确定性的愚蠢
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
确定性的愚蠢
The Folly of Certainty
我的备忘录写作灵感可以来自各种各样的渠道。这一次,是《纽约时报》7 月 9 日(周二)的一篇文章触动了我。吸引我注意的是副标题中的几个词:“她没有任何怀疑。” 说话者是罗恩·克莱因,曾任拜登的幕僚长。话题是拜登总统是否应该继续竞选连任。而“她”指的是拜登的竞选主席珍·奥马利·狄龙。文章接着引用她的话说,就在 6 月 27 日他与前总统唐纳德·特朗普辩论的前几天,她曾表示:“乔·拜登会赢,就这么简单。”
于是,我这篇备忘录的主题就定了:不是拜登会不会继续竞选或退出——也不是如果他继续竞选会不会赢——而是,一个人怎么会毫无怀疑。考虑到拜登候选资格的不确定性寿命,这将是我又一篇“短篇”备忘录。
这个选题让我想起另一次,我听到一位资历极深的人士表达绝对的确定性。那一次,一位公认的外交事务专家告诉我们这群人说,“以色列在年底前‘干掉’伊朗核能力的可能性是 100%。” 他看起来像个真正的内部人士,我没有理由怀疑他的话。然而,那是 2015 年或 2016 年的事,我至今还在等那个“年底”到来(替他辩护一句,他没说是哪一年)。
正如我在《知识的错觉》(2022 年 9 月)备忘录中所指出的,宏观预测者根本不可能做出一个正确纳入所有已知会影响未来的诸多变量、以及那些几乎或完全无法知晓的随机影响的预测。正是因为这个原因,正如我过去所写的,那些受制于宏观未来变幻莫测的投资者和其他人,应该避免使用诸如“将会”、“不会”、“必须”、“不可能”、“总是”和“绝不”这样的词。
政治
当 2016 年总统大选来临时,几乎所有人都对两件事确信不疑:(a) 希拉里·克林顿会赢,但 (b) 如果命运弄人,唐纳德·特朗普赢了,股市就会崩盘。最谨慎的评论员说克林顿有 80% 的可能性获胜,而她获胜概率的估计值从那里往上加。
然而,特朗普赢了,而股市在接下来的 14 个月里上涨了超过 30%。大多数预测者的反应是调整他们的模型,并承诺下次会做得更好。而我的反应是:“如果这还不足以让你相信 (a) 我们不知道会发生什么,以及 (b) 我们不知道市场会对实际发生的事情作何反应,那我就不知道什么才能让你相信了。”
即使在三周前那场被广泛讨论的总统辩论之前,我认识的人中也没有谁对即将到来的选举结果表现出多大信心。今天,奥马利·狄龙女士可能会软化她对拜登必胜的肯定口吻,解释说她是被辩论结果打了个措手不及。但这正是问题的关键!我们不知道会发生什么。随机性确实存在。
有时事情如人们所料,他们便得出结论说自己早就知道会发生什么。有时事情偏离人们的预期,他们就会说,如果他们早知道
The impetus for my memos can come from a wide variety of sources. This one was inspired by an article in The New York Times on Tuesday, July 9. What caught my eye were a few words in the sub-headline: “She doesn’t have any doubt.” The speaker was Ron Klain, a former Biden chief of staff. The subject was whether President Biden should continue to run for reelection. And the “she” was Jen O’Malley Dillon, Biden’s campaign chair. The article went on to quote her as having said, “Joe Biden is going to win, period,” in the days just before his June 27 debate against former President Donald Trump. And, with that, I had the subject of this memo: not whether Biden will continue campaigning or drop out – or whether he’ll win if he continues – but rather how anyone can be without doubt. It’ll be another of my “shortie” memos given the uncertain shelf life of the Biden candidacy. This choice of subject calls to mind another time I heard a highly credentialed person express absolute certainty. In that case, an acknowledged expert in foreign affairs told a group I was part of there was “a 100% probability that the Israelis would ‘take out’ Iran’s nuclear capability before year-end.” He seemed like a genuine insider, and I had no reason to doubt his word. Yet, that was 2015 or ’16, and I’m still waiting for “before year-end” to come around (in his defense, he didn’t say which year). As I indicated in my memo The Illusion of Knowledge (September 2022), there’s no way a macroforecaster can produce a forecast that correctly incorporates all the many variables that we know will affect the future as well as the random influences about which little or nothing can be known. It’s for this reason, as I’ve written in the past, that investors and others who are subject to