真正的欧洲人现在需要“B计划”

2011 · 专栏 · 原文约 909 词
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欧盟的诞生,遵循了卡尔·波普所说的“渐进式社会工程”。一群高瞻远瞩的政治家,怀揣着建立“欧洲合众国”的理想,认识到这一目标只能逐步实现:设定有限的目标,调动实现目标所需的政治意愿,签订条约,要求各国只交出它们政治上能够承受的那部分主权。二战后,煤钢共同体就是这样一步步演变为欧盟的——每一步都不完整,但也明白,在适当的时候,还需走下一步。

The European Union was brought into existence by what Karl Popper called “piecemeal social engineering”. A group of far-sighted statesmen, inspired by the vision of a United States of Europe, recognised that this ideal could be approached only gradually, by setting limited objectives, mobilising the political will needed to achieve them and concluding treaties that required states to surrender only as much sovereignty as they could bear politically. That is how the postwar Coal and Steel Community was transformed into the EU – one step at a time, understanding that each step was incomplete and would require further steps in due course.

欧盟的缔造者们借助二战记忆、苏联构成的威胁以及更深层次一体化带来的经济利益,激发了必要的政治意愿。这一进程因自身的成功而不断自我强化,随着苏联解体,德国统一的前景又为其注入了强劲动力。

The EU’s architects generated the necessary political will by drawing on the memory of the second world war, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the economic benefits of greater integration. The process fed on its own success and, as the Soviet Union crumbled, it received a powerful boost from the prospect of German reunification.

德国认识到,只有在欧洲更大程度统一的背景下才能实现国家统一,并且它愿意为此付出代价。德国通过多拿出一些筹码来帮助调和相互冲突的国家利益,欧洲一体化进程由此达到顶峰,其标志是《马斯特里赫特条约》的签署和欧元的引入。

Germany recognised that it could be reunified only in the context of greater European unification, and it was willing to pay the price. With the Germans helping to reconcile conflicting national interests by putting a little extra on the table, the process of European integration reached its apogee with the Maastricht treaty and the introduction of the euro.

但欧元是不完整的货币:它有中央银行,却没有财政部。其设计者们完全清楚这一缺陷,但他们相信,一旦需要,政治意愿就会被调动起来,推动下一步的进程。

But the euro was an incomplete currency: it had a central bank but no treasury. Its architects were fully aware of this deficiency, but believed that when the need arose, the political will could be summoned to take the next step forward.

但现实并非如此,因为欧元还存在其设计者未曾察觉的其他缺陷。他们误以为金融市场能够自行纠偏,因此规则只着眼于约束公共部门的过度行为。即便在这方面,他们也过分依赖主权国家的自我约束。

That is not what happened, because the euro had other deficiencies of which its architects were unaware. They laboured under the misconception that financial markets can correct their own excesses, so the rules were designed to rein in only public-sector excesses. Even there, they relied too heavily on self-policing by sovereign states.

然而,过度行为主要发生在私营部门,因为利率趋同导致了经济分化。弱国利率下降助长了房地产泡沫,而最强的国家德国不得不勒紧腰带,以应对统一带来的负担。与此同时,金融部门因不健全金融工具的蔓延和糟糕的借贷行为而彻底沦陷。

The excesses, however, were mainly in the private sector, as interest-rate convergence generated economic divergence. Lower interest rates in the weaker countries fuelled housing bubbles, while the strongest country, Germany, had to tighten its belt in order to cope with the burden of reunification. Meanwhile, the financial sector was thoroughly compromised by the spread of unsound financial instruments and poor lending practices.

德国统一后,一体化进程的主要推动力消失了。接着,金融危机引发了一股分裂的浪潮。决定性时刻出现在雷曼兄弟倒闭之后,当局不得不保证,其他具有系统重要性的金融机构不会允许倒闭。德国总理安格拉·默克尔坚持认为,欧盟不应提供联合担保;每个国家必须各自照顾自己的金融机构。这正是当今欧元危机的根源。

With Germany reunified, the main impetus behind the integration process was removed. Then, the financial crisis unleashed a process of disintegration. The decisive moment came after Lehman Brothers collapsed, and authorities had to guarantee that no other systemically important financial institution would be allowed to fail. The German chancellor Angela Merkel insisted that there should be no joint EU guarantee; each country would have to take care of its own institutions. That was the root cause of today’s euro crisis.

