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霍华德·马克斯

微观经济学 101：供给、需求与可转换证券

Clients Howard Marks Microeconomics 101: Supply, Demand and Convertibles

决定一项投资能否成功，有两个主要因素。第一是被投资对象本身的内在品质。简而言之，你买入一部分股权或借钱给它的那门生意，到底有多好？在其他条件相同的情况下，投资一家好公司总比投资一家坏公司强。

［其他条件相同（ceteris paribus）是经济学家爱用的术语，意思是“在其他条件都一样的情况下”。没错，在给定的价格下，买一家更好的公司比买一家更差的公司更明智。当然，“其他条件”从来不会完全一样，而且你也不太可能被要求在价格相同、但品质明显不同的两项资产之间做选择。］

决定一项投资好坏的第二个因素是价格。在其他条件相同的情况下，面对两项品质相似的资产，少花钱总比多花钱好。许多投资者采取的策略是寻找拥有更好产品、管理层、资产负债表和前景的公司。不少人声称只买顶级品质的资产。

我们这个团队没有那样的奢侈条件，而且说到底，追求博物馆级别的资产与我们的理念背道而驰。在可转换债券领域，就像高收益债券、当然还有困境债务一样，我们投资的公司通常不会赢得广泛喝彩，也不会站在评级金字塔的顶端。相反，它们的品质落在相当宽的区间里。

比起公司本身的绝对品质，我们更关心的是，无论买的是什么，我们付出的价格是多少。简言之，我们认为“在合适的价格下，一切资产都是三 A 级”。我们遵循这条路子有很多理由，其中包括一个事实：跟我们抢着这么干的人相对很少。但我们还觉得，以低于价值的价格买入任何资产，几乎可以保证成功。识别顶级品质的资产却做不到这一点——为那份品质多付钱的风险依然存在。

这一切跟微观经济学有什么关系？微观经济学研究的是价格形成过程，而价格在很大程度上归结为供求问题。在其他条件相同的情况下——在这里就是把供给水平保持不变——需求越大，价格就越高，需求越小，价格就越低。正因如此，在别人都买的时候跟着买，这件事本身就足以断送一笔投资的前程。20 世纪 80 年代的大量房地产投资之所以命运多舛，就是因为投资者的过度需求和过于宽松的信货，诱使开发商盖出了没有租户的楼宇。后来许多杠杆收购之所以失败，则是因为过度的需求把公司价格推到了……

Two principal factors determine whether an investment will be successful. The first is the intrinsic quality of the underlying entity being invested in. In short, how good is the venture you are buying a piece of or lending money to? It's better to invest in a good company than a bad one, ceteris paribus, [Ceteris paribus is a favorite term of economists. It means “everything else being equal,” and yes, at a given price, it's smarter to invest in a better company than a worse one. Of course, “everything else” never is equal, and you're not likely to be asked to choose between two assets of obviously different quality at the same price.] The second factor determining whether something will be a good investment is price. Ceteris paribus, given two assets of similar quality, it's better to pay less than more. Lots of investors take the approach of searching out companies with better products, managements, balance sheets and prospects. Many say they will only buy top quality assets. Our group does not have that luxury and, at any rate, pursuing museum quality assets would be antithetical to our philosophy. In convertibles, as in high yield bonds and certainly in distressed debt, our companies generally are not widely applauded or atop the ratings heap. Instead, they fall within a broad range in terms of quality. We are less concerned with the absolute quality of our companies than with the price we pay for whatever it is we're getting. In short, we feel “everything is triple-A at the right price”. We have many reasons for following this approach, including the fact that relatively few people compete with us to do so. But we feel buying any asset for less than it's worth virtually assures success. Identifying top quality assets does not; the risk of overpaying for that quality still remains. What does all of this have to do with microeconomics? Well microeconomics is the study of the price-setting process, and much of price comes down to a matter of supply and demand. Ceteris paribus -- in this case, holding the level of supply constant -- price will be higher if there is more demand and lower if there is less. And that's why buying when everyone else is can, in and of itself, doom an investment. Many real estate investments made in the 1980s were ill-fated because excess demand from investors and too-easy credit induced builders to erect structures for which there are no tenants. Many of the later LBOs failed because excessive demand pushed prices for companies to levels which were

