经济现实
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
Economic Reality
Economic Reality
后记,6 月 13 日:自 5 月 26 日发布以下备忘录以来,反响热烈。在随后的讨论中,我意识到我本该以这样一段话开篇:
归根结底,经济学是研究选择的学问。因为选择涵盖人类经验的一切可能方面,经济学也是如此……
个人如何做出选择:你想要更好的成绩吗?更多时间放松?更多时间看电影?取得更好的成绩可能需要更多学习时间,或许也意味着更少的休息和娱乐。我们不仅作为个人要做出选择,作为社会也要做出选择。我们想要更清洁的环境吗?更快的经济增长?两者或许都可取,但改善环境的努力可能与更快的经济增长相冲突。社会必须做出选择……
我们总想要更多更好的住房,更多更好的教育——几乎一切都要更多更好。
如果我们的资源……是无限的,我们就可以对每个愿望都说“是”——那也就没有经济学了。因为我们的资源是有限的,我们不可能对一切都说是。对一件事说是,就意味着对另一件事说不。无论我们喜欢与否,我们都必须做出选择。
我们无限的欲望不断与有限的资源相碰撞,迫使我们挑选某些活动而舍弃其他。稀缺性就是不得不在各种备选方案中做选择的境况。(《宏观经济学原理》,莉比·里滕伯格和蒂姆·特里加滕著,着重号为原文所加)
正因为如此,我们每天都要做出经济选择。人人都知道这类选择无可避免。
人人如此,唯独政客例外。政客承诺更好的成绩和更多的休闲时间。更清洁的环境和更快的经济增长。这就是促使我写下这份备忘录的原因:在政治和政府领域——不同于现实世界——“或者”一词常常被抛到窗外,换成了“和”。不需要做任何选择。
几个月前,我看到一幅漫画,画的是两位初选对手的讽刺像。一个下面写着“鬼话连篇”,另一个下面写着“免费的好东西”。任何选举季都注定会有大量前者,但经济学告诉我们,后者是不现实的。我写这份备忘录,就是帮助读者理解其中的缘由。
Addendum, June 13: There’s been a lot of response since the memo that follows was originally published on May 26. In the discussions that have ensued, I realized that I should have led with something like this: Ultimately, economics is the study of choice. Because choices range over every imaginable aspect of human experience, so does economics. . . . How do individuals make choices: Would you like better grades? More time to relax? More time watching movies? Getting better grades probably requires more time studying, and perhaps less relaxation and entertainment. Not only must we make choices as individuals, we must make choices as a society. Do we want a cleaner environment? Faster economic growth? Both may be desirable, but efforts to clean up the environment may conflict with faster economic growth. Society must make choices. . . . We would always like more and better housing, more and better education – more and better of practically everything. If our resources were . . . unlimited, we could say yes to each of our wants – and there would be no economics. Because our resources are limited, we cannot say yes to everything. To say yes to one thing requires that we say no to another. Whether we like it or not, we must make choices. Our unlimited wants are continually colliding with the limits of our resources, forcing us to pick some activities and to reject others. Scarcity is the condition of having to choose among alternatives. (Macroeconomics Principles, Libby Rittenberg and Tim Tregarthen. Emphasis added) Because of the above, we make economic choices every day. Everyone knows choices like these are inescapable. Everyone, that is, except for politicians. The politician promises better grades and more leisure time. A cleaner environment and faster economic growth. That’s what caused me to write the memo: in politics and government – unlike the real world – the word “or” often goes out the window, replaced by “and.” No choices are necessary. A few months ago I saw a cartoon featuring caricatures of two primary opponents. Under one it said “bullst” and under the other it said “free st.” There’s bound to be a lot of the former in any election season, but economics tells us the latter is unrealistic. I wrote this memo to help readers understand why.
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2016 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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1977 年,为应对阿拉伯石油禁运造成的严峻能源前景,吉米·卡特总统设立了能源部长一职,并选定詹姆斯·施莱辛格出任美国首任“能源沙皇”。此前,施莱辛格曾任原子能委员会主席、中央情报局局长和国防部长,早年还在弗吉尼亚大学教过经济学。施莱辛格履新之际,一则关于他学术生涯的轶事流传甚广——无疑纯属杜撰——我看后乐不可支。
故事是这样的:施莱辛格是一位极具说服力的资本主义布道者,他经济学班上的两名学生受其感召,决定毕业后投身商海。他们的计划是从银行借钱,买一辆卡车,去弗吉尼亚乡下收购木柴,再转卖给乔治城的名流显贵。施莱辛格对他们的创业念头全力支持,两人也满怀热情地干了起来。创业伊始,这两位昔日的学生就发现生意火爆得几乎供不应求。
因此,当银行来电告知他们账户余额已归零、卡车即将被收回时,两人震惊不已。他们找到施莱辛格,他聚精会神地听他们讲述经过:事实上,他们能以每考德 50 美元的价格大量收购木材,又以每考德 40 美元的价格全部售出。他们怎么会破产?到底哪里做错了?施莱辛格吸了一口不离手的烟斗,说道:“答案明摆着:你们需要一辆更大的卡车。”
In 1977, responding to the difficult energy outlook brought on by the Arab Oil Embargo, President Jimmy Carter created the position of Secretary of Energy and chose James Schlesinger as America’s first “energy czar.” Previously Schlesinger had served as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, and Secretary of Defense, and in his early days he taught economics at the University of Virginia. I was tickled by a story – undoubtedly apocryphal – about his days in academia that made the rounds when Schlesinger was in his new energy post. As the story went, Schlesinger was such a convincing evangelist for capitalism that two students in his economics class decided to go into business after graduation. Their plan was to borrow money from a bank, buy a truck, and use it to pick up firewood purchased in the Virginia countryside, which they would then sell to the grandees in Georgetown. Schlesinger wholeheartedly endorsed their entrepreneurial leanings, and they proceeded with great enthusiasm. From the start of their venture, the former students could barely keep up with the demand. Thus it came as quite a shock when their banker called to tell them the balance in their account had reached zero and the truck was about to be repossessed. They contacted Schlesinger, and he listened attentively as they recounted their experience: they had, in fact, been able to acquire vast amounts of wood for $50 a cord, and they’d been able to sell all they had for $40 a cord. How could they be broke? Where had they gone wrong? Schlesinger puffed on his ever-present pipe and said: “The answer’s obvious: you need a bigger truck.”
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虽然施莱辛格的情况并非如此(尽管上面的故事暗示了这一点),但大多数普通公民并不具备判断什么在经济上可行、什么不可行的能力。眼下正值选举季,各种治愈经济顽疾的承诺满天飞,这似乎是一个特别合适的时机,来探讨在经济学法则的框架内,哪些目标能够实现,哪些不能。这些法则或许不像物理定律那样百分之百应验,但它们通常能划定结果的范围。我在这里的目标,是指出中央银行和政府试图做的某些事情——以及选举候选人承诺要做的事情——是如何与这些法则背道而驰的。
While it certainly wasn’t the case with Schlesinger (despite what the above tale suggests), most ordinary citizens don’t have what it takes to figure out what is and isn’t economically feasible. Since we’re in the midst of election season, with promises of cures for our economic woes being thrown around, this seems like a particularly appropriate time to explore what can and can’t be achieved within the laws of economics. Those laws might not work 100% of the time the way physical laws do, but they generally tend to define the range of outcomes. It’s my goal here to point out how some of the things that central banks and governments try to do – and election candidates promise to do – fly in the face of those laws.
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上高中的时候,有个哥们儿劝我去上一门会计课。我发现我们学的复式记账法逻辑严密、对称工整、毫不含糊。学完会计,我又去学经济学,同样觉得它条理清晰。从那时起,我经商这条路就算定下来了。就像施莱辛格故事里的道理一样,经济学的其余内容也相当直白,它的规律很靠得住。你要是 50 美元买进、40 美元卖出,那肯定赚不到钱……就这么简单(也撑不了多久)。这让我想起 2000 年 1 月我在“bubble.com”里讲的一个笑话,那是我父亲大约 60 年前讲给我的:
“我卖什么都亏钱。”
“那你怎么还做得下去?”
“我靠走量把亏的补回来。”
When I was in high school, one of my buddies convinced me to take a class in accounting. I found the double-entry bookkeeping we learned to be logical, symmetrical and unambiguous. After accounting I moved on to economics, and I found it equally logical. The die was cast for my career in business. Like the lesson of the Schlesinger story, the rest of economics is also pretty straightforward, and its laws are quite reliable. If you buy for $50 and sell for $40, you won’t make money . . . period (or stay in business long). That reminds me of a joke I used in “bubble.com” in January 2000, one my father told me roughly 60 years ago: “I lose money on everything I sell.” “Then how do you stay in business?” “I make it up on volume.”
