you’re 55 years old, so on. People now take those benefits for granted, but I lived in the world where a lot of children died, and every city had a tuberculosis sanitarium, and half the people who got tuberculosis died. It’s just amazing how well medicine has worked. On the other hand, compared to the best it can possibly be, the American system is pretty peculiar.
这个问题非常难解决,因为其中一种激励方式是每月按人头支付照料费用,省下来的钱全归你自己。这就是政府与疗养院打交道的制度。“疗养院”这个名字真不错,你在天堂里“疗养”,在那种地方根本不会“疗养”。
[笑声]
取这么个委婉的名字确实有诱惑力。但这就制造了巨大的动机去拖延照料、把钱省下来,政府有一套严格的规定和监督体系等等。如果没有这套制度,在疗养院里照顾老人的费用会是现在的十倍。这是当时唯一可行的办法。
全世界都在朝这个方向走,因为成本一直在涨。如果政府愿意向 A 支付任意他要的价钱,让他向 B 提供服务,而 B 不用花一分钱?那这套制度当然会产生大量不必要的检查、不必要的成本、不必要的程序、不必要的干预。精神科医生可以一直跟病人聊下去,没有任何改善。
这套制度当然会出问题,而另一套替代方案也有问题。再加上你还有政客,还有那些既得利益者,他们极其富有、极其有权势,疯狂游说。现在一个州立法机构,面对 GDP 中医疗系统占的那么大比例,你想想游说有多厉害。
于是我们就搞出了这些“鲁布·戈德堡”式的复杂系统,各种滥用层出不穷。几乎没有一家正经的制药公司没犯过多种严重的违规行为,实质上等同于向医生行贿,这当然是非法的。它们全干过大蠢事。
器械制造商如果有区别,那就是更糟糕。滥用和荒唐事比比皆是,成本当然一直在涨。而这套制度,按平均水平来说,却是世界历史上最大的成就者。非常复杂。
我认为这个问题会得到解决,我们最终很可能走向类似疗养院那样的制度。你看看医疗领域,正在发生什么?越来越多的做法是:付给某个人一笔固定总价,让他负责所有他们声称需要的东西。
这套制度有一定机会控制成本。现在你去一家顶尖医学院的医院,如果你患了晚期癌症之类明显的东西,离死亡只有一天,接诊医生很可能会给你开个查胆固醇的单子,还要查其他各种乱七八糟的东西,所有账单全寄给政府。
只要激励机制允许这样,人们就会这么做,而且还会为自己的行为找合理化理由。必须在这一点上做更多事,比现在做的更多。我认为趋势会更偏向“打包付费”的模式。我看不出还有什么别的制度能像疗养院那样控制成本。
顺便说一句,你的医生不能在疗养院里走过每一张病床就向政府寄账单。法律不允许那样。但如果你把病人转到医院,你就可以每天走过病床五分钟,然后向政府寄一张 45 美元的账单。
如果激励错了,行为就会错。我保证。不是所有人,但足够比例的人会让你不喜欢这套制度。我想这个话题够难的了,就说到这儿吧。我们能看到它往哪里去。在荷兰,他们有一套制度,同一批人对所有人提供免费医疗,对另一些人则提供管家式医疗服务。实际上运行得相当不错,所以这是一个可能的方向。
问:这里有一个关于美国亚裔人口的问题。我们当中不成比例的人进入了美国顶尖大学,很多人在学校里成绩名列前茅,毕业后有更好的工作,但很少有人能爬到行业的顶层,尤其是在投资领域。您认为这是为什么?在这个国家,有什么因素在阻碍我们?
查理·芒格:不,阻碍你的是算术法则。很奇怪的事情是,恰好 99% 的人处于最底层的 99%。不管怎样,这永远是事实。当然,很少有人能进入前 1%。事实上,只有 1% 的人能进入。
[笑声]
问(惠特尼·蒂尔森):作为伯克希尔的长期股东,我非常高兴看到昨晚宣布的与 3G 公司的最新交易。我理解您可能无法具体评论那笔交易,但您能否谈谈您与亨氏和 3G 合作的经验,以及对未来的期望?这些家伙有什么特别之处,能从相当稳定、增长缓慢的业务中榨出如此非凡的业绩?
查理·芒格:通过极大的纪律、极大的意志和极大的智慧,3G 采用了一种比所有其他人都更极端的零基预算制度。然而,他们一次又一次地做到了这一点,在削减大量成本之后,公司的实力反而变得更加强大或与原来一样强大。当然,这是一个非常有趣的例子。
同样的事情也发生在非营利机构。当大金融危机来临时,我所知道的每一所大学都裁掉了 6%、8%、10% 的员工。我不知道有哪一个案例是大学在裁掉 10% 的人之后运行得更差的。没有。零。成功的机构往往变得臃肿、肥胖、自满。这是人性的本质。
够强硬、够精明、知道不砍错东西、做事公平的人,就有机会收购企业,砍掉那些他们根本不需要的开支。3G 可能是世界上在这方面做得最极端的大型企业。
我实际上认为他们最终很可能也会增加销售额。3G 有趣的地方在于,他们教给我们一些关于现实的东西:那就是,成功的机构里有很多不必要的人……我观察它们就能告诉你们这一点。如果你走进农业部,你会觉得那里的工作人员不够吗?
[笑声]
我认为你会发现很多企业总部都在想:“这些人到底他妈的在干什么?”
至于《每日日报》,我认为它没有人员过剩。我认为它从来没有过。格里,你对这个有什么看法?他观察了这么多年。我认为我们从来没有过很多不必要的成本。
萨尔茨曼先生:我们确实没有很多不必要的成本。曾几何时,《每日日报》自己就有大约 300 名员工。现在,我们有大约 150 名员工。你可以看到,我们根据公司的发展方向,相应减少了开支。比如止赎业务,从大约 2006 年到 2011 年,业务量猛增,我们只增加了 1.5 个人来处理所有额外的工作。当繁荣转向相反方向时,我们裁掉了这 1.5 个人,也许还多裁了一点。所以我们努力在预期趋势方面领先一步,当然也利用技术,因为正是这样我们才能处理那特定的一系列事件。
查理·芒格:但是,通常情况下,如果你超级成功,天上掉金子,每个总裁都会配一个助理。很快,助理又会有助理。人性就是这样运作的。就像癌症一样。在这一点上非常强硬的人可以削减很多成本,但只能从某些类型的公司下手。如果 3G 试图在《每日日报》削减大量成本,他们会死的。
[笑声]
问:指数化投资在过去 30 年增长了很多。您曾经说过,如果有一天人人都指数化,那这套办法就不会太好用。
It’s very hard to fix, because one kind of incentive is to pay so much a month for taking care of the people, and everything you save is yours. That is the system the government uses in dealing with convalescent homes. That’s a great name, the ‘convalescent home’. You convalesce in Heaven; you don’t convalesce in that home. [laughter] It’s tempting to have this euphemistic name. But that creates huge incentives to delay care and keep the money, and the government has strict rules and compliance systems and so forth. If we didn’t have that system, the cost of taking care of old people in convalescent homes would be ten times what it is. It was the only feasible solution. The rest of the world is going in that direction because the costs just keep rising. If the government is going to pay A anything he wants for selling services to B, who doesn’t have to pay anything? Of course that system is going to create a lot of unnecessary tests, unnecessary costs, unnecessary procedures, unnecessary interventions. Psychiatrists that keep talking to the patient forever with no improvement. Of course that system is going to cause problems, and the alternative system also causes problems. Now, add the fact that you’ve got politicians, and add the fact that you’ve got existing players who are enormously rich and powerful, who lobby like crazy. A state legislature now, with a huge percentage of GDP going through the medical system, just imagine what the lobbying is like. So, we get these Rube Goldberg systems, and we get a lot of abuse of various kinds. There’s hardly an ethical drug company that hasn’t created multiple gross abuses, which in substance go into the bribery of doctors, which of course is illegal. They’ve all committed big follies. The device makers, if anything, have been worse. There’s been a lot of abuse and craziness, and the costs, of course, just keep rising. That’s in a system that averaged out as the greatest achiever in the history of the world. It’s very complicated. I think it will get addressed and we probably will end up with systems that are more like we do with the convalescent homes. If you look at medicine, what’s happening is that more and more they’re going to a system where they pay somebody X dollars for everything they say they need. That system has some chance of controlling the cost. If you go into a great medical school hospital today, and you’re within one day of dying of some obvious thing like advanced cancer, the admitting physician is very likely to ask for a test of your cholesterol and every other damn thing, and all the bills go to the government. As long as incentives allow that, people will do it, and they’ll rationalize their behavior. Something has to be done on that, more than is now being done. I think the drift will be more in the direction of block care. I don’t see any other system that would have controlled cost in the convalescent homes. By the way, your doctor can’t just walk by every bed in the convalescent home and send the bill to the government. That’s not allowed by the law. But if you transfer the patient into the hospital, you can walk by the bed five minutes every day, and send a $45 bill to the government. If the incentives are wrong, the behavior will be wrong. I guarantee it. Not by everybody, but by enough of a percentage so that you won’t like the system. I think that’s enough on a subject that’s so difficult. We can see where it’s going. In the Netherlands, they have a system where the same people are giving a free system to everybody and a concierge system to the others. It’s actually working pretty well, so that’s a possibility. Q: A question in regarding to the Asian population in the United States. A disproportionate number of us go to elite universities in the U.S., and a lot of us have upper ranked performance in school and have better jobs after school, but very few of us make it to the top of the field, especially in investing. Why do you think that is the case? What’s working against us in this nation? Mr. Munger: No, what’s working against you are the laws of arithmetic. It’s a strange thing, but exactly 99 percent of the people are at the bottom 99 percent. That will always be true no matter what. Of course very few people will get to the top 1 percent. In fact, only 1 percent gets there. [laughter] Q (Whitney Tilson): As a long time Berkshire shareholder, I was delighted to see the latest deal with the 3G guys announced last night. I understand you may not be able to comment on that specifically, but