对未来的认知
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
未来的知识
Knowledge of the Future
我在上周的备忘录里再次引用过哈佛流行病学家马克·利普西奇的观点,他提出信息分为三类:(a)事实,(b)基于与其他病毒类比的知情推断,以及(c)观点或猜测。他是在谈论新冠病毒时提到这一点的,但我一直在思考它对投资的意义。
过去,我曾将投资定义为配置资本以从未来发展中获利的行动。我也提到过,未来无法预知,这构成了一个挑战。这是我们不得不面对的悖论。
按照利普西奇的分析框架,在投资领域:
As I showed by using it again in last week’s memo, I was impressed by the observation of Marc Lipsitch, Harvard epidemiologist, that there are (a) facts, (b) informed extrapolations from analogies to other viruses and (c) opinion or speculation. He said it in connection with the novel coronavirus, but I’ve been thinking about its relevance to investing. In the past, I’ve defined investing as the act of positioning capital so as to profit from future developments. I’ve also mentioned the challenge presented by the fact that there’s no such thing as knowing what future developments will be. This is the paradox we must deal with. To follow Lipsitch’s analysis, in our world of investing: • • •
关于未来,几乎谈不上有什么事实依据。我们对未来的种种理论推演,绝大多数不过是从过往模式中作出的外推。而这些外推中的很大一部分——连同我们其余几乎所有的结论——无非就是利普西奇所说的“观点”或“猜测”,用我的话说就是“瞎猜”。(乔治·萧伯纳曾言:“一切行业都是针对外行的阴谋。”因此,投资行业的规矩似乎要求其成员在描述对未来看法时,用上“分析”“评估”“预测”“推断”“展望”这类冠冕堂皇的词汇。我们极少见到“猜测”二字。)
there are few if any facts regarding the future, the vast majority of our theorizing about the future consists of extrapolating from past patterns, and a lot of that extrapolation – and just about all the rest of our conclusions – consists of what Lipsitch calls opinion or speculation and what I call guesswork. (George Bernard Shaw said, “All professions are conspiracies against the laity.” Thus the rules of the investment profession seem to require that its members describe their views about the future using highsounding terms like “analysis,” “assessment,” “projection,” “prediction” and “forecast.” Rarely do we see the word “guess.”)
上周在《校准》一文中,我提到曾写信给橡树资本的一位同事说:“如今,大家对现状掌握着相同的数据,对未来同样一无所知。”我选择这个备忘录标题,是因为它本身是个矛盾修辞:实际上,关于未来投资环境,几乎不存在有意义的知识。因此,这份备忘录将探讨一些人们自以为知道、实则未必的事情。
Last week, in Calibrating, I mentioned having written to an Oaktree colleague that, “These days everyone has the same data regarding the present and the same ignorance regarding the future.” I chose the title of this memo because it’s such an oxymoron: there’s practically no such thing as meaningful knowledge regarding the future investment environment. Thus, this memo will be about some things people think they know but may not.
从过去外推
我们用“从过去外推”来应对未来,这是最好的办法。如果做不到研究过去的规律、将其应用到面向未来的决策中,我们就得每天对所有未来可能性重新下结论。比如在投资中,我们要研究典型的过往周期、偏离常态的例外,以及大多数涨势里常见的上下波动细节——上周《校准》一文讲过这些。
但盲目相信过往模式的适用性,跟完全无视它们一样没道理。必须有充分理由相信,过去可以外推到未来;正如利普西奇所言,这必须是“有依据的外推”。由此,我想到了眼下的这一轮行情。
Extrapolating from the Past We use extrapolation from the past as the best way to deal with the future. If not for the ability to research past patterns and apply them to decisions regarding the future, we’d have to reach a new conclusion every day about every future possibility. So, for example, in investing we study typical past cycles, the exceptions from the norm, and details like the up-and-down pattern that’s part of most rallies, as described last week in Calibrating. But blind faith in the relevance of past patterns makes no more sense than completely ignoring them. There has to be good reason to believe the past can be extrapolated to the future; as Lipsitch says, it has to be informed extrapolation. And that brings me to the current episode.
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美国今天看到的是什么?
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What does the U.S. see today? • • • •
自 102 年前的西班牙流感以来,我们遭遇了最为严重的疫情之一;自 80 年前大萧条结束以来,我们面临了最剧烈的经济萎缩;石油输出国组织(OPEC)时代(或许也是历史上)油价跌幅最为惨烈;同时,这也是有史以来最大规模的央行与政府干预。
one of the greatest pandemics to reach us since the Spanish Flu of 102 years ago, the greatest economic contraction since the Great Depression, which ended 80 years ago, the greatest oil-price decline in the OPEC era (and, probably, ever), and the greatest central bank/government intervention of all time.
