无人知晓II

2020 (inferred) · memo · 原文约 4155 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

没人知道之二

Nobody Knows II

这个周末,在动荡的七天大跌之后,我写完了这份备忘录的大部分内容。但周一我没能发出去,而那天标普 500 指数大涨 4.5%,即 135 点,创下历史最大点数涨幅。我无法每天更新,把每一次涨跌(或降息)都考虑进去。而我的真正目标——一如既往——是提出如何看待事态发展的思路,而不是说“买”或“卖”。所以请把这份备忘录当作周日午后写的来读——无论此后市场如何变动——让我展示我是如何评估近期事件的。

I wrote most of this memo over this past weekend, on the heels of the tumultuous seven-day correction. But I couldn’t get it out on Monday, and that day the S&P 500 rallied by 4.5%, or 135 points, for the biggest point gain in its history. I just can’t update it daily to take into account every rise or fall (or rate cut). And my real goal – as usual – is to suggest how to think about developments, not to say “buy” or “sell.” So please read this memo as of Sunday afternoon – whatever the markets have done since – and let me show how I assess the recent events.

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我上一次使用这个备忘录标题是在 2008 年 9 月 19 日,也就是雷曼兄弟申请破产两天后。现在绝对是重提这个标题的合适时机。

过去几周,我反复被问到我对新冠病毒及其市场影响的看法。我总能随手给出答案,这要归功于我 1 月份备忘录《你敢赌吗?》中的内容。你可能还记得,我大量引用了安妮·杜克关于决策的书《赌注中的思考》中的语录。其中让我印象最深、也是自 1 月 13 日备忘录发布以来我反复引用的一句是:

任何一个领域的专家都比新手有优势。但无论是老手还是新手,都无法确定下一次掷硬币的结果会怎样。老手只是猜得更准一些。(强调为原文所加)

换句话说,如果我对新冠病毒发表任何看法,那不过是猜测而已。

过去我曾写过,当中国人问我对自己国家未来的看法时,我的反应是:“你住在那儿,我不在。你为什么要问我?”我不仅不是中国问题的专家,而且我坚信一个国家的未来无法预测,尤其是那些在独特体制下运行的国家。我会提供我对中国未来的看法,但我赶紧补充一句,那不过是直觉。人们可能因为觉得我聪明、认为我是成功的投资者,或者知道我有丰富的历史阅历而向我征求意见。但这些都不应被误认为我对各种话题都有专业知识。

这就让我回到了新冠病毒的话题。人们对它知之甚少,因为这是它首次出现。正如哈佛流行病学家马克·利普西奇在关于这个话题的播客中所说,信息分为三类:(甲)事实,(乙)基于与其他病毒类比的有依据的推断,以及(丙)观点或猜测。科学家们正努力做出有依据的推断。到目前为止,我认为关于新冠病毒的数据还不够充分,无法让他们把这些推断变成事实。而非科学家说的任何话,都很可能只是猜测。

I last used this memo title on September 19, 2008, two days after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing. This is certainly an appropriate time to recycle it. Over the last few weeks, I’ve been asked repeatedly for my view of the coronavirus and its implications for the markets. I’ve had a ready answer, thanks to something from my January memo, You Bet! As you may remember, I drew heavily on quotations from Annie Duke’s book on decision making, Thinking in Bets. The one that stayed with me most – and that I’ve used a lot since the memo was published on January 13 – is this one: An expert in any field will have an advantage over a rookie. But neither the veteran nor the rookie can be sure what the next flip will look like. The veteran will just have a better guess. (Emphasis added) In other words, if I said anything about the coronavirus, it would be nothing but a guess. I’ve written in the past about my reaction when people in China ask for my view of their country’s future. “You live there,” I say. “I don’t. Why are you asking me?” Not only am I not an expert on China, but I firmly believe the future of a country isn’t subject to prediction, especially one that operates under a system that’s unique. I furnish my opinion of China’s future, but I hasten to point out that it’s nothing but a hunch. People may ask me for my opinion because they think I’m intelligent, think I’ve been a successful investor, or know I’ve lived through a lot of history. But none of that should be confused with expertise on subjects of every kind. And that leads me back to the coronavirus. No one knows much about it, since this is its first appearance. As Harvard epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch said on a podcast on the subject, there are (a) facts, (b) informed extrapolations from analogies to other viruses and (c) opinion or speculation. The scientists are trying to make informed inferences. Thus far, I don’t think there’s enough data regarding the coronavirus to enable them to turn those inferences into facts. And anything a non-scientist says is highly likely to be a guess.

