说不通
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
毫无道理。
Doesn’t Make Sense
学者们有一套关于市场有效性的理论。他们说,因为市场参与者信息灵通且理性,所以市场能做出正确决策,为每一项资产合理定价。正因如此,投资者才无法稳定地找到足以跑赢市场的错误定价机会。
但投资者——以及这个星球上的大多数人——远不是学者们假设的那种毫无感情的计算机器。人们会做出错误决策,会上当受骗,会一直从一个非理性的立场摇摆到另一个。事实上,我惊叹于商业、投资和政治领域中有多少事情源于非理性,根本讲不通。我在这里就想聊聊其中的几件。
Academics have their theories about market efficiency. Because market participants are well-informed and rational, they say, markets make correct decisions and smoothly assign the right price to each asset. It’s for this reason that investors can’t routinely find the mispricings they need in order to be able to beat the market. But investors – and most of the people living on this planet, for that matter – are far from the unemotional computing machines the academics assume them to be. They make faulty decisions, fall for scams and swing from one irrational position to another all the time. In fact, I marvel at how many things take place in the worlds of business, investments and politics that stem from irrationality and just don’t make sense. It’s my purpose here to write about a few.
让市场来定调
Letting the Market Call the Tune
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在《谁干的?》一文中,我谈到了花旗集团前首席执行官查克·普林斯。2007 年 7 月初,他敏锐地观察到:“一旦音乐停止,就流动性而言,事情会变得复杂。”然而,他接着补充道:“只要音乐还在播放,你就得起身跳舞。我们仍在跳舞。”由于花旗和其他银行一样卖力起舞——甚至有过之而无不及——并在次贷相关减记上损失了同样多甚至更多的资金——普林斯在 2007 年 11 月丢掉了饭碗。
我强调的普林斯那番话,似乎象征着从 2003 年初到 2007 年夏天普遍存在的态度。人们在从事高风险的事情——即使常常明知伴随的风险,就像普林斯似乎也清楚的那样——因为他们看到,要想保持竞争力,别无选择。
听到普林斯离职的消息,我的第一反应是:(a) 当一家公司境况如此糟糕时,首席执行官或许活该丢饭碗;(b) 要避免那种命运,普林斯只需让花旗避开他所指出的冒险行为就够了。如果他做到了后者,花旗今天将是赢家中的一员,而不是输家;它不必在股价低迷时发行股票来补充资本;反而会有资金去利用当下更好的市场环境。所以说,当普林斯宣称只要音乐响着,花旗就得跳舞——从而让市场来定调——他的领导是有缺陷的。
In “Whodunit,” I talked about Chuck Prince, the ex-CEO of Citigroup. Early in July of 2007, he astutely observed, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated.” However, he went on to add, “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” Because Citigroup danced as much as the other banks or more – and lost as much or more on subprime-related write-downs – Prince lost his job in November 2007. The portion of Prince’s statement that I’ve highlighted seems emblematic of the attitudes that prevailed from early 2003 until the summer of 2007. People were doing risky things – often even though they recognized the attendant risk, as Prince seemed to do – because they saw no alternative if they wanted to remain competitive. Upon hearing of Prince’s departure, my immediate reaction was to think (a) when a firm fares so badly, the CEO may deserve to lose his job, and (b) to avoid that fate, Prince just had to cause Citi to avoid the risky behavior he identified. If he had done the latter, Citi would be among the big winners today instead of the losers; it wouldn’t have to recapitalize by selling equity at depressed prices; and instead it would have funds with which to take advantage of today’s better market environment. So in saying that if the music was playing, Citi had to dance – and thus letting the market call the tune – Prince’s leadership was flawed.
2008 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
版权所有,保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
强制性短期主义
Compulsory Short-Termism
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但要说普林斯和花旗本可以拒绝随大流而避开麻烦,这样说对吗?让我们像某些 DVD 那样来个倒放,设想一个不同的结局。假设现在是 2005 年 7 月,而不是 2007 年 7 月。查克·普林斯未卜先知地说:“当音乐停止,就流动性而言,事情会变得复杂。我们不会掉进那个陷阱。从今天起,我们对贷款、抵押贷款、次贷、债务抵押债券和结构性投资工具采取保守立场。别人爱怎么跳就怎么跳,我们这场不参加了。”那会发生什么?他可能不会在 2007 年底丢掉工作,而是会更早丢。为什么?因为从他发表那个声明到 2007 年 7 月,普林斯看起来会像个傻瓜。当其他银行抢市场份额时,花旗的份额在缩水;当其他银行借便宜钱去做看似利差诱人的抵押贷款相关投资时,花旗却坐冷板凳,放弃唾手可得的利润。股东们会嚷嚷着要普林斯的人头。
说到底,这正应了我最喜欢的谚语之一:过于领先时代,和犯错没什么两样。
在我看来,美国商业最糟糕的两件事中,最糟的是短视。(另一件是高管在公司业绩糟糕时照样活得滋润。)公司因短期成功而受奖赏,因短期失败而受惩罚,却很少有人问长期如何。唯一要紧的是“你最近为我做了什么?”这很大程度上来自股东。
几年前在一份备忘录里,我列了几个在我职业生涯中已湮没无闻的说法,包括“受托责任”“资本保全”“股息收益率”,还有一个是“长期投资者”。
大多数投资经理每个季度都被拿来跟基准比较,被指望创造超额收益。一些客户手指扣在扳机上,随时准备砍掉一个一两年表现不佳的经理。为此,经理们也手指扣在扳机上,随时准备抛掉短期表现落后的股票或债券。而那些证券表现落后的公司首席执行官同样如坐针毡——董事会很少支持让华尔街失望的高管。
太多人把长期看作不过是一连串短期的叠加。他们觉得,要想五年投资记录最佳,办法就是依次攒出二十个组合,让它们在接下来二十个季度里每个季度都表现最好。没人愿意投资一家在长期投资尚未见效前可能一直落后的公司。他们宁可就今天卖掉股票,想着以后还能买回来。
But is it right to say Prince and Citi could have avoided trouble by refusing to go along? Let’s do what some DVDs let you do nowadays: go back and consider an alternative ending. It’s July 2005 instead of July 2007. Presciently, Chuck Prince says, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will get complicated. We’re not going to get caught in that trap. As of today, we’re adopting a conservative stance toward loans, mortgages, subprime, CDOs and SIVs. The others can dance all they want; we’re sitting this one out.” What would’ve happened? Rather than lose his job in late 2007, he probably would have lost it sooner. Why? Because from whenever he made that statement until July 2007, Prince would have looked dumb. While other banks were gaining market share, Citi’s share would have been shrinking. And while other banks were borrowing on the cheap to make mortgage-related investments at seemingly attractive spreads, Citi would have been on the sidelines, forgoing easy profits. Shareholders would have been yelling for Prince’s scalp. The bottom line is one of my three favorite adages: Being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong. Of the two things I think are most wrong about American business, the worst is short-termism. (The other is the ability of executives to thrive while their companies do poorly.) Companies are rewarded for short-term success and penalized for shortterm failure, whereas few people ask about the long term. The only thing that matters is “What have you done for me lately?” A lot of this emanates from stockholders. In a memo several years ago, I listed a few phrases that have sunk into obscurity over the course of my career. They included “fiduciary duty,” “preservation of capital” and “dividend yield.” Another is “long-term investor.” Most investment managers are measured against a benchmark every quarter and expected to add value. Some clients have their fingers on the trigger, ready to axe a manager who underperforms for a year or two. For this reason, managers sit with their own fingers on the trigger, ready to dump a stock or bond whose short-term performance lags. And company CEOs whose securities are laggards are likewise on the hot-seat, with boards that rarely support executives who disappoint Wall Street. Too many people think of the long run as nothing but a series of short runs. The way to have the best five-year investment record, they think, is by sequentially assembling the twenty portfolios that will produce the best performance in each of the next twenty quarters. No one wants to invest in a company that may lag until long-term investments pay off down the road. They’ll just sell its stock today, assuming they’ll be able to buy it back later.
