Wesco金融2002年度股东大会——查理·芒格讲话纪要

2002 · 会议 · 原文约 3850 词
译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文,也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。
打开来源正文

2002 年 Wesco 股东大会笔记,2002 年 5 月 8 日

惠特尼·蒂尔森整理

关于伯克希尔·哈撒韦和 Wesco 的评论

伯克希尔在再保险领域的竞争优势

“我确实认为我们在再保险方面有一些优势,因为人们相信我们愿意并且有能力赔付,所以这不是一种大宗商品。我认为我们有一些特殊才能。话虽如此,我认为依赖特殊才能是危险的——更好的做法是拥有大量拥有不受监管定价的垄断型企业。但这不是今天的世界。我们通过运用自己的才能赚了钱,今后也会继续这样做。”

“我很高兴我们有保险业务,虽然这不是一个稳赚不赔的买卖,我得提醒你们。我们必须足够聪明才能让这一切奏效。”

伯克希尔保险业务的前景

“总体结果会是,我们做得相当不错——意思是在(行业)排名前 10%——因为我们做的事与众不同。在新泽西州,当他们设定费率上限时,我们说要退出市场,我们确实退出了。我们是全美国为数不多的清算衍生品账册的公司之一。我们本希望能把它卖掉,但没成。我们愿意做一些让人不愉快的事。”

“总的来说,我们对保险业务持温和乐观态度。” [这是芒格式的说话方式,实际意思是“我对保险业务相当看好。”]

伯克希尔的未来前景

“这是一个有限且竞争极其激烈的世界。所有大型资本聚集体最终都会发现,增长变得比登天还难,因此回报率也会不断降低。”

“就我个人而言,我认为伯克希尔会比现在更大更强。但股票在今天的价格上能否成为一笔好投资,是另一个问题。我们唯一一直保证的事情就是,未来会比过去糟糕得多。”

伯克希尔收购的企业类型

“我们做的很多事情都相当基本。砖块自巴比伦时代就有了。它们的消费是规律且可预测的。我们的砖厂主导了所在区域。”

“我们倾向于购买那些——很多情况下——我们不完全清楚未来会怎样,但结果会是体面的生意。”

伯克希尔会投资 Level 3 吗?

“我们和其他人有同样的难题:很难预测(Level 3 的)未来。我们会投资它吗?当然,这是可能的。毕竟,我们在英国有电力分销业务,在爱荷华州有发电和配电业务。我们有在情况真正糟糕、其他人都避之不及的时候涉足其中的历史。”

Notes from the 2002 Wesco annual meeting, 5/8/02 By Whitney Tilson COMMENTS ON BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY AND WESCO Berkshire's competitive advantages in reinsurance "I do think we get some advantage in reinsurance because people trust our willingness and ability to pay, so it's not a commodity. I think we have some special talents. That being said, I think it's dangerous to rely on special talents -- it's better to own lots of monopolistic businesses with unregulated prices. But that's not the world today. We have made money exercising our talents and will continue to do so." "I'm glad we have insurance, though it's not a no-brainer, I'm warning you. We have to be smart to make this work." Outlook for Berkshire's insurance operations "The overall result is that we're going to do pretty well -- meaning in the top 10% [of the industry] -- because we do different things. In New Jersey, when they capped rates, we said we were going to withdraw from the market, and we did. We're one of the only corporations in America to run off its derivative book. We had hoped to sell it, but that didn't work out. We're willing to do some unpleasant things." "Generally speaking, we're mildly optimistic about our insurance operations." [This is Mungerspeak for "I'm quite enthusiastic about our insurance operations."] Berkshire's future outlook "It's a finite and very competitive world. All large aggregations of capital eventually find it hell on earth to grow and thus find a lower rate of return." "Personally, I think Berkshire will be a lot bigger and stronger than it is. Whether the stock will be a good investment from today's price is another question. The one thing we've always guaranteed is that the future will be a lot worse than the past." Types of businesses Berkshire buys "A lot of things we do are fairly basic. Bricks have been around since Babylon. Their consumption is regular and predictable. Our brickyards dominate their region." "We tend to buy things -- a lot of things -- where we don't know exactly what will happen, but the outcome will be decent." Would Berkshire ever invest in Level 3? "We have the same problem as everyone else: it's very hard to predict the future [of Level 3]. Could we invest in it? Sure, it's conceivable. After all, we're in the electricity distribution business in the UK and the generating and distribution business in Iowa. We have a history when things are really horrible of wading in when no-one else will."