could you just talk about your experience with Heinz and with 3G and what you hope for the future? What’s so special about these guys that they’re able to squeeze out such extraordinary performance out of fairly stable, slow growth businesses? Mr. Munger: Through enormous discipline, enormous will, and enormous intelligence, 3G has adopted a zero-based budgeting system which is more extreme than anybody else’s. Yet they’ve been able to do it time after time in a way where the place ends up as strong or stronger after they’ve removed a lot of the cost. Of course, that’s a very interesting example. The same thing went on in the nonprofit center. When the great financial crisis came, every university I know of laid off 6 percent, 8 percent, 10 percent of their people. I know of no case where the university didn’t work better after they got rid of the 10 percent. None. Zero. Successful places tend to get bloated, fat, complacent. It’s the nature of human life. Somebody who is tough enough, shrewd enough, who knows enough not to cut the wrong things and to do everything fair, has an opportunity to buy things and cut out expenses they don’t really need. 3G is probably the most extreme large operation in the world doing that. I actually think they will probably end up increasing the sales as well. What’s interesting about 3G is they’re teaching us something about reality: namely, that successful places contain a lot of unnecessary people…I could have told them that by observing them. If you went into the Department of Agriculture, would you have the feeling the thing was understaffed? [laughter] I think you’d find many a corporate headquarters going, “What in the hell are all these people doing?” Now the Daily Journal I do not think is overstaffed. I don’t think it ever has been. Gerry, what’s your comment on that? He’s watched it all these years. I don’t think we’ve had a lot of unnecessary costs ever. Mr. Salzman: We haven’t had a lot of unnecessary costs. At one time, the Daily Journal by itself had approximately 300 employees. Now, we have about 150 employees. You can see that we have taken the direction of the company and reduced expenses accordingly.If you take the foreclosure business, which went from about 2006 to 2011 just like that, we added one and a half people to handle all of that additional work. When the boom went the other direction, we eliminated the one and half plus maybe a little bit more. So we tried to be ahead of the game in terms of anticipating and certainly using technology, because that’s the way we were able to handle that particular sequence of events. Mr. Munger: But, normally, if you’re super successful, if the sky rains gold, everybody’s president gets an assistant. Pretty soon, the assistant has an assistant. It’s just the way human nature works. It’s like cancer. Somebody who’s really tough about that can remove a lot of costs, but only from certain kinds of companies. 3G would perish if it tried to reduce a lot of costs at the Daily Journal. They would starve to death. [laughter] Q: Indexing has grown a lot in the last 30 years. You once said that if we ever get to the point where everybody’s indexing, it’s not going to work very well.
查理·芒格:这件事离发生还远得很,所以我没怎么花时间去想。我认为人性决定了这件事永远不会发生。我很少去想那些几乎注定不会发生的事情。
在现实世界中,指数基金已经取得了很大进展。它大概本来就该取得这么大进展,因为这相当理性。这对很多原本靠选股赚钱的人来说是不利的。那些人大概本来就该遭受这种不利。
但这种事发生并不会让人感到愉快,就像当年韩国快速崛起成为竞争强国、后来中国更是强势崛起时,日本也不会觉得好受一样。不过我认为指数基金是会长期存在的。
如果你停下来想一想,文明人类向来有占卜师、萨满、信仰治疗师,天知道还有什么行当。选股行业里,只有百分之四或五的人超级理性、自律,其余的人就跟信仰治疗师或萨满差不多。
恐怕事实就是这样。好在这些人在外人眼里还保持着建设性、理性的形象,尽管他们实际上就是些信仰治疗师。这至少能维持他们的自尊。
[笑声]
Mr. Munger: It’s far enough away from happening so that I don’t spend much time thinking about it. I think human nature is such that it will never happen. I don’t spend much time thinking about what is almost certain never to happen. In the world as it is, indexing has gained a lot. It probably should have gained a lot, because it’s quite rational. It’s bad for a lot of people who would otherwise be earning money as stock pickers. It probably should have been bad for those people. It doesn’t make it pleasant to have it happen, any more than it helped Japan have a pleasant time when Korea came up so fast as a competitive powerhouse, and even more so when China rose. But I think indexing is here to stay. If you stop to think about it, civilized man has always had soothsayers, shamans, faith healers, and God knows what all. The stock picking industry is four or five percent super rational, disciplined people, and the rest of them are like faith healers or shamans. And that’s just the way it is, I’m afraid. It’s nice that they keep an image of being constructive, sensible people when they’re really would-be faith healers. It keeps their self respect up. [laughter]
提问者:查理,我来自澳大利亚悉尼。我想再谈谈李光耀。新加坡的当前政府和未来政府有多大可能延续这种文化?
查理·芒格:可能性很大。李光耀留下了一个基础,清除了腐败,让进入体制变得困难,同时给予人们很高的薪酬。在新加坡,实际上没什么动力去偷窃。无论是议会成员还是高级政府行政人员,薪酬都非常优厚,而且备受尊敬,等等。
我认为他在新加坡留下的遗产会继续发展得很好。但当然,他在推行这些改革时,中国还处于落后状态。现在新加坡必须与中国竞争。这使得情况变得更难。
提问者:自从他儿子或继任者上台以来,出现了一些变化,比如允许赌场进入新加坡……
查理·芒格:我本会厌恶那一点。经营赌场赚钱太容易了,相比任何正常的商业。它没有库存,就像拥有印钞许可证,人们根本无法抵挡这种诱惑。所以,他组织了一个赌场业务。只允许外国人参与;他不想毁了本地人。我不会与魔鬼同床共枕到那种程度。但李光耀当时已不再真正掌权。如果他还年轻,我愿意相信他不会那么做。
我认为,在美国,我们在各地设立赌场和彩票的做法是不可取的。在一个先进文明中,这不是一个可取的发展,而那些通过引入这种毒药来解决短期问题的该死的政客,应该下到地狱的最底层。这意味着我几乎把他们都判下了地狱,因为他们几乎都这么干了。我几乎找不到一个地方他们不设立新赌场。电视广告里全是人们在赌桌上赢钱的欢乐景象。
(笑声)
Q: Charlie, I’m here from Sydney, Australia. I’d like to just come back to Lee Kuan Yew. What are the chances of that culture continuing with the current government and future governments of Singapore? Mr. Munger: They’re pretty good. Lee Kuan Yew left a base, eliminated the corruption, made it hard to get in, and paid the people a lot. There’s no real incentive to steal in Singapore. Either in Parliament or as an advanced government administrator, you get paid very well, and you’re admired, and so forth. I think what he’s left in Singapore will continue to do very well. But of course, he rose when he was doing it and China wasn’t. Now Singapore has to compete with China. China makes it harder. Q: What about the changes since his son or predecessor came in, for example, allowing casinos to come into Singapore… Mr. Munger: I would have hated that. You make so much money running a casino, compared to any normal human business. There are no inventories, it’s like having license to print money, and people just can’t stand the temptation. So, he organized a casino business. Only foreigners can play; he didn’t want to ruin the locals. I would not have slept with the devil that much. But Yew was no longer really in power when that happened. If he’d still been young, I’d like to think he would not have done that. I do not consider it desirable in the United States that we’ve created casinos and lotteries everywhere. That was not a desirable development in an advanced civilization, and the damn politicians that solve their short‑term problems by bringing in this poison deserve to be in the lowest circle of hell. That means that I’m consigning practically all of them, since practically all of them have done it. I can hardly find a place where they aren’t putting in new casinos. And the advertising on TV is happy people winning at the table. [laughter]
说到虚假广告!你们该看看那些赌桌前试图翻本的赌徒脸上绝望的表情。想象一下靠把这种画面搬上电视谋生的滋味。
问:您如何如此出色地应对失败、挫折和失望?
