再论废除经济法则

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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

关于废除经济法则的更多讨论

More on Repealing the Laws of Economics

去年 9 月,我写了一份备忘录,题为《我们该废除经济规律吗?》,在文中我将经济体描述为按照某些基本规律自行运转的有机实体。其中最著名的就是供需规律:一般来说,价格下降时人们会买得更多,价格上涨时人们会生产得更多。另一条规律与激励有关:一般来说,人们会将资源(比如自己的劳动)配置到回报最高的活动中去。这些规律连同其余规则都一目了然,理解它们用不着博士学位。事实上,它们就植根于人性之中。

但政府有时想要的结果与自由运转的经济体所产出的结果不同。为此,它们颁布法规和政策,试图凌驾于经济规律之上。有些政府甚至走得更远,采纳社会主义或共产主义,建立起政府指令完全取代经济规律的经济体。

租金管制

我在 9 月备忘录中讨论的一个典型例子就是租金管制。当公寓需求超过供给时,租金自然会上涨,也许最终会涨到某个地点现有居民承受不起的地步。但民选官员通常想保留社区风貌。他们希望自己的选民能继续租住本选区的公寓,而不会输给出价更高的人。为了兑现这方面的选民服务,他们通过法律限制租金涨幅。这下那些原本住不起该辖区的人也能住进来了。这些租户很高兴,这也就让民选官员很高兴,因为满意的选民往往会投票支持现任者。

但并非所有人都高兴。房东们不高兴,因为他们无法收取自由市场中本来能收的足额租金,于是停止对公寓的投资,有时还把房源撤出市场。有意建造新公寓的开发商也因为担心赚不到足够回报而裹足不前。同样不高兴的还有那些想住进该地区、付得起市场租金却找不到空置公寓的人,因为公寓都被按低于市场租金居住的人占着。

这种情况至少有两个问题。第一,政府在选择赢家和输家,而不是让市场力量来做这件事。就租金管制而言,住进公寓的人(以及潜在地政治上的现任者)是赢家,但房东、开发商和找房的人是输家。实施租金管制的民选官员会说他们只是想为现有住户争取公平,但显然他们是在不公平地对待其他人。

此外,整个社会也承受负面后果。住在管制租金公寓里的租户拥有一项相当值钱的资产:一个价格实惠的住处。但这项资产没法变现;他们只能靠继续住在那儿来享受好处。因此,他们往往不愿搬家,这降低了他们自己和所有人的流动性。租金管制还抑制了现有公寓的升级改造和新公寓的建设,于是住房存量跟不上需求。

Last September, I wrote a memo titled Shall We Repeal the Laws of Economics? in which I described economies as organic entities that operate on their own pursuant to some underlying laws. The best known is the law of supply and demand: in general, people will buy more of something as the price goes down and produce more of it as the price goes up. Another has to do with incentives: in general, people will allocate resources (such as their labor) to the activities for which they will be best rewarded. These and the rest of the rules are straightforward, and it doesn’t take a Ph.D. to understand them. In fact, they’re part of human nature. But governments sometimes want outcomes different than those a free-functioning economy will produce. To that end, they enact rules and regulations designed to override the laws of economics. Some governments even go so far as to adopt socialism or communism, creating economies where government commands take over entirely from the laws of economics. Rent Control A prime example discussed in my September memo was rent control. When demand for apartments exceeds supply, it’s only natural that rents will rise, perhaps eventually to the point where people who live in a given location can’t afford to continue doing so. But elected officials typically want to preserve neighborhoods. They want their constituents to be able to continue renting apartments in their districts and not lose out to others who can pay more. To deliver on this aspect of constituent service, they pass laws to limit rent increases. Now people who otherwise couldn’t afford to live in the jurisdiction can do so. Those tenants are happy, and that makes the elected officials happy, as happy constituents tend to vote for incumbents. But not everyone is happy. Landlords are unhappy about not being able to charge the full rent they could charge in a free market, so they stop investing in their apartments and sometimes take them off the market. Developers who might be interested in building new apartments refrain from doing so out of concern that they won’t be able to earn a sufficient return. Also unhappy are people who would like to live in that location and can afford to pay market rents but are unable to find vacant apartments because they’re occupied by people paying below-market rents. There are at least two things wrong with this situation. The first is that governments are choosing winners and losers, rather than letting market forces do so. In the case of rent control, the people who occupy apartments (and potentially political incumbents) are the winners, but landlords, developers, and people looking for apartments are the losers. The elected officials enacting rent control will say they’re only trying to produce fairness for existing occupants, but they’re obviously treating others unfairly. In addition, there are negative implications for society overall. Tenants living in rent-controlled apartments enjoy a very valuable asset: a bargain-priced place to live. But there’s no way to monetize that asset; they can only enjoy the benefit by continuing to live there. For this reason, they tend not to move, reducing mobility for themselves and everyone else. Rent control also discourages the upgrading of existing apartments and the construction of new apartments, so the housing stock fails to keep up with

