这能行吗?

2009 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 4855 词
译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文,也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。
打开来源正文

Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

能奏效吗?

Will It Work?

前几天,我的儿子安德鲁——大四学生,未来的信贷分析师——问我是否觉得财政部长盖特纳做得对。和以往一样,他的问题引出了一段父辈的回应,后来长成了这份备忘录。

你要建一座桥,会请一位土木工程师,他的“计算”会精确决定用多少混凝土和钢材。这样桥才能稳稳承住你预期通行的车辆重量。如果你要做木工活儿,可以用专为这活儿开发并经检验的工具:像斜切盒、木工刨、抽芯钻这类冷门玩意儿。

今天要牢记的最重要一点是:经济学不是一门精确的科学。甚至可能压根算不上什么科学,因为科学的意义在于可以做受控实验,过去的结果可以放心复现,因果关系可以依赖成立。经济学被称为“沉闷的科学”,不是没有道理。

经济学里的解决方案远不如工程师的计算那么可靠,也许根本不存在一把正好合适修理经济的工具。当然,工具箱里有很多选项:降息;量化宽松;减税、退税和税收抵免;刺激支票;基建支出;注资;贷款、救助和接管;监管宽容,等等等等。但谁也不该觉得存在一把“金工具”,解问题不过是弄清楚是哪一把、然后用上它。谁要是用这个标准要求解决问题的人,那是不公平也不现实的。原因有好几条,包括这些:

The other day, my son Andrew – college senior and credit-analyst-to-be – asked whether I think Treasury Secretary Geithner is doing the right things. As has happened before, his question elicited a fatherly response that grew into this memo. When you want a bridge built, you hire a civil engineer whose “calcs” will determine exactly how much concrete and steel should be used. Then it’ll be sure to hold the weight of the cars you expect to cross it. And if you have to perform a task in carpentry, you can employ specialized tools developed and tested expressly for the job: esoteric things like miter boxes, routers and extractors. One of the most important things to bear in mind today is that economics isn’t an exact science. It may not even be much of a science at all, in the sense that in science, controlled experiments can be conducted, past results can be replicated with confidence, and cause-and-effect relationships can be depended on to hold. It’s not for nothing that economics is called “the dismal science.” Solutions in economics aren’t nearly as dependable as engineers’ calculations, and there may not be a tool that’s just right for fixing an economy. Of course, the toolbox offers lots of possibilities, including interest rate reductions; quantitative easing; tax cuts, rebates and credits; stimulus checks; infrastructure spending; capital injections; loans, rescues and takeovers; regulatory forebearances and on and on. But no one should think there’s a “golden tool,” such that solving the problem is just a matter of figuring out which one it is and applying it. Anyone who holds the problem solvers to that standard is being unfair and unrealistic. There are a number of reasons why, including these:     

每种情况各不相同,没有哪一次与以往完全一样。这意味着固定配方行不通,眼前这次更是前所未有。大多数政策行动并非全好或全坏,它们只是意识形态、目标、问题解决和资源分配之间不完美的妥协。经济问题涉及多个层面,某一方面的解决办法可能对另一方面无效,甚至可能加剧问题。经济是动态的,问题是移动的靶子,环境不断变化,不会静止不动等着某个解决办法生效。经济学的主要成分是心理,而心理的运作显然无法被完全了解、控制或修正。

Every situation is different, and none is exactly like any that has come before. That means fixed recipes can’t work. Certainly this one has never been seen before. Most policy actions aren’t all good or all bad. They merely represent imperfect compromises as to ideology, goals, problem solving and resource allocation. Economic problems are multi-faceted, meaning the solution for one aspect might not work on – and in fact might exacerbate – another aspect. Economies are dynamic, and the problems are moving targets. The environment changes constantly, rather than sitting still and waiting for a solution to work. The main ingredient in economics is psychology, and the workings of psychology clearly can’t be fully known, controlled or fixed.

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

版权所有。

All Rights Reserved

《纽约时报》1 月 31 日托马斯·弗里德曼这样写道:

人人都在寻找那个人——能准确告诉你全球金融体系症结所在、如何摆脱当前困局、以及该怎样保护储蓄的那个人……但真正令人恐惧的是:那个人不在这里,他已经离开了……

这场经济危机没有灵丹妙药,没有神奇的救助方案,也没有神奇的刺激计划。我们织就了一张错综复杂的金融乱网——次级抵押贷款裹挟在复杂债券和衍生品中,加杠杆推高,再全球化到地球各个角落——我们多么希望这一切很快结束,但这种情况极不可能。

“我懂”学派(2001 年首次出现在一份备忘录中)仍在做预测。他们拿过去的经济衰退做统计对比,从那些经验中推演解决方案。因此该学派的共识是复苏将在 2010 年第一季度启动。我还看到有人根据过去下跌与复苏之间的平均时间间隔来预测股市反弹。

我认为对当下事件抱持笃定看法是个错误。相反,我觉得这是重申“我不懂”学派信念的大好时机——我是该学派的正式成员。没有人应该确信自己知道将会发生什么,或何时发生。在这个节骨眼上,我们唯一能依靠的是内在价值、公司的生存能力,以及我们作为投资者的持久力。当然,即便是这些,也意味着我们必须对未来可能的样子做出判断。而这一要求反过来又意味着,没有任何事情可以完全安全或确定地对待。不过,如果我们认为在大多数情况下这三要素都会存在,就可以采取行动。这正是当下应有的心态。