芒格先生:我遇到的这些事少得多。
(笑声)
其实很简单。极其罕见的孤立案例,远比永无止境的痛苦海洋容易忍受。
问:最近您写到信任的好处……
芒格先生:哦,与值得信任的人打交道,并把其他人统统赶出你的生活,这实在太有用了。这应该被当作教义来传授。但问题在于,在普通学校里,这么做的结果会是立刻把 40% 的人打入遗忘的角落。
没人会再和他们说话,我也不确定一个崇尚平等的文明是否愿意如此残酷。但聪明人都想避开那些纯粹是“鼠毒”的家伙,而这样的人还不少。
问:一个人如何赢得这种信任?
芒格先生:部分靠经验。获得信任最简单的方法就是值得信任,并持续值得信任。
如今,赌场试图通过在电视上展示一个兴高采烈的赢家来赢得信任,但我们中有谁信任赌场吗?当女儿带回一个在赌场信贷部门谋生的男朋友时,我们会说“哦,真好”吗?
(笑声)
顺便说一句,许多标榜自己非常体面的资本主义大机构,不过是披着伪装的赌场。你觉得衍生品交易台是什么?就是披着伪装的赌场。那些人自以为在为经济做贡献、在管理风险,他们让巫医看起来都显得体面了。
Talk about false advertising! You should look at the desperate faces of people trying to get even at the table. Imagine making your living putting those kinds of images on television. Q: How do you deal so well with failures and upsets and disappointments? Mr. Munger: I have so many fewer. [laughter] It’s very simple. An isolated example that’s very rare is much easier to endure than a perfect sea of misery that never ceases. Q: Recently you’ve written about the benefits of trust…. Mr. Munger: Oh, it’s just so useful dealing with people you can trust and getting all the others the hell out of your life. It ought to be taught as a catechism. The trouble with doing it is, in an ordinary school, you’d immediately cast 40 percent of the people into oblivion. Nobody would even talk to them, and I’m not sure an egalitarian civilization is willing to be that tough. But wise people want to avoid other people who are just total rat poison, and there are a lot of them. Q: How does someone earn that trust? Mr. Munger: You do it partly by experience. The simplest way to get trust is to deserve it, and just keep deserving it. Now, the casino has tried to deserve trust by having a happy winner up there on television, but do any of us trust casinos? Would any of us say, oh goody, when the daughter brings home a boyfriend who makes his living in the credit department of a casino? [laughter] And by the way, a lot of our major capitalistic institutions that parade as really respectable, they’re just casinos in drag. What do you think a derivative trading desk is? It’s a casino in drag. People feeling they’re contributing to the economy, and they’re managing risk. They make the witch doctors look good.
问:大约 20 年前,你曾就非营利组织、大学等机构的捐赠基金投资管理做过一次演讲。如今,养老金和捐赠基金行业中有很多人都在追随耶鲁模式,也就是所谓的戴维·斯文森模式。该模式建议将相当比例的资产配置到对冲基金和私募股权。我记得最近在电视节目上听你说过,如果你来管理捐赠基金,你会几乎全部投资于普通股。
芒格先生:我不管理捐赠基金,而且我不喜欢像大型州养老金等地方存在的政治化倾向。管理数十亿美元的资金非常困难。既然戴维
Q: About 20 years ago you gave a talk on the investment management of the endowment funds for nonprofits, colleges, and so on. Many people in the pension and endowment fund business are now following the Yale model, the socalled David Swensen model. This recommends a significant percentage of assets toward hedge funds and private equity. And I think recently I heard you say on a television program that if you were managing endowment funds, you would have it virtually all in common stocks. Mr Munger: I don’t manage endowment funds, and I don’t like the politicization that exists in places like big state pension funds and so forth. It’s very difficult to manage umpteen‑billion dollars. Since David
斯文森在耶鲁大学做得极其成功,当然这种模式就传播开了。任何成功的模式都会通过榜样效应扩散。
另一样扩散开的是杠杆收购模式,在如今这样的世界,那些人的确占有优势。普通股票的长期税前平均收益率是 10% 左右?而他们采用的方式,利用杠杆进行投资,同时还削减了一些不必要的成本,比如 3G 这类公司,再加上一些其他技巧。单靠金融工程,你就有了天然优势。当然,他们在挑选排名前 25% 的杠杆收购基金方面有出色的经验,也为他们的捐赠基金客户带来了很好的回报。这就是大卫·斯文森所做的事情的一部分。
说到对冲基金,沃伦一直以对规模达数万亿美元的对冲基金持怀疑态度而闻名,我认为他是对的。我觉得会有很多非常糟糕的经历。同时也会有一些好的经历。有少数人能够为这些私募股权项目挑选出一些真正精明、表现优异的顾问。耶鲁或哈佛赚来的部分钱,确实是通过精明手段获得的。他们用了杠杆。我自己不会这么做,因为我不喜欢资产负债表上堆满巨额杠杆。我害怕人性。
尽管如此,他们做的很多事情确实相当精明,当然也取得了很高的回报。我不认为这很容易做到。我不认为任何一个普通人能轻易做到的事情,还能取得那么好效果。大卫·斯文森凭借耶鲁的声誉和他自己的声望,挑选了周围最聪明的一些人。
这就像一个琢磨如何让百老汇演出成功的人。成功的事实并不意味着它容易。他做了一件非常了不起的事,当然这个榜样效应就传播开了。我认为对任何人来说,都没有真正轻松的解决方案。任何真正可能奏效的东西,很可能都是艰难的。
Swensen was so extremely successful at Yale, of course the system has spread. Any successful system will spread by example. The other thing that’s spread is the leveraged buyout system, and those people actually have an advantage in a world like the one we have. If common stocks are yielding 10 percent average over time pre‑tax? And you have a different way involving investment in which you use leverage, and you also eliminate some unnecessary costs, like 3G, and a few other tricks. Just with the financial engineering, you have a natural advantage. Of course they’d have wonderful experience in selecting the top 25 percent of the LBO funds, and have served their endowment clients very well. That is part of what people like David Swensen did. When it gets to hedge funds, Warren has been famously skeptical about trillions of dollars in hedge funds, and I think he’s right. I think there’ll be a lot of very bad experience. There will also be some good experience. A few people have been able to select a few advisors for some of these private equity things where they really done well by being shrewder. Some of the money they made at Yale or Harvard was actually made shrewdly. They used leverage. I wouldn’t have done it myself, because I don’t like balance sheets swelling with vast amounts of leverage. I’m afraid of human nature. Nonetheless, a lot of what they did was quite shrewd, and of course they did have large returns. I don’t think it’s easy to do. I don’t think anything any ordinary person can do easily is likely to work that well. What David Swensen did, with the aid of Yale’s reputation and his own, was select some of the smartest people around. It was a like a guy who figured on how to make successful plays on Broadway. The fact it succeeded doesn’t mean it was easy. He did something very remarkable and of course the example spreads. I don’t think there’s any real easy solution for anybody. Anything that’s really likely to work, is likely to be hard.
问:您如何看待像 Kickstarter 这样的新型互联网创业平台?
查理·芒格:我对这些新型互联网平台一无所知。
(笑声)
问:好的。对于那些早期创业者、年轻的时代变革者,按照传统思维方式,您会给出什么建议?