2016 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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对于身处商界的我们而言,经济学定义着现实。(你可能觉得听我调侃过它,但我嘲讽的是经济预测,而非经济学本身。这两者天差地别。)本备忘录的主题正是经济现实。我主要采用的方法是描述人们(尤其是政客们)倾向于提出那些与经济现实相悖的提议,并解释为何这些提议难以奏效。
For those of us in the business world, economics defines reality. (You may think you’ve heard me poke at it, but what I deride is economic forecasting, not economics. There’s a big difference.) The realities of economics are the subject of this memo. My primary methodology will be to describe ways in which people (and especially politicians) tend to propose things that conflict with economic reality, and explain why they’re unlikely to work.
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先看央行试图实现货币刺激的那些动作。央行想帮经济成长时,会采取一些措施,比如降低对银行贷款收取的利率,或者近些年更多采用的,购买资产(也就是“量化宽松”)。理论上,这两招都能增加流通中的资金,刺激经济活动。利率越低,流通的钱越多,个人和企业就越可能去借贷、消费和投资。这些事会让经济更有活力。
但这里有个坎。央行官员没法凭空创造经济进步;他们只能暂时刺激一下活动。GDP,也就是国民产出,大致可以看作投入的劳动量乘以生产率,或者说每单位劳动对应的产出量。长期来看,这两样东西跟流通中的货币量或利率水平没什么关系。经济活动的水平,是由国家的生产力决定的。
央行的动作能鼓励或加速经济活动,但没法创造出原本不会发生的经济活动。央行做的很多事,就是把本来会在将来某个时候发生的事,提前到今天来做。这些效果是否持久,或者说是否只是在一场零和游戏的边界内把事件加速了,其实并不清楚。不过,芝加哥布斯商学院的兰德尔·克罗兹纳教授写信给我时提到,有一点确实是有益的:
[央行]能帮助防止彻底的金融崩溃,以及金融崩塌带来的、波及整个经济的负面外部效应。在这种情形下,只要操作得当,它们的行动就不仅仅是把未来的生产提前到现在,还能避免因恐慌而损失掉的经济活动。
早年间,汽车经常打不着火,有那种往化油器里喷的液体,能让车发动起来。但那不是长期运转的燃料。
举个例子,借钱给人,能让他们今天买下本来可能要晚些才买(甚至根本不买)的东西。如果一个消费者靠低息贷款今天买了艘船,那这艘船明年他就不会再买了。借钱给人并不会改变他们一辈子的收入,也就是说,等贷款要还的时候,消费者可能以后买的船就少了,因为可支配收入被压缩了。
到目前为止,正如过去七年所显示的:(a)央行没能实现它们期望的那种增长;(b)每一轮刺激的冲击力,似乎在逐次减弱。
与其相信央行能让经济变得更高效,我的底线看法是,每个经济体都有一种自然发生的增长率,长期产出由这个比率决定,而不是由央行官员的动作说了算。
Let’s start with central banks’ attempts to achieve monetary stimulus. When central banks want to help economies grow, they take actions such as reducing the interest rates they charge on loans to banks or, more recently, buying assets (“quantitative easing”). In theory, both of these will add to the funds in circulation and encourage economic activity. The lower rates are, and the more money there is in circulation, the more likely people and businesses will be to borrow, spend and invest. These things will make the economy more vibrant. But there’s a catch. Central bankers can’t create economic progress; they can only stimulate activity temporarily. GDP, or national output, can be seen roughly as the amount of labor employed times productivity, or the amount of output per unit of labor. In the long term, these things are independent of the amount of money in circulation or the rate of interest. The level of economic activity is determined by the nation’s productiveness. Central bank actions can encourage or accelerate economic activity, but they can’t create economic activity that otherwise wouldn’t occur. Much of what central banks do consists of making things happen today that otherwise would happen sometime in the future. It’s not clear that the effects are long-lasting or anything more than an acceleration of events within the confines of a zero-sum game. What is beneficial, however, as Professor Randall Kroszner of the Chicago Booth School of Business wrote me, is the fact that: [Central banks] can help to prevent a complete financial meltdown and the negative economy-wide externalities associated with a financial collapse. In these circumstances, and if done appropriately, their actions can do more than just move up future production to the present by helping to avoid economic activity losses due to a panic. In the old days, when cars often failed to start, there were fluids we could squirt into the carburetor to get them going. But they weren’t fuel for long-term operation. For example, lending people money can enable them to buy things today that they otherwise mightn’t have bought until later (if at all). If a consumer buys a boat today with money made available through a low-interest loan, that’s a boat he won’t buy next year. Lending people money doesn’t alter their lifetime incomes, meaning consumers may buy fewer boats later, when the loans have to be repaid, causing disposable income to contract. So far, as the last seven years show, (a) central banks haven’t been able to generate the growth they hoped for and (b) the impact of each successive jolt of stimulus seems to have been less powerful. Rather than believing central banks can make economies more productive, it’s my bottom line that there’s a naturally occurring growth rate for each economy, and that rate dictates the long-term output, not central bankers’ actions.
2016 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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近年来,以下这些地方有什么共同点:中国、爱尔兰、西班牙和亚利桑那州?答案很简单:大量空置的新房。在过去十多年里,这些地区的政府和央行选择通过让建筑融资唾手可得来鼓励经济增长。这对经济可以产生奇效……正如这些地区在 2007-08 年危机爆发前几年所表现的那样。
建筑活动增加了对劳动力、建筑材料、配套服务和辅助业务的需求。只有一个问题:宽松的融资——尤其是足以覆盖 100% 成本的融资——会鼓励开发商建造没有需求的空间。建造卖不出去的住宅、不需要的办公空间和不经济的基础设施,短期内推高了 GDP,却给国家的金融体系背上了沉重负担,尤其是那些向建筑商放贷的机构。最终,坏账留在银行手里,或许还得靠纾困来解决。
另一个例子是圣泰海洋(Sainty Marine),这家中国国有企业最近成为头条新闻,因为它是中国首家申请破产的上市公司。圣泰海洋先做船舶买卖,后来转型造船,按照合同行事——与业内其他公司不同——这些合同签订时没有金融担保的保障。它需要融资来造船,于是从国有银行拿到了钱。但当一家国有银行把钱借给一家国有造船企业时,谁在做像样的商业决策?谁会操心船有没有租约、持有这些船能不能赚钱这类问题?
关键在于,像过度建设这样的错误永远可能发生——但如果没人基于经济原则做决策,这类错误发生的可能性就大得多。如果放贷人员放贷时对还款没有直接利益关系,他们就不太可能对实力不足的借款人说“不”。而如果借款人不会因还不上钱而受影响,哪个借款人会拒绝送上门的融资呢?
不是所有贷款都能顺利还上。一旦还不上,通常借贷双方都会受影响。正如有人曾说:“破产之于资本主义,犹如地狱之于天主教。”当参与各方既不受利润驱动,也不担心亏损时,好的经济决策就不太可能做出。
What have the following places had in common in recent years: China, Ireland, Spain and Arizona? The answer’s simple: large numbers of empty new homes. In the last decade-plus, governments and central banks chose to encourage economic growth in these jurisdictions by making financing readily available for construction. This can do wonders for an economy . . . as it did in these cases in the years leading up to the crisis of 2007-08. Construction increases the demand for labor, building materials, support services and ancillary businesses. There’s only one catch: easy financing – especially if sufficient to cover 100% of costs – can encourage developers to create space for which there’s no demand. The process of creating unsalable homes, unneeded office space and uneconomic infrastructure adds to GDP in the short run but burdens the countries’ financial systems, especially the institutions that make the loans to builders. In the end, the bad loans stay with the banks, perhaps necessitating bailouts. Another example can be seen in the case of Sainty Marine, a Chinese state-owned enterprise that recently made headlines by becoming China’s first listed company to file for bankruptcy. Sainty Marine first bought and sold ships and then transitioned into shipbuilding, acting on contracts that – unlike elsewhere in the industry – were entered into without the benefit of financial guarantees. It needed financing in order to build those ships, and got it from state-owned banks. But when a state-owned bank lends money to a state-owned shipbuilder, who’s making business-like decisions? Who worries about issues like whether there’ll be charters for the ships and whether owning them will be profitable? The point is that mistakes like overbuilding are always possible – but they’re much more likely to occur if no one’s making decisions on an economic basis. If lending personnel are making loans without a direct stake in their repayment, they’re less likely to say “no” to weak loan applicants. And if borrowers won’t be affected by a failure to repay loans, which of them will decline offers of financing? Not all loans work. And when they don’t work, both the lender and the borrower are usually affected. As someone once said, “bankruptcy is to capitalism as hell is to Catholicism.” When the parties involved aren’t motivated by profit or worried about loss, good economic decisions are unlikely to be made.
