我们该废除经济法则吗?
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
我们该废除经济规律吗?
Shall We Repeal the Laws of Economics?
几个月来,我一直在为写一份关于上述话题的备忘录积攒剪报,但像风险、债务、不确定性这类我最爱的话题一次次插队,把这份备忘录一再推迟,直到美国大选季全面拉开帷幕,让这个话题变得迫在眉睫。
和我一样,你肯定也注意到了,从前总统特朗普、副总统哈里斯到各级地方候选人,政客们又开始作出无视经济现实的承诺。特朗普呼吁加征关税,哈里斯抨击食品杂货业的牟利行为,不过是两个例子:前者会让候选人忽略的成本落到民众头上,后者则反映出对问题缺乏有意义的理解。当然,我的目的不是捧谁或踩谁,而是想说明,经济学里没有“免费的午餐”,尽管候选人信誓旦旦地说有。
背景
2016 年,在一场格外喧闹的总统大选如火如荼之际,我发表了两份跳出投资、放眼世界的备忘录,题目是《经济现实》和《政治现实》。第一份解释说,经济学很大程度上研究的是我们如何做选择——人们如何在各种可选方案之间分配有限的资源。第二份则指出,在政治领域——尤其是在竞选承诺的天地里——根本不存在“有限”这回事。正如我在《政治现实》里写的:
我一向爱看矛盾修辞法——那些自相矛盾的短语——比如“大虾米”和“常识”。我要把“政治现实”也加进这个清单。政治世界有它自己的一套变了样的现实,在那套现实里,经济现实似乎常常不起作用。不需要做什么选择:候选人可以把一切统统许诺下来。而且没有后果。如果某个政策在现实世界可能带来负面影响,政客们似乎可以心安理得地视而不见。
在那两份备忘录之后,2019 年我又写了一篇《政治现实遭遇经济现实》。它的主旨是:政客们可以随心所欲地许诺经济上的种种好处,但如果他们的承诺违背了经济现实,他们就兑现不了,因为归根结底,经济规律是不容置疑的。自由经济由数百万生产者与消费者、雇主与雇员、储户与投资者各自基于自身利益作出的决策所驱动。政府可以立法鼓励甚至强制某些行为,但一般说来,没法命令经济产出指定结果。经济体系里变数太多,二阶效应太多,政府通常既没法凭空造出繁荣,也没法精确造出政策制定者想要的那个经济结果。
历史上充斥着失败的指令经济。有证据可以证明这一点,其中甚至包含了科学方法所要求的“对照组”。八十年前,朝鲜是一个统一的国家。后来,二战结束,它一分为二,两边的居民、地理和资源显然都差不多:韩国(受美国影响)和朝鲜(受苏联影响)。此后,韩国一直按资本主义民主制度运转,朝鲜则是共产主义专制体制。两者几乎没有
For months, I’ve been saving up clippings for a memo on the above topic, but favorite subjects such as risk, debt, and uncertainty repeatedly jumped the queue, delaying my intended memo until the U.S. election season got into full swing, making it compelling. Like me, you’ve undoubtedly noticed that politicians ranging from former President Trump and Vice President Harris to down-ballot candidates are back to making promises that ignore economic reality. Trump’s call for tariffs and Harris’s attack on grocery profiteering are merely two examples of proposals that would impose costs the candidate ignores (in Trump’s case) or that fail to reflect a meaningful understanding of the problem (in Harris’s case). My purpose, of course, is not to promote or dismiss either candidate, but rather to illustrate that there is no “free lunch” in economics, despite candidates’ assertions to the contrary. The Background In 2016, with an unusually clamorous presidential election in full swing, I published two memos that strayed from investing into the world at large, called Economic Reality and Political Reality. The first explained that economics is largely the study of how we make choices – how people allocate finite resources among the available options. The second stated that in politics – and especially in the land of campaign promises – there’s no such thing as finiteness. As I wrote in Political Reality: I’ve always gotten a kick out of oxymorons – phrases that are internally contradictory – such as “jumbo shrimp” and “common sense.” I’ll add “political reality” to the list. The world of politics has its own, altered reality, in which economic reality often seems not to impinge. No choices need be made: candidates can promise it all. And there are no consequences. If something might have negative consequences in the real world, politicians seem to feel free to ignore them. I followed those two memos with one in 2019 entitled Political Reality Meets Economic Reality. Its main thrust was that politicians can promise whatever they want regarding the economy, but they won’t be able to deliver if their promises fly in the face of economic reality because, ultimately, the laws of economics are incontrovertible. Free economies are driven by self-interested decisions made by millions of producers and consumers, employers and employees, and savers and investors. Governments can pass laws designed to encourage or even compel behavior, but in general they can’t mandate economic outcomes. There are so many moving pieces and second-order consequences that governments generally can’t engineer both prosperity and the specific economic outcomes that policymakers may seek. History is littered with command economies that didn’t succeed. There’s proof for this that includes the “control group” required by the scientific method. Eighty years ago, Korea was a single country. Then, following World War II, it was split in two, obviously with similar people, geography and resources: South Korea (under U.S. influence), and North Korea (under Soviet influence). Since then, South Korea has operated as a capitalist democracy and North Korea as a communist dictatorship. There’s little
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
关于朝鲜的可靠经济数据很少,但根据中情局的《世界概况》,其按购买力计算的人均 GDP 估计为 2000 美元,而韩国为 5 万美元。朝鲜公民被描述为贫困,但至少它没有边境问题,因为没人试图偷渡过去。除了经济差异,还有政治分歧(民主与独裁),但我认为可以公平地说,资本主义赢了。
在讨论经济制度时,我常问人们,自第一次世界大战结束以来,美国经济一直占据优势地位,其公民平均生活水平更高,这该归功于什么?美国人更聪明吗?更勤奋吗?更应得吗?都不是。我确信,这是因为我们历来拥抱自由市场体系和资本主义。自由市场提供的激励,高效地将资本和其他资源引导到最能发挥生产力的地方。它们促使生产者制造人们最想要的商品,促使工人从事其产出价值最高的职业。它们还鼓励勤奋工作和冒险精神。结果是整个社会的生活水平提高,但当然不是每个人都获得同等程度的利益。由于激励与人们不同能力的相互作用,有些人比其他人做得好得多。还有些人因好运或继承的优势而繁荣,而非天生能力。自由市场体系未必在所有情况下产生“公平”的结果,但旨在实现公平的经济制度,通常无法提供鼓励集体福祉所需的经济生产力激励。这正是它们失败记录的根源。
8 月 15 日,媒体报道次日副总统哈里斯将宣布她的经济政策。大部分关注集中在她承诺禁止食品杂货行业哄抬物价上。“自 2019 年以来,食品杂货价格……已上涨 26%,据左倾智库罗斯福研究所特别项目主任伊丽莎白·潘科蒂称”(《华盛顿邮报》,8 月 15 日),许多选民表示通胀是他们最大的担忧。基于这些原因,哈里斯针对食品杂货价格的举动完全在预料之中。(讽刺的是,8 月 15 日也是美国通胀自 2021 年 3 月以来首次降至 3% 以下被报道的日子。)但我确信,这属于那种旨在吸引选民但基础不稳固且可能失败的简单化经济解决方案。
什么是哄抬物价?