查理·芒格:对于管理一个基于计算机科学的大型网络这个新世界,我一无所知。这一切都是在我的习惯已经定型之后才出现和发展的,要我回头再去学一套完全不同的玩法,我没那个兴趣。我过去那一套已经做得足够好了,所以我并不觉得遗憾。我就让它过去了。
我希望所有擅长此事的人一切顺利。我对他们的感觉,就像看一个人走钢丝横越尼亚加拉大瀑布一样——那是人家的谋生之道,但我自己没兴趣去试。
(笑声)
我不是要去跟 Google 的佩奇和布林比高低,对于那些想发财的年轻人,我也没有什么建议可以给他们。基本上,我认为想快速致富的欲望相当危险。我自己的系统是慢慢变富。这样能把一个相当愉快的过程拉长,所以我向所有人推荐我的系统。毕竟,如果你快速致富了,接下来能做的一切无非就是被自己的员工、游艇之类的东西洗劫一空。而如果你慢慢变富,你就能在一生中享受这个过程。
(笑声)
我给你的建议是:去采用“慢慢变富”系统。
问:我很想听听您对长期防御性的看法。在您投资过的数千家公司中,有没有提炼出什么主题?
Q: What do you think of new Internet platforms for starting companies such as Kickstarter? Mr. Munger: I don’t know anything about new Internet platforms. [laughter] Q. All right. What advice would you give for early entrepreneurs, young game changers, in the old way of thinking? Mr. Munger: I don’t know anything about the new world of managing a big network based on computer science. It all came up and developed after I was convicted in my habits, to then go back and learn to play a different game. What I was doing worked well enough, so I didn’t feel deprived. I let it pass. I wish everybody well who’s good at it. I feel the same way about a guy that walks across the tight rope over Niagara Falls. It’s his way of making a living, but I’m not inclined to try it. [laughter] I’m not trying to outdo Page and Brin at Google, and I don’t have any advice for young people who want to get rich. Basically, I think the desire to get rich fast is pretty dangerous. My own system was to get rich slow. It protracts a rather pleasant process, so I recommend my system to everybody. After all, if you get rich fast all you can do is be robbed by your own employees and your yacht and so forth. Whereas if you get rich slow you amuse yourself over a lifetime. [laughter] My advice to you is to go to the “get rich slow” system. Q: I’d be curious about your thoughts on longterm defensibility. Any themes you’ve distilled from the thousands of companies that you invested in?
查理·芒格:我们倾向于寻找轻松的决策,但发现要找到这样的决策非常困难,只不过我们刚好找到了足够应付自己问题的几个。我没有什么系统。既然我自己都勉强够用,自然没有大量盈余分给大众。我不是藏着掖着,是我真没有。
(笑声)
问:过去您提到过不想耗尽美国的碳氢化合物。现在全球似乎石油泛滥。能否谈谈您对全球石油市场的最新看法?
查理·芒格:你会惊讶地发现,我的想法一点都没变。
(笑声)
我认为美国的碳氢化合物储备是我们拥有的最珍贵的东西之一,其珍贵程度丝毫不亚于爱荷华州的表层土。就像我不愿意因为伊朗或其他地方愿意出钱,就把爱荷华州的全部表层土出口给他们一样,我很珍惜我们地下蕴藏的碳氢化合物。现在的潮流是追求能源独立,恨不得越快用完越好。我认为作为国家政策,这简直是疯了。我肯定属于那顶多百分之一的少数派,但当然我是对的。
(笑声)
我们找不到这些碳氢化合物的替代品。我们用它们制造化肥。它们是化工原料。没有碳氢化合物,我们的飞机就飞不了。我们不应该把它们全部用光。这是有限的资源。想当然地认为存在替代品,那是完全不安全的。
长期来看,这些资源的价值一直在上涨。我们真是够幸运,没有更早学会水力压裂技术把它们全采出来,否则我们早就干完了。但其他所有人都抱着一种想法:只要是自由市场里发生的事,哪怕是用斧头杀人,那也是合理的。
Mr. Munger: We tend to look for easy decisions, and we find it very hard to find easy decisions, but we’ve just found enough barely to handle our own problems. I don’t have a system. Since I barely have enough for myself, I do not have a vast surplus to give to the multitudes. I’m not holding back on you, I just don’t have them. [laughter] Q: In the past you mentioned how you didn’t want to use up the U.S.’s hydrocarbons. Now it’s seems like the world is awash in oil. Could give us your updated thoughts on the global oil market. Mr. Munger: You’ll be surprised to know that I’ve not changed my mind. [laughter] I think the hydrocarbon reserves in the United States are one of the most precious things we have, every bit as precious as the topsoil of Iowa. Just as I don’t want to export all the topsoil in Iowa to Iran or someplace, just because they are willing to give us some money, I love the hydrocarbon reserves we have in the ground. The fashion is to be independent and to use them up as fast as we can. I think that’s insanity as a national policy. I must in a minority of one percent tops, but of course I’m right. [laughter] We have no substitute for those hydrocarbons. We use them to make our fertilizer. It’s chemical feedstock. We are not going to be able to run our airplanes without hydrocarbons. We do not want to use that all up. It’s finite. It’s not at all safe to assume there’s a substitute. They have a long record over time of appreciating in value. We’re just damn lucky we didn’t learn fracking earlier to remove them all or we would have done it. But everybody else just has the idea that anything that happens in the free market is all right even if it’s an ax‑murder.
[笑声]
他们认为出口碳氢化合物是合理的。我认为这是一个极其愚蠢的政策,但如果你有一小块油田租约,你当然想出口,但我认为这对国家完全没有好处。我很高兴我们还有很多没开采的碳氢化合物。
你为什么不为此感到高兴呢?如果我们现在像日本一样,100% 依赖进口碳氢化合物,我们会多高兴?我们会感到暴露在危险之中。我们完全有理由感到暴露和危险。
如果完全没有碳氢化合物,如果依赖别人,我们还会觉得自己是世界上的一个强国,可以阻止别人不当行为吗?不,我认为这种想法之所以如此非主流,并不意味着它是错的。只是说明别人思考得不够好。
[笑声]
问:展望未来,你认为哪些意外或未被充分认识的变化最为重要,哪些行业会最不愉快?
查理·芒格:我认为对年轻人未来 50 年影响最大的一个问题是:我们极有可能不会没有一些重大灾难。我认为我们经历了一段非常有利的时期,但我不认为花时间担心你无法改变的事情有什么建设性。只要你在管理资金时认识到可怕的事情会发生,那么余生中你可以做一个愚蠢的乐观主义者。
本杰明·富兰克林说过一句非常明智的话。他说:“结婚前睁大双眼,结婚后睁一只眼闭一只眼。”
[笑声]
[laughter] They think exporting hydrocarbons makes sense. I think it’s a ridiculously stupid policy, but if you have a little oil lease, of course you want to export, but I don’t think it’s good for the country at all. I love the fact we have a lot of hydrocarbons left that we haven’t exploited. Why wouldn’t you be pleased to have it? How happy would we all be if we were importing 100 percent of our hydrocarbons right now, like Japan? We’d feel exposed and in danger. We’d be right to feel exposed and in danger. Will we feel like some big power in the world that might prevent other people from misbehaving if we have no hydrocarbons at all, if we are dependent on others? No, I think the fact that that idea is so unconventional doesn’t mean it’s wrong. It just means other people don’t think very well. [laughter] Q: Going forward, what unexpected or under‑appreciated changes changes do you think are most relevant, and which industries do you think will be most unhappy? Mr. Munger: I think the one that affects the next 50 years for young people: it’s very unlikely that we won’t have some major catastrophes. I think we’ve had a very favorable period, but I don’t think it’s terribly constructive to spend your time worrying about things you can’t fix. As long as when you are managing your money, you recognize that a terrible thing is going to happen, in the rest of your life you can be a foolish optimist. Benjamin Franklin said a very wise thing. He said, “You keep your eyes wide open before a marriage and half shut thereafter.” [laughter]
我觉得有些灾难是你无法修复的。富兰克林说得对,睁一只眼闭一只眼。我想我们大多数人本来也就是这么做的。不过我认为,这是最有可能发生的变化。
我看不出我们如何才能回到那个没有受过教育的穷人也能迅速向上攀升的时代。只要我们还搞自由贸易和全球竞争——而我又不想停止与拥有核武器的大国中国搞自由贸易——中国和美国就必须和睦相处。每个国家如果不和对方好好相处,那都是脑子坏了。我认为贸易有助于我们和睦相处。
如果贸易伤害了某些人,生活总是会在某些方面伤害一些人、帮助另一些人。人们应该更愿意坦然承受生活带来的打击。这才是男子汉气概——接受生活本来的样子。而不是整天牢骚满腹,试图通过抱怨来解决问题。
问:如今市场上有件比较奇怪的事,就是某些政府债券出现了持续的负利率。我想知道您对此有何看法。
查理·芒格:这基本上是我这辈子头一回见到。我记得最便宜的利率是 1.5%。这当然让所有经济学家都大吃一惊。也让那些创建日本寿险业的人大吃一惊,他们基本上都破产了,因为他们曾经承诺支付 3% 的利率。我觉得所有人都被这件事惊到了,包括那些后来装作自己早就知道的经济学专业人士。但实际上,几乎所有人都惊呆了。
当利率降到那么低的时候,我就惊呆了;当欧洲利率变成负值——我真的是惊呆了。在座的有多少人曾预测到欧洲会出现负利率?请举手。
(没人举手)
这就是我的感受。我怎么可能对一件我从未想过、而且看起来如此不可能的事情成为专家呢?这是一个新领域……
I think those are catastrophes that you can’t fix. Franklin is right, keep your eyes half shut. I think that’s what most of us do anyway. Though I think that’s the change that’s most likely. I don’t see how we bring back that age where an uneducated man can march ahead rapidly. As long as we have free trade and worldwide competition, and I don’t want to stop having free trade with a big nuclear power like China. China and the United States have to get along. Each country would be out of its mind not to get along with the other. I think trade helps us to get along. If it hurts some people, life is always going hurt some people in some ways and help others. There should be more willingness to take the blows of life as they fall. That’s what manhood is, taking life as it falls. Not whining all the time and trying to fix it by whining. Q: One of the more peculiar things that we see in the markets today is the existence of persistent negative interest rates on certain government bonds. I’m wondering if you just have any thoughts around that. Mr. Munger: This has basically never happened before in my whole life. I can remember 1½ percent rates. It certainly surprised all the economists. It surprised the people who created the life insurance industry in Japan, who basically all went broke because they guaranteed to pay a 3% interest rate. I think everybody’s been surprised by it, including all the people who are in the economics profession who kind of pretend they knew it all along. But I think practically everybody was flabbergasted. I was flabbergasted when they went low; when they went negative in Europe – I’m really flabbergasted. How many in this room would have predicted negative interest rates in Europe? Raise your hands. [No hands go up] That’s exactly the way I feel. How can I be an expert in something I never even thought about that seems so unlikely. It’s new territory….