以上这一切的未来显然无法预知。我们没有理由认为,自己知道它们在未来的岁月中会如何运作、彼此如何相互作用,以及会对其他一切产生什么后果。简而言之,我的看法是,如果你正经历前所未有的情况,你根本无法断言它会如何收场。
在我最近的两篇备忘录中,我强调了自己的信念:在我们今天面临的正面与负面情景之间,没有“有依据”的选择方式,而且大多数人的决定方式都反映了自身的偏见。在网上搜索上述关于职业的引文出处时,我偶然发现了一段文字,我认为它支持我的观点,即大多数人得出结论的依据本身就值得商榷:
无知的心智恰恰不是一块干净、空白的画布,而是塞满了无关或误导性的生活经验、理论、事实、直觉、策略、算法、启发式规则、隐喻和预感的杂物,而这些杂物不幸地看上去和感觉上像是有用而准确的知识。这种杂乱是我们作为物种的诸多最强大优势之一所带来的不幸副产品。我们是无拘无束的模式识别者和挥霍无度的理论家。通常,我们的理论足以让我们度过一天,或者至少活到能够繁衍后代的年纪。但我们讲故事的创造天赋,加上我们无法察觉自身无知的能力,有时会导致尴尬、不幸乃至极其危险的局面——尤其是在一个技术先进、复杂的民主社会中,这种社会偶尔会赋予错误的流行信念以巨大的破坏力(参见:金融危机;伊拉克战争)。(《我们都是自信的傻瓜》,戴维·邓宁,密歇根大学心理学教授,《太平洋标准》杂志,2014 年 10 月 27 日)
换句话说,我们也许无法预知未来,但这并不能阻止我们得出关于未来的结论,并坚定地坚持这些结论。
The future for all these things is clearly unknowable. We have no reason to think we know how they’ll operate in the period ahead, how they’ll interact with each other, and what the consequences will be for everything else. In short, it’s my view that if you’re experiencing something that has never been seen before, you simply can’t say you know how it’ll turn out. In my last two memos, I stressed my conviction that there’s no “informed” way to choose between the positive and negative scenarios we face today, and that most people decide in a way that reflects their biases. While searching the Internet for the source of the quote above about professions, I came across something that I think supports my view that most people reach conclusions for reasons that are questionable: An ignorant mind is precisely not a spotless, empty vessel, but one that’s filled with the clutter of irrelevant or misleading life experiences, theories, facts, intuitions, strategies, algorithms, heuristics, metaphors, and hunches that regrettably have the look and feel of useful and accurate knowledge. This clutter is an unfortunate byproduct of one of our greatest strengths as a species. We are unbridled pattern recognizers and profligate theorizers. Often, our theories are good enough to get us through the day, or at least to an age when we can procreate. But our genius for creative storytelling, combined with our inability to detect our own ignorance, can sometimes lead to situations that are embarrassing, unfortunate, or downright dangerous – especially in a technologically advanced, complex democratic society that occasionally invests mistaken popular beliefs with immense destructive power (See: crisis, financial; war, Iraq). (“We Are All Confident Idiots,” David Dunning, Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan, Pacific Standard magazine, October 27, 2014) In other words, we may not be able to know the future, but that doesn’t keep us from reaching conclusions about it and holding them firmly.
回归常态
我们当前面临的最大不确定性之一,就是经济前景。乐观者期待 V 型复苏,而复苏能否成真,牵动着太多东西。这取决于美国何时复工,而复工又在很大程度上取决于感染趋势。
早先,我们被告知疫情扩散会是“指数级”的。我们明白了那意味着什么——新增病例数每天按固定比例增长——也了解了“拉平曲线”的概念。因此,用投资的语言来说,病例数
Getting Back to Normal One of the greatest uncertainties we face today surrounds the outlook for the economy. The optimists expect a V-shaped recovery, and a great deal is riding on the question of whether it’ll materialize. It depends on when America will go back to work, and that, in turn, depends to a great extent on the trend in infections. Early on, we were told the growth of the disease would be “exponential.” We learned what that meant – the number of new cases would grow from one day to the next by a constant percentage – and about the idea of “flattening the curve.” Thus, in the language of investing, the number of cases
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这一传播过程会“复利式增长”。由于每日新增病例按固定百分比上升,其数量会在固定增长率作用于不断扩大的基数上时持续增加。
要控制住疫情,必须经历以下过程:
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would “compound.” Because new cases would rise each day by a constant percentage, their number would increase as the fixed growth rate was applied to an expanding base. In order to get the disease under control, the following progression has to take place: • • • •
每日新增病例数的增长必须低于预期,也就是说增长率必须下降,而非保持恒定。随后,每日新增病例数必须趋于稳定,这意指增长率在逐步下滑。接着,每日新增病例数必须开始减少,这意味着增长率转为负值。最后,每日新增病例数必须降至零,这意味着疫情已被遏制。
The growth in the number of daily new cases has to come in below expectations, meaning the rate of growth has to decline rather than remain constant. Then the number of daily new cases has to stabilize, meaning the rate of growth is declining. Then the number of daily new cases has to decline, meaning the rate of growth is negative. Then the number of daily new cases has to go to zero, meaning the disease has been stopped.