Here’s how Thomas Friedman put it in The New York Times of January 31: Everyone is looking for the guy – the guy who can tell you exactly what ails the world’s financial system, exactly how we get out of this mess and exactly what you should be doing to protect your savings. . . . But here’s what’s really scary: the guy isn’t here. He’s left the building. . . . There is no magic bullet for this economic crisis, no magic bailout package, no magic stimulus. We have woven such a tangled financial mess with subprime mortgages wrapped in complex bonds and derivatives, pumped up with leverage, and then globalized to the far corners of the earth that, much as we want to think this will soon be over, that is highly unlikely. The “I know” school (which first appeared in a memo in 2001) is still making predictions. Statistical comparisons are being made to past recessions and solutions extrapolated from those experiences. Thus it’s the consensus of this school that the recovery will start during the first quarter of 2010. I also see people projecting a stock market rebound based on the average time between past declines and the recoveries therefrom. I think it’s a mistake to hold confident opinions about the events of today. Instead, I think this is a great time to reaffirm faith in the “I don’t know” school, of which I’m a card-carrying member. No one should feel certain they know what’s going to unfold, or when. The only things we have to fall back on at this juncture are intrinsic value, company survival and our own staying power as investors. Of course, even these things mean we have to make judgments about what the future is likely to look like. That requirement, in turn, means nothing can be approached with complete safety or certainty. Nevertheless, we can take action if we think those three elements will be present under most circumstances. That’s the right mindset for today.

比数独还难

想从经济工具箱里找到一件趁手的完美工具,根本办不到。今天面临的挑战随便列几条就能说明问题。要是想练练脑子,别玩数独或填字游戏了,来试试破解这些难题吧:

Harder Than Sudoku The impossibility of reaching into the economic toolbox for that one perfect tool is easily illustrated with a list of some of the challenges present today. For a learning exercise, skip today’s Sudoku or crossword puzzle and take a crack at resolving these dilemmas:    

消费者信心和支出疲软。我们希望刺激经济,但又不愿用恶性通胀来替代疲软。

我们愿意放弃财政纪律,转而通过赤字支出实施刺激,但又不想吓跑海外投资者,让他们不敢购买我们为弥补赤字而发行的国债。

我们愿意发放刺激支票,但似乎无法让恐慌的民众把这笔钱花出去,而不是存起来。

事实上,我们知道消费者之所以陷入困境,是因为支出超出了收入,而

Consumer confidence and spending are weak. We want to stimulate, but we don’t want to replace weakness with hyperinflation. We’re willing to drop fiscal discipline in favor of stimulus through deficit spending, but we don’t want to scare away offshore investors from the Treasury securities we’ll issue to fund our deficits. We’re willing to distribute stimulus checks, but we seem unable to make frightened individuals spend the money rather than save it. In fact, we know consumers got into trouble by spending more than they earned, and

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

2

2

保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

     

    

 

现在他们应该积累一些储蓄。然而,近期消费者支出增长快于收入增长,而储蓄率上升意味着支出增长将慢于收入增长,而此刻正值收入下滑、急需支出之际。同样,随着税收收入减少,各州和城市必须平衡预算。一个办法是提高所得税和销售税率,但这将进一步抑制地方经济,加重受困民众的负担。

我们想为银行注资,但不想奖励过去的错误。我们考虑购买银行的"有毒"资产。但如果出价高于市场价,那就是对鲁莽者的补贴(见上文);若按市场价或低于市场价购买,则又会因减记进一步侵蚀银行资本。

我们知道,暂停按市值计价会计法能终止减记,但这样做也可能削弱市场对资产负债表的信心,并推迟金融机构触底复苏所需的那一天到来。

我们想让银行放贷,但不能也不应该强迫它们向无信用资格的借款人放贷。

我们想减少住房止赎的发生,但不想奖励那些通过购买多套住房进行投机或在房贷申请中撒谎的人。而且,我们宁愿不宽待那些买了超出承受能力住房的人,而亏待那些行事谨慎的人。

我们想为无力偿还房贷的人提供救济,但不想给人们停止还款的激励。

我们正在考虑让破产法官重新设定抵押合同条款,但不想告诉贷款人贷款合同不再神圣不可侵犯,那肯定会让他们不愿发放新贷款。

我们不希望汽车公司破产及其供应商和经销商随之倒闭带来的负面影响。但除非我们确信该行业能以有竞争力的价格生产出好车,否则我们也不愿向该行业注资。

我们希望看到汽车行业"合理化",但这意味着看到人们失业或减薪,这会扩散痛苦,给福利基金带来压力,并削减国内生产总值。

我们希望纳税人支持的汽车制造商使用美国钢铁,但(假设其比进口钢材更贵)这将要么(a)提高汽车价格,让本已拮据的购车者付出更高成本,使三大汽车巨头更加缺乏竞争力;要么(b)要求公司自行消化差额,使它们更难实现盈利。