2020 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

版权所有,保留所有权利。

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所以,总体来看,有事实、推论和猜测。搞清楚你面对的是哪一种,这一点始终至关重要。至于病毒,我认为没人知道以下这些问题的答案:

So, overall, there are facts, inferences and guesses. It’s always essential to know which you’re dealing with. As for the virus, I don’t think anybody knows the answers to the following questions:  

病毒如何在人与人之间、社区与社区之间传播?——一些检测呈阳性的人,与确诊者或已知爆发疫情国家的接触史毫无关联。

会有多少人感染?——2 月 28 日,世界卫生组织负责人表示,其“已将 COVID-19 的传播风险与影响风险评估提升至全球范围内的最高级别”。据利普西奇博士称,该病毒将影响 40% 至 70% 的美国成年人。(我仅以此为例,并不断言其正确性,也不认为这是唯一应接受的观点。)

疫情会消退吗?——根据报告数据,中国新增病例数已大幅下降,从 2 月上半月 13 天中 9 天新增超 3000 例,降至月底 9 天中 8 天新增低于 500 例。这在多大程度上归因于人员流动限制?这一下降趋势能在多大程度上推广至世界其他地区?有人认为,随着天气转暖,疫情会像其他流感一样消退。此番情形是否适用?

其影响几何?——迄今为止,仅 20% 的感染者出现超出“轻微”症状的描述,病死率仅为感染者的 2% 至 3%。这些比例会持续吗?死亡病例是否仍主要集中在老年人和/或基础病患者中?利普西奇博士预测的 40% 至 70% 感染率中,2% 的病死率意味着美国将有百万人死亡。另一方面,据全球健康经济学家、加州大学旧金山分校荣休教授迪恩·贾米森称:美国拥有比疫情中心中国更优越的卫生系统,且已有数月的预警时间……“我认为美国不太可能出现真正大规模的疫情爆发——即数千人死亡的情况,”他说。(《华尔街日报》,3 月 2 日)

How does the virus travel from person to person and community to community? – People have tested positive who had no known contact with other people who had it or who were in countries in which there are known outbreaks. How many people will contract it? – On February 28, the head of the World Health Organization said it had “increased our assessment of the risk of spread and the risk of impact of COVID-19 to very high at a global level.” According to Dr. Lipsitch, it will affect 40% to 70% of all adult Americans. (I only provide this as an example. I don’t assert that it’s correct, or that his is the opinion to accept.) Will it recede? – According to the reported data, the number of new cases in China has declined substantially, from 9 out of 13 days with more than 3,000 the first half of February, to 8 out of 9 with less than 500 at the end of the month. How much of this is a function of the restriction of people’s freedom of movement? To what extent can this downtrend be extrapolated to the rest of the world? Some say the virus will recede when the weather turns warm, as happens with other flus. Will that apply in this case? What will its effect be? – To date, only 20% of those contracting the virus have experienced something described as more than “mild,” and the fatality rate has been only 2-3% of those infected. Will these percentages hold? Will the fatalities continue to be primarily among people who are elderly and/or compromised? 2% of Dr. Lipsitch’s 40-70% suggests a million deaths in the U.S. On the other hand, according to Dean Jamison, a global health economist and professor emeritus at University of California, San Francisco: . . . the U.S. has a superior health system to China, where the outbreak is centered, and months of warning. . . . “I think we’re unlikely to see a really large outbreak in the U.S. — meaning thousands of deaths,” he said. (The Wall Street Journal, March 2)

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将采取哪些应对措施?——学校和办公室会关门吗?人们会被要求待在家里吗?会像中国那样把食物送到家门口吗?大型公共活动会取消吗?疫苗会被研制出来吗,什么时候能研制出来?

对经济会有什么影响?——如果人们被困在家里,无法像往常一样上班、购物、外出就餐或旅行,GDP 会受到多大冲击?负面财富效应会如何影响人们的消费意愿?“GDP 零增长”和“与去年持平”是一个意思——那是乐观预期,还是现实预期?

市场会作何反应?——既然市场的反应最终将取决于经济面与情绪面的共同作用,那么它究竟会跌到何种程度,似乎难以量化。

What countermeasures will be taken? – Will schools and offices be closed? Will people be told to stay in their homes? Will food be delivered to homes as in China? Will large public events be canceled? Will a vaccine be invented, and when? What will be the effect on the economy? – If people are shut in at home and unable to go to work, shop, eat out or travel as usual, how will GDP be impacted? How will a negative wealth effect impact people’s propensity to spend? “Zero GDP growth” means the same thing as “same as last year” – is that an optimistic expectation or a realistic one? How will the markets react? – Since the markets’ reaction ultimately will be a function of both economics and emotion, it seems impossible to quantify how far it’ll go.