世界各地和美国各地在这场疫情中所处的阶段各不相同。有些地方每日新增病例数仍在上升;有些地方曲线趋于平缓,新增病例在下降(例如,早期疫情严重的美国城市已出现积极趋势);还有些地方早期控制得不错,但随着防疫措施放松、人们开始回归正常生活,疫情出现反弹。以下是一些影响疫情曲线走势的关键问题:
Different places around the world and in the U.S. are at different stages in this progression. There are places where the number of daily new cases is continuing to rise; places where the curve is flattening and the new cases are declining (e.g., trends are positive in U.S. cities that were beset early); and places that had good results early but are seeing rebounds as rules are relaxed and people start to return to their normal behavior. Here are a few of the questions that bear on the outlook for the curve: • • • • • • • •
检测和接触追踪能否帮助感染者脱离社会活动?
大量无症状感染者是否会阻碍隔离病毒携带者的工作?
能否通过检测判断人们是否感染过疾病并产生抗体,从而让他们安心重返公共生活而无惧再次感染?
群体免疫会形成吗?会是永久的吗?
天气转暖是否会带来帮助?
会出现治愈方法吗?
病毒是否会变异成其他形态,需要新的疗法?
疫苗能否研发出来,又将在何时问世?
Will testing and contact mapping facilitate keeping infected people out of circulation? Will large numbers of asymptomatic infections impede the effort to isolate carriers? Will it be possible to test people to learn whether they’ve had the disease and developed antibodies, such that they can go out in public without fear of reinfection? Will herd immunity develop? Will it be permanent? Will the arrival of warm weather be helpful? Will a cure be developed? Will the virus morph into other forms, requiring new cures? Will a vaccine be developed, and when?
最棘手的问题之一仍然是社会及其领导人将如何在最大限度地减少病毒致死人数和重启经济之间做出取舍。换句话说,在本页顶部所列步骤的哪一步,我们会发出复工的信息?人们居家时间越长,经济停摆越久,疫情控制的进展就越深入,我们也就越接近控制住疾病。然而,与此同时,对经济造成的损害也越大,重启经济的难度也越高。
决定在 5 月 1 日而非 5 月 31 日结束居家令,短期内对经济更有利,但这也会让人们在仍有感染者存在的情况下重返社会,因此很可能导致类似香港和新加坡出现过的“反弹”或“回响”效应;导致疫情曲线重新陡峭;并引发更多感染和死亡。我们将如何权衡这一取舍?没有算法能决定,是偏袒少数人(或数千人)的生命,还是利于数百万人的经济改善。一方面,选择经济似乎显得冷酷无情。另一方面,我们又允许甚至鼓励许多导致大量死亡的活动,比如驾车。以下是著名投资者爱德华·兰珀特于 4 月 6 日在《纽约太阳报》上的表述:
One of the thorniest questions remains how society and its leaders will make the trade-off between minimizing deaths from the virus and restarting the economy. In other words, at which step in the progression at the top of this page will the back-to-work message be delivered? The longer people stay at home and the economy remains shut down, the further the progression will be allowed to go, and the closer we’ll get to containing the disease. Simultaneously, however, the more damage will be done to the economy and the harder it’ll be to restart. A decision to end the stay-at-home orders on May 1 rather than May 31 will be better for the economy in the short run, but it’ll also send people into society while there are still infected people around, and thus it’s likely to result in a “rebound” or “echo,” as Hong Kong and Singapore have seen; in a re-steepening of the curve; and in further infections and deaths. How will we make that trade-off? There’s no algorithm for deciding whether to favor life for a few (or for thousands) versus economic improvement for millions. On one hand, choosing the economy seems hardhearted. On the other, we permit or even encourage many activities that result in large numbers of deaths, such as driving. Here’s how renowned investor Edward Lampert put it in The New York Sun on April 6:
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开车有风险。2018 年,美国因汽车相关事故死亡的人数达 36560 人,数据来自美国国家公路交通安全管理局。但我们并未禁止汽车,也没把限速定为每小时 10 英里。这样做能消除大部分死伤,但也会严重影响人员和货物快速运输所支撑的经济活动。
总体来看,汽车的好处大于代价。个人明知风险而自愿承担。企业通过降低风险来竞争盈利。为应对市场失灵和外部性,并提供一定的最低保障,政府通过监管机制来降低风险、补偿损失。
这些思路同样可用于指导应对新冠病毒的公共政策,指出一条中间道路,在最小化伤害的同时,不使经济或个人自由付出过高代价……
我们需要让美国迅速复工。企业和个人可以动态适应,明智地保护自身利益、寻找机会、做出权衡。政府可以提供交通信号灯和安全标准。这种公共卫生思路与一个自由而经济繁荣的国家相契合,而非相冲突。它每天都在我们的高速公路上得到检验。
我想就这个话题提出的最后一个问题,关乎每个人必须做出的决定:在疫情防控的哪个阶段,他们自己和亲人会停止社交隔离。橡树资本的债务交易员贾斯汀·夸利亚(他经常出现在这些备忘录里)和萨姆·罗通多就这个问题提了几个疑问:
假设隔离解除:
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Driving an automobile is risky. In 2018, the number of auto-related fatalities in the United States was 36,560, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Yet we don’t ban automobiles, nor do we impose a 10 mile an hour speed limit. Doing so would eliminate most of those deaths and injuries, but it would also adversely affect economic activity enabled by faster transportation of people and products. Overall, the benefits of automobiles exceed the costs. Individuals knowingly assume the risks. Businesses compete to make money by reducing those risks. To deal with market failures and externalities, and to provide a certain minimum floor, we have regulatory mechanisms imposed by government to mitigate risks and compensate for losses. These same approaches can be useful in guiding the public policy response to the coronavirus, showing the way to a middle ground that minimizes harm without excessive costs to either the economy or individual freedom. . . . We need to get America back to work quickly. Businesses and individuals can adapt dynamically to intelligently guard their interests, seek opportunities, and make tradeoffs. The government can provide the traffic signals and the safety standards. That approach to public health is consistent with a free and economically vibrant country, rather than in conflict with it. It’s tested on our highways every day. The last issue I want to raise on this subject surrounds the decisions each individual will have to make regarding the point in the progression of control at which they and their loved ones will cease practicing social distancing. Oaktree debt traders Justin Quaglia (who’s been showing up in these memos a lot) and Sam Rotondo came up with a few questions on this subject: Assuming the quarantine is lifted: • • • •
你第一次坐飞机会是在什么时候?当邻座的人开始咳嗽,你会作何反应?
