救助银行的正确与错误方式
据华盛顿方面的报道，奥巴马政府可能即将从不良资产救助计划（TARP）的第二批资金中拿出多达 1000 亿美元，用于设立一家“聚合银行”，以清除银行资产负债表中的有毒证券。该计划打算利用美联储的资产负债表，将这笔资金放大 10 倍，从而让银行系统摆脱高达 1 万亿美元（合 7700 亿欧元、7260 亿英镑）的不良资产。
According to reports in Washington, the Obama administration may be close to devoting as much as $100bn of the second tranche of the troubled asset relief programme funds to creating an “aggregator bank” that would remove toxic securities from the balance sheets of banks. The plan would be to leverage this amount up 10-fold, using the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, so that the banking system could be relieved of up to $1,000bn (€770bn, £726bn) worth of bad assets.
尽管细节尚未确定，但这一做法让人联想到美国前财政部长汉克·保尔森最初采取、但最终放弃的方案。该提案存在同样的缺陷：有毒证券本质上难以估值。引入一个大型买家，不会带来价格发现，反而会导致价格扭曲。
Although the details have not yet been decided, this approach harks back to the approach originally taken – but eventually abandoned – by Hank Paulson, the former US Treasury secretary. The proposal suffers from the same shortcomings: the toxic securities are, by definition, hard to value. The introduction of a significant buyer will result, not in price discovery, but in price distortion.
此外，这些证券并非同质化，这意味着即使采用拍卖流程，聚合银行也会因逆向选择而得到劣质资产。即使人为抬高价格，大多数银行也无法按市价标记其剩余投资组合，因此它们还需要额外的救助。最可能的解决办法是“圈护”它们的投资组合，由美联储承担超出特定限额的损失。
Moreover, the securities are not homogeneous, which means that even an auction process would leave the aggregator bank with inferior assets through adverse selection. Even with artificially inflated prices, most banks could not afford to mark their remaining portfolios to market so they would have to be given some additional relief. The most likely solution is to “ring-fence” their portfolios, with the Federal Reserve absorbing losses that extend beyond certain limits.
这些措施——如果实施的话——将以纳税人付出巨大代价为代价，为银行提供人为的生命支持，但无法使银行以有竞争力的利率恢复放贷。银行需要很长时间的丰厚利差和陡峭的收益率曲线，才能重建其股权。
These measures – if enacted – would provide artificial life support for the banks at considerable expense to the taxpayer, but would not put the banks in a position to resume lending at competitive rates. The banks would need fat margins and steep yield curves for a long time to rebuild their equity.
在我看来，基于现实估值的股权注入计划，随后降低银行的最低资本要求，将对重启经济有效得多。其不利之处在于，这需要远远超过 1 万亿美元的新资本。在适当的情况下，这将涉及一个“好银行/坏银行”解决方案。这将严重稀释现有股东，并有可能使大部分银行股权落入政府手中。
In my view, an equity injection scheme based on realistic valuations, followed by a cut in minimum capital requirements for banks, would be much more effective in restarting the economy. The downside is that it would require significantly more than $1,000bn of new capital. It would involve a good bank/bad bank solution, where appropriate. That would heavily dilute existing shareholders and risk putting the majority of bank equity into government hands.
奥巴马政府面临的艰难选择是：要么部分国有化银行，要么将银行保留在私人手中但国有化它们的有毒资产。选择前者将给广大民众——不仅是银行股东，还有养老金受益者——带来巨大痛苦。然而，这将澄清局面并重启经济。
The hard choice facing the Obama administration is between partially nationalising the banks, or leaving them in private hands but nationalising their toxic assets. Choosing the first course would inflict great pain on a broad segment of the population – not only on bank shareholders but also on the beneficiaries of pension funds. However, it would clear the air and restart the economy.
后一种做法将避免承认和正视痛苦的经济现实，但它将使银行系统陷入同样的困境，而这种困境曾导致政府赞助企业——房利美和房地美——失败。公共利益要求银行以有吸引力的条件恢复放贷。然而，这种放贷必须由政府指令强制执行，因为银行的自利动机将促使它们专注于保全和重建自身股权。
The latter course would avoid recognising and coming to terms with the painful economic realities, but it would put the banking system into the same quandary that proved the undoing of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The public interest would dictate that the banks should resume lending on attractive terms. However, this lending would have to be enforced by government diktat because the self-interest of the banks would lead them to focus on preserving and rebuilding their own equity.
政治现实正在推动奥巴马政府走向后一种做法。它无法要求国会授权额外支出 1 万亿美元用于银行资本重组，因为保尔森在要求并动用 TARP 资金的方式上已把局面搞砸。甚至 TARP 的第二批资金——剩余的 3500 亿美元——也只能通过国会策略才能松动。这正是促使奥巴马政府考虑从中保留多达 1000 亿美元用于“聚合银行”解决方案的原因。
Political realities are pushing the Obama administration towards the latter course. It cannot go to Congress and ask for the authorisation to spend an additional $1,000bn on recapitalising the banks because Mr Paulson has poisoned the well in the way he demanded and then spent the money for Tarp. Even the second tranche of Tarp – the remaining $350bn – could only be pried loose by a congressional manoeuvre. That is what is leading the Obama administration to contemplate reserving up to $100bn of that tranche for the “aggregator bank” solution.
股市正通过对金融股施压，迫使政府尽早做出决定。但新团队应避免重蹈前任的覆辙，在尚未深思熟虑之前就宣布计划。在这两条道路之间做出的选择意义重大；一旦做出，将不可逆转。它应基于对备选方案的审慎评估。
The stock market is pressing for an early decision by putting pressure on financial stocks. But the new team should avoid repeating the mistakes of the previous one and announcing a programme before it has been thoroughly thought out. The choice between the two courses is momentous; once made, it will become irreversible. It should be based on a careful evaluation of the alternatives.
巴拉克·奥巴马总统只有通过与前任团队建立断裂，才能兑现他大胆新做法的承诺。国会和公众认为，为银行做得太多，而为陷入困境的房主做得不够，这种感受是正确的。政府应该将 GSEs 从不确定状态中解脱出来，并更积极地利用它们来稳定住房市场。做到这一点后，它就可以回到国会，请求授权以正确的方式对银行系统进行资本重组。
President Barack Obama can fulfil his promise of a bold new approach only by establishing a discontinuity with the previous team. Congress and the public are right in feeling that too much has been done for the banks and not enough for beleaguered householders. The government ought to take the GSEs out of limbo and use them more actively to stabilise the housing market. Having done so, it could go back to Congress for authorisation to recapitalise the banking system the right way.
本文作者是索罗斯基金管理公司主席。
The writer is chair of Soros Fund Management.