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前几天上班路上,我听到法国正在发生抗议活动。工人们抱怨劳动法规可能发生的变动,这些变动会让他们的工作变得更不稳定。简而言之,法国工人喜欢现状:他们每周工作时间不能超过 35 小时,雇主解雇他们的权利受到一套冗长、折磨人且结果不确定的程序限制。他们也喜欢漫长的假期和国家提供的广泛福利。问题是,如果工作时间不长,每小时的生产率也不高,那么支付高于平均水平的福利的钱从哪里来。政府和法规创造不了繁荣。
在当前的竞选活动中,伯尼·桑德斯呼吁全民免费医疗和免费公立大学教育。所有候选人都发誓要保护当前的社会保障福利水平,而这些福利水平若没有其他变革,注定会让该体系破产。这类福利总得有人买单。这笔钱要么来自“当前收入”——即国内生产总值(GDP)的一部分(也就是税收收入)——要么通过
Riding to work the other day, I heard about protests occurring in France. Workers were complaining about potential changes in labor regulations that would make their jobs less secure. In brief, French workers like it the way things are: they can’t be pushed beyond 35 hours a week, and employers’ ability to terminate them is subject to a drawn-out, torturous and uncertain program. They also like their lengthy vacations and the extensive benefits provided by the state. The question is where the ability to pay for above average benefits will come from if neither the hours worked nor the productivity per hour is above average. Governments and regulations can’t produce prosperity. In the current campaign, Bernie Sanders has called for free health care and free public college education for all. And all the candidates have sworn to protect the current level of Social Security benefits, which are sure to render the system insolvent absent other changes. Benefits like these have to be paid for. This can be done either out of “current earnings” – a share of GDP (i.e., tax revenues) – or through
2016 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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借款。但政府不能凭空创造用来支付的手段。
从这个角度看,政府与家庭或企业并无多大区别。
borrowings. But governments can’t create out of thin air the means with which to make disbursements. In that way they’re not so different from households or businesses. *
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一些政府幻想通过提高富人税率来实现“多提供”的奇迹。毕竟,富人——按定义——拥有的钱远超所需:其他所有人靠少得多的收入也能过活。
过去十年,“民粹主义”在政坛的势头急剧上升。它主要意味着划清阶级界限,宣称站在普通人一边。这往往归结为利用收入较低的多数人对富裕少数人的怨恨。民粹主义在正在进行的美国总统大选中是一股特别强大的力量,其燃料来自工人阶级因全球化、工作外包以及一些人未能跟上技术进步而产生的经济不满。两党中的“局外人”或非建制派候选人——唐纳德·特朗普和伯尼·桑德斯——在告诉选民经济对他们不利、并煽动对日子过得更好的人的不满时,获得了不小的成功。现在就连希拉里·克林顿也在谈论富人和权势者时说:“牌堆是向着他们码的……我的工作就是重新洗牌。”
税收是政客们把阶级怨恨付诸行动的主要工具。许多人最终诉诸一句老话:“我们不是要压榨富人。我们只是要他们交公平的一份。”我在《全是税》一文(2011 年 11 月)中详细讨论过这个话题。但在我看来,(a)无法确定公平的一份是多少,(b)这个话题上只有自称专家的意见,(c)“公平的一份”似乎总是等于“比他们一直在交的更多”。
有理由假设,大多数民主社会最终都会走到这一步:多数人把顶层群体视为可以无限挤奶的现金奶牛。“再敲他们一笔吧;他们拿这个没办法。”但事实是,这种“多数人的暴政”是一种不健康的发展。首先,当有能力的人有强烈的动力去贡献时,社会会过得更好。其次,当税收变成没收性质时,向上的抱负和流动性将受到制约。最后,面对不断上升的税率,纳税人未必就毫无还手之力。
这让我想起 4 月 30 日《纽约时报》上的一篇文章,标题是《一位顶级纳税人搬走了,新泽西打了个寒颤》。文章讲的是税率上升对纳税人行为的影响,出发点是一个事实:新泽西州收入最高的个人已经搬到了佛罗里达。(新泽西已将最高所得税档从 1996 年的 6.37% 提高到今天的 8.97%,而佛罗里达没有州所得税。)
“如果你一年赚几亿美元,还要向新泽西州缴纳接近 10% 的税,这笔账你自己会算,”新泽西州议会共和党领袖约翰·布拉姆尼克说。“搬到佛罗里达,一年能省下几百万。你怎么能怪他?”……
在纽约、加州、康涅狄格、马里兰和新泽西,最富有的 1% 人口缴纳了总所得税的三分之一以上。现在,少数几位亿万富翁,甚至单单一个人……就能对州的财政收入和预算产生显著影响。……
在加州,5745 名收入 500 万美元及以上的纳税人(仅占 1360 万份报税表的 0.04%)在 2013 年贡献了超过 100 亿美元的所得税。
One way some governments think they can pull off the miracle of providing more is by raising taxes on the rich. After all, the rich have – by definition – more money than they need: everyone else gets by on much less. “Populism” has been a strongly rising element in politics over the last decade. It primarily means drawing class distinctions and claiming to be on the side of the common man. This often comes down to playing on the resentment of the lower-earning majority toward the wealthy minority. Populism is a particularly strong force in the U.S. presidential election now underway, fed by economic dissatisfaction among the working class due to the effects of globalization, job outsourcing, and technological progress with which some haven’t kept up. “Outsider” or non-establishment candidates in both parties – Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders – are having a lot of success telling voters the economy isn’t working for them and appealing to resentment toward those who are doing better. Now even Hillary Clinton is saying of the wealthy and powerful, “The deck is stacked in their favor . . . my job is to reshuffle the cards.” Taxes are the main instrument for politicians to put class resentment to work. Many eventually resort to an old saw: “We’re not out to soak the rich. We just want them to pay their fair share.” I discussed this subject at length in “It’s All Very Taxing” (November 2011). In my view, however, (a) there’s no way to determine what the fair share is, (b) there are only the opinions of self-styled experts on this subject, and (c) “fair share” always seems to come down to “more than they’ve been paying.” It makes sense to assume that most democratic societies eventually will reach the point where the majority views the top tier as a cash cow available for unlimited milking. “Let’s hit them for a little more; there’s nothing they can do about it.” But the truth is, this “tyranny of the majority” is an unhealthy development. First, society does better when able members have strong incentive to contribute. Second, upward aspiration and mobility will be constrained when taxes become confiscatory. Finally, taxpayers aren’t necessarily powerless in the face of rising tax rates. That brings me to an article that appeared in The New York Times on April 30, entitled “One Top Taxpayer Moved, and New Jersey Shuddered.” It concerns the impact of rising rates on taxpayer behavior, starting from the fact that New Jersey’s biggest single earner had moved to Florida. (New Jersey has raised its top income tax bracket from 6.37% in 1996 to 8.97% today, whereas Florida doesn’t have a state income tax.) “If you’re making hundreds of millions of dollars and you’re paying close to 10 percent to the state of New Jersey, you do the math,” said John Bramnick, the Republican leader in the New Jersey Assembly. “You can save millions a year by moving to Florida. How can you blame him?” . . . In New York, California, Connecticut, Maryland and New Jersey, the top 1 percent pay a third or more of total income taxes. Now a handful of billionaires or even a single individual . . . can have a noticeable impact on state revenues and budgets. . . . In California, 5,745 taxpayers earning $5 million or more [or only 4/100s of a percent of the 13.6 million returns filed] generated more than $10 billion of income taxes in 2013,
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约占该州总人口的 19%,据州官员称。“任何一个依赖所得税的州,只要这些大户中有一位打个喷嚏,都会跟着感冒……”
虽然并非每个人都会为了减税而搬迁住所,但有些人会。别忘了,全美 50 个州中有 7 个州不对居民征收所得税。所以这件事的底线——我认为在财政责任方面是个好消息——就是各州别无选择,只能把纳税人视为流动的。如果你把最高税率提高 10%,你不会从他们身上多收 10% 的税。南希和我认识的纽约人中,有相当多的人把家安在了佛罗里达。这是经济现实的反映——也应当抑制过度向富人征税的倾向。
美国是世界上极少数几个对公民全球收入都征税的国家之一,无论他们住在哪里,无论收入从哪里赚得。因此,美国人想通过移居海外来逃避联邦所得税,并没有好办法。(严格来说,他们可以退出美国税制,方法是缴纳一笔相当于出售全部资产、实现迄今为止全部增值所应缴的税款。但他们还得放弃公民身份,并牺牲频繁回美的机会,愿意做到这一步的人屈指可数。)
几乎其他所有国家的公民,在“劫富济贫”运动来临时都有更简单的应对之道(看看法国几年前实施 75% 最高税率时搬走的那批高收入者就知道了)。因此,大多数政府都清楚,他们虽然能对富人提高税率,但在多数情况下,没法让这些人乖乖坐着不动接受。
or about 19% of the state’s total, according to state officials. “Any state that depends on income taxes is going to get sick when one of these guys gets a cold . . .” While not everyone would change their residence to reduce their taxes, some will. Remember that seven of the 50 states do not tax their residents’ incomes. Thus the bottom line on this – I think the good news in terms of fiscal responsibility – is that states have no choice but to think of taxpayers as mobile. If you raise the top tax rate by 10%, you won’t collect 10% more taxes from them. A surprisingly large number of the people Nancy and I meet in New York have their residences in Florida. That’s a reflection of economic reality – and should restrain the tendency to excessively tax the rich. The U.S. is one of only a tiny number of countries whose citizens are taxed on all their worldwide income, regardless of where they live or where their income is earned. Thus, Americans don’t have a good way to escape federal income taxation by moving abroad. (Technically, they can leave the U.S. tax system by paying the taxes that would be due if they were to sell all their assets and realize all the appreciation to date. But they also have to surrender their citizenship and sacrifice frequent visits to the U.S., and the number of people willing to do all this is limited.) Citizens of almost every other country have an easier way to respond when the “soak-the-rich” movement arrives (see the big earners who moved away when France enacted a 75% top rate a few years ago). Thus most governments are aware that while they can raise tax rates on people of means, in most cases they can’t make them sit still and take it.