the vagaries of the macrofuture should avoid using terms such as “will,” “won’t,” “has to,” “can’t,” “always,” and “never.” Politics When the 2016 presidential election rolled around, there were two things about which almost everyone was certain: (a) Hillary Clinton would win but (b) if by some quirk of fate Donald Trump were to win, the stock market would collapse. The least certain pundits said Clinton was 80% likely to win, and the estimates of her probability of victory ranged upward from there. And yet, Trump won, and the stock market rose more than 30% over the next 14 months. The response of most forecasters was to tweak their models and promise to do better next time. Mine was to say, “if that’s not enough to convince you that (a) we don’t know what’s going to happen and (b) we don’t know how the markets will react to what actually does happen, I don’t know what is.” Even before the much-discussed presidential debate of three weeks ago, no one I know expressed much confidence regarding the outcome of the coming election. Today, Ms. O’Malley Dillon would likely soften her position regarding the certainty of a Biden victory, explaining that she was blindsided by the debate result. But that’s the point! We don’t know what’s going to happen. Randomness exists. Sometimes things go as people expected, and they conclude that they knew what was going to happen. And sometimes events diverge from people’s expectations, and they say they would have
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如果当时没有发生什么意外事件,这个判断可能就对了。但无论是哪种情况,意外发生的可能性——也就是预测出错的可能性——始终存在。在后一种情形里,意外成了现实,前一种则没有。但这并不能说明意外发生的概率本身。
宏观经济学
2021 年,美联储认为当时正在发生的通胀会证明是“暂时性的”,后来它把这一词解释为短期、非根深蒂固、且可能自我纠正。我认为,要是给予足够时间,美联储可能被证明是对的。通胀本来可能在三年或四年内自行消退,前提是(a)造成消费支出激增的疫情救济资金被花完,(b)全球供应链恢复正常运转。(然而,不减缓经济的话,风险在于通胀心理可能在那些年内扎根,迫使采取更强力的措施。)但因为美联储的判断在 2021 年没有兑现,而继续等待又行不通,美联储被迫启动了历史上最快的加息计划之一,影响深远。
2022 年年中,几乎可以肯定美联储加息会引发衰退。利率大幅上升会冲击经济,这合情合理。此外,历史清楚表明,主要央行的紧缩政策几乎总是导致经济收缩,而非“软着陆”。然而,衰退并未出现。
相反,2022 年末,市场观察者的共识转向了以下观点:(a)通胀在缓解,这将允许美联储开始降息;(b)降息能让经济避免衰退,或确保任何收缩都温和且短暂。这种乐观情绪点燃了 2022 年末的股市反弹,至今未熄。
然而,支撑那轮反弹的预期中的 2023 年降息并未发生。接着,2023 年 12 月,当美联储官员的“点阵图”预测 2024 年会有三次降息时,驱动市场的乐观派加倍押注,预期六次降息。通胀的顽固性迄今阻止了任何降息,2024 年已过半。现在共识又聚拢到 9 月首次降息的念头。而股市不断创出新高。
今天的乐观者可能会说:“我们对了,看看那些涨幅!”但关于降息,他们就是错了。对我来说,这一切只是又一个提醒:我们不知道会发生什么,也不知道市场会对已发生的事作何反应。
布林资本(Brean Capital)的康拉德·德夸德罗斯(Conrad DeQuadros),我最喜欢的经济学家(这话听起来像不像个悖论?),为这份备忘录提供了一条关于经济学家结论的有趣花絮:
> 我用费城联储的焦虑指数(未来季度实际 GDP 下降的概率)作为衰退结束的指标。当调查中超过 50% 的经济学家预测未来季度实际 GDP 下降时,衰退已经结束或接近结束。(强调系原文)
换句话说,唯一值得确定的结论是:经济学家本不该对任何事表达确定。