我想强调,上述讨论的目的并非给出答案,也不是要显得面面俱到或权威。恰恰相反,它意在指出不确定性的程度。如果正如我所想的那样,这些情况目前未知且无法知晓,那么显然,关于病毒影响的一切可靠性论断都无从谈起。

I want to stress that the purpose of the above discussion isn’t to give answers or to appear to be complete or authoritative. If anything, it’s to indicate the degree of uncertainty. If it’s true, as I think, that these things are currently unknown and unknowable, then clearly there can be no such thing as a reliable statement regarding the implications of the virus.

2020 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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经济影响

疫情初期,新冠病毒还只是“那边”的事,影响也大多属于间接波及:

The Economic Impact In the early days of the disease, when the coronavirus was something that was happening “over there,” the effects likewise were mostly second-hand:    

很明显,中国经济的重大收缩源于工厂关闭、亚洲零售支出的下降、亚洲出入境旅行的减少,以及关闭世界供应链中一个关键部分所产生的重要影响。

obviously, a major contraction of the Chinese economy due to factory closures, the decline in retail spending in Asia, the curtailment of travel to and from Asia, and the important impact of shutting down an essential part of the world supply chain.

供应链效应尤其重要。中国某个小零件的断供,就可能瘫痪一件大型设备的生产。只要有一个零件缺货,除非有替代来源,否则生产就得停摆。转移采购地是一项挑战:既耗时,又无法保证新地点不会同样陷入疫情。

最近,影响已超越亚洲,逼近美国,对非亚洲地区的影响规模也在扩大:

雀巢公司(Nestlé SA)通知超过 29 万名员工,暂停国际商务旅行至 3 月 15 日。几家美国航空公司取消飞往中国的航班,并对前往其他受影响目的地的乘客豁免改签费。美国服装和鞋类企业正面临供应链延迟,可能导致春季商品短缺。由于中国生产的芭比娃娃(Barbies)和 Nerf 枪停产,玩具货架可能空空如也。此外,集装箱船运营商已取消 4 月 1 日前洛杉矶港的 40 个航次,其中大部分为从中国出发的船只。(《华尔街日报》,3 月 2 日)

经济影响的原因可以理解,但其综合影响无法像大多数经济现象那样量化,甚至可能更难量化,因为当前局势中的各种因素都在不断变化。有多少预测者,就有多少种预测:

标普全球(S&P Global)预测,美国经济第一季度年增长率将从 2019 年第四季度的 2.1% 放缓至 1%,其中半个百分点可归因于新冠病毒。就全年而言,影响将是温和的,会使增长率下降 0.1 到 0.2 个百分点。但该预测假定影响主要发生在海外。(《华尔街日报》,3 月 2 日)

贾米森先生(上文介绍的加州大学旧金山分校荣休教授)表示,这种情况仍可能导致美国企业和学校关闭,交通网络瘫痪,并使全年经济增长减少半个百分点。这足以减缓经济,但不足以引发衰退,即连续两个季度经济收缩。他预计任何事件都不会持续超过几个月,随后经济活动将急剧回升。(同上)

“这里已经具备了经济活动中断的所有要素,”北方信托(Northern Trust)首席经济学家卡尔·坦南鲍姆(Carl Tannenbaum)表示。“正在发生的事情的影响被低估了,”他补充道,“我认为一个月前那种‘这事会过去’的假设,在现阶段已不合时宜。”(同上)

The supply-chain effects are particularly important. The unavailability of a small Chinese component can cripple the production of a large piece of equipment. And it only takes one, unless there are alternative sources. Relocating sourcing will be a challenge: it’ll take time, and there’s no assurance that the new locations won’t become engulfed in the disease. More recently, the repercussions have moved beyond Asia and closer to the U.S., and they have grown in scale for the non-Asia world: Nestlé SA told more than 290,000 employees to suspend international business travel until March 15. Several U.S. airlines are canceling flights to China and waiving change fees for passengers traveling to other affected destinations. U.S. apparel and footwear companies are facing supply-chain delays, which could result in a shortage of spring goods. Toy aisles may be bare as production of Barbies and Nerf guns in China flattened. And containership operators have canceled 40 sailings at the Port of Los Angeles through April 1, mostly for vessels coming from China. (The Wall Street Journal, March 2) The reasons for the economic impact are understandable, but their collective impact can’t be quantified any more than most economic phenomena, and probably less given how much the elements in this situation are in flux. There are as many forecasts as there are forecasters: S&P Global is forecasting the U.S. economy to slow to a 1% annual growth rate in the first quarter from 2.1% pace in the fourth quarter of 2019, with a half-percentage point attributable to the coronavirus. For the full year, the effect would be modest, shaving one or two tenths of a percentage point off growth. But that forecast assumes the impact is mainly overseas. (The Wall Street Journal, March 2) Mr. Jamison [the UCSF emeritus professor introduced above] said such a scenario could still cause U.S. businesses and schools to close, grind transportation networks to a halt, and trim a half percentage point from economic growth for the year. That is enough to slow the economy but not cause a recession, or two straight quarters of economic contraction. He expects any event wouldn’t last longer than several months and be followed by a sharp increase in economic activity. (Ibid.) “You have all the ingredients for an interruption of economic activity here,” said Carl Tannenbaum, chief economist for Northern Trust. “The impact of what’s going on is being underappreciated,” he added. “I don’t think the presumption of a month ago, that this will blow over, is an appropriate posture at this point.” (Ibid.)

