立足未稳
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
在不确定的基点上
On Uncertain Ground
当今世界似乎比我一生中任何时候都更加不确定。这句话听起来简单,却意义深远。而且不只是我这么觉得。《纽约时报》8 月 12 日在关于先锋集团创始约翰·博格尔的一篇文章中写道:“人们必须清醒过来,迫在眉睫,”他说。这是他见过的最糟糕的投资时期——在干了 60 年之后,这话分量不轻……“经济上空乌云笼罩,”博格尔先生说。“金融体系已遭重创。黑天鹅事件——发生概率低但后果毁灭性的事件——风险虽小,却是真实存在的。”
我打算用这份备忘录专门谈谈世界的不确定性、投资环境,然后给出我对相应策略应对的看法。这需要我涉及大量话题,但我会尽量在每一个话题上比平时少花笔墨。如果你读完这份备忘录还觉得意犹未尽,可以回头再看看《我的忧思》(2008 年 8 月 28 日)和《长期视角》(2009 年 1 月 9 日)。
The world seems more uncertain today than at any other time in my life. That’s a simple sentence but one with significant implications. And it’s not just me. Here’s what The New York Times said on August 12 in an article about John Bogle, the founder of Vanguard: “It’s urgent that people wake up,” he says. This is the worst time for investors that he has ever seen – and after 60 years in the business, that’s saying a lot. . . . “The economy has clouds hovering over it,” Mr. Bogle says. “And the financial system has been damaged. The risk of a black-swan event – of something unlikely but apocalyptic – is small, but it’s real.” I’m going to devote this memo to the uncertainty in the world and the investment environment and then offer my take on the appropriate strategy response. This will require me to touch on a large number of topics, but I will try to dwell less than usual on each of them. If after reading this memo you find yourself hungry for more, you might go back to “What Worries Me” (August 28, 2008) and “The Long View” (January 9, 2009).
宏观环境背景
我相信,美国经济将会在相当长一段时期内增长乏力。对于其他发达国家,考虑到它们各自面临的问题,我的预期更为悲观。(此时恰好该重复我那句老话:我不是经济学家,我的很多观察远远得不到经济学界同行的认同。还请各位注意,橡树资本投资哲学的一条核心原则是,我们的投资决策不受宏观预测左右。我们常说,对宏观形势有自己的看法是一回事,但真按这个看法去行动就是另一回事了。我奉劝各位对一切宏观预测都抱类似态度,尤其是我本人的预测。)
2008 年或 2009 年前后,有位参议员来找我——猜猜为什么?——为了拉竞选捐款。他大概是想找点话聊,就问我能不能向他保证美国经济马上就会强劲复苏。“别提强劲了,”我告诉他,“我只盼着能有点起色。”我至今没改口。
人有一种很自然的倾向,以为事情会一直维持现状;即便有所变化,也会回到我们习以为常的模样。多数人把经济增长视为常态;毕竟,在我们有生之年,这确实是普遍规律。事实上,全球经济已经稳步增长了几百年。这是“人尽皆知”的事。但有多少人想过,经济增长从何而来,它究竟是自然而然、不可避免的,还是并非如此?
The Macro-Economic Setting It’s my belief that we’re going to see relatively sluggish economic growth in the U.S. for a prolonged period of time. My expectations for other developed nations, given their specific issues, are even less positive. (This is a good time for my typical reminder that I am not an economist, and far from all of my observations would be supported by that fraternity. And please note that one of the key tenets of Oaktree’s investment philosophy dictates that our investing will not be governed by macro forecasts. We say it’s one thing to have an opinion on the macro, but something very different to act as if it’s correct. I urge you to consider adopting a similar attitude toward all macro forecasts, especially mine.) Around 2008 or ’09, I had a visit from a senator looking – surprise! – for a campaign contribution. I suppose to make conversation, he asked if I could assure him we were headed for a vigorous recovery. “Forget vigorous,” I told him. “I’m hoping for lackluster.” I haven’t changed my tune. There’s a very human tendency to think things will stay as they are, and if they change, that they’ll revert to what we’re used to. Most people think of economic growth as the norm; after all, that’s been the general rule during our lifetimes. In fact, the global economy has grown nicely for hundreds of years. That’s something “everyone knows.” But how many people think about where economic growth comes from, and whether it’s naturally occurring and inevitable?
2012 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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经济增长不会凭空发生。它的活力取决于人口增长、有利的基础设施、积极的抱负和利润动机、技术与生产率的进步,以及外部环境的良性发展等多种因素的结合。从许多方面看,我认为美国在这些方面的前景比过去要差一些,只是程度各有不同。出生率在下降;基础设施已经过时;技术未来能否像近些年那样大幅提升生产率,还不确定(但也许它一直都是如此);收入阶梯上的向上流动已经停滞。
我经常思考赤字支出和信贷的作用。在 2008 年危机之前的四十来年里,消费者可以让支出增长快于收入增长,因为信贷越来越容易获得(而且他们也越来越愿意使用它)。同样,慷慨的资本市场极大地便利了政府的赤字支出。世界各地的经济主体都能花掉他们没有的钱,从而买下他们负担不起的东西。这对经济增长贡献巨大,但很少有人意识到负面后果:杠杆率上升,对资本市场持续慷慨的依赖加深,因此脆弱性增加。换句话说,短期的非理性行为直接导致了长期的问题。这是经济过程中的常态。
今天,几乎没有借款人还能像五年前或十年前那样获得资本市场的支持。情况发生了根本逆转,贷款人如今似乎在意借款人的偿还能力,而且他们发现一些客户不太够资格获得信贷。由于几乎没有借款人真有能力还清债务,这导致了各种信贷困境,从美国的房屋止赎、市政破产,到欧洲外围国家的债务危机。
美国消费者似乎已经得出结论,他们应该少欠点债(或者发现他们借不到那么多钱了)。无论原因如何,储蓄率上升了,表明人们把赚到的钱乃至更多都花掉的倾向在减弱。放眼全球,借款人一方都在走向紧缩(减少支出超出收入的部分),甚至去杠杆(支出少于收入,用盈余来偿还债务)——有些是自愿的,有些是被迫的。
这些趋势对单个借款人的资产负债表是健康的,但意味着消费减少,因此对 GDP 增长不利。如果所有人同时这么做,结果可能相当紧缩。无论你怎么看,消费信贷使用减少都意味着经济增长放缓。
另一个让我犹豫的具体因素与信心有关。心理在影响经济增长方面扮演着巨大角色——也许是主导性的、自我实现的角色。简而言之,如果人们认为未来会好,他们就会花钱和投资,事情就会好起来。但如果他们对未来转向悲观,缩进壳里,拒绝花钱和投资,增长就会放缓。
消费者被 2008 年危机深深创伤:失业、被赶出房子、因市场下跌而变穷、被拒绝信贷。那些没有直接感受到这些影响的人——
Economic growth doesn’t just happen. Its vigor depends on a combination of population gains, a conducive infrastructure, positive aspiration and profit motive, advances in technology and productivity, and benign exogenous developments. In many ways and to varying degrees, I think the future for these things in the U.S. is less good than it was in the past. The birthrate is down; our infrastructure is out of date; it’s uncertain whether technology can add as much to productivity in the future as it has in the recent past (but perhaps it always is); and mobility up the income curve has stagnated. I think a lot about the role of deficit spending and credit. In the forty or so years leading up to the crisis of 2008, consumers could grow their spending faster than their incomes because of the increasing availability of credit (and their increasing willingness to make use of it). Likewise, generous capital markets greatly facilitated deficit spending on the part of governments. Economic units around the world were able to spend money they didn’t have and thus buy things they couldn’t afford. This made a big contribution to economic growth, but few people recognized the negative implications: increased leverage, increased dependency on the continued generosity of the capital markets, and thus increased precariousness. In other words, unwise behavior in the short run led directly to problems in the long run. This is a normal aspect of the economic process. Few debtors can tap the capital markets today to the same extent they could five or ten years ago. In a radical turn of events, lenders now appear to care about borrowers’ ability to repay, and they find some of their customers less than creditworthy. Since almost no borrowers actually have the ability to pay off their debts, this has led to credit difficulties ranging from home foreclosures, to municipal bankruptcies in the U.S., to debt crises in peripheral Europe. American consumers seem to have concluded that they should owe less (or have found that they can’t borrow as much). For whatever reason, the savings rate has risen, suggesting a decline in the propensity to spend all one makes and more. All around