been right if only some unexpected event hadn’t transpired. But, in either case, the chance for the unexpected – and thus for forecasting error – was present. In the latter instance, the unexpected materialized, and in the former, it didn’t. But that doesn’t say anything about the likelihood of the unexpected taking place. Macro Economics In 2021, the U.S. Federal Reserve held the view that the bout of inflation then underway would prove “transitory,” which it has subsequently defined as meaning temporary, not entrenched, and likely to selfcorrect. I think the Fed might have been proved right, given enough time. Inflation might have retreated of its own accord in three or four years, after (a) the Covid-19 relief funds that caused the surge in consumer spending were spent down and (b) the global supply chain returned to its normal operations. (However, not slowing the economy would have brought the risk that inflationary psychology might take hold in those 3-4 years, necessitating even stronger action.) But because the Fed’s view wasn’t borne out in 2021 and waiting longer was untenable, the Fed was forced to embark on one of the fastest programs of interest rate increases in history, with profound implications. In mid-2022, there was near certainty that the Fed’s rate increases would precipitate a recession. It made sense that the dramatic increase in interest rates would shock the economy. Further, history clearly showed that major central bank tightening has almost always led to economic contraction rather than a “soft landing.” And yet, no recession has materialized. Instead, late in 2022, the consensus among market observers shifted to the view that (a) inflation was easing, and this would permit the Fed to start cutting interest rates, and (b) rate cuts would enable the economy to avoid recession or ensure that any contraction would be mild and short-lived. This optimism ignited a stock market rally in late 2022 that persists today. And yet, the anticipated rate reductions in 2023 that undergirded the rally didn’t transpire. Then, in December 2023, when the “dot plot” of Fed officials’ views called for three interest rate cuts in 2024, the optimists driving the market doubled down, pricing in an expectation of six. Inflation’s stubbornness has precluded any rate cuts thus far, with 2024 more than half over. Now the consensus has coalesced around the idea of a first cut in September. And the stock market keeps hitting new highs. The optimists today would likely say, “We were right. Look at those gains!” But, regarding interest rate cuts, they were simply wrong. For me, all this does is serve as another reminder that we don’t know what’s going to happen or how markets will react to what does happen. Conrad DeQuadros of Brean Capital, my favorite economist (how’s that for an oxymoron?), has supplied an interesting tidbit for this memo on the subject of economists’ conclusions: I use the Philly Fed’s Anxious Index (the probability of a decline in real GDP in the upcoming quarter) as an indicator that a recession has ended. By the time more than 50% of the economists in the survey project a decline in real GDP in the coming quarter, the recession is over or close to being over. (Emphasis added) In other words, the only thing worthy of certainty is the conclusion that economists shouldn’t be expressing any of it.