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国家政府实现财政目标的另一个简便办法,就是印钞票。但让更多货币涌入市场会稀释货币的价值。政府可以提高人们的名义收入,但最终人们会发现,虽然钱包鼓了,购买力却没比以前多一分。
在 2008 年 10 月发表的《否定主义的局限》一文中,我提到过魏玛德国的例子:政府把 1000 马克的纸币加盖成“100 万马克”,但它仍然只买得了一只羊。
马克对美元的汇率,从 1921 年初的 60 马克兑 1 美元,跌至 1922 年初的 320 马克兑 1 美元,到 1922 年底更是跌到 8000 马克兑 1 美元。难以置信的是,根据维基百科(用户维护的资料,或许并非总是最权威的):
1923 年 12 月,汇率达到 4,200,000,000,000 马克兑 1 美元。1923 年,通货膨胀率达到每月 3.25 × 10 的 6 次方个百分点(价格每两天翻一番)。
当时负责印刷这些(新 100 万亿马克)纸币的公司之一,提交了一张 32,776,899,763,734,490,417.05(3.28 × 10 的 19 次方,即 33 的 10 的 18 次方倍)马克的账单。(这可不是笔误。)
对政府来说,制造通胀的最大好处在于能用贬值的货币来履行债务。这正是 20 世纪 20 年代德国恶性通胀背后的动机——让以马克计价的支出和债务更容易偿付。
Another way national governments can make it easier to accomplish their financial goals is by printing money. But flooding the market with more currency debases the value of the currency. They can increase people’s nominal incomes, but eventually they’ll find their fatter wallets don’t contain any more spending power than they used to. In “The Limits to Negativism” (October 2008), I discussed the fact that in Weimar Germany, the government took the 1,000 mark note and over-stamped it “One Million Marks.” But it still only bought one goat. The mark fell from 60 to the U.S. dollar in early 1921 to 320 to the dollar in early 1922 and 8,000 to the dollar by the end of 1922. It’s hard to believe, but according to Wikipedia (user-maintained and perhaps not always the most authoritative): In December 1923 the exchange rate was 4,200,000,000,000 Marks to 1 U.S. dollar. In 1923, the rate of inflation hit 3.25 x 106 percent per month (prices double every two days). One of the firms printing these [new 100 trillion Mark] notes submitted an invoice for 32,776,899,763,734,490,417.05 (3.28 x 1019, or 33 quintillion) Marks. [That’s not a misprint.] The great advantage for governments in creating inflation lies in the ability to meet obligations with debased currency. That was the motivation behind Germany’s hyperinflation in the 1920s – to make it easier to cover expenses and debts denominated in Marks.
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如今大多数国家都盼着出现通胀。通胀能降低国家债务的“实际”价值,让实际偿还轻松些。各国财政部和央行想方设法鼓励通胀,手段是降息、增发货币。比如量化宽松,就是美联储用新印出来的美元去买未偿债务;这应当增加流通中的货币量,从而抬高商品的美元标价。瞧,通胀来了。
但政府的努力至今收效甚微,通胀仍不见踪影。通胀是个神秘现象(我认为很大程度上是心理层面的)。上世纪 70 年代,美国政府拿它没办法,如今世界各国又找不到办法把它引出来。
从经典理论看,通胀源于(a)“需求拉动”——商品供给固定,买家太多;或(b)“成本推动”——生产成本快速上升。如今这两种成因都不见踪影。所以通胀相当疲弱,这让那些想用更便宜的货币还债的国家大失所望。
Today most nations want to see inflation. That would reduce the “real” value of their national debt and ease repayment in real terms. Treasuries and central banks have tried to encourage inflation by cutting interest rates and increasing the amount of money in circulation. Quantitative easing, for example, consists of the Fed using newly printed dollars to buy outstanding debt; this should increase the amount of money in circulation and thus raise the dollar price of goods. Voilà: inflation. But governments’ efforts have been strikingly unsuccessful and, so far, inflation is MIA. Inflation is a mysterious (and, I think, largely psychological) phenomenon. The U.S. government couldn’t figure out how to stop it in the 1970s, and the nations of the world can’t find a way to start it today. Classically, inflation has resulted from (a) “demand pull” – too many buyers for a fixed supply of goods, or (b) “cost push” – rapid increases in the costs of production. Neither of these causes is in evidence today. Thus inflation is quite feeble, and that’s disappointing to countries that would like to pay their debts with cheaper currency.
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促进国家经济改善的另一项相关工具,是通往货币贬值的又一条路径:汇率下调。一国通过调整其货币的汇率,可以增强其与世界其他地区的交易能力。
假设美国想增加制成品出口。一种做法是让商品变得更便宜。但如果制造成本的美元无法降低呢?既然如此,为什么不直接减少购买一美元商品所需的外币数量?
举个例子,假设美国某小零件的售价是 100 美元,而美元兑鲁里塔尼亚科佩克的汇率是 1 美元兑 10 科佩克。这样,这个小零件在鲁里塔尼亚的售价就是 1000 科佩克。假设我们把汇率调整为 1 美元兑 8 科佩克。现在,鲁里塔尼亚买家只需支付 800 科佩克就能买到这个小零件。美国卖家收到的美元金额不变,但鲁里塔尼亚买家购买一个零件所需支付的科佩克数量减少了 20%。美国对鲁里塔尼亚的零件出口因此暴增。
当然,货币贬值虽然让一国出口更具竞争力,但也意味着其公民购买进口商品时需要支付更多本国货币。所以,和这里讨论的其他事项一样,没有免费的午餐。在政策层面,一国能采取的改善自身处境的手段,几乎都既(a)带有负面后果,又(b)在缺乏经济效率根本性提升的情况下,无法改善长期前景。
而且,顺便提一句,这里还有一个绕不开的难题:你不能单方面贬值自己的货币;你只能让本国货币相对另一种货币贬值。如果多个国家同时想贬值,会发生什么?中国想让人民币对日元贬值,但日本想让日元对人民币贬值。这被称为“竞争性贬值”。我们能确定的一点是,每个国家不可能同时相对所有其他国家贬值……尽管它们竭尽全力。
A related tool for national economic betterment consists of another route toward currency debasement: devaluation. A nation can increase its ability to deal with the rest of the world by adjusting its currency’s rates of exchange. Let’s say the U.S. wants to increase its exports of manufactured goods. One way to do this is to make the goods cheaper. But what if the dollar costs of manufacturing can’t be reduced? In that case, why not just reduce the amount of foreign currency it takes to buy a dollar’s worth of goods? For example, let’s say the selling price of a U.S. widget is $100, and there are 10 Ruritanian kopeks to the dollar. Thus a widget costs 1,000 kopeks in Ruritania. Say we change the exchange rate to 8 kopeks to the dollar. Now that widget costs a Ruritanian buyer only 800 kopeks. The number of dollars the U.S. seller receives is unchanged, but the number of kopeks the Ruritanian buyer has to pay for a widget is reduced by 20%. Sales of U.S. widgets to Ruritanians skyrocket. Of course, while a weaker currency makes a country’s exports more competitive, it also means its citizens have to pay more of their home currency to buy imports. So, as in the case of the other things under discussion here, there’s no free pass. There’s little a country can do in terms of policy actions to improve its situation that (a) doesn’t have negative ramifications and (b) will enhance the long-run outlook in the absence of fundamental improvement in economic efficiency. And, by the way, here’s another wrinkle: you can’t just devalue your currency; you can only devalue it against another currency. What happens when multiple countries want to devalue at the same time? China tries to devalue the yuan versus the yen, but Japan tries to devalue the yen relative to the yuan. This is called “competitive devaluation.” The one thing we can be sure of is that every country can’t simultaneously devalue versus all the others . . . try as they may.
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关于贬值和汇率的讨论,最终会引向全球化和国际竞争这个整体议题。全球化是当今最重要、最具影响力的话题之一,它正在塑造经济进步和政治话语。
让我们回到二战后初期。美国本土在物理上和经济上都完好无损——因为未受战火波及——而欧洲和日本则被摧毁殆尽。美国企业表现强劲,繁荣的美国消费者是强劲需求的来源。在大多数领域,美国产品是世界上最好的。“进口汽车”基本上不存在,我们的父母(或祖父母)买的电视机、高保真音响和家电都是本国生产的。就连我们的衣服也是美国制造的。
在这个非常积极的经济环境中,消费者、生产者和工人都兴旺发达,在大多数方面,美国人享有世界上最高的生活水平。现在这一点存疑了,这已成为总统竞选中的一个主要议题。我在《什么让我担忧》(2008 年 8 月)中是这样表述的:
我们高生活水平的原因之一,是美国人做同样一份工作拿到的报酬比其他所有人都高。只要(a)美国享有[前面]列出的那些好处,并且(b)有重要的壁垒保护现状,这就没有问题。但为什么这种情况应该持续下去?它怎么可能持续下去?