the world, there’s movement on the part of borrowers – sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary – toward austerity (reducing the excess of spending over incomes) or even delevering (spending less than you make and using the surplus to pay down debt). These trends are healthy for individual borrowers’ balance sheets, but they imply reduced consumption and thus are negative for GDP growth. If everyone does these things at the same time, the results can be quite contractionary. Regardless of how you look at it, less use of consumer credit implies less economic growth. The other specific element that gives me pause relates to confidence. Psychology plays a huge role – perhaps a dominant and self-fulfilling one – in influencing economic growth. In short, if people think things will be good in the future, they’ll spend and invest, and things will be good. But if they turn pessimistic regarding the future and go into their shells, refusing to spend and invest, growth will slow down. Consumers were traumatized by the crisis of 2008: laid off, forced out of their houses, made poorer by market declines, and denied credit. Those who didn’t feel these influences directly
2012 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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新闻头条仍然充斥着经济疲软、金融机构倒闭、需要救助以及银行业和抵押贷款领域舞弊的报道。这些影响要消退,可能需要相当长一段时间的疗伤。
经济的韧性很大程度上来自经济学家所说的“动物精神”:当人们天生的乐观、贪婪和健忘倾向被一些经济利好消息点燃时,这种乐观情绪会推动经济上行。眼下,动物精神大多处于冬眠状态,危机创伤的逆转可能不会轻松到来。但这并不意味着不会逆转。美国消费者有出人意料地表现乐观的倾向。
企业投资在经济复苏中扮演关键角色。当管理者判断消费者在低迷期后即将恢复支出时,他们会雇佣工人、投资新设备,以满足他们认为即将到来的需求。然而,当前的复苏在这方面鲜有表现。我认为普遍心态是,“先看看现有产能还能撑多久,再花钱去扩张。”或者就像我前几天在广播里听到的关于生产率提升的报道那样,“企业继续用更少的投入做更多的事。”于是,企业囤积了现金,而不是建设产能。
这很大程度上被归因于企业高管对商业环境的不确定感。与之前里根、布什、克林顿和布什总统任下 28 年亲商、亲自由市场的政府不同,今天许多商界人士感受到奥巴马政府的敌意——或者至少是漠视——这届政府中私营部门的代表性寥寥无几。此外,人们对经济前景、监管和税收也充满不确定和焦虑。所有这些都阻碍了扩张。
最近,担忧又转向了“财政悬崖”——如果貌似陷入僵局的政府在 2013 年初之前不采取行动,自动增税和削减开支将同时生效(后面再详谈)。最后,大多数商界人士可能希望米特·罗姆尼当选下一任总统,但他在民调中落后。这些疑虑的叠加,正在助长我们看到的疲弱扩张。(当然,总有一天,被推迟的支出可能会让位于对产能的积极投资。)
人们很容易把这些难题视为无解,看作是自我强化的恶性循环的一部分。当过度负债的人削减支出时,他们集体行动会削弱经济。疲弱的经济又让企业不愿雇佣和扩张,于是经济持续疲软。然而,必须记住,把一切都看作毫无希望与把环境视为毫无风险一样错误。两者都不该过度反应。
潜在的经济利好确实存在,但在今天这种低迷时期往往被忽视。其中包括房地产复苏初现端倪;能源自给自足的可能性;美国制造业已经精简瘦身,而中国竞争对手的成本在上升;以及美国在高等教育、创造力和创业精神方面仍然领先。
were still pounded by headlines trumpeting economic weakness, the collapse of financial institutions, the need for bailouts, and malfeasance in the banking and mortgage industries. It could require significant healing before these influences abate. Much of an economy’s resilience comes from what economists call “animal spirits”: the bullishness that drives things upward when people’s innate optimism, acquisitiveness and tendency to forget harsh lessons are sparked by some bits of good economic news. Right now, with animal spirits largely in hibernation, a reversal of the crisis’s trauma may not come easy. But that doesn’t mean there won’t be one. The U.S. consumer has a tendency to surprise on the upside. Business investment plays a key role in economic recovery. When managers conclude that consumers are about to resume spending after a downturn, they hire workers and invest in new equipment in order to meet the increased demand they believe is coming. Yet the current recovery has seen little in this regard. I think the prevailing attitude has been, “Let’s see how far we can stretch our current capacity before spending to expand it.” Or as I heard on the radio the other day, in a report on productivity gains, “Businesses continue to do more with less.” Thus companies have built cash hoards, not productive capacity. Much of this has been attributed to uncertainty on the part of executives concerning the business environment. In contrast to the preceding 28 years of pro-business and pro-free market administrations under Presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton and Bush, today many business people detect antipathy – or, at minimum, indifference – on the part of the Obama administration, in which the private sector is little represented. In addition, there is uncertainty and anxiety regarding the outlook for the economy, regulation and taxes. All of these things have deterred expansion. Most recently, concern has shifted to the “fiscal cliff” – the combination of automatic tax increases and spending cuts that will go into effect at the beginning of 2013 if nothing is done before then by the seemingly gridlocked government (more on this later). Finally, most business people probably want Mitt Romney to be the next president, but he’s behind in the polls. The sum of these doubts is contributing to the sluggish expansion we’re seeing. (Of course, one of these days deferred spending could give way to invigorated investment in capacity.) It’s easy to view problems like these as insoluble and part of a self-feeding vicious circle. When people who are overly indebted reduce their spending, their collective action weakens the economy. The weak economy discourages businesses from hiring and expanding, and thus it stays weak. It’s essential, however, to remember that it can be just as wrong to see things as hopeless as it is to consider an environment risk-free. One mustn’t overreact in either direction. Potential economic pluses do exist, and they tend to be overlooked in downcast periods like today. These include the incipient housing recovery; the possibility of energy self-sufficiency; the fact that U.S. manufacturing has slimmed down and our Chinese competitors have seen costs rise; and the fact that the U.S. still leads in higher education, creativity and entrepreneurship.
2012 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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对我来说,这一切的关键在于,我们并非正处在一个繁荣期。复苏正在进行,而且很可能会持续下去,但更可能的是黯淡无光,而非生机勃勃。大多数美国人的金融记忆里,只有 V 形复苏和像 1990 年代那样的美好时光,那时他们想不出不借钱、不消费的理由。五年后,我想人们仍会问:“经济什么时候才能启动?我们什么时候才能回到好日子?”
For me, the bottom line of all this is that we aren’t looking at a period of prosperity. A recovery is underway and is likely to continue, but it is more likely to be lackluster than vigorous. Most Americans’ financial memory consists of V-shaped recoveries and periods of good feeling like the 1990s, when they couldn’t think of reasons not to borrow and spend. Five years from now, I think people will still be asking, “When will the economy get going? When will we get back to good times?”
黑天鹅、地雷与长期难题
除了这个平淡无奇的整体展望之外,我(和大多数人一样)也能一口气列出一长串前所未见的当前及潜在问题。每一个问题都值得单独写一份备忘录,但——正如我所说——我正努力节省你的时间和精力。
Black Swans, Landmines and Long-Term Problems In addition to this unexciting general outlook, I (like most others) can reel off a litany of current and potential problems like I’ve never seen before. Each one deserves a memo, but – as I said – I’m trying to be economical with your time and attention.