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市场
在 2022 年 10 月准确预测美联储未来 20 个月不会降息的罕见人士绝对正确……但如果这个预测让他们远离市场,他们就错过了标普 500 指数大约 50% 的涨幅。另一方面,那些降息乐观派在利率判断上完全错了,但今天很可能富得多。所以,没错,市场行为极难准确揣测。但我不打算在这里花时间罗列市场专家的错误。相反,我想聚焦于为什么这么多市场预测都以失败告终。经济和企业的表现往往倾向于可预测,因为支配它们的力量多少有些……怎么说呢……机械。在这些领域,人们或许可以带着一定信心说“如果 A,那么 B”。因此,这里的预测或许有一定概率是正确的,尽管这多半只发生在趋势持续不变、外推法有效的情况下。
但市场的波动幅度超过经济和公司。为什么?因为市场参与者的心理或情绪既重要又不可预测。在康拉德·德夸德罗斯的进一步帮助下,我可以说明市场更大的波动性,如下所示:
40 年年度百分比变化标准差
GDP
企业利润
标普 500 指数价格
Markets The rare person who in October 2022 correctly predicted that the Fed wouldn’t cut interest rates over the next 20 months was absolutely right . . . and if that prediction kept them out of the market, they’ve missed out on a gain of roughly 50% in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. The rate-cut optimist, on the other hand, was absolutely wrong about rates but is likely much richer today. So, yes, market behavior is very tough to gauge correctly. But I’m not going to take time here to catalog the errors of market savants. Instead, I’d like to focus on why so many market forecasts fail. The performance of economies and companies might tend toward predictability given that the forces governing them are somewhat . . . shall I say . . . mechanical. In these areas, one might say “if A, then B” with some degree of confidence. Predictions here might, therefore, have some chance of being correct, albeit that’s mostly the case when trends continue unabated and extrapolation works. But markets swing more than economies and companies. Why? Because of the importance and unpredictability of market participants’ psyches or emotions. Thanks to further help from Conrad DeQuadros, I can illustrate the greater variability of markets, as follows: 40-Year Standard Deviation of Annual Percentage Changes GDP Corporate profits S&P 500 price
1.8%
9.4
13.1
1.8% 9.4 13.1
为什么股价的涨跌幅度,远比支撑它们的经济和公司本身大得多?为什么市场行为如此难以预测,而且往往看似与经济事件和公司基本面毫无关联?金融“科学”——经济学和金融学——假定每一位市场参与者都是“经济人”:一个旨在最大化自身经济利益而做出理性决策的人。但心理和情绪所扮演的关键角色,往往让这一假设站不住脚。投资者情绪波动极大,淹没了基本面在短期内的影响力。正因如此,相对而言,很少有市场预测能被证明是正确的,而“因正确理由而正确”的预测更是凤毛麟角。
Why is it that stock prices rise and fall so much more than the economies and companies that underlie them? And why is it that market behavior is so hard to predict and often seems unconnected to economic events and company fundamentals? The financial “sciences” – economics and finance – assume that each market participant is a homo economicus: someone who makes rational decisions designed to maximize their financial self-interest. But the crucial role played by psychology and emotion often causes this assumption to be mistaken. Investor sentiment swings a great deal, swamping the short-run influence of fundamentals. It’s for this reason that relatively few market forecasts prove correct, and fewer still are “right for the right reason.” *
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如今,各路评论人士对即将到来的总统大选作出了种种预测。他们中许多人的结论看起来论据充分,甚至颇具说服力。我们听到和看到各种说法:有人认为拜登应该退选,也有人认为他不该退;有人觉得他会退,也有人觉得他不会;有人相信他若继续竞选尚能取胜,还有人断定他必输无疑。显然,智力、教育、信息渠道和分析能力并不足以保证预测准确。许多评论员都具备这些素质,但很明显,他们不可能全对。
多年来,我常引用约翰·肯尼思·加尔布雷思的智慧。正是他所说:“预测者分两种:一种是无知的,另一种是不知道自己无知的。”我发现自己一直在用这句话。我还有一句钟爱的加尔布雷思名言,出自他的《金融狂热简史》一书。在解释“投机狂热与程序性崩溃”的原因时,他谈到两个因素,“在当下或过去都不太受人注意。其一是金融记忆的极其短暂。”这句话我也常常引用。
Today, pundits are making all sorts of predictions about the upcoming presidential election. Many of their conclusions seem well-reasoned and even persuasive. We hear and read statements from those who believe Biden should and shouldn’t drop out; those who think he will and won’t; those who think he can win if he stays in the race; and those who think he’s sure to lose. Obviously, intelligence, education, access to data, and powers of analysis can’t be sufficient to produce correct forecasts. Many of these commentators possess these attributes, but clearly, they won’t all be right. Over the years, I’ve often cited the wisdom of John Kenneth Galbraith. It’s he who said, “There are two kinds of forecasters: those who don’t know, and those who don’t know they don’t know.” I find myself using this quote all the time. Another of my favorite Galbraith quotes is from his book A Short History of Financial Euphoria. In describing the reasons for “speculative euphoria and programmed collapse,” he discusses two factors “little noted in our time or in past times. One is the extreme brevity of the financial memory.” I often cite this factor, too.