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
明白了这一点,企业就面临巨大的压力去强调短期业绩。它们可能会怎么应对呢?
Understanding this, companies face great pressure to emphasize short-term results. What might they do in response?
最大化收入(或许可通过塞满管道积压订单、提供折扣把未来的销售提前到现在来实现)。
削减研发等见效慢领域的开支。
借债来回购股票,因为债务资本便宜,而股权昂贵(尽管股权提供安全,杠杆放大风险也不假)。
Maximize revenues (perhaps by stuffing pipelines and offering discounts that accelerate future sales into the present). Minimize expenses in slow-to-bloom areas like research and development. Borrow to buy back stock, because debt capital is cheap and equity is expensive (despite the fact that equity provides safety and leverage amplifies risk).
你希望你的公司做这些事情吗?大概不想。但集体的外部压力是否迫使公司朝这些方向走?绝对会。那些短期内最大化利润的做法,往往在长期看来反而减少利润、增加风险,但如今这些做法可能成了必修课。
投资者越来越短视,没有比某些对冲基金更甚的了,它们把注意力全放在年度激励费上。普通股票或许能带来大致跟随企业利润增长的回报,优质公司的股票长期看应该表现更佳,但对冲基金(及其投资者)期望更高。它们有强烈的动机持有一小批近期表现最佳的股票。一个办法是先建仓,然后施压公司去“最大化股东价值”。由于它们紧盯短期表现和短期报酬,它们主张的许多事情——比如分拆、股票回购和超额股息——长期来看可能并非最优。但这不在它们考虑范围内。
这种行为正是五月份《飞鸟集》里关于自由放任辩论的活例子。长远来说,资本掌握在精明、专注、聪慧的经理人手中,不受条框束缚,可四处追逐利润,这对社会应是好事。理论上,他们愿意逆流押注、采取不受欢迎的立场、挑战不作为的管理层,这是积极的。但短期内,他们可能带来不稳定效应,尤其是当多家行动一致时。也许这恰恰说明,自由市场的解决方案——就像其他一切事物——都有正反两面。
如果查克·普林斯在 2005 年就把花旗集团拉到一边旁观,很可能会有对冲基金试图赶他下台。而当时花旗看起来过于保守,董事会恐怕也无力抵抗。所以,当你经营一家上市公司时,光是对的还不够。你必须在短期内是对的。而在选择行动路线时,对短期有利的方案通常会比长期正确的方案更受青睐。这似乎都不太理想。
Do you want your companies doing these things? Probably not. But do the collective external pressures force companies in these directions? Absolutely. The things that maximize profits in the short run often serve to decrease profits and increase risk in the long run, but they can be mandatory these days. Investors are increasingly short-sighted, and none more so than some hedge funds, with their emphasis on year-by-year incentive fees. The average stock might deliver a return roughly in line with the growth in corporate profits, and the stocks of better companies should outperform in the long run, but hedge funds (and their investors) expect more. They’re strongly motivated to hold a subset of stocks that will be the best near-term performers. One approach is to take positions and then pressure companies to “maximize shareholder value.” With their focus on short-run performance and short-run compensation, many of the things they advocate – like spin-offs, stock buy-backs and oversized dividends – can be less than optimal for the long run. But that’s not their concern. This kind of behavior exemplifies the debate over laissez-faire described in “The Aviary” in May. In the long run, it should be good for society to have capital in the hands of sophisticated, focused, bright managers who are free of guidelines and can go anywhere in pursuit of profit. In theory, it should be a positive that they’re willing to bet against the herd, adopt unpopular positions and take on unresponsive managements. But in the short run, they can have a destabilizing effect, especially when several act in common. Maybe it just proves that free-market solutions – like just about everything else – have both positive and negative aspects. If Chuck Prince had taken Citigroup to the sidelines in 2005, it’s highly likely that some hedge funds would have tried to force him out. And with Citi looking unduly conservative, the board might not have been in a position to resist. So being right isn’t always enough when you run a public company. You have to be right in the short run. And in choosing a course of action, the one that’s right for the short run generally will be preferred over the one that’s right for the long run. None of this seems ideal.