欧洲问题规模大得惊人,风险极高,不确定性无穷无尽。欧洲各国及其银行——特别是葡萄牙、意大利、爱尔兰、希腊和西班牙(即“欧猪五国”)——大肆利用了前面提到的过度借贷能力。它们以各种方式挥霍了这些资金,从给公民的过度福利计划到命运多舛的投资,不一而足。它们欠下了永远还不清的债务,在经济疲软时期连支付利息都会困难重重。未来它们将被迫削减开支,但这会进一步削弱它们的经济,加重民众的痛苦。其结果已经引发了动荡,未来可能还会持续。然而——尽管采取了紧缩和去杠杆的努力——在许多国家,公共和私人债务总额与 GDP 之比如今反而高于五年前(据 GLG 合伙公司的贾米尔·巴兹所言)。
人们总在问欧洲会怎样。我告诉他们,局势极其复杂、模糊、充满不确定性,但有三件事我绝对确定:(a)我不知道,(b)没人知道,(c)如果你向专家讨教并照做,十有八九会犯错误。
人们投资橡树基金,依据的是一份有限合伙协议,其中花几页写我们要做什么,再用几十页写我们要遵守的规则以及万一不遵守会怎样。我的印象是,在欧盟这件事上,政客们写第一部分时满怀美好憧憬,却把其余部分忘得一干二净。在我看来,面对这种局面,除了承认我们对未来一无所知,别无他法。就这么简单。
既然那些具体的细枝末节被省略了,欧洲就没有现成的蓝图或操作手册。没有程序来确保各国不出现过度赤字,也没有程序把某个成员国踢出欧盟。任何措施都需要利益各异的各国当选官员一致同意。把这一切放在一起,我觉得以下问题都无法确定:应该采取什么措施来解决问题?又能采取什么措施?
Europe represents a problem of enormous proportions, huge risk and limitless uncertainty. The nations and banks of Europe – and especially Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain (the PIIGS) – partook liberally of the excessive ability to borrow described above. They squandered the proceeds in a variety of ways, ranging from excessive benefit programs for citizens to ill-fated investments. They owe amounts they can’t ever repay and will have trouble servicing in times of economic weakness. They’ll be forced to spend less in the period ahead, but that will further weaken their economies and add to the pain felt by their citizens. The results have included unrest and may continue to do so. And yet – despite attempts at austerity and delevering – in many countries the ratio of total public and private debt to GDP is now greater than it was five years ago (according to Jamil Baz of GLG Partners). People ask all the time what will happen in Europe. I tell them the situation is enormously complex, murky and uncertain, but I’m absolutely sure of three things: (a) I don’t know, (b) nobody knows, and (c) if you ask an expert for advice and follow it, you’ll probably be making a mistake. When people invest in an Oaktree fund, it’s on the basis of a limited partnership agreement that spends a few pages on what we’re going to do and dozens more on things like the rules we’ll follow and what happens if we don’t. I get the impression that in the case of the European Union, politicians wrote the first section based on glowing hopes but forgot about the rest. When faced with conditions like these, in my view, there’s absolutely no alternative to saying we have no idea what the future holds. Period. Since the nuts and bolts stuff was omitted, there’s no schematic diagram or instruction manual for Europe. There are no procedures for ensuring nations don’t run excessive deficits, or for moving a member state out of the European Union. Any actions that are taken will require unanimous decisions on the part of elected officials from nations with divergent interests. Taking all of this together, I feel there can be no certainty about: o what should be done to fix the problem, o what can be done,
2012 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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将要采取什么措施,以及
这些措施会带来什么后果,尤其是第二层级的连锁效应。我预计欧洲的领导人会艰难前行,继续在最后一刻勉强做出最低限度的必要行动。会有一些缓解措施,但真正的解决方案很难达成(后者要求欧洲各国大幅让渡主权)。上周,欧洲央行宣布了一项债券购买计划,市场对此反应积极。只要这项政策持续,购买债券就能压低借贷成本,但它解决不了根本问题。外围国家面临的重大任务远不止于此:削减赤字并加以监督,减轻累积过度的债务负担,并恢复增长与竞争力。因此,这个问题很可能会拖延数年,除非它不会升级为全球性危机。每个人都希望欧洲能采取必要的行动,但希望本身算不上一项计划。
o what will be done, and o what the ramifications will be, especially the second-order consequences. I imagine Europe’s leaders will muddle through, continuing to do the absolute minimum that suffices at the last possible moment. There will be palliatives, but solutions will be hard to achieve (the latter would require the nations of Europe to significantly surrender sovereignty). Last week the European Central Bank announced a program of bond buying, and this was viewed positively. Buying bonds will keep borrowing costs down for as long as it’s practiced, but it won’t solve the problems. The important tasks facing the peripheral nations are much greater: cutting deficits and policing them, reducing the excessive debt burden that was allowed to build up, and restoring growth and competitiveness. Thus the problem is likely to drag on for years, assuming it doesn’t flare up into a global crisis. Everyone hopes Europe will do what’s needed, but hope isn’t much of a plan.
美国财政状况没有那么严峻,后果没那么迫近,而且因为我们能印出世界储备货币,也更容易回避问题……但也好不到哪去。事实上,在某些方面反而更危险,因为问题更多堆积在远期,可能也更隐蔽。我们的政客同样用宽松的货币让所有人都得到一切:慷慨的福利计划,还有大幅减税(需要时也推出大规模刺激计划)。福利支出、利息和其他强制性开支吞掉了全部税收;至于政府其他支出——国防、教育、交通、科研这些——干脆别提了。我们面对的是巨额年度赤字和不断膨胀的国家债务。
顺带说一句,今天赤字状况没有更糟的一个原因是利率水平极低,这相当于储户在给政府提供巨额补贴。即便利率这么低,联邦债务利息仍消耗掉联邦税收总额的大约 10%。想想看,如果 10 年期国债收益率不是低于 2% 而是 7%,赤字会变成什么样。
福利项目是最大的问题,主要是医疗保险(老年人的医疗)、医疗补助(穷人的医疗)和社会保障(退休福利)。往年的政客在授予福利时,很少考虑福利会以什么增速膨胀、钱从哪里来。福利要么被扩大,要么与通胀挂钩,而战后婴儿潮一代预期寿命大幅延长,注定要造成惊人的负担;16 万亿美元的国家债务,与没有资金支持的未来福利相比简直是小巫见大巫,后者的现值各家估算在额外 50 万亿到 90 万亿美元之间。
除了联邦层面,我们在州和地方层面也有问题。联邦政府把负担往下推给各州,同时削减拨款;与此同时,疲软的经济侵蚀州和地方税收,推高民众的需求。我最近读到,有个城市不得不在警察、消防员和教师之间选择裁谁,以便平衡预算。换句话说,这个城市已经……
The U.S. fiscal situation is less acute, less immediate, and easier to duck given that we can print the world’s reserve currency . . . but little better. In fact, in some ways it is more dangerous because the problems are more back-end loaded and perhaps less overt. Our politicians, too, used easy money to give everyone everything: generous benefit programs as well as significant tax reductions (and major stimulus programs when needed). Entitlements, interest and other mandatory expenditures consume all of the taxes collected; forget about the rest of government spending – on things like defense, education, transportation and scientific research. We face huge annual deficits and ballooning national debt. As an aside, one reason our deficit situation isn’t worse today is the ultra-low level of interest rates, which constitute a tremendous subsidy of the government by savers. Even with these low rates, interest on the federal debt consumes roughly 10% of all federal taxes collected. Imagine what the deficit would be if the 10-year Treasury note were at 7% rather than less than 2%. Entitlement programs are the biggest problem, primarily Medicare (healthcare for the elderly), Medicaid (healthcare for the poor) and Social Security (retirement benefits). Politicians in years gone by granted benefits without much thought to the rate at which they would grow and where the money to pay them would come from. Benefits have been expanded or indexed to inflation, and the post-war Baby Boomers, with their muchincreased life expectancies, are bound to create an incredible burden; the national debt of $16 trillion is dwarfed by unfunded future benefits, the present value of which is variously estimated at an additional $50-90 trillion. We have problems at the state and local level, in addition to the federal. The federal government is pushing burdens off to states and reducing funding; at the same time the soft economy is cutting into state and local tax collections and increasing citizens’ needs. I recently read about a city that had to choose between policemen, firemen and teachers for the layoffs through which to balance its budget. In other words, the city has been
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提供的服务水平已经超出了其财力所能承受的范围。痛苦的财政紧缩不可避免;消防员、警察和教师都不是轻易能裁减的。此外,多年来,州及地方政客们在承诺公共雇员的退休和医疗福利时,并未考虑如何支付这些费用。目前资金缺口达 1 万亿至 3 万亿美元的养老金计划,就像一颗定时炸弹。今年我们已目睹了一系列市政破产事件,我相信还会有更多。
providing a level of services that it can’t afford. Painful austerity is unavoidable; neither firemen, policemen nor teachers can be easily dispensed with. Also, for years state and local politicians have promised public employees retirement and health benefits without regard for how they would be paid. Pension plans that are currently underfunded by $1-3 trillion represent a ticking time bomb. We’ve seen a spate of municipal bankruptcies this year, and I believe more are coming.