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但我不记得自己写过加尔布雷思提出的第二个因素——“金钱与智力的虚假关联”。当人们变得富有,别人就会认为他们聪明。当投资者成功时,人们常常以为他们的智慧能在其他领域同样带来好结果。此外,成功的投资者往往也开始相信自己智力的强大,对与投资毫无关联的领域大发议论。
但投资者的成功可能是一连串好运或有利环境的产物,而非什么特殊天赋。他们或许聪明,或许不聪明,但往往是,在投资之外的领域,他们并不比大多数普通人懂得更多。然而,许多人毫不吝啬地发表见解,而这些见解常常被大众高度重视。这就是虚假关联的部分。如今,我们看到其中一些人围绕与选举相关的各种议题,带着笃定的态度各抒己见。
关于那些表现出确定感的人,已经说了很多。我们都认识那种“经常犯错却从不怀疑”的人。这让我想起另一句我钟爱的引言,据说(或许牵强)出自马克·吐温:“让你惹上麻烦的不是你不知道的事,而是你确信不疑却根本不是那么回事的事。”
回到 2020 年年中,当疫情似乎已经成为一个多少被理解的现象时,我放慢了写备忘录的节奏,不再像三四月那样一周一篇。五月,我趁机会写了两篇与疫情无关的备忘录,题为《不确定性》和《不确定性二》,其中用了大量篇幅讨论智识谦逊这个话题。虽然这些备忘录写的是我最喜欢的主题之一,却几乎没什么反响。所以,我会从《不确定性》中引用一段,希望你能因此回头看看它们。
以下是那篇最初引起我对智识谦逊关注的文章的节选:
按作者的定义,智识谦逊是智识傲慢或自负的反面。用通俗的话说,它类似于思想开明。智识谦逊的人可以持有坚定的信念,但承认自己会犯错,并愿意在大事小情上接受被证伪。(艾莉森·琼斯,《杜克今日》,2017 年 3 月 17 日)
……简单来说,智识谦逊意味着说“我不确定”“对方可能是对的”,甚至“我可能错了”。我认为这是投资者必备的特质;我知道,我喜欢交往的人都有这种特质。……
没有哪句话以“我不知道,但……”或“我可能错了,但……”开头,会让人惹上大麻烦。如果我们承认不确定性,就会在投资前先调查研究,反复核验结论,并且谨慎行事。景气时我们或许达不到最优,但不太可能引火烧身或彻底崩溃。另一方面,那些确定无疑的人可能会省去这些步骤,而如果他们既确定又错了,正如马克·吐温那句引言所言,结果可能是灾难性的。……
But I don’t remember ever writing about his second factor, which Galbraith says is “the specious association of money and intelligence.” When people get rich, others take that to mean they’re smart. And when investors succeed, it’s often assumed their intelligence can lead to similarly good results in other fields. Further, successful investors often come to believe in the strength of their own intellect and opine about fields with no connection to investing. But investors’ success can be the result of a string of lucky breaks or a propitious environment, rather than any special talents. They may or may not be intelligent, but often they don’t know any more than most others about subjects outside of investing. Nevertheless, many are unsparing with their opinions, and those opinions often are highly valued by the general populace. That’s the specious part. And today we find some of them speaking with conviction on all sides of the issues related to the election. A lot has been said about those who express certainty. We all know people we’d describe as “often wrong but never in doubt.” This reminds me of another of my favorite quotes, one that’s attributed (perhaps tenuously) to Mark Twain: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.” Back in mid-2020, when the pandemic seemed to have become a more or less understood phenomenon, I slowed the pace of my memo writing from the one-a-week pattern of March and April. In May, I took the opportunity for two non-Covid-related memos titled Uncertainty and Uncertainty II, in which I devoted a significant amount of space to the subject of intellectual humility. While these memos were on one of my favorite topics, they generated little response. So, I’ll quote a bit from Uncertainty and hopefully give you reason to look back at them. Here’s part of the article that first brought the subject of intellectual humility to my attention: As defined by the authors, intellectual humility is the opposite of intellectual arrogance or conceit. In common parlance, it resembles open-mindedness. Intellectually humble people