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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保留所有权利
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Unreliable Ratings
Unreliable Ratings
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要说过去几年里权力最大、却最不争气,而且最被戳穿面目的群体,恐怕非信用评级机构莫属。评级机构被赋予了准官方的地位,充当信用市场的警察,可它们干得一塌糊涂。
这不是新鲜事。我一直觉得评级机构容易出错,我职业生涯里很大一部分时间就是在利用它们的错误。它们常常把看似安全的债券评得太高,把风险高的债券评得太低。它们调整评级总是慢半拍,可真要改了,又往往矫枉过正。说到底,按评级来管理债券组合,结果不是白忙一场就是灾难一场。要赚钱,更靠谱的办法是跟评级对着干。
然而,当政府觉得华尔街得有人管、债券投资者得有人护的时候,他们还是找上了评级机构。动手之前,我怀疑没人去查过评级到底准不准。现在我们都知道了。几千个结构性抵押证券的评级被评得过高,随后被下调,常常一次就降好几档。担保债务凭证(CDO)的层级里,没被降级的反倒成了例外,而不是常态。换句话说,那些评级错得离谱。
在我看来,AAA 评级不光意味着违约概率低,还应该意味着被降级的概率也低。评级机构可能会说,住宅违约的进展让它们措手不及,但我觉得 AAA 评级同样应该意味着“被措手不及”的概率低。顺着“黑天鹅”的思路想,凡是可能遭遇“不太可能发生的灾难”的东西,就不该拿到 AAA 评级。可显然,当时拿到 AAA 的有一大堆。
Probably the group that had the most power and yet covered itself with the least distinction over the last few years – and has been outed to the greatest extent – are the credit rating agencies. The rating agencies were accorded quasi-official status as the policemen of the credit markets, and they failed miserably. This is nothing new. I’ve always considered the rating agencies to be error-prone, and much of my career has consisted of taking advantage of their mistakes. They’ve often rated seemingly safe bonds too high and risky bonds too low. They’ve been slow to adjust ratings, but when finally they did change, they usually overshot. The bottom line is that managing a bond portfolio according to ratings would be somewhere between unavailing and disastrous. Profits are more likely to be found in gaming against the ratings. Nevertheless, when the government felt Wall Street had to be policed and debt investors protected, they turned to the agencies. Before doing so, I doubt anyone checked to see how accurate ratings have been. Now we know. Thousands of ratings of structured mortgage securities turned out to be too high and were adjusted downward, often many notches at a time. The CDO tranche that didn’t have to be downgraded is the exception, not the rule. In other words, the ratings were grossly wrong. In my view, a triple-A rating shouldn’t just imply a low probability of default, but a low probability of downgrading as well. The agencies may say they were blindsided by developments in residential defaults, but I think a triple-A rating should also imply a low probability of being blindsided. To follow on with the “black swan” thought process, something potentially subject to an “improbable disaster” shouldn’t receive a triple-A rating. But clearly a lot did.
一个注定失败的模型
A Model Destined to Fail
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说到底,事情很简单:流程有缺陷,结果就没法让人放心。
如今多数人都明白,评级流程当初毛病很大。
我以前写过它最大的软肋:评级机构是发行方掏钱请来的,评的正是付钱那家的债。在《现在一切都糟糕了吗?》(2007 年 9 月)里,我把这比作一场审判,被告自己挑法官、自己付薪水。可我现在意识到,这比喻漏掉了一个关键环节。实际情况是,被告可以问一批候选法官各自会怎么判,挑一个再开庭。发行方能拿一笔拟发行的债去问好几家机构,听它们大概会给什么评级,然后挑中意的那家来雇。
想想这种安排下机构的算盘:费用归愿意给最高评级的那家。顺着来,利润就涨;端着原则,就被甩在后头。
The bottom line’s simple: you can’t get dependable results from a faulty process. Most people realize now that the rating process was highly flawed. I’ve written before about the biggest weakness: the fact that rating agencies are hired and paid by the issuers whose debt they’re rating. In “Now It’s All Bad?” (September 2007), I compared this to a trial where the defendant picks and pays the judge. But I realize now that I overlooked an important element in the equation. It’s actually a trial where the defendant gets to ask a number of prospective judges what verdict they’d reach before choosing one. Issuers can describe a proposed issue to multiple agencies, hear back as to what rating they’re likely to assign, and then hire the one they want. Think about an agency’s incentives under this arrangement: the fee goes to the one willing to supply the highest rating. Go along and your profits grow; stand on principle and you’re left behind.
2008 年,橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)。
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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版权所有
All Rights Reserved
20 世纪 60 年代我进入这一行时,穆迪和标普靠卖出版物订阅赚钱。因此它们的客户是投资者,不受发行方摆布。但后来它们的大部分收入转向来自发行方,评级机构就明白谁在给它们发工资了。
还有个更深的问题:只有超出平均水平的判断力,才能让你成为出类拔萃的投资者。市场共识的未来预期,已经反映在股价里。只有比共识更敏锐的人,才能帮你做得比平均水平好。
现在来看看评级过程。谁都能算出当前的财务比率,看出某家公司今天的状况。而对一般人来说,未来看起来和共识没两样。所以,要对一家公司的前景做出有用的评估,你需要一个能比大多数人预见更多可能性和风险的人。但如果某人真的对债券前景有超凡洞察,他会靠给债券评级谋生,还是会去找份管理投资的工作?钱不是万能的,但大多数人会往自己最高、最好的用途上靠。我觉得可以公平地说,评级机构吸引不来债券大师。
既然评级业务竞争激烈、利润微薄,机构分析师拿的报酬,主要是给高评级和“响应及时”的,而不是独特见解。坚守原则、态度保守的决策得不到回报,现在这一点已经一目了然。
穆迪在 5 月披露,由于程序错误,11 只欧洲 CPDO(为承保大量信用保险而设立的复杂投资工具)被错误地评为三 A 级,而不是双 A 级。行吧,人人都会犯错。但事情没那么简单。
据 7 月 2 日《纽约时报》报道,苏利文-克伦威尔律师事务所为穆迪做了调查,发现错误曝光之后,评级仍未得到纠正。该报告称,负责监控和调整评级的员工在错误被发现后,考虑了“不适合评级过程的因素”……穆迪在一份声明中说,身份不明的员工违反了行为准则,该准则要求分析师只考虑信用因素,不考虑“对穆迪、发行人、投资者或其他市场参与者的潜在影响”。
到底发生了什么并不完全清楚,我觉得也没人想把事情弄得太清楚。但看起来,穆迪的员工出于“商业原因”忽略了已经曝光的评级错误。
据 5 月 23 日《华尔街日报》一篇关于评级的文章称,穆迪和惠誉……