想想两座城市。A 城的工作岗位多于人口,B 城的人口多于工作岗位。起初,A 城的人——那里劳动力相对稀缺——做同样一份工作会比 B 城的人拿得多。他们能继续拿高薪的关键,在于存在阻止人们搬到 A 城的壁垒。否则,人们会从 B 城搬到 A 城,直到两座城市的人口与工作岗位比例相同,工资也相同为止。换句话说,地理上的不平等取决于资源的不可流动性。
在上个世纪的大部分时间里,壁垒维持了我们的高工资。其他国家的产品不如我们的好。有些缺乏投资资本,有些时不时被战争摧毁。也许它们不具备我们产生技术创新的能力,或者我们的管理技能。高昂的运输成本、关税、偏见(我小时候,“日本晶体管收音机”就是“低质量”的同义词)或法律限制(例如,不让外国航空公司自由竞争我们的市场)可能保护了美国工人的工资。国际贸易不是今天这个样子。但所有这些都可能随着时间改变,很难看出美国工人的收入优势如何能够持续下去……
1949 年,一款名为大众甲壳虫的小车问世了。它外形怪异,圆滚滚的,发动机在后面,但天哪它太便宜了:大约 1300 美元。外国车的质量最初遭到怀疑,但随着时间的推移质量提高了,卓越的性价比战胜了文化上的抵触,进口车在汽车销售中的份额不断增长。
那一年美国卖出了两辆甲壳虫,然后是几百辆,接着是几千辆。很快日本开始送来丰田、达特桑(现在的日产)和本田,它们也很成功。对比 1949 年的那两辆甲壳虫,就能看出它们的成功有多大了:1981 年,日本汽车制造商签署了一项“自愿限制协议”,限制每年最多向美国出口 168 万辆汽车。最近韩国也开始向美国送车。如今外国品牌占美国市场汽车销量的 55% 以上。当然,进口车成功的很大一部分原因是
This discussion of devaluation and exchange rates leads eventually to the entire issue of globalization and international competition. Globalization is one of the most important and influential topics today, and it is shaping economic progress and political discourse. Let’s go back to the early post-World War II period. The U.S. mainland was physically and economically intact – having been spared from combat – while Europe and Japan had been decimated. U.S. corporations were performing strongly, and the prosperous U.S. consumer was the source of powerful demand. In most fields, American products were the best in the world. “Imported cars” were essentially non-existent, and the television sets, hi-fis and appliances our parents (or grandparents) bought were produced here. Even our clothing was made in America. In this very positive economic environment, consumers, producers and workers all thrived, and in most regards, Americans enjoyed the highest standard of living in the world. Now that is in doubt, and this has become a main issue in the presidential campaign. Here’s how I put things in “What Worries Me” (August 2008): One of the reasons for our high standard of living is the fact that Americans have been paid more for doing a given job than everyone else. This was fine as long as (a) the U.S. enjoyed the benefits listed [earlier], and (b) significant barriers protected the status quo. But why should this go on? How can it go on? Think about two cities. City A has more jobs than people, and city B has more people than jobs. Initially, people in city A – where labor is relatively scarce – will be paid more for doing a given job than people in city B. The key to their continuing to earn more is the existence of barriers that prevent people from moving to city A. Otherwise, people will move from city B to city A until the ratio of people to jobs is the same in both cities and so are the wages. Among other things, geographic inequalities are dependent on the immobility of resources. For much of the last century, barriers kept our pay high. Other countries’ output wasn’t as good as ours. Some lacked investment capital, and some were decimated by war from time to time. Perhaps they didn’t possess our ability to generate technological advancements or our managerial skills. High transportation costs, tariffs, prejudices (when I was a kid, “Japanese transistor radio” was synonymous with “low quality”) or legal restrictions (e.g., keeping foreign airlines from competing freely in our markets) may have protected American wages. International trade wasn’t what it is today. But all of these things can change over time, and it’s hard to see how the earnings supremacy of U.S. workers will be sustainable. . . . In 1949 we saw the arrival of a little car called the Volkswagen Beetle. It was odd, with its rounded shape and the engine in the back, but boy was it cheap: roughly $1,300. The quality of foreign cars was initially the subject of skepticism, but over time quality improved, the superior price/value bargain overcame cultural resistance, and the share of car sales going to imports grew. Two Volkswagens were sold in the U.S. that year, then hundreds, and then many thousand. Soon Japan started to send over the Toyota, Datsun (now Nissan) and Honda, and they were successful, too. To put their success into perspective versus those two Beetles in 1949, in 1981 the Japanese automakers entered into a “voluntary restraint agreement” limiting the number of cars they could bring into the U.S. to 1.68 million per year. More recently Korea began sending cars to the U.S. Today foreign brands account for more than 55% of car sales in the U.S. market. Of course a good part of the success of imports has been
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这与成本较低有关。(如今在美国销售的许多“外国品牌”汽车其实是在本土生产的,不过是在非工会工厂里,包括福利在内的总劳动力成本平均每小时 10 美元,折合每辆车 250 美元,比美国车企的工会工厂低。过去,外国车确实在海外制造时,成本差异要大得多。)
如果外国车在质量与价格上综合占优,美国车企的市场份额注定下滑。而一旦下滑,美国汽车工人的收入和生活水平就不得不开始向那些生产性价比更高汽车的海外同行看齐。随着 20 世纪推进,贸易壁垒、高昂的运输成本、强大的工会以及惯性让美国工人保持领先,但最终现实追上了这个行业。
举个例子:汽车工人工会为工人争取到了优厚的福利,据经济政策研究所的数据:
2005 年,福特平均时薪 27.41 美元与(外资工厂)的 23.79 美元之间差距为 3.62 美元。若将附加福利、法定缴费、养老金福利、退休人员医疗保健及其他离职后劳动成本算进去,差距扩大到 20.55 美元(64.88 美元对比 44.33 美元)。
美国车企在销售背负沉重福利成本的汽车方面能力有限,而外国车的福利成本则低得多。归根结底,在全球化的世界里,如果 A 国的人愿意比 B 国的人拿更低的工资,那么 B 国的制造商只有四种可能:
related to lower costs. (A substantial number of the “foreign brand” cars sold in the U.S. today are actually made here, but in non-unionized plants at total labor costs including benefits that average $10/hour, or $250/car, less than the U.S. carmakers’ unionized plants. In the past, when foreign cars were actually made abroad, the cost differential was much more dramatic.) U.S. automakers’ market share was destined to decline if foreign cars were some combination of better and cheaper. And when it did, U.S. autoworkers’ income and standard of living had to start to equalize relative to those building better-value-for-the-money cars abroad. Trade barriers, high transportation costs, a strong union and inertia kept the U.S. worker ahead as the 20th century wore on, but eventually reality caught up with the industry. Here’s an example: the autoworkers’ union had bargained for excellent benefits for auto workers, and according to the Economic Policy Institute: In 2005, there was a gap of $3.62 between the average hourly wage of $27.41 at Ford and $23.79 for [foreign-owned plants]. When fringe benefits, legally required payments, pension benefits, retiree health care, and other post-employment labor costs are added in, the gap grew to $20.55 ($64.88 versus $44.33). There was a limit on the ability of U.S. automakers to sell cars burdened with substantial benefit costs while foreign car costs included much less for benefits. The bottom line is that, in a globalized world, if people in country A will work for less than those in country B, there are only four possibilities for manufacturers in country B:
同样的产品卖更高的价格,会丢掉市场份额;
同样的价格卖成本更高的产品,利润空间会变小(甚至亏本);
同样的价格卖品质更差的产品(这一条恐怕长久不了);
或者让政府给进口商品竖起贸易壁垒,比如用关税拉平售价,或用配额限制竞争。
charge a higher price for the same product and lose market share, charge the same price for the higher-cost product and enjoy smaller profit margins (or even suffer losses), charge the same price for an inferior product (this probably can’t be done for long), or get the government to erect trade barriers on imported goods, such as a tariff that equalizes selling prices or a quota that restrains competition.
于是,美国汽车制造商的经营与财务状况不断恶化,以至于在全球金融危机期间,通用汽车和克莱斯勒宣告破产(从而得以削减成本、甩掉福利负担),福特则经历了一场彻底的自我重组,结果殊途同归。此后,工人们签订的合同更为简朴,他们的相对生活水平也因势所必然地随之下滑。这正是当前工人阶级不满情绪背后的缘由之一。
Thus the operating and financial condition of U.S. automakers deteriorated such that, during the Global Financial Crisis, General Motors and Chrysler declared bankruptcy (enabling them to cut costs and shed benefits), and Ford underwent a thorough restructuring with the same result. Workers’ more modest contracts since then have, of necessity, caused their relative standard of living to decline. This is an example of the reasons behind the working class’s current discontent.