要让你的孩子重返校园,需要发生什么条件你才觉得安全?
当所有人复工、过敏季节来临,身边几位同事说话开始带鼻音、咳嗽不止时,会发生什么?
你和妻子(或丈夫)、朋友、家人外出晚餐时,你希望由戴着口罩和手套的服务员来上菜吗?
when will you take your first flight? How will you react when the person next to you starts coughing? what has to happen to make you feel it’s safe to send your child back to school? what will happen when everyone returns to work, allergy season begins, and a few of your colleagues begin to sound nasally and cough persistently? when you go out to dinner with your wife/husband/friend/family, do you want to be served by a waiter/waitress wearing a mask and gloves?
我再补充两个问题:如果测试显示你已有免疫力,在新感染病例仍在报告的情况下,你会停止社交隔离并重返公共场所吗?还有,作为纽约人,你何时会重新乘坐地铁?
诸如此类的问题表明,仅凭政府的一则通告不太可能让所有人恢复以往的习惯,包括重返工作岗位(如果他们有的选的话)。相反,经济的重启可能会是渐进式的,并且在疫苗研发成功或实现群体免疫之前,可能还会经历反复的前进与后退阶段。
I’ll add two more: If a test says you have immunity, will you stop social distancing and go back into public spaces while new infections are still being reported? And for us New Yorkers, when will you get back on the subway? Questions like these suggest that a mere message from government is unlikely to get everyone to return to their former habits, including their jobs (if they have a choice). Instead, the reopening of the economy is likely to be gradual and, until a vaccine is perfected or herd immunity is reached, subject to alternating periods of progress and retreat.
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华盛顿进入战斗状态
过去几周,美联储、美国证券交易委员会和财政部宣布了一项前所未有的刺激、支持、救助和监管宽松计划。他们还在不断推出新举措,扩大现有措施的规模和范围。没有理由相信有什么是他们不会做的,或者有什么幅度是他们不会超越的。一个月前,我还是众多担心美联储武器库火力有限的人之一,因为当时联邦基金利率只有 1.5%,而过去大部分降息周期通常有 500 个基点左右的空间。现在我们看到了美联储潜在工具箱的广阔程度。
3 月 15 日,美联储宣布两次共计 150 个基点的降息(将短期联邦基金利率降至接近零)中的第二次时,美联储主席杰伊·鲍威尔说了这样一番话:“我们一定会动用我们的工具,做我们需要做的事情。”(路透社,3 月 16 日)两周后,他进一步阐述了美联储的意图(着重号为笔者所加):
鲍威尔先生已明确表示,即使利率降至零,美联储的火力也是无限的。“在贷款方面,我们不会弹尽粮绝,”他周四(3 月 26 日)在接受 NBC《今日》节目采访时说,“这种情况不会发生。”(《华尔街日报》,3 月 30 日)
以下是《简报情报》4 月 10 日关于美联储行动的部分摘要(着重号为笔者所加):
CNBC 报道称,美联储“大幅扩大了拯救经济的努力,甚至将垃圾债券也列入可购买的资产清单,因为预计一波企业将难以在预期的衰退中幸存。”据 CNBC 报道,“在美联储表示将提供 2.3 万亿美元的项目,将其操作扩展至中小型企业和美国各城市及州之后,股市上涨,国债收益率上升,美元走软。”
CNBC 表示,美联储“将其企业贷款项目扩展到了一个全新领域,包括购买评级低于投资级的公司 ETF。此前它已宣布购买投资级公司债券和 ETF 的项目。现在它还将接受 AAA 级商业抵押贷款支持证券和抵押贷款债务凭证。”
彭博社报道称,“公告发布后,投资者迅速推高了公司债券和股票的价格。高收益债务是涨幅最大的品种之一,追踪这些债券的一些最大 ETF 创下了十年来的最大涨幅。”据彭博社报道,“美联储行动的性质超越了央行购买较低评级债务和市政信用的传统边界,引发了对其未来角色的质疑。”
《华盛顿邮报》发表社论称,“美联储正在将其资产负债表服务于私人部门,我们希望这段时期绝对必要且尽可能短暂”,但“任何超出美联储职权范围的必要资金——用于医疗保健、州预算纾困和个人收入支持——都将由国会来提供。”
Washington Goes to Battle Over the last few weeks, the Fed, SEC and Treasury have announced an unprecedented program of stimulus, support, rescue and regulatory relief. They continue to bring new actions forward and expand the size and scope of existing ones. There’s no reason to believe there’s anything they won’t do or any magnitude they won’t exceed. I was among many who were worried a month ago about the limited scope of the Fed arsenal, given that the federal funds rate stood at only 1½% and most past rate-cutting programs ran to about 500 basis points. Now we see the vast extent of the Fed’s potential toolkit. On March 15, in announcing the second of two rate cuts totaling 150 basis points that took the shortterm