When I came into this business in the 1960s, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s made their money selling subscriptions to their publications. Thus their customers were investors, and they weren’t beholden to the issuers. But when they began to derive most of their revenue from the issuers, the agencies understood who was buttering their bread. There’s a further problem: only above-average judgment can make you a superior investor. The consensus view of the future is incorporated in market prices. Only someone more astute than the consensus can help you do better than average. Now let’s turn to the rating process. Anyone can compute current financial ratios and see how a company’s doing today. And the future looks the same to the average person as it does to the consensus. Thus, for a helpful assessment of a company’s prospects, you need someone who can foresee possibilities and risks better than most. But if someone possesses above-average insight into bonds’ prospects, will he assign credit ratings for a living, or will he get a job managing investments? Money isn’t everything, but most people tend toward their highest and best use. I think it’s fair to say the rating agencies don’t attract bond gurus. Since the ratings business is highly competitive and profit margins are slim, agency analysts tend to be paid for high ratings and “responsiveness,” as opposed to unique insight. Principled, conservative decisions aren’t rewarded, as is now plain to see. Moody’s disclosed in May that, because of a programming error, eleven European CPDOs (complex investment vehicles formed to write large amounts of credit insurance) had been incorrectly rated triple-A instead of double-A. Okay, everyone makes mistakes. But the plot thickens. According to The New York Times of July 2, the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell conducted an investigation for Moody’s and found that the ratings hadn’t been corrected even after the error came to light. Its report, . . . blamed employees in charge of monitoring and adjusting ratings for considering “factors inappropriate to the rating process” after the errors were discovered. . . . In a statement, Moody’s said unidentified employees had violated a code that required analysts to consider only credit factors, not “the potential impact on Moody’s, or an issuer, an investor or other market participant.” It’s not exactly clear what happened, and I don’t think anyone’s trying to make it particularly clear. It seems, however, that Moody’s employees overlooked the ratings errors that came to light for “business reasons.” According to an article on ratings in The Wall Street Journal of May 23, Moody’s and Fitch,
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……受访者承认,在收到债券发行方或其银行的要求后,他们曾更换过负责债券评级的分析师。据信用评级机构现任及前任官员称,变动通常发生在某只特定债券获得评级之后,意味着该分析师不会参与该债券发行方的下一笔交易。……
知情人士透露,在穆迪,负责担保债务凭证(CDO)评级的团队中,至少有一名分析师在过去几年内被调离某家特定投资银行的交易,因为该银行的银行家要求换一位提问更少的分析师。
另一名穆迪的抵押贷款分析师被调至公司的监督部门,此前穆迪一位官员认同某位投资银行家的看法,认为该分析师过于挑剔,知情人士称。……
“我们是服务行业,”惠誉结构融资部门集团董事总经理约翰·邦菲利奥表示。(强调为后加)
最后,7 月 9 日,《纽约时报》从评级机构内部电子邮件中摘录了以下内容,这些邮件是美国证券交易委员会(SEC)对机构调查报告的一部分:
“我们没有足够资源来支撑目前的工作。”
“我想弄清楚,我们能否在此刻确定,我们的决定是否会导致业务损失,以及损失多少?”
“我们本周正与你们小组会面,讨论调整房地产资产 CDO 评级标准,因为面临持续失去交易的威胁。”
让不受监管、有时还不专业的组织,在错误激励下运作,去执行超出其能力范围的任务,并被任命为资本市场的看门人,这毫无道理。但事实却正是如此。
. . . acknowledged they have switched analysts assigned to rate bonds after receiving requests to do so from bond issuers or their bankers. Changes usually were made after a specific bond was rated, meaning the analyst wouldn’t work on the bond issuer’s next deal, according to current and former officials at the credit-rating firms. . . . At Moody’s, at least one analyst in the group that rated collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, was moved off a particular investment bank’s deals within the past few years after bankers requested an analyst who raised fewer questions, according to people familiar with the matter. Another mortgage analyst at Moody’s was moved to the firm’s surveillance unit after a Moody’s official agreed with an investment banker’s opinion that the analyst was too fussy, a person familiar with the situation said. . . . “We’re a service business,” says John Bonfiglio, group managing director of structured finance at Fitch. [Emphasis added] Lastly, on July 9, The New York Times provided these tidbits from internal rating agency emails, which were part of an SEC report on its investigation of the agencies: “We do not have the resources to support what we are doing now.” “I am trying to ascertain whether we can determine at this point if we will suffer any loss of business because of our decision and if so, how much?” “We are meeting with your group this week to discuss adjusting criteria for rating C.D.O.’s of real estate assets this week because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.” It doesn’t make sense for unregulated and sometimes unprofessional organizations, operating under the wrong incentives and performing tasks that are above their heads, to be appointed watchdogs of the capital markets. But that’s what happened.
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当坏到极致反而是好事的时候
When It’s Good to Be Bad
只有在爱丽丝梦游仙境般的世界里,信用评级差才会带来好处。但今天这套复杂且基于规则的会计体系,却让这种事成了可能。
5 月 18 日,《华尔街日报》报道了债券和抵押贷款保险公司瑞迪安集团的故事。虽然该公司业务不佳,但一项会计收益让它得以报出第一季度 1950 万美元的净利润,而若非这项收益,它本该报出 2.15 亿美元的亏损。不过,这可是一笔非同寻常的收益。它并非源于瑞迪安资产价值的上升,而是源于其负债价值的下降。
Only in an Alice-in-Wonderland world can there be benefits in having a weak credit rating. But today’s complex, rules-based accounting system makes it possible. On May 18, The Wall Street Journal published the story of Radian Group, a bond and mortgage insurer. Although its business was poor, an accounting gain enabled it to report a $195 million net profit for the first quarter, as opposed to the $215 million loss it would have reported otherwise. However, this was an unusual gain. It didn’t arise because the value of Radian’s assets went up, but rather because the value of its liabilities went down.
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据《华尔街日报》报道,情况是这样的:
会计的一条基本规则是,负债价值下降通常会带来收益,进而提升利润。在新的(按市值计价会计)规则下,公司在考虑某些负债的市场价值时,必须把市场对自身财务健康的看法考虑进去。这样一来,公司财务状况不佳反而可能导致负债价值下降……
换句话说,如果你欠了钱,而你还债的可能性下降,你的财务状况反而会增强。但还债能力的下降难道不是应该跟虚弱挂钩,而不是跟强大挂钩吗?在实施这样的规则之前,有人应该先问问这合不合理。似乎没人这么做过。
同样,按市值计价会计——在极端情况下——可能要求公司按所有资产如果今天被迫出售所能变现的价格来估值。而这些价格往往会随着假设需要抛售的资产增多而下跌。清算价值跟内在价值或持续经营价值是天差地别的。我们真的想基于所有资产都要立刻卖掉的假设来估值吗?这有什么意义?