在我们面临的诸多问题中,政治现状的低迷值得特别一提。过去,政客们——尽管如今是一批新人——曾一手制造了没有资金支持、不断膨胀的福利负担,如今却大多拒绝就减轻这些负担达成一致行动。而且,似乎没有人因找不到解决方案而受到惩罚。
正如需要一致同意将阻碍欧洲解决其问题一样,美国政客似乎把“意识形态纯洁性”(即严守党派路线)和连任看得比真正努力解决问题更重要。他们嘴上说想解决赤字问题,但许多人对增税避之不及;另一些人则对削减福利深恶痛绝;可自由支配支出已经所剩无几,削减它不足以解决问题;而“妥协”更成了一个脏字。
2010 年,一群在职和退休政客组成的辛普森-鲍尔斯委员会被要求拿出解决方案。十八名成员中有十一人支持一项负责任的提案——当然包括一些痛苦——但未能获得正式批准所需的十四票绝对多数。国会和白宫任由这份提案因无人理会而胎死腹中。尽管当前和未来的赤字带来巨大危险,愿意触碰美国政治“第三轨”问题的人却寥寥无几。
当然,问题不只出在政客身上。许多选民说,他们更愿意选择那些拒绝“背弃原则”(即不与对方妥协以寻求解决方案)的当选官员。虽然一些选民可能理解福利项目带来的风险,但大多数人拒绝削减自己的任何福利。
共和党副总统候选人保罗·瑞安是个“财政专家”,他关心赤字问题,并有一份“瑞安路线图”来削减赤字。他对此如是说:华盛顿一直没跟你们说实话。如果我们不改革政府在医疗和退休项目上的支出,就毫无希望控制住我们的支出——以及由此产生的债务危机。(《纽约时报》,2012 年 8 月 12 日)
瑞安被选入竞选名单,是因为他在赤字问题上的强硬立场和整体保守倾向被认为能吸引共和党“基本盘”。但具有讽刺意味的是,瑞安对改革福利项目的兴趣可能在竞选过程中成为劣势,需要他认真往回撤。太多人只是凭钱包投票:个人利益往往压过意识形态。虽然我们可以不同意瑞安的做法,但应该为这位敢于碰这个不受欢迎话题的罕见政客叫好。
The depressing state of politics deserves special mention among the problems we face. Having acted in the past to create unfunded, ballooning benefit burdens, politicians – albeit a new crop – now largely refuse to agree on action to reduce them. And no one seems to be penalized for failing to find a solution. Just as the need for unanimity will frustrate Europe’s attempts to solve its problems, U.S. politicians seem to value things like “ideological purity” (i.e., toeing the party line) and being reelected above real attempts at problem solving. They say they want to solve the deficit problem, but tax increases are off limits for many; cuts in entitlements are anathema for others; there isn’t enough discretionary spending left to cut in order to solve the problem; and “compromise” has become a dirty word. In 2010 a group of active and retired politicians – the Simpson-Bowles Commission – was asked to come up with a solution. Eleven of the eighteen members supported a responsible proposal including, of course, some pain, but there wasn’t the fourteen-vote supermajority needed to formally endorse it. Congress and the White House let it die of inattention. Despite the enormous danger presented by our current and future deficits, too few were willing to touch matters representing the “third rail” of American politics. Of course, it’s not just the politicians. Many voters say they prefer elected officials who will refuse to “desert their principles” (that is, compromise with the other side in pursuit of a solution). While some voters may understand the risk presented by entitlement programs, most reject any reduction of their own benefits. Paul Ryan, the Republican nominee for vice president, is a “fiscal wonk” who cares about the deficit and has a “Ryan Roadmap” to shrink it. Here’s what he says on the subject: Washington has not been telling you the truth. If we don’t reform spending on government health and retirement programs, we have zero hope of getting our spending – and as a result our debt crisis – under control. (The New York Times, August 12, 2012) Ryan was chosen for the ticket because his hawkishness on the deficit and overall conservatism were expected to appeal to the Republican “base.” But ironically, Ryan’s interest in reforming entitlements may constitute a disadvantage on the campaign trail, requiring some serious backtracking. Too many people simply vote their wallets: selfinterest usually trumps ideology. While we can disagree with Ryan’s approach, we should applaud the rare politician who is willing to tackle this unpopular subject.
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考虑到美联储理事会中“通胀鹰派”在复苏进行时抵制刺激经济的方式,人们对能否依赖进一步刺激措施存有担忧。然而,我预期美联储会在较长时间内维持低利率,并/或采取其他刺激行动。伯南克主席最近的表态在这方面几乎没有留下疑问。另一方面,正如我认为许多经济学原理由心理因素决定,我也相信刺激计划的影响很大程度上是心理上的。降息以及量化宽松(QE)等债券购买计划在首次宣布时具有冲击效应,但我认为这种效应会随时间递减。归根结底,当人们不怀有扩张性思维时,要让经济增长并不容易。
Given the way “inflation hawks” on the Federal Reserve Board resist stimulating the economy when a recovery is underway, there’s concern over the ability to count on further stimulus. However, I expect the Fed to keep interest rates low for a prolonged period of time and/or undertake other stimulus actions. Recent statements from Chairman Bernanke leave little doubt on this subject. On the other hand, just as I think a lot of economics is determined by psychology, so do I believe a lot of the impact of stimulus programs is psychological. Interest rate cuts, and bond buying programs like QE, have shock value when first announced, but I think it diminishes over time. In the end, it’s not easy to make an economy grow when people aren’t thinking expansively.
如今央行主导的低利率环境,意味着投资者被困在一个回报率极低的世界里做生意。短期国库券利率近乎为零,国债收益率仅处于 1% 至 3% 区间,这奠定了风险投资收益预期的基准。由于这一基准线当前如此之低,即便叠加了可观的风险溢价,许多投资的绝对预期回报也远不及过去的水准。
Today’s low interest rates, engineered by the central banks, mean that investors are consigned to doing business in a low-return world. Interest rates near zero on T-bills, and yields of 1-3% on Treasury notes and bonds, set the base from which the prospective returns on investments entailing risk are established. And because that floor is so low today, even with healthy risk premiums added, the absolute prospective return on many investments isn’t nearly what it was in the past.
美国长期竞争优势正受到威胁,因为我们在教育、医疗和交通等领域的基础设施日益老旧(同时,一些趋势正让其他国家在这些方面追赶上来)。二战后,正是这些条件成就了美国的伟大,但如今似乎缺乏意愿(或资金)将其恢复到原有水平。
The long-term competitive position of the U.S. is threatened by our deteriorating infrastructure in areas like education, healthcare and transportation (as well as trends that are enabling other nations to catch up to us in these regards). These are things that made America great following World War II, but there seems to be little will (or money) to restore them to previous levels.
在我看来,日益加大的收入不平等是个严峻的问题。顶层与底层之间的收入差距急剧拉大,底层向上攀升的能力却在下降。资本收入(资本利得和股息)的税率相对于劳动收入有所下调。最后,如今人人都比以往更清楚顶层人士过得有多好。美国经济的许多成功源于低收入群体相信这个制度能让他们靠勤奋向上走。一旦这一点变得不那么真切——而如今的前景令人谨慎,尤其考虑到公共教育质量低下——整个社会都可能承受负面后果。
In my view, growing income inequality is a significant problem. The difference in incomes between those at the top and those at the bottom has risen dramatically, and the ability of those at the bottom to move up the chain has declined. Tax rates applied to income on capital (capital gains and dividends) have been cut relative to those on labor. Finally, everyone knows more than ever about how well the people at the top are doing. A lot of America’s economic success has stemmed from the fact that people in the lower income brackets felt the system would allow them to move up through hard work. To the extent that becomes less true – and the outlook today is guarded, especially given the low quality of public education – there can be negative ramifications for society overall.