我们想抑制衍生品投机,但不想让企业、农民、保险公司和投资者合法对冲风险变得更加困难。

事实上,我们想遏制企业界的过度行为,但大多数人认为,将企业国有化或由政府指令其经营并非好主意。

now they should build some savings. But whereas in the recent past consumer spending grew faster than incomes, a rising savings rate means spending would grow slower than incomes, just at a time when incomes are falling and spending is needed. Likewise, with tax revenues down, states and cities have to balance their budgets. One way to do so is to raise income tax and sales tax rates, but this will further depress local economies and increase the burden on their beleaguered citizens. We want to recapitalize the banks, but we don’t want to reward past mistakes. We’re thinking about buying the banks’ “toxic” assets. But if we pay above-market prices, that’s a subsidy to the reckless (see above), and if we pay market or belowmarket prices, that will further erode bank capital through write-downs. We know suspending mark-to-market accounting would end write-downs, but doing so might also reduce confidence in balance sheets and postpone the day of reckoning needed for our financial institutions to reach bottom and recover. We want the banks to lend, but we can’t – and shouldn’t – make them extend loans to non-creditworthy borrowers. We want to reduce the incidence of home foreclosure, but we don’t want to reward people who speculated by buying multiple homes or lied on mortgage applications. And we’d rather not treat people who bought more house than they could afford better than those who acted prudently. We want to make mortgage relief available to those who are unable to service their mortgages, but we don’t want to give people incentives to stop making payments. We’re considering letting bankruptcy judges reset mortgage contracts, but we don’t want to tell lenders that loan contracts are no longer sacrosanct, which certainly would deter them from making new loans. We don’t want the depressant impact of auto companies going bankrupt and suppliers and dealers following suit. But we also don’t want to pump money into the industry unless we’re confident it can produce good cars at competitive prices. We want to see the auto industry “rationalized,” but that means seeing people lose their jobs or have their paychecks reduced, which would spread pain, put stress on benefit funds, and cut into GDP. We want taxpayer-supported automakers to use American steel, but (assuming it’s more expensive than imported steel) that will either (a) raise car prices, making cars more expensive for hard-pressed buyers and making the Big 3 less competitive, or (b) require the companies to eat the difference, making it harder for them to achieve profitability. We want to curb speculation in derivatives, but we don’t want to make it harder for businesses, farmers, insurers and investors to legitimately hedge risk. In fact, we want to prevent excesses on the part of business, but most people don’t think it’s a good idea to nationalize companies or have the government tell them how to operate.

这张清单已经清楚地表明——而且这只是部分清单——解决当前问题需要妥协,并把各种不同的要素结合起来。有些措施会奏效,另一些则会失败,不得不更换。有些措施在问题的某一方面能起作用,却会加剧另一方面。最后,谁都不该指望,即使明智的组合能迅速产生结果。

It’s abundantly clear from this list – and it’s only a partial list – that solving the current problem will require compromises and a combination of disparate elements. Some will work, while others will fail and have to be replaced. And some will work with regard to one facet of the problem but aggravate another. Lastly, no one should think that even a wise combination will produce quick results.

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

3

3

版权所有,保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

监管超额薪酬

政府想叫停的种种过火行为,有一部分出在受援银行的薪酬领域。超额薪酬跟硬核色情有不少共通之处:美国最高法院大法官波特·斯图尔特当年写后者时就说,这东西很难定义,但“我一看就知道”。

一家机构亏了数十亿美元、要靠纳税人救助,却还砸下数百万甚至数十亿美元给高管发奖金,旁人看了自然反感。可超额薪酬到底怎么界定,又该怎么管?更重要的是,怎么保证这副药不会比病本身还糟?

2 月 14 日《华尔街日报》报道:

国会周五通过的庞大刺激方案里,末尾加了一条,限制接受联邦资金的公司给高层发奖金的规模……最严的薪酬限制是:任何拿钱的公司在支付高层奖金时,不得超过其全年总薪酬的三分之一。

对拿纳税人钱支持的机构在薪酬上设点限制,看起来合理,也躲不开。可这条规定真是好事吗?问题就摆在这儿:

Regulating Excess Compensation Some of the excesses the government wants to stop are in the area of compensation at rescued banks. Excessive compensation seems to have a lot in common with hard-core pornography: As Potter Stewart, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote about the latter, it’s hard to define but “I know it when I see it.” It’s easy to react adversely when an institution that lost billions and needed a taxpayer bailout is seen paying millions or billions in executive bonuses. But how do we define excessive compensation, and what should be done about it? More importantly, how do we make sure the cure won’t be worse than the disease? On February 14, The Wall Street Journal reported that, The giant stimulus package that cleared Congress Friday includes a lastminute addition that restricts bonuses for top earners at firms receiving federal cash . . . The most stringent pay restriction bars any company receiving funds from paying top earners bonuses equal to more than onethird of their total annual compensation. Some limitation on compensation at taxpayer-supported institutions seems reasonable and unavoidable. But is this provision a good thing? Here are some of the problems:  

 

   

限制并未涉及薪酬,只针对奖金。

奖金——尤其是与业绩挂钩的奖金——从股东和纳税人的角度看,应当优于高额固定工资。事实上,就在几年前,联邦立法还曾倾向于与业绩基准挂钩的激励性薪酬。

一位年薪 100 万美元的高管,若获得 50 万美元奖金,则符合这一限制。但一位年薪 25 万美元的高管,若获得 20 万美元奖金,反而违规。纳税人会倾向于前者而非后者吗?

过去的挑战,比如为第二次世界大战动员工业,是通过招募“一美元年薪”的领导者来应对的。这里或许可以期待,有能力的商界人士愿意只为一笔丰厚的成功酬金而挺身而出。花旗集团首席执行官维克拉姆·潘迪特的年薪仅为 1 美元。我们真要把他的奖金限制在 50 美分吗?

新法律将限制接受纳税人援助的银行的奖金,而非所有银行。这是否会让受救助的银行沦为二流管理?进而沦为二流盈利能力?这是否可取?

银行管理层和董事会或许希望避开这一限制,为此他们可能拒绝或急于偿还联邦资金。这样做可能减少银行的资本,削弱其实力,抑制其放贷能力。

即便是银行中最大的输家,也拥有一些盈利部门和一流的经理人。我们是否希望这些薄弱机构因为无法提供有竞争力的薪酬,而将这些人才拱手让给更强的同行?