Here’s how, according to the Journal: One of the basic rules of accounting says that a reduction in the value of a liability leads to a gain that usually boosts profit. Under the new [mark-tomarket accounting] rule, companies have to take into account the market’s view of their own financial health when considering the market value of some liabilities. In this case, a company’s poor health can lead to a reduction in the liability’s value. . . . In other words, if you owe money and the probability you’ll pay your debts declines, your financials strengthen. But shouldn’t a declining ability to pay be associated with weakness, not strength? Before enacting rules like this one, someone should ask if they make sense. It doesn’t seem anyone did. Similarly, mark-to-market accounting can – in the extreme – require a company to value its assets at the prices that would be realized if they all had to be sold today. And those prices are likely to decline as more assets are assumed to need dumping. Liquidation values are far different from intrinsic values or going-concern values. Do we really want to value assets on the assumption that they’re all going to be sold immediately? What purpose does that serve?
都怪投机者。
Blame the Speculators
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当前关于投机者在石油定价中所扮演角色的争论,让我想起了 1952 年诺亚·斯威特议员被问及对威士忌的看法时那番经典的应答:
如果你说的是威士忌,那魔鬼酿造的毒液,罪恶的祸水,那玷污纯真、颠覆理智、摧毁家庭、制造苦难与贫困的凶残怪物,它实实在在地夺走幼小孩童口中的面包;如果你说的是那种邪恶的饮品,将虔诚的男女从正直优雅生活的巅峰,拖入堕落、耻辱、绝望、无助与无望的无底深渊,那么,我的朋友,我以全身心的每一根纤维反对它。
然而,如果你说的威士忌是交谈的润滑剂,是哲学的美酒,是生命的甘露,是好友相聚时共饮的麦芽酒,它让歌声在心底响起,让满足的暖意在眸中闪烁;如果你说的是圣诞的欢愉,是那位年迈绅士在霜晨中脚步轻快的提神小酌;如果你说的是那让人放大喜悦、忘却人生重大悲剧与心碎的饮品;如果你说的是那种每年将无数百万美元注入国库、为残疾孩童和盲聋者带去关怀照料的饮品,
The current debate over the role of speculators in oil pricing reminds me of Rep. Noah Sweat’s classic answer when asked in 1952 what he thought about whiskey: If you mean whiskey, the devil’s brew, the poison scourge, the bloody monster that defiles innocence, dethrones reason, destroys the home, creates misery and poverty, yea, literally takes the bread from the mouths of little children; if you mean that evil drink that topples Christian men and women from the pinnacles of righteous and gracious living into the bottomless pits of degradation, shame, despair, helplessness, and hopelessness, then, my friend, I am opposed to it with every fiber of my being. However, if by whiskey you mean the oil of conversation, the philosophic wine, the elixir of life, the ale that is consumed when good fellows get together, that puts a song in their hearts and the warm glow of contentment in their eyes; if you mean Christmas cheer, the stimulating sip that puts a little spring in the step of an elderly gentleman on a frosty morning; if you mean that drink that enables man to magnify his joy, and to forget life’s great tragedies and heartbreaks and sorrow; if you mean that drink the sale of which pours into our treasuries untold millions of dollars each year, that provides tender care for our little crippled children, our blind, our deaf,
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我们那些愚蠢、可怜而又年迈体弱的同胞,去建设这个国家最优质的公路、
医院、大学和社区学院,那么,我的朋友,我绝对、毫不犹豫地支持这样做。
这是我的立场,而且一如既往,在原则问题上我绝不让步。
我想你大概可以说,斯韦特议员发现威士忌的优劣,全在品酒人自己的眼中。看来,石油价格上涨中“投机者”所扮演的角色,也是如此。
政客们似乎并不急于向选民们道出关于石油的真相:
our dumb, our pitifully aged and infirm, to build the finest highways, hospitals, universities, and community colleges in this nation, then my friend, I am absolutely, unequivocally in favor of it. This is my position, and as always, I refuse to be compromised on matters of principle. I guess you could say Rep. Sweat found the merits of whiskey to be in the eye of the beholder. So, it seems, is the role of “speculators” in the escalation of oil prices. Politicians don’t seem eager to tell constituents the truth about oil:
我们用的石油太多了(也许是因为美国的油价比别处便宜)。
我们的汽车能效远未达到应有的水平。
今年油价以美元计价的上涨,有相当一部分可能要归因于这样一个事实:如今一美元能买到的商品(或能兑换的其他货币)比十二月份时少了不少。
哦,对了:华盛顿在燃油效率标准这类事情上,完全是掉链子了。
We use too much of it (perhaps because it’s cheaper in the U.S. than elsewhere). Our cars are less efficient than they should be. A good bit of this year’s increase in the dollar price of oil may be attributable to the fact that a dollar now buys considerably less goods (or other currencies) than it did in December. Oh yeah: and Washington completely dropped the ball in areas like fuel efficiency standards.
因此,一些政治家将油价上涨归咎于他人——投机者,这并不令人意外。但什么是投机者?这可能会得到类似斯威特议员那样的回答。问一个普通人,答案可能是一个懒散的赌徒,为了追求不义之财而轻率冒险。
在商品市场上,交易者被区分为“商业”和“非商业”两类。例如,商业交易者可能在主营业务中购买石油(如航空公司、公用事业公司或炼油厂),因此有理由对冲价格上涨风险。或者它可能是一个石油生产商,希望通过以当前价格出售其未来产量来防范价格下跌。做出价值判断的人认为这些都是“合理”的理由。
另一方面,投机者是非商业交易者——任何在其业务中不直接依赖石油的人。当前的不满情绪暗示他们购买石油没有正当理由。
但那些希望将自然资源作为平衡投资组合一部分的长期投资者呢?或者寻求通胀保护的个体?又或者希望将部分储备投资于除贬值倾向美元之外的资产的主权国家?这些动机并非“不合法”,也不应受到贬低。
特别是,有人建议应禁止养老基金交易石油。这更多与寻找替罪羊和短期认知有关,而非防止不当行为或解决我国的能源问题。
So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that some politicians are blaming the price rise on other people: speculators. But what is a speculator? That’ll bring an answer like Rep. Sweat’s. Ask a lay person, and the answer will be a shiftless gambler who takes unwise chances in pursuit of unjustified profits. In the commodities market, a distinction is made between “commercial” and “noncommercial” traders. A commercial trader may buy oil, for example, in the course of its main business (like an airline, utility or oil refiner) and thus have a reason to hedge against price rises. Or it may be an oil producer that wants to protect against falling prices by selling its future production at the current price. People making value judgments deem these to be “legitimate” reasons. Speculators, on the other hand, are non-commercial traders – anyone without direct reliance on oil in its business. The current furor implies they don’t have valid reasons for buying oil. But what about the long-term investor who wants to own natural resources as part of a balanced portfolio? Or the individual seeking protection against inflation? Or the sovereign nation that wants to put part of its reserves into something other than depreciation-prone dollars? These motives aren’t “illegitimate,” and they don’t deserve to be disparaged. In particular, some have suggested that pension funds should be barred from trading in oil. This has to have more to do with scapegoating and short-term perception than it does with preventing improper behavior or solving our nation’s energy problem.