federal funds rate to nearly zero, Fed Chairman Jay Powell said the following: “We really are going to use our tools to do what we need to do here.” (Reuters, March 16). Two weeks later, he elaborated on the Fed’s intentions (emphasis added): Mr. Powell has made clear that even with interest rates at zero, the Fed’s firepower is limitless. “When it comes to lending, we are not going to run out of ammunition,” he said Thursday [March 26] in an interview on NBC’s “Today” show. “That doesn’t happen.” (The Wall Street Journal, March 30) Here are some excerpts from Bulletin Intelligence’s April 10 recap regarding the Fed’s actions (emphasis added): CNBC reports that the Federal Reserve has “dramatically expanded its efforts to save the economy, even adding junk bonds to the list of assets it can buy, as a wave of businesses are anticipated to have trouble surviving the expected recession.” According to CNBC, “Stocks jumped, Treasury yields rose and the dollar sagged after the Fed said it would provide $2.3 trillion in programs that expand its operations to reach small and midsized businesses and U.S. cities and states.” CNBC says the Fed “expanded its corporate lending programs to take it into an entirely new area, including ETFs of companies that are rated below investment grade. It had previously announced a program to buy investment-grade corporate debt and ETFs. It also will now accept triple-A-rated commercial mortgage-backed securities and collateralized loan obligations.” Bloomberg reports that “investors quickly bid up prices on corporate bonds and stocks after the announcement. High-yield debt was among the biggest gainers, with some of the largest ETFs tracking those bonds surging the most in a decade.” According to Bloomberg, “The nature of the Fed’s actions pass the traditional boundaries of the central bank to purchase lower-rated debt and the credit of municipalities, raising questions about its future role.” The Washington Post editorializes, “The Fed is putting its balance sheet at the service of the private sector for what we must hope is the shortest period absolutely necessary,” but “it will be up to Congress to provide whatever needed funding – for health care, state budget relief and individual income support – lies beyond the Fed’s ambit.”
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《华尔街日报》的一篇社论认为,美联储此举是一步错棋,加大了美联储对高风险资产的敞口(见第 8 页),只顾华尔街而忽视了普通民众。同时,这一决定也对美国资本主义的传统理念构成威胁,因为美联储和财政部正在成为美国企业的主要放贷方。
没有人怀疑,抗击疫情对经济造成的冲击迫切需要迅速而有力的应对。不到一个月前,布鲁斯·卡什和我还在思考全球萧条的可能性。如今没人再提这个话题了,讨论的焦点大多集中在 2019 年的 GDP 能否在 2021 年或 2022 年被超越。
现在,我们不再讨论萧条,而是思考政府各项举措的妥当性及其长期影响。我不打算详细剖析华盛顿出台的方案,但确实想提出几个问题:
“无限”是个有趣的词(见上一页)。这个方案真的无限吗?这样做好吗?迄今宣布的刺激措施、贷款、救助、福利和债券购买加起来已达数万亿美元。由此带来的联邦赤字和美联储资产负债表的扩张会有什么影响?说句玩笑话,政府可以给每个美国人寄一张 100 万美元的支票,总成本是 330 万亿美元。这样做会不会带来负面后果,比如通胀抬头、美国信用评级下调或美元失去世界储备货币地位?如果答案是肯定的,那么在低于 330 万亿美元的某个点,这些后果是否会开始显现?如果是,那个点在哪里?我们会不会已经到达那个点?
显然,这些政府机构正在做的是缓解经济冰封带来的金融冲击。正如我在 3 月 31 日发表的《何去何从?》一文中所提到的,他们完全有能力分配足够的资金来弥补企业损失的收入和工人损失的工资。但美国第二季度相当一部分商品和服务产出化为乌有,这对美国会有什么影响?经济将如何反弹,速度多快?如果出现停停走走的情况,如果工人像第 4 页所说的那样逐步返岗,V 型复苏还有可能吗?如果一些过去每周收入不到 1200 美元的失业工人现在能领到更多的救济金,又会有什么影响?