1992 年，橡树资本管理有限合伙公司（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

1992 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

这个价格就太高了。反过来，买别人在什么价位都不愿意买的东西，几乎注定最终会成功，这就引出了对当前可转债需求水平及其对价格影响的讨论。

今年夏天我写过，可转债通常会抓住股票的大部分上涨空间，同时能显著抵御下跌，在当今不确定性高企的环境下，这种表现特征应当具有吸引力。我当时没有提到——现在想指出的——是可转债出现划算交易的一个因素，是市场对它们的需求相对低迷。

1992 年的当下，强劲的需求支撑了股价。这股需求中重要的一部分，是大量资金从低收益的短期投资中撤出，涌入共同基金。但流入可转债基金的资金却很少，正如下面这段《巴伦周刊》的摘录所示。这些数字值得一看。

可转债基金

没得到多少尊重。1991 年它们表现极佳，上涨 30%，与标普 500 指数持平；今年迄今又涨了 3.5%，而标普 500 指数微跌。这一成绩令人瞩目，因为可转债这种债券与股票之间的混合体，通常比股票更保守，在牛市中跑输标普 500 指数，在熊市中跌幅小于股票。

然而，投资者平常对任何收益率高于存单和货币市场基金的东西都抢着买，如今却敬而远之。可转债基金的资产在 6 月 30 日为 23.6 亿美元，自年初以来仅增加 1 亿美元，远低于 1987 年崩盘前 53 亿美元的峰值。

too high given their prospects. Conversely, buying what no one else will buy at any price almost assures eventual success, and that leads to a discussion of the current level of demand for convertibles and its impact on their prices. I wrote this summer that convertibles tend to capture most of the upside performance of stocks while being significantly insulated from declines, and that such performance characteristics should be attractive given the high level of uncertainty today. What I didn't mention -- and what I want to point out now -- is that one of the factors contributing to the availability of bargains among convertibles is the relatively low level of demand for them. Here in 1992, strong demand has supported stock prices. Important among the components of that demand is the heavy flow into mutual funds of cash fleeing from lowyielding short term investments. But flows into convertible funds have been low, as indicated by the following clipping from Barron's. The figures are worth reviewing. Convertible securities funds don't get much respect. They had a great 1991, when they rose 30%, matching the S&P 500, and so far this year, they're up 3.5%, while the S&P is down a fraction. This showing is impressive since convertibles, bond-equity hybrids, are usually a more conservative choice than stocks, trailing the S&P in bull markets and falling less than stocks in down markets. Yet investors, normally quick to snap up anything offering better yields than CDs and money-market funds are staying away. Assets of convertible funds stood at $2.36 billion on June 30, up just $100 million since the start of the year, and way below their peak of $5.3 billion just before the 1987 crash.

1977 年到 1984 年间，可转换共同基金的数量一直维持在七家，到那段时期结束时，它们的总资产约为 4.52 亿美元。到 1987 年底，基金数量增至三十只，资产规模达到 58 亿美元，增长约十三倍。现在回头看，1985 年至 1987 年间资金大量涌入可转换债券，显然“污染了水源”，导致价格纪律丧失、买入价格过高的证券，最终表现不佳。

市场反应转为负面，可转换共同基金的资产在 1989 年底降至 32 亿美元，如今只剩下 22 亿美元，比 1987 年的水平下降了 62%。如果强大的资金流入，正如我所相信的那样，是表现不佳的前兆（反之亦然），那么今天的前景应该相当不错。可转换债券如今不受待见，也吸引不了资金流入。这就为愿意逆势而为的人留下了便宜货。我们希望你们能把可转换债券视为一种有吸引力的方式，来增加你们对股票投资的配置比例。

Between 1977 and 1984, the number of convertible mutual funds was constant at seven, and at the end of that period their total assets stood at the princely sum of $452 million. By the end of 1987 there were thirty funds with assets of $5.8 billion, for a thirteen-fold increase. It can clearly be seen in retrospect that the strong flow of capital into convertibles in 1985-87 “poisoned the well” and led to a loss of price discipline, to purchases of over-priced securities, and to poor performance. Reaction was negative, and convertible mutual fund assets dropped to $3.2 billion at year-end 1989 and only $2.2 billion today, down 62% from the 1987 level. If strong inflows are, as I believe, a precursor of poor performance (and vice versa), then the outlook today should be excellent. Convertibles are getting no respect and attracting no inflows. That leaves bargains for those willing to act as contrarians. We hope you will consider convertibles an attractive way to hold an increased portion of your commitment to equities.

October 8, 1992

1992 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

1992 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.