2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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自我实现的预期构成真实的经济风险:消费者越来越预期经济将恶化。晨间咨询公司的消费者预期指数(ICE)自 2 月 24 日以来下跌 2.5 点,目前报 112.9。政策制定者担心的是,消费者未来预期的下滑会变成自我实现的预言:随着更多消费者预期未来几个月经济收缩,他们更可能推迟非必需消费,进而拖累美国总需求。(晨间咨询,3 月 1 日)

Self-Fulfilling Expectations Pose Real Economic Risks: Consumers increasingly expect the economy to get worse. Morning Consult’s Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE) fell 2.5 points since Feb. 24 and currently stands at 112.9. The fear for policymakers is that the slide in consumers’ future expectations becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: As more consumers expect the economy to contract in the coming months, they become more likely to delay discretionary purchases, which in turn drives down aggregate U.S. demand. (Morning Consult, March 1)

投资者反应

2 月 20 日至 28 日七个交易日的市场下跌,无疑代表了极为强烈的负面反应。例如,标普 500 指数下跌了 432 点,跌幅 12.8%。以下几点可以说明其严重程度:

过去两周的市场崩盘堪称历史性事件:自 1896 年以来其发生概率约为 0.1%;暴跌速度和 VIX 指数飙升幅度均创纪录;10 年期美国国债收益率处于历史最低点。(洪灏,交银国际,交通银行子公司,3 月 1 日)

虽然我们才刚刚进入这一阶段,但这次压力事件已经跻身过去 25 年中最严重的几次之列,与亚洲金融危机(1997 年)、长期资本管理公司事件(1998 年)、世贸中心袭击(2001 年)、会计丑闻(2002 年)、大危机(2008-2009 年)、闪崩(2010 年)、欧元区危机(2011 年)、中国“重新挂钩”(2015 年)和 VIX 事件(2018 年)同属一个精英群体。(迪恩·克努特,宏观风险顾问公司,3 月 1 日)

毫无疑问,新冠病毒确实是一个大问题,而且迄今为止的反应已经相当严重。真正要紧的是,价格变动是否与基本面的恶化程度成比例。

对大多数人来说,最容易的做法是说:(a)这种疾病很危险,(b)它会对企业造成负面影响,(c)它迄今已引发了重大市场反应,(d)我们无从知道下跌会走多远,所以(e)我们应该卖出以避免更大的损失。但上述任何一点都不意味着卖出必然是正确之举。

所有这些说法都反映了一定程度的悲观情绪。然而,无法判断这种悲观情绪是恰当的、不足的还是过度的。我在 2016 年 1 月的《沙发上》一文中写道:“在现实世界中,事物通常在‘相当不错’和‘不太妙’之间波动。但在投资世界里,人们的认知常常从‘完美无缺’摇摆到‘毫无希望’。”我能说的是,一个月前,大多数人认为宏观前景一片向好,他们想不出有什么可能实现的负面催化剂。而现在,那个无法想象的催化剂已经出现,并且令人恐惧。

(这里有几个重要教训。第一,衰退或回调的催化剂并不总是可以预见的。第二,它似乎可以凭空出现,就像这次病毒似乎所做的那样。而且

Investor Reaction The markets’ decline in the seven trading days February 20-28 certainly represents a very strong negative reaction. The S&P 500, for example, declined by 432 points, or 12.8%. Here are a couple of indications of its magnitude: The market crash in the past two weeks has been truly historic: its probability of occurrence is ~0.1% since 1896; the velocity of the plunge and of the VIX surge is the fastest on record; and the 10-year [Treasury yield] is at all-time low. (Hao Hong, BOCOM International, a subsidiary of Bank of Communications, March 1) While we are merely days into it, this stress episode is already among the most substantial of the last 25 years, joining an elite group that includes Asian Contagion (1997), LTCM (1998), the WTC attack (2001), the Accounting Scandals (2002), the Big One (2008-2009), the Flash Crash (2010), the Eurozone Crisis (2011), the China “re-peg” (2015) and the VIX event (2018). (Dean Curnutt, Macro Risk Advisors, March 1) There’s no doubt about the fact that the coronavirus represents a major problem, or that the reaction so far has been severe. What really matters is whether the price change is proportional to the worsening of fundamentals. For most people, the easy thing is to say that (a) the disease is dangerous, (b) it will have a negative impact on business, (c) it has kicked off a major reaction to date, and (d) we have no way of knowing how far the decline will go, so (e) we should sell to avoid further carnage. But none of the above means selling is necessarily the right thing to do. All these statements reflect a measure of pessimism. However, there’s no way to tell whether that pessimism is appropriate, inadequate or excessive. I wrote in On the Couch, (January 2016) that “in the real world, things generally fluctuate between ‘pretty good’ and ‘not so hot.’ But in the world of investing, perception often swings from ‘flawless’ to ‘hopeless.’ ” What I can say is that a month ago, most people thought the macro outlook was uniformly favorable, and they had trouble thinking of a possible negative catalyst with a serious likelihood of materializing. And now the unimaginable catalyst is here and terrifying. (There are a few important lessons here. First, the catalyst for a recession or correction isn’t always foreseeable. Second, it can seemingly appear out of thin air, as this virus seems to have done. And