最后,我想谈谈美联储的角色及其行为的冲击。就在两个月前,我与 12 家联邦储备银行中一家的行长共进晚餐。我问过他,在降息空间有限的情况下,美联储是否会采取购买公司债券的策略。他说不会,美联储只购买政府和机构债券。如上所述,几周前美联储将投资级公司债券纳入了购买清单,上周又进一步纳入了部分高收益证券(从 BBB 降级到 BB 的债券和一些高收益 ETF)。
它还向商业发展公司(BDC,即购买或向中型企业放贷的公司)提供了监管宽限。为帮助它们避免触及业务限额,美联储表示,它们可以按 12 月 31 日的价格对其账面上的贷款进行估值。“SEC 主要想解决这样一个问题,即 BDC 投资组合公司公允价值的暂时下调可能使杠杆率超过监管上限,从而限制 BDC 的进一步放贷。因此,——”
An editorial in the Wall Street Journal views the Fed’s move as a misstep that increases the Fed’s exposure to risky assets [see page 8], and overlooks Main Street in favor of Wall Street. The decision also poses a threat to the traditional concept of American capitalism, as the Fed and Treasury become the leading lenders to US businesses. There’s no doubt in anyone’s mind that there was a pressing need for a swift and pronounced response to the economic impact of the effort to combat the pandemic. Less than a month ago, Bruce Karsh and I were pondering the possibility of a global depression. We never hear about that topic anymore, and much of the discussion centers around whether 2019 GDP will be exceeded in 2021 or whether it’ll take until 2022. Now, instead of discussing depression, we wonder about the propriety and long-term impact of the various government actions. I don’t intend to dissect the program emanating from Washington in detail, but I do want to raise some questions: “Limitless” is an interesting word (see previous page). Is the program really limitless? And is that okay? The stimulus, loans, bailouts, benefits and bond buying that have been announced thus far add up to several trillion dollars. What are the implications of the resultant additions to the federal deficit and the Fed’s balance sheet? To be facetious, the government could send every American a check for $1 million, at a cost of $330 trillion. Would there be negative consequences from doing this, such as burgeoning inflation, a downgrade of U.S. creditworthiness or the dollar losing its status as the world’s reserve currency? If the answer is yes, is there a point below $330 trillion at which those ramifications might kick in? And if so, where? Could we be there already? Obviously, what these government entities are doing is cushioning the financial impact of the economic deepfreeze. And as I mentioned on March 31 in Which Way Now?, they clearly have the ability to distribute enough money to make up for businesses’ lost revenues and workers’ lost wages. But what’ll be the impact on America of the loss of a substantial portion of the second quarter’s production of goods and services? How will the economy rebound, and at what speed? If we have stops and starts, and if workers return gradually as suggested on page 4, is a V-shaped recovery still likely? What’ll be the effect if some unemployed workers who used to earn less than $1,200 per week can receive more than that in benefits? Finally, I want to talk about the Fed’s role and the impact of its behavior. Just two months ago, I attended a dinner with the president of one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. I asked him whether the Fed might adopt the tactic of buying corporate bonds, given the limited room for rate cuts. No, he said, it would only buy government and agency obligations. As mentioned above, a few weeks ago the Fed added investment grade corporates to its buying list, and last week it dropped down to include some high yield securities (BBBs downgraded to BB and some high yield ETFs). It also gave regulatory relief to business developments companies, or BDCs, which buy or make loans to mid-size businesses. In order to help them avoid tripping limits on their activities, the Fed said they can value the loans on their books at December 31 prices. “The SEC is primarily trying to address the issue that a temporary markdown in the fair value of BDC portfolio companies could increase leverage above the regulatory maximum, thus limiting further lending by a BDC. As such,
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美国证券交易委员会允许商业发展公司在计算资产覆盖率(杠杆率)时采用调整后的投资组合价值。”(Keefe, Bruyette & Woods,4 月 9 日)换言之,我们正处在一个监管的奇幻世界里,在这里,财务报表无须假装准确或及时。
我对后面这些举措尤其感到意外。美联储购买非投资级债券的目的是什么?它是想确保所有公司都能借到钱,不管基本面如何?还是想保护债券持有人免受损失,甚至免受按市值计价的下跌?谁来替政府买这些债券,并确保买入价不会太高,避开违约的发行人(还是说没人关心这些)?
美国证券交易委员会又为何要给高杠杆的投资工具松绑?如果这样的实体被证明杠杆过高,抵押品被减记,以至于受到束缚甚至被清算,社会会有什么损失?为什么高杠杆的投资者——表面上并非系统重要性机构——要受到保护,免受痛苦?
全球金融危机之后,美联储和财政部采取了一系列行动,鼓励价格发现、重燃风险承担意愿、重新打开市场。这些举措效果不错,目标也实现了,美国从全球金融危机中的复苏迅速而强劲。(当然,我们也可以争论风险承担的意愿是否回弹得太快、太过头了。)但其中一些做法是通过鼓励市场机制运转来实现的,并非直接行动。如今债券在被买入,规则在被豁免。这些事情会不会有变得不可取的一天?