问:在经历了如此长期的低利率环境后,利率显然已经在改变人们的风险行为,您目前对哪些具体的意外后果感到担忧?
查理·芒格:我认为如此怪异且重要的事情很可能带来后果。那些自信满满认为自己知道后果的人——他们当初谁也没预料到这种情况——现在却断言接下来会发生什么?又是那些巫医。
你问我接下来会发生什么?见鬼,我也不知道接下来会发生什么。我觉得这一切都非常诡异。如果利率降到零,全世界所有政府都在疯狂印钱,而物价却在下跌——我当然感到困惑。任何一个聪明人,如果他不觉得困惑,那说明他对形势的理解还很不到位。
如果你觉得这事令人费解,说明你的大脑运转正常。
Q: Are there any specific unintended consequences that you are concerned about now that we’ve had such a prolonged period of low interest rates, which are clearly altering folks’ risk behavior? Mr. Munger: I think something so strange and so important is likely to have consequences. I think it’s highly likely that the people who confidently think they know the consequences – none of whom predicted this – now they know what’s going to happen next? Again, the witch doctors. You ask me what’s going to happen? Hell, I don’t know what’s going to happen. I regard it all as very weird. If interest rates go to zero and all the governments in the world print money like crazy and prices go down – of course I’m confused. Anybody who is intelligent who is not confused doesn’t understand the situation very well. If you find it puzzling, your brain is working correctly.
提问:今年是伯克希尔·哈撒韦年报的第五十年。你和沃伦各自写了一封信,彼此之前都没读过。我想听听你对沃伦那封信的看法。
查理·芒格:我认为沃伦的信非常、非常有价值。我尤其欣赏他批评银行的那部分。比如联合大企业(conglomerate)运动的膨胀,那本质上就是一种靠财务会计玩出来的传销游戏。会计师们全都为之背书。他们根本就不该为这种并购热潮背书的——不断收购低质量盈利,却让报表上的利润节节攀升。那是一个邪恶的体系,一种邪恶的赚钱方式,以一个邪恶的方式来运营会计行业,去为那些结果背书。没有其他人敢这么直言。当沃伦在这样重要的话题上发声时,我非常钦佩他,他说得完全正确。但指望有人会因此真正重视他的话、从而改变什么,我觉得几率很小。
对你们这些懂行的人来说,比如说,你们当中有多少人赞成国际电话电报公司(IT&T)那种联合大企业的玩法——它们的会计师为其盈利报告背书?如果觉得那很了不起,请举手。
(无人举手)
答案就是,那并不了不起。我很欣赏沃伦的做法。没有别人在干这事。还有哪个首席执行官在说,美国金融家及其会计师长期以来的行为严重失当?没有。我觉得有人能站出来这样说,是很有用的。他说得完全正确。糟糕的是,当年所有人都随波逐流,包括投资经理们。而且,这种事至今仍在发生。
不管你想象得有多糟糕,总有人能做出更烂的事。第一次就不道德,第二次也不会变得更好。人们还对此趋之若鹜。我对此嗤之以鼻。这才是唯一正确的态度。
Q: This is the fiftieth year for the Berkshire Hathaway report. You and Warren each wrote a letter that neither had read before. I’d just like your comments on what you thought of Warren’s. Mr. Munger: I think Warren’s letter was very, very useful. I particularly liked it where he was criticizing banks. Take the growth of the conglomerate movement which is sort of a chain letter game that people played with financial accounting. The accountants all blessed it. The accountants never should have blessed the conglomerate craze, with constantly buying low quality earnings and making the earnings go up. It was an evil system and an evil way to make money. It was an evil way to run an accounting profession to bless the outcomes. Nobody else was talking that way. I tend to admire Warren when he gets off on important subjects like that, where he’s totally right. The chances that anybody will pay a lot of attention to him in a way that changes anything is, I think, quite small. For a few of the cognoscenti, like you people, how many of you approve of the way, say, IT&T played the conglomerate game where their accountants blessed their earnings reports? Raise your hand if you thought it was wonderful. [no hands go up] The answer is it wasn’t wonderful. I liked what Warren did. Nobody else is doing it. What other CEOs are saying that American financiers and their accountants grossly misbehaved for a long time? Nobody. I think it’s useful when somebody does that. And he’s totally right. It was awful, the fact that everybody went along with it, including the investment managers. It’s still happening. However bad you think it is, somebody actually comes by and does it worse. It wasn’t moral the first time and the second outcome is not better. People are enthusiastic about it. I’m holding my nose. That’s the only correct response.
问:您认为,哪种护城河最不常被谈论,或者最容易被误解?
查理·芒格:人人都巴不得有一条被误解的护城河。你这是在座最贪婪的家伙。
(笑声)
你无非是想知道,有没有一条你懂但别人不懂的护城河。多朴素的愿望。
(笑声)
你打算让一个 91 岁的老头来教你?这让我想起一个我最喜欢的故事。一个年轻人找到莫扎特说:“我想在您的指导下创作交响乐。”
莫扎特说:“你这么年轻,还不够格写交响乐。”
年轻人说:“可您 10 岁就开始写了,我都 21 岁了。”
莫扎特说:“没错,但我可没到处问别人该怎么写。”
(掌声)
问:Journal Technologies 要解决客户的哪些问题?
查理·芒格:每个政府部门都需要各种尚未实现的自动化。这很复杂。系统要与其它系统交互。软件越来越重要。这非常困难。政府有自己的一套办事方式,那是由历史、地方法规等等塑造的。这中间没有简单的事。像微软这样的公司,在收购 Great Plains Software 公司时,进入了一个和我们有点类似的行业。他们取得了一定程度的成功。就连微软,当他们收购一个经过充分验证的软件系统——跟我们在做的事多少有些类似——也很难取得超越“适度成功”的结果。这绝不容易。但确是非常必要。这是一个巨大的市场。当然,正确的想法是真正为客户服务。总会有人赢的。
问:我很想知道,您是否认为今天电视行业发生的事情与报业曾经经历的有什么相似之处?