哄抬物价通常被定义为卖方利用市场力量或暂时的供需失衡,将价格提高到原本不会出现的水平。食品价格在 2021 年和 2022 年确实大幅上涨,导致人们对食品零售商产生怀疑。但价格上涨是否可能有除卖方恶意决定哄抬之外的原因?以下是一些可能性:
•
•
•
reliable economic data regarding North Korea, but according to the CIA’s Worldbook, its GDP in purchasing power terms is estimated at $2,000 per person versus $50,000 in South Korea. North Korea’s citizens are described as impoverished, but at least it doesn’t have a border problem, since nobody’s trying to sneak in. There are political differences (democracy versus dictatorship) in addition to the economic ones, but I think it’s fair to say capitalism has won. In discussions of economic systems, I usually ask people what they think has been responsible for the economic preeminence the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of World War I, and thus for its citizens’ higher average standard of living. Are Americans smarter? Harder working? More deserving? None of the above. I’m confident it’s because of our historical embrace of the free-market system and capitalism. The incentives provided by free markets efficiently direct capital and other resources where they’ll be most productive. They prompt producers to make the goods people want most and workers to take the jobs where they’ll be most productive in terms of the value of their output. And they encourage hard work and risk taking. The result is a higher standard of living for society in general, but certainly not everyone benefits to the same degree. Thanks to the way incentives interact with people’s different abilities, some people do considerably better than others. Some also prosper thanks to good luck and/or inherited advantage, rather than innate ability. The free-market system doesn’t necessarily produce “fair” outcomes in all circumstances, but economic systems designed to do so generally don’t provide the incentives needed to encourage economic productivity for the collective good. That’s what accounts for their record of failure. On August 15, the media reported that the next day, Vice President Harris would announce her economic policies. The bulk of the attention went to her promise to ban price gouging in the grocery industry. “Grocery prices … have jumped 26 percent since 2019, according to Elizabeth Pancotti, director of special initiatives at the Roosevelt Institute, a left-leaning think tank” (The Washington Post, August 15), and many voters say inflation is their greatest concern. For this combination of reasons, Harris’s targeting of grocery prices is entirely predictable. (Ironically, August 15 was also the day U.S. inflation was reported to have fallen below 3% for the first time since March 2021.) I’m certain, however, that this falls under the heading of simplistic economic solutions that are designed to appeal to voters but are unsoundly based and likely to fail. What Is Price Gouging? Price gouging is generally defined as sellers taking advantage of market power or temporary supply/demand imbalances to raise prices to levels that otherwise wouldn’t prevail. And food prices did rise significantly in 2021 and 2022, leading to suspicion of food retailers. But might there be reasons for the price increases other than a malevolent decision to gouge on the part of sellers? Here are a few possibilities: • • •
2020 年 3 月疫情暴发时,大多数人待在家里自己做饭,对食品杂货的需求大幅攀升,库存随之告罄。生产体系被打乱,原材料要么短缺,要么分布地点与需求错位。这便引发了人们热议的“供应链问题”。商品供不应求——再加上过多资金追逐有限商品——正是通胀的经典成因。联邦政府向纳税人发放了巨额疫情救济金。领到补助的人数远超在疫情中蒙受财务损失的人数。这些人反而占了便宜,手里攥着数万亿美元留待日后开销。
When the pandemic began in March 2020, most people stayed home and cooked their own meals, significantly increasing the demand for groceries and depleting inventories. The production system was disrupted, with inputs in short supply or in the wrong places relative to the needs. This led to the much-discussed “supply-chain problems.” Too few goods – when coupled with too much money chasing them – constitute the classic reason for inflation. The federal government sent taxpayers massive amounts of Covid-19 relief. Many more people received benefits than had been hurt financially by the pandemic. Those people came out ahead, capturing trillions of dollars for future spending.
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
2
2
版权所有,保留一切权利。
All Rights Reserved
•
•
2021 年年中,德尔塔变种病毒出现,人们再次待在家里,避免与他人接触,购买的商品比平时更多,服务消费则更少。商品需求因此强劲,超出有限的供给,推动价格上涨。
When the Delta variant of Covid popped up in mid-2021, people again stayed home and shrunk from contact with others, spending more on goods and less on services than they otherwise might have. Demand for goods was strong as a result, outstripping the limited supplies and causing prices to rise.
超市行业的利润率很低——大约占销售额的 1% 到 2%——而在 2021-22 年,这个数字变化不大。那么,存在价格欺诈吗?如果涨价的原因真是欺诈,为什么偏偏在那几年发生,而不是更早?再看看今天的高价,能不能用欺诈之外的因素解释?《纽约时报》,一家很少替资本主义辩护的报纸,在 8 月 15 日写道:
堪萨斯城联邦储备银行的研究人员去年报告说,美国经济中快速的就业增长,以及随之而来的工资上涨,是食品杂货价格上涨的主要推手。
食品价格上涨由多重因素促成,其中许多与宏观经济相关。但归根结底,是当时的环境让食品销售商得以涨价,他们也确实这么做了。
涨价错了吗?
上述才是关键问题。价格欺诈的定义总离不开“不公平”“过高”“离谱”这类字眼。这些都是主观词汇,见仁见智,可以争论一番。
行为是否得当,通常取决于看的人是谁。卖家认为极其合理的涨价,在买家眼里就是欺诈。给欺诈下定义的难处,让我想起有人说:“我们不是要榨干富人,只是让他们交够该交的税。”我远不是说富人不该交“该交的税”,可这个“该交”的标准是什么,又由谁来定?同样,价格是否公道,由谁来判断,怎么判断?
超市把面包这种必需品涨价,算不算欺诈?答案是这事很复杂,也正是这种复杂性,让公平地监管价格变得困难。
•
•
•
Profit margins in the supermarket industry are low – about 1% to 2% of sales – and that changed only a little in 2021-22. So, was there gouging? And if gouging is the explanation for the price increases, why did it occur in those years, rather than sooner? Again, might today’s high prices be explained by something other than gouging? The New York Times, rarely a defender of capitalism, wrote the following on August 15: Researchers from the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City reported last year that rapid job growth in the U.S. economy, and the wage increases that came with it, were major contributors to rising grocery prices. A number of factors contributed to the increase in food prices, many of them linked to the macro economy. But the bottom line is that conditions allowed food sellers to raise prices, and they did so. Is Raising Prices Wrong? The above is the key question. Definitions of price gouging invariably include words like “unfair,” “excessive,” and “exorbitant.” These are subjective terms that are open to judgment and debate. The propriety of behavior with regard to these words is usually in the eye of the beholder. The seller’s highly reasonable price increase is the customer’s gouging. The difficulty of defining gouging reminds me of those who say, “we’re not out to soak the rich; we just want to make them pay their fair share in taxes.” I’m far from saying the rich shouldn’t pay their “fair share,” but what’s the standard for a fair share, and who gets to set it? In the same way, who determines whether prices are fair, and how? When a supermarket raises the price of a necessity like bread, is that gouging? The answer is that it’s complicated, and that’s what makes it hard to regulate prices fairly. • • • •
如果农民为化肥和人工支付了更高的成本,然后把小麦涨价卖给面包师,面包师把涨价转嫁给超市,以面包价格提高的形式体现,这公平吗?
如果面包师提高卖给超市的面包价格,超市把涨价转嫁给消费者,这有错吗?
如果超市的员工要求涨薪,超市能靠提高所售商品的售价来抵消增加的开支吗?
如果因为一部热门电视剧带火了三明治,导致需求上升,供应链上的人趁机提高面包价格,这算错吗?
If the farmer pays more for fertilizer and labor and then charges the baker more for wheat, can the baker fairly pass that on to the supermarket in the form of a higher price for bread? If the baker raises the price he charges the supermarket for bread, is it wrong for the supermarket to pass on the increase to the consumer? If the supermarket’s employees demand higher pay, can it offset the increase by raising the prices of the things it sells? If demand increases because a hit TV show popularizes sandwiches, is it wrong for people in the supply chain to take advantage and charge more for bread?
在自由市场中,价格由供需关系决定。商品和服务的提供者因供应减少或需求增加而提高价格,这本身是否有错?几个例子或许能说明这一问题的复杂性。
In a free market, prices are determined by supply and demand. Is it wrong per se for providers of goods and services to raise prices in response to reduced supply or increased demand? A few examples should make clear the complex nature of this question. •
优步在高峰时段实行“动态加价”,这时打车的人更多。这算不算不公平的做法?如果政府规定优步不许这么干,打车价格就会低于某些人愿意支付的水平,司机也拿不到原本能挣到的全额车费。而司机到手的费率可能还不够高,不足以让开车的时间值回票价。
Uber applies “surge pricing” during rush hour, when more people want rides. Is that an unfair practice? If the government says Uber mustn’t do so, that will make rides available at prices below what some people would pay and deprive drivers of the full fare they could otherwise collect. And the rate the drivers would then receive might not be high enough to justify the time
2024 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
3
3
版权所有,保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
•
•
•
•
•
•
他们被困在路上,意味着能应付高峰期需求的司机变少了,需要打车的人依然没人服务。这样更好吗?
如果泰勒·斯威夫特演唱会的 1000 张票以 100 美元一张出售,却有 3000 人排队购买,传递的信息是什么?很简单:票价太便宜了!演唱会主办方把价格提高到只剩 1000 人排队,算不公平吗?大概没几个人会这么说。但如果价格维持在 100 美元,前 1000 人把票买光,剩下的需求就得不到满足,这时买了票的人就能以高于 100 美元的价格转卖。利润落到了黄牛手里,他们以过低的价格拿到了票。这公平吗?如果把票价提高,差价归泰勒·斯威夫特所有,体现粉丝对她劳动的充分价值,岂不是更公平?
2021 年,当人们想搬离城市公寓,住房和建材供应紧张时,房价一路飙升。如果你 2019 年拥有一套价值 40 万美元的房子,疫情后要价 50 万美元,你的行为算不道德吗?政府该起诉那些给房子加价的人吗?