伯克希尔的文化

“伯克希尔的文化可以持续很长很长时间,因为我们把权力下放给了配得上它的人。”

“对我们很多股东来说,我们的股票就是他们拥有的全部资产,我们对此心知肚明。我们的[保守主义]文化根深蒂固。”

股价

“我们不喜欢自己的股票[伯克希尔和西科]涨得太高——只应该涨得名副其实——所以我们倾向于给它们泼点名副其实的冷水。比如,在伯克希尔 B 股招股说明书里,我们说过不建议任何人买我们的股票。人们还是买了,但我们努力降温过。”

回购

“要是你们大家对我们看低一些就好了,那就会有更多机会回购西科和伯克希尔的股票。”

债券

“伯克希尔通过两种方式持有债券:

  1. 通过我们的保险业务。主要是抵押贷款支持证券,还有一些政府债券和少量垃圾债。
  2. 通过我们的融资子公司。一些有趣的小玩意儿。我管它叫‘沃伦·巴菲特杂项账户’。只要他还在做,我就没问题。我们赚了几亿美元,风险很小,也没费什么周折。”

对西科的评价

“西科的保险业务还不错,但规模不大。”

“过去一两年,西科的生意有了一些起色。”

伯克希尔的保险会计处理

“总的来说,我们认为自己比大多数保险公司更保守。尽管如此,在某些时期,我们发现准备金并不充足。但随着时间的推移,我们不仅会努力变得更保守,我们确实会做到。”

伯克希尔会进入标普 500 指数吗?

“如果伯克希尔由机构持有,它早就进入标普 500 指数了。但伯克希尔忠诚的股东会导致如果它被纳入标普 500 指数[因为所有指数基金都必须买入该股票],股价会飙升,那会令人难堪。迟早会进去,但不是明天。”

Berkshire's culture "Berkshire's culture could go on for a long, long time because we've decentralized power to people who deserve it." "For many of our shareholders, our stock is all they own, and we're acutely aware of that. Our culture [of conservatism] runs pretty deep." Share price "We don't like our stocks [Berkshire and Wesco] to get too high -- only deservedly high -- so we tend to throw deserved bits of cold water on them. For example, in the prospectus for the Berkshire B shares, we said we wouldn't advise anyone to buy our stock. People bought it anyway, but we tried to dampen it." Share buybacks "If only you people thought a lot less of us, there would be more opportunity to buy back Wesco and Berkshire shares." Bonds "Berkshire owns bonds in two ways: 1) Through our insurance operations. Mainly mortgage backed, with some government and a little junk. 2) Through our finance subsidiary. Interesting little things. I call it the 'miscellaneous Warren Buffett account.' As long as he's doing it, I'm OK with it. We've made a few hundred million [dollars] with little risk or fuss." Comments on Wesco "Wesco's insurance operations are decent, but small." "Wesco's business has come up some in the past year or two." Berkshire's insurance accounting "Generally speaking, we think we're more conservative than most insurers. Nevertheless, in certain periods, we've discovered that our reserves were not adequate. But over time, we'll not only try to be more conservative, we will be." Will Berkshire be in the S&P 500? "If Berkshire were owned by institutions, it would already be in the S&P 500. But Berkshire's loyal shareholders would cause a price spike if it were added to the S&P 500 [because of all the index funds that would have to buy the stock], which would be an embarrassment. Sooner or later it will be in, but not tomorrow."

沃伦·巴菲特投资哲学的形成史

“沃伦·巴菲特是在本·格雷厄姆膝下开始学习投资的,格雷厄姆就像拿着盖革计数器在 30 年代的废墟上扫描。那时候股票便宜得离谱。格雷厄姆买入的公司平均质量很平庸,但股价一反弹,就能赚 20%。”

“沃伦在这个体系下训练并赚到了钱,所以他接受新观念比较慢。我学到的道理是,赚钱最好的办法是买入那些能在长期内获得高资本回报率的伟大企业。”

“我们沿用了格雷厄姆的基本思想,但现在我们试图寻找的是被低估的伟大公司。这个概念对本·格雷厄姆来说是陌生的。”

“即使没有本·格雷厄姆,沃伦也会成长为一位伟大的投资者。他比格雷厄姆更出色。即使从未遇到任何人,沃伦也会很了不起。他能在任何需要高智商、定量能力和冒险精神的领域出类拔萃。不过,芭蕾舞他肯定跳不好。”

巴菲特、芒格与辛普森之间的差异

“差异不大。”

(卢·辛普森负责管理 GEICO 的投资组合,当时也在现场,芒格请他回答这个问题。他说:)“你俩和我的主要区别在于规模。我们有 25 亿美元,而你们是很多倍,所以我们在寻找小机会时更有优势。如果找到一个 2 亿到 2.5 亿美元的仓位,我们可以投进去,并能产生影响。”

芒格:“这确实有影响。也许卢就是更聪明。他的回报率(过去几年)一直比我们好。”

对伯克希尔·哈撒韦持股的评论

通用再保险

“通用再保险在准备金上判断错误——美国几乎每家保险公司都这样——所以我们吃了大亏。”

“通用再保险一直想做得对(准备金计提正确)。损失悄悄蔓延到了所有人身上。你可能会想,在伯克希尔旗下,他们一贯很好的准备金计提会变得更保守,符合伯克希尔的文化。”