查理·芒格:报业当然很容易分析。它经历了一场技术上的革命性变化。最致命的一点就是把分类广告从报纸里抽走,因为那是个纯金矿。我认为这无药可救。
我们的报纸曾经是坚不可摧的地方权力中心,也是国家政治体系中非常具有建设性的部分。当然,它们后来被极大地削弱了。这对国家不是好事。它是偶然发生的。我们失去了所有这些可以保持绝对正直的地方权力中心,因为它们曾经拥有坚不可摧的财务地位。
电视不一样。我有点惊讶,旧的广播电视网能在互联网和有线电视的新世界里生存得这么好。我不确定自己对这个情况有足够深刻的理解,能预测未来 25 年会发生什么。
最近有件事,我在中国看到的。伯克希尔的年报发布时,在中国引起了巨大的轰动。中国很感兴趣。在中文看来我们很儒家。他们喜欢富有的老人。
(笑声)
我们努力表现得有智慧。这是中国体制的调性。伯克希尔的报告在中国各地都引起热议。突然之间,热度消失了。
发生了什么?一个中国女人,自己掏了 15 万美元,花了一年时间,制作了一部纪录片。她在网上放了这部片子。
是一部电影。她获得了 2 亿次观看量。她做的是关于雾霾的长篇东西,讲中国人如何因此死亡,以及洛杉矶如何通过减少燃煤和燃油产生的硫来解决雾霾问题。做得非常棒。
这个女人正在改变中国的政策。她不在报纸上露脸。她不在电视台出镜。没人听说过她。
就靠一部该死的纪录片。这是个新世界。这是一种新的权力来源。我不知道这样一个世界会走向何方。我只知道它不一样了。这很重要。在这个案例中,它极具建设性。
中国让北京人因为空气质量糟糕而早死十年,这错得离谱。既不道德又愚蠢:这不是好组合。中国会解决这个问题。这个女人,靠一部电影,确实在帮忙。
世界变化得如此之快。很难知道谁会拥有权力,会发生什么。我对很多媒体也是这种感觉。当拥有印刷机的人控制报纸,拥有网络分配权的人控制广播时,我对情况还清楚一些。
弗兰克·墨菲 [1929 年创立马菲无线] 更喜欢广播全是黑白图像、只有三个网络的时代。他那时有一个庞大而稳固的地位。他可不欢迎那么多新竞争。
我不明白他们怎么能同时通过空间传输那么多信息。
你我在一个收音机信号会互相干扰的世界里长大。正因如此,才不能有太多频道。现在,一个女人能通过天知道什么途径,让一整部电影获得 2 亿次点击。那些比特数据是怎么做到互不干扰的?
(笑声)
这非常复杂。我不懂。我只懂花生糖。
(笑声)
Q: What do you think is the least talked about or most misunderstood moat around a business ? Mr. Munger: Everybody would really like to have a misunderstood moat. You’re the greediest fellow that’s spoken. [laughter] All you want to know is if I have a moat that you can understand that other people don’t. A modest wish. [laughter] You’re going to ask a 91yearold man how to do it? Reminds me of one of my favorite stories. A young man comes to Mozart and says, “With your help I want to compose symphonies.” Mozart says, “You’re too young to be composing symphonies.” He says, “Look, you were doing symphonies when you were 10 years of age. I’m 21.” Mozart says, “Yes, but I wasn’t running around asking other people how to do it.” [applause] Q: What are the customers’ problems that Journal Technologies are trying to solve? Mr. Munger: Every government department needs all kind of automation it doesn’t have. It’s complicated. The systems interact with other systems. Software is more and more important. It’s very difficult. The governments have their own way of doing businesses that are created by history, local legislation, and so forth. There’s nothing simple about it. A company like Microsoft got in a business somewhat similar to ours when they bought Great Plains Software, Inc. They’ve succeeded with it moderately. Even Microsoft finds it difficult to do anything but have moderate success when they buy some thoroughly proven software system — more or less similar to what we’re trying to do. There’s nothing easy about it. But it’s very necessary. It’s a huge market. The right idea, of course, is to really serve the customer correctly. Somebody’s going to win. Q: I’m curious whether or not you see any parallels between what’s happening today in television and what’s happened to the newspaper industry. Mr. Munger: The newspaper industry, of course, is easy. It had a revolutionary change in technology. The worst single thing was to take the classified ads out of the paper, because that was the total goldmine. I don’t think that’s fixable. Our newspapers were impregnable local powerhouses, and very constructive parts of the political system of the country. Of course, they’ve gradually been enormously weakened. That was not good for the country. It happened by accident. We lost all these local powerhouses that could have total integrity, because they had impregnable financial positions. Television is different. I’ve been a little surprised how well the old broadcast networks have survived the new world of the Internet and cable television. I’m not sure I understand the situation well enough to predict what’s going to happen over the next 25 years. Something happened recently, which I watched in China. When the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report came out, it created a great buzz in China. China is interested. We look Confucian to the Chinese. They like elderly rich men. [laughter] We’re trying to be wise. That’s the Chinese system. There was a great buzz of the Berkshire report all through China. All of a sudden, the buzz stopped. What happened? One woman in China took $150,000 of her own money and a year of her life and created a documentary film. She ran the thing over the Internet. It was a film. She got 200 million views. What she did was a long thing about smog, how the people were dying in China, and how Los Angeles fixed its smog problem by taking sulfur out of the air when people burn coal and oil and so on. Terribly well done. This one woman is changing the policy of China. She isn’t on the newspapers. She isn’t on the television stations. Nobody had ever heard of her. One damn documentary. That is a new world. That’s a new source of power. I don’t know where a world like that is going to end up. I just know it’s different. It’s important. In this case, it was very constructive. China has been dead wrong to allow people to die 10 years early in Beijing because the air is so lousy. Immoral and stupid: not a good combination. China’s going to fix it. This woman is actually helping, with one film. The world changes like that so rapidly. It’s hard to know who’s going to have the power and what’s going to happen. That’s the way I feel about a lot of the media. I understood it better when the people who had the printing press controlled the newspaper, and the people who had the network allocation controlled the broadcasting. Frank Murphy [of Murphy Radio, founded 1929] liked it better when broadcasting was all black and white, and there were only three networks. He had a big, strong position. He did not welcome all the new competition. I do not understand how they get so much information through space at the same time. You and I grow up in a world where these radio stations interfered with one another. That’s why you couldn’t have very many channels. Now, one woman can put 200 million hits on a whole damn movie through God knows what. How do the bits not conflict with one another? [laughter] It’s very complicated. I don’t understand it. I understand peanut brittle. [laughter]
查理·芒格:我一生中最让我惊讶的事情是——有那么多高智商的人做出极其愚蠢的事情。这种事到处都在发生。但令人震惊的是,这些愚蠢行为居然能极端到那种程度,而做出这些行为的人又如此才华横溢。我认为人类大脑天生就容易在很多方面出错。这让世界变得非常危险。
Q: What has surprised you the most about human nature? Mr. Munger: The one thing that has surprised me all my life is how many people with high IQs do massively stupid things. It happens everywhere. But it is surprising how extreme the stupidity is and how talented the people are who do them. I think the human mind was almost made to malfunction in a lot of different ways. It makes the world a very dangerous place.
你信任的人,比如你的内科医生、你的主治医师、你的投资经理,不管是什么人,都有可能彻底发疯。给你举个例子:
我见过一些医生,他们觉得对自己有利的治疗方案对你也一定有利。但是,在加利福尼亚州的雷丁市,有几位医生冒了出来,他们给每个来咨询的人都做开胸手术。他们真的说服了自己,认为每个人都需要开胸手术。一颗正常的心脏在他们眼里就是“夺命杀手”。如果换成碳纤维、尼龙或者别的什么材料,病人反而好得多。
他们做了大量的开胸手术。顺便说一句,他们的手术效果棒极了。没有人比根本不需要手术的人更能在开胸手术中存活下来了。
(笑声)
我看人总是往最坏处想。但他们居然认为自己是在做正确的事,真的在帮助病人。这让我很惊讶。
这简直不可思议。怎么有人能这样行事?怎么还能年复一年地持续下去?其他医院还派高管去那里学习,想把医院也办成这样。
(笑声)
他们既赚了钱,又获得了地位,还展示了技术。但这太过分了,你会觉得这种事不可能发生。就算发生了,你也以为早该被别人发现。可它持续了好多年。而且他们的老板还试图让旗下其他医院也复制同样的成果。真是不可思议。
问:他们被起诉了吗?