最后,当经济在 2021 年复苏,每个失业者对应多个职位空缺,工资水涨船高时,工人能对老板说:“我以后能找到更高薪水的工作。你不给我加薪,我就走人。”在员工谈判占上风的时候,政府该限制工资涨幅吗?2023 年秋,美国汽车工人联合会利用用工紧张带来的议价优势,从福特公司争取到“第一年加薪 11%,四年半合同期内总加薪 25%,5000 美元签约奖金,以及生活成本调整”(维基百科)。这是一笔巨额合约。这算不算敲竹杠?
they’d spend stuck in traffic, meaning fewer drivers would be available to handle the peak demand and people needing rides would remain unserved. Is that preferable? If 1,000 tickets for a Taylor Swift concert are put on sale at $100 and 3,000 people line up to buy them, what’s the message? Simple: they’re too cheap! Would it be unfair for the concert promoter to raise the price until there are just 1,000 people in line? Few people would say so. But if instead the price remains at $100 and the first 1,000 people buy them all, that leaves unmet demand, in which case those who bought the tickets would be able to resell them for more than $100. The profit would go to the resellers, who got their tickets at a price that was too low. Is that fair? Wouldn’t it be fairer if the ticket prices were raised and the increment went to Tay Tay, reflecting the full value her fans put on her labor? In 2021, when people wanted to leave their city apartments, and homes and building materials were in short supply, home prices shot upward. If you owned a home worth $400,000 in 2019 and asked $500,000 for it in the post-pandemic environment, was your behavior immoral? Should the government prosecute people who asked more for their homes? Lastly, when the economy sprung back to life in 2021 and there were multiple job openings per unemployed worker, making higher salaries attainable, workers were able to tell the boss, “I can get a higher salary down the road. If you don’t give me a raise, I’m leaving.” Should the government limit wage increases at a time when employees have an edge in negotiations? In the fall of 2023, the United Auto Workers union took advantage of the bargaining power caused by the tight labor conditions to extract from Ford “an 11% wage increase in the first year, and total 25% increase in wages over the 4.5 year contract, a $5,000 ratification bonus and a cost-of-living adjustment.” (Wikipedia) This was a huge package. Did it represent gouging?
以上每个例子都展示了一方利用供需关系,对自己提供的东西收取更高的价格。当然,它们的行为并非不正当,只是市场运作方式的体现。
另一种选择是由政府来裁决每起案件中的胜负。应该是优步司机还是乘客?演唱会观众还是表演者?房主还是购房者?工人还是雇主?许多人会不假思索地同情乘客、演唱会观众、购房者和工人,因为人们往往不太关心获利的一方:司机、流行歌手、房主和雇主。但如果政府偏向某一方,就会扭曲自由市场的运作,使其无法高效地为整个社会服务。关于这一点,稍后再谈。
有些卖方行为显然是错误的,包括合谋、价格垄断,以及旨在将竞争对手挤出市场的掠夺性定价。但禁止这些行为的法律早已存在。而试图禁止和惩罚那些被认为不公平、过高或离谱的涨价——而非源于不当行为的涨价——的额外法律,注定难以执行,而且适得其反。
反价格欺诈法会管用吗?
正如历史充满了失败的计划经济一样,它也证明了价格管制尝试的无效。1974 年,石油输出国组织的石油禁运引发通货膨胀,让数百万人的生活举步维艰,美国政府通过分发“WIN”徽章来应对,代表“立刻遏制通胀”。我还保留着自己的那枚徽章,但无论是它,还是原本应该随之而来的自愿消费者行动,都不足以阻止通胀在 1980 年达到 13.5%。这些徽章遭到嘲笑,据维基百科记载,一些怀疑者将它们倒着佩戴。“那样戴的话,‘NIM’就代表‘没有立刻的奇迹’、‘永不停歇的通胀旋转木马’,或‘急需现金’。”
Each of these examples shows one party taking advantage of supply/demand conditions to charge more for the thing they have to offer. But certainly, their actions aren’t illegitimate. They’re simply examples of how markets work. The alternative would be to have the government decide who should prevail in each case. Should it be the Uber driver or the passenger; the concertgoer or the performer; the homeowner or the homebuyer; the worker or the employer? Many have a knee-jerk tendency to sympathize with the passenger, concertgoer, homebuyer, and worker, as it’s easy to care less about the person who’s profiting: the driver, popstar, homeowner, and employer. But if the government puts its thumb on the scale in favor of one party or the other, it distorts the workings of the free market and keeps it from functioning efficiently on behalf of society overall. More on this later. There are forms of seller behavior that are clearly wrong. These include collusion, price fixing, and predatory pricing designed to drive competitors out of the market. But laws prohibiting these behaviors are already on the books. Additional laws designed to prohibit and punish price increases that someone views as unfair, excessive or exorbitant – as opposed to being the result of improper conduct – are sure to prove difficult to enforce and counter-productive. Would a Law Against Price Gouging Work? Just as history is full of failed command economies, it also shows the ineffectiveness of attempts to regulate prices. In 1974, when the OPEC oil embargo set off inflation that made life difficult for millions, the U.S. government countered by distributing “WIN” buttons, standing for Whip Inflation Now. I still have mine, but neither it nor the voluntary consumer actions that were supposed to follow were enough to keep inflation from reaching 13.5% in 1980. The buttons were derided, with some skeptics wearing them upside down, according to Wikipedia. “Worn that way, ‘NIM’ stood for ‘No Immediate Miracles,’ ‘Nonstop Inflation Merry-go-round,’ or ‘Need Immediate Money.’ ’’
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
4
4
版权所有,保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
价格管制的更近案例发生在委内瑞拉。我在《经济现实》(Economic Reality)中是这样写的:
一个典型的例子就是价格管制,其适用范围已扩大到越来越多的商品:食品和关键药品当然在内,但还有汽车电池、基本医疗服务、除臭剂、尿布,当然还有卫生纸。表面上的目标是抑制通胀,让穷人买得起生活必需品,但任何懂点经济学基本常识的人都能预见到后果:当价格被定在生产成本之下,卖家就没钱把货架补满。官方价格很低,但那是个幻象:商品已经消失了。(《大西洋月刊》,2016 年 5 月 12 日,着重号为后加)
接下来是个让人震惊的事实:你可以给商品定价,但你不能逼着人们去生产它们。这听起来很像经济现实。
这个例子说明了一个事实:官员们可能以为大笔一挥就能控制经济走向,但他们会被第二层后果拦住,而这些后果让他们的努力变得复杂。
想压低必需品的价格本身没有错。但最好的办法是鼓励增加供给。另一个办法是别向经济中注入过量流动性,把需求过度刺激起来。强制压低价格通常是达成目标最没用的手段。
趁这个机会,我想引用经济学家的一句老话:“解决高价格的最好办法就是高价格。”这不是开玩笑,远非如此。一般来说,高价格意味着需求相对于供给偏强。最终,那些高价格会促使生产者多生产、消费者少消费,两个方向对价格的压制作用都明摆着。我们经常在石油市场上看到这一点,仅举一例。
一个为监管食品价格而设的政府官僚机构很难成功,而且几乎肯定会带来负面效果。那么,价格管制就真的毫无可取之处吗?我能想到一个:那个新官僚机构里会多出成千上万个新岗位(虽然都是不产出的)。正如杰森·弗曼(Jason Furman),一位相对自由派的经济学家,对哈里斯的反哄抬价格举措所评价的那样:“这不是明智的政策,我认为最大的希望是它最终只停留在大量口号层面,落不到实处。”
另一个典型案例:租金管制
几个月前最初让我想到写这份备忘录的,是租金管制。我对此有亲身经历,1956 年我十岁时,曾住过一间月租 92 美元的公寓。
二战期间,联邦政府实施了租金管制,目的是在几乎没有新公寓楼在建、养家糊口的人都在前方打仗而非挣正常工资的情况下,不让家庭因房租过高而被迫搬出住所。纽约市公寓的租金被冻结在 1943 年的水平。在战时的特殊环境下,这或许是个好主意,但该计划战后并未被废除,至今仍约束着一些建于 80 多年前的公寓。而租金管制至今仍在严重扰乱纽约市公寓的供需关系。
总体而言,纽约市的租金管制规定,只要公寓还被 1971 年的老租户或与他们同住的亲属居住,就限制其租金涨幅。该法律当初是为了保护当时的住户而制定的,但后来,受管制的租金公寓被一代代传给了那些并非