近年来一些银行经理人犯下严重错误,这难道就意味着所有银行高管都不配享有高额薪酬吗?这难道就意味着

It doesn’t limit compensation, just bonuses. Bonuses – especially if tied to achievements – should be preferable to high salaries from the point of view of shareholders and taxpayers. In fact, it was just a few years ago that federal legislation created a preference for incentive compensation tied to benchmarks. An executive with a $1 million salary is in compliance with this restriction if he receives a bonus of $500,000. But one who’s paid $250,000 is in violation if he receives a bonus of $200,000. Should the taxpayer prefer the former to the latter? Past challenges, like mobilizing industry for World War II, were met by recruiting “dollar-a-year” leaders. One hope here might be that able businesspeople will come forward to work for nothing but a big success fee. Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit is receiving a salary of $1. Should we really limit his bonus to 50 cents? The new law will limit bonuses at taxpayer-assisted banks, not all banks. Will that doom the rescued banks to second-rate management? And thus second-rate profitability? Is that desirable? Bank managements and boards may want to avoid this limitation, and to do that they may turn down or rush to repay federal money. Doing so may reduce the banks’ capital, weakening them and inhibiting their ability to lend. Even the biggest losers among the banks had some profitable units and excellent managers. Do we want the weak institutions to lose these to their stronger peers because they can’t pay competitively? Does the fact that some bank managers made grave mistakes in recent years mean no bank executives can be deserving of high compensation? Does the

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

4

4

保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

政府真的想给银行业贴上污名,把有能力的银行高管赶到薪酬不受管制的行业去吗?我上一次看到一项关于企业行为的立法获得近乎一致的拥护,是在 2002 年安然丑闻之后。美国企业至今仍在承受《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》中一些考虑不周的条款带来的后果。

government really want to stigmatize the field of banking and chase able executives from it to industries where compensation is unregulated? The last time I saw legislation with near-unanimous appeal on a corporate-behavior issue was in 2002, after the Enron scandal. American business is still suffering from some of Sarbanes-Oxley’s less-well-conceived provisions.

观察者们对复苏计划未能迅速公布或缺乏细节感到失望。然而,这里有一条快速且详尽加入的规定,它对推动事态进展却作用不大。归根结底,想要快速解决问题,恐怕难以实现。

Observers are disappointed when recovery plans aren’t announced quickly or in detail. Yet here’s a provision that was inserted quickly and in detail, and it doesn’t do a lot to advance the ball. Bottom line: a quick fix will prove hard to come by.

谁是对的?

我母亲过去常讲一个关于“老村子”——旧大陆的犹太村镇——的故事,在那里,争执由拉比来裁决。有个村子里,一场争吵闹得不可开交,毫无妥协余地。村民把双方带到拉比面前。“说说你的道理,”拉比对其中一人说,那人便说了。“你说得对,”拉比宣布。

一个旁观者插嘴道:“拉比,您不能跟他说他对;您还没听另一方的说法呢。”于是拉比让另一方讲他的道理,他也讲了。他的说法与对方截然相反。“你说得对,”拉比说。

“等等,拉比,”一个村民说,“第一个人讲了他的故事,您说他对。然后另一个人讲了他的故事——各方面都不一样——您也说他对。他们不可能都对。”“你也说得对,”拉比说。

眼下关于银行国有化的争议表明,(a)一个问题两边都可以有站得住脚的论点,(b)要搞清楚谁对可能很难。以下是《华尔街日报》2 月 24 日提出的一些正反观点:

国有化企业有什么好处?

一些银行正在缓慢地走向资不抵债。及时将它们国有化,可以让政府清理掉最具毒性的资产,重组剩余部分,然后把残骸卖给私人投资者。从更广的范围看,国有化有助于治愈银行体系,并鼓励剩余的公司增加放贷。

有哪些坏处?

被国有化银行的投资者可能会血本无归。而且,哪怕只国有化一两家银行,也可能引发一连串的信心崩溃……

国有化还会代价高昂、操作复杂,给本不擅长运营超级大公司的官僚机构增添负担。而虽说目标是

Who’s Right? My mother used to tell a story about the shtetls – villages – in the old country where disagreements were settled by the rabbi. In one, an argument was raging with no possible grounds for compromise. The villagers brought the two parties to the rabbi. “Tell your side,” the rabbi said to one fellow, and he did. “You’re right,” the rabbi declared. One of the bystanders piped up: “You can’t tell him he’s right, rabbi; you haven’t heard the other side of the story.” So the rabbi told the other party to tell his side, and he did. His story was the polar opposite of the other party’s. “You’re right,” said the rabbi. “Hold on, rabbi,” a villager said, “the first guy told his story and you said he was right. Then the other guy told his story – different in every regard – and you said he was right. They both can’t be right.” “And you’re right,” said the rabbi. The current disagreement over bank nationalization shows that (a) there can be valid arguments on both sides of an issue and (b) it can be hard to figure out who’s right. Here are a few of the pros and cons as advanced by The Wall Street Journal on February 24: What are the pluses to nationalizing firms? Some banks are bleeding slowly toward insolvency. Nationalizing them promptly would allow the government to wipe out the most toxic assets, reorganize what is left and sell the remains to private investors. On a broader front, nationalization could help heal the banking system and encourage the remaining firms to boost lending. What are the minuses? Investors in the nationalized bank would likely be wiped out. And nationalizing even one or two banks could create a chain reaction of failing confidence. . . . Nationalization would also be expensive and complicated, taxing a bureaucracy that isn’t set up to operate mega-firms. And while the goal of

2009 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司。

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

5

5

版权所有。

All Rights Reserved

国有化的结果或许是把企业归还到私人手中,但出于政治目的经营这些企业的诱惑将是巨大的。显然,双方各执一词。

nationalization may be to return companies to private hands, the temptation to run them for political purposes would be immense. Obviously, there are arguments on both sides.