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社区的需求,无论是房屋状况还是数量,都亟需满足。换句话说,政府可以限制房东对公寓收取的租金,但无法强制开发商建造新房。这些干预措施会降低整体社会福利,并阻碍资源流向生产率最高的领域。

加州火灾保险

非常不幸的是,今年早些时候,在南加州野火发生后,我们目睹了无视经济规律所导致的极端经济后果。当大火摧毁了太平洋帕利塞兹和阿尔塔迪纳的社区时,数千人失去了家园,其中包括 12 名橡树资本的员工。除了生活各方面遭受严重扰乱之外,他们中的许多人还承受着极为负面的财务后果。这是因为许多人没有投保或投保不足,而这往往源于加州保险监管机构的行为。

加州政府的大部分权力牢牢掌握在民主党手中,该党总体上倾向于高度的积极干预,尤其是在经济事务方面。值得注意的是,由于民主党在州议会中占据绝对多数,并且对潜在的共和党对手几乎无所畏惧,民主党的民选官员无需为了通过立法或保住席位而收敛自己的行为。与支持租金管制(加州也有很多这种做法)一样,政府试图通过限制保险公司对火灾保险收取的保费来帮助房主。

为了体现时代特色,我会让我的新(且由人工智能驱动的)编辑助理 Perplexity 来为你补充背景信息。我简化了格式并添加了强调,但没有改一个词。下面这段内容与我花一两个小时写出来的东西相当接近:

在 2025 年毁灭性大火之前,加州的火灾保险市场就已陷入危机,这种状态是由监管限制、保险公司撤离以及日益加剧的野火风险共同造成的。

保险公司被禁止使用前瞻性巨灾模型来设定野火风险的费率,而是被法律要求依据过去 20 年的历史平均损失来确定费率。随着野火变得更加频繁和严重,这种方法的问题日益凸显,历史数据已无法有效预测未来风险。监管规定还阻止保险公司提高保费以反映再保险成本的增加,进一步限制了它们根据实际风险为保单定价的能力。

大型保险公司开始撤出加州市场,或停止在火灾高发地区承保新保单。丘博保险于 2021 年停止为高价值住宅承保新保单,好事达保险于 2022 年跟进,而该州最大的住宅保险公司州立农业保险则于 2023 年停止承保新保单。2024 年,州立农业保险宣布在全州范围内不续保超过 7 万份保单,其中包括太平洋帕利塞兹和阿尔塔迪纳等高风险地区的数千份保单,而这距离 2025 年大火仅有几个月。其他保险公司,包括东京海上美国公司及其子公司,也于 2024 年退出了市场。

设法保住保单的房主往往面临保费大幅上涨。例如,有些人发现他们的年保费从 4500 美元涨到了 18000 美元。结果,许多业主要么失去了保障,要么无力为自己的房产投保,导致

the needs of the community in terms of both condition and quantity. In other words, governments can limit the rents landlords can charge for their apartments, but they can’t make developers build new ones. These things can reduce overall societal welfare and interfere with the movement of resources to the use where they’re most productive. Fire Insurance in California Most unfortunately, earlier this year, in the aftermath of the Southern California wildfires, we witnessed an extreme economic consequence of overriding the laws of economics. When fires decimated the communities of Pacific Palisades and Altadena, thousands lost their homes, including a dozen Oaktree employees. On top of the severe disruption of all aspects of their lives, many of them are suffering extremely negative financial consequences. This is because many were uninsured or underinsured, often as a result of actions taken by California insurance regulators. Most of California’s government is firmly under the control of the Democratic party, which generally leans toward a high level of activism in general and intervention in economic matters in particular. Notably, because the Democrats hold a super-majority in the state legislature and have little fear of potential Republican opponents, Democratic elected officials don’t have to moderate their behavior to pass legislation or hold on to their seats. And just like the support for rent control – there’s a lot of that in California, too – the government sought to help out homeowners by limiting the premiums companies could charge for fire insurance. In a sign of the times, I’ll let my new (and AI-powered) editorial assistant, Perplexity, fill you in on the background. I’ve simplified the format and added emphasis, but I haven’t changed a word. What follows below is pretty close to what I would have produced in an hour or two: Before the devastating fires of 2025, California’s fire insurance market was already in a state of crisis, shaped by a combination of regulatory constraints, insurer withdrawals, and mounting wildfire risk. Insurers were prohibited from using forward-looking catastrophe models to set rates for wildfire risk. Instead, they were required by law to base their rates on historical average losses over the previous 20 years. This approach became increasingly problematic as wildfires grew more frequent and severe, making historical data a poor predictor of future risk. Regulations also prevented insurers from raising premiums to reflect increased reinsurance costs, further limiting their ability to price policies according to actual risk. Major insurers began withdrawing from the California market or ceasing to write new policies in fire-prone areas. Chubb stopped writing new policies for high-value homes in 2021, Allstate followed in 2022, and State Farm, the state’s largest home insurer, stopped writing new policies in 2023. In 2024, State Farm announced non-renewals for over 70,000 policies statewide, including thousands in high-risk areas like Pacific Palisades and Altadena, just months before the 2025 fires. Other insurers, including Tokio Marine America and its subsidiaries, also exited the market in 2024. Homeowners who managed to keep their policies often faced dramatic premium hikes. For example, some saw their annual premiums rise from $4,500 to $18,000. As a result, many property owners either lost coverage or could not afford to insure their properties, leading to