There’s more recent experience with price controls, in Venezuela. Here’s what I said about it in Economic Reality: A case in point is the price controls, which have expanded to apply to more and more goods: food and vital medicines, yes, but also car batteries, essential medical services, deodorant, diapers, and, of course, toilet paper. The ostensible goal was to check inflation and keep goods affordable for the poor, but anyone with a basic grasp of economics could have foreseen the consequences: When prices are set below production costs, sellers can’t afford to keep the shelves stocked. Official prices are low, but it’s a mirage: The products have disappeared. (Atlantic Monthly, May 12, 2016, emphasis added) Here’s a shocker: you can set prices for goods, but you can’t make people produce them. That sounds a lot like economic reality. This is an example of the fact that officials may believe they can control economic developments with a stroke of the pen, but they’ll be thwarted by second-order consequences that complicate the effort. There’s nothing wrong with trying to bring down the cost of necessities. However, the best way to do this is to encourage additions to supply. Another way is to not overstimulate demand by injecting excessive liquidity into the economy. Mandating lower prices is generally the least effective way to get them. This is a good time for me to cite the economist’s adage that “the best solution for high prices is high prices.” This isn’t a joke; far from it. In general, high prices mean demand is strong relative to supply. Eventually, those high prices will encourage producers to produce more and consumers to consume less, and the depressant impact on prices from both directions is obvious. We see this all the time in the oil market, for just one example. A government bureaucracy set up to regulate the price of food is very unlikely to succeed and almost certainly would have adverse effects. So, are there no benefits we can count on from price controls? I can think of one: thousands of new (albeit unproductive) jobs in that new bureaucracy. As Jason Furman, a relatively liberal economist, said of Harris’s anti-gouging efforts, “This is not sensible policy, and I think the biggest hope is that it ends up being a lot of rhetoric and no reality.” Another Case in Point: Rent Control The issue that first suggested this memo several months ago was rent control, something I’ve had personal experience with, having lived in an apartment that rented for $92 a month in 1956, when I was ten. The federal government implemented rent control during World War II so that, with few new apartment buildings being built and breadwinners away fighting the war rather than earning their normal wages, families wouldn’t be priced out of their apartments. Rents on New York City apartments were frozen at 1943 levels. This was probably a good idea under the unusual circumstances of wartime, but the program wasn’t dismantled afterwards, and it still governs some apartments that were built more than 80 years ago. And rent regulation still plays havoc with the supply and demand for New York City apartments. In general, New York City rent control limits rent increases on apartments so long as they’re occupied by people who were tenants in 1971 or relatives who lived with them. The law was enacted to protect the occupants at the time, but apartments have been passed down at controlled rents to people who didn’t
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
5
5
版权所有,保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
1971 年时人们未必还住在这些公寓里。符合上述条件的人越来越少,因此这类租金管制正在逐步退出。
在“租金稳定”的名义下,较新的法规仍在执行。其中之一是强制性包容性住房政策,其内容据我了解大致如下:如果你想建一栋公寓楼,又需要获得某种分区规划豁免——几乎所有项目都需要——则必须同意以下条款:
•
•
•
•
necessarily live in them in 1971. Fewer and fewer people are still around who satisfy the above criterion, so this form of rent regulation is winding down. Newer regulations continue in force under the rubric of “rent stabilization.” One example is Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, which has been explained to me as follows: if you want to build an apartment building and need some zoning relief – and virtually all projects do – you must agree as follows: • • • •
一部分公寓将属于“可负担住房”。可负担住房的租户收入必须远低于当地平均水平。允许收取的租金上限将按租户收入的一定比例设定。续租时租金涨幅将受到管制,通常每年限定在几个百分点以内。
A percentage of the apartments will be “affordable.” Tenants for affordable apartments must earn incomes well below the average in the area. The maximum allowable rent will be set based on a percentage of tenants’ income. Rent increases upon lease renewal will be regulated, usually at a few percent per year.
多数人都会认同,鼓励新建经济适用公寓是值得称赞的,但这样做的一个连带效应,是推高了公寓的建设成本。假如每年能多建一些新公寓,大概对所有人都会更好。归根结底,纽约市大多数公寓的租金仍然受某种形式的管制,而且不太可能彻底解除管制。因此,新建公寓的动力有限,举例来说,2002 年到 2017 年间,纽约市出租公寓数量的年增长率仅为 0.3%。
受管制公寓的翻修也受到限制。在任何 15 年的周期内,翻修支出被限定在很小的额度内,而且这笔投入只能通过每月租金小幅上涨来回收,涨幅仅相当于翻修成本的一个零头。这样一来,翻修通常根本不划算:
许多房东不愿把空置的租金稳定公寓租出去,因为运营和翻新成本可能超过法定租金上限。截至 2022 年,纽约市约有 2 万套租金稳定公寓处于空置状态。(维基百科)
一个系统出现了这样的怪象——(a) 公寓需求旺盛,但 (b) 让公寓空着比租出去更赚钱——这难道没有问题吗?公寓和面包或卫生纸没多大差别。官方可以限制人们必须支付的价格,这在消费者中很受欢迎,但除了最专制的地区,官方没法强迫供应商按管制价格出售商品。
今年我一直在留意纽约公寓状况的相关报道,注意到以下因素通常被归为阻碍公寓建设的原因:(a) 缺乏税收优惠和补贴,(b) 郊区对建设经济适用公寓楼有抵触情绪,(c) 高利率(尽管最后这一条解释不了 2010 年代公寓建设量偏低的原因)。最让我吃惊的是,租金管制的影响一个字都没人提。
2 月 9 日《纽约时报》的一篇文章尤其引起了我的兴趣。文章报道说,纽约市出租公寓中“空置且可租”的比例已降至 1.4%,为 1968 年以来的最低水平。文章接着写道:“住房专家认为健康的空置率应在 5% 到 8% 左右。”那为什么空置公寓这么少?归根结底是供求关系在起作用:
a) 正如泰勒·斯威夫特门票的例子一样,这些公寓实在太便宜了。这意味着需求强劲,公寓根本空不下来。
Most would agree that it’s laudable to encourage the creation of new affordable apartments, but this particular method of doing so has the related effect of increasing the cost of apartment construction. Probably everyone would be better off if there were simply more new apartments built every year. The bottom line is that rents for the majority of New York City apartments remain subject to one form of control or another and are unlikely to ever become fully deregulated. As a result, the incentives to build new apartments are limited, and between 2002 and 2017, for example, the growth in the number of rental apartments in New York City was only 0.3%, per year. Improvements in regulated apartments are also regulated. Expenditures on improvements are limited to a very small amount in any 15-year period, and the investment can be recouped only through an increase in the monthly rent equal to a tiny percentage of the cost of the improvements. Thus, making improvements is generally uneconomic: Many landlords do not fill their vacant rent stabilized units, as the operational and renovation costs may exceed the legal maximum rent. As of 2022, there are roughly 20,000 vacant rent stabilized apartments in New York City. (Wikipedia) Might there be something wrong with a system where (a) there’s strong demand for apartments but (b) it’s more profitable to keep apartments vacant than rent them out? Apartments aren’t much different from bread or toilet paper. Officials can limit the price people have to pay, which is popular with consumers, but other than in the most dictatorial jurisdictions, they can’t force suppliers to produce goods for sale at the regulated prices. As I’ve tried this year to keep up with articles about New York’s apartment situation, I’ve noticed that the following factors are usually listed as discouraging apartment creation: (a) a lack of tax incentives and subsidies, (b) resistance to construction of affordable apartment buildings in the suburbs, and (c) high interest rates (albeit the last one can’t be used to explain the low level of apartment construction in the 2010s). What struck me most was the absence of any mention of the impact of rent regulations. A February 9 article in The New York Times particularly piqued my interest. The article reported that the percentage of New York City rental apartments that were “vacant and available” had fallen to 1.4%, the lowest since 1968. It went on to say, “Housing experts consider a healthy vacancy rate to be somewhere around 5 to 8 percent.” So why are so few apartments vacant? It comes down to supply and demand: a) As in the example of Taylor Swift tickets, they’re simply too cheap. That means demand is strong and apartments don’t sit vacant.