一个提案

前几天晚上,我和朋友理查德·雷斯勒共进晚餐,他是 CIM 集团的负责人兼创始人。他对如何解决问题有个想法(一如既往),而且这个想法相当不错。下面我来概括一下他对银行业的看法:

One Proposal The other night, I had dinner with my friend Richard Ressler, principal and founder of CIM Group. He has an idea as to how things can be fixed (as usual), and it’s a pretty good one. I’ll summarize below his thoughts on the banking industry:   

有些银行机构因规模庞大、影响深远,理应获得存款保险、政府担保和救助的支持。这些银行只应从事吸收存款和发放贷款这类平常业务,不应采用超高杠杆或进行另类投资,也不应通过不受监管的表外子公司开展业务。那些想涉足这些银行禁区业务的机构可以自行其是,但得不到政府保护。如果想扛起 30 倍杠杆去追逐自营利润,就得自己承担后果。

因此,银行业务与高风险投资应当分离开来。

There are banking institutions which, because of their magnitude and significance, should be supported through deposit insurance, government guarantees and rescues. These banks should engage only in the prosaic acts of accepting deposits and making loans. They should not take on ultra-high leverage or make exotic investments. And they shouldn’t do business through unregulated, off-balance-sheet subsidiaries. Institutions that wish to do things that are off-limits to these banks should do so, but without the benefit of government protection. If they want to take on 30-times leverage and pursue proprietary profits, they should bear the consequences themselves. Thus banking and risky investing should be separated.

2 月 2 日的《纽约时报》上,普林斯顿大学教授保罗·克鲁格曼提出,我们必须避免“柠檬社会主义”:事情搞砸了,纳税人承担代价;事情办成了,股东和高管拿走好处。理查德提到的办法,正是防止这种情况的一条路:确保政府支持和超强风险承担不会发生在同一家企业里。

有人告诉我,这句话不是马克·吐温说的,但一句广泛归到他名下的谚语似乎正中要害:“历史不会重演,但总会押韵。”我们不需要发明新的机制来实现上述目标;可以回望历史,从《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》中汲取灵感。

大崩盘之后,国会委员会调查了其原因,其中一些让人想起今天的情况。调查的结果就是这部 1933 年法案,它规定银行业必须与投资银行业务和投资服务分开。与当前形势关系密切的是,格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的效力在 1999 年终结,当时其关键条款被《格雷姆-里奇-比利雷法案》废除。这部新法律的目标是,通过允许金融集团共同持股,鼓励银行、投资服务和保险领域的竞争。

保护社会免受政府担保机构从事高风险投资活动的影响,是好事。金融服务领域的竞争,也是好事。但这两个目标可能相互冲突,必须加以权衡,而关于孰轻孰重的共识会不时摇摆。因此,除了

In The New York Times of February 2, Professor Paul Krugman of Princeton argued that we have to avoid “lemon socialism: taxpayers bear the cost if things go wrong, but stockholders and executives get the benefits if things go right.” One way to prevent this, as Richard suggests, is to make sure government support and high-octane risk taking don’t take place in the same firms. I’ve been told it isn’t his, but a saying widely attributed to Mark Twain seems to be on the mark: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” There’s no need to invent the mechanism through which to accomplish the above; we can look to history and gain inspiration from the Glass-Steagall Act. After the Great Crash, congressional committees investigated its causes, some of which remind one of today’s. The result was this 1933 law, which mandated that banking be separated from investment banking and investment services. It’s far from irrelevant to the current situation that Glass-Steagall’s powers ended in 1999, when key parts were repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. This new law had the goal of encouraging competition in banking, investment services and insurance, by permitting common ownership by financial conglomerates. Protecting society against risky investment activities on the part of governmentinsured institutions is a good thing. And competition in providing financial services is a good thing. But the two goals can be in conflict and have to be balanced, and the consensus as to which should prevail will oscillate from time to time. So in addition to

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

6

6

版权所有,保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

没有完美的解决方案,同样也可能没有一劳永逸的解决方案。正因如此,危机才会不断重演,历史才会不断押韵。

there not being perfect solutions, there also may not be permanent solutions. That’s why crises will recur and history will continue to rhyme.

一如既往的政治

商业人士乃至许多普通公民,闻之色变的莫过于本段标题这三个字。日前,一位曾身居高位的老友道出了华盛顿的生存法则,将其归纳为“三大 P”。

Politics as Usual Few phrases strike terror in the hearts of businesspeople and many just-plain-citizens more than the three little words that are the title of this section. The other day, a friend with high-up experience explained the facts of life in Washington. He organized his observations into the “Three P’s.”   

政策是在高层次的理性辩论中形成的。善意之士可以各持己见,但政策分析往往基于事实和底层意识形态,路径相对直接。

流程是政策转化为行动所经由的机制。它复杂而隐秘,唯有在华盛顿历练过的人才能驾驭。

政治则塑造政策所化身的法律。我那位朋友对此有过许多形容,但最令我印象深刻的一个词是“令人作呕”。

Policy is fashioned through intellectual debate conducted on a high plane. Wellmeaning people can disagree, but policy analysis follows from facts and underlying ideology in a relatively straightforward way. Process is the mechanism through which policy is turned into action. It is complex and arcane and the exclusive province of people with experience in Washington. Politics shapes the law that policy becomes. My friend had lots of words for it, but the one that stood out to me was “distasteful.”