我们大多数人相信自由市场体系是最佳的资源配置方式。现在政府似乎乐于插手,取代私人部门的位置。我们有了最后的买家和最后的贷款人,缓解痛苦,却接管了自由市场的角色。当人们觉得政府会保护他们免受自身行为带来的不愉快财务后果时,这叫“道德风险”。个人和机构免受痛苦,但学到的教训却是坏的。
一家公司用现金、也许再借些钱来回购自己的股票。一家收购方选择用更高的杠杆而不是更低的杠杆。或者一只房地产投资信托基金或贷款抵押债券的组织者背负更多债务以放大回报。每一种情形里,选定的策略在事情顺利时都会放大利润,但在事情不顺时也会放大亏损,并降低挺过艰难时期的概率。如果这些参与者在成功时享受自己行动的果实,在失败时却免受损失,那么冒险就会受到鼓励,避险就会受到压制。
有句老话——出处说法不一——大意是“没有破产的资本主义,就像没有地狱的天主教。”这句话深深打动了我。市场在参与者对损失怀有健康恐惧时运转得最好。美联储或政府不该承担消除这种恐惧的角色。
如今有些人说,那些举债过头的人不可能预见到疫情及其对经济的破坏。所以,按照这种说法,政府把他们从困境中救出来“不是他们的错”,意思是救助并非不讲道理。正如我在《现在往哪走?》里写到的,我理解他们没有忽视某个大概率风险之罪。但小概率(甚至不可预见)的事情时不时会发生,投资者和生意人必须把这种可能性考虑进去,并预期——
the SEC is allowing BDCs to use an adjusted portfolio value when calculating their asset coverage (leverage) ratio.” (Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, April 9) In other words, we’re in a regulatory wonderland where there’s no pretense that financial statements have to be accurate or current. I was particularly surprised by these latter actions. What’s the Fed’s purpose in buying noninvestment grade debt? Does it want to make sure all companies are able to borrow, regardless of their fundamentals? Does it want to protect bondholders from losses, and even mark-to-market declines? Who’ll do the buying for the government and make sure the purchase prices aren’t too high and defaulting issuers are avoided (or doesn’t anyone care)? And why should the SEC provide relief to leveraged investment vehicles? If such an entity proves to be over-leveraged and sees its collateral marked down such that it’s constricted or even liquidated, what’s the loss to society? Why should leveraged investors – ostensibly not systemically important – be protected from pain? In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed and Treasury undertook a number of actions to encourage price discovery, rekindle risk-bearing and reopen markets. They worked well, their goals were accomplished, and the U.S. recovery from the GFC was swift and strong. (Of course, we can debate whether the willingness to bear risk snapped back too fast and too far.) But some of these things were done through encouraging the operation of market mechanisms, not direct action. Now bonds are being bought and rules waived. Is there a point at which these things become undesirable? Most of us believe in the free-market system as the best allocator of resources. Now it seems the government is happy to step in and take the place of private actors. We have a buyer and lender of last resort, cushioning pain but taking over the role of the free market. When people get the feeling that the government will protect them from unpleasant financial consequences of their actions, it’s called “moral hazard.” People and institutions are protected from pain, but bad lessons are learned. A company uses its cash and perhaps borrows more to repurchase its shares. A corporate acquiror chooses to use more leverage rather than less. Or the organizer of a REIT or CLO takes on more debt in order to amplify its returns. In each case, the chosen tactic will magnify profits if things go well, but it’ll also magnify losses if things go poorly and reduce the probability of surviving tough times. If these parties get to enjoy the fruits of their actions when they’re successful but are protected from loss when they fail, risk-taking is encouraged and risk aversion is suppressed. There’s an old saying – variously attributed – to the effect that “capitalism without bankruptcy is like Catholicism without hell.” It appeals to me strongly. Markets work best when participants have a healthy fear of loss. It shouldn’t be the role of the Fed or the government to eradicate it. Some people argue these days that there’s no way those who took on leverage that turned out to be excessive could have been expected to anticipate a pandemic and the resultant damage to the economy. Thus, the argument goes, the jam the government is rescuing them from “isn’t their fault,” meaning the bailout isn’t unreasonable. As I wrote in Which Way Now?, I understand they aren’t guilty of having ignored a likely risk. But unlikely (and even unforeseeable) things happen from time to time, and investors and businesspeople have to allow for that possibility and expect to
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就得自己承担后果。换句话说,他们得像那个六英尺高的人一样思考,盼着能趟过一条平均深度五英尺的河。我看不出为什么金融家们仅仅因为所遭遇的事件难以预料,就该被政府出手相救。
以下是《华尔街日报》对上周美联储行动的评论(4 月 9 日;强调为原文所加):
大赢家包括非投资级公司债券和房地产投资信托基金,尽管存在信用风险,它们现在有资格参与美联储的项目。高收益债券和市政债券价格也应声上涨。像亚马逊、英特尔和英伟达这样的成长型公司股价下跌或持平,整体市场反应平淡。