当今世界似乎充满了难以攻克的挑战。想想那些实际存在和潜在的问题区域:伊拉克、阿富汗、伊朗、以色列/巴勒斯坦、叙利亚、巴基斯坦、朝鲜,以及前苏联加盟共和国不时爆发的冲突。相比之下,从柏林墙倒塌(1989 年)和苏联解体(1991 年)到 2001 年“9·11”袭击之前的这段时期,堪称太平盛世,基本上看不到可能动摇世界稳定的冲突。对比如此鲜明,令人忧虑。
The world of today seems full of intractable challenges. Think about the list of actual and potential problem areas: Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Syria, Pakistan, North Korea, and occasional flare-ups in former Soviet republics. In contrast, the period from the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the USSR (1991) up until the attacks on September 11, 2001 seems like a halcyon one largely free of conflicts considered capable of destabilizing the world. The comparison is stark and troubling.
我列出的最后一个重大不确定因素是中国的展望。在通往今天的这些年里,中国的特点是什么?
- 资源利用不足,主要是人力资源,以及低廉的制造成本,
- 一个由中央主导、而非自由市场力量驱动的经济,
- 金融资源迅速增长,
The last big element of uncertainty on my list is the outlook for China. In the years leading up to today, what characterized China? o underused resources, largely human, and low manufacturing costs, o an economy directed centrally, not by free market forces, o rapidly growing financial resources,
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- 同时也有一种强烈的愿望,希望通过经济增长和工业化,把人口推向城市,并在经济上向上流动;
- 需要应对 2008 年全球金融危机及其产生的不良贷款;
- 预期制造业将无限扩张,因为中国既向世界各国供应商品,也服务于本国日益壮大的消费阶层;
- 由此产生的笃定是,中国不可能失手。
上述种种的结果,就是大规模资金供给,以推进中国的经济发展和城市化。国有企业被创建和扩张,基础设施建设加速推进。尤其是住宅建设,以远超常态的速度展开。
这或许是又一起资金过剩导致资本配置决策失误的案例。中国的现代历程只经历过增长,而没有经历过繁荣与萧条的周期。即便中央政府想要放缓建设步伐,地方政府——其大量收入来自出售开发用地——却没有同样的动机。中国个人投资者的资本出路非常有限:银行存款利率低于通胀率,实际为负收益,海外投资又被禁止。这种组合把大规模投资引向房地产或被称为“信托”的储蓄产品,后者的资金流向固定资产开发。于是,这个过程失控了。围绕城市化和基础设施建设的良好初衷,沦为大规模投机性资本流动的牺牲品。结果是固定资产投资过度。
(当局或央行刺激经济的一个好办法,就是为住宅建设提供资金。这会带来就业增加,以及建材和零部件支出的增长。但当经济随之升温时,楼市泡沫往往接踵而至。房价上涨,投机性购买跟进。唯一缺的,就是那些多余或买不起的房子的最终买家。特别值得注意的是,过度的住宅投资是导致中国、爱尔兰、西班牙和美国近期问题的一个重要因素。在这四个国家,新建住宅的“波将金村”拔地而起,显得经济活力十足……但实际上空置无人。)
就中国的情况而言,资金并非由外部债权人撤走。相反,中央决策层认定,是时候减少刺激了。这样一来,杠杆得以降低,固定资产投资增速放缓,经济也能避免过热和通胀。然而,正如历史上反复出现的那样,计划经济往往不按计划者的意愿运行,周期也很难调控。
中国经济增长已经放缓,而面对增长减速,日子并不比别处好过。全球经济的疲软,以及侵蚀成本优势的通胀,降低了对中国出口的需求,而出口正是支撑中国经济的一大支柱。情况已经很清楚:(a)国内消费不足以给中国经济提供所需的增长,因此(b)中国并非……
o a strong desire for economic growth and industrialization in order to move the population to the cities and upward in economic terms, o the need to respond to the global financial crisis of 2008 and the non-performing loans it produced, o an expectation that manufacturing would expand without limit as China supplied goods to nations around the world as well as its own growing consumer class, and o resulting certainty that China couldn’t miss. The upshot of all of the above was massive provision of capital in order to advance China’s economic development and urbanization. State-owned enterprises were created and expanded, and infrastructure building was accelerated. Residential construction, in particular, took place at an elevated rate. This may have been yet another instance where too much money led to bad capital allocation decisions. China’s modern era had seen only growth, not cycles of boom and bust. Even when the central government wanted to rein in the rate of building, local governments – which derive a lot of their revenue from sales of land for development – were not similarly motivated. Chinese individuals faced very limited options for investing their capital: bank interest was below the rate of inflation and thus negative in real terms, and foreign investment was prohibited. This combination drove large-scale investment into either properties or savings products known as “trusts,” the proceeds of which flowed into fixed asset development. Thus the process went out of control. Good intentions around urbanization and infrastructure development fell victim to massive speculative capital flows. The consequence was excessive fixed investment. (One great way for authorities or central bankers to stimulate an economy is by providing capital for residential construction. This results in increased employment and spending on materials and components. When the economy heats up in response, however, a housing bubble often ensues. Home prices rise and speculative buying follows. The only thing missing is end-buyers for the unneeded or unaffordable homes. It’s particularly interesting to note that excess residential investment contributed in a major way to the recent problems in China, Ireland, Spain and the U.S. In all four countries “Potemkin villages” of new homes grew up, suggesting economic vigor . . . but standing empty.) In China’s case, capital wasn’t withdrawn by external lenders. Rather, the central planners decided it was time to reduce stimulus. In this way leverage would be reduced, the rate of fixed asset investment would ease, and the economy would be kept from overheating and inflating. However, as has been seen throughout history, planned economies tend to defy the planners, and cycles are hard to modulate. China’s economic growth has slowed, and living with declining growth has turned out to be no easier in China than elsewhere. Worldwide economic weakness and costadvantage-eroding inflation have reduced the demand for Chinese exports, a main prop supporting China’s economy. It has been made clear that (a) internal consumption isn’t enough to give China’s economy the growth it needs and thus (b) China isn’t without
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对世界其他地区的依赖。中国的着陆是软是硬,尚未可知。
而如果中国硬着陆——部分原因在于世界其他地区需求疲软——它的疲弱是否会反噬,进一步削弱那些向中国出售原材料和制成品的国家?世界经济复杂、相互关联且彼此依存。中国是其中的典型例证,此刻也是全球不确定性的一个来源。
那么我们看到的是什么?我认为,是全球范围内的经济脆弱,以及众多因素,既可能在短期内加剧局势,也可能让它在长期内持续低迷。我想不起在过去什么时候,没有任何一个司法管辖区被视为完全安全的投资之地,但今天似乎正是如此。人们为美国兴奋时,通常也仅是相对而言:“坏街区上最好的房子。”
20 世纪 60 年代在芝加哥大学,我学到美国短期国债提供的是“无风险回报率”。如今,多数投资者难以想象任何东西是无风险的。当我与投资者交谈时,大多数人甚至对美债完全安全这一说法,都会不自在而嗤笑。
dependence on the rest of the world. It has yet to be determined whether China’s landing will be soft or hard. And if China lands hard – in part because of weak demand from the rest of the world – will its weakness feed back, further weakening those nations from which China buys raw materials and finished goods? The world’s economy is complex, interrelated and interdependent. China is a major example of this and, at this moment, a contributor to worldwide uncertainty. So what do we find? Economic fragility throughout the world, I think, as well as a number of factors capable of exacerbating the situation in the short run or keeping it weak in the long. I can’t remember a time when no jurisdiction was considered completely safe for investment, but that seems to be the case today. When people enthuse about the U.S., it’s usually only in relative terms: “the best house on a bad block.” At the University of Chicago in the 1960s, I was taught that U.S. Treasury bills paid the “riskfree rate of return.” Nowadays most investors have trouble thinking of anything as riskless. When I talk to investors, most of them snicker uncomfortably about the proposition of even U.S. Treasurys being entirely safe.
难道就没有什么好消息吗?