顺便说一句,我那位朋友还指出了政府和企业之间一个重要的区别——他在这两个领域都极有经验。他说,在企业里,每个人的主要目标都是公司的成功。为公司成功做贡献能让一个人展现能力,从而在组织中晋升。公司的成功创造出一池利润,个人能从中获得丰厚回报。这同时也算是为团队赢了一场“胜利”,而每个人都想成为这个团队的一员。

但在政府里,成功难以衡量,难以归因于任何一个人的贡献,而且来得也慢。因此,很难把政府的成功视为当选官员的主要动机。相反,最重要的是能连任。这种个人化、短期的考量,可能与国家的长期福祉毫无关系。他说,在众议院尤其如此,因为两年任期意味着议员们永远都在为连任竞选奔波。

尽管国家面临危机,亟需迅速行动,我们却看到了不少照旧的政治把戏。YouTube 上能近距离围观这些东西,它还给了政客们许多人似乎渴望的观众。

如今,对银行家、抵押贷款机构和信用评级机构的私刑心态大行其道。我不是说其中很多不是罪有应得,但仍然可能做得过头了。把某个所谓的恶棍往死里踩,永远都是好看的政治戏码——不管是 1986 年给戴着手铐的内幕交易者来一场游街示众,还是 2009 年对银行家的电视听证会。

你去 YouTube 上看看国会如何拷问银行家,就能明白我认为那是诽谤和人身攻击(“诉诸人的偏见、情绪或特殊利益”)了。

As an aside, my friend laid out an important difference between government and business, in which he’s also highly experienced. In business, he says, everyone’s main goal is the success of the company. Contributing to the success of the company enables an individual to demonstrate ability and thus rise in the organization. Success for the company creates a pool of profits from which the individual can be well paid. It also amounts to a “win” for a team of which every person wants to be a member. But in government, success is hard to measure, difficult to connect to any one individual’s contribution, and slow in coming. Thus it’s hard to view success for the government as constituting elected officials’ primary motivation. Instead, the most important thing is getting re-elected. That personal, short-term consideration can have nothing to do with the long-term well-being of the nation. This is especially true in the House of Representatives, he says, where two-year terms mean the members are never done running for re-election. Despite the crisis facing the country and the crying need for prompt action, we’re seeing a good dose of politics as usual. YouTube provides an up-close look at this stuff. It also gives politicians the audience many seem to crave. Today a lynch-mob attitude prevails toward bankers, mortgage lenders and credit-rating agencies. I’m not saying a lot of it isn’t deserved, but it still can be overdone. It’s always good political theater to pile on a purported villain, whether through a perp-walk for handcuffed inside traders in 1986 or a televised congressional hearing for bankers in 2009. Check out Congress’s grilling of bankers on YouTube and you’ll see what I think is vilification and ad hominem attack (“appealing to one’s prejudices, emotions, or special

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

7

7

版权所有

All Rights Reserved

(该词条出自《随机屋词典》,指“诉诸个人利益而非理智或理性”)而面向公众传播。一位国会议员对花旗银行首席执行官维克拉姆·潘迪特说,他对银行达成的一笔交易感到震惊:“政府拿到 70 亿美元的优先股,却要承担 2500 亿美元的损失风险……你告诉我,潘迪特先生:我在哪里能找到这样的交易?”潘迪特解释说,这是一份保险:花旗以 70 亿美元为保费,获得了一份覆盖 3010 亿美元抵押贷款证券的保单,花旗自身承担前 30 亿美元的损失,以及超出部分损失的 10%。

保险单的购买价格远低于保险公司承担的风险金额,这难道有什么好意外的?如果不是这样,谁还会买保险呢?根据这份保单,如果损失不超过 380 亿美元,花旗就会赔钱(在这种情况下,花旗在前 30 亿美元损失上拿不到任何赔付,但会获得接下来 80 亿美元损失的 90%,因此所得金额恰好等于其支付的 70 亿美元保费)。这笔交易真的算得上白送吗?国会议员得知政府倾向于看到花旗存活下来并愿意给它一笔优惠交易,真的应该感到惊讶吗?

在竞选过程中和获胜后,奥巴马总统都呼吁超越党派之争、团结行动。既然民主党掌控白宫和国会,对他来说,这意味着共和党人应该投票支持主要由民主党人制定的解决方案。到目前为止,这并未实现。在刺激方案上,国会中 217 名共和党议员里只有 3 人——刚刚超过 1%——与民主党多数派投了相同的票。(而在 308 名民主党议员中,也只有 7 人站在共和党一边。)两党之间几乎没有跨党派合作。当然,广泛共识难得一见,原因有很多:

interests rather than to one’s intellect or reason” – Random House Dictionary) intended for public consumption. One congressman told Vikram Pandit, Citibank’s CEO, he was amazed by a deal the bank had made: “The government gets $7 billion in preferred stock and the government’s on the hook for $250 billion of losses. . . . You tell me, Mr. Pandit: where can I get a deal like this?” Pandit explained that it was insurance: for a premium of $7 billion, Citibank got a policy covering $301 billion of mortgage securities, with Citi taking the first $30 billion of losses and 10% of any losses beyond that. Should it come as a surprise that an insurance policy costs significantly less to buy than the amount of risk assumed by the insurer? If it didn’t, why would anyone buy one? Under this policy, Citi will lose money if there aren’t $38 billion in losses (in which case Citi would receive nothing on the first $30 billion but 90% of the next $8 billion, so proceeds would be equal to the $7 billion premium it had paid). Was this deal really such a giveaway? And should the Congressman really be surprised to learn the government has a preference for seeing Citi survive and is willing to cut it a good deal? On the campaign trail and in victory, President Obama called for non-partisanship and united action. With Democrats controlling the White House and Congress, to him that means Republicans should vote in favor of solutions crafted primarily by Democrats. So far, it’s not happening. On the stimulus package, only three of the 217 Republican votes in Congress – just over one percent – were cast with the Democratic majority. (And only seven of the 308 Democratic votes went with the Republicans.) Not much aisle crossing in either direction. Of course, there are lots of reasons why broad agreement is rarely seen: 