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价格——所有东西的价格——都是由供需互动决定的,而这两者的短期波动可能淹没长期基本面。当然,上文提到的那类买家带来的增量需求,也许把近期油价推高到了原本应有的水平之上。但上涨压力无疑还来自以下几个方面:(1)消费增长(尤其在像中国和印度这样的发展中国家);(2)国际紧张局势加剧;(3)一个简单的事实——因为现在一美元能买到的东西比以前少,卖家按每桶多要些美元是合乎逻辑的。那么,投机者该承担多少责任呢?
全球每年消耗 300 亿桶石油,按当前价格计算价值超过 4 万亿美元。投资者——甚至投机者——的买入,真的能对今年这 300 亿桶石油总成本增加 1 万亿美元的大部分负责吗?我不觉得这种解释有多大道理。
当经济或市场出现重大问题,政客和媒体往往发现把矛头指向所谓的坏人很有吸引力。这比承认监管不力,或者承认我们面对难以解决的难题要容易得多。眼下的经济风波之后,肯定会引来批评甚至起诉。但任何不当行为都更像是宽松环境的症状,而不是问题的根源,惩罚这些行为也不太可能成为解决方案中有效的一环。
Prices – for everything – are set by the interaction of supply and demand, and short-term swings in these things can swamp long-term fundamentals. Certainly, incremental demand from the kinds of buyers described above may have lifted the recent price of oil above what it otherwise would have been. But upward pressure doubtless came as well from (1) increased consumption (especially in developing countries like China and India), (2) rising international tensions, and (3) the simple fact that, because a dollar now buys less than it used to, it’s logical for sellers to demand more of them per barrel. How much of the blame rightly falls on the speculators? Thirty billion barrels of oil are consumed each year worldwide, worth over $4 trillion at today’s prices. Can the buying of oil by investors – even speculators – really be responsible for much of this year’s $1 trillion increase in the total cost of those thirty billion barrels? I don’t think that explanation makes much sense. When major problems arise in the economy or markets, politicians and the media often find it attractive to point fingers at alleged evil doers. That’s a lot easier than admitting that regulation fell short, or that we face intractable problems. We’re sure to see criticism and even prosecutions following the current economic episode. But any misdeeds are likely to be symptomatic of a lax environment, not causes of the problem, and punishing them is unlikely to be an effective part of the solution.
消除对损失的恐惧
Eliminating the Fear of Loss
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几周前,我与《洛杉矶时报》一位见解独到的商业记者汤姆·彼得鲁诺进行了一次愉快的交谈。他借我们同为加州人的共同背景,提出了一个我认为非常贴切的类比。他是这样说的:
我们都听说过美联储的举措与道德风险之间的联系。过去二十年间,发生过许多事件和恐慌:黑色星期一、长期资本管理公司的崩盘、千年虫、科技泡沫破裂、9/11,以及此起彼伏的经济衰退。每当此时,美联储都会匆忙介入,通过降息和增加流动性来预防或抵消这些事件带来的负面影响。据说有几次,这些行动确实避免了世界金融体系的崩溃。
但代价就是道德风险:人们越来越预期美联储会出手拯救不谨慎的冒险者。当局的所作所为让人们以为他们总会在危难时刻伸出援手,这种做法反而鼓励了冒险行为。而我们所有人,无论是否参与其中,都要分担拯救冒险者的成本。这样一来,美联储的保护政策所鼓励的冒险行为,使得风险不断攀升。最终的结果是房地产泡沫和全面的信贷危机,两者叠加,让数百万人蒙受金钱损失,甚至可能失去了他们的住房,将金融机构推到崩溃边缘,也迫使政府耗费了大量资源去解决问题。
汤姆问我,难道看不出我们的金融体系管理与森林火灾政策之间的相似之处吗?西部各州常年遭受森林火灾,就拿
A couple of weeks ago, I had a great talk with Tom Petruno, an insightful business reporter for the Los Angeles Times. Calling on our shared experience as Californians, he presented what I consider a very apt analogy. It went like this: We’ve all heard about the connection between the Fed’s actions and moral hazard. There’ve been many incidents and scares over the last couple of decades: Black Monday, the meltdown of Long-Term Capital Management, Y2K, the bursting of the tech bubble, 9/11, and a recession here and there. Each time, the Fed rushed in with interest rate cuts and increases in liquidity designed to prevent or offset their depressing effects. A few times, it was said, these actions averted a collapse of the world financial system. But the cost was moral hazard: a growing expectation that the Fed would bail out imprudent risk takers. By behaving in ways that cause people to think they’ll always come to the rescue, authorities encourage risky behavior. And we all share the cost of rescuing the risk takers, whether we participated or not. In this way, the risk taking encouraged by the Fed’s policy of protecting participants caused the risks to grow everhigher. The result is a housing bubble and full-scale credit crunch that together have cost millions of people money and perhaps their homes, pushed financial institutions to the brink, and caused the government to expend a lot of its problem-solving resources. Tom asked if I didn’t see a parallel between the management of our financial system and the policy toward forest fires. The western states experience forest fires all the time, for
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起火的原因各式各样:闪电、乱丢的烟头、失控的野营篝火,甚至纵火。这些频繁发生的火灾虽不受欢迎,却有个好处:它们能清掉旱季里每年堆积起来的那点干灌木。
但近年来,当局为了防患于未然,总是迅速扑灭这些火。结果,灌木丛年复一年地积攒下来。今年 5 月,一连串反常的雷暴引发了 2000 处火点,积攒多年的灌木丛把其中一些变成了大灾,而当时消防资源已经捉襟见肘。
上周日,也就是 27 号,《洛杉矶时报》推出了一组关于森林火灾的重头报道。其中一段是这么写的:
政府长期扑灭野火的努力,反而让问题变得更糟……林业部门尽可能快地扑灭大部分野火,阻挠了大自然的自我清理——那些频繁、温顺的小火,曾经把内华达山脉和美国西南部的松林打扫得干干净净。如今,林地缠满了茂密的灌木和枯枝。一旦起火,往往就烧成大火。
听着耳熟吗?显然,金融危机和森林火灾之间的类比站得住脚。我跟汤姆说,正如美联储越来越倾向于解决一切问题、导致人们冒更大的风险,早灭火的政策同样制造了道德风险——它鼓励人们把房子盖到更深的林子里。最后只能由社区来保护这些不明智的建筑的安全,就像如今政府觉得自己必须去救次贷借款人和金融机构一样。
资本主义能产生巨大的成果,但参与者必须被允许既赢也输。如果不这样,他们会相信唯一可能的结果就是赢,或者最坏也就打个平手。只有在对获利的希望和对亏损的恐惧之间取得平衡时,才能做出好的商业决策。后者绝不能消除。体系必须被允许运转。当然,这又得和防止灾难的愿望相权衡,由此必然带来一些非常艰难的选择。
