何去何从?

2020 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 4294 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

前路何方?

Which Way Now?

过去六周,市场经历了最好的时光,也经历了最坏的时光:

In the last six weeks the markets have seen the best of times and the worst of times: •

从 2 月 19 日到 3 月 23 日,美国股市经历了史上最快的崩盘,标普 500 指数下跌 33.9%。随后,上周二至周四的 17.5% 涨幅,又创下了自 1930 年代以来最好的三日连涨纪录。

From February 19 to March 23, the U.S. stock market saw the quickest meltdown in history, for a loss of 33.9% on the S&P 500. Then its 17.5% gain from Tuesday through Thursday of last week made for the best three-day stretch since the 1930s.

在 2 月 27 日至 3 月 27 日之间的 21 个交易日里,标普 500 指数共有 18 天的涨跌幅超过 2%:其中 11 天下跌,7 天上涨。这期间包含了自 1933 年以来最大的单日百分比涨幅,以及自 1940 年以来第二大单日百分比跌幅(仅次于 1987 年的黑色星期一)。

Of the 21 trading days between February 27 and March 27, a total of 18 days saw moves in the S&P 500 of more than 2%: eleven down and seven up. They included the biggest daily percentage gain since 1933 and the second-biggest percentage loss since 1940 (exceeded only by Black Monday in 1987).

从 3 月 9 日到 3 月 20 日,发行新的投资级债券似乎是不可想象的。随后,正如我们的交易员贾斯汀·夸利亚指出的,上周政府救助计划的消息使得 49 家公司发行了 1070 亿美元的投资级债券。这创下了有史以来发行量最大的一周;也是发行量最大的一个月(106 家发行方共发行 2130 亿美元)的一部分;还是发行量最大的一个季度(4730 亿美元,比 2019 年第一季度增长 40%)的一部分。事实上,上周的发行量比 2019 年 12 个月中的 9 个月还要多。

From March 9 through March 20, issuing a new investment grade bond seemed inconceivable. Then, as our trader Justin Quaglia points out, last week’s news of the government’s rescue package enabled 49 companies to issue $107 billion of IG bonds. That made it the biggest week for issuance on record; part of the biggest month on record ($213 billion from 106 issuers); and part of the biggest quarter on record ($473 billion, up 40% from the first quarter of 2019). In fact, there was more issuance last week than in nine of the 12 months in 2019.

最后,在 3 月 26 日,贾斯汀写道:“真难相信我在两周之内先后用了‘恐慌’和‘FOMO’这两个词。”

Finally, on March 26, Justin wrote, “It’s hard to believe I used the words ‘panic’ and ‘FOMO’ within two weeks of each other.”

回顾以上种种,重要的是要注意到,人们在多大程度上(因此市场也在多大程度上)似乎认为长期现象可以在短期内改变。

众所周知,新冠病毒在美国和其他地方仍在蔓延;经济注定要经历一场严重的衰退;高杠杆实体不得不担心其贷款和流动性来源;油价处于 1973 年石油禁运以来的最低水平之列。但金融资产的价格也随之下跌:这是恰当的、过高还是过低?换句话说,我们必须在前所未有的不确定性和完全缺乏历史类比指导的背景下,考虑前景和价值的合理性。

毫无疑问,政府和美联储的大规模现金注入有能力在短期内改善局面,市场无疑把它们当成了稳赢的举措。但我认为,抽出时间认真讨论各种可能的情形非常重要。上周的补救措施一定能奏效吗?前一周的负面因素真的被抹去了吗?在短期和中期内,谁会胜出:疫情、经济后果,还是美联储/财政部的行动?为了以负责任的方式思考这些问题,我决定试着把乐观和悲观的因素分别罗列出来。

Looking at the above, it’s important to note the degree to which people (and thus markets) seem to think long-term phenomena can change in the short run. It’s common knowledge that the coronavirus is still gaining ground in the U.S. and elsewhere; the economy is destined for a serious recession; leveraged entities have to worry about their sources of loans and liquidity; and the price of oil is among the very lowest since the 1973 OPEC embargo. But the prices of financial assets have moved down as well: appropriately, too much or too little? In other words, we have to consider the outlook and the appropriateness of value, in the context of unprecedented uncertainty and the total absence of guidance from analogies to the past. There’s no doubt about the ability of the government’s and the Fed’s massive cash injections to make things better in the short run, and certainly the market has treated them as sure winners. But I think it’s important to take time out for a serious discussion of possible scenarios. Are this past week’s remedies certain to work? Are the prior week’s negatives really erased? Which will win in the short and intermediate term: the disease, economic ramifications or Fed/Treasury actions? To try to think about these things in a responsible way, I’ve decided to try cataloging the optimistic and pessimistic elements.