个人与个人、政党与政党之间,确实存在真正的意识形态分歧。有人希望政府扩大职能来解决问题,有人则更愿依靠自由市场。有人认为增加政府开支是解决问题的关键,有人则倾向于减税。有人想救助实力薄弱的金融机构,有人则认为只有最强、经营最好的机构才应存活。因此,不与多数人保持一致,未必就是人品有缺陷。

Genuine ideological differences exist between individuals and between parties. Some want an expanded government to fix problems, and others prefer to rely on free markets to do so. Some view increased government spending as holding the key to the solution, and others prefer to reduce taxes. Some want to rescue weak financial institutions, and others want only the strongest, best-run to survive. Thus, failing to go along with the majority isn’t necessarily a sign of a character flaw.

动机层面的差异同样言之成理。总统是国家层面的官员,职责在于寻求整体方案。但议员由地方选举产生,代表地方利益,这些利益可能与其他地区乃至国家整体利益相左。他们为选民争取特定利益,本不应令人意外。

There are also valid differences in motivation. The president is a national officer whose job it is to find an overall solution. But legislators are elected locally to represent local interests, and those can diverge from the interests of other regions or the nation. It shouldn’t come as a surprise that they push for particular benefits for their constituents.

最后就是个人利益。事实上,双方各自心底的目标都是想让本党成员当选,同时让对方难堪。哪怕解决一个严峻的国家问题迫在眉睫,保守派给出的方案也可能让自由派选区的选民反感、无法接受,反之亦然。于是,做“正确的事”几乎等于政治自杀。有多少民选官员会去选后者呢?

Finally there comes self-interest. The truth is that each party has the underlying goal of wanting to elect its members and make the other side look bad. And even if it’s needed to solve a grave national problem, a conservative answer might be repugnant and unacceptable to voters in a liberal district, and vice versa. Thus, doing the “right thing” can be tantamount to political suicide. How many elected officials will choose the latter?

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

8

8

版权所有。

All Rights Reserved

今日之论调

我认为政府里那些正在应对当前局势的人,面临的是一道难啃的骨头:

Today’s Rhetoric I think people in government who’re addressing the situation have a difficult row to hoe: 

首先,也是最紧迫的一点,他们不得不夸大紧急状况,以便让立法者(以及那些把他们选上台的选民)相信形势严峻,必须采取强有力行动。因此,我们听到了诸如“灾难”“崩溃”和“大萧条以来最严重”这样的字眼。

First and most immediately, they’ve had to play up the emergency in order to convince legislators (and the voters who put them in office) that the situation is dire and strong action is required. Thus we’ve heard words like “catastrophe,” “collapse” and “worst since the Great Depression.”

其次,他们最好还是淡化这种威胁。富兰克林·D. 罗斯福因说过“我们唯一需要恐惧的就是恐惧本身”而备受赞誉。鉴于信心在经济运行中扮演的关键角色,散布恐慌并非明智之举。受惊人群的理性反应是储蓄而非消费,卖出而非买入投资,这会让情况变得更糟。

Second, however, they’re well advised to play down the threat. Franklin D. Roosevelt receives a lot of credit for having said, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Given the crucial role of confidence in the functioning of an economy, it’s not a great idea to spread panic. The rational response of frightened people is to save rather than spend, and to sell investments rather than buy, making things worse.

第三,总统很可能会想设立一个适度的预期。如果大家觉得有效的应对措施应该立竿见影,那么进展缓慢就会被看作失败。谁都不想让消费者和企业因为在 2009 年经济复苏无望而进一步缩手缩脚。

Third, the President likely wants to create modest expectations. If there’s a feeling that a valid response should work right away, slow progress will look like failure. No one wants consumers and businesses to further pull in their horns if economic recovery isn’t forthcoming in 2009.

人们很难不同情这种两难处境。这再次表明,在现实的经济与政治世界中,相互冲突的目标总得有所妥协。

It’s hard not to be sympathetic to this dilemma. It shows another of the ways in which conflicting goals have to be compromised in the real world of economics and politics.

结论

当前局面——以及它的成因和我们希望达成的解决方案——牵涉的环节太多,我尽量把关键点提炼出来。要让体系重回正轨、让经济重新运转起来,我认为必须完成三件大事:

The Bottom Line There are so many moving parts to the current situation – and to its causes and what we hope will be its solution – that I’ve tried to boil things down to the essentials. In order to right the system and get the economy moving forward again, I think three main things have to be accomplished:   

我们的经济及其各个组成部分都必须去杠杆化;资本的大规模破坏必须得到处理;信心必须得到恢复。

Our economy and its component parts have to be delevered; The vast destruction of capital has to be dealt with; and Confidence has to be restored.

保罗·克鲁格曼在《纽约时报》2 月 16 日的文章中这样描述这一挑战:

过去十年的大部分时间里,美国是借贷者和花费者的国家,而非储蓄者……

然而直到最近,美国人还相信自己正变得更富有,因为他们收到的账单显示,房产和股票投资组合的升值速度超过了债务的增长速度……

Here’s how Paul Krugman described the challenge in The New York Times of February 16: For most of the last decade America was a nation of borrowers and spenders, not savers. . . . Yet until very recently Americans believed they were getting richer, because they received statements saying that their houses and stock portfolios were appreciating in value faster than their debts were increasing. . . .