any number or reasons: lightning, stray cigarettes, campfires that get out of control, even arson. While undesirable, these frequent fires have a good side: they get rid of the relatively small amount of dry brush created each year during our dry season. But in recent years, the authorities promptly extinguished these fires to make sure they wouldn’t get out of control. As a result, brush was permitted to accumulate from year to year. And this May, when a series of freak lightning storms started 2,000 fires, the builtup brush turned some of them into major conflagrations at a time when fire-fighting resources were stretched thin. This past Sunday, the 27th, the Los Angeles Times kicked off a major series on forest fires. Here’s part of what it said: The government’s long campaign to tame wildfires has, perversely, made the problem worse. . . . By stamping out most wildland blazes as quickly as possible, the Forest Service has stymied nature’s housekeeping – the frequent, well-behaved fires that once cleaned up the pine forests of the Sierra Nevada and the Southwest. Now, woodlands are tangled with thick growth and dead branches. When fires break out, they often explode. Sound familiar? Clearly, the analogy between financial crises and forest fires is solid. And I told Tom that just as the Fed’s growing tendency to solve every problem led people to take greater risks, the policy of fighting fires early also created moral hazard by encouraging people to build homes further into the forest. It fell to the community to keep those unwisely built structures safe, just as the government now feels it has to rescue subprime borrowers and financial institutions. Capitalism can produce great results, but participants have to be allowed to both win and lose. If they aren’t, they come to believe the only possible outcomes are winning or, at worst, breaking even. Good business decisions can be made only if the hope for gain is balanced by the fear of loss. The latter must not be eliminated. The system must be allowed to work. Of course, this has to be balanced against the desire to prevent catastrophes, necessitating some very difficult choices.
Counting on a “V”
Counting on a “V”
U
U
最后,关于复苏前景,我想提醒一句:别抱太高指望。我听到不少人预测,明年一切会好转。比如,本月早些时候,电梯里的新闻滚动条引用了一项预测,说 2009 年房价将上涨 4%,几乎抵消 2008 年的跌幅。
人们已被调教得习惯 V 形下跌与反弹。1987 年、1990 年、1994 年、1998 年和 2002 年,我们都见过市场或经济快速下行又快速回升。但事情未必总如此。我们这些 1970 年代就混迹于这一行的人,知道另一种情形。
Finally, I want to provide a word of caution regarding expectations for recovery. I hear predictions that things will come back next year. Earlier this month, for instance, an elevator news display cited a forecast that home prices will rise 4% in 2009, almost offsetting 2008’s decline. People have become conditioned to expect V-shaped declines and recoveries. We saw quick downs and ups in the markets or the economy in 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002. But it doesn’t have to be that way. Those of us who were in this business in the 1970s know different.
2008 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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70 年代,标普 500 指数在 1973-74 年下跌 37%;所谓“漂亮五十”成长股遭遇巨额亏损;1973 年阿拉伯石油禁运;通胀率高达百分之十几;短期利率处于百分之二十几的水平;还有《商业周刊》那篇臭名昭著的封面报道《股票之死》。滞胀横行,工资与物价的螺旋式上涨似乎无路可退。人们戴着徽章宣传福特总统的 WIN 计划(“现在就打败通胀”),但无论徽章还是计划,都毫无用处。纽约的股票经纪人去开出租车,投资行业里找工作难如登天。这意味着,要想在 70 年代跻身投资行业,你基本上得在 1969 年之前就已有工作。而这又意味着,你在 1969 年时至少得满 21 岁……如今则已六十开外。我们这些人还在工作的,已经不多了。
我可以告诉你,70 年代没人谈什么“V”形反转。我们经历的是一段持续近十年的金融萎靡。当时我们最大的指望,不过是一场“碟形”复苏,和如今的情形截然不同。
正如我在三月份《潮水退去》一文中所说,经济并非硬连线,谁也无法预知事态会如何发展。况且,这次有些要素是前所未见的。综合来看,我看到的问题短期内未必能消失,而且有可能出现一段持续数月乃至数个季度的低迷期。
首先,我们来看看金融机构和房地产市场。近些年来,众所周知,这两者结合,在杠杆、创新结构设计和不计后果的购买的共同作用下,催生了一个泡沫。金融机构和房地产已遭受重创,它们还很可能给经济的其他领域带来损害。要遏制它们的下行螺旋,我认为有四件事必须发生:
The ‘70s saw a 37% decline in the S&P 500 in 1973-74; huge losses in the “nifty-fifty” growth stocks; the Arab oil embargo in 1973; inflation in the high teens; short-term interest rates in the 20s; and an infamous Business Week cover story, “The Death of Equities.” Stagflation ruled, and there seemed to be no way out of the wage-price spiral. People wore buttons promoting President Ford’s WIN program (“Whip Inflation Now”), but neither the buttons nor the program did any good. New York stockbrokers were driving cabs, and it was extremely difficult to find employment in the investment industry. That means that in order to be part of the investment industry in the ‘70s, you pretty much had to have your job by 1969. And that in turn means you had to be at least 21 by 1969 . . . and sixty or older today. There aren’t many of us still working. I can tell you, no one was talking about a “V” in the 1970s. We experienced financial malaise lasting almost a decade. The best we felt we could hope for was a “saucershaped” recovery, a far different story. As I said in “The Tide Goes Out” in March, economies aren’t hard-wired, and no one knows in advance how things will go. Further, some of the ingredients this time never have been seen before. When taken together, I see problems that may not go away any time soon and the possibility of a sluggish period lasting more than months or quarters. First, let’s consider financial institutions and the housing market. In recent years, as everyone knows, the former combined with the latter to create a bubble based on the combination of leverage, innovative structuring and heedless buying. Institutions and housing have been gravely hurt, and they’re likely to bring harm to additional sectors of the economy. For their downward spiral to be arrested, I see four things that have to happen:
房价必须止跌。
住房抵押贷款必须重新放得出来。
金融机构必须停止出现新的资产减记。
金融机构必须能够筹集新的资本,用来重建它们的资产负债表。
Home prices have to stop going down. Home mortgages have to be made available. Financial institutions have to stop experiencing incremental write-offs. Financial institutions have to be able to raise additional capital with which to rebuild their balance sheets.