“在沃伦的层面,我们是通过通用再保险的首席执行官来运作的,他必须微调文化。那是一种不错的文化,但市场环境这么艰难,我们需要稍微改进一下。”

芒格在收购通用再保险中的角色

“那件事在我听说之前就已经推进得很远了。以后这种情况还会越来越多。”

History of Buffett's investing philosophy "Warren Buffett came to investing at the knee of Ben Graham, who ran a Geiger counter over the detritus of the 1930s. Stocks were ridiculously cheap. Graham bought companies that were quite mediocre on average, but made 20% when their stock bounced." "Warren trained under this system and made money, so he was slower to come to the idea I learned that the best way to make money is to buy great businesses that earn high returns on capital over long periods of time." "We're applying Graham's basic ideas, but now we're trying to find undervalued GREAT companies. That concept was foreign to Ben Graham." "Warren would have morphed into a great investor without Ben Graham. He is a greater investor than Graham was. Warren would have been great had he never met anyone else. He would have excelled at any field that required a high IQ, quantitative skills and risk taking. He wouldn't have done well at ballet though." Differences between Buffett, Munger and Simpson "Not very much." [Lou Simpson, who manages GEICO's investment portfolio, was in the audience, so Munger asked him to address this question. He said:] "The big difference between you and Warren and my situation is the difference is size. We're $2.5 billion, whereas you and Warren are many times more, so we have an advantage in looking at smaller situations. If we find a $200-$250 million position, we can invest and make a difference." Munger: "It does make a difference. Maybe Lou is just smarter. His returns have been better [over the past few years]." COMMENTS ON BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY HOLDINGS Gen Re "Gen Re misguessed its reserves -- almost every insurer in America did -- which is why we took a big loss." "Gen Re always tried to do it right [reserve properly]. Losses crept up on everybody. You'd think that under Berkshire, their reserving, which was always very good, would be more conservative, consistent with Berkshire's culture." "At Warren's level, we operate through the CEO of Gen Re, who has to tinker with the culture. It's a good culture, but with the world so tough, we need to improve it a bit." Munger's role in the purchase of Gen Re "That thing was very far along before I ever heard of it. There will be more of this as the years go on."

Finova

“Finova 是一个收尾型业务。它在 9/11 事件之后的收尾效果不如之前好,但最终会顺利解决。我们会赚到几亿美元。这在伯克希尔的历史上只是一个小插曲。”

美国运通

“美国运通确实有一些事情没处理好。我对我们了解到的美国运通的情况满意吗?满意。我们从未指望他们像我们处理投资那样处理自己的投资。但我们都是成熟的大人了。我们对美国运通并不感到沮丧。”

USG

“(我们对)USG(的投资)显然进展得不太好。问题不只是石棉——石膏板市场也崩了。我们也忽略了这一点。我能说什么呢?这让我想起一个故事:有个男人,他有妻子和三个孩子,却和一个刚认识的女人搞出了私生子。当被问及为什么这么做时,他说:‘当时觉得这是个好主意。’”

投资建议

成为好投资者

“如果你要成为一名投资者,你总会做一些你并不具备全部必要经验的投资。但如果你持续努力,随着时间推移让自己变得稍微好一点,你就会开始做一些几乎确定会有好结果的投资。关键在于纪律、努力工作和实践。这就像打高尔夫——你必须下苦功。”

投资思维模型

“对于不同的公司,你需要不同的核查清单和不同的思维模型。我永远无法简单地说:‘这里有三个要点。’你必须自己去推导,把它深深烙印在你的脑子里,伴随你余生。”

能力圈

“有很多东西我们会跳过。我们有三个篮子:进、出和太难。很多东西都进了‘太难’的篮子。如果这是伯克希尔子公司的问题,我们没法跳过,但如果我们没拥有它,我们就直接跳过。”

“我不知道人们如何应对(试图搞清楚所有事情)。”

“我们必须有特殊的洞察力,否则就把它放进‘太难’的篮子。你们所有人都必须找到一个特殊的能力领域,并专注于它。”

抄底买入

“过去几十年,我们的通常做法是,如果我们喜欢的东西(的股票)下跌了,我们就越买越多。有时候事情发生了变化,你意识到自己错了,就退出来。但如果你对自己的判断建立了正确的信心,那就继续买入,利用好股价的下跌。”