2020 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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第三,当不可预见的催化剂冲击一个充满乐观情绪以至于“为完美定价”的市场时,其负面影响可能更为显著。

在结束这个话题前,我想提及当前市场反应中一些不合逻辑之处,这些现象告诉我,市场无法被指望来体现理性:

third, the negative effect of an unforeseeable catalyst is likely greater when it collides with a market that reflects so much optimism that it is “priced for perfection.”) Before leaving this subject, I want to make mention of some illogicalities that mark the current market reaction, telling me that the market can’t be relied on to reflect reason:  

 

有人将新冠病毒及其引发的市场反应与 9·11 事件相提并论。但那次只是一日事件,没有理由认为它适合作为这次情况的参照模板。

可以说,至今为止的市场杀戮是不分青红皂白的。亚马逊和谷歌(Alphabet)的股价跌幅与大盘一致。但这两家公司显然不依赖顾客到店,因此按理说比大多数公司更能抵御病毒的影响。而亚马逊——主打电商订单和送货上门——在当前形势下甚至可能找到优势。

过去一周,不仅股票受创,黄金也未能幸免。既然黄金被视为动荡时期的终极避险资产,我实在想不出任何理由,它会在市场调整中与股票同步下跌。

在避险情绪中,人们涌向 10 年期美国国债,推高其价格,将收益率压低至 1.1%。仔细想想,这与我 10 月份抱怨的负利率相去无几。拿出一笔钱,去投资一个未来十年每年保证回报 1.1% 的品种,除了极度恐惧的表现,还能是什么?再对照标普 500 指数 2% 的股息收益率,或者按此前盈利预测计算近 6% 的盈利收益率来想想这个问题。

我并非股票的顽固信徒,但在这个收益率水平买入 10 年期国债,又怎么能说是更明智的选择?

Some people are comparing the coronavirus and its market reaction to the events of 9/11. But that was a one-day event, and there’s no reason to consider that an appropriate model for this instance. It can be argued that the carnage to date has been indiscriminate. The shares of Amazon and Alphabet (Google) experienced declines in line with that of the overall market. But certainly since they don’t rely on visits from customers, they might be expected to be more immune to the effect of the virus than most. And Amazon – featuring e-tail orders and at-home deliveries – could actually find advantages in the current situation. Not only were stocks hit over the last week, but so was gold. Since gold is supposed to be the ultimate source of protection in times of dislocation, I can’t imagine any reason why it should decline in sympathy with stocks in a market correction. In a flight to safety, people have flocked to the 10-year Treasury note, bidding up its price and dropping its yield to 1.1%. If you think about it, this isn’t very different from the negative interest rates I complained about in October. How can it be anything but a manifestation of extreme fear to make an investment that guarantees a return of 1.1% a year for the next ten years? And consider that question in the light of the 2% dividend yield on the S&P 500, or perhaps its earnings yield of almost 6% (based on prior earnings forecasts). I’m not a dyed-in-the-wool devotee of equities, but how can buying the 10-year at these yields make better sense.

最后,我想请大家留意迪恩·柯努特在上文列举的过去 25 年“精英级压力时刻”。每一次都让人揪心。但紧随其后的复苏,为坚定持有的投资者带来了可观收益。

大多数投资者似乎只想着一个简单的关系:坏消息 → 股价下跌。过去一周左右,我们确实看到了一些这样的情形。但我过去一直主张,事情没那么简单。真正的过程是:坏消息 + 心理受挫 → 股价下跌。我们遇到了坏消息,股价也跌了。但如果心理受挫过度,那么可以说,即便消息本身很糟,股价的下跌也过头了。

Finally I want to call your attention to the “elite group of stress episodes” of the last 25 years enumerated just above by Dean Curnutt. Every one of them was gut-wrenching. And they were followed by recoveries that produced significant gains for stalwart investors. Most investors seem to think in terms of a very simple relationship: bad news → price declines. And certainly we’ve seen some of that over the last week or so. But I’ve argued in the past that there’s more to the story. The real process is: bad news + decline in psychology → price declines. We’ve had bad news, and we’ve had price declines. But if psychology has declined too much, it might be argued that the price declines have been excessive given the news, as bad as it is.