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大范围的保障不足。到 2025 年山火发生时,受影响房产中只有不到四分之一投保了火灾险。

州政府支持的 FAIR 计划,本意是作为最后手段的保险选项,在私营保险公司纷纷撤离后,参保人数激增。然而,FAIR 计划的保障范围有限,且保费高于私营保险,往往需要附加保单才能获得足够的保障。FAIR 计划对山火风险的敞口急剧上升,引发了对下一场灾难性火灾季中其偿付能力的担忧。

加州法律规定,在宣布进入紧急状态的地区,住宅保单的拒续和取消必须强制执行一年的暂停期。这一保护措施在重大山火后生效,但并不能阻止保险公司在紧急状态宣布之前退出或拒绝续保。

费率调整的监管审批流程变得越来越慢,平均审批时间从 157 天(2013–2019 年)拉长到 293 天(2020–2022 年)。这种拖延加剧了保险公司的挫败感,也加剧了市场的不稳定。

正如 Perplexity 所指出的,保险公司被告知,不能按照森林火灾频率和破坏性上升的幅度来给火灾保单定价。同样,它们也不能通过提价来转嫁再保险公司根据风险和破坏性上升而收取的更高再保费。

如果一栋价值 500 万美元的房子,在某一年有 1% 的概率被烧毁,而保险监管机构规定你每年只能收取 2.5 万美元的火灾保费,你会怎么做?(注意:我根本不需要 Perplexity 来告诉我,保险公司在这张保单上的预期赔付是 5 万美元:500 万美元的 1%。)答案很简单:你不签这张保单。

这个教训跟租金管制如出一辙,只是被这场灾难性的山火渲染得更加触目惊心。跟租金一样,你可以限制保险公司收取保费的额度,但你无法强迫它们按这个价格提供保险。在这个案例中,政府试图强行推行非市场化的解决方案,结果剥夺了许多人的保险保障,最终给成千上万的人带来了痛苦。

还有别的吗?哦,有的:关税呢?

以上是 2 页半的铺垫,现在进入我的正题:关税。自 4 月 2 日“解放日”以来,我们已有两个月的时间来思考这个问题,所以我打算来一次完整的讨论(同时也尽量保持客观、远离政治)。

首先,什么是关税?根据《韦氏词典》的定义,它是“一国政府对进口商品,或在某些国家对出口商品征收的税率表”。换句话说,它就是税。出口公司、出口国或进口公司可能会选择承担部分或全部关税,但前提是它们愿意花钱来维持自己在进口国的市场份额。否则,关税就会以涨价的形式转嫁给最终消费者。

美国为什么要加征关税?特朗普总统支持关税的立场,无疑源于他长期以来的信念:我们的商品贸易逆差(进口超过出口的部分——2024 年为 1.2 万亿美元)就是外国在宰我们的证据。用他自己的话说,“我们在贸易上每天亏 50 亿美元”。我不打算纠缠于我个人坚持的观点,即国际贸易本身并不是宰人——它实际上是公平交易,因为出口国拿到钱,进口国拿到货。