难道账本的另一边就没有任何积极的东西,能抵消上面描述的疲弱基本面,让投资变得有吸引力吗?我觉得,有几件事值得一提。
第一件是,事情有可能不会像我说的那么糟。由于心理因素对人类思维过程的影响,事情往往在极端时刻看起来没那么糟(或没那么好)。但既然我不太相信宏观经济预测,我也不认为有办法证明我的悲观完全没有道理。
第二件是,在许多情况下,资产价格处于合理水平,至少相对于其他投资或历史而言是这样。
Is There No Good News? Isn’t there anything on the positive side of the ledger, capable of balancing against the weak fundamental picture described above and making investment attractive? A few things deserve mention, I think. The first is the possibility that things won’t turn out to be as bad as I describe. Because of the impact of psychology on people’s thought processes, it often turns out that things aren’t as bad (or as good) as they seemed at the extremes. But since I’m not a big believer in macro forecasting, I don’t believe there’s a way to prove that my negativism isn’t fully warranted. The second is the fact that asset prices are reasonable in many cases, at least relative to other investments or to history.
1999 年,人人无忧无虑之时,标普 500 指数市盈率超过 30 倍。如今,该市盈率已下降过半,且远低于二战后的平均水平。此外,股票股息收益率和盈利收益率与债券收益率相比,显得格外有利。毫无疑问,股票相对历史参数已有所便宜——尽管也可以说,它们还不够便宜,因为未来增长恐难达到历史速度。
In 1999, when everyone was unworried, the S&P 500 traded at more than 30 times earnings. Today the p/e ratio has more than halved, and it is well below the post-World War II average. In addition, dividend and earnings yields on equities are unusually favorable relative to the yields on bonds. There’s no doubt that stocks have cheapened relative to historic parameters – although the case can also be made that they aren’t cheap enough, since future growth is unlikely to be at the historic rate.
高收益债券相对国债的收益率利差,目前处于历史上被视为相当丰厚的水平,并且历来都能带来远高于国债的后续回报。换句话说,通过高收益债券承担信用风险所获得的回报,处于过去足以超额补偿信用风险的水平。
Yield spreads on high yield bonds relative to Treasurys are at levels that historically have been considered generous and have consistently given rise to subsequent returns well above those on Treasurys. In other words, the reward for accepting credit risk via high yield bonds is at a level that in the past has more than compensated for the credit risk
2012 奥克特里资本管理有限合伙公司
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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尽管历史数据远没有那么丰富,但高级贷款和夹层债务似乎也是如此。
entailed. Although there’s far less historic data, the same seems true of senior loans and mezzanine debt.
房地产价格已从五六年前的高峰回落,大体回到十年前泡沫前的水平。住宅地产价格远低于峰值,除少数一线城市外,商业地产同样如此。
Real estate prices have corrected from the peak of 5-6 years ago and are largely back to the pre-bubble levels of a decade ago. Residential real estate prices are well down from the peak, and the same is true for commercial real estate in all but a half dozen first-tier cities.
为什么事实会是这样?因为还有第三个因素:投资者心理相比危机前的水平已大幅收敛。从买方的角度来看,这是非常健康的。
And why is this true? Because of the third factor: investor psychology that is much curtailed from pre-crisis levels. This is very healthy from a buyer’s point of view.
心理环境
眼下确实是充满不确定性的时代——这一点毋庸置疑。宏观前景相当模糊,投资者的信心程度也随之降到了低位。这让我想起一件事——发生在更广阔的、投资之外的世界里——就在十一年前的这个星期。
9·11 那天我在纽约,亲身经历了那种不确定性、恐惧和混乱。几天后我终于回到加州,坐下来和当时十四岁的儿子安德鲁谈了谈,想确认他在那样的变故之后还好。他以他惯有的敏锐问我:“爸,世界是不是比以前更不安全了?”我心里冒出了正确的答案:“也许它确实不如以前安全……也许它从来就没有人们以为的那么安全。”同样,今天宏观的未来看起来比我记忆中的任何时候都更加不确定,但很可能它从来就没有人们以为的那样确定。
上世纪八十年代和九十年代,一切都很顺。经济增长强劲,企业欣欣向荣,生产力和科技取得了巨大进步,利润大幅攀升,利率下行,通胀沉寂,股市飞涨,房产和 401k 账户不断升值,带来了正面的“财富效应”。世界大体和平。所有这些都助长了乐观心理,又反哺经济,形成了典型的良性循环。
那段时期,是好结果完全靠得住,还是只是底层过程碰上了好运气,才结出好果子?如果是后者,那些结果是否好到超出了人们应当指望能持续的程度?
不管怎样,人们确实把这些结果外推了。九十年代股市每年回报 20%,而不是正常的 10%,投资者就抬高了对随后几年的回报预期,也相应提高了股票的配置比例。谁都知道,从一个装着黑白球的袋子里连续摸出十个白球,下一个是黑球的概率其实增加了。但在投资世界里,这样的事件反而让人相信袋子里只有白球——全是好结果。这正是那种非理性的、情绪化的思维,催生了牛市和泡沫。
所以等到九十年代末的时候,很多投资者已经认定,世界是个温和的地方,盈利是理所当然的——也就是说,风险和不确定性几乎不存在。
The Psychological Environment These are uncertain times – there’s no doubt about it. The macro outlook is quite unclear, and the level of investor confidence is commensurately low. This reminds me of something that happened – in the larger, non-investment world – eleven years ago this week. I was in New York on 9/11, and I experienced the uncertainty, fear and confusion firsthand. When I finally got to California several days later, I sat down with my son Andrew, then fourteen years old, to make sure he was okay given what had transpired. He asked me, with his usual perceptiveness, “Dad, is the world less safe than it used to be?” The right answer came to me: “Maybe it’s less safe than it used to be . . . and maybe it was never as safe as people thought it was.” Similarly, the macro future seems far more uncertain today than at any time in my experience, but there’s a good chance it was never as certain as people thought. In the 1980s and ’90s, everything went right. Economic growth was strong. Companies thrived. There were great gains in productivity and technology. Profits rose dramatically. Interest rates declined. Inflation was quiescent. Equities soared. Houses and 401k accounts appreciated, producing a positive “wealth effect.” The world was largely at peace. All of this contributed to positive psychology, feeding back to further spur economic strength in a classic virtuous circle. Was this a period in which favorable outcomes were entirely dependable, or just one in which the underlying processes met up with good luck, producing favorable outcomes? And if the latter, were the results better than people should have expected to continue? Regardless, people did extrapolate them. When stocks returned 20% a year in the 1990s, rather than the normal 10%, investors ratcheted up their return expectations for the subsequent years, and with them their allocations to equities. Everyone knows that if you reach into a bag containing both black and white balls and pull out ten white ones in a row, the probability has increased that the next one will be black. But in the investment world, events like that serve to convince people that there are only white balls – favorable outcomes – in the bag. That’s part of the illogical, emotional thinking that makes for bull markets and bubbles. So by the time the late 1990s rolled around, many investors had concluded that the world was a benign place in which profits were inevitable. That is, that there was little risk or uncertainty.