Finova "Finova is a run-off situation. It's not going to run off as well as it would have before 9/11 happened, but it will work out fine. We'll make hundreds of millions. It's a blip in the history of Berkshire." American Express "American Express has had some things that didn't work out. Am I satisfied by what we know at American Express? Yes. We never expected them to handle their investments the way we'd handle ours. But we're big boys. We're not depressed about American Express." USG "[Our investment in] USG obviously hasn't worked out very well. It wasn't just asbestos -- the market for wallboard went to hell. We missed that too. What can I say? It reminds me of a story about a man who had a wife and three kids. He conceived an illegitimate child with a woman he'd just met. When asked why he did it, he said, 'It seemed like a good idea at the time.'" INVESTMENT ADVICE Becoming a good investor "If you're going to be an investor, you're going to make some investments where you don't have all the experience you need. But if you keep trying to get a little better over time, you'll start to make investments that are virtually certain to have a good outcome. The keys are discipline, hard work and practice. It's like playing golf -- you have to work on it." Investing mental models "You need a different checklist and different mental models for different companies. I can never make it easy by saying, 'Here are three things.' You have to derive it yourself to ingrain it in your head for the rest of your life." Circle of competence "There are a lot of things we pass on. We have three baskets: in, out and too tough. A lot of stuff goes into the 'too tough' basket. We can't do that if it's a problem at a Berkshire subsidiary company, but if we don't own it, we just pass." "I don't know how people cope [trying to figure everything out]." "We have to have a special insight, or we'll put it in the 'too tough' basket. All of you have to look for a special area of competency and focus on that." Buying into stock declines "Over many decades, our usual practice is that if [the stock of] something we like goes down, we buy more and more. Sometimes something happens, you realize you're wrong, and you get out. But if you develop correct confidence in your judgment, buy more and take advantage of stock prices."

对各类公司、行业及其他经济问题的评论

房利美

“我们持有那只股票很多很多年,当然也赚了很多钱。”

“沃伦和我对于巨额杠杆会感到紧张,除非我们百分之百确信风险不会渗入企业文化。”

“这让我想起一个例子:有个人运营一家公司,开除了他的顶级销售员。那人问他,‘为什么开除我?我是你的顶级销售员。’他回答说,‘你让我紧张。我是个有钱的老头了。我为什么要紧张呢?’”

劳合社

“目前,劳合社的情况大为改善。劳合社一度变成了一个污水池。道德变得很糟糕,来钱容易,三小时的午餐配上酒水……文化变得相当恶劣,堕落成巨大的承保亏损。”

“现在好多了,但还没完全改革。结果如何,还有待观察。”

穆迪

“伯克希尔购买的大部分债券,都是沃伦挑选的。他不需要穆迪,也不看他们的评级。但他相信穆迪提供了有用的服务。”

董事的影响力(或缺乏影响力)

“乔·罗森菲尔德——一个了不起的人,也是很好的朋友——曾被邀请加入西北贝尔的董事会。他说,那是他们最后一次请教他。这很典型。有时候,当董事会拥有专业知识时,CEO 会征求意见,但他们通常自己做决定,并动用手下人员。平均来看,CEO 决定自己想做什么,董事会说‘同意’。”

“(在沃伦和我任职的董事会上)我们的影响力很小。偶尔会有例外,如果有人非常尊重我们的话。”

金融机构的风险

“金融机构的迷人之处在于,通往地狱的道路有很多条。你可以把信贷推得太远,做一笔愚蠢的收购,过度利用杠杆——能让你垮台的,远不止衍生品一项。”

消费信贷

“我心目中一个国家的增长模式是二战后的德国——没有消费信贷,但高速增长。”

“今天的美国,我们年复一年地大力推动消费信贷。偶尔会有像 Providian 那样的爆雷。我们会不会发生一场全国性的大爆雷?会的。这种事往往能自我纠正。”

COMMENTS ON VARIOUS COMPANIES, INDUSTRIES AND OTHER ECONOMIC MATTERS Freddie Mac "We held that stock for a great many years, and of course made a great deal of money." "Warren and I get nervous with vast amounts of leverage unless we're 100% confident that risktaking won't creep into the culture." "It reminds me of a guy running a company who fired his top producer. The guy asked him, 'Why are you firing me? I'm your top producer.' To which he responded, 'You make me nervous. I'm a rich old man. Why should I be nervous?" Lloyd's "At present, Lloyd's is greatly improved. Lloyd's had become a sewer. Ethics became terrible, easy money, three-hour lunches with drinks... The culture got quite bad and it degenerated into huge underwriting losses." "It's way better now, but not totally reformed. The jury's still out." Moody's "Most of the bonds Berkshire buys, Warren picks. He doesn't need Moody's, nor does he look at their rating. But he believes Moody's provides a useful service." Influence of board members (or lack thereof) "Joe Rosenfeld -- a marvelous human being and great friend -- was asked to be on the board of Northwestern Bell. He said it was the last thing they ever asked him. That's typical. Sometimes a CEO asks for advise when a board has expertise, but they generally make their own decisions and use their staff. Averaged out, the CEO decides what he wants to do and the board says yes." "We have very little influence [on the boards Warren and I serve on]. There's an occasional exception if someone has very high regard for us." Risks of financial institutions "The beauty of a financial institution is that there are a lot of ways to go to hell in a bucket. You can push credit too far, do a dumb acquisition, leverage yourself excessively -- it's not just derivatives [that can bring about your downfall]." Consumer credit "My method for a nation growing is Germany after World War II -- no consumer credit, but high growth." "In the U.S. today, we push consumer credit harder year after year. There are occasional blowups like Providian. Could we have a big national blow-up? Yes. It tends to be self-correcting."