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当然,这让我想到一个想法,它比任何其他想法都更能推动这份备忘录的诞生:“我们会把工作机会带回来。”唐纳德·特朗普最坚决的承诺之一,就是应对美国制造业工作流失海外的问题,让商品重新在这里生产。伯尼·桑德斯反对自由贸易,主张我们必须“制定贸易政策,要求美国企业在这里创造就业,而不是在海外”。这些是可行的立场吗?(稍作题外话:美国制造业就业人数为 1230 万,比 1979 年达到的 1950 万峰值下降了 37%。那么,制造业产值的峰值是什么时候达到的呢?答案可能让你惊讶:就是现在!当前美国制造业产出水平接近
Of course, this leads me to the idea that probably did more than any other to set the wheels in motion for this memo: “we’ll bring back the jobs.” One of Donald Trump’s most emphatic promises is that he will respond to America’s loss of manufacturing jobs to other nations by causing goods to be made here again. Bernie Sanders opposes free trade and argues we must “develop trade policies which demand that American corporations create jobs here, and not abroad.” Are these actionable positions? (A minute for an aside: U.S. manufacturing employment of 12.3 million workers is down 37% from the peak of 19.5 million reached in 1979. So when did the value of manufacturing output hit its peak? The answer may surprise you: today! The current level of U.S. manufacturing output is in the vicinity of the
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历史最高水平,大约是 1979 年的两倍。产出翻倍,工人却不到原来的三分之二,意味着人均产出增长了两倍多。所以,如果我们按 1979 年的生产率来生产今天的产出,得额外多雇 2500 万工人!因此,虽然自 2001 年以来,我们因中国而流失了 320 万个工作岗位,但流失的更多工作岗位其实源于生产率的提升。如果政府真想保住就业,干脆禁止生产率进步算了。这个想法让我想起 19 世纪初的卢德分子,那些英国纺织工人对工业化不满,联合起来捣毁节省劳动力的工厂机器。当然,历史表明,靠法令或强力意志阻挡经济进步,很难行得通。)
假设有可能在中国制造像手机这样劳动密集型的产品,成本远低于美国(这并非不合理假设,因为中国制造业工人的平均年收入不到 9000 美元)。再假设,一部手机送到美国零售商手里的成本,中国制造为 100 美元,而美国制造为 150 美元。在这种情况下,特朗普或桑德斯政府将面临以下选择:
all-time high and roughly double the 1979 level. Twice the output with less than 2/3 the workers means output per worker has more than tripled. Thus, if we were producing today’s output at the 1979 level of productivity, we’d be employing 25 million more workers! So while we’ve lost 3.2 million jobs to China since 2001, for example, we’ve lost many times that to improvements in productivity. Perhaps if the government wants to preserve jobs it should just outlaw productivity gains. That thought reminds me of the early-19th-century Luddites, English textile workers who were unhappy about industrialization and banded together to destroy labor-saving factory machinery. Of course, history shows it’s hard to hold back economic progress by edict or force of will.) Let’s assume it’s possible to manufacture high-labor-content goods like cellphones much more cheaply in China than in the U.S. (not an unreasonable assumption, since the average manufacturing worker in China makes less than $9,000 per year). And let’s assume the resulting cost to deliver a cellphone to an American retailer is $100 if made in China versus $150 if made in the U.S. In that case, a Trump or Sanders administration would have the following choices:
禁止进口手机,要求必须在美国本土生产,成本因此达到 150 美元;找到愿意接受中国工资水平的美国工人,把成本降到 100 美元;或者对中国进口商品加征关税,使美国零售商的手机成本拉平到 150 美元。
forbid imports of cellphones, requiring that they be made in the U.S. at a cost of $150, find Americans willing to work at Chinese wages, bringing the cost down to $100, or impose a trade tariff on Chinese imports that equalizes the U.S. retailer’s cost for phones at $150.
我再想不到其他可能性了。第一种在今天这个时代恐怕行不通。第二种同样不现实,因为没多少美国人愿意干那种枯燥乏味的活儿,而中国那边每小时不到 5 美元的工资又违反了我们的联邦最低工资标准。这样一来就只剩第三条路:关税。事实上,特朗普先生确实说过,要对从中国进口的商品征收 45% 的关税,对墨西哥征收 35%,对其他国家来的商品也要征收不同的关税。可这条路有几个问题:
I’m not aware of any other possibilities. The first probably isn’t feasible in this day and age. The second is equally unlikely, since few Americans are likely to elect to do the tedious work involved, and the Chinese wage of less than $5 per hour would violate our federal minimum. That leaves the third option: tariffs. And, in fact, Mr. Trump has said he would impose a 45% tariff on Chinese imports, 35% on Mexico, and various tariffs on goods from other countries. Here are some of the problems with that:
首先,这类关税很可能违反现行贸易协定。要实施这些关税,我们就得撕毁这些协定。
我们不得不考虑报复性措施——其他国家难道不会对美国出口商品征收对等关税,进一步伤害我们的制造业基础吗?正如《纽约时报》5 月 3 日所写,“发动贸易战或许能让失业工人宣泄情绪,但不太可能创造多少工厂岗位。”
如果中国——我们最大的债权国——有一天决定不再那么热衷于参与新的美国国债融资,我们那不断膨胀的国债再融资能力会变成什么样?
贸易壁垒升高,会对二战以来美国扩大贸易协定的主要动机之一——防止冲突——产生什么影响?
最后一点,也是最简单的一点:哪个美国人愿意为一部手机比现在多付 50% 的钱?
First, such tariffs are probably barred under trade agreements that are in place. To impose them, we would have to abrogate those agreements. We have to wonder about retaliatory actions – wouldn’t other countries impose offsetting tariffs on U.S. exports that would further harm our manufacturing base? As The New York Times wrote on May 3, “starting a trade war might be cathartic for workers who have lost jobs, but it is unlikely to create a lot of factory work.” What would happen to our ability to refinance our perpetually growing national debt if China, our biggest creditor, decided one day it wasn’t quite as eager to participate in new Treasury financings? What would rising barriers do to one of the main motivations behind the broadening of U.S. trade agreements since World War II: preventing conflict? Finally, but most simply, what American wants to pay 50% more for a cellphone than he does today?
我们在这里看到一个提醒:“经济常识”其实并不常见。那些认为“把工作带回来”是个好主意的选民们,有没有想过,按美国工资水平制造的商品——或者旨在将中国商品成本提高到美国水平的关税——会对他们的生活成本造成什么影响?我猜他们没想过。据估计,有 320 万美国人的制造业工作岗位因中国而流失,这些人的利益,又该如何与数亿不得不为进口商品支付高得多的价格的消费者的利益相平衡?这不是一个容易回答的问题。
配额、关税和补贴,都是国家保护那些没有这些手段就无法与国际竞争对手抗衡的产业的方式。因此,它们是政策决策可能导致扭曲的一个绝佳例子。由于关税和补贴所针对的产业
What we have here is a reminder that “economic common sense” isn’t so common. Have the voters who think it’s a great idea to “bring back the jobs” thought about what goods manufactured at U.S. wages – or tariffs designed to bring the cost of Chinese goods up to those levels – would do to their cost of living? I’d guess not. How will the interests of the 3.2 million Americans estimated to have lost their manufacturing jobs to China be balanced against the hundreds of millions who would have to pay considerably more for imported goods? Not an easy question. Quotas, tariffs and subsidies are all ways for countries to protect industries that can’t hold their own against international competitors without these things. Thus they’re a good example of ways in which policy decisions can lead to distortions. Since the industries for which tariffs and subsidies are
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这些行业,顾名思义,一旦建立,就属于离了关税便无法竞争的行业。要让这类关税落地,必须有人做出决断:其一,这些行业应当被扶持维持运营;其二,这些行业产品的消费者,应当被阻止享受更低的价格——倘若消费者能轻易购得免关税的海外商品,这种低价本会出现。
我们是想补贴本国农民,还是想让美国人买到国外的廉价粮食(哪怕农民因此破产)?撇开国家战略层面的考量不谈,我们是想保住那些美国缺乏竞争力的行业里的工作岗位,还是想让美国消费者整体上把生活成本压到最低?每一桩,都只能二选一……不可能两全。
归根结底——就像我在这里谈到的许多事情一样——经济规律不容忽视,也不会有凭空出现的灵丹妙药。虽然这不是全部原因,但美国制造业岗位流失海外的主要症结在于,那些国家的工人愿意拿低得多的工资干活。在这个全球化的世界里,这意味着美国人既想保住过去那种高薪的制造业工作,又想继续享受近来买惯了的低价商品,两头都占是做不到的。加征关税解决不了这个难题。只要美国工人要求的工资高于别处的劳动者,他们就既不太可能为世界其他地方制造多少东西,也不太可能为自己制造多少东西。经济现实如何让棘手问题难以找到轻松答案,这是个再清楚不过的例子。
established are, by definition, industries that can’t compete without them, for these things to be enacted, someone has to make a decision that (a) these industries should be kept afloat and (b) consumers of these industries’ goods should be prevented from paying the lower prices that would prevail if consumers had easy access to goods from abroad, free of tariffs. Do we want to subsidize our farmers, or do we want to allow Americans to buy cheap crops from abroad (and let the farmers go out of business)? Leaving aside strategic national considerations, do we want to protect the jobs of those who work in industries where the U.S. is uncompetitive, or do we want to allow U.S. consumers as a whole to minimize their cost of living? In each case, it’s one or the other . . . but not both. The bottom line, as with so many of the things I’m discussing here, is that economic laws cannot be ignored or magical solutions willed to appear. While it’s far from the entire explanation, the main reason the U.S. has lost manufacturing jobs to foreign countries is that people there are willing to work for much less. In this globalized world, that means Americans can’t enjoy both the high-paying manufacturing jobs they used to have and the low-cost goods they’ve been buying of late. The imposition of tariffs can’t solve that conundrum. As long as American workers demand wages higher than people elsewhere, they’re unlikely to manufacture much for the rest of the world, or for themselves, either. This is an incredibly clear example of how economic reality makes it hard to find easy solutions to difficult problems.