2020 年橡树资本管理公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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乐观的理由

没有人认为现在的情况很好,但乐观者的观点建立在坏消息早日结束、好消息在不久将来出现的基础上。以下是其组成部分。(如你所知,我通常避免使用宏观预测,也从不自己做预测。在这份备忘录中,我会借用他人的预测来说明问题,但这并不是因为我有理由相信它们是正确的):

The Positive Case No one thinks things are good right now, but the optimist’s view is built around the early cessation of bad news and the arrival of better news in the not-too-distant future. Here are the components. (As you know, I usually avoid using macro forecasts and never make my own. I will borrow from others for the purposes of exposition in this memo, but not because I have reason to believe they’re correct): •

最早感染病毒的国家已经显示出良好的进展。它们报告的新增病例数据已经趋于平缓,在韩国,出院人数已经超过入院人数。我们法兰克福办公室的负责人赫尔曼·丹巴赫报告说,意大利、德国和奥地利的数字正在好转。

The earliest countries to contract the virus have shown good progress. The reported data on their new cases has flattened, and in South Korea, more people are being released from the hospitals than are entering. Hermann Dambach, head of our Frankfurt office, reports that the numbers are improving in Italy, Germany and Austria.

我看到的每一项预测都假设病毒将在三个月左右得到控制。曲线先趋平,然后掉头向下。病毒先被遏制,然后被消灭。

o 检测识别出感染者,隔离/检疫使他们无法感染他人。

o 群体免疫形成,减少了能够传播疾病的人数。

o 天气转暖导致疫情消退。

o 找到有助于康复的治疗方法。

o 疫苗研发成功。

Every forecast I’ve seen assumes the virus will be brought under control within three months or so. The curve is flattened and then turned downward. The virus is contained and then eliminated. o Testing identifies those infected, and isolation/quarantine keeps them from infecting others. o Herd immunity develops, reducing the number of people capable of transmitting the disease. o Warmer weather causes the disease to recede. o Treatments are found that aid recovery. o A vaccine is developed.

疫情对经济的负面影响将是剧烈但短暂的。“V 型”一词主导了大多数预测,无论是第二季度与下半年之间,还是 2020 年与 2021 年之间。因此,例如,一位预测者认为标普 500 指数成分公司第二季度盈利下降 120%,但认为第三季度可能环比上升约 80% 以上(也就是说,仅比 2019 年下降 20%),然后在第四季度再上升 50%。在 2020 年下降 33% 之后,盈利将在 2021 年上升 55%,并超过 2019 年的水平。

The negative impact of the disease on the economy will be sharp but brief. The term “Vshaped” dominates most forecasts, both between Q2 and H2 and between 2020 and 2021. Thus, for example, one forecaster who has the earnings of the S&P 500 companies down 120% in Q2 thinks they may rise roughly 80+% in Q3 on a quarter-over-quarter basis (that is, to down just 20% from 2019) and then rise by a further 50% in Q4. And after a decline of 33% in 2020, earnings will rise by 55% in 2021 and exceed what they were in 2019.

让人们待在家里——从而导致企业关门——在经济上等同于让病人进入昏迷状态以帮助治愈严重疾病。政府将在昏迷期间为经济提供生命支持,并在治愈后让病人苏醒过来。

经济复苏将得到疫情好转消息的助力,但改善主要是美联储/财政部救助和刺激计划成功的结果。这些机构宣布了前所未有的支出,并表示将不惜一切代价。在全球金融危机中经过数月审议才采取的行动,在这次危机的最初几周就推出了。后续步骤可能包括任何人能想到的一切措施,并且在金额上不受限制。

Telling people to stay home – and thus causing businesses to close – is the economic equivalent of putting a patient into a coma to facilitate curing a serious disease. The government will provide life support to the economy during the coma and bring the patient out of the coma after the cure has been effected. The economic recovery will be abetted by better news about the disease, but the improvement will mainly be the result of the success of the Fed/Treasury package of rescue and stimulus. These organizations have announced unprecedented expenditures and have indicated that they’ll do whatever else it takes. Actions that were taken after months of deliberation in the Global Financial Crisis have been rolled out in the early weeks of the current episode. Further steps are likely to include everything anyone can think of and be unconstrained as to amount.

银行的脆弱性远低于全球金融危机时期,杠杆率只有当时的三分之一。因此,对整个金融体系健康的担忧大大减轻了。

The banks are much less vulnerable than they were during the Global Financial Crisis, with only a third of the leverage. Thus concerns for the health of the overall financial system are greatly reduced.

2020 年橡树资本管理公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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美国高效的私营部门将补充政府的公共卫生努力,生产大量的物资和设备,并开发检测方法、治疗方法和疫苗。

The U.S.’s effective private sector will supplement the public health efforts of government, producing massive amounts of supplies and equipment, and developing testing, treatments and vaccines.

证券价格的下跌将吸引买家,基金中以“干火药”形式存在的充足资本可供使用。

The price declines of securities will draw in buyers, and ample capital is available in the form of dry powder in funds.