can have strong beliefs, but recognize their fallibility and are willing to be proven wrong on matters large and small. (Alison Jones, Duke Today, March 17, 2017) . . . To put it simply, intellectual humility means saying “I’m not sure,” “The other person could be right,” or even “I might be wrong.” I think it’s an essential trait for investors; I know it is in the people I like to associate with. . . . No statement that starts with “I don’t know but . . .” or “I could be wrong but . . .” ever got anyone into big trouble. If we admit to uncertainty, we’ll investigate before we invest, double-check our conclusions and proceed with caution. We may sub-optimize when times are good, but we’re unlikely to flame out or melt down. On the other hand, people who are sure may dispense with those things, and if they’re sure and wrong, as the Twain quote suggests, the outcome can be catastrophic. . . .
……或许伏尔泰在 250 年前说得最透彻:怀疑并非令人愉悦的状态,但确信无疑才是荒诞不经。
凡受心理波动、非理性与随机性影响的领域,容不下任何笃定的判断。政治、经济属此类,投资亦然。没有人能可靠地预知这些领域的未来走向,但许多人却高估了自己的能力,
. . . maybe Voltaire said it best 250 years ago: Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd. There simply is no place for certainty in fields that are influenced by psychological fluctuations, irrationality, and randomness. Politics and economics are two such fields, and investing is another. No one can predict reliably what the future holds in these fields, but many people overrate their ability and
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但许多人仍会尝试这样做。摒弃确定性可以让你远离麻烦。我强烈建议这么做。
附言:去年夏天的网球大满贯赛事为我那篇备忘录《少一些失败者,还是多一些赢家?》提供了灵感。同样,上周六温布尔登的女单决赛也为这份备忘录提供了一段素材。巴博拉·克赖奇科娃战胜了贾斯明·保利尼,赢得女子冠军。赛前,博彩玩家认为克赖奇科娃是 125 赔 1 的冷门。换句话说,他们确信她不会赢。博彩玩家的怀疑或许有道理,但看来他们在做预测时不该如此笃定。
说到不可预测之事,我不能不提最近针对唐纳德·特朗普的暗杀企图,这一事件本可能带来更严重、更具冲击力的后果。即便事情已经发生,特朗普总统也逃过了重伤,但没有人能确切说出它将如何影响选举(尽管目前看来它似乎提振了特朗普的前景)或市场。所以,如果非要说的话,这反而强化了我的底线:做预测在很大程度上是一场输家的游戏。
2024 年 7 月 17 日
attempt to do so nevertheless. Eschewing certainty can keep you out of trouble. I strongly recommend doing so. P.S.: Last summer’s Grand Slam tennis tournaments provided the inspiration for my memo Fewer Losers, or More Winners? Similarly, this past Saturday’s women’s final match at Wimbledon has provided a snippet for this memo. Barbora Krejcikova prevailed over Jasmine Paolini to win the women’s title. Before the tournament, bettors considered Krejcikova a 125-to-1 shot. In other words, they were sure she wouldn’t win. The bettors may have been right to doubt her potential, but it seems they shouldn’t have been quite so certain in making their predictions. And speaking of the unpredictable, I can’t fail to mention the recent attempt on Donald Trump’s life, an event that could well have had a more grave and impactful result. Even now that it has happened and President Trump has escaped serious injury, no one can state with certainty how it will impact the election (though at present it appears to bolster Trump’s prospects) or the markets. So, if anything, it reinforces my bottom line: making predictions is largely a loser’s game. July 17, 2024
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