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说到工资,顺便提一下最低工资。美国政府最早在 1938 年的《公平劳动标准法》中确立了联邦最低工资,定为每小时 0.25 美元。此后上调过 22 次,如今是 7.25 美元。各州的规定五花八门。少数州没有最低工资,有些州的最低标准低于联邦水平,许多州沿用联邦标准,还有一批州的最低工资高于联邦水平。就在今年,加州(到 2021 年底,从现在的 10 美元)和纽约州(到 2018-19 年底,从现在的 9 美元)已立法将州最低工资提高到 15 美元(有例外情况)。随着收入最低的工人工资上涨,他们新得到的这份好处从何而来,又会带来什么影响?
关于提高最低工资的争论吵得厉害,却始终没有定论…… 主要是个意识形态问题。保守派和企业利益方确信,提高最低工资对企业和工人都是灾难。如果更高的工资推高售价,而竞争对手的劳动力成本更低,企业和就业就会受损。如果售价和非劳动力成本不变,那就有一个固定大小的饼要分(在工人工资和企业主利润之间)。这样一来,如果强制要求每位工人拿更高的工资,而老板那部分保持不变,按定义工资那块饼就只能分给更少的人,结果是失业。反过来,如果从老板那份里掏钱付更高的工资,创业的人会减少,有些企业可能关门,结果还是失业。
自由派和工会组织则坚称,不会有实质影响。比如,根据全国就业法律项目的一项研究,1938 年以来联邦 22 次上调最低工资,大部分情况下就业增长并未因此放缓。少数几次放缓都发生在经济衰退期,所以或许并非工资上调所致。
While on the subject of wages, it’s appropriate to mention the minimum wage. The U.S. government first established a federal minimum wage of $0.25 an hour in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. It has been raised 22 times since then and now stands at $7.25. At the state level, there’s a patchwork of regulation. A few states don’t have a minimum wage. Some have minimums that are below the federal level. Many states use the federal minimum, and a bunch have minimums higher than the federal level. Just this year, however, increases in the state minimum to $15 (with exceptions) have been enacted in California (by the end of 2021, from $10 today) and in New York (by the end of 2018-19, from $9 today). As the wages of the lowest-paid workers increase, where does their newfound prosperity come from, and what will be the effects? The debate over increasing the minimum wage is loud and inconclusive . . . and mainly a matter of ideology. Conservatives and business interests are sure an increase in the minimum wage will be disastrous for both business and workers. If higher wages drive up selling prices vis-à-vis competitors who face lower labor costs, business and jobs will suffer. If selling prices and non-labor costs are unchanged, there’s a fixed pie to be divided up (between workers’ wages and business owners’ profits). Thus, if you mandate higher pay per worker and the owners’ slice remains the same, the wage slice of the pie by definition will cover fewer recipients; the result is job losses. And if instead you take the higher wages out of the owners’ part of the pie, fewer businesses will start up, and some might close, again resulting in job losses. Liberals and labor organizations, on the other hand, insist there will be no material impact. For example, according to a study from the National Employment Law Project, following most of the 22 federal increases since 1938, job formation didn’t slow from what it had been. And in the few cases where it did slow, the increase took place in recessionary times, so maybe it wasn’t the result of the wage increase.
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在这两个极端立场之间(大概没有一个完全正确),有很多东西值得思考:
In between these polar positions (neither of which is probably completely right), there are lots of things to think about:
对无差别化业务(比如快餐业)而言,处于高最低工资标准的州、紧邻工资低得多的州,什么样的标准才合理?
同一最低工资标准,是否适用于某个州内所有企业,而不论其劳动密集程度千差万别?
同一最低工资标准,是否适用于某个州内所有企业,而不论其盈利状况如何?那些像医院一样、严重依赖低成本劳动力的非营利机构,又该如何对待?
同一最低工资标准,是否适用于某个州的各个地区,而不论其经济活力和生活成本差异巨大?
鉴于眼下讨论的涨幅高达 50% 至 100%,与历史相比幅度巨大,且美国已不再具备早先几次提薪时所拥有的增长潜力和竞争力,那么过去那种就业影响温和的历史记录,是否还能作为参考依据?
What’s right for undifferentiated businesses (think fast food) in a high-minimum-wage state abutting one where the wage is much lower? Is the same minimum wage right for all businesses in a given state regardless of their varying degrees of labor-intensiveness? Is the same minimum wage right for all businesses in a state regardless of their profitability? And what about non-profits like hospitals, with their heavy reliance on low-cost labor? Is the same minimum wage right for all parts of a state regardless of the differences in their economic vibrancy and cost of living? And is a benign job-formation-impact history relevant given that we’re now talking about increases of 50-100%, large changes relative to history, and given that the U.S. no longer has all the growth potential and competitiveness that it did when the prior increases took place?
桑德斯参议员说过,他要推动联邦最低工资涨到 15 美元。可 15 美元这个数,对全美各地区、各州、各城市都合适吗?(有意思的是,纽约州和加州提出的方案里,纽约市和罗切斯特不一样,洛杉矶和贝克斯菲尔德也不一样。)要是单一的最低工资标准不适用于所有地方,那又该由哪个政府机构来干这件不可能干成的事——给每个地方定出合适的最低工资?我不是要在 这里定夺最低工资问题,而是想说这话题不简单。光靠强制提高工资,似乎很难让所有人都过得更好。有些生意会变差,甚至做不下去;创业意愿可能受挫;自动化设备进一步投入的盈亏平衡点会降低。(今天《华盛顿邮报》的头条是:“麦当劳前 CEO 称提高最低工资反而会让机器人抢走饭碗”)有些工人可能失业,或者根本找不到工作。记住,政府和监管机构不创造财富,只做再分配。除了最长远的意义之外,它们的影响大体上是零和游戏。
Senator Sanders has said he’ll enact a $15 minimum federal wage. Is it possible that $15 is an appropriate minimum for all regions, states and cities? (It’s interesting to note in this regard that the proposed changes in New York and California treat New York City differently from Rochester, and Los Angeles differently from Bakersfield.) And if a single minimum wage isn’t right for every location, what government commissariat will perform the impossible task of setting the right minimum for each one? I don’t mean to decide the minimum-wage issue here, but rather to say it’s not an easy subject. It seems unlikely that you can make everyone better off just by mandating a higher wage. Some businesses will become less successful or non-viable. Business formation may be discouraged. The breakeven cost for further investment in automation will decline. (Headline from today’s Washington Post: “ExMcDonald’s CEO says raising the minimum wage will help robots take jobs”) Some workers may lose their jobs or fail to get jobs. Remember, governments and regulators don’t create wealth, they only redistribute it. Their impact is largely a zero-sum game except in the longest-term sense.
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作为自称的“民主社会主义者”,伯尼·桑德斯对商业,特别是金融行业表现出敌意——“华尔街的商业模式就是欺诈”——他的言论听起来似乎会采取相当激进的措施来监管经济。例如,他曾表示会拆分大银行(却很少提及具体做法)。
与其逐一列举他的政策违反的经济法则,不如直接提出几个我认为关键的问题:
As an avowed “democratic socialist,” Bernie Sanders expresses hostility toward business, especially the financial sector – “The business model of Wall Street is fraud” – and he sounds like he’d go pretty far to regulate the economy. For instance, he’s said he will break up the big banks (without much mention of how). Rather than go into all the economic laws his policies violate, I’ll simply ask some questions I consider relevant:
美国之所以能登上世界经济之巅,背后靠的是什么?要是他不把我们的成功很大程度上归功于资本主义自由市场体制,那咱俩可就说不到一块儿去了。那些在管制经济下繁荣起来的国家如今何在?苏联和东德又怎么样了?当年东德和西德并排而立,两相对照,岂非一场绝佳的控制实验?古巴、委内瑞拉和越南的普通人日子过得如何?中国又为何不断加大运用自由市场手段的力度?