当我读到关于当前局势的更为乐观的看法时,我不禁想起我最喜欢的一条报纸标题,其中包含“银行家们很乐观”这句话。也许通常如此,但值得注意的是,这篇报道发表于 1929 年 10 月 30 日,报道的是前一天股市的崩盘。在那个充满乐观的日子,大萧条还有十一年要走。

When I read the more positive views regarding the current episode, I can’t help but think back to my favorite newspaper headline, which included the phrase “Bankers Optimistic.” Usually the case, perhaps, but it’s worth noting that the story in question was published on October 30, 1929, reporting on the prior day’s stock market crash. On that day of optimism, the Great Depression still had eleven years to run.

悲观的理由

我总是说,我们必须意识到并坦承自己的偏见。我承认我的偏见:我更像一个忧心者,而不是梦想家。也许正是这一点让我成为了更好的信贷分析师而非股票分析师。平均而言,我可能比必要的更为防御性(尽管在我的职业生涯中,不知何故我总能在危机触底时转向积极行动)。因此,今天我的“负面清单”比“正面清单”更长(而且我会更详细地阐述),这不应该让人感到意外。

The Negative Case I always say we have to be aware of and open about our biases. I admit to mine: I’m more of a worrier than a dreamer. Maybe that’s what made me a better credit analyst than equity analyst. On average I may have been more defensive than was necessary (although somehow I was able to shift to aggressive action when crisis lows were reached during my career). Thus it shouldn’t come as a surprise today that my list of cons is longer than my pros (and I will elaborate on them at greater length). •

我非常担心疫情的前景,尤其是在美国。很长一段时间以来,应对措施只是建议或忠告,而不是命令和规则。上周末,春假期间大学女生在海滩上的照片尤其让我不安,她们之后会回到自己的社区。其他国家在减缓疫情方面取得的成功,取决于广泛的社交隔离、检测和测体温以识别感染者,并将其与其他人隔离开来。美国在所有这些都是落后的。检测很少能进行,大规模测体温根本不存在,人们还在质疑大规模隔离是否合法。

o 美国的总病例数已超过中国和意大利,并且仍在迅速上升(而且由于检测不足,可能被低估了)。

o 死亡人数从周四的 1000 例到周六翻了一番,达到 2000 例。

o 前 FDA 局长、医学博士斯科特·戈特利布最近在推特上写道:“我担心新奥尔良、达拉斯、亚特兰大、迈阿密、底特律、芝加哥、费城等地正在出现的局势。在中国,湖北以外的省份从未超过 1500 例。在美国,已有 11 个州达到这个数字。我们的疫情很可能在全国范围内蔓延。”

o 美国在应对方面设备不足,医院、病床、呼吸机和物资都短缺。防护不足的医生、护士和急救人员面临风险。

我担心,只要我们不去效仿那些成功国家的做法,病例数和死亡人数就会继续上升。医疗系统将被压垮。分诊决定——包括谁生谁死——将不得不做出。将会出现一个看不到尽头的时刻。我担心相关新闻头条会变得更加糟糕。

I’m very worried about the outlook for the disease, especially in the U.S. For a long time, the response consisted of suggestions or advice, not orders and rules. I was particularly troubled last weekend by pictures of college kids on the beach during spring break, from which they would return to their communities. The success of other countries in slowing the disease has been a function of widespread social distancing, testing and temperature-taking to identify those who are infected, and quarantining them from everyone else. The U.S. is behind in all these regards. Testing is rarely available, mass temperature-taking is nonexistent, and people wonder whether large-scale quarantining is legal. o The total number of cases in the U.S. has surpassed both China’s and Italy’s and is still rising rapidly (and is likely understated due to under-testing). o The number of deaths doubled from 1,000 to 2,000 between Thursday and Saturday. o From a recent tweet by Scott Gottlieb, MD, former commissioner of the FDA: “I’m worried about emerging situations in New Orleans, Dallas, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, among others. In China no province outside Hubei ever had more than 1,500 cases. In U.S. 11 states already hit that total. Our epidemic is likely to be national in scope.” o The U.S. is under-equipped to respond in terms of hospitals, beds, ventilators and supplies. Under-protected doctors, nurses and first responders are at risk. I’m concerned that the number of cases and deaths will continue to rise as long as we fail to emulate the successful countries’ actions. The health system will be overwhelmed. Triage decisions – including who lives and who dies – will have to be made. There will be a point where there doesn’t seem to be an end in sight. I’m afraid the headlines are going to get much uglier in this regard.

2020 年橡树资本管理公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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经济将以创纪录的速度收缩。数百万人将失业。人们将无法光顾商家。不仅工人拿不到工资、企业没有收入,而且企业的实物产出也将下降,这意味着食品等必需品可能会短缺。上周有 330 万人新申请失业救济,而前一周为 28.2 万人,周度纪录为 69.5 万人。在政府采取行动之前,预期包括以下内容:

o 失业率将回到 8-10%,公民很快就会现金短缺;

o 企业将倒闭;

o 第二季度 GDP 将比去年同期下降 15-30%(而 1958 年第一季度下降了 10%,是有史以来最糟糕的季度);

o 一些预测者称标普 500 指数成分公司的总盈利将在第二季度下降 10%,但这似乎是一个可笑的小跌幅。在光谱的另一端,我看到一个预测称标普 500 指数盈利将下降 120%(没错:总体而言,这 500 家公司将从盈利转为亏损)。

政府的支付加上增加的失业保险将对许多工人替代工资,对企业的援助将替代部分收入损失。但这些资金需要多长时间才能到达受助者手中?有多少本应获得援助的人会被遗漏?援助会持续多久?(一个四口之家 3400 美元撑不了多久。)在深度冻结之后,需要什么才能让经济重新焕发生机?复苏会有多快?换句话说,V 型复苏是一个现实的期望吗?

The economy will contract at a record rate. Many millions will be thrown out of work. People will be unable to patronize businesses. Not only will workers miss paychecks and businesses miss revenues, but businesses’ physical output will tail off, meaning essentials like food may run short. Last week, 3.3 million new unemployment claims were filed, versus the previous week’s 282,000 and the weekly record of 695,000. Prior to the government’s actions, expectations included the following: o unemployment would return to 8-10%, and citizens would soon run short of cash; o businesses would close; o second-quarter GDP would decline from the year-ago level by 15-30% (versus a decline of 10% in the first quarter of 1958, the worst quarter in history); o some forecasters said the combined earnings of the S&P 500 companies would decline 10% in the second quarter, but that seems like a ridiculously small decline. At the other end of the spectrum, I’ve seen a prediction that S&P earnings would decline by 120% (that’s right: in total, the 500 companies would shift from profits to losses). Government payments plus augmented unemployment insurance will replace paychecks for many workers, and aid to businesses will replace some of their lost revenues. But how long will it take to get these funds to recipients? How many should-be recipients will be missed? For how long will the aid continue? ($3,400 to a family of four won’t last long.) What will it take to bring the economy back to life after it’s been in a deep freeze? How fast will it recover? In other words, is a V-shaped recovery a realistic expectation?

社会隔离与经济复苏之间的冲突将很难化解。我们如何知道疫情是否值得付出这样的代价?人们居家时间越长,经济复苏就越困难。但人们越早复工、恢复其他活动,控制疫情就越艰难。

首先,每日新增病例数的增长必须放缓。其次,新增病例数必须开始逐日下降(也就是说,增长率必须转为负值)。然后,每日新增病例必须停止出现。(当然,要做到这些,我们需要加大检测力度并实施强制隔离。)只要每天还有新增病例,就说明仍有感染者。如果让他们重新回到社会、接触他人,疫情就会持续并蔓延。而如果我们借新增病例数量下降之机重启经济活动,就可能面临感染率反弹的风险。

It will be very challenging to resolve the conflict between social isolation and economic recovery. How will we know whether the disease merits the cure? The longer people remain at home, the more difficult it will be to bring the economy back to life. But the sooner they return to work and other activities, the harder it will be to get the disease under control. First, the growth in the number of new cases each day has to be reduced. Next, the number of new cases has to begin to decline from one day to the next (that is, the growth rate has to turn negative). Then new cases have to stop appearing each day. (Of course, we’ll need increased testing and mandatory quarantining for these things to occur.) As long as there are new cases each day, there are people who are infectious. If we send them back into the world and into contact with others, the disease will persist and spread. And if we seize the opportunity provided by a decline in the number of new cases to resume economic activity, we risk a rebound in the rate of infection.

总体来看,我们的一些公司收入下滑,另一些公司收入归零。它们可以削减开支,但因为许多成本是固定的(比如房租),削减速度赶不上收入下滑的速度。这正是二季度利润会收缩、枯竭,甚至转负的原因。某些行业(如娱乐业)的营收可能较快回暖,而另一些行业(如邮轮业)则恢复缓慢。

For the most part, we have companies whose revenues are down and companies whose revenues are gone. They can reduce their expenses, but because many of them are fixed (like rent), they can’t reduce expenses as fast as revenues decline. That’s why second-quarter profits will shrink, dry up or turn negative. Revenues may come back relatively soon for some industries (like entertainment), but less rapidly for others (like cruise lines).

许多公司进入这一阶段时负债累累。管理层利用低利率和宽松的资本市场发行债券,有些还进行了股票回购,

Many companies went into this episode highly leveraged. Managements took advantage of the low interest rates and generous capital market to issue debt, and some did stock buybacks,

2020 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2020 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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减少股本、提高每股收益(也许还有高管薪酬)。无论采取哪一种或两种做法,都会推高债务与净资产的比率。一家公司相对其净资产负债越多,景气时期净资产收益率就越高……但萧条时期净资产收益率也会越低(或亏损越大),在艰难时期存活下来的可能性也越小。企业杠杆让收入与利润下滑的问题变得更复杂。因此,我们预计未来几个月违约事件会增多。

reducing their share count and increasing their earnings per share (and perhaps their executive compensation). The result of either or both is to increase the ratio of debt to equity. The more debt a company has relative to its equity, the higher the return on equity will be in good times . . . but also the lower the return on equity (or the larger the losses) in bad times, and the less likely it is to survive tough times. Corporate leverage complicates the issue of lost revenues and profits. Thus we expect to see rising defaults in the months ahead. •

同样地,近年来,宽松的资本市场环境以及在低利率世界中寻求回报的需求,催生了杠杆投资实体的形成。与杠杆公司一样,债务提高了它们的预期回报,但也增加了它们的脆弱性。因此,我认为我们很可能会看到杠杆实体出现违约现象,原因包括价格下调、评级降级,甚至可能对其投资组合资产违约;贷款方提高“折扣”(即,在每美元抵押品基础上减少贷款金额);以及追加保证金通知、投资组合清算和强制出售。在全球金融危机中,像抵押贷款支持证券(CMO)和债务抵押债券(CDO)这样的杠杆投资工具崩溃,给持有其低级债务和股权的银行带来了损失。银行系统的重要性迫使政府救助(这种不满情绪极大地助长了当今的民粹主义)。这次,杠杆证券化在金融体系中不那么普遍,而且它们的风险资本并非由银行提供(得益于沃尔克规则),而是主要由非银行贷方和基金提供。因此,我认为政府对他们进行救助的可能性不大。(顺便说一句,并不是设计这些杠杆实体的结构者犯了错误。他们只是未能在模拟的场景中纳入类似当前的这种情景。他们怎么能做到呢?如果每个商业决策都必须考虑到疫情,那么几乎不会有交易发生。)

Likewise, in recent years, the generous capital market conditions and the search for return in a low-interest-rate world caused the formation of leveraged investment entities. As with leveraged companies, debt increased their expected returns but also their vulnerability. Thus I believe we’re likely to see defaults on the part of leveraged entities, based on price markdowns, ratings downgrades and perhaps defaults on their portfolio assets; increased “haircuts” on the part of lenders (i.e., reduced amounts loaned against a dollar of collateral); and margin calls, portfolio liquidations and forced selling. In the Global Financial Crisis, leveraged investment vehicles like Collateralized Mortgage Obligations and Collateralized Debt Obligations melted down, bringing losses to the banks that held their junior debt and equity. The systemic importance of the banks necessitated their bailouts (the resentment of which contributed greatly to today’s populism). This time, leveraged securitizations are less pervasive in the financial system, and their risk capital wasn’t supplied by banks (thanks to the Volcker Rule), but mostly by non-bank lenders and funds. Thus I feel government bailouts are unlikely to be made available to them. (As an aside, it’s not that the people who structured these leveraged entities erred. They merely failed to include an episode like the current one among the scenarios they modeled. How could they? If every business decision had to be made in contemplation of a pandemic, few deals would take place.)

最后,除了疫情及其经济影响,还有一个重要因素:石油。由于消费下降和沙特与俄罗斯之间的价格战相互叠加,油价从年末的每桶 61 美元跌至如今的 19 美元。这一价格水平仅略高于 1973 年 OPEC 禁运前夕,而此后 47 年间,油价只有两次短暂低于当前水平。虽然许多消费者、企业和国家从低油价中受益,但对其他人而言,负面影响不容忽视:

· 石油生产企业和产油国遭受重大亏损。

· 就业岗位流失:油气行业直接提供美国超过 5% 的就业岗位(间接提供的更多),且自全球金融危机以来,该行业为失业率下降贡献巨大。

· 行业资本投资大幅下滑,而近期这一投资在美国总投资中占比可观。

· 由于消费下降,原油及成品油储存能力吃紧,产量被迫削减。

· 减产或停产对油藏造成损害。

· 美国石油独立程度下降。

Finally, in addition to the disease and its economic repercussions, we have one more important element: oil. Due to a confluence of reduced consumption and a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia, the price of oil has fallen from $61 per barrel at year-end to $19 today. The price of oil was only slightly lower immediately before the OPEC embargo in 1973, and in the 47 years since then it has only been lower on two brief occasions. While many consumers, companies and countries benefit from lower oil prices, there are serious repercussions for others: o Big losses for oil-producing companies and countries. o Job losses: the oil and gas industry directly provides more than 5% of American jobs (and more indirectly), and it contributed greatly to the decline of unemployment since the GFC. o A significant decline in the industry’s capital investment, which recently has accounted for a meaningful share of the U.S.’s total. o Production cuts, since consumption is down and crude/product storage capacity is running out. o The damage to oil reservoirs that results when production is reduced or halted. o A reduction in American oil independence.

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如前述,负面情况包括感染与死亡人数上升、医疗体系不堪重负、数百万人失业、企业大面积亏损以及违约潮加剧。一旦出现这些情形,投资者很可能从上星期的乐观情绪,转向整个三月其余时间普遍弥漫的悲观情绪。促成因素可能包括:

o 经济与生命双重威胁带来的负面心理,

o 对更多风险的恐惧,

o 以及极其负面的财富效应,抑制消费与投资。

As recounted above, the negative case encompasses rising numbers of infections and deaths, unbearable strain on the healthcare system, job losses in the many millions, widespread business losses and mounting defaults. If these things arise, investors are likely to shift from the optimism of last week to the pessimism that was prevalent in the rest of March. Contributing factors may include: o negative psychology surrounding the combination of threats to the economy and life itself, o fear of more, and o a very negative wealth effect that depresses spending and investing.

政府项目

上周,政府颁布了《新冠病毒援助、救济和经济安全法案》(CARES Act),涉及约 2 万亿美元的救援和支持资金。与此同时,美联储将再投入数万亿美元以提供流动性并支撑金融体系,且已“承诺动用其全部工具”。我不打算逐一列举 CARES 法案的所有条款,只需指出摩根大通的描述就长达 8 页。如上所述,这些措施的清单及其规模很可能还会扩大。

我想分享康拉德·德夸德罗斯(Conrad DeQuadros)对经济形势和政府回应的一段精辟描述,他是布林资本(Brean Capital)的经济学家,我近来常引用他的话:

CARES 法案不应被视为财政刺激,而应看作一揽子经济稳定措施。2020 年 3 月经济活动的崩塌并非正常的周期性衰退,而是政府强制要求个人和企业“暂停”的结果。法案的许多条款旨在防止私营部门瓦解,以便在病毒得到控制、停摆解除后,经济活动能够迅速反弹。……

衰退不可避免,因为航空、酒店、餐厅、影院等行业的产出已经损失。然而,这些计划将为企业在病毒允许复工时提供支持,让我们看到经济活动的急剧回升。就在一个月前,熟练劳动力还是稀缺资源,关键在于保住劳动力与企业的联系。对企业支持实质上就是对劳动力的支持,因为如果企业无法用现金流支付工资,裁员数字将使最新失业救济申请数据相形见绌。

这些措施效果如何?最近一个季度,劳动报酬为 2.9 万亿美元(实际值,非年化),仅举一个示意性数字:劳动收入下降 20%(实际值)相当于 5770 亿美元,这与直接面向家庭的收入支持规模大致相当,尚未考虑对企业支持的效应——这种支持将阻止劳动收入更大幅度下滑。这套财政方案将释放美联储超过 4 万亿美元的资本市场支持计划。此外还有用于抗击病毒传播的资金,病毒越早得到控制,就能挽救更多生命,美国也能越早复工复产。经过几个月的居家隔离,我们猜想积压的需求会相当可观。2020 年的财政赤字可能达到约 2.5 万亿美元的规模,但若这套方案失败,衰退将更加漫长,

The Government Programs Last week the government enacted the CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, with roughly $2 trillion of rescue and support. At the same time, the Fed will spend several trillion more to provide liquidity and buttress the financial system, and it has “committed to using its full range of tools.” I will dispense with listing all the provisions of the CARES Act, and merely note that J.P. Morgan’s description runs to eight pages. And as mentioned above, the list of ingredients and their magnitude are likely to grow. I’ll share a useful description of the economic situation and the government response from Conrad DeQuadros of Brean Capital, an economist I’ve taken to quoting: The CARES Act should not be thought of as fiscal stimulus but as an economic stabilization package. The collapse of economic activity in March 2020 is not a normal cyclical recession but is the result of a mandated “time out” of individuals and businesses by the government. Many of the provisions of the Act are designed to prevent the private sector from unraveling so that when the containment of the virus permits shutdowns to be lifted, activity can bounce back. . . . There is no avoiding recession because the output of airlines, hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, etc. is lost. However, these programs will support businesses so that when the virus permits the resumption of activity, we can see a sharp rebound in activity. Skilled labor was a scarce resource just one month ago and the key is to keep that labor and businesses connected. The support for businesses is really support for labor because if companies cannot pay workers from cash flows, the layoff figures will dwarf the numbers suggested by the latest jobless claims data. How effective will the measures be? In the latest quarter, labor compensation was $2.9 trillion (actual, non-annualized) and, to consider a purely illustrative number, a 20% (actual) drop in labor incomes amounts to $577 billion, which is about the magnitude of direct income support to households without considering the impact of support for businesses, which will head off a steeper decline in labor incomes. The fiscal package will unlock upward of $4 trillion of capital market support programs from the Fed. In addition there are the funds to help combat the spread of the virus and the sooner the virus can be contained, the more lives will be saved and the sooner America can get back to work. After a few months of being housebound, we suspect there will be plenty of pent up demand. The fiscal deficit in 2020 could be of the magnitude of $2.5 trillion but if the package fails, the recession would be longer and

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危机更深,财政代价更大。

和往常一样,我不知道哪位经济学家的判断正确,但我乐于接受康拉德的总结。

从理解迄今采取的行动继续往前,我想谈谈这项努力的前景。

政府似乎有能力,正如康拉德所说,支撑并稳定经济。以我简化的看法,我设想它能印出足够的支票,来弥补每个美国工人失去的工资和每家企业失去的收入。换句话说,它能“模拟”经济对收入的作用。但我有两个问题:这样做可以吗?够用吗?

首先,正如我前面提到的,我们实际上需要工人和企业的产出。如果所有企业都关门,我们就没有所需的东西。如今,比如,人们依赖食品杂货配送和外卖。但有没有人想过食物从哪里来,又是怎么送到我们手里的?财政部能弥补人们失去的工资,但人们需要的是工资能买到的东西。所以,用支票替代工资和收入,时间一长就不够了:经济必须生产出商品和服务。

其次,假设政府一直开支票永远替代工资和收入,而且经济继续以最低但足够的水平运转,所需的东西都得以出现。长期影响会是什么?就像油藏一样,长期停摆对经济的生产能力会有什么影响?重启经济、恢复到原有功能水平需要多长时间?

最后,财政部每季度继续向赤字(即使疫情前已达 1 万亿美元)注入数万亿美元,美联储也继续向货币体系注入更多万亿美元,这会产生什么影响?去年六月,在我的备忘录《这次不一样》里,我讨论过现代货币理论,——简化来说——它认为联邦赤字和债务无所谓。这不再只是理论;我们现在就得面对它的后果:

deeper and the fiscal cost would be greater. As always, I don’t know which economists are right, but I’m happy to go with Conrad’s summation. Moving on from understanding the actions to date, I want to talk about the outlook for this effort. The government seems able, as Conrad says, to support and stabilize the economy. In my simplistic view, I imagine it can print enough checks to replace every American worker’s lost wages and every business’s lost revenues. In other words, it can “simulate” the effect of the economy on incomes. But I have two questions: is that okay, and is it enough? First of all, as I mentioned above, we actually need the output of workers and businesses. If all businesses shut down, we won’t have the things we need. These days, for example, people are counting on grocery deliveries and take-out food. But does anyone wonder where food comes from and how it reaches us? The Treasury can make up for people’s lost wages, but people need the things wages buy. So replacing lost wages and revenues will not be enough for long: the economy has to produce goods and services. Second, let’s assume the government writes checks to replace wages and revenues forever, and that the economy continues to produce at a minimal but sufficient level, so the things we need materialize. What will be the long-term effect? As with oil reservoirs, what will be the impact of long-term inactivity on the ability of the economy to produce? How long will it take to restart the economy and bring it back to its previous level of functioning? Lastly, what would be the effect of the Treasury continuing to add trillions of dollars each quarter to the deficit (which was running at $1 trillion even before the virus hit) and of the Fed continuing to pump trillions more into the monetary system? Last June, in my memo This Time It’s Different, I discussed Modern Monetary Theory, which – to simplify – says federal deficits and debt don’t matter. It’s no longer just a theory; we have to deal with its implications now: •

以上情况对美元的价值及其作为世界储备货币的地位会有什么影响?(当然,在这种环境下,其他国家很可能采取与我们类似的做法,这意味着美元相对于其他货币可能不会贬值。)

What would be the effect of the above on the value of the dollar, and thus on the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency? (Of course, in this environment, other countries are likely to behave much the same as we do, meaning the dollar may not be debased relative to other currencies.)

美元储备货币地位的削弱,会不会让我们更难为赤字融资,并推高为此必须支付的利率?

Might a reduction of the dollar’s reserve-currency status make it harder for us to finance our deficits and raise the interest rates we have to pay to do so?

如此程度的印钞会不会引发通胀上升?

Might money-printing to that degree bring on an increase in inflation?

全球原材料和成品产出减少所带来的供给冲击,会不会加剧通胀?制造通胀的因素极其神秘,但这些看起来确实是合理的候选答案,尤其是叠加在一起的时候。

Might a supply shock stemming from reduced global output of raw materials and finished goods add to the increase in inflation? The factors that create inflation are truly mysterious, but these certainly seem like reasonable candidates, especially when combined.

也许没有经过严肃审查,也没有有意识地决定采纳,现代货币理论已经来了。不管我们喜不喜欢,我们将比我想象的更快看到它的影响。(记住,芝加哥大学布斯商学院调查的“顶尖学者”中,100% 的人不同意现代货币理论的某些主张。)

Possibly without serious vetting and a conscious decision to adopt it, Modern Monetary Theory is here. Whether we like it or not, we’ll get to see its impact much quicker than I had thought. (And remember, 100% of the “top scholars” polled by The University of Chicago Booth School of Business disagreed with some of MMT’s claims).

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总结

与其重新发明轮子——也为了向大家展示别人如何看待当前形势(尽管方式与我的观点相似)——我想分享一封来自纪念斯隆·凯特琳医院首席投资官杰森·克莱因的便条,借用他的结论来分担这项工作:

从此处看多的理由似乎是:货币政策会奏效,财政政策会跟进,估值已经重置,社会将遵循有效的医疗政策(如社交隔离)并取得成效,实体经济将适应,地缘政治将保持缓和。熊市似乎是每个问题的反面,而且有可能变得更加黑暗,因为与中国甚至伊朗爆发热战的前景似乎相当不祥。纵观近期所有事件,我觉得某种程度上最有趣的是,在美国能源需求已经因新冠疫情限制而遭受需求侧冲击之际,沙特阿拉伯选择在这一时刻挑起针对美国页岩油的供给冲击。这凸显了事件的不可预测性。正如您所说,没人知道。

我的橡树联合创始人、常任批评者理查德·马森可能会说推特不是可靠的来源,但我还是想引用 @yourMTLbroker 发的一条简明扼要的推文:

看多理由:一切在六周内重启。失业者可以回到原来的工作岗位,或者像真正的美国人一样,自力更生。经济在六个月内恢复正常。私募股权 2 万亿美元干火药、低油价和 0% 利率为经济添柴加火。咆哮的二十年代意味着现在的 2020 年代。

看空理由:失业率升至 20% 以上。至少在两年内一切都不会恢复正常,与此同时,需求遭受巨大冲击。封锁对企业的影响以及石油冲击造成了类似萧条的条件。

在全球金融危机期间,我担心金融新闻的连锁下滑,以及金融机构接连破产对经济的影响。但日常生活与从前相比没有变化,生命和肢体也没有明显威胁。

今天的负面结果范围似乎要广泛得多,如上所述。社会隔离、疾病和死亡、经济收缩、对政府行动的极大依赖,以及对长期影响的不确定性都伴随着我们,主要问题围绕着它们会走多远。

尽管如此,资产的市场价格已经对事件和前景做出了反应(从非常微观的角度看,我觉得上周的反弹反映了过多的乐观情绪,但这是我的看法)。我认为周五资产价格对乐观情景的定价是公允的,但没有为消息恶化的可能性留出足够空间。因此,我对上述所有情况的反应是预期资产价格会下跌。你可能觉得还有时间在潜在负面事态发展之前增加防御性,也可能觉得没有。但最重要的是做好准备,应对下跌并利用下跌。

Summing Up Rather than reinvent the wheel – and to show you how others are viewing the situation (albeit in ways that parallel my view) – I’m going to share the workload by recycling the conclusion from a note I received from Jason Klein, CIO of Memorial Sloan Kettering: The bull case from here seems to be that monetary policy will work, fiscal policy will kick-in, valuations have reset, society will follow effective healthcare policies (e.g., social distancing) that will be effective, the real economy will adapt, and geopolitics will remain subdued. The bear market seems to be the flip side of each issue, and has the potential to be much darker as the prospects of a hot war with China, or even Iran, seem rather ominous. Across all recent events, I find it in some ways most interesting that Saudi Arabia chose to instigate a supply shock targeting U.S. shale at a moment when the demand for U.S. energy was already reeling from the demandside shock from COVID-19 restrictions. It highlights the unpredictability of events. As you’ve said, nobody knows. Richard Masson, my Oaktree co-founder and resident scold, might say Twitter isn’t a worthy source, but nevertheless I want to include a concise summary tweeted by @yourMTLbroker: Bull case: everything opens in 6 weeks. The unemployed can go back to old jobs or as true Americans, bootstrap. Economy back to normal within 6 months. 2T $ in PE dry powder, low gas prices and 0% interest rates pour fuel onto on the economy. The roaring 20’s mean the 2020's now. Bear case: Unemployment goes to 20%+. Everything does NOT go back to normal before at least a year or two, and in the meantime, there is a huge demand shock. The effects of the lockdown on businesses as well as the oil shock create depression-like conditions. In the Global Financial Crisis, I worried about a downward cascade of financial news, and about the implications for the economy of serial bankruptcies among financial institutions. But everyday life was unchanged from what it had been, and there was no obvious threat to life and limb. Today the range of negative outcomes seems much wider, as described above. Social isolation, disease and death, economic contraction, enormous reliance on government action, and uncertainty about the long-term effects are all with us, and the main questions surround how far they will go. Nevertheless, the market prices of assets have responded to the events and outlook (in a very micro sense, I feel last week’s bounce reflected too much optimism, but that’s me). I would say assets were priced fairly on Friday for the optimistic case but didn’t give enough scope for the possibility of worsening news. Thus my reaction to all the above is to expect asset prices to decline. You may or may not feel there’s still time to increase defensiveness ahead of potentially negative developments. But the most important thing is to be ready to respond to and take advantage of declines.

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世界总有一天会恢复正常,尽管今天看来它不太可能保持原样。最重要的是——无论从健康还是财务角度——我们在过渡期间的表现。保重!

The world will be back to normal someday, although today it seems unlikely to end up unchanged. What matters most – in terms of both health and finances – is how we do in the interim. Stay safe!

March 31, 2020

March 31, 2020

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