芒格先生:当然被起诉了。
(笑声)
The man whom you trust, he’s your physician, your doctor, you investment manager, what have you, can go plum crazy. To give you an example: I’m used to doctors who think a procedure that’s good for them is good for you. But in Redding, California, a couple of doctors rose who gave everybody who consulted them open heart surgery. They really convinced themselves that everybody needed open heart surgery. A normal heart was a widow maker. If they replaced it with carbon, nylon, or something, they were way better off. They did massive amounts of open heart surgery. By the way, their surgical results were wonderful. Nobody survives open heart surgery better than the guy who doesn’t need it at all. [laughter] I expect the worst in human nature. But they thought they were doing the right thing and really helping the patients. That surprised me. It seems impossible. How could anybody behave that way? How could it go on for year after year? Hospitals were sending their executives up there to learn how to run their hospitals this way. [laughter] They were making money and achieving status and demonstrating skill. But it’s so extreme, you think that couldn’t happen. If it did happen, you think it would be identified by other people early. It ran on for years. And their bosses were trying to get their other hospitals to have the same results. Amazing. Q: Were they sued? Mr. Munger: Of course. [laughter]
他们吊销了那些医生的执照,但没人坐牢。你可能会以为他们会下到地狱的最底层,但他们没有。他们只是丢了执照。
问:什么时候您会相信,软件行业会因为流程和系统的改进,使律师行业的计费工时减少?
芒格:我觉得你别指望这事很快发生。
(笑声)
我确实认为存在一种趋势,要限制那种雇佣大量年轻人、让他们每天工作 13 个小时来增加计费工时的做法。这不仅仅是律师行业的问题,咨询公司也这么干,会计师也这么干,很多人都在这么干。
这是人性在作祟。但我确实认为,在法律行业,你正在看到反对的声音冒出来。有些客户坚持要求采用不同的制度。这已经走得太远了。
问:在中国,有人在争论中国是否应该学习新加坡的管理模式,因为这种管理模式可能只适用于像新加坡这样的小地方、一个城市国家,而不适用于像中国这样的大国。
芒格:中国从新加坡学来的并不是它的整个管理体系。它学的是经济管理模式中的商业部分。它采用了企业私有制。在那之前,中国政府几乎拥有所有东西。
他们借鉴了李光耀在新加坡的部分做法。中国那种威权主义和自由企业的奇特组合,对它的经济产出创造了奇迹。李光耀的例子起到了很大作用。但他并不认为,适合一个小城市国家的东西,就一定适合一个完全不同的、落后的泱泱大国。
They did take away the doctors’ licenses, but nobody went to jail. You’d think they’d go the lowest circle of hell, but they didn’t. They lost their licenses. Q: When might you believe the software industry will catch up with the law profession in the form of reduced billable hours due to the processes and systems? Mr. Munger: I wouldn’t hold your breath. [laughter] I do think there is some trend to limit the idea of hiring a lot of young people and have them all go 13 hours and so on, trying to increase the billable hours. That is not just the law profession. The consultants do it. The accountants do it. Lots of people do it. It’s human nature operating. But I do think in law you’re seeing the elements of rebellion. Some clients are insisting on different systems. It’s gone too far. Q: In China there are debates about if China should learn Singapore’s management style, because this type of management style might work in a tiny place like Singapore, a citystate, but not in a big country like China. Mr. Munger: What China adopted from Singapore was not its total management system. It adopted its system of an economic management business. It had private ownership of business. Before that, the Chinese government had owned practically everything. They took part of what Lee Kuan Yew had done in Singapore. China’s weird combination of authoritarianism and free enterprise has worked wonders for its economic output. Lee Kuan Yew’s example had a lot to do with it. But he didn’t think necessarily that was right for a small City State, was right for a whole backward country of a different nation.
没有人觉得那套方案是完美的,但我确实认为,中国的反腐败举措完全是照着李光耀的剧本来的。中国过去腐败问题很严重。
中国国内生产总值(GDP)连续几十年保持每年 8%、9% 或 10% 的增长。它们并非尽善尽美,但比起起点,已经取得了巨大的成就。
真正有趣的是,一个人对这样的结果能产生多么大的影响。他最初是一名左翼劳工领袖。这简直不可思议。我希望这样的事情能更频繁地发生。
[笑声]
问:您会用哪些方法来量化一项投资中适当的债务水平——无论是房地产、私募股权,还是上市公司?
查理·芒格:适当的债务水平因情况而异。我没有任何通用的规则。总的来说,如果你的投资具有不确定性,比如说,经营一家庞大复杂的企业,那么拥有大量额外的财富和流动性,好处就非常多。如果你掌握着资本主义的权力,你就是一重巨大的社会安全网。我们难道希望它们都把杠杆加到极限,好让我们能最大限度地回购股票吗?它们都是大型社会企业,理应保有安全储备。
认为它们都应该把杠杆加到极限来取悦一帮激进投资者的想法,就相当于为了节省钢材而把桥梁上的所有安全余量都去掉。那是个愚蠢的想法。
问:您能谈谈指数化投资不断增长的市场份额,以及这将对股东与他们所拥有公司之间的关系产生什么影响吗?
查理·芒格:随着时间的推移,这很可能会产生重大影响,因为现在你得到了一大批永久股东。管理指数基金的人,实际上现在就是永久股东。他们不能卖出股票。是的,当然,他们会逐渐开始更多地动用这种权力。这种新的权力会被明智地使用吗?我表示怀疑。
[笑声]
问:您能谈谈当今市场的整体价格水平吗?如果您所有的钱都在一个免税账户里,您会倾向于增加现金比例吗?
查理·芒格:你问的是一个我生活中并不存在的立场。
[笑声]
如果你说,“查理,如果你一直是个牙医,你会怎么行医?”我可能无法给出像我深思熟虑过的问题那样好的回答。我很满足于几乎 100% 持有股票,但我确实认为我持有的股票平均而言比别人的好。
因此,我的决定更容易些。如果我也像其他人一样必须持有普通的股票,那我该怎么做,我反而不太确定。我小心翼翼地避免了那种命运。
[笑声]
几十年来我都能做到这一点。现在,优势已经不如从前了,但一个老人能拥有任何一点优势,就已经很幸运了。
[笑声]
问:考虑到谷歌和苹果这样的公司正处于技术中心,您认为它们拥有持久的护城河吗?
查理·芒格:我不是科技公司护城河方面的专家。我大体上不持有它们的原因是,我不明白那些护城河能否持续。我确实认为谷歌是一家非常了不起的公司。如果有人拿枪指着我的头说,“查理,你必须买一家大型科技公司,”我可能会选择谷歌。
Nobody thinks that it’s his exact solution, but I do think the anti corruption part of China was right out of Lee Kuan Yew’s book. China had a lot of corruption. China increased its GDP at 8, 9, or 10 percent per annum for decades. They weren’t perfect, but it was a lot of achievement from where they started. What’s really interesting is how much influence on this outcome one human being had. He started as a leftist labor leader. It’s perfectly amazing. I wish it could happen more often. [laughter] Q: What methods would you use to quantify the appropriate amount of debt in an investment, whether it be real estate, private equity, or a public corporation? Mr. Munger: The appropriate amount of debt varies with the circumstances. I don’t have any general rule. Generally speaking, if you’re investment is uncertain, say, as running a big complicated enterprise, there’s a lot to be said for having a lot of extra wealth and liquidity. You’re a huge social safety net if you’re a controller of capitalist power. Do we want them all to be leveraged to the gills so we can buy back the maximum amount of stock? They are big social enterprises that should have reserves of safety. The idea that they should all leverage themselves to the gills to please a bunch of activists would be like taking all the safety margin out of bridges on the theory we’d save steel. That’s a dumb idea. Q: Could you speak about the growing market share of indexing and the effect that will have on the relationship of shareholders to the companies that they own. Mr. Munger: It’s likely to have a significant effect over time, because now you get a bunch of permanent owners. The people who run the index funds are now, in effect, permanent owners. They can’t sell. Yes, of course, they will drift into using more of that power. Will it be used intelligently, the new power? I doubt it. [laughter] Q: Can you speak to the general level of market prices today? If you had all your money in a tax deferred account, would you be tempted to increase the level of cash? Mr. Munger: You’re asking me for a position I don’t occupy in life. [laughter] If you said, “Charlie, how would you practice dentistry if you’ve been a dentist?” I may not be able to give you as good an answer as I could about something I thought about a lot. I’m content owning virtually 100 percent stocks, but I really think that I own stocks that are better than other people’s on average. Therefore, my decision is easier. What I would have to do if I had to own average stocks like everybody else, I’m not so sure. I’ve carefully avoided that fate. [laughter] I’ve been able to do it for a lot of decades. Now, the margins are not what they used to be, but an old man is lucky to have any advantage at all. [laughter] Q: Do you think companies like Google and Apple have long lasting moats, considering that they are right at the center of technology? Mr. Munger: I am not an expert on the moats of technology companies. The reason, by and large, I don’t own them is because I do not understand whether or not there are moats that will last or not. I do think Google is a very remarkable company. If you put a gun to my head, said, “Charlie, you’ve got to buy a big technology company,” I might choose Google.