“一旦你习惯了每年靠刺激消费信贷增长 5%,当达到极限时你该怎么办?”

“我不喜欢这样。我不喜欢想广告让人们更多地使用信用卡。但这并不违法,也许世界因此而变得更好。可这不是我的性情。”

财富效应

“财富效应是指因股价上涨而刺激消费支出增加的程度。它当然存在,但程度有多大?不久前我做过一次演讲,我说财富效应比经济学家认为的更大。我现在仍然这么说。”

“财富效应是经济假设的驱动因素之一,但不是唯一因素。政府在两年内从连续多年盈余转变为每年增加 10% 的支出。此外,利率下降导致房产价值上升,让人们感觉更富有了。所以,存在抵消效应。”

“看看博尔斯海姆珠宝。当 Level 3(奥马哈一只广泛持有的股票)暴跌 97% 时,对博尔斯海姆的销售产生了巨大影响。奥马哈待售的房屋也多了起来。”

“很多人试图只看一个因素来预测宏观经济因素。你需要看所有因素。”

意外风险

“很多事情的发生是你无法预测的。谁能预料到反恐战争、过去两年政府支出每年增加 10% 等等?”

“我们努力经营公司,确保没有回到起点的可能。我认为我们对此(回到起点的风险)的认识要深刻得多,但这并不能保证它不会发生在我们身上。在我们的保险承保中,我们加入了更多限制风险的条款,也更加关注总体风险。”

预期意外(日本案例)

“沃伦说过,40 年里会发生很多令人惊讶的事情。”

“日本有趣的一点是,每家寿险公司基本上都资不抵债,因为它们承诺支付 3%。谁能想到这会导到资不抵债,但利率降到了零并持续了好几年。它们试图投资股票,却得到了负回报。你能想象 13 年股票负回报、利率低于 1% 的情况吗?”

“这种事在美国就绝对不可能发生吗?我不这么认为。奇怪的事情总会发生。”

对会计师和投行的批评

华尔街的道德(或者说缺乏道德)

“总体来说,华尔街的道德在我有生之年一直不够完美。过去经纪人会把非常保守的公用事业股以高溢价卖给老太太们。”

"Once you get used to growing each year by goosing consumer credit 5%, what do you do when you've reached the limit?" "I don't like it. I don't like thinking up ads to get people to use their credit card more. But it's not illegal and maybe the world's even better for it. It's not my temperament though." The wealth effect "The wealth effect is the extent to which consumer spending is goosed upward due to increases in stock prices. Of course it exists, but to what extent? I made a speech a while back in which I said that the wealth effect is greater than economists believe. I still say this." "The wealth effect is one driver of economic assumption, but not the only one. The government in two years has gone from back-to-back surpluses to increasing spending 10% each year. Also, the decline in interest rates has led to an increase in housing values, which makes people feel richer. So, there are countervailing effects." "Look at Borsheim's. When Level 3 [a widely held stock in Omaha] crashed 97%, there was a big effect [on Borsheim's sales]. There are also more homes for sale [in Omaha]." "So many people try to predict macroeconomic factors by looking at only one factor. You need to look at all the factors." Risk of the unexpected "A lot of things happen that you can't predict. Who would have predicted the war on terrorism, government spending increasing 10% each of the past two years, etc.?" "We try to run our companies so there's no chance of going back to Go. I think we're way more aware of that possibility [the risk of going back to Go], but that's no guarantee [that it can't happen to us]. In our insurance underwriting, we put in more clauses [limiting our risk] and are more aware of aggregate risks." Expect the unexpected (Japan example) "Warren has said that over 40 years, a lot of surprising things will happen." "What's interesting in Japan is that every life insurance company is essentially insolvent because they promised to pay 3%. Who'd have thought that this could lead to insolvency, but interest rates went to zero and stayed there for years. They tried to invest in equities, but got negative returns. Can you imagine 13 years with negative equity returns and interest rates below 1%?" "Is it inconceivable that it could ever happen here? I don't think so. Strange things happen." CRITIQUES OF ACCOUNTANTS AND INVESTMENT BANKERS Wall Street's ethics (or lack thereof) "Generally speaking, ethics on Wall Street have been imperfect throughout my lifetime. In the old days, brokers would sell old ladies very conservative utility stocks with a big mark-up."