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
6
6
版权所有
All Rights Reserved
b)此外,由于租金被人为压得过低,潜在的开发商无法获得有吸引力的回报,这意味着新增供应寥寥无几。(我还猜想,如果公寓开发商能在投资上获得合理回报,他们反而得担心新法规把利润没收走。)正如前面提到的一般物价问题,如果公寓需求强劲而供应受限,其结果应是租金上涨,从而鼓励房东增加供应。但市场力量在纽约市无法自由运转;经济规律已被监管钝化。2 月 9 日的文章中有如下说法(这来自《纽约时报》,通常也不是资本家的朋友):
答案在于,开发商建公寓的收益,普遍比不上其他投资形式的回报……
住房专家估计,纽约市需要建造的住房数量以数十万计。
但到目前为止,州市两级政府并未采取行动,以加速足够的住房开发来解决这场危机……
州长(凯茜·)霍楚尔在一份声明中表示,这项调查“再次提醒我们,只有靠大兴土木才能走出这场危机”。
但值得注意的是,被形容为可能“靠大兴土木走出危机”的那些“行动”,总是强调政府提供的补贴和激励,从不允许自由市场决定租金。支持这种安排的人会说,它维持了可负担性和多样性。从纯经济角度看,这意味着一些如果租金由自由市场决定就住不起纽约的人,只要足够幸运能租到受租金管制公寓,就能住下来。但另一些想住纽约、也负担得起更高租金的人,却因为找不到公寓而无法入住。最后,那些公寓不受管制的房东,能够收取比公寓供应未受抑制时更高的租金。这是好事还是坏事,取决于个人价值观。但显而易见的是,纽约市并未遵循经济规律,自由市场机制也未发挥应有作用,拍板的是政府里的人。
我以杰森·弗曼对食品价格的一番评论来结束这段讨论:
弗曼先生……说……如果价格不随强劲需求上涨,新公司可能就没那么大的动力进入市场以扩大供应。(《纽约时报》,8 月 15 日)
顺便提一句,在 8 月 16 日的一揽子经济方案中,哈里斯表示将禁止拥有 50 套以上公寓的房东在两年内将租金上调超过 5%。这个主意可能好也可能不好,但肯定不会鼓励加大公寓投资。
监管杂谈
政府试图无视或凌驾于经济规律之上的例子数不胜数,想一一列举令人望而生畏,但有几项我不得不在此谈一谈,以及它们的弊病:
b) Also, because rents are kept too low, would-be builders can’t achieve attractive returns, meaning there are few additions to supply. (I also imagine that if apartment builders could earn an acceptable return on investment, they’d have to worry about new regulations expropriating it.) As mentioned earlier with regard to prices in general, if demand for apartments is strong and supply is restricted, the result should be rents that rise, encouraging landlords to add to supply. But market forces aren’t allowed to freely function in New York City; the laws of economics have been blunted by regulation. The February 9 article included the following statements (and this is from The New York Times, again usually not the capitalist’s friend): The answer is that developers generally can’t make returns for building apartments that are competitive with the returns on other forms of investment. . . . Housing experts estimate that the number of homes the city needs to build is in the hundreds of thousands. So far, however, the city and state have not made moves that could accelerate enough housing development to solve the crisis. . . . [Governor Kathy] Hochul said in a statement that the survey was “the latest reminder that we can only build our way out of this crisis.” But it’s interesting to note that the “moves” that are described as having the potential to lead to “building our way out of this crisis” always emphasize government-provided subsidies and incentives, never allowing the free market to set rents. A person in favor of this arrangement would argue that it maintains affordability and diversity. What it means in purely economic terms is that some people who couldn’t afford to live in New York City if rents were set by free-market forces are able to live there if they’re lucky enough to secure an apartment with regulated rent. But other people who would like to live in New York City and can afford higher rents can’t do so because there are no apartments for them. And lastly, landlords that have apartments that are somehow unregulated can command higher rents than would be the case if additions to the supply of apartments weren’t being discouraged. It’s a matter of personal philosophy whether this is good or bad. But clearly, the laws of economics and the actions of free markets aren’t at work in New York City. Someone in government is making the decisions. I’ll end this discussion with a comment Jason Furman made about grocery prices: Mr. Furman . . . said . . . if prices do not rise in response to strong demand, new companies may not have as much inclination to jump into the market to ramp up supply. (The New York Times, August 15) By the way, as part of her August 16 economic package, Harris said she would prohibit landlords who own more than 50 apartments from raising rents by more than 5% for two years. That may or may not be a good idea, but it’s certainly not going to encourage increased investment in apartments. Regulatory Miscellany There are so many examples of governmental attempts to ignore or override the laws of economics that it’s daunting to think of cataloging them, but I must discuss a few here, and their shortcomings:
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
7
7
保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
•
•
哈里斯经济方案的另一个组成部分,是向首次购房者提供 2.5 万美元首付补助的计划。确实,如今年轻人要攒够买房所需的现金很不容易。问题在于,给一百万个潜在购房者每人 2.5 万美元,合计 250 亿美元,几乎必然会导致房价立即上涨,从而抵消该计划预期带来的大部分好处。解决办法很简单:通过一项法律,禁止现有卖家因该计划出台而提高房价。但未来进入市场的房子怎么办?更简单:再立一部法,规定你卖房要价不得高于该计划不存在时本应有的价格。试试怎么执行这条吧。
Another component of Harris’s economic program is a plan to give first-time homebuyers $25,000 to help with down payments. Certainly, it’s hard these days for young people to come up with the cash needed to become homeowners. The problem here is that giving a million would-be buyers $25,000 each, or $25 billion in all, would almost certainly result in an immediate increase in home prices, eliminating much of the hoped-for benefit from the program. Easy: that can be prevented by passing a law that prohibits current sellers from raising home prices in response to enactment of the program. But what about homes that will come onto the market in the future? Simple: enact another law that says you can’t ask more for your home than you would have if the program didn’t exist. Try enforcing that one.
•
•
唐纳德·特朗普在担任总统期间,对中国商品加征关税,以回击他认为不公平的贸易做法。如今,他承诺对进口商品全面征收 10% 的关税。这些关税或许能抑制进口、刺激国内生产,并减少美国长期存在的贸易逆差。但最终买单的很可能是进口商品的消费者,因为制造商和出口商在能转嫁关税时,大概率不会自己消化。多年来,低成本进口抑制了美国通胀,让美国人得以享受诱人的生活水平。全面加征新关税,无异于对美国消费者变相涨价。而且,这些关税——以及他国为报复而加征的关税——会阻碍全球化,而全球化通过让各国人民为世界做自己最擅长的事,惠及全球经济。
When he was president, Donald Trump enacted tariffs on goods from China to counter trade practices he considered unfair. Now, he promises a 10% across-the-board tariff on imports. Those tariffs might discourage imports, stimulate domestic production, and reduce the U.S.’s chronic trade deficit. But they’d likely be paid by consumers of imported goods, as manufacturers and exporters are unlikely to absorb a tariff if they can pass it on. For many years low-cost imports have held down inflation in the U.S. and enabled Americans to enjoy an attractive standard of living. Broad new tariffs are likely to be the equivalent of price increases for American consumers. And the tariffs – and those imposed by other nations in retaliation – would hamper globalization, which benefits the global economy by letting people in each nation do for the world what they’re best at.
•
•
特朗普的政策主张还包括延长他 2017 年税改中即将到期的减税措施,并推出一系列新的减税方案。这些方案堪称面面俱到,涵盖企业和个人的减税,包括取消对小费、社会保障福利和加班费的征税。根据宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院的预算模型估算,到 2026 年,该计划将使收入最低的 20% 人群平均减税 320 美元,而收入最高的 1% 人群则平均减税 4.722 万美元。即便不考虑最新提议(如豁免加班费),这些措施预计将在未来十年内使国家赤字增加 5.8 万亿美元;若计入其对整体经济的潜在刺激效应(即所谓的“涓滴效应”),赤字增加额则为 4.1 万亿美元。除此之外,没有任何迹象表明这些减税措施将得到相应的资金支持。
Trump’s policy proposals also include extension of his expiring 2017 tax cuts and a panoply of new ones. There’s something for everyone, with tax cuts for corporations and individuals, including ending the taxation of tips, Social Security benefits, and overtime pay. The Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates that in 2026, the plan would reduce taxes by $320 for the average person in the bottom income quintile and $47,220 for those in the top percentile. Even without factoring in the latest proposals, like exempting overtime pay, these actions are projected to increase the national deficit by $5.8 trillion over the next decade, or $4.1 trillion after incorporating their potential stimulative impact on the overall economy (so-called “trickle-down effects”). Other than that possibility, there’s no suggestion the cuts would be paid for.
•
•
加利福尼亚是所谓“进步”经济理念的培养皿。2022 年,州议会通过一项法案,成立一个由行业代表和餐饮业工人组成的委员会,为快餐行业设定工资标准。面对行业出资发起罢免公投的威胁,立法者修改法案,规定拥有超过 60 家门店的快餐连锁店必须执行每小时 20 美元的最低工资。新法直到今年 4 月才生效,评估其影响还为时过早。然而,媒体报道充斥着餐厅关门、员工被解雇或工时被削减、雇主投资于节省劳动力的技术,以及消费者面临大幅涨价的案例。尽管“夫妻店”不受新最低工资约束,但可预料的是,许多小店被迫跟进法定标准以留住员工,这意味着立法者为小型餐厅设计的保护可能只是幻觉。经济规律就是这样运作的。
California is a Petri dish for so-called “progressive” economic ideas. In 2022, the state legislature passed a bill creating a council comprised of industry representatives and restaurant workers to set wages in the fast-food industry. Faced with a threatened industry-financed referendum to repeal the law, legislators modified it to mandate a minimum hourly wage of $20 for fast food chains of more than 60 restaurants. The new law only took effect in April, so it’s too early to assess its impact. Press accounts, however, are replete with accounts of restaurants closing, employees being laid off or having their hours reduced, employers investing in labor-saving technologies, and substantial price increases for the consumer. Although “mom and pop” restaurants are not required to pay the new minimum wage, predictably many have been forced to match the mandated rate to retain their employees, meaning the protection legislators intended for small restaurants may be illusory. That’s how the laws of economics work.