他们确实招揽了聪明头脑。我认为,他们网罗了最顶尖的人才。他们确实非常狂热。他们无疑拥有稳固的市场地位。我了解他们护城河的价值与其他公司相比如何吗?答案是不了解。你问错人了。顺便说一句,任何敢给你明确答案的人,很可能是在胡扯。
(笑声)
问:丹麦最近被评为世界上最幸福的国家。对此您有什么看法?
查理·芒格:这可能确实是真的!
(笑声)
那是一个没有多少热带疾病的北欧国家。拥有庞大的社会保障网络。它由单一民族构成,因此没有不同群体带来的治理难题。它地处文明国家环绕的优越位置,所以无论他们自己是否发明新东西,都能过得相当不错。
地理位置非常有利。如果你身处一个你高度认同的小群体,你会更愿意互相扶持。人类思维就是这样运作的。如果通过微笑时间等生理指标衡量幸福感,那么丹麦的幸福程度很可能超过几乎任何地方。我猜这是真的。但这并不意味着我想住在丹麦。
(笑声)
我选择接受世界本来的样子,在我住的地方生活。我更喜欢这样。
问:我是一名工程师。我们怎样才能防止工程系本科生涌向金融行业?
查理·芒格:这个问题的答案是:“我不知道。”我不认为所有聪明头脑都涌入金融业是件好事。就像金融市场上充斥着那么多伪装成投资产品的赌博赌场一样,这并非好事。我认为当前的发展趋势并不健康。如果我是全能的皇帝来统治世界,我会修改法律,从而改变结果。我会改变激励机制。至于有人会关注我关于法律的观点,这种可能性是零。
问:大约二十年前在西科金融股东大会上,有人问您:“您认为二十世纪最重要的发明是什么?”您当时说:“空调。”然后您谈到,在空调出现之前,美国有大片地区简直就是热带。如果今天再问,您认为过去一百年最重要的发明是什么?
查理·芒格:很难不说是互联网。我们已经有了良好的交通、飞机、火车、空调、有效的药物等等。而互联网的出现,加上即时通讯的手机、小型便携电脑、iPad 等等,让中国那位原本毫无权力的女性得以改变整个政府的局面。它带来了其他剧烈的变革,包括对投资的破坏性影响。我会说互联网非常重要。你不觉得每个人都这么想吗?
问:伯克希尔在中美能源上投入了大量资金。您如何看待这项投资的前景?
查理·芒格:非常好。
(笑声)
我认为它会非常成功。再说一次,我们努力对监管机构、客户、工程、安全等方方面面做正确的事。我认为它对伯克希尔会非常有利。我认为它对中美能源的客户也会非常有利。
我希望自己对每一件事都能像对这件事一样乐观。我认为这几乎是无需动脑就能做出的决策。
问:到底是什么让特利丹公司的亨利·辛格尔顿区别于其他创建多元化企业集团的人?为什么您和沃伦尊重他?
查理·芒格:我们尊重亨利·辛格尔顿的原因很简单:他是个天才。亨利·辛格尔顿每次参加 aptitude 测试,不是满分 800 分就是提前交卷。
(笑声)
他是杰出的数学天才,曾是普特南研究员。即使上了年纪,他也能蒙眼下棋,水平接近大师级。他拥有令人敬畏的智慧,绝对属于最顶尖的千分之一。
他是个极端理性的分析者。当然,他创建多元化企业集团,是因为当时法律允许这么做。他采用的方法和所有人一样,但做得更好,并赚了很多钱。当这种模式不再受欢迎时,股价大幅下跌,他便以低于其价值的价格全部买回。
当然,他去世时是一位非常富有的人。在金融这类事情上,他是个完全理性的人。我觉得亨利·辛格尔顿身上有一点很有意思,对教育很有启示:同时观察亨利和沃伦如何投资和运作,我们有两个绝佳的机会来审视人性。
亨利非常理性。他在某些方面和伯克希尔很相似。亨利从未发行过股票期权。他和沃伦之间有一些共通之处,那是逻辑推导出的必然结果。
我觉得有趣的是,沃伦在投资赚钱方面比亨利聪明得多。亨利天生聪明得多,但沃伦思考投资的时间要长得多。作为投资者,沃伦完全超越了亨利,尽管亨利是天才,而沃伦不过是接近天才而已。
(笑声)
这是我最后一个问题,因为已经到了董事开会的时间。此外,即使对一群投资迷来说,你们大概也听够了。
(掌声)
They certainly hire brains. They’re getting the best brains, I think, of anybody. They’re certainly fanatic. They certainly have an entrenched position. Do I understand the value of their moat compared to the value of everybody else’s? The answer is no. You’re asking the wrong person. By the way, anybody who does give you the answer is probably full of you know what. [laughter] Q: Denmark was recently declared the most happy country in the world. Any thoughts on that? Mr. Munger: It may be true! [laughter] You’ve got a Nordic nation without a lot of tropical diseases. You’ve got a big social safety net. It’s monoethnic, so they don’t have the tensions of different groups making the place hard to govern. They’re situated and surrounded by advanced civilizations, so they can live pretty well, whether they invent anything new themselves or not. It’s very favorably located. If you are in a small group with which you closely identify, you don’t mind supporting one another more. It’s just the way the human mind works. It may well be that if you measure happiness physiologically by time spent smiling, and so forth, then Denmark may well be happier than almost any place else. I suspect it’s true. That does not make me want to live in Denmark. [laughter] I’ll take the world the way it is, where I live. I prefer it. Q: I’m an engineer. How do we keep engineering undergraduates from running off into finance? Mr. Munger: The answer to that is, “I don’t know.” I don’t think it’s good having all the brains go into finance. Just like it’s not good to have so many gambling casinos in disguise in the financial markets. I don’t think that the current development is good. If I were running the world as an omnipotent emperor, I would change the laws, so the outcome changed. I would change the incentives. The chances of anybody paying attention to my ideas about the laws are zero. Q: At the Westco meeting about twenty years ago, you were asked the question, “What do you consider the most important invention of the twentieth century?” You said, “Air conditioning.” You then talked about huge swathes of the United States that really were tropics before air conditioning. What would you say today has been the most significant invention of the last hundred years? Mr. Munger: It’s hard not to say the Internet. We had the good transportation, the airplanes, the trains, the air conditioning, the good pharmaceuticals and so on. Having the Internet, the instant cellphone, the little portable computers, the iPads and so on, that’s what made this one woman in China who didn’t have any power before change a whole governmental outcome. It’s having other dramatic changes, including destructive changes on investments. I would say the Internet is very important. Don’t you think everybody feels that way? Q: Berkshire has put a lot of money behind MidAmerican Energy. How do you see that playing out? Mr. Munger: Very well. [laughter] I think it will work out very well. Again, we’re trying to do the right thing by the regulators, the customers, the engineering, the safety, you name it. I think it’ll work very well for Berkshire. I think it will work very well for the customers of MidAmerican Energy. I wish I was that optimistic about everything, as I am about that one. I regard that as almost a nobrainer. Q: What separated Teledyne’s Henry Singleton from the other people who developed conglomerates, and why did you and Warren respect him? Mr. Munger: We respect Henry Singleton for a very simple reason: He was a genius. Henry Singleton never took an aptitude test where he didn’t score an 800 and leave early. [laughter] He was a major mathematical genius, a Putman Fellow. Even when he was an old man, he could play chess blindfolded, at just below the Grand Master level. He had an awesome intellect, well into the top 1/1,000 of one percent. This was an extreme analytic. Of course, he did create a conglomerate because it was legally allowed at the time. He did it the way everybody else was doing it, he did it better, and he made a lot of money. When they ran out of favor, the stock went way down, he bought it all back for less than it was worth. Of course, he died a very wealthy man. He was a totally rational human being in things like finance. What I found interesting about Henry Singleton, which has interesting educational implications, is that in watching both Henry and Warren invest and operate at the same time, we had two great windows of opportunity to examine human nature. Henry was very rational. He was quite similar to Berkshire in some ways. Henry never issued a stock option. He had certain commonalities with Warren that were just logical outcomes. What was interesting to me was how much smarter Warren was at investing money than Henry. Henry was born a lot smarter, but Warren had thought about investments a lot longer. Warren just ran rings around Henry as an investor even though Henry was a genius, and Warren was a mere almostgenius. [laughter] That is my last question because we reached the time when the directors meet, and besides, even for a group of addicts, you’ve probably had all you can take. [applause]