“当年的承保标准要好得多。现在,只要能卖得出去的东西,都有人卖。这太糟糕了。”

“在梅隆家族时代的第一波士顿,有些事情他们是绝对不会做的。”

“这从来都不容易。某个家伙需要给孩子交学费,到了月底,假设他的业绩指标还没完成,正好苏西的账户来了。你瞧,交易就来了。”

“华尔街的道德水准,平均来说,顶多也就是个平庸水平。”

“我认为,你在生活中不会因为在圣母玛利亚面前没有通奸而得到太多赞誉。”

“充当托儿的分析师一直都有,但在互联网泡沫时期达到了极致,因为其中牵扯的利益太大了。华尔街的公司靠每股两美分的股票交易佣金赚不到钱,但做承销交易却能赚得盆满钵满。”

“如果你设定了奖励 A 的激励机制,却又说想要 B 的结果,那你就是在让人精神分裂。”

“这并不意味着华尔街没有一些非常出色、非常聪明的人——确实有,就像在座的各位一样——但我认识的每一个人,为了做正确的事,都得和自己的公司作斗争。”

对律师事务所和会计师事务所的批评

“我认为法律行业的问题很多。很多律所接了他们不该接的业务。会计行业的问题更是有过之而无不及。所有顶尖的律所和会计所都有他们本不该拥有的客户。所有领先的律所和会计所在拒绝或开除坏客户方面都不够果断。”

“太多的律所和会计所被卷入了见不得光的事情。比如,那些附带风险代理费和保密条款的避税方案,简直就是彻头彻尾的败类。麻烦是会传染的——它们会蔓延。”

“律师们过去一直逍遥法外。现在的默认规则是,用任何手段为任何人辩护,并且不被起诉。不过这种状况正在改变。现在,人们变得更小心了。这种退缩的趋势是好事。”

“我对为坏人辩护、帮助他们作恶,从来都没有丝毫兴趣。但普遍的观点是,约翰尼·科克伦做得很棒。”

“人们说,辩护律师第二快乐的日子,是为一个无辜的人赢得无罪判决。”

衍生品

“最初,有利率互换。如果你做的是无担保的裸交易,你可能损失或赚取巨额金钱。但交易员们赚不到足够的钱,所以他们采用了逐日盯市的会计方法。所有人都屈服了,采用了宽松的(会计)标准,并创造出与理论模型挂钩的奇异衍生品。结果,那些被会计师认可的各种利润,其实根本不是真正赚到的。当你想要把这些钱拿到手时,它却化掉了。它从来就不存在。”

“会计师们为此写了 800 页的规则。”

“只要你有一丁点儿贪心,你就能做安然公司做过的事。即使你不贪心,你的员工仍然会(因为衍生品而让你陷入麻烦)。”

“(衍生品会计)真是令人作呕。那是一个污水池,如果我是对的,迟早会有人为此付出惨痛代价。你们所有人都得做好准备,应对衍生品账簿爆雷的那一天。对我来说,这(衍生品会计)有多荒谬是一直显而易见的。”

“对于像伯克希尔这样已经很有钱的人来说,涉足这个业务是个疯狂的想法。对大型银行来说,这也是个疯狂的业务。”

[关于这个话题,以下是 2002 年 5 月 20 日《商业周刊》的一段摘录:

“批评人士称,财务会计准则委员会(FASB)在制定《财务会计准则第 133 号》(简称 FAS 133)时,其吹毛求疵的程度达到了最低谷。该准则规范金融衍生品和套期保值的会计处理,于 1992 年启动,其基础是一个简单的原则:期货、互换、期权和其他衍生品应按其市场价值入账。但每个季度对衍生品重新估值,会给公司盈利带来巨大且难以预测的波动。为了避免这种情况,FASB 为套期保值交易、原材料远期合约、保险合同以及其他特殊情况设立了例外条款。FASB 成员约翰·M·‘尼尔’·福斯特说:‘这些例外条款是合理的,但一旦你走上这条路,就很难停下来。’其结果是:FAS 133 及其支持文件重达 800 页——而且这还是一份正在进行中的工作。”]

关于教育与正确思维方式的评论

欺骗自己

“不欺骗自己的这种精神,是你可能拥有的最好的精神之一。它之所以强大,是因为它如此罕见。”

思维模型

“一般来说,你需要具备合适的思维模型,并有一份检查清单去逐一核对。如果有 2 到 3 项不在检查清单上,而你又是飞行员的话,你可能会坠机。”

“(这种思维方式)是显而易见的。但是,你们当中有多少人在大学里被教导过这样思考?”

[在大约 200 人的房间里,有一个人举起了手。当被问及他上的是哪所大学时,他说:“麻省理工学院。”]

芒格哼了一声,说:“这不是事先排练好的。这凸显了科学的重要性。如果你有孩子或孙子孙女,让他们去上科学课。你能想象阿默斯特学院诗歌系主任会说出什么样的胡言乱语吗?”