What has been behind the United States’ progress to the top of the world’s economic heap? (If he doesn’t attribute a lot of our success to the capitalist, free-market system, then we disagree.) Where are the countries that have thrived under control economies? How about the U.S.S.R. and East Germany? (Didn’t the ability to watch the former East Germany and West Germany sideby-side provide a good controlled experiment?) How do average folks live in Cuba, Venezuela and Vietnam? Why is China continually increasing its use of free-market techniques?
2016 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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举一个经济集中管控的实例如何?以下是 2016 年 5 月 12 日《大西洋月刊》上一篇关于委内瑞拉的文章摘录(我加了重点并调整了段落顺序):
价格管控便是一个典型例子,其范围不断扩大,覆盖了越来越多的商品:食品和关键药品,没错,还有汽车电池、基本医疗服务、除臭剂、尿布,当然,还有卫生纸。表面目标是为了抑制通胀,让穷人买得起商品,但任何懂点经济学基本常识的人都能预见到后果:当价格被压低到生产成本以下,卖家就无力维持货架供应。官方价格很低,但这只是海市蜃楼:商品早已消失不见。
这让人震惊:你能给商品定价,但没法逼人生产。这听起来很像是经济现实。
这些无效——或者说适得其反——的价格管控,不过是巨大经济乱局中的一小部分。这场乱局是怎么来的?
不久前,委内瑞拉——“一个看似现代、看似民主的国家,距离美国只有几小时航程”——还很富裕,宜居。
坐拥全球最大石油储量,又赶上石油热潮的尾声,先是查韦斯、自 2013 年起是马杜罗领导的政府,在过去的 17 年里获得超过 1 万亿美元的石油收入。
但接着,它迎来了起点:
查韦斯推行的“21 世纪社会主义”试验,这位自封的穷人卫士,誓言要把国家财富分配给大众,却把国家引向了灾难,如今全世界都在他钦点的继任者马杜罗治下目睹这场灾难……
过去两年,委内瑞拉经历的崩溃,在这样一个中等收入国家中几乎前所未有,除非是在战争状态下。死亡率飙升;公共服务一个接一个瘫痪;三位数通胀让超过 70% 的人口陷入贫困;失控的犯罪浪潮让人们夜间不敢出门;购物者得排队数小时才能买到食物;婴儿因缺乏基本的廉价药品和医院设备而大量夭折,老人和慢性病患者同样如此。
这就是一个曾经富裕、曾经现代的国家在经济集中管控之下所遭遇的命运。我们要不要试一试?
How about an example of central economic control in action? Here are some excerpts from an article about Venezuela that appeared in The Atlantic of May 12, 2016 (I’ve added some emphasis and reordered the paragraphs): A case in point is the price controls, which have expanded to apply to more and more goods: food and vital medicines, yes, but also car batteries, essential medical services, deodorant, diapers, and, of course, toilet paper. The ostensible goal was to check inflation and keep goods affordable for the poor, but anyone with a basic grasp of economics could have foreseen the consequences: When prices are set below production costs, sellers can’t afford to keep the shelves stocked. Official prices are low, but it’s a mirage: The products have disappeared. Here’s a shocker: you can set prices for goods, but you can’t make people produce them. That sounds a lot like economic reality. These ineffective – or counterproductive – price controls were only one part of a huge economic mess. How did it arise? Not long ago, Venezuela – “a seemingly modern, seemingly democratic nation just a few hours’ flight from the United States” – was wealthy and a good place to live. Sitting atop the world’s largest reserves of oil at the tail end of a frenzied oil boom, the government led first by [Hugo] Chavez and, since 2013, by [Nicolas] Maduro, received over a trillion dollars in oil revenues over the last 17 years. But then it saw the beginning of: The experiment with ‘21st-century socialism’ as introduced by . . . Chavez, a selfdescribed champion of the poor who vowed to distribute the country’s wealth among the masses, and instead steered the nation toward the catastrophe the world is witnessing under his handpicked successor Maduro . . . In the last two years Venezuela has experienced the kind of implosion that hardly ever occurs in a middle-income country like it outside of war. Mortality rates are skyrocketing; one public service after another is collapsing; triple-digit inflation has left more than 70 percent of the population in poverty; an unmanageable crime wave keeps people locked indoors at night; shoppers have to stand in line for hours to buy food; babies die in large numbers for lack of simple, inexpensive medicines and equipment in hospitals, as do the elderly and those suffering from chronic illnesses. This is the fate that has befallen a once-wealthy and once-modern nation operating under central economic control. Shall we give it a try?
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2016 年橡树资本管理有限公司
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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就经济现实而言,我的最终结论是:短期内,政府理论上具备以下能力:
a)加速经济活动,把本属于未来的活动提前到今天,
b)让某一群体的日子变好,代价是损害另一群体(比如富人与穷人的此消彼长),
c)鼓励某种形式的经济活动,压制其他形式(比如投资追求资本利得,而不是追求股息)。
你可以把这些看作潜在有用的政策工具,也可以看作扭曲经济运行的行为。从定义上说,这些手段的设计初衷,是达成市场放任自由时不会出现的结果。也许并非所有目标都确实可取,有些目标一旦被写进法律,可能因为意想不到的后果而不再被视为可取。有些问题——比如资本收益的税率应该高于还是低于劳动收入——纯粹是立场问题,很大程度上取决于政治观点。还有些政策动作,可能纯粹是政治分肥,是对选民忠诚的回报。
与上面所列政府影响经济的可行手段相比,还有一长串事情是它们做不到的。
a)单靠刺激手段,创造不出多少净增长、净财富或净繁荣。经济产出的一定量的财富,可以被搬来搬去,但政府没法凭空把它变多。
b)政府没法让所有人同时受益。大多数情况下,它们只能从一群人手里拿走,给另一群人。例子就是:通过进口关税提高某个夕阳产业客户的价格,从而改善该行业工人的境遇。
c)政府采取的多数行动,都会波及本意要帮助的对象以外的人,并对所有人产生二阶后果。法国可以出台法规保护现有岗位,让解雇变得困难,但同样的法规也会吓退创业者和企业主,让他们不愿开办或扩大生意,也不愿雇新人。
d)政府可以提供激励,把人往某个方向推,但没法让经济(或经济中的个人)按预期表现。比如,1990 年代日本政府试图通过邮寄支票来刺激消费(今天管这叫“直升机撒钱”),但保守的日本民众把钱存进银行而不是花掉,把政府的行动变成了“推绳子”的经典案例。
根本性的改进——比如投资激励、税收制度或基础设施方面的明智变革——能抬高增长曲线的斜率,为社会带来可观的长期净收益(尽管未必对每个社会成员都如此)。短期修补根本不可能凭空造出财富。最后我用丘吉尔的一句话收尾,再添上我自己的几句:“我们认为,一个国家想靠征税(或刺激、或贬值)把自己送进繁荣,就像一个人站在桶里,想提着桶把把自己拎起来。”
For me, the bottom line on economic reality is that, in the short run, governments theoretically have the ability to: a) accelerate economic activity, bringing forward to today otherwise-future activity, b) make life better for one group of citizens at the expense of another (e.g., the rich versus the poor), and c) encourage one form of activity versus others (e.g., investing for capital gains versus investing for dividends). One could view these things as potentially helpful policy tools, or as actions that distort the workings of the economy. By definition, they are designed to accomplish results that wouldn’t occur if the market were left free. Perhaps not all the goals are truly desirable, and some may cease being considered desirable after they’ve been enshrined in law, possibly because of unintended consequences. Some issues – for example, the question of whether income on capital should be taxed higher or lower than income from labor – are just a matter of opinion based largely on political point of view. Some actions taken may be nothing more than patronage and rewards for voter loyalty. In contrast to the above list of things governments can do to affect economies, there’s a significant list of things they can’t do. a) They can’t create much net growth, wealth or prosperity through stimulus alone. A certain quantum of wealth is produced by an economy. It can be moved around, but governments can’t increase it magically. b) They can’t make everyone better off simultaneously. For the most part they can only take from one group to give to another. An example is the ability to improve the fortunes of workers in an endangered industry through import tariffs that raise prices for the industry’s customers. c) There aren’t many actions they can take that won’t have repercussions for people other than the ones they’re intending to benefit, and second-order consequences for everyone. France can enact regulations that protect current jobholders by making it difficult to lay them off, but those same regulations will deter entrepreneurs and owners from starting or expanding businesses and hiring new employees. d) While governments can provide incentives and nudge people in a given direction, they can’t make economies (or the people in them) perform as desired. For example, in the 1990s the Japanese government tried to stimulate consumption by mailing out checks (something that’s referred to today as “helicopter money”). But its conservative citizens put the money in the bank rather than spend it, turning the government’s action into a classic case of “pushing on a string.” Fundamental improvements – intelligent changes in investment incentives, the tax system or infrastructure, for example – can increase the slope of the growth curve and provide substantial net long-term benefits for a society (although not necessarily for every individual member). Short-term fixes simply cannot create wealth out of thin air. I’ll close with something Winston Churchill said, with some additions of my own: “We contend that for a nation to try to tax [or stimulate or devalue] itself into prosperity is like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift himself up by the handle.”
May 26, 2016
May 26, 2016
2016 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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