•
•
同样,加利福尼亚州也通过了一项法律,规定医疗行业工人的最低时薪为 25 美元。但据《华尔街日报》5 月 27 日报道,最近官员们意识到,这项法律“将因医疗补助成本上升和州立机构工人薪酬增加,每年给州政府带来 40 亿美元的额外开支”,因此他们推迟了该法律对这部分工人的生效时间。这里令人震惊的是,你不可能在不从别人那里拿钱的情况下把钱给别人,而加州纳税人可能不会乐意州政府将更多资金导向医疗工作者,尤其是在当前预算赤字的情况下。
Similarly, California passed a law mandating a $25-an-hour minimum wage for workers in the healthcare industry. But more recently, according to The Wall Street Journal of May 27, officials realized that it “would cost the state $4 billion more a year owing to higher Medicaid costs and compensation for workers at state-owned facilities” and so they delayed the benefit of the law with respect to those workers. Shocking here is the idea that you can’t give money to someone without getting it from someone else, and California taxpayers might not enjoy the state directing more of it to healthcare workers, especially given the current budget deficit.
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
8
8
保留所有权利
All Rights Reserved
•
•
如果有一个问题两党意见一致,那就是“别碰社会保障!”现在和未来的退休人员都想要他们每月的那张支票,希望规则维持原样。两党领袖也都同意这一点。问题是,这套办法行不通。社会保障是类似保险的缴费制项目,靠信托基金运转。工薪族通过缴税往里投钱,退休人员领取支票。但领取福利的退休人数相对于缴钱的在职员工人数一直在增长,如果什么都不改,基金必定会按照一个不可逆转的数学过程走向破产。能用来恢复社会保障健康的调节杠杆很多,但没人愿意去动,因为一动就会得罪人(也就是得罪某些选民)。选项包括:(a)提高社会保障税率,(b)提高缴税收入的封顶线,(c)削减福利,(d)限制生活成本调整幅度,(e)提高退休年龄,(f)限制退休人员领取年数,(g)对潜在受助者做收入审查。这些选项没有一条被视为可以接受。每个人都只想要自己的支票,按承诺的那样。
人们花的比挣的多会导致什么后果,不需要经济学学位也能明白。(只有在政治现实里,才有人指望出现不同的结果。)然而,我们从政客或民选官员嘴里听不到一个字,说要做出必要改变来避免社会保障信托基金破产。政府当然可以把社会保障从自筹资金项目转变为政府拨款福利,乍一看,这个转变似乎主要是措辞上的。但动用信托基金、从财政部掏钱发福利,会进一步加重已经够棘手的赤字、国债和年度偿债负担,而这些负担又会反过来进一步推大赤字和债务。
If there’s one thing both parties agree on, it’s “hands off Social Security!” Retirees present and future want their monthly payments, and they want the rules left as they are. The leaders of both parties have agreed to this. It’s just that it can’t work. Social security is a contributory program analogous to insurance, and it works through a trust fund. Workers pay in via taxes and retirees get checks. But the number of retirees drawing benefits has been growing relative to the number of active workers paying in, and, if nothing is changed, the fund is sure to become insolvent through an inexorable mathematical process. There are many levers that could be pulled to restore Social Security to health, but nobody wants to pull them, since doing so would displease someone (that is, displease some voters). The options include (a) raising the Social Security tax rate, (b) raising the ceiling on the earnings on which tax is paid, (c) reducing benefits, (d) limiting cost-of-living adjustments, (e) raising the retirement age, (f) limiting the number of years for which retirees can collect, and (g) means testing would-be recipients. None of these is considered acceptable. Everyone just wants their checks as promised. It doesn’t take a degree in economics to know what happens when people spend more than they bring in. (Only in political reality might someone expect a different outcome.) However, we don’t hear a word from politicians or elected officials about making the changes that are necessary to keep the Social Security trust fund from insolvency. The government can switch Social Security from a self-funded program to a government-funded benefit, of course, and at first glance, the change appears to be mainly semantic. But depleting the trust fund and paying benefits from the Treasury would add further to the already-troublesome deficit, the national debt, and the annual debt service, which would feed back to further increase the deficit and debt.
这就引出了一个我在世界各地常被问到的话题:美国政府的赤字与债务。我的回答是,这令人难堪。橡树资本有幸为多个拥有主权财富基金、而非背负国家债务的国家管理资金。有些国家把意外之财放进保险箱,比如挪威的石油收入,或者澳大利亚电信公司私有化的收益。还有许多国家之所以量入为出,只是因为他们不得不如此——他们没有那种无限印钞而不引发货币贬值的奢侈。但美国习惯性地寅吃卯粮,支出超过收入。我们上一次财政盈余是在 2000 年,克林顿政府任期结束时。如今,我们的国债年利息首次超过了国防部预算。可两党都不愿去解决赤字问题,也不愿为平衡预算站出来。我们的国会连预算都很少提交,更别提平衡预算了。这种不负责任的行为,放在我们自己的企业里是绝不能容忍的。
美国表现得好像它有一张信用额度无限、又无需偿还的信用卡。它之所以能这样,是因为迄今为止它一直能蒙混过关,而我们的执政官员缺乏量入为出的意志。如今我们已经很少听到现代货币理论了——那个在 2020 年流行起来的观点,认为“对于掌控自己货币的国家来说,赤字和债务无关紧要。”然而,我们的政府仍然表现得好像这套理论是成立的。
在 1930 年代,约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯提出,当经济增长过于缓慢、无法创造出所需就业岗位时,政府应当增加支出以刺激需求,即使这意味着出现赤字并靠借债来弥补。然后,当繁荣恢复、就业到位时,它应当让支出低于收入,实现盈余,并用来偿还债务。听起来都没问题,除了最后那一点:关于盈余和还债的那部分,已经被遗忘了。
事实是,赤字推动了大多数人乐见的经济增长,而政府支出超过收入,则让官员们得以送出“免费的东西”,从而换取选票。但这么做的代价——
That leads me to a topic I’m asked about all around the world: the U.S. government’s deficit and debt. I answer that they’re an embarrassment. Oaktree is privileged to manage money for several countries that have sovereign wealth funds, not national debt. Some countries put windfalls into a lockbox, like Norway’s oil revenues or the proceeds from the privatization of Australia’s telephone company. And many other countries live within their means simply because they have to – they don’t have the luxury of printing unlimited amounts of money without precipitating a devaluation. But the U.S. habitually runs deficits, spending more than it takes in. Our last surplus came in 2000, at the end of the Clinton administration. Today, for the first time, simply the annual interest on our national debt exceeds the Defense Department budget. Yet neither party is willing to address the deficit or stand for balanced budgets. Our congress rarely submits a budget at all, no less a balanced one. This is irresponsible behavior we wouldn’t tolerate in our own organizations. The U.S. acts as if it has a credit card with no limit on the balance and no requirement to pay it down. It does so because it’s been able to get away with it thus far, and our governing officials lack the will to spend less than they can. We don’t hear much these days about Modern Monetary Theory, the view popularized in 2020 that “for countries in control of their currencies, deficits and debts don’t matter.” Nevertheless, our government still acts as if this theory is valid. In the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes posited that when an economy is growing too slowly to produce the needed jobs, the government should increase spending to stimulate demand, even if that means running a deficit and covering it by borrowing. And then, when prosperity resumes and the jobs are there, it should spend less than it takes in, running a surplus and using it to repay the debt. All good, except for that last bit: the part about surpluses and debt repayment has been forgotten. The truth is, deficits encourage the economic growth that most people enjoy, and spending more than the government takes in permits officials to give away “free stuff,” thereby gaining votes. But doing this
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
9
9
版权所有
All Rights Reserved
这需要持续无视经济规律,举债度日,仿佛认定这些债务永远无需偿还。这样的局面能否无休止地持续下去?我们拭目以待,但我认为不能。
共同点何在?
上述已采取和拟议中的行动,与第三页末尾开始的问题一样,都具备某些共同要素。
•
perpetually requires ignoring the laws of economics, running up debts in the apparent belief that they’ll never have to be paid. Can it go on without end? We’ll see, but I would think not. What Are the Common Threads? The actions and proposed actions described above, like the questions beginning at the bottom of page three, all have certain elements in common. • • •
•
•
•
•
这些目标表面上往往看起来值得称道:更便宜的商品和服务,以及更平等的分配结果。但按照经济的运行规律,它们通常会带来无法控制、也无益处的次级后果。
其核心都是“谁得到什么?”的问题。钱不可能凭空冒出来;只有谁出钱、谁拿钱的取舍。这是一场零和游戏。
这些目标往往带有民粹色彩,立法者和监管者来挑选赢家和输家。他们通常把自己的行为包装成保护受压迫的小人物免受贪婪的大人物欺压。多数反自由市场法规都包含规模标准,也就是说它们只适用于超市,不适用于街角杂货店;只适用于拥有大量公寓的房东;只适用于一定规模的医疗机构;只适用于连锁餐厅,不适用于独立餐馆。在这种背景下,我们该留意拜登总统 8 月在民主党全国代表大会上说的话:“我为自己是首位走上罢工纠察线的总统、并被贴上史上最亲工会总统的标签而感到自豪。”雇员本身比雇主更值得保护吗?没有雇主,人们上哪儿找工作去?不管怎样,他们确实成了政客们方便攻击的目标。
围绕这些问题的言论常常充满令人不安的阶级对立和分裂色彩。以下是我上个月收到的一位候选人来信的片段:“即便通胀在回落,食品价格依然高得离谱。这又是企业贪婪伤害消费者的一个迹象。首席执行官们不该一边用创纪录的利润塞满自己腰包,一边让家庭为餐桌上的饭菜或买药发愁。”在这种环境下,“利润”成了肮脏的字眼,“贪婪的企业”活该被怀疑、被监管。
最后,民选官员们有个习惯,就是让自己免受影响。因此,看看加州的最低快餐时薪不适用于政府大楼里的餐厅,倒是挺有意思的。哪个官员愿意惹恼一个被迫为午餐多掏钱的雇员呢?