"Underwriting standards were better then. Now, what can be sold, will be sold. It's terrible." "With First Boston, under the Mellons, there are just some things they wouldn't do." "It's always hard. Some guy needs to pay his kid's tuition and at the end of the month, let's say he's behind on his quota and there's Suzi's account. Lo and behold, there's some activity." "The ethics of Wall Street will always average out to mediocre at best." "I don't think you get a lot of credit in life for not committing adultery with the Virgin Mary." "Analysts as shills were always present, but it reached extremes in the dot-com boom because there was so much money at stake. Wall Street firms can't make money trading stocks for two cents per share, but can make so much money doing deals." "If you set up incentives to reward A, and then say you want B, you'll give people schizophrenia." "This doesn't mean there aren't some wonderful, intelligent people on Wall Street -- there are, like those in this room -- but everyone I know has to fight their own firm [to do the right thing]." Critique of legal and accounting firms "I think there's plenty wrong with the legal profession. Plenty of law firms take business they shouldn't. Accounting has this problem in spades. All have clients they shouldn't have. All the leading law and accounting firms aren't quick enough to decline or kick out bad clients." "Too many law and accounting firms get roped into shady things. For example, tax shelters, with their contingency fees and secrecy, are a total abomination. The troubles are contagious -they spread." "Lawyers have gotten away with murder. The rule of thumb now is to defend anyone, using any means, and not get sued. This is changing however. Now, people are being more careful. This tendency to pull back is good." "I never have the least interest in defending miscreants and helping them misbehave. But the general view is that it's wonderful what Johnny Cochran did." "They say the second-happiest day for a defense lawyer is winning an acquittal of an innocent man." Derivatives "Originally, there were interest rate swaps. If you did them naked, you could lose or make an enormous amount. But there wasn't enough money for traders, so they adopted mark-to-market accounting. Everyone caved, adopted loose [accounting] standards and created exotic derivatives linked to theoretical models. As a result, all kinds of earnings, blessed by accountants, are not really being earned. When you reach for the money, it melts away. It was never there." "The accountants have written 800 pages of rules on this." "If you're the least bit venal, you can do what Enron did. Even if you're not, your employees will still [get you in trouble with derivatives]." "It [accounting for derivatives] is just disgusting. It is a sewer, and if I'm right, there will be hell to pay in due course. All of you will have to prepare to deal with a blow-up of derivative books. To me, it's always been obvious it [the accounting for derivatives] is ridiculous." "It's a crazy idea for people who are already rich -- like Berkshire -- to be in this business. It's a crazy business for big banks to be in." [On this topic, here's an excerpt from the 5/20/02 Business Week: "Critics say FASB's nitpicking hit bottom with Financial Accounting Standard No. 133, which governs accounting for financial derivatives and hedging. Launched in 1992, the standard is based on a simple principle: Futures, swaps, options, and other derivatives should be carried on books at their market value. But revaluing derivatives every quarter can create wide and unpredictable swings in corporate earnings. To avoid that, FASB carved out exceptions for hedging deals, forward contracts for materials, insurance policies, and other special cases. 'The exceptions are legitimate,' says FASB member John M. 'Neel' Foster, 'but once you start down that path, it's hard to stop.' The result: FAS 133 and its supporting documents weigh in at 800 pages--and it's still a work in progress."] COMMENTS ON EDUCATION AND PROPER THINKING Fooling oneself "The ethos of not fooling yourself is one of the best ethoses you could possibly have. It's powerful because it's so rare." Mental models "Generally speaking, you need to have appropriate mental models and a checklist to go through each of them. If 2-3 items are not on the checklist, and you're a pilot, you might crash." "It [this approach] is perfectly obvious. But how many of you were taught to think this way at university?" [One person in a room of perhaps 200 raised his hand and, when asked which university he attended, said "MIT."] Munger snorted and said: "This wasn't rehearsed. This underscores the importance of science. If you have kids or grandkids, make them take science [classes]. Can you imagine the kind of nonsense we'd get from the head of the poetry department at Amherst?"

个人电脑的使用

“我用电脑吗?目前还没有。我刚装了一台电脑,但到现在它还是黑的。我什么类型都不用。至于将来?那就走着瞧吧。”

“我是托马斯·亨特·摩根的忠实追随者 [1933 年他获得了诺贝尔生理学或医学奖]。在加州理工学院时,他禁止使用弗里登计算器,当时每个人都在用它做各种计算。为什么?我沿着河岸走就能捡到金子。那我何必还要去砂矿淘金?如果需要,我也愿意去砂矿淘金,但我希望能不干这种事就进坟墓。”

“有组织的常识(或非凡的智慧)——也就是非常基础的知识——是一种极其强大的工具。计算机有巨大的危险。人们计算过多,思考过少。”

科学的重要性

“我认为科学素养极其重要……科学培养出来的思维习惯非常有价值。”

“我曾在纽约一所大型天主教女校演讲,他们要求每个学生都必修物理。”

“即使你不是科学家,也能掌握像热力学这样的大思想。很多人根本没费心去学热力学,这是个大错误。我记得有一家公用事业公司投资了一个从海水中产生能源的计划。[任何稍有科学常识的人都会知道] 这违反了热力学定律。”

市中心学校

“市中心的学校系统是一场灾难。这些学校拿到的牌很难打,但许多学校已经证明,这并非不可能打的牌。”

大学

“[美国大学] 问题很多。我会裁掉四分之三的教员——除了硬科学以外的所有科目。但没人会这么做,所以我们只能忍受这些缺陷。[教学] 是多么荒谬,令人吃惊。存在致命的分裂脱节。每个系里都有那些狭隘孤僻的人,他们看不到全局。”