货币与财政政策

好消息是,许多市场参与者正指望全球央行和财政部出手相助,帮我们摆脱任何经济放缓的困境。举个例子:

[2 月 28 日]美联储主席鲍威尔发布简短声明称,“美国经济基本面依然强劲。然而,新冠病毒对经济活动构成不断演变的风险。美联储正密切监控事态发展及其对经济前景的影响。我们将动用工具,适时采取行动支持经济。”鲍威尔声明发布后,

Monetary and Fiscal Policy The good news is that many market participants are counting on the world’s central banks and treasuries to help pull us out of any economic slowdown. Here’s one example: [On February 28,] Fed Chairman Powell released a short statement saying, “The fundamentals of the U.S. economy remain strong. However, the coronavirus poses evolving risks to economic activity. The Federal Reserve is closely monitoring developments and their implications for the economic outlook. We will use our tools and act as appropriate to support the economy.” Following Powell’s statement,

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期货市场已完全消化 3 月 18 日降息 50 个基点的预期。(RDQ 经济研究,2 月 28 日)

市场参与者似乎认为:(a)降息和其他刺激措施总是好事;(b)它们会奏效。然而,鉴于疫情对经济的影响难以预知,投资者怎能对美联储(以及其他央行和财政部)化解冲击的能力抱持乐观?本月降息 50 个基点或许足以扭转局面,或许不够。但投资者很可能从鲍威尔“我们将动用工具并酌情采取行动”的措辞中推断,美联储会“不惜一切代价”。但我们必须清醒认识到“弹药”的局限性。在《另一方面》(2019 年 8 月)中,我列出了一份“低利率不受欢迎且可能有害的种种方式”的清单,最后一条是:

最后,但非常重要的一点是,当利率处于低位时,央行手中最有力的刺激经济工具——降息空间——所剩无几。

正常的降息周期大致涵盖 500 个基点。一想到短期利率目前仅剩 150 个基点,这个事实就不太令人振奋。所以我们能确定的一点是,美联储没有空间实施正常的降息周期(各方一致坚称不会降至负利率)。

此外,我们还得怀疑,动用美联储手中 150 个基点中的 50 个基点是否明智。这够用吗?当疫情的经济影响减弱后,却只剩 100 个基点或更少的空间来应对可能出现的衰退时,美联储又能做什么?

关于货币政策和财政政策的事实如下:

futures markets moved to fully price in a 50‐basis‐point rate cut on March 18. (RDQ Economics, February 28) Market participants seem to think that (a) rate cuts and other stimulus are always a good thing and (b) they’ll work. Yet, given that the economic impact of the disease is unknowable, how can investors be sanguine about the ability of the Fed (plus other central banks and treasuries) to counteract it? Fifty basis points this month may or may not be enough to stem the tide. But investors probably infer from Powell’s “we will use our tools and act as appropriate” language that the Fed will “do what it takes.” But we must be mindful of the limitations on “ammunition” that exist. In On the Other Hand (August 2019), I supplied a list of “ways in which low rates are undesirable and potentially harmful.” The last one was this: Finally, but very importantly, when interest rates are low, central banks don’t have at their disposal as much of their best tool for stimulating economies: the ability to cut rates. The normal program of rate cuts covers roughly 500 basis points. That’s not a very encouraging thought when we think about the fact that the short rate already stands at a mere 150 bps. So the one thing we know is that the Fed doesn’t have room for a normal regime of rate-cutting (there’s uniform insistence that it won’t cut into negative territory). Further, we have to wonder about the desirability of using 50 bps of the 150 bps the Fed does have at its disposal. Will it be enough? And what will the Fed be able to do when the economic impact of the virus has been muted but we only have 100 bps or less left with which to fight any recession that appears? The facts regarding monetary and fiscal policy are these:      

2009 年,为应对全球金融危机,美联储首次将短期利率降至零。

由于不愿让随后的经济复苏脱轨,美联储在耶伦主席于 2015-2018 年实施一系列加息、将联邦基金利率推升至 2.25%-2.50% 之前,一直犹豫不决,未敢加息。