金融危机迫使主权国家用自己的信用来替代已经崩溃的信用,而在欧洲,每个国家都只能单打独斗,这让欧洲政府债券的信用度受到了质疑。风险溢价扩大,欧元区分裂成了债权国和债务国两大阵营。德国转了 180 度的大弯,从一体化的主要推动者变成了“转移支付联盟”的主要反对者。

The financial crisis forced sovereign states to substitute their own credit for the credit that had collapsed, and in Europe each state had to do so on its own, calling into question the creditworthiness of European government bonds. Risk premiums widened, and the eurozone was divided into creditor and debtor countries. Germany changed course 180 degrees from being the main driver of integration to the main opponent of a “transfer union”.

这造就了一个两种速度的欧洲:债务国在债务重压下苦苦下沉,而盈余国则一路高歌猛进。作为最大的债权国,德国能够决定援助条件,这些条件带有惩罚性,将债务国推向破产边缘。与此同时,德国从欧元危机中获益,危机压低了汇率,进一步增强了其竞争力。

This created a two-speed Europe, with debtor countries sinking under the weight of their liabilities, and surplus countries forging ahead. As the largest creditor, Germany could dictate the terms of assistance, which were punitive and pushed debtor countries towards insolvency. Meanwhile, Germany benefited from the euro crisis, which depressed the exchange rate and boosted its competitiveness further.

随着融合变成分崩离析,欧洲政治机构的作用也发生逆转,从推动进一步统一变成了捍卫现状。结果,任何认为现状不可取、不可接受或不可持续的人都不得不采取反欧立场。而随着负债累累的国家被推向破产,不满者的数量持续增加,芬兰的“正统芬兰人”等反欧政党的支持率也在上升。

As integration has turned into disintegration, the role of the European political establishment was also reversed, from spearheading further unification to defending the status quo. As a result, anyone who considers the status quo undesirable, unacceptable or unsustainable has had to take an anti-European stance. And, as heavily indebted countries are pushed towards insolvency, the number of the disaffected continues to grow, together with support for anti-European parties such as True Finns in Finland.

然而,欧洲的建制派仍在坚持:现状之下别无选择。金融当局采取越来越孤注一掷的手段来争取时间。但时间并不站在他们一边:双速欧洲正在拉大成员国之间的距离。希腊正走向无序违约和/或货币贬值,后果难以估量。

Yet Europe’s political establishment continues to argue that there is no alternative to the status quo. Financial authorities resort to increasingly desperate measures in order to buy time. But time is working against them: the two-speed Europe is driving member countries further apart. Greece is heading towards disorderly default and/or devaluation, with incalculable consequences.

如果这种看似不可阻挡的进程要得到遏制和逆转,那么希腊和欧元区都必须紧急采取 B 计划。希腊违约或许不可避免,但它不必然是无序的。而且,尽管一定程度的蔓延将难以避免——无论希腊发生什么,都很可能波及葡萄牙,而爱尔兰的财政状况也可能变得不可持续——但欧元区其他国家必须被圈护起来。这意味着要加强欧元区,这很可能需要更广泛地使用欧元债券,并建立某种形式的欧元区范围内的存款保险计划。

If this seemingly inexorable process is to be arrested and reversed, both Greece and the eurozone must urgently adopt a plan B. A Greek default may be inevitable, but it need not be disorderly. And, while some contagion will be unavoidable – whatever happens to Greece is likely to spread to Portugal, and Ireland’s financial position, too, could become unsustainable – the rest of the eurozone needs to be ringfenced. That means strengthening the eurozone, which would probably require wider use of Eurobonds and a eurozone-wide deposit-insurance scheme of some kind.

要激发政治意愿,欧盟自身需要制定一套备选方案(plan B)。欧洲精英必须回归当初指引联盟创立的原则,承认我们对现实的理解本质上是存在缺陷的,认知必然带有偏见,制度也难免有不足。一个开放的社会不会把现有安排奉为神圣不可侵犯;当这些安排失效时,它允许有替代方案。

Generating the political will would require a plan B for the EU itself. The European elite needs to revert to the principles that guided the union’s creation, recognising that our understanding of reality is inherently imperfect, and that perceptions are bound to be biased and institutions flawed. An open society does not treat prevailing arrangements as sacrosanct; it allows for alternatives when those arrangements fail.

动员沉默的亲欧多数派支持这样一个理念应该是有可能的:当现状难以为继时,我们应当寻求欧洲层面的解决方案,而非各自为政的民族国家方案。“真正的欧洲人”在德国及其他国家的人数,理应超过真正的芬兰人党和其他反欧派。

It should be possible to mobilise a pro-European silent majority behind the idea that when the status quo becomes untenable, we should look for a European solution rather than national ones. “True Europeans” ought to outnumber true Finns and other anti-Europeans in Germany and elsewhere.