The goals usually seem commendable on the surface: cheaper goods and services, and more equal outcomes. But, given the way things work in economics, they usually have second-order consequences that are uncontrollable and unhelpful. At their core, they’re all questions of “who gets what?” There’s no possibility of money appearing from out of the ether; there are just choices regarding who pays in and who gets something out. It’s a zero-sum game. The goals are often populist, with legislators and regulators picking winners and losers. They usually fashion their actions as protecting the downtrodden little guy from the rapacious big guy. Most antifree-market regulations incorporate size criteria, meaning they only apply to supermarkets, not corner grocery stores; landlords with a lot of apartments; medical facilities of a certain size; and restaurant chains, not independents. In this context, we should note what President Biden said at the Democratic National Convention in August: “I’m proud to have been the first president to walk a picket line and be labeled the most pro-union president in history.” Are employees per se more deserving of protection than employers? Without employers, where would people get jobs? Regardless, they do serve as convenient targets for politicians. The rhetoric surrounding these matters is often alarmingly classist and divisive. Here’s part of a typical note I received from a candidate last month: “Even with inflation lowering [sic], food prices still seem sky-high. It’s another sign of corporate greed hurting . . . consumers. CEOs shouldn’t be lining their pockets with record profits while families struggle to put food on the table or pay for medications.” In this kind of environment, “profit” is a dirty word, and “greedy corporations” are ripe for suspicion and regulation. Finally, elected officials have a habit of exempting themselves from impact. Thus, it’s interesting to observe that California’s minimum fast-food wage doesn’t apply to restaurants in government facilities. What official wants to suffer the wrath of an employee forced to pay more for lunch?
经济学定律最重要的特征之一,就是它们对所有人都适用。另一方面,试图否定这些定律的做法,通常是为了让一部分人得到不同于其他人的待遇。每当出现这种情况,掌权者就是在挑选他们心目中的赢家和输家。在一个“自由社会”里,这可不是什么好主意。
从根本上说,政府补贴和经济监管,等同于鼓励人们去做那些他们原本不会主动采取的行动。换句话说,这些行动在自由市场中根本不会发生。诸如此类的强制措施应当受到审慎审视。其中一些可能源于官员们所罗门王式的英明决策,以及对社会公平的追求;另一些则可能是出于偏好再分配的思想倾向;还有一些,纯粹是为了讨好选民。
对许多职业政客来说,头等大事就是当选并连任。民选官员对经济的干预,往往是为了吸引选民。除此之外,这么做还有个额外好处,就是能让官员们推卸责任——他们可以把政治上不受欢迎的事态发展归咎于“坏家伙”,比如强大的企业和贪婪的房东。最后,经济监管还能
One of the most important characteristics of the laws of economics is that they apply to everyone. On the other hand, attempts to negate those laws are usually designed to affect some parties differently from others. Whenever this is the case, those in charge are picking would-be winners and losers. Not a great idea in a “free society.” Fundamentally, government subsidies and economic regulations amount to encouraging actions that people wouldn’t take on their own. In other words, these actions wouldn’t happen in a free market. Mandates like these should be examined critically. Some may stem from officials’ Solomonic decisions and desire for a fair society. Others are probably the result of a philosophic bias in favor of redistribution. And still others are just a matter of currying favor with voters. For many career politicians, the first order of business is getting elected and reelected. Elected officials’ tinkering with the economy is often designed to appeal to voters. Then there’s the added benefit of getting officials off the hook, since they can redirect blame for politically undesirable developments to “bad actors,” such as powerful corporations and greedy landlords. Finally, economic regulations can
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
10
10
版权所有
All Rights Reserved
这些措施只能带来暂时的缓和效果,负面副作用要等到多年以后才会显现,届时推行这些政策的官员早已离开政治舞台。
自由市场还是管制市场?这才是问题所在
政府并不生产产品,不会在投入成本之上创造额外价值,除了通过自身支出外,也不直接贡献于国内生产总值。它们一只手收钱(或印钱),另一只手分配资金和服务。它们向纳税人征税,并以未来纳税人的名义举债。然后,它们把钱花在福利项目、薪资、资本支出和补贴上。政策制定的核心在于谁出钱、谁受益。
政府不以盈利为目标,这意味着管理政府的人在效率上可以高枕无忧。企业管理团队如果生产的产品价值不及投入成本——也就是赚不到利润——很快就会被淘汰。但政府没有这样的预期,因此,衡量政府效能缺乏像企业利润那样直观的标尺。
政府确实扮演着至关重要的角色,这些角色可能与利润或附加值毫无关系。
provide temporarily palliative outcomes, with the negative side effects coming only in later years, when the officials who enacted them have left the political stage. Free Markets or Controlled Markets? That Is the Question Governments don’t make a product, create value over and above the cost of the inputs they employ or – other than through their spending – contribute to GDP. They collect (or print) money with one hand and distribute money and services with the other. They collect taxes from taxpayers and incur debts in the name of future taxpayers. Then they pay out money for benefit programs, salaries, capital expenditures, and subsidies. Policymaking is about who will pay in and who will receive the benefits. Governments don’t strive for profits, meaning the people who run governments get a free pass on efficiency. Corporate management teams that fail to produce a product worth more than the inputs – aka make a profit – won’t last long. But governments aren’t expected to do so, and as a result, there’s no easy yardstick for quantifying a government’s effectiveness, like profits do for a business. Governments do play essential roles that may have nothing to do with profits or value added. • •
它们提供人们无法自行提供的东西,如国防、医疗、治安和消防服务、教育、基础设施,以及对紧急情况的应对——既包括物理性的(洪水、龙卷风和流行病),也包括经济性的(衰退和恶性通货膨胀)。
它们还为那些原本会遭受苦难的人提供安全网。对于政府应承担多少这些责任,存在广泛分歧,而这些分歧正是美国两大政党之间最大争议之一的根源。
They provide things people can’t provide for themselves, such as defense, healthcare, police and fire services, education, infrastructure, and response to emergencies, both physical (floods, tornados, and pandemics) and economic (recessions and hyperinflation). They also provide safety nets for those who would otherwise suffer. There are extensive differences of opinion over how much of this governments should do, and those differences underly one of the biggest disagreements between the U.S. political parties.
在满足基本需求之外,政府应在多大程度上拉平公民的收入与生活质量?如前所述,政府从一部分人手中取走资源给予另一部分人,正是出于这一目的。但必须承认,每向这个方向迈出一步——而非要求人们自食其力——都是与自由市场力量相悖的一步,并伴随着相应后果。
Beyond necessities, how far should a government go to even out its citizens’ incomes and quality of life? Doing so is one of the reasons why governments take from some to give to others as described above. But it must be acknowledged that each step in this direction – as opposed to requiring people to fend for themselves – is a step in contravention of free-market forces, with consequences. •
•
•
达尔文将物种经由所谓“适者生存”而得以强化的过程描述了一番。这确实在起作用,物种由此向上演化。但按定义,这是个冷酷的过程:强者昌,弱者亡。对物种整体是好事,对每个成员却未必。
同理,一个社会的总体经济福祉,靠自由市场的运转实现最大化。在这个过程中,有人比旁人过得好——理想情况下,过得好的是最有才华、最勤奋、最当得起的人,但现实未必总是如此。只有在最乐观(也最不济)的体制里,才不承认有人会过得比别人好。但差距近来已大幅拉大,围绕“好多少”才算公平、才能被接受,争论正日益升温。
Darwin described the way species are strengthened through what is known as “survival of the fittest.” It works, and species evolve upward. But this is, by definition, a cold-blooded process through which the strong thrive and the weak perish. Good for the whole of the species, but not for every member. Likewise, the collective economic welfare of a society is maximized by the operation of the free market. In the process, some people do better than others – preferably, but certainly not always, the most talented, hardest working, and most deserving. Only in the most rose-colored (and illfated) systems is it not accepted that some people will do better than others. But the differential has expanded a great deal of late, and there is a growing debate as to “how much better” is fair and acceptable.
