美国必须牵头拯救新兴经济体
当前的全球金融体系存在一种有害的不对称。发达国家的金融当局掌握着主导权,它们会不惜一切代价防止体系崩溃。然而,它们对边缘国家命运的关切却少得多。结果,这个体系为中心国家提供的稳定性和保护,远多于外围国家。这种不对称——体现在美国在国际货币基金组织享有的否决权上——解释了为什么过去 25 年里美国能够不断累积日益庞大的经常账户赤字。所谓的“华盛顿共识”对其他国家施加了严格的市场纪律,但美国却得以豁免。
The global financial system as it is currently constituted is characterised by a pernicious asymmetry. The financial authorities of the developed countries are in charge and they will do whatever it takes to prevent the system from collapsing. They are, however, less concerned with the fate of countries at the periphery. As a result, the system provides less stability and protection for those countries than for the countries at the centre. This asymmetry – which is enshrined in the veto rights the US enjoys in the International Monetary Fund, explains why the US has been able to run up an ever-increasing current account deficit over the past quarter of a century. The so-called Washington consensus imposed strict market discipline on other countries but the US was exempt from it.
1997 年的新兴市场危机重创了印尼、巴西、韩国和俄罗斯等外围国家,但美国毫发无损。随后,许多外围国家奉行稳健的宏观经济政策,再次吸引了大量资本流入,近年来经济增长迅速。接着,金融危机爆发了,而这场危机源于美国。直到最近,巴西等外围国家基本上未受太大影响;事实上,它们还从大宗商品繁荣中受益。但在雷曼兄弟破产后,金融体系遭遇了暂时性的心脏骤停,美国和欧洲的当局不得不采取孤注一掷的措施来抢救它。实际上,它们决定不再允许任何其他大型金融机构违约,同时还为储户提供了损失担保。这对外围国家产生了意想不到的负面后果,而当局对此措手不及。近日,资金普遍从外围国家逃回中心国家以求避险。新兴市场货币兑美元和日元出现下跌,有些跌幅剧烈。利率和信用违约溢价飙升,股市暴跌。追加保证金通知大量涌现,并蔓延至美国和欧洲的股市,引发了新一轮恐慌的阴影。
The emerging market crisis of 1997 devastated the periphery such as Indonesia, Brazil, Korea and Russia but left America unscathed. Subsequently, many peripheral countries followed sound macroeconomic policies, once again attracting large capital inflows, and in recent years have enjoyed fast economic growth. Then came the financial crisis, which originated in the US. Until recently peripheral countries such as Brazil remained largely unaffected; indeed, they benefited from the commodity boom. But after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the financial system suffered a temporary cardiac arrest and the authorities in the US and Europe resorted to desperate measures to resuscitate it. In effect, they resolved that no other big financial institution would be allowed to default and also they guaranteed depositors against losses. This had unintended adverse consequences for the peripheral countries and the authorities have been caught unawares. In recent days there has been a general flight for safety from the periphery back to the centre. Currencies have dropped against the dollar and the yen, some precipitously. Interest rates and credit default premiums have soared and stock markets crashed. Margin calls have proliferated and spread to stock markets in the US and Europe, raising the spectre of renewed panic.
国际货币基金组织正在讨论为外围国家设立一项新的信贷安排,这与过去那些附带条件、却因条件过于严苛而从未被使用过的信贷额度形成对比。这项新安排对于奉行稳健宏观经济政策的国家,既不附带条件,也不会带来污名。此外,IMF 也随时准备向条件较差的国家提供附带条件的信贷。冰岛和乌克兰已经签署协议,匈牙利将是下一个。
The IMF is discussing a new credit facility for countries at the periphery, in contrast to the conditional credit lines that were never used because the conditions attached to them were too onerous. The new facility would carry no conditions and no stigma for countries following sound macroeconomic policies. In addition, the IMF stands ready to extend conditional credit to countries that are less well qualified. Iceland and Ukraine have already signed and Hungary is next.
思路是对的,但力度太小、来得太晚。这项机制下最大可提取金额是成员国份额的五倍。以巴西为例,这笔钱最多也就 150 亿美元,跟巴西自己超过 2000 亿美元的外汇储备相比简直是杯水车薪。要安抚市场,需要力度大得多、灵活得多的方案。核心央行应该对符合条件的边缘国家央行以及外汇储备充足的国家——特别是中国、日本、阿布扎比和沙特阿拉伯——开放大规模互换额度,这些国家也应该拿出一笔补充基金,以更灵活的方式投放。此外,当前迫切需要长短结合的信贷安排,让财政状况稳健的国家能够实施凯恩斯式的反周期政策。只有刺激内需,才能驱散全球性萧条的阴影。
The approach is right but it will be too little, too late. The maximum that could be drawn under this facility would be five times a country’s quota. In the case of Brazil, for example, this would amount to $15bn, a pittance when compared with Brazil’s own foreign currency reserves of more than $200bn. A much larger and more flexible package is needed to reassure markets. The central banks at the centre should open large swap lines with the central banks of qualifying countries at the periphery and countries with large foreign currency reserves, notably China, Japan, Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, ought to put up a supplemental fund that could be dispersed more flexibly. There is also an urgent need for short-term and longer-term credit to enable countries with sound fiscal positions to engage in Keynesian counter-cyclical policies. Only by stimulating domestic demand can the spectre of a world-wide depression be removed.
遗憾的是,监管机构总是滞后于事件发展,这正是金融危机失控的原因。危机已蔓延至海湾地区,沙特和阿布扎比或许因自顾不暇而无力为全球基金做出贡献。是时候开始考虑大规模创建特别提款权或其他形式的国际储备了,但这需要美国点头才行。
Unfortunately the authorities are always lagging behind events; that is why the financial crisis is spinning out of control. Already it has enveloped the Gulf countries, and Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi may be too concerned with their own region to contribute to a global fund. It is time to start thinking about creating special drawing rights or some other form of international reserves on a large scale, but that is subject to American veto.
美国总统乔治·W·布什已召集 11 月 15 日召开 G20 峰会,但除非美国认真支持全球救援行动,否则召开这样的会议并无多大意义。如果美国不想丧失其领导地位,就必须在保护外围国家免受源于美国的这场风暴冲击方面做出表率。即使布什先生不认同这一观点,也希望下一任总统能赞同——但到那时,损失将更为惨重。
President George W. Bush has convened a G20 summit for November 15 but there is not much point in holding such a meeting unless the US is serious about supporting a global rescue effort. The US must show the way in protecting the peripheral countries against a storm that has originated in the US, if it does not want to forfeit its claim to the leadership position. Even if Mr Bush does not share this point of view, it is to be hoped the next president will – but by then the damage will be much greater.
本节作者是索罗斯基金管理公司(Soros Fund Management)主席、《金融市场新范式》一书的作者。
The writer is chair of Soros Fund Management and author of ‘The New Paradigm for Financial Markets’.