2012 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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我坚信,投资界最大的风险,莫过于普遍弥漫的“无风险”信念。这种危险状态通常源于对未来的过度确信,认为未来可知、可测……且温和。如今,这种情绪已寥寥无几。我认为,这本身就是一大积极因素。
2005 至 2007 年危机前那段时期,一个显著特征就是:大多数人确信自己完全理解(a)经济如何运转,(b)世界五到十年后会是什么样,以及(c)一旦出问题该如何补救。今天,几乎没人再这么想了。从自以为懂,到承认不懂,这个过程谈不上愉快。
但一项活动的风险,不仅来自活动本身,更来自人们对待它的方式。当装备进步让登山变得更安全时,人们反而会调整行为,使之变得更危险。同样,投资中的诸多风险,并非源于证券、公司或交易所,而是源于投资者的行为。简言之,投资者行事审慎时风险低,行事鲁莽时风险高。
一个被视为安全的世界,可能因这种安全感促使投资者沿风险曲线外移、推高价格,或采取比实际情况更笃定的行动,而变得不再安全。我认为,这恰恰精准描述了危机前的岁月。反过来,一个不确定的世界,也可能比人们感知的更安全——如果他们的担忧促使自己谨慎行事(尤其是促使他们把资产卖到进一步下跌概率降低的价位)。诚然,当今世上很少有人会对那连串刺眼的负面因素视而不见。
不过请留意,虽然投资者的热情与风险失明今天已降至令人安心的低位——这或许是当下环境能说出的最大亮点——但央行压低利率的行动,却迫使投资者沿风险曲线外移,以追逐回报。他们未必对风险视而不见,但许多人仍在参与高风险倾向的活动。我用已故岳父萨姆·弗里曼的一句话,来称呼这些被迫参与的投资者:“戴着手铐的志愿者。”
It’s my firm belief that the riskiest thing in the investing world is widespread belief that there’s no risk. Usually that dangerous condition stems from excessive conviction that the future is knowable and known . . . and benign. Today there’s very little of that. I think that’s a substantial positive. It was one of the outstanding characteristics of the pre-crisis period of 2005-07 that most people were sure they completely understood (a) what made the economy work, (b) what the world would look like in five or ten years, and (c) how things could be fixed if problems arose. Today very few people feel that way. There’s nothing pleasant about the transition from feeling you know something to realizing you don’t. But the risk in an activity doesn’t stem just from the activity itself, but from how people approach it. When equipment is developed that makes mountain climbing safer, people change their behavior in ways that make it more risky. Equally, much of the risk in investing stems not from securities, companies or exchanges, but from investor behavior. In short, risk is low when investors behave prudently and high when they don’t. A world that’s perceived as safe can be rendered unsafe if the perception of safety causes investors to move out the risk curve, bid up prices, or take actions that assume greater certainty than turns out to be the case. I think that perfectly describes the years leading up to the crisis. Conversely, an uncertain world can be safer than people perceive if their concern causes them to behave cautiously (and especially if it causes them to sell down assets to prices from which the likelihood of further declines is reduced). Certainly few people in the world today are oblivious to the litany of outstanding negatives. Please note, however, that while investor ardor and risk-blindness are at reassuringly low levels today – and that may be the best single thing that can be said for the current environment – the actions of central banks to minimize interest rates have served to force investors out on the risk curve in search of return. They may not be blind to the risks, but many are participating in pro-risk activities nevertheless. I refer to these coerced participants with a phrase from my late father-in-law, Sam Freeman: “handcuff volunteers.”
宏观的作用
如今,耳边几乎全是宏观话题,别的鲜有人提。证券走势高度趋同,意味着投资回报更多取决于大盘整体动向,而非个股自身特性。而市场走势呢,反过来又主要跟着宏观形势走。
于是,投资者比以往任何时候都更相信,投资的成功之路在于对宏观未来做出正确判断。这催生了所谓的“风险偏好、风险规避”式投资,做法是:预期宏观形势向好,就加大风险敞口;预见到形势不妙,就收缩风险敞口。既然大部分结果都由宏观事件决定,投资者自然认为,时间就该花在琢磨宏观上。
The Role of Macro These days we hear little about anything other than macro considerations. Security movements are highly correlated, meaning investment returns are more a function of broad market movements than individual security characteristics. And market movements are, in turn, primarily in response to macro developments. Thus investors believe more than ever that the route to investment success lies in correct judgments about the macro future. This has given rise to so-called “risk-on, risk-off” investing, consisting of investors’ attempts to profit by increasing their risk exposure when they expect favorable macro developments, and decreasing it when they foresee unfavorable developments. Since macro events determine most of the results, it’s on the macro that investors believe they should spend their time.
2012 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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我完全不同意。基于宏观预测在短期内炒股,是投资中许多“若能做对就能大幅提升收益”的事情之一……但前提是得能做对,而实际上做不到,至少无法持续做到。
任何活动的预期价值,等于“做对所能获得的收益”乘以“做对的概率”,再减去“尝试失败可能造成的损失”乘以“失败的概率”。投资者往往被某种策略的潜在收益冲昏头脑,却很少去想自己有多大可能做对。因为我对做出正确预测的能力评价极低——尤其是把握时机的本事——所以我一概摒弃试图从短期宏观判断中获利的做法。
风浪大时最好的应对,是专注于完成漫长的航程,而不是去想下一个浪头会把船头抬起来还是压下去。
我们的投资目的地,最佳抵达方式就是准确评估资产价值,衡量价格与价值之间的关系,并在发现价格错定时果断、不动声色地采取行动。这依然是通往投资成功最可靠的路径——我认为也是唯一可靠的路径。当前的环境丝毫不会改变这一点。
I couldn’t agree less. Playing the market in the short term based on macro forecasts is one of the many things in investing that could add greatly to results if it could be done right . . . but it can’t, certainly not consistently. The expected value from any activity is the product of the gains available from doing it right multiplied by the probability of doing it right, minus the potential cost of failing in the attempt multiplied by the probability of failing. Investors are often blinded by the potential gains from a tactic and thus don’t think much about the likelihood they can get it right. Because I think so little of the ability to make correct forecasts – and especially of the ability to get the timing right – I dismiss attempts to benefit from short-term macro judgments. The best response when seas are choppy is to focus on completing the long-term voyage and not think about whether the next wave is going to push the nose of the boat up or down. Our investment destination is best reached by accurately valuing assets, assessing the relationship between price and that value, and acting resolutely and unemotionally when mispricings are detected. That’s still the best – I think the only – reliable path to investment success. Nothing about the current environment alters that one bit.
关于战略的几点思考
尽管我不相信基于宏观预期的短期战术调整,但我确实认为客户、投资组合经理和策略师在配置中期投资组合时,应当把宏观环境纳入考量。同时,尽管我对预测持高度怀疑态度,但我们不能忽视长期的周期性前景。(这算自相矛盾吗?绝对算!)
今年 1 月 10 日,我发出了一份“仅限客户”的备忘录,题为“我们能为你做什么?”此后它已被发布到网站上,希望各位能抽空一读。我在那份备忘录中提到,我提出了三个问题,或许有助于制定战略。
Some Thoughts on Strategy While I don’t believe in short-term tactical adjustments based on macro expectations, I do think clients, portfolio managers and strategists should take macro conditions into account when positioning portfolios for the medium term. And while I’m a big skeptic regarding forecasting, I think we can’t ignore the long-term secular outlook. (Is that an inconsistency? Absolutely!) On January 10 of this year, I sent out a “clients-only” memo called “What Can We Do For You?” It has since been posted to the website, and I hope you’ll take a look at it. I said in that memo that I had come up with three questions that might help in setting strategy.
你是否预期繁荣会回归?对这个话题做出一个简单、不必十分精确的判断,会深刻影响我们对投资介质与方式的选择。正如上文详尽所述,我的结论是,短期内我们不会重返危机前数年的繁荣景象。
Do you expect prosperity or not? A simple, not-necessarily-precise judgment on this subject can strongly influence our choice of investment media and approach. As described at length above, it’s my conclusion that we won’t soon see a return to the prosperity of the pre-crisis years.
在投资的两大主要风险中,你今天更应担心哪一个:亏钱的风险,还是错失机会的风险?显然,当前的宏观不确定性让人倾向于担忧损失。然而,尽管低回报环境意味着我们不必太过考虑机会成本,但最安全投资所提供的近乎为零的回报(以及资产价格的温和水平)却表明,在追求更令人满意的回报时,应当承担一定的风险。
Of the two main risks in investing, which should you worry about more today: the risk of losing money or the risk of missing opportunities? Certainly today’s macro uncertainties argue for worrying about loss. But even as the low-return climate suggests we needn’t give much thought to opportunity costs, the near-zero returns offered on the safest investments (and the moderate level of asset prices) argue for assuming some risk in the pursuit of a more satisfactory return.
今天你应该采用哪种投资风格,激进还是谨慎?跟上面说的一样,我觉得利与弊大致平衡,所以我们的行动也应该如此。
What kind of investing attributes should you employ today, aggressive or cautious? As above, I feel the pros and cons are balanced, and thus so should be our behavior.