根据历史的证据,选择一目了然:(a)高效的自由市场经济,伴有其激励措施和不均等的成果,或(b)指令经济,成果均等但表现欠佳。在第二页,我写了以下内容:
自由市场提供的激励将资本和其他资源导向最具生产力的地方。它们促使生产者制造人们最想要的商品,促使工人从事就其产出价值而言最具生产力的工作。它们还鼓励勤奋工作和承担风险。
The choice is clear based on the evidence provided by history: (a) efficient free market economies with their incentives and uneven outcomes or (b) command economies with their uniform outcomes and sub-par performance. On page two, I wrote the following: The incentives provided by free markets direct capital and other resources where they’ll be most productive. They prompt producers to make the goods people want most and workers to take jobs where they’ll be most productive in terms of the value of their output. And they encourage hard work and risk taking.
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
11
11
版权所有
All Rights Reserved
相反,如果市场变得不那么自由——也就是说,如果它们被迫遵循政府法令而非经济规律:
•
•
•
•
In contrast, if markets are made less free – that is, if they’re forced to follow government edicts rather than the laws of economics: • • • •
资本和原材料将被引导到并非最能发挥效能的地方;
生产者将无法制造出人们最需要的东西,反而会制造政府认为人们应该拥有的东西;
劳动者将被安排到他们产出低于本可以实现的岗位上;
辛勤工作和冒险精神将减少,因为从事这些活动的回报会受到限制,有时甚至会被转移给那些没有付出劳动或承担风险、却被当权者视为应得之人的人。
capital and raw materials will be directed to places other than where they’ll be most productive; producers will fail to make the things people want most, and instead will make things the government thinks people should have; workers will be assigned to work where they’ll produce less than they otherwise might; and hard work and risk taking won’t take place as much, since the rewards for doing those things will be capped and, in some cases, redirected to people who didn’t do the work or take the risk but whom those in control deem deserving.
激励与自由市场对于高效运转的经济体不可或缺,但它们的存续也注定经济体内某些成员会比其他成员更为成功。两者相辅相成,不可分割。
中国
此刻你或许会问:“那中国呢?中国经济并非依照经济学法则自由运作,却依然表现不俗。”我们视中国为“共产主义国家”,充斥着国有企业、产业政策和五年规划。然而,过去 45 年间,中国 GDP 年均增长近 9%,并于 2010 年跃居全球第二大经济体。这该如何解释?
事实证明,中国经济的诸多成就源于其蓬勃发展的私营部门。我访华近 20 年,尤其在早年访问期间,始终难以理解集体意识形态与私营企业何以共存。这无疑是“奇怪的组合”。本月早些时候,我赴厦门参加中国国际投资贸易洽谈会,再次直面这一困惑。无论作何解释,事实是中国经济高度依赖充满活力的私营部门。2022 年夏,哈佛大学肯尼迪学院的爱德华·坎宁安曾用一句流行概括来描述这一现象:
中国的私营部门常被总结为四组数字:60/70/80/90。私营企业贡献了中国 GDP 的 60%、创新能力的 70%、城镇就业的 80% 以及新增就业岗位的 90%。
政府对此心知肚明。2023 年 3 月 13 日,美国有线电视新闻网报道了中国国务院总理李强的表态:
“去年一段时间,社会上出现了一些不正确的讨论和言论,使一些民营企业家感到担忧,”李强周一表示。“从新的起点出发,我们将营造市场化、法治化、国际化的营商环境,平等对待各类所有制企业,保护企业产权和企业家权益。”
这无疑是务实主义对意识形态纯粹性的胜利,是顺应经济现实而非试图凌驾于其上的鲜明例证。
Incentives and free markets are essential for a high-functioning economy, but their existence assures that some members of the economy will do better than others. You can’t have one without the other. China At this point you might ask, “But what about China? The Chinese economy isn’t free to operate pursuant to the laws of economics, but it’s doing well.” We think of China as a “communist country,” replete with state-owned enterprises, industrial policy, and five-year plans. And yet, China’s GDP has grown at nearly 9% per annum for the last 45 years, and in 2010 it became the world’s second-largest economy. How could that be? As it turns out, much of China’s economic success is attributable to a vibrant private sector. I’ve been visiting China for nearly 20 years and, especially during my early visits, I struggled to comprehend the logic that permits the coexistence of the collective ideology with private enterprise. Certainly, those are “strange bedfellows.” A visit to Xiamen, China earlier this month for the China International Fair for Investment & Trade reminded me of this conundrum. Regardless of the explanation, the fact is that China’s economy relies heavily on the dynamic private sector. In the summer of 2022, Edward Cunningham of the Harvard Kennedy School used a popular formulation to describe it: China’s private sector is often summed up with a combination of four numbers: 60/70/80/90. Private firms contribute 60% of China’s GDP, 70% of its innovative capacity, 80% of its urban employment and 90% of new jobs. And the government recognizes this. On March 13, 2023, CNN reported on a statement from Chinese Premier Li Qiang: “For a period of time last year, there were some incorrect discussions and comments in the society, which made some private entrepreneurs feel worried,” Li said Monday. “From a new starting point, we will create a market-oriented, legalized and internationalized business environment, treat enterprises of all types of ownership equally, protect the property rights of enterprises and the rights and interests of entrepreneurs.” Certainly, this represents a triumph of pragmatism over ideological purity. It’s a clear example of accommodating to economic reality rather than trying to override it.
2024 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
12
12
保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
*
*
*
*
*
*
我理解经济体制运作的第一步,始于 20 世纪 50 年代末的初中时期,那时我读了乔治·奥威尔的《动物农场》。奥威尔写于 1945 年的这本书,表面上是童话,实则是针对俄国及共产主义/社会主义的尖锐批判。那本书教会了我理解自由市场与指令经济所需的大部分知识。如果你没读过,或者读过太久以至于记不清内容,我建议你找来读一读。
在《动物农场》的寓言里,动物们接管了农场的运作。对我来说,关键启示来自他们刷在谷仓墙上的那句引自卡尔·马克思的格言:“各尽所能,按需分配。”
多么理想主义的宣言!如果每个人都能尽其所能地生产,能力更强的社会成员产出更多,那固然很好。如果每个人都能得到所需,更需要的个体获得更多,那也很理想。但正如农场里的动物们很快发现的,如果劳动者只能留下自己所需的部分,那些能力更强的人就没有动力去付出额外努力,来生产出用于填补能力较弱者所需的剩余。当然,最大的挑战在于找到恰当的平衡:以税收形式从成功者那里取走足够多,用以支撑公共服务、政府项目和社会财富转移,同时又不削弱他们的工作积极性,也不促使他们迁往低税率地区。
我上面讨论的是经济生活的现实,其某些后果可能不尽如人意。但左右经济的不是理想主义者的愿望,而是这些现实规律。其中最重要的,是激励的力量和供求的影响。这些规律必须被尊重;它们不能被忽视、不能凭愿望抹去,也不能被违反而不承担后果。
任何认为中央计划经济优于自由市场、偏好均分利益的人,都没有研读过历史(或读过《动物农场》)。这在理论上或许动听,却从未真正行得通。经济规律最终总会胜出。国家可以尊重它们并享受相应收益,也可以试图违背它们,并因表现不佳而付出代价。在政治世界里,可以有无限的恩惠和人人有份的好事;但在经济世界里,只有权衡取舍。
2024 年 9 月 19 日
My first step toward understanding the workings of the various economic systems came in junior high school in the late 1950s, when I read George Orwell’s Animal Farm. Orwell wrote it in 1945 as a thinly veiled critique of Russia and communism/socialism. That book taught me most of what I needed to know about free markets versus command economies. If you haven’t read it, or if you read it so long ago that you can’t remember what it says, I suggest you pick it up. In the allegory of Animal Farm, the animals took over the running of the farm. For me, the key lesson emanates from the motto they painted on the barn wall, borrowed from Karl Marx: “From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs.” What an idealistic statement! It would be great if everyone produced all they could, with the more able members of society producing more. And it would be great if everyone got what they need, with needier individuals getting more. But, as the animals on the farm soon learned, if workers only get to keep what they need, there’s no incentive for the more able among them to put in the additional effort required to produce a surplus from which to fill the needs of the less able. The great challenge, of course, is to strike the proper balance: to take enough from the successful in the form of taxes to fund services, government programs, and wealth transfers without eroding their incentive to work or encouraging them to seek out low-tax jurisdictions. What I discuss above are the economic facts of life, and some of their ramifications may be less than ideal. But idealists’ wishes don’t govern economies; these realities do. Foremost among them are the power of incentives and the influence of supply and demand. The rules must be respected; they can’t be ignored, wished away, or overridden without consequences. Anyone who thinks it’s better to live in a centrally planned economy that prefers evenly distributed benefits over free markets hasn’t studied history (or read Animal Farm). It may sound good in theory, but it has never worked. The laws of economics will always win out eventually. Nations can respect them and reap the associated benefits, or they can try to contravene them and pay the price in terms of underperformance. In the world of politics, there can be limitless benefits and something for everyone. But in economics, there are only tradeoffs. September 19, 2024
2024 年 Oaktree 资本管理有限合伙公司
2024 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
13
13
版权所有。
All Rights Reserved