2009 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

9

9

版权所有。

All Rights Reserved

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

现实随即给了当头一棒,事实证明,那些忧心忡忡的人一直都看对了。资产价值的飙升是一场幻觉——而债务的激增却再真实不过……

……这是一场全方位的乱局。人人都在谈论银行的问题,它们的情况确实比体系内其他环节更为糟糕。但负债过多、资产过少的玩家绝不止银行;对整个私营部门来说,同样的描述也完全适用。正如美国伟大的经济学家欧文·费雪在 1930 年代指出的那样,当人们意识到自己债务过重时所做的事情,如果所有人都同时这么干,往往会适得其反。抛售资产、偿还债务的努力会加剧资产价格的下跌,进一步侵蚀净资产。增加储蓄的努力会转化为消费需求的崩塌,加深经济衰退。

……政府官员明白这个问题:我们需要“遏制这个极具破坏性、且可能引发通缩的螺旋”,奥巴马的高级经济顾问劳伦斯·萨默斯如是说。债务必须削减,而削减也确实在进行中(当然,联邦层面除外)。但削减的过程通常令人不快:破产、丧失抵押品赎回权、债务重组。“减债”听起来是件好事,但它很可能伴随着用借来的钱买下的资产被痛苦地剥夺。

许多资产的价值远低于从前——这正是债务负担变得不堪承受、不得不削减的主要原因之一。投资者、消费者、房主和金融机构将不得不重建自己的资本,与此同时,它们和整个经济一起,努力再次向前迈进。

信心也必须重建。只有当人们相信收入和资产价值将恢复增长时,借贷、消费和投资的意愿才会回升。

过去,我们看到过一种标准模式在展开,最典型的例子出现在公司债务领域。一旦否认结束,人们接受资本毁灭这一事实,重组就可以进行,债务被清偿,所有权易手。资产向新所有者转移——他们可能拥有更低的成本基础,并有能力注入额外资本——带来了可观回报的可能性,而回报的出现重新点燃了投资的兴趣。这种模式在今后几年中将成为一大主题,看来是不可避免的。

政府的行动显然旨在实现我说我们需要做的三件事。有些会奏效,有些则不会。我相信,最终,他们尝试的各种措施——加上上述模式以及积极的一面——

Then reality struck, and it turned out that the worriers had been right all along. The surge in asset values had been an illusion – but the surge in debt had been all too real. . . . . . . this is a broad-based mess. Everyone talks about the problems of the banks, which are indeed in even worse shape than the rest of the system. But the banks aren’t the only players with too much debt and too few assets; the same description applies to the private sector as a whole. As the great American economist Irving Fisher pointed out in the 1930s, the things people and companies do when they realize they have too much debt tend to be self-defeating when everyone tries to do them at the same time. Attempts to sell assets and pay off debt deepen the plunge in asset prices, further reducing net worth. Attempts to save more translate into a collapse of consumer demand, deepening the economic slump. . . . Government officials understand the issue: we need to “contain what is a very damaging and potentially deflationary spiral,” says Lawrence Summers, a top Obama economic adviser. Debt has to be reduced, and it’s happening (other than at the federal level, of course). But the way it happens is usually unpleasant: bankruptcies, foreclosures and debt restructurings. “Debt reduction” sounds like a good thing, but it’s likely to be accompanied by the painful loss of the assets that had been bought with borrowed money. Many assets are worth far less than they used to be – that’s one of the main reasons why the debt load has become unbearable and has to be reduced. Investors, consumers, homeowners and financial institutions will have to rebuild their capital as they – and the economy – attempt to again move ahead. And confidence has to be rebuilt, too. The willingness to borrow, spend and invest will rebound only when people believe incomes and asset values will resume their growth. In the past, we’ve seen a standard pattern unfold, with the best examples falling in the corporate debt arena. Once denial ends and people accept capital destruction as a fact, restructurings can take place in which debt is discharged and ownership changes hands. The transition of assets to new owners, who may have lower cost bases and the ability to inject additional capital, brings the possibility of attractive returns, the onset of which restores interest in investing. It seems inescapable that this pattern will be a major feature of the next few years. The government’s actions clearly are aimed at accomplishing the three things I say we need. Some will work, and some won’t. I believe that, eventually, the combination of things they try – along with the pattern described above and the positive bent that

2009 年橡树资本管理有限公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

10

10

版权所有,保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

是自由市场体系的基础——将让我们重回上升轨道。只是这条路上不会轻松、不会迅速,也不会毫无痛苦。

正因如此,我认为我们今天做出的投资决策,必须把价值、生存能力和持久力放在首位。我坦然承认,在糟糕时期确保生存,与在好时期追求回报最大化是矛盾的。如果经济和市场出乎意料地走强,坚持这三点不会带来最大的回报,但这并不是我主要担心的事。

考虑到当下的不确定性,能找到一些在经济向好时能带来可靠回报、同时在糟糕时期还能确保生存的投资,已经相当不易。本着这一宗旨,我们一向愿意把“可靠”与“最大”之间的那部分回报空间让给别人。这次也不例外。

underlies the free market system – will return us to an upward trajectory. It just won’t be easy, quick or painless. And that’s why I think the investment decisions we make today must emphasize value, survivability and staying power. I readily acknowledge that assuring survival in bad times is inconsistent with return maximization in good times. Insistence on these three things won’t produce the greatest rewards if the economy and markets surprise on the upside, but that’s not my main concern. Given the uncertainty present today, it’s hard enough to find investments that can be relied on to deliver solid returns in good times but also assure survival in bad. In that interest, we’ve always been willing to cede to others much of that part of the return distribution lying between “solid” and “maximum.” This time is no different.

March 5, 2009

March 5, 2009

2009 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2009 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

11

11

版权所有,保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved