剧变
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
Sea Change
Sea Change
海洋巨变(习语):彻底的转变,态度、目标上的根本性转向……(Grammarist 词典)
在我 53 年的投资生涯中,见过无数经济周期、钟摆式摆动、狂热与恐慌、泡沫与崩盘,但真正称得上巨变的,我只记得两次。我觉得眼下我们可能正身临第三次。
正如我在备忘录中反复讲过的,1969 年我踏入投资管理行业时,许多银行——包括我当时任职的那家——把股票组合集中在所谓的“漂亮五十”上。漂亮五十由被认为最优秀、增长最快的公司股票组成——好到天塌下来也砸不到它们头上。对这些股票,人人都确信“没有嫌贵的价”。但如果你在我入行那会儿买了漂亮五十,一直拿到 1974 年,你手里攥着的是超过 90% 的亏损……而亏掉的,是美国最优秀公司的一部分股权。事实证明,感知到的品质并不等于安全,也不等于投资成功。
与此同时,在债券世界里,穆迪把评级为单 B 的证券描述为“不具备理想投资特征”。非投资级债券——即评级在双 B 及以下的——对受托人来说碰都不能碰,因为规范的财务行为要求规避风险。正因如此,后来被称为高收益债券的品种,根本无法作为新发行证券卖出去。但到了 1970 年代中期,迈克尔·米尔肯和另外几个人冒出一个想法:只要债券提供的利息足以补偿违约风险,那么发行非投资级债券、审慎地投资于它们,就是可行的。1978 年,我开始买入这类证券——标的或许是美国风险最高的上市公司——而我一直稳稳当当地赚钱。
换句话说,过去审慎的债券投资只限于买那些被假定安全的投资级债券,而如今,只要风险得到了足够补偿,投资经理可以审慎地买入几乎任何品质的债券。我最初涉足时,美国高收益债券市场规模大约 20 亿美元,如今已接近 1.2 万亿美元。
这显然代表了投资行业方向上的重大转变。但这还没完。在高收益债券发行问世之前,公司只能被更大的企业收购——那些能用手头现金支付、或能借到大笔钱且仍保持投资级评级的企业。但有了发行高收益债券的能力,小公司现在可以借助高杠杆吃掉大公司,因为再也无需拥有或维持投资级评级了。这一变化尤其催生了杠杆收购和如今所称的私募股权行业的壮大。
sea change (idiom): a complete transformation, a radical change of direction in attitude, goals . . . (Grammarist) In my 53 years in the investment world, I’ve seen a number of economic cycles, pendulum swings, manias and panics, bubbles and crashes, but I remember only two real sea changes. I think we may be in the midst of a third one today. As I’ve recounted many times in my memos, when I joined the investment management industry in 1969, many banks – like the one I worked for at the time – focused their equity portfolios on the so-called “Nifty Fifty.” The Nifty Fifty comprised the stocks of companies that were considered the best and fastest-growing – so good that nothing bad could ever happen to them. For these stocks, everyone was sure there was “no price too high.” But if you bought the Nifty Fifty when I started at the bank and held them until 1974, you were sitting on losses of more than 90% . . . from owning pieces of the best companies in America. Perceived quality, it turned out, wasn’t synonymous with safety or with successful investment. Meanwhile, over in bond-land, a security with a rating of single-B was described by Moody’s as “failing to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment.” Non-investment grade bonds – those rated double-B and below – were off-limits to fiduciaries, since proper financial behavior mandated the avoidance of risk. For this reason, what soon became known as high yield bonds couldn’t be sold as new issues. But in the mid-1970s, Michael Milken and a few others had the idea that it should be possible to issue non-investment grade bonds – and to invest in them prudently – if the bonds offered enough interest to compensate for the risk of default. In 1978, I started investing in these securities – the bonds of perhaps America’s riskiest public companies – and I was making money steadily and safely. In other words, whereas prudent bond investing had previously consisted of buying only presumedly safe investment grade bonds, investment managers could now prudently buy bonds of almost any quality as long as they were adequately compensated for the attendant risk. The U.S. high yield bond universe amounted to about $2 billion when I first got involved, and today it stands at roughly $1.2 trillion. This clearly represented a major change in direction for the business of investing. But that’s not the end of it. Prior to the inception of high yield bond issuance, companies could only be acquired by larger firms – those that were able to pay with cash on hand or borrow large amounts of money and still retain their investment grade ratings. But with the ability to issue high yield bonds, smaller firms could now acquire larger ones by using heavy leverage, since there was no longer a need to possess or maintain an investment grade rating. This change permitted, in particular, the growth of leveraged buyouts and what’s now called the private equity industry.
2022 年,橡树资本管理公司
2022 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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然而,这一变革最为关键之处并非高收益债券或私募股权,而是一种全新投资者心态的采纳。风险不再被一味规避,而是相对于回报来权衡,并希望能理智地承担。这种新的风险/回报思维,对于许多新型投资形式的发展至关重要,如不良债务、抵押贷款支持证券、结构性信贷和私人借贷。可以毫不夸张地说,当今的投资世界与 50 年前已几乎毫无相似之处。今天投身这一行业的年轻人,若得知当年投资者并不以风险/回报术语思考,或许会大为震惊。如今,我们时时刻刻都在如此思考。因此,这是一场沧海桑田般的巨变。
几乎在同一时期,宏观经济领域也正经历着重大变革。我认为一切始于 1973 年至 1974 年的 OPEC 石油禁运,这使得每桶石油价格在不到一年内从大约 24 美元飙升至近 65 美元。这一价格飙升推高了众多商品成本,并引发了迅速的通胀。由于 20 世纪 70 年代美国私营部门的工会化程度远高于现在,且许多集体谈判协议含有自动生活成本调整条款,不断上升的通胀触发了工资上涨,而这又加剧了通胀,导致了进一步的工资增长。这种看似无法遏制的螺旋上升催生了强烈的通胀预期,在许多情况下,这些预期如其所本性般,自我实现。
消费者价格指数的同比增幅,1972 年为 3.2%,到 1974 年升至 11.0%,随后四年回落至 6% 至 9% 的区间,1979 年再度反弹至 11.4%,1980 年达到 13.5%。当时一片绝望,因为从“打倒通胀”(WIN,“Whip Inflation Now”)徽章到价格管制,再到 1974 年升至 13% 的联邦基金利率,各种抗通胀手段都未能带来任何缓解。直到 1979 年保罗·沃尔克被任命为美联储主席,以及他在 1980 年将联邦基金利率提高到 20% 所展现的决心,通胀才得到控制,通胀心理被彻底扑灭。结果,到 1983 年底,通胀率回落至 3.2%。
沃尔克成功控制通胀后,美联储得以将联邦基金利率降至 8% 至 9% 的高个位数区间,并在 20 世纪 80 年代剩余时间内维持这一水平,进入 90 年代后又下调至 5% 至 6% 的中个位数区间。他的行动开启了一个持续四十年的利率下行环境(后续章节对此将有更多阐述)。我认为这是我职业生涯中目睹的第二次沧海桑田。
利率的长期下行在风险/回报思维出现仅几年后便开始了,我认为这两者的结合共同催生了:(a)投资者乐观情绪的重生,(b)通过激进投资工具追求利润的热潮,以及(c)股市令人难以置信的黄金四十年。标普 500 指数从 1982 年 8 月的低点 102 点,上涨至 2022 年初的 4796 点,年复合回报率达 10.3%。这是多么了不起的一段时期!能亲身参与其中,是金融和投资职业生涯中再大的幸运不过了。
一股不可思议的顺风
过去四十年推动投资者成功的因素有哪些?我们看到了(a)美国的经济增长和卓越地位;(b)我们最伟大公司的惊人表现;(c)技术、生产力和管理技巧的进步;以及(d)全球化带来的益处。然而,如果说长达四十年的利率下降并未在其中扮演最大角色,我会感到意外。
一股强大的顺风
过去 40 年推动投资者成功的因素有哪些?我们看到了以下主要贡献:(a)美国的经济增长和卓越地位;(b)那些伟大公司的非凡表现;(c)技术、生产力和管理方法的进步;(d)全球化的益处。不过,如果 40 年的利率下降没有起到最关键的作用,我会感到意外。
However, the most important aspect of this change didn’t relate to high yield bonds, or to private equity, but rather to the adoption of a new investor mentality. Now risk wasn’t necessarily avoided, but rather considered relative to return and hopefully borne intelligently. This new risk/return mindset was critical in the development of many new types of investment, such as distressed debt, mortgage backed securities, structured credit, and private lending. It’s no exaggeration to say today’s investment world bears almost no resemblance to that of 50 years ago. Young people joining the industry today would likely be shocked to learn that, back then, investors didn’t think in risk/return terms. Now that’s all we do. Ergo, a sea change. At roughly the same time, big changes were underway in the macroeconomic world. I think it all started with the OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74, which caused the price of a barrel of oil to jump from roughly $24 to almost $65 in less than a year. This spike raised the cost of many goods and ignited rapid inflation. Because the U.S. private sector in the 1970s was much more unionized than it is now and many collective bargaining agreements contained automatic cost-of-living adjustments, rising inflation triggered wage increases, which exacerbated inflation and led to yet more wage increases. This seemingly unstoppable upward spiral kindled strong inflationary expectations, which in many cases became selffulfilling, as is their nature. The year-over-year increase in the Consumer Price Index, which was 3.2% in 1972, rose to 11.0% by 1974, receded to the range of 6-9% for four years, and then rebounded to 11.4% in 1979 and 13.5% in 1980. There was great despair, as no relief was forthcoming from inflation-fighting tools ranging from WIN (“Whip Inflation Now”) buttons to price controls to a federal funds rate that reached 13% in 1974. It took the appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed chairman in 1979 and the determination he showed in raising the fed funds rate to 20% in 1980 to get inflation under control and extinguish inflationary psychology. As a result, inflation was back down to 3.2% by the end of 1983. Volcker’s success in bringing inflation under control allowed the Fed to reduce the fed funds rate to the high single digits and keep it there over the rest of the 1980s, before dropping it to the mid-single digits in the ’90s. His actions ushered in a declining-interest-rate environment that prevailed for four decades (much more on this in the section that follows). I consider this the second sea change I’ve seen in my career. The long-term decline in interest rates began just a few years after the advent of risk/return thinking, and I view the combination of the two as having given rise to (a) the rebirth of optimism among investors, (b) the pursuit of profit through aggressive investment vehicles, and (c) an incredible four decades for the stock market. The S&P 500 Index rose from a low of 102 in August 1982 to 4,796 at the beginning of 2022, for a compound annual return of 10.3% per year. What a period! There can be no greater financial and investment career luck than to have participated in it. An Incredible Tailwind What are the factors that gave rise to investors’ success over the last 40 years? We saw major contributions from (a) the economic growth and preeminence of the U.S.; (b) the incredible performance of our greatest companies; (c) gains in technology, productivity and management techniques; and (d) the benefits of globalization. However, I’d be surprised if 40 years of declining interest rates didn’t play the greatest role of all.
2022 年橡树资本管理有限公司
2022 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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20 世纪 70 年代,我从芝加哥一家银行贷款,利率为“基准利率上浮 0.75%”。(如今我们很少听到基准利率这个词了,但在当时它是衡量银行贷款给最优质客户的标准利率——也就是 LIBOR 的前身。)每次利率变动,银行都会寄来通知,我把 1980 年 12 月那份利率达到高点的通知裱了起来:上面写明我的贷款利率已升至 22.25%!四十年后,我竟能以 2.25% 的固定利率借款 10 年。这意味着利率下降了 2000 个基点。简直堪称奇迹!
利率下降会带来哪些影响?
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In the 1970s, I had a loan from a Chicago bank, with an interest rate of “three-quarters over prime.” (We don’t hear much about the prime rate anymore, but it was the benchmark interest rate – the predecessor of LIBOR – at which the money-center banks would lend to their best customers.) I received a notice from the bank each time my rate changed, and I framed the one that marked the high point in December 1980: It told me the interest rate on my loan had risen to 22.25%! Four decades later, I was able to borrow at just 2.25%, fixed for 10 years. This represented a decline of 2,000 basis points. Miraculous! What are the effects of declining interest rates? • • • •
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它们通过让消费者以信贷方式购物、企业投资设施、设备和库存的成本更低,加速了经济增长。
它们向借款人提供补贴(以贷款人和储户的损失为代价)。
它们降低了企业的资本成本,从而提升了盈利能力。
它们提高了资产的公允价值。(资产的理论价值定义为未来现金流量的折现现值。折现率越低,现值越高。)因此,随着利率下降,市盈率和企业价值等估值参数上升,房地产的资本化率下降。
它们降低了投资者对考虑中投资所要求的预期回报,从而推高了他们愿意支付的价格。这一点在债券市场体现得最为直接——众所周知“利率降,价格升”——但在整个投资领域都同样适用。
通过抬高资产价格,它们制造了一种“财富效应”,让人们感觉更富有,因而更愿意消费。
最后,通过同时提升资产价值和降低借贷成本,它们为那些用杠杆购买资产的人带来了滚滚财源。
They accelerate the growth of the economy by making it cheaper for consumers to buy on credit and for companies to invest in facilities, equipment, and inventory. They provide a subsidy to borrowers (at the expense of lenders and savers). They reduce businesses’ cost of capital and thus increase their profitability. They increase the fair value of assets. (The theoretical value of an asset is defined as the discounted present value of its future cash flows. The lower the discount rate, the higher the present value.) Thus, as interest rates fall, valuation parameters such as p/e ratios and enterprise values rise, and cap rates on real estate decline. They reduce the prospective returns investors demand from investments they’re considering, thereby increasing the prices they’ll pay. This can be seen most directly in the bond market – everyone knows it’s “rates down; prices up” – but it works throughout the investment world. By lifting asset prices, they create a “wealth effect” that makes people feel richer and thus more willing to spend. Finally, by simultaneously increasing asset values and reducing borrowing costs, they produce a bonanza for those who buy assets using leverage.
我想花更多时间谈谈最后一点。试想一位在利率下降环境中使用杠杆的买家:
I want to spend more time on that last point. Think about a buyer who employs leverage in a decliningrate environment: • • • •
他分析一家公司,得出每年能赚 10% 的结论,于是决定买入。然后他问资本市场主管,借 75% 的资金要花多少成本。当得知是 8% 时,就全速推进。用借来的 75% 资本赚 10%,同时按 8% 付息,会把另外 25%(他自己的股本)的回报杠杆化到 16%。银行争着放贷,结果利率从 8% 降到 7%,让这笔投资更赚钱(杠杆后回报 19%)。他的浮动利率债务利息成本随时间下降,当固定利率债务到期时,他发现自己能以 5% 的利率续借。现在这笔交易成了大满贯(杠杆后回报 25%,其他条件不变)。
He analyzes a company, concludes that he can make 10% a year on it, and decides to buy it. Then he asks his head of capital markets how much it would cost to borrow 75% of the money. When he’s told it’s 8%, it’s full speed ahead. Earning 10% on three-quarters of the capital that’s borrowed at 8% would lever up the return on the other one-quarter (his equity) to 16%. Banks compete to make the loan, and the result is an interest rate of 7% instead of 8%, making the investment even more profitable (a 19% levered return). The interest cost on his floating-rate debt declines over time, and when his fixed-rate debt matures, he finds he can roll it over at 5%. Now the deal is a home run (a 25% levered return, all else being equal).
这段叙述忽略了一个事实:利率下降既提升了被他收购企业的盈利能力,也推高了该企业的市场价值。那么,私人股本和其他杠杆策略在过去 40 年里大获成功,还有什么好奇怪的呢?
最近一次拜访客户时,我想出一个比喻来表达我对长期利率下降影响的看法:有些机场设有自动人行道,站在上面能让疲惫的旅客省力不少。但如果你不在上面站着不动,而是按平常步伐行走,你会前进得飞快。因为你对地面的移动速度,等于你步行的速度加上人行道运行速度的总和。
This narrative ignores the beneficial impact of declining interest rates on both the profitability of the company he bought and the market value of that company. Is it any wonder then that private equity and other levered strategies enjoyed great success over the last 40 years? In a recent visit with clients, I came up with a bit of imagery to convey my view of the effect of the prolonged decline in interest rates: At some airports, there’s a moving walkway, and standing on it makes life easier for the weary traveler. But if rather than stand still on it, you walk at your normal pace, you move ahead rapidly. That’s because your rate of travel over the ground is the sum of the speed at which you’re walking plus the speed at which the walkway is moving.
2022 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2022 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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这就是我认为过去 40 年投资者所经历的情况。他们享受了经济增长和所投资公司的成长,以及由此带来的持股价值上升。但除此之外,他们还站在一条移动人行道上,被利率下行一路托举向前。结果相当辉煌,但我怀疑没多少人真正想明白收益从何而来。在我看来,这一时期投资者赚到的所有钱,有很大一部分来自利率大幅下降所催生的顺风。我几乎认为,再怎么强调过去四十年利率下行的影响都不为过。
近期经历
2009 年底全球金融危机结束到 2020 年初疫情爆发之间,这段时期以超低利率为标志,宏观环境及其影响极为罕见。
2008 年底,美联储为将经济拉出全球金融危机泥潭,将联邦基金利率降至接近零,利率创下历史新低。低利率伴随量化宽松:美联储通过购买债券向经济注入流动性(或许也是为了防止投资者恐慌)。影响十分显著:
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That’s what I think happened to investors over the last 40 years. They enjoyed the growth of the economy and the companies they invested in, as well as the resulting increase in the value of their ownership stakes. But in addition, they were on a moving walkway, carried along by declining interest rates. The results have been great, but I doubt many people fully understand where they came from. It seems to me that a significant portion of all the money investors made over this period resulted from the tailwind generated by the massive drop in interest rates. I consider it nearly impossible to overstate the influence of declining rates over the last four decades. The Recent Experience The period between the end of the Global Financial Crisis in late 2009 and the onset of the pandemic in early 2020 was marked by ultra-low interest rates, and the macroeconomic environment – and its effects – were highly unusual. An all-time low in interest rates was reached when the Fed cut the fed funds rate to approximately zero in late 2008 in an effort to pull the economy out of the GFC. The low rates were accompanied by quantitative easing: purchases of bonds undertaken by the Fed to inject liquidity into the economy (and perhaps to keep investors from panicking). The effects were dramatic: • • •
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低利率和充裕的流动性刺激了经济,并引发市场爆炸性上涨。
强劲的经济增长和更低的利息成本增厚了企业利润。
如上所述,估值参数抬升,推高了资产价格。股市持续上涨超过十年,其间仅有几次持续数月的短暂回调。标普 500 指数从 2009 年 3 月的低点 667 点一路攀升至 2020 年 2 月的高点 3386 点,年复合回报率达 16%。
市场走强让投资者早早抛弃了由危机催生的避险情绪,比预期更迅速地重新拥抱风险。它还让 FOMO——错失恐惧症——成为投资者中弥漫的主流情绪。买家急于入场,持有者也不愿卖出。
投资者重新燃起的购买欲望让资本市场重新开放,企业融资变得便宜又便捷。放贷方急于把钱投出去,使得借款方能在约束更少的条款下享受低利率,而这些条款削弱了对放贷方的保护。安全投资回报微薄,逼着投资者转向风险更高的资产。
得益于经济增长和充裕的流动性,违约和破产案例寥寥无几。
主要的外部影响因素是全球化的推进和全球武装冲突的有限范围,这两者都显然是有益的。
The low rates and vast amounts of liquidity stimulated the economy and triggered explosive gains in the markets. Strong economic growth and lower interest costs added to corporate profits. Valuation parameters rose, as described above, lifting asset prices. Stocks increased non-stop for more than ten years, except for a handful of downdrafts that each lasted a few months. From a low of 667 in March 2009, the S&P 500 reached a high of 3,386 in February 2020, for a compound return of 16% per year. The markets’ strength encouraged investors to drop their crisis-inspired risk aversion and return to risk taking much sooner than expected. It also made FOMO – the fear of missing out – the prevalent emotion among investors. Buyers were eager to buy, and holders weren’t motivated to sell. Investors’ revived desire to buy caused the capital markets to reopen, making it cheap and easy for companies to obtain financing. Lenders’ eagerness to put money to work enabled borrowers to pay low interest rates under less-restrictive documentation that reduced lender protections. The paltry yields on safe investments drove investors to buy riskier assets. Thanks to economic growth and plentiful liquidity, there were few defaults and bankruptcies. The main exogenous influences were increasing globalization and the limited extent of armed conflict around the world. Both influences were clearly salutary.
因此,在这段时期里,美国经历了历史上最长的经济复苏(尽管也是最缓慢的复苏之一),以及最长的牛市,两者都超过了十年。
当新冠疫情导致全球大部分经济停摆时,美联储掸去了金融海啸期间耗时数月才制定并实施的那套救助计划的灰尘,在几周内就将其付诸实施,且规模远超前版。美国政府也通过贷款和巨额救济金(在惯常的赤字支出之外)插了一手。结果,从 2020 年 3 月到 2021 年底这段时期,前文列举的金融危机后的种种发展完全重演了一遍。
As a result, in this period, the U.S. enjoyed its longest economic recovery in history (albeit also one of its slowest) and its longest bull market, exceeding ten years in both cases. When the Covid-19 pandemic caused much of the world’s economy to be shut down, the Fed dusted off the rescue plan that had taken months to formulate and implement during the GFC and put it into effect in a matter of weeks at a much larger scale than its earlier version. The U.S. government chipped in with loans and vast relief payments (on top of its customary deficit spending). The result in the period from March 2020 to the end of 2021 was a complete replay of the post-GFC developments enumerated above,
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包括一次快速的经济反弹和更为迅速的市场复苏。(标普 500 指数从 2020 年 3 月的低点 2237 点升至 2022 年第一天的 4796 点,不到两年时间上涨了 114%。)
在感觉漫长得如同永恒的一段时间里——从 2012 年 10 月到 2020 年 2 月——我的标准演讲题目一直是“投资于低回报世界”,因为那正是我们所处的环境。当时许多资产类别(尤其是信贷)的预期回报处于历史低位,我列举了投资者可用的主要选择:
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including a quick economic bounce and an even quicker market recovery. (The S&P 500 rose from its low of 2,237 in March 2020 to 4,796 on the first day of 2022, up 114% in less than two years.) For what felt like eons – from October 2012 to February 2020 – my standard presentation was titled “Investing in a Low Return World,” because that’s what our circumstances were. With the prospective returns on many asset classes – especially credit – at all-time lows, I enumerated the principal options available to investors: • • • •
按你以前的方式继续投资,接受回报率会比以往低的现实;
降低风险,为市场回调做准备,同时接受更低的回报;
持有现金,获取零收益,寄希望于市场下跌从而提供更高回报(而且还得赶紧行动);或者
加大风险,追求更高的回报。
invest as you previously have, and accept that your returns will be lower than they used to be; reduce risk to prepare for a market correction, and accept a return that is lower still; go to cash and earn a return of zero, hoping the market will decline and thus offer higher returns (and do it soon); or ramp up your risk in pursuit of higher returns.
这些选择各有其严重缺陷,原因也很充分。在低回报时代,要可靠且安全地获得良好回报,本就困难重重。
我的备忘录的长期读者都知道,我对投资环境的观察主要基于印象与推断,而非数据。因此,在近期的会议中,我一直在用以下一系列特征来描述当前这段时期。(不妨想想你是否认同这一描述。我稍后会再回到这个话题。)
Each of these choices had serious flaws, and there’s a good reason for that. By definition, it’s hard to achieve good returns dependably and safely in a low-return world. Regular readers of my memos know that my observations regarding the investment environment are primarily based on impressions and inferences rather than data. Thus, in recent meetings, I’ve been using the following list of properties to describe the period in question. (Think about whether you agree with this description. I’ll return to it later.)
2009 年至 2021 年
美联储行为
通货膨胀
经济展望
困境可能性
市场情绪
买方
持有方
主要担忧
风险厌恶
信贷窗口
融资
利率
收益率利差
预期回报
2009 to 2021 Fed behavior Inflation Economic outlook Likelihood of distress Mood Buyers Holders Key worry Risk aversion Credit window Financing Interest rates Yield spreads Prospective returns
高度刺激
休眠
积极
极小
乐观
渴望
自满
FOMO(错失恐惧症)
缺席
完全开放
充足
史上最低
温和
史上最低
Highly stimulative Dormant Positive Minimal Optimistic Eager Complacent FOMO Absent Wide open Plentiful Lowest ever Modest Lowest ever
2009 年到 2021 年的整个时期(2020 年少数几个月除外),投资者群体中乐观情绪占上风,担忧几乎不见踪影。低通胀让中央银行得以维持宽松的货币政策。对企业和资产来说,这是一段黄金时光。
The overall period from 2009 through 2021 (with the exception of a few months in 2020) was one in which optimism prevailed among investors and worry was minimal. Low inflation allowed central bankers to maintain generous monetary policies. These were golden times for corporations and asset
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股东们,得益于良好的经济增长、廉价易得的资本以及免于困境的自由,我们得以受益。
这是一个资产持有者的市场,也是借款人的市场。无风险利率为零,损失恐惧消失,人们急于进行风险投资,对于贷款人和寻找廉价资产的投资者而言,这是一个令人沮丧的时期。
在最近与客户的会面中,我一直在说,橡树资本在 2009 年至 2019 年期间“身处荒野”,因为我们专注于信贷,并且高度重视价值投资和风险控制。举例来说,在 2007-08 年筹集了我们当时规模最大的基金,并在雷曼兄弟破产后成功地将其大部分资金投入使用后,鉴于投资环境,我们认为将后续基金的规模减半,再后续基金再减半是合适的。橡树资本在此期间的管理总资产增长相对缓慢,我们大多数封闭式基金的回报虽然不错,但按我们的标准来看,只能算是温和。这感觉像是一场漫长的苦战。
那是过去。这是现在。
当然,以上所有情况在过去一年左右发生了逆转。最重要的是,通货膨胀在 2021 年初开始抬头,当时我们摆脱隔离,导致过多的资金(居家隔离者积累的储蓄,包括大规模新冠疫情救助计划的分配)追逐过少的商品和服务(供应因制造业和交通运输的不均衡重启而受阻)。由于美联储认为通胀是“暂时性的”,它继续推行低利率和量化宽松政策,保持货币宽松。这些政策在需求不需要刺激的时候,进一步刺激了需求(尤其是对住房的需求)。
随着 2021 年的推移,通胀加剧,到年底,美联储承认通胀不太可能是短暂的。因此,美联储在 11 月开始减少债券购买,并于 2022 年 3 月开始加息,开启了有记录以来最快的加息周期之一。股市在 2021 年大部分时间里忽视了通胀和利率上升,临近年底时开始下跌。
此后,事件沿着可预测的轨迹发展。正如我在 2016 年 1 月的备忘录《在沙发上》中所写,现实世界中的事件在“相当不错”和“不那么火热”之间波动,而投资者的情绪往往在“完美无瑕”和“绝望透顶”之间摇摆,因为之前被视为温和的事件现在被解读为灾难性的。
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owners thanks to good economic growth, cheap and easily accessible capital, and freedom from distress. This was an asset owner’s market and a borrower’s market. With the risk-free rate at zero, fear of loss absent, and people eager to make risky investments, it was a frustrating period for lenders and bargain hunters. On recent visits with clients, I’ve been describing Oaktree as having spent the years 2009 through 2019 “in the wilderness” given our focus on credit and our heavy emphasis on value investing and risk control. To illustrate, after raising our largest fund up to that time in 2007-08 and putting most of it to work very successfully in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, we thought it appropriate, given the investment environment, to cut the amount in half for its successor fund and halve it again for the fund after that. Oaktree’s total assets under management grew relatively little during this period, and the returns on most of our closed-end funds, although fine, were moderate by our standards. It felt like a long slog. That Was Then. This Is Now. Of course, all of the above flipped in the last year or so. Most importantly, inflation began to rear its head in early 2021, when our emergence from isolation permitted too much money (savings amassed by people shut in at home, including distributions from massive Covid-19 relief programs) to chase too few goods and services (with supply hampered by the uneven restart of manufacturing and transportation). Because the Fed deemed the inflation “transitory,” it continued its policies of low interest rates and quantitative easing, keeping money loose. These policies further stimulated demand (especially for homes) at a time when it didn’t need stimulating. Inflation worsened as 2021 wore on, and late in the year, the Fed acknowledged that it wasn’t likely to be short-lived. Thus, the Fed started reducing its purchases of bonds in November and began raising interest rates in March 2022, kicking off one of the quickest rate-hiking cycles on record. The stock market, which had ignored inflation and rising interest rates for most of 2021, began to fall around year-end. From there, events followed a predictable course. As I wrote in the memo On the Couch (January 2016), whereas events in the real world fluctuate between “pretty good” and “not so hot,” investor sentiment often careens from “flawless” to “hopeless” as events that were previously viewed as benign come to be interpreted as catastrophic. • • • • • • •
利率上升,要求的回报也随之提高。因此,当初在低利率环境下看似估值合理的股票,如今市盈率跌至与高利率相匹配的水平。
同理,利率的大幅攀升也对债券价格产生了惯常的抑制作用。股市和债市双双下跌,令“错失恐惧”消散,取而代之的是对亏损的担忧。
市场跌势加剧,2020 年和 2021 年表现最佳的东西(科技股、软件、SPAC、加密货币)如今跌得最惨,进一步打击了市场心理。
外部事件有能力动摇市场情绪,尤其在艰难时期,而 2022 年最大的此类事件当属俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。乌克兰冲突减少了粮食和油气的供应,加剧了通胀压力。
由于收紧货币政策旨在为经济降温,投资者关注的是美联储实现软着陆的难度,因此衰退的可能性极大。
Higher interest rates led to higher demanded returns. Thus, stocks that had seemed fairly valued when interest rates were minimal fell to lower p/e ratios that were commensurate with higher rates. Likewise, the massive increase in interest rates had its usual depressing effect on bond prices. Falling stock and bond prices caused FOMO to dry up and fear of loss to replace it. The markets’ decline gathered steam, and the things that had done best in 2020 and 2021 (tech, software, SPACs, and cryptocurrency) now did the worst, further dampening psychology. Exogenous events have the ability to undercut the market’s mood, especially in tougher times, and in 2022 the biggest such event was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Ukraine conflict reduced supplies of grain and oil & gas, adding to inflationary pressures. Since the tighter monetary policies were designed to slow the economy, investors focused on the difficulty the Fed would likely have achieving a soft landing, and thus the strong likelihood of a recession.
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对衰退的预期及其对盈利的影响,浇灭了投资者的热情。因此,标普 500 指数在 2022 年头九个月的跌幅,堪比上世纪最严重的全年跌幅。(如今已回升不少。)衰退预期还加剧了对债务违约上升的担忧,新股发行变得困难重重。银行此前在低利率环境下承诺为收购提供融资,如今却发现手中积压了数十亿美元的“悬空”过桥贷款,按面值无法出售。这些贷款让银行背负了巨额亏损。这些悬空贷款迫使银行缩减可用于新交易的资金规模,令收购方更难获得融资。
The anticipated effect of that recession on earnings dampened investors’ spirits. Thus, the fall of the S&P 500 over the first nine months of 2022 rivaled the greatest full-year declines of the last century. (It has now recovered a fair bit.) The expectation of a recession also increased the fear of rising debt defaults. New security issuance became difficult. Having committed to fund buyouts in a lower-interest-rate environment, banks found themselves with many billions of dollars of “hung” bridge loans unsaleable at par. These loans have saddled the banks with big losses. These hung loans forced banks to reduce the amounts they could commit to new deals, making it harder for buyers to finance acquisitions.
上述一系列事态的发展,让悲观情绪取代了乐观情绪。那个以宽松资金、乐观的借款人和资产持有者为特征的市场消失了;如今,放贷方和买方占据了更有利的位置。信贷投资者得以要求更高的回报和更完善的债权人保护。陷入困境的候选名单——即收益率较美国国债高出超过 1000 个基点的贷款和债券——从几十个增长到了数百个。在我眼中,环境的变化是这样的:
The progression of events described above caused pessimism to take over from optimism. The market characterized by easy money and upbeat borrowers and asset owners disappeared; now lenders and buyers held better cards. Credit investors became able to demand higher returns and better creditor protections. The list of candidates for distress – loans and bonds offering yield spreads of more than 1,000 basis points over Treasurys – grew from dozens to hundreds. Here’s how the change in the environment looks to me:
美联储行为
通货膨胀
经济前景
困境可能性
市场情绪
买家
持有者
主要担忧
风险规避
信贷窗口
融资
利率
收益率利差
预期回报
Fed behavior Inflation Economic outlook Likelihood of distress Mood Buyers Holders Key worry Risk aversion Credit window Financing Interest rates Yield spreads Prospective returns
2009 to 2021
2009 to 2021
Today
Today
高度刺激
休眠
正面
极小
乐观
急切
自满
错失恐惧症(FOMO)
缺席
全面开放
充裕
历史最低
温和
历史最低
Highly stimulative Dormant Positive Minimal Optimistic Eager Complacent FOMO Absent Wide open Plentiful Lowest ever Modest Lowest ever
紧缩
40 年新高
衰退可能
上升
谨慎
犹豫
不确定
投资亏损
上升
紧缩
稀缺
回归常态
常态
远超充裕
Tightening 40-year high Recession likely Rising Guarded Hesitant Uncertain Investment losses Rising Constricted Scarce More normal Normal More than ample
如果右侧一栏如实描述了新的环境(我相信确实如此),那么我们正在目睹的,就是中间一栏所列条件被彻底逆转。那些条件在 2021 年和 2020 年末盛行,在 2009 至 2019 年期间,乃至过去 40 年的大部分时间里一直占据主导。
If the right-hand column accurately describes the new environment, as I believe it does, then we’re witnessing a complete reversal of the conditions in the middle column, which prevailed in 2021 and late 2020, throughout the 2009-19 period, and for much of the last 40 years. How has this change manifested itself in investment options? Here’s one example: In the low-return world of just one year ago, high yield bonds offered yields of 4-5%. A lot of issuance was at yields in the 3s, and at least one new bond came to the market with a “handle” of 2. The usefulness of these bonds for institutions needing returns of 6 or 7% was quite limited. Today these securities yield roughly 8%,
这一变化在投资选择中是如何体现的?举一个例子:就在一年前的低回报世界里,高收益债券的收益率是 4% 到 5%。大量新发行债券的收益率在 3% 左右,至少有一只新债以 2% 的“开头数字”面市。对于那些需要 6% 或 7% 回报率的机构来说,这些债券的用处相当有限。如今,这些证券的收益率约为 8%,意味着即使考虑到一些违约,它们也很可能带来类似股票的回报,而且这些回报源自公开证券的合同现金流。各类信贷工具潜在的表现,都可能帮助投资者实现其目标。
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通胀和利率在未来几年里,极有可能继续成为左右投资环境的主导因素。尽管历史表明,没有人能预测通胀,但它似乎很可能高于我们在全球金融危机后习以为常的水平,至少在一段时间内如此。利率的走向将在很大程度上取决于美联储在控制通胀方面取得的进展。如果在这一过程中利率大幅走高,之后很可能会回落,但没有人能预测回落的时间和幅度。
meaning even after allowing for some defaults, they’re likely to deliver equity-like returns, sourced from contractual cash flows on public securities. Credit instruments of all kinds are potentially poised to deliver performance that can help investors accomplish their goals. The Outlook Inflation and interest rates are highly likely to remain the dominant considerations influencing the investment environment for the next several years. While history shows that no one can predict inflation, it seems likely to remain higher than what we became used to after the GFC, at least for a while. The course of interest rates will largely be determined by the Fed’s progress in bringing inflation under control. If rates go much higher in that process, they’re likely to come back down afterward, but no one can predict the timing or the extent of the decrease. While everyone knows how little I think of macro forecasts, a number of clients have asked recently about my views regarding the future of interest rates. Thus, I’ll provide a brief overview. (Oaktree’s investment philosophy doesn’t prohibit having opinions, just acting as if they’re right.) In my view, the buyers who’ve driven the S&P 500’s recent 10% rally from the October low have been motivated by their beliefs that (a) inflation is easing, (b) the Fed will soon pivot from restrictive policy back toward stimulative, (c) interest rates will return to lower levels, (d) a recession will be averted, or it will be modest and brief, and (e) the economy and markets will return to halcyon days. In contrast, here’s what I think: • • •
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虽然大家都知道我对宏观预测有多么不以为然,但最近不少客户问我,对未来利率走势有何看法。因此,我简单谈谈。(橡树资本的投资理念并不禁止持有观点,只是禁止把观点当成既定事实来行事。)在我看来,推动标普 500 指数自 10 月低点近期上涨 10% 的买家,其动力来自以下信念:(a)通胀正在缓解;(b)美联储很快将从紧缩政策转向刺激政策;(c)利率将回到较低水平;(d)经济衰退将被避免,或者即便发生,也是温和而短暂的;(e)经济和市场将重回太平盛世。
The underlying causes of today’s inflation will probably abate as relief-swollen savings are spent and as supply catches up with demand. While some recent inflation readings have been encouraging in this regard, the labor market is still very tight, wages are rising, and the economy is growing strongly. Globalization is slowing or reversing. If this trend continues, we will lose its significant deflationary influence. (Importantly, consumer durables prices declined by 40% over the years 1995-2020, no doubt thanks to less-expensive imports. I estimate that this took 0.6% per year off the rate of inflation.) Before declaring victory on inflation, the Fed will need to be convinced not only that inflation has settled near the 2% target, but also that inflationary psychology has been extinguished. To accomplish this, the Fed will likely want to see a positive real fed funds rate – at present it’s minus 2.2%. Thus, while the Fed appears likely to slow the pace of its interest rate increases, it’s unlikely to return to stimulative policies any time soon. The Fed has to maintain credibility (or regain it after having claimed for too long that inflation was “transitory”). It can’t appear to be inconstant by becoming stimulative too soon after having turned restrictive. The Fed faces the question of what to do about its balance sheet, which grew from $4 trillion to almost $9 trillion due to its purchases of bonds. Allowing its holdings of bonds to mature and roll off (or, somewhat less likely, making sales) would withdraw significant liquidity from the economy, restricting growth. Rather than be in a stimulative posture on a perpetual basis, one might imagine the Fed would prefer to normally maintain a “neutral interest rate,” which is defined as neither stimulative nor restrictive. (I know I would.) Most recently – last summer – that rate was estimated at 2.5%.
与此形成对比的是,我的看法如下:
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- 随着疫情救济金撑起的超额储蓄被花掉、供应赶上需求,当前通胀的根源可能会逐渐消退。
- 尽管最近一些通胀数据在这方面令人鼓舞,但劳动力市场仍然非常紧张,工资在上涨,经济在强劲增长。
- 全球化正在放缓或逆转。如果这一趋势持续下去,我们将失去其显著的通货紧缩影响。(重要的是,1995 年至 2020 年间,耐用消费品价格下降了 40%,这无疑要归功于更便宜的进口商品。我估计,这每年使通胀率降低了 0.6 个百分点。)
- 在宣布战胜通胀之前,美联储不仅需要确信通胀已稳定在 2% 目标附近,还需要确信通胀心理已被消除。要做到这一点,美联储很可能希望看到实际联邦基金利率为正——目前该利率为负 2.2%。
- 因此,虽然美联储似乎可能放慢加息步伐,但短期内不太可能回归刺激政策。
- 美联储必须维持信誉(或者在长期宣称通胀是“暂时性”之后重新赢回信誉)。它不能刚转向紧缩,就过早地转向刺激,那样会显得反复无常。
- 美联储面临一个问题:如何处置其资产负债表。由于购买债券,其规模从 4 万亿美元膨胀到近 9 万亿美元。允许其持有的债券到期并自然退出(或者,可能性稍小一些,直接卖出),将大量抽走经济中的流动性,抑制增长。
- 与其永远保持刺激姿态,人们可以想象,美联储更愿意通常维持一个“中性利率”,即既不刺激也不紧缩的利率水平。(我知道我会这么做。)最近——就在去年夏天——这个利率被估计为 2.5%。
- 同样,尽管我们大多数人都相信自由市场是经济资源的最佳配置者,但十多年来,我们在货币领域并没有自由市场。美联储可能更愿意减少其在资本配置中的角色,减少对利率的管控和对抵押贷款债券的持有。
- 美联储长期维持刺激性利率,必然伴随着风险。可以说,我们最近已经看到,这样做可能引发通胀,尽管过去两年的通胀在很大程度上可归因于与疫情相关的一次性事件。
- 美联储很可能希望看到正常利率水平足够高,以便在未来需要刺激经济时有降息空间。
- 2008 年之后进入商界的人——或者记忆力不长的资深投资者——可能会认为当前的利率偏高。但放眼更长的历史,这些利率并不高,这意味着没有明显理由认为利率应该更低。
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基于这些原因,我相信未来几年的基准利率平均水平,更可能是 2% 到 4%(即与当前水平相差不远),而不是 0% 到 2%。当然,也有反面论点。但对我来说,底线是:除非出现需要我们紧急救援的严重衰退(而那本身又会带来一系列后果),否则未来几年极可能不会出现高度刺激性的利率。但我向您保证,橡树资本不会拿钱去赌这个判断。
Similarly, although most of us believe the free market is the best allocator of economic resources, we haven’t had a free market in money for well over a decade. The Fed might prefer to reduce its role in capital allocation by being less active in controlling rates and holding mortgage bonds. There must be risks associated with the Fed keeping interest rates stimulative on a long-term basis. Arguably, we’ve seen most recently that doing so can bring on inflation, though the inflation of the last two years can be attributed largely to one-off events related to the pandemic. The Fed would probably like to see normal interest rates high enough to provide it with room to cut if it needs to stimulate the economy in the future. People who came into the business world after 2008 – or veteran investors with short memories – might think of today’s interest rates as elevated. But they’re not in the longer sweep of history, meaning there’s no obvious reason why they should be lower.
我们确实知道的是,当前的通胀和利率分别高于过去 40 年和 13 年来的水平。没有人知道上面右侧一栏的描述还会准确多久。它们将受到经济增长、通胀和利率以及外部事件的影响,而所有这些都无法预测。无论如何,我认为未来几年的大环境总体上不会那么美好:
These are the reasons why I believe that the base interest rate over the next several years is more likely to average 2-4% (i.e., not far from where it is now) than 0-2%. Of course, there are counterarguments. But, for me, the bottom line is that highly stimulative rates are likely not in the cards for the next several years, barring a serious recession from which we need rescuing (and that would have ramifications of its own). But I assure you Oaktree isn’t going to bet money on that belief. What we do know is that inflation and interest rates are higher today than they’ve been for 40 and 13 years, respectively. No one knows how long the items in the right-hand column above will continue to accurately describe the environment. They’ll be influenced by economic growth, inflation, and interest rates, as well as exogenous events, all of which are unpredictable. Regardless, I think things will generally be less rosy in the years immediately ahead: • • • •
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- 未来 12 至 18 个月内出现经济衰退,在经济学家和投资者看来似乎已是定局。
- 那次衰退很可能会伴随企业盈利恶化和投资者心理恶化。
- 新融资的信贷市场条件似乎不太可能很快变得像近年来那样宽松。
- 没有人能预测债务违约率会升到多高,或在高位持续多久。在此背景下值得指出的是,1978 年至 2009 年间,高收益债券的年均违约率为 3.6%,而在 2010 至 2019 年这十年间“恰到好处”的条件下,违约率低至不寻常的 2.1%。事实上,那十年里只有一年的违约率达到历史平均水平。
- 最后,有一个预测我很有把握:利率不会从这里再下降 2000 个基点。
A recession in the next 12-18 months appears to be a foregone conclusion among economists and investors. That recession is likely to coincide with deterioration of corporate earnings and investor psychology. Credit market conditions for new financings seem unlikely to soon become as accommodative as they were in recent years. No one can foretell how high the debt default rate will rise or how long it’ll stay there. It’s worth noting in this context that the annual default rate on high yield bonds averaged 3.6% from 1978 through 2009, but an unusually low 2.1% under the “just-right” conditions that prevailed for the decade 2010-19. In fact, there was only one year in that decade in which defaults reached the historical average. Lastly, there is a forecast I’m confident of: Interest rates aren’t about to decline by another 2,000 basis points from here.
正如我多次在谈论经济和市场时写到的,我们永远不知道自己将走向何方,但我们应该知道自己身在何处。对我来说,底线在于:当前的条件在许多方面与上文描述的后金融危机环境截然不同——而且大多不如那时有利。这些变化可能持续很长时间,也可能随着时间推移而消退。但我认为,我们不太可能很快看到后金融危机时期那种乐观和轻松。
As I’ve written many times about the economy and markets, we never know where we’re going, but we ought to know where we are. The bottom line for me is that, in many ways, conditions at this moment are overwhelmingly different from – and mostly less favorable than – those of the post-GFC climate described above. These changes may be long-lasting, or they may wear off over time. But in my view, we’re unlikely to quickly see the same optimism and ease that marked the post-GFC period. We’ve gone from the low-return world of 2009-21 to a full-return world, and it may become more so in the near term. Investors can now potentially get solid returns from credit instruments, meaning they no longer have to rely as heavily on riskier investments to achieve their overall return targets. Lenders and bargain hunters face much better prospects in this changed environment than
我们已从 2009 至 2021 年的低回报世界,进入了一个全面回报的世界,而且短期内可能更加如此。投资者现在有可能从信贷工具中获得稳健回报,这意味着他们不再需要那么严重地依赖风险更高的投资来实现整体回报目标。在这种变化了的环境中,放贷者和寻便宜货的人面临的前景,比他们在 2009 至 2021 年间的处境要好得多。重要的是,如果您承认当前环境已经并且可能继续与过去 13 年——以及过去 40 年的大部分时间——截然不同,那么就应该得出结论:那些在过去时期表现最佳的投资策略,未必就是未来几年能跑赢的策略。
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这就是我所说的海变。
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2022 年 12 月 13 日
they did in 2009-21. And importantly, if you grant that the environment is and may continue to be very different from what it was over the last 13 years – and most of the last 40 years – it should follow that the investment strategies that worked best over those periods may not be the ones that outperform in the years ahead. That’s the sea change I’m talking about. December 13, 2022
2022 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2022 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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