我看到的问题是,这四件事环环相扣,彼此依赖——典型的“先有鸡还是先有蛋”难题。房价不停止下跌,资产减记就不会停;贷款不重新放开,房价就跌个不停;银行筹不到新资本,贷款就无从谈起;而资本要恢复充裕,又得等减记停止。哪一环会先松动,带动其他环节?又是什么促使它发生?何时发生?
这些事当然会发生。也许出于我们无法预见的原因,也许毫无来由,也许只是因为局面坏到不能再坏。我讲这些,只是想说明我看不到轻松或快速的解决之道——不过话说回来,我本来就不是个盲目乐观的人。
The problem I see is that each of these four things is dependent on the occurrence of another – a classic chicken-or-the-egg problem. Write-offs won’t stop until home prices stop going down. Prices won’t stop going down until mortgages become available. Mortgages won’t become available until lenders can raise capital. And capital won’t be freely available until write-offs stop coming. Which will happen first, facilitating the others? What will cause it to happen? When? These things will happen, of course. Maybe for reasons we can’t foresee. Maybe for no apparent reason. And maybe just because things got so bad they couldn’t get any worse. I go through this only to show why I don’t see an easy or quick solution. But then I’m rarely an unbridled optimist.
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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其次,消费者支出是经济的主要支柱,而近期前景没有理由被认为是乐观的:
Second, consumer spending is a principal lynchpin of the economy, and there’s no reason to think the near-term outlook here is positive:
就业、收入、财富效应以及整体消费心理,都可能趋于负面,进而对经济起到抑制作用。能源成本上升和房贷还款增加(因通胀担忧推高利率而加剧),两者都有可能阻碍消费支出。消费者恐怕难以像过去那样轻易借贷,信用卡可能不再那么随意可得,用房屋净值借款几乎无望,况且可借的净值本来就不多了。美国消费者多年来没有储蓄,银行里几乎没存下什么可供开销的钱。消费者或许终于意识到储蓄至关重要。果真如此,为了存钱,他就不得不量入为出——终于如此。这同样会抑制消费。
Employment, earnings, the wealth effect and consumer psychology in general are all likely to be negative, and thus to act as depressants on the economy. Higher energy costs and higher mortgage payments (driven up as inflation worries lift interest rates) both have the potential to hamper consumer spending. Consumers aren’t likely to be able to borrow as easily as in the past. Credit cards may not be available as freely. Borrowing on home equity could be nearly impossible and, anyway, there isn’t as much equity to borrow against. The American consumer hasn’t saved in years and thus has very little in the bank to spend. The consumer may realize that savings are essential – at last. If so, in order to save, he’ll have to spend less than he makes – at last. This, too, will depress spending.
过去十年——甚至到 2008 年上半年——的记录显示,美国消费者韧性惊人,打死也不愿改掉花钱的习惯。因此,消费继续坚挺并非不可能……只是不合逻辑罢了。
从根本上说,我认为这轮经济需要低头蛰伏。金融机构必须加固资产负债表,消费者也该如此。风险容忍度和金融创新都应收敛。监管注定要收紧,作为对金融机构支持的交换,联邦政府很可能会要求它们降低杠杆、少冒风险。这样一来,融资可能变得稀缺。
但积极因素确实存在。以美元计价的出口商品对世界其他地方来说非常便宜,会为美国经济托底。美联储也会竭尽全力施以援手(但降息的空间终究有限,而且对通胀必须保持警惕)。
乐观派和悲观派之间的拉锯照旧上演。7 月 18 日,《金融时报》援引德意志银行首席执行官约瑟夫·阿克曼的话说:“我们正在看到危机结束的开端。”可就在第二天,《纽约时报》又引用了艾伦·布林德(前美联储理事会副主席)的说法:“金融体系现在的状况,比一个月前看起来糟得多。”
总体而言,我依然认为,经济陷入相当长一段时间的疲软,概率更大。眼下除了住宅地产和金融机构,遍地廉价资产的日子并不常见,所以慢慢投资大概不会让你错过什么大机会。但它能让你远离麻烦,并确保手里始终有钱,去抓住前面出现的任何便宜货。在我的书里,这条路走得慢一点,最说得通。
The record over the last decade – and even the first half of 2008 – shows the American consumer to be incredibly resilient and unwilling to break the spending habit. Thus it isn’t impossible that spending will stay strong . . . just illogical. Basically, I think this economy has to hunker down. Financial institutions have to strengthen their balance sheets. Consumers should do so as well. There should be less risk tolerance and financial innovation. Regulation is destined to increase, and in exchange for its support of financial institutions, the Federal government is likely to demand that they carry less leverage and take less risk. Thus financing could be scarce. But positives do exist. Dollar-denominated exports look very cheap to the rest of the world and will bolster the U.S. economy. And the Fed will do everything possible to help (but it can reduce rates only so far and has to remain vigilant regarding inflation). The usual tug-of-war is taking place between the optimists and the pessimists. On July 18, the Financial Times quoted Deutsche Bank chief executive, Josef Ackermann, as saying, “We are seeing the beginning of the end of the crisis.” But the very next day, The New York Times quoted Alan Blinder (ex-vice chairman of the Fed board of governors): “The financial system looks substantially worse now than it did a month ago.” On balance, I continue to think the odds favor economic sluggishness for a notinsubstantial period of time. Given today’s general dearth of beaten-down assets outside of residential real estate and financial institutions, investing gradually probably won’t cause you to miss great opportunities. But it will keep you out of trouble and ensure that you have capital with which to take advantage of any bargains ahead. In my book, going slow here makes the most sense.
July 31, 2008
July 31, 2008
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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