大约在 2018 年底,当利率达到投资者担心会危及经济扩张的水平时,鲍威尔主席领导的美联储掉转方向,开启了一系列三次降息。

于是今天我们就有了我上面提到的 150 个基点的空间——"弹药有限"。

除了降息,美联储还有能力通过购买政府证券进行量化宽松,向经济注入流动性。但我们无法知晓美联储资产负债表扩张的长期影响。

最后,把目光从美联储移开,我们还可以考虑财政政策(即增加赤字支出)。但这将给我们的国家债务再添负担。

In 2009, to fight the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed cut short-term rates to zero for the first time. Not wanting to derail the subsequent recovery, it hesitated to raise rates before Chair Yellen enacted a series of rate increases in 2015-18 that took the Fed funds rate to 2.25-2.50%. When around the end of 2018 interest rates reached levels that investors feared would jeopardize the economic expansion, Chair Powell’s Fed reversed course and embarked on a series of three rate cuts. Thus today we have the 150 bps I mentioned above – “limited ammunition.” In addition to rate cuts, the Fed has the ability to pump liquidity into the economy by engaging in quantitative easing through purchases of government securities. But we can’t know the long-term impact of expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet. Finally, looking away from the Fed, we can think about fiscal policy (i.e., increased deficit spending). But this will add even more to our national debt.

通常情况下,财政和货币刺激政策是在经济疲软时期实施的。(即便是被许多人视为赤字支出之父的凯恩斯勋爵,也主张在经济增速过慢、无法创造就业时运行赤字并积累债务,然后在刺激政策产生盈余时偿还债务。)如今,我们却处于接近零利率和万亿美元赤字的境地,

Normally, fiscal and monetary stimulus is applied in times of economic weakness. (Even Lord Keynes, whom many people consider the father of deficit spending, advocated running deficits and accumulating debt when the economy grows too slow to create jobs, and then repaying the debt when the stimulus produces surpluses.) Now we have near-zero interest rates and trillion-dollar deficits in

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繁荣时期,没人想要经济衰退,但提前打光弹药或许并不明智。美联储和政府应对新冠疫情经济冲击的工具非常有限。因此,我认为眼下对他们的能力过分乐观并非明智之举。

times of prosperity. No one wants a recession, but using up our ammunition preemptively may not have been smart. The Fed/government’s tool for fighting the economic impact of coronavirus are very limited. Thus I believe it’s undesirable to be highly sanguine about their powers at this juncture.

该怎么办?

这些天,总有人问我是不是该买股票了。我的回答要更细致一些:现在大概是个买入的时机。但不存在我们能明确指认的某个独一无二的买入时点。今天唯一能确定的是,股票价格比两周前低了不少,这是绝对的。

未来几天、几周、几个月,股价还会跌吗?这个问题本身就问错了……主要是因为它根本无解。既然我们回答不了第二页列出的那些关于病毒的问题,就无法明智地判断市场会怎么走。我们知道,市场在七个交易日内跌了 13%。但我们完全没有依据推断接下来几周还会再跌 13%——或者涨同样幅度——因为答案很大程度上取决于投资者心理的变化。(我说“很大程度上”,是因为它也会受病毒相关进展的影响……但同样,我们也没有依据判断实际的进展会与投资者已经计入资产价格的预期有怎样的出入。)

相反,明智的投资必须始终建立在价格与价值的关系之上。换句话说,不是问“崩盘还会继续吗?”而是问“迄今为止的崩盘是否让证券定价合理;或者考虑到基本面,它们是否高估;又或者它们已经变得便宜?”我毫不怀疑,评估价格相对于价值仍是长期投资最可靠的方法。(前面整段讨论的重点就在于,短期内没有任何东西能提供可靠的帮助。)

我想先坦承,确定内在价值从来不是一件简单、一清二楚的事。现在——考虑到病毒有可能让未来的世界与我们过去所知截然不同——价值是否已经难以确定到无法依赖?简而言之,我不这么认为。我认为我们确实知道的一点是,新冠病毒不是 1918 年西班牙流感大流行的重演,那次流感“据估计感染了全球约 5 亿人——约占当时地球人口的三分之一——并导致估计 2000 万至 5000 万人死亡,其中包括约 67.5 万美国人。”(history.com)相反,它更像是流感那样的一种季节性疫病,我们已经与之共存多年,开发出了疫苗,也学会了应对。流感每年夺去大约 3 万至 6 万美国人的生命,这当然很糟糕,但和一场无法控制的瘟疫完全不同。

所以,尤其是在我们对新冠病毒有了更多了解并开发出疫苗之后,在我看来,它不太可能从根本上、永久地改变我们所知的生活,让未来的世界面目全非,摧毁商业,或让价值评估变得不可能。(是的,这是猜测:我们总得做一些猜测。)