“这种情况不仅发生在学术界。公司也可能变得各自为政。看看安达信和安然发生了什么。他们不全都是坏人,但他们的文化是功能失调的。很容易创造出这样一种文化:你有好人,却得出糟糕的结果。政府的许多领域都是功能失调的。大学是同谋。他们对自己培养出来的产品毫无愧疚感。”

“我们有世界上最好的大学。他们在硬科学方面很强,但如果你看看商科、法学、社会学……”

Personal computer use "Do I use a computer? Not so far. I just had a computer installed, but so far it's dark. I don't every type. As for the future? We'll see." "I'm a big follower of Thomas Hunt Morgan [in 1933, he won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine]. While at Cal Tech, he banned the Frieden calculator, which everyone used for all sorts of calculations. Why? I walk along the river and pick up gold. So why should I do placer mining? I'm willing to do placer mining if need be, but I'm hoping to go to my grave without doing so." "Organized common (or uncommon) sense -- very basic knowledge -- is an enormously powerful tool. There are huge dangers with computers. People calculate too much and think too little." Importance of science "I think scientific literacy is terribly important…Habits of the mind formed from science are so valuable." "I once spoke at one of New York's great Catholic girls schools, and they require every student to take physics." "Even if you're not a scientist, you can pick up on the big ideas like thermodynamics. A lot of people haven't bothered to learn thermodynamics, and that's a big mistake. I recall a utility that invested in a scheme to create energy from seawater. [Anyone with even a rudimentary knowledge of science would know that] this violates the laws of thermodynamics." Inner-city schools "Center-city school systems are a disaster. The schools are dealt a difficult hand, but many schools have shown not an impossible one." Universities "There's a lot wrong [with American universities]. I'd remove 3/4 of the faculty -- everything but the hard sciences. But nobody's going to do that, so we'll have to live with the defects. It's amazing how wrongheaded [the teaching is]. There is fatal disconnectedness. You have these squirrelly people in each department who don't see the big picture." "This doesn't just happen in academia. Companies can get balkanized. Look at what happened at Arthur Andersen and Enron. They weren't all bad people, but their cultures were dysfunctional. It's easy to create such a culture, in which you have good people but terrible results. Many areas of government are dysfunctional. Universities are complicit. They don't feel guilty about the product they're producing." "We have the best universities in the world. They are strong in the hard sciences, but if you go to business, law, sociology…"

人生及其他方面的建议

恐怖主义风险与移民政策

“我们对恐怖主义风险的处理简直愚蠢透顶。你能想象吗?一个有着阿拉伯名字、长得像阿拉伯人的人,去学开大型喷气式飞机,却不想学如何起飞或降落,居然没人问任何问题?!但这就是人性,这就是官僚机构的做派。”

“我支持推行万无一失的国民身份证,对移民也不会过分纠结正当程序——我确实会更严格一些。但我们是个民主国家,总会慢慢熬过去的。”

“加拿大(的移民政策)更糟糕。他们应该挂个横幅,上面写着:‘欢迎恐怖分子!’”

“真可悲,我们需要像 9/11 这样的事件才能警醒。”

书籍

“《冰河时代》([仅在英国有售;今年晚些时候将在美国出版])是我读过的最好的书之一。我花了几千美元买来送给朋友。如果你不喜欢《冰河时代》,那你有点问题。”

“我还推荐《苏格兰人如何发明现代世界:西欧最贫穷的国家如何创造我们的世界及其一切》。一百万贫穷的人民,身处恶劣的气候、毫无资源,却对世界产生了如此巨大而建设性的影响,这太惊人了。我试图想明白为什么,但没做到。这位教授做到了。这是一本精彩的书。”

ADVICE ON LIFE AND OTHER Terrorism risk and immigration policy "Our handling of the terrorism risk has been insanely sloppy. Can you imagine that someone with an Arabic name, who was Arabic looking, took lessons on flying big jets in which he didn't want to learn how to take off or land, and no-one asked any questions?! But it's the human condition. It's what bureaucracies do." "I would be in favor of foolproof national identity cards, and wouldn't worry about due process with immigrants -- I'd really be more rigorous. But we're a democracy, and we'll muddle through." "Canada's [immigration policies are] worse. They should have a banner that says, 'Welcome Terrorists!'" "It's sad that we need an event like 9/11 to wake up." Books "Ice Age [only available in the UK; will be published in the U.S. later this year] is one of the best books I've ever read. I've spent thousands of dollars buying copies for my friends. If you don't like Ice Age, then you have some limitations." "I also recommend How the Scots Invented the Modern World: The True Story of How Western Europe's Poorest Nation Created Our World and Everything in It. It's amazing how one million poor people with a lousy climate and no resources had such a large and constructive influence on the world. I tried to figure it out and couldn't. This professor did that. It's a wonderful book."