这反映了美联储新贷款工具的优先顺序,以及它在风险曲线上走得有多远。以定期资产支持证券贷款工具为例,美联储曾在 2008 年首次使用,上个月又进行了修订。2008 年时,该工具只接受 AAA 级证券,并且通过这些贷款赚了钱。而周四,美联储表示现在将接受风险高得多的信贷,包括商业抵押贷款证券和贷款抵押债券。
这些都是华尔街将贷款池打包成的证券,而华尔街曾大力游说美联储和财政部扩大该工具的范围。这意味着美联储实际上会买下全国最差的购物中心和一些负债最重的公司。亏损的可能性会大得多。财政部在为损失兜底,但纳税人在这里面临的风险比美联储在 2008-2009 年承担的风险更大。
美联储可能觉得,在疫情危机过去之前,这一切对于保护金融体系的正常运转和降低系统性风险至关重要,但不要搞错,美联储首先是在保护华尔街。目标似乎是要抬高资产价格,就像金融危机后美联储所做的那样,并寄希望于财富效应能渗透到经济的其他部分。
2008 年的银行救助被普遍视为政府把华尔街置于主街之上的典型案例,它极大地助长了此后撕裂美国政治的民粹主义情绪。而最近这次救助杠杆贷款机构的举措,可能会给这场大火再添一把柴。
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bear the consequences. In other words, they have to think like the six-foot-tall man hoping to get across the stream that’s five feet deep on average. I see no reason why financiers should be bailed out simply because the event they’re being harmed by was unpredictable. Here’s the reaction of The Wall Street Journal to last week’s Fed actions (April 9; emphasis added): The big winners included non-investment grade corporate bonds and real-estate investment trusts that will now qualify for Fed programs despite their credit risk. High-yield and municipal bond prices also rose. Growth companies like Amazon, Intel and Nvidia fell or were flat, and the overall market reaction was underwhelming. This reflects the priorities of the Fed’s new lending facilities, and how far out on the risk curve it is going. Take the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility that the Fed first used in 2008 and that it revised last month. In 2008 TALF accepted only triple-A-rated securities and it made money on the loans. On Thursday the Fed said it will now accept much riskier credits including commercial mortgage securities and collateralized loan obligations. These are loan pools packaged into securities by Wall Street, which lobbied the Fed and Treasury hard for the TALF expansion. This means the Fed will in effect buy the worst shopping malls in the country and some of the most indebted companies. The opportunities for losses will be that much greater. Treasury is backstopping losses, but the taxpayer risks here are greater than what the Fed took on in 2008-2009. The Fed may feel all of this is essential to protect the financial system’s plumbing and reduce systemic risk until the virus crisis passes, but make no mistake that the Fed is protecting Wall Street first. The goal seems to be to lift asset prices, as the Fed did after the financial panic, and hope that the wealth effect filters down to the rest of the economy. The bank bailout of 2008 has been roundly cited as a case of the government putting Wall Street ahead of Main Street, and it contributed significantly to the populism that has riven American politics ever since. This recent step to rescue leveraged lenders may add further fuel to that fire. *
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市场似乎已对前景作出了裁决。美国死亡人数已达 2.3 万,且仍在上升。每周失业救济申请量是历史纪录的 10 倍。本季度的 GDP 跌幅可能创下史上最差。但人们对疗法和疫苗的前景感到振奋,投资者认定美联储/财政部将减轻痛苦,带来 V 型复苏。有句老话说“不要和美联储作对”——意思是美联储想做什么都能做到——投资者信了。因此,标普 500 指数自 3 月 23 日见底以来已上涨 23%,而过去市场反弹中常见的回撤却几乎无人担忧。
The market seems to have passed judgment with regard to the future. U.S. deaths have reached 23,000 and continue to rise. Weekly unemployment claims are running at 10 times the all-time record. The GDP decline in the current quarter is likely to be the worst in history. But people are cheered by the outlook for therapies and vaccines, and investors have concluded that the Fed/Treasury will reduce the pain and bring on a V-shaped recovery. There’s an old saying that “you can’t fight the Fed” – that is, the Fed can accomplish whatever it wants – and investors are buying it. Thus, the S&P 500 has risen 23% since its bottom on March 23, and there’s little concern about the retrenchments that typically have been part of past market rallies.
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但我的艺术家女婿贾斯汀·比尔却满腹狐疑。他周六告诉我:“我不明白。病毒肆虐,商业停摆,政府到处撒钱,尽管税收收入肯定下滑了。市场怎么还能涨得这么猛?”未来自会揭晓答案。
2020 年 4 月 14 日
But Justin Beal, my artist son-in-law, is mystified. “I don’t get it,” he told me on Saturday. “The virus is rampant, business is frozen, and the government’s throwing money all over the place, even though tax revenues have to be down. How can the market be rising so strongly?” We’ll find out as the future unfolds. April 14, 2020
2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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