What to Do? These days, people have been asking me whether this is the time to buy. My answer is more nuanced: it’s probably a time to buy. There can be no unique time to buy that we can identify. The only thing we can be sure of today is that stock prices, for example, are a lot lower in the absolute than they were two weeks ago. Will stocks decline in the coming days, weeks and months? This is the wrong question to ask . . . primarily because it is entirely unanswerable. Since we don’t have answers to the questions about the virus listed on page two, there’s no way to decide intelligently what the markets will do. We know the market declined by 13% in seven trading days. There can be absolutely no basis on which to conclude that they’ll lose another 13% in the weeks ahead – or that they’ll rise by a like amount – since the answer will be determined largely by changes in investor psychology. (I say “largely” because it will also be influenced by developments regarding the virus . . . but likewise we have no basis on which to judge how actual developments will compare against the expectations investors already have factored into asset prices.) Instead, intelligent investing has to be based – as always – on the relationship between price and value. In other words, not “will the collapse go further?” But rather “has the collapse to date caused securities to be priced right; or are they overpriced given the fundamentals; or have they become cheap?” I have no doubt that assessing price relative to value remains the most reliable way to invest for the long term. (It is the thrust of the whole discussion just above that there’s nothing that provides reliable help in the short term.) I want to acknowledge up front that ascertaining intrinsic value is never a simple, cut-and-dried thing. Now – given the possibility that the virus will cause the world of the future to be very different from the world we knew – is value too unascertainable to be relied upon? In short, I don’t think so. What I think we do know is that the coronavirus is not a rerun of the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, “which infected an estimated 500 million people worldwide – about one-third of the planet's population – and killed an estimated 20 million to 50 million victims, including some 675,000 Americans.” (history.com) Rather, it’s one more seasonal disease like the flu, something we’ve had for years, have developed vaccines for, and have learned to deal with. The flu kills about 30,00060,000 Americans each year, and that’s terrible, but it’s very different from an unmanageable scourge. So, especially after we’ve learned more about the coronavirus and developed a vaccine, it seems to me that it is unlikely to fundamentally and permanently change life as we know it, make the world of the future unrecognizable, and decimate business or make valuing it impossible. (Yes, this is a guess: we have to make some of them.)

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美国股市较最高点下跌了约 13%。这是很大的跌幅。要接受美国商界——以及它未来将产生的现金流——比 2 月 19 日那天便宜了 13%,这可不是小事。这句话听起来可能像是我认为市场被低估了。但这不是正确的解读。如果它在 2 月 19 日被高估了,那么经过下跌之后,它可能只是没那么高估了,而不是今天被低估了。它也可能估值合理,甚至被低估,但这并非必然。

我认为两周前股市被高估了……有点高估。这意味着我认为今天,即使企业的短期前景有所恶化,也更接近合理估值,但不一定是白送。用最直白的数字来说,在暴跌之前,标普 500 指数的市盈率在 19 倍左右,比二战后的平均水平高出约 20%(关于这个平均值目前是否适用,各方都有论据)。因此,在下跌 13% 之后,你得说市盈率已经相当接近合理水平了(除非今年的盈利会与之前的预期大相径庭)。

买、卖还是持有?我认为做一些买入是可以的,因为东西更便宜了。但鉴于我们不知道未来负面事件会有多严重,没有任何合乎逻辑的理由让你把所有的现金都投出去。我会做的是,算算你想在跌到底部时投入多少资金——不管什么时候到底——然后今天先投入一部分。股市可能会掉头向上,你会庆幸自己买了一些。也可能继续下跌,这样的话你还有钱(希望也有胆量)去买更多。对于那些承认自己不知道未来会怎样的人来说,生活就是这样。

但没人能告诉你这是买入的时机。没人知道。

2020 年 3 月 3 日

The U.S. stock market’s down about 13% from the top. That’s a big decline. It would be a lot to accept that the U.S. business world – and the cash flows it will produce in the future – are worth 13% less today than they were on February 19. That sentence may make it sound like I think the market’s undervalued. But that’s not the proper interpretation. If it was overvalued on the 19th, rather than being undervalued today, after the decline, it could just be less overvalued. Or it could be fairly valued, or even undervalued, but it isn’t necessarily. I think the stock market was overvalued two weeks ago . . . somewhat. That means I think that today, even with the short-term prospects of business somewhat diminished, it’s closer to fairly valued, but not necessarily a giveaway. In the starkest numerical terms, before the rout, the p/e ratio on the S&P 500 was 19 or so, roughly 20% above the post-World War II average (and there are arguments on both sides regarding the current applicability of that average). Thus, after a 13% decline, you’d have to say the p/e ratio is pretty close to fair (unless earnings for the year will be very different from what they previously had been expected to be). Buy, sell or hold? I think it’s okay to do some buying, because things are cheaper. But there’s no logical argument for spending all your cash, given that we have no idea how negative future events will be. What I would do is figure out how much you’ll want to have invested by the time the bottom is reached – whenever that is – and spend part of it today. Stocks may turn around and head north, and you’ll be glad you bought some. Or they may continue down, in which case you’ll have money left (and hopefully the nerve) to buy more. That’s life for people who accept that they don’t know what the future holds. But no one can tell you this is the time to buy. Nobody knows. March 3, 2020

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