2012 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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一方面,我们面临整体经济前景乏善可陈,以及可能出现进一步负面事件的威胁,这些事件或许影响重大,但希望不至于大概率发生。另一方面,这些担忧或许能在一定程度上被资产价格的低企和投资者心理所抵消。前者强烈反对激进投资,但后者——以及高安全级别投资所能提供的低预期回报——则表明投资计划应当包含一些前行的步伐。
我在芝加哥大学读书时,流行用“ceteris paribus”这个限定语,意思是“在其他条件相同的情况下”。因此我可以直截了当地说,在其他条件相同的情况下,一个以增长缓慢、潜在严重问题和巨大不确定性为特征的前景,应当要求:(a)更多配置固定收益投资而非股票,(b)更多追求今天的价值而非明天的增长,(c)更多安全投资,减少杠杆使用。
但是——这是最大程度的“但是”——今天,其他条件远非相同。安全投资已被哄抬,以至于其回报充其量微薄得可怜。如果你今天以 1.7% 的收益率买入十年期美国国债,很难想象除了萧条和通缩之外,还有什么环境能让你对结果感到满意。因此,一个更重要的结论是,这个世界并非黑白分明,并非可以理直气壮地坚持安全、回避风险。除非你认为避免损失压倒一切地重要,并且确实能放弃赚钱,否则今天的策略必须在规避风险与追求回报之间取得平衡。
适度的投资预期是确定航向的重要因素。任何坚持要求“美好旧时光”式回报的人,都将陷入麻烦。今天,得到个位数高位到十几位的、大致可靠的回报,就算出色的结果。我会建议不要追求更高的回报——或者至少,任何这种尝试都应当被认识到会带来一些非常现实的风险。
面对今天的形势,人们该怎么做?我认为最明智的应对依然是投资于定价合理的公司证券和能产生收益的资产。公司仍然最有能力适应通货膨胀、错位和竞争这类环境现象。
1958 年一本鲜为人知的书,W. 布拉多克·希克曼所著的《公司债券质量与投资者经验》,据说给了迈克尔·米尔肯很多灵感,促使他在 20 世纪 70 年代推广高收益债券,并为它们培育了发行和二级市场。在他的书中,希克曼报告了 1900 年至 1943 年间公司债券的表现。他表明,债券的质量和评级越低,持有它的回报就越高。
这是一个非常重要的结论。除了支持高收益债券投资之外,它还表明,即使在这段包含大萧条的时期,公司债券投资也相当成功。这告诉我的是,尽管经济环境极其严峻,许多公司依然能够赚钱并偿还债务。这支持了我的信念:公司投资是应对不确定时期的一个有吸引力的策略。
On one hand, we face a lackluster general economic outlook and the threat of further negative developments that could be impactful but hopefully are not overwhelmingly likely. On the other, these worries may be offset to a degree by the lowness of asset prices and investor psychology. The former elements argue strongly against aggressive investing, but the latter – and the low promised returns on highly safe investments – argue that one’s investment program should include some forward movement. When I attended the University of Chicago it was very fashionable to use the qualifier ceteris paribus: “all other things being equal.” So I can flatly state that, ceteris paribus, an outlook characterized by slow growth, potential serious problems and great uncertainty should call for (a) more fixed income investments than equities, (b) more pursuit of value today than growth tomorrow and (c) more safe investments and less use of leverage. However – and it’s the biggest possible “however” – all else is far from equal today. Safe investments have been bid up, such that the returns available on them are paltry at best. If you buy the ten-year U.S. Treasury note today at 1.7%, it’s hard to imagine environments other than depression and deflation in which you’ll be happy with the outcome. So one of the more important conclusions is that this isn’t a black-and-white world in which it’s reasonable to insist on safety and eschew risk. Unless you consider loss avoidance overwhelmingly important and can truly forgo making money, the approach for today has to balance risk aversion and the pursuit of return. Moderate investment expectations are an important element in setting one’s course. Anyone who insists on returns like “the good old days” is heading for trouble. A somewhat reliable return in the high single digits or low double digits to mid-teens would represent an outstanding result today. I would counsel against trying for much more – or at least that any attempt to do so should be recognized as entailing some very real risk. What should one do when faced with the conditions confronting us today? I think the smartest response still consists of investing in well-priced corporate securities and income-producing assets. Corporations still have the best chance of adjusting to environmental phenomena such as inflation, dislocation and competition. An obscure 1958 book, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience by W. Braddock Hickman, is said to have given Michael Milken a lot of his inspiration to popularize high yield bonds and foster new issue and secondary markets for them in the 1970s. In his book, Hickman reports on the performance of corporate bonds between 1900 and 1943. He shows that the lower a bond’s quality and rating, the higher the return from holding it. This is a very important conclusion. Aside from arguing for high yield bond investing, it shows that even in this period, which included the Great Depression, corporate bond investing was quite successful. What that tells me is that despite the extremely tough economic climate, many corporations were able to make money and service their debt. This supports my belief that corporate investing represents an attractive strategy for uncertain times.
2012 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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一种简单的看法认为,当今世界充满不确定性,我们不应贸然前行。但在我看来,更明智的态度是:尽管存在不确定性,我们也不该自动满足于那些被认为绝对安全的资产——尤其鉴于两点:其一,资金涌向这些看似安全的避风港,已使其承诺的回报变得微薄;其二,那种安全可能只是幻象。相反,我们应当努力掌控自身命运,在负责任地管理风险的前提下,追求合理的回报。
投资最耐人寻味的一个特点在于,你无法什么都不做。在投资世界里,即便不作为也是一种作为。选择维持现状,而非转向其他可能的选择;选择被动应对环境,而非主动出击;选择避开风险,固守于看似安全之地——这些都是重大的决定,必须建立在严肃分析和主动决策的基础上。
当今的挑战在于,虽然你能以相对低廉的价格买入风险较高的资产,因为大众正急于寻求安全,但大众的担忧并非凭空而来。如果你因为认为安全溢价过高而提高风险敞口,在某些情景下,你会犯下大错。由于这些情景发生的概率明显高于零,我们不能完全放弃谨慎。
双方各有论据,使得当今的策略制定颇为棘手。但当所有论据都倒向一边、让选择清晰明了时,那种清晰反而可能引导投资群体制造泡沫或崩盘。因此,我们前进的标准不能是“前路必须一目了然”。我要重复查理·芒格几年前告诉我的投资心得——尽管上次的备忘录里已经用过——“这本就不该是件容易的事。谁要是觉得容易,谁就是傻瓜。”
前景显然算不上特别乐观(资产也谈不上便宜),不足以支持激进投资。但与此同时,市场状况也告诉我,这并非躲到床底下避难的时候。“继续前进,但保持谨慎”——这就是我今天的座右铭。环境充满不确定性,但我们不应因此裹足不前。
The simplistic view says that because the world is uncertain today, we shouldn’t venture forth. But I think it’s much wiser to say that despite the uncertainty, we shouldn’t automatically settle for assets believed to be entirely safe – especially since (a) flight of capital to their seeming safety has rendered their promised returns low and (b) that safety can prove to be illusory. Instead we should attempt to take control of our fate and strive for reasonable returns with the risks handled responsibly. And one of the most interesting aspects of investing stems from the fact that you can’t just do nothing. In the investing world, even doing nothing is doing something. It’s choosing to stay with what you have rather than switch to what you could have. It’s deciding to deal with the environment passively rather than actively. And it’s avoiding the risky to stay with the seemingly safe. These are significant actions, and they must be undertaken on the basis of serious analysis and active decision making. The challenge today is that while you can get less-than-safe things relatively cheap because the crowd is desperate for safety, the crowd’s concerns are not imaginary. If you turn up the risk because you think the premium being paid for safety is too high, there are scenarios under which you will have made a big mistake. Because the probability of those scenarios occurring is materially above zero, we can’t dispense entirely with caution. The presence of arguments on both sides renders strategy setting difficult today. But when all the arguments are on the same side, making the choice clear, that clarity can lead the investing herd to create a bubble or a crash. Thus our criterion for moving ahead can’t be that the way forward has to be obvious. I’m going to repeat what Charlie Munger told me about investing a couple of years ago, even though I used it in my last memo, too: “It’s not supposed to be easy. Anyone who finds it easy is stupid.” The outlook certainly isn’t so propitious (and assets aren’t so cheap) as to call for investing aggressively. But at the same time, market conditions tell me this isn’t a time for hiding under the bed. “Move forward, but with caution” -- that’s my mantra today. The environment is uncertain, but we shouldn’t find that paralyzing.
September 11, 2012
September 11, 2012
2012 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2012 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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