widespread underinsurance. By the time of the 2025 fires, fewer than a quarter of affected properties were insured against fire. The state-backed FAIR Plan, intended as a last-resort insurance option, saw a surge in enrollment as private insurers withdrew. However, FAIR Plan coverage is limited and more expensive than private insurance, often requiring supplemental policies to achieve adequate protection. The FAIR Plan’s exposure to wildfire risk increased dramatically, raising concerns about its solvency in the event of another catastrophic fire season. California law provided for a mandatory one-year moratorium on non-renewals and cancellations of residential insurance policies in areas affected by a declared state of emergency. This protection applied after major wildfires but did not prevent insurers from withdrawing or refusing to renew policies before such emergencies were declared. The regulatory approval process for rate changes became increasingly slow, with the average time for approval rising from 157 days (2013–2019) to 293 days (2020–2022). This lag contributed to insurer frustration and market instability. As Perplexity notes, insurers were told they couldn’t price fire policies to reflect increases in the frequency and severity of forest fires. Likewise, they couldn’t raise prices to pass through the higher premiums their reinsurers were charging based on the increased frequency and severity. If a $5 million house has a 1% probability of burning down in a given year and the insurance regulator says you can only charge $25,000 per year for a fire policy, what will you do? (Note: I didn’t need Perplexity to tell me the insurance company faces an expected payout of $50,000 on that policy: 1% of $5 million.) The answer’s simple: you don’t write that policy. The lesson here is the same as with rent control but rendered much more graphic by the catastrophic fires. Just as with rents, you can limit the price insurers can charge for coverage, but you can’t make them provide coverage at that price. In this case, governmental efforts to enforce a non-free-market solution deprived many of access to insurance, ultimately bringing misery to thousands. Anything Else? Oh Yes: What About Tariffs? That’s 2½ pages of prologue leading up to my main topic: tariffs. As we’ve had two months since “Liberation Day” on April 2 to think about them, I’m going to attempt a complete discussion (and also try to stay objective and apolitical). First, what is a tariff? According to Merriam-Webster, it’s “a schedule of duties imposed by a government on imported or in some countries exported goods.” In other words, it’s a tax. The exporting company, the exporting country, or the importing company might choose to pay some or all of the tariff, but only if they’re willing to spend money to maintain their market share in the importing country. Otherwise, the tariff will be paid by the end-consumer in the form of a price increase. Why is the U.S. raising tariffs? The reason for President Trump’s pro-tariff stance is no doubt his longheld conviction that our negative trade balance in goods (the amount by which our imports exceed our exports – $1.2 trillion in 2024) is proof that foreign countries are ripping us off. As he puts it, “we’re losing $5 billion dollars a day on trade.” I’ll leave aside my insistence that international trade isn’t a ripoff in itself – it’s literally a fair trade since the exporting country gets the money, and the importing

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国家能买到它想要的商品。我还得略过美国 2024 年 2900 亿美元的服务贸易顺差——这类东西发达国家往往乐于出口,比如金融、通信、信息服务,还有知识产权。

关税想达到什么目的?4 月 9 日,在我的备忘录《没人知道(又一次)》里,我猜测特朗普总统实施关税的目标如下:

country gets the goods it desires. I’ll also overlook the U.S.’s $290 billion positive trade balance in 2024 in services – things advanced countries would tend to sell, such as financial, communication, and information services, along with intellectual property. What are tariffs meant to achieve? On April 9, in my memo Nobody Knows (Yet Again), I guessed at President Trump’s goals in enacting them as follows: • • • • • • • •

支持美国制造业

抑制进口

鼓励出口

缩小或消除我们的贸易逆差

通过回流生产使供应链更加安全

阻止针对美国的不公平贸易行为

迫使其他国家回到谈判桌前

为美国财政部创造收入

support U.S. manufacturing discourage imports encourage exports shrink or eliminate our trade deficit make supply chains more secure through onshoring deter unfair trade practices aimed at the U.S. force other countries to the negotiating table generate revenue for the U.S. Treasury

正如我此前写过的,这八个目标每一项本身都值得追求,关税也确实应当有助于实现它们。从根本上说,提高进口商品的成本——而这正是关税的作用——应当朝着所有这些方向迈出一步。经济学中真正重要的问题是,还会产生哪些其他影响。

让我先岔开话题,做个贸易入门讲解。假设有两个国家,中间隔着一堵墙。在 A 国,工人每小时挣 100 美元,一辆汽车卖 5 万美元。在 B 国,工人每小时挣 50 美元,同样的汽车卖 3.5 万美元。因为没有跨境贸易,一切相安无事。

但如果这堵墙倒塌,某个有商业头脑的人会把汽车从 B 国运到 A 国,以 3.6 万美元的价格(加上 1000 美元运费)卖得火爆。严重的工资和价格不均衡——经济学家称之为失衡——在劳动力和商品可以自由流动的情况下无法持续。这就是贸易在起作用。因此,随着时间推移,工人会为了更高的工资从 B 国迁往 A 国。这会导致 A 国工资下降(可用工人增多)和 B 国工资上升(可用工人减少),最终,B 国的汽车不再便宜。关税就像上面假设的那堵墙。它们阻碍外国竞争,让国内制造商即使产品性价比更差,也能卖得出去。

假设我们实现了上面列出的前两个目标,这两者都属于所谓的“贸易保护主义”的可预见结果,因为关税保护国内产业免受外国入侵。如果进口商品因关税而变得更贵——或者干脆被贸易壁垒全面禁止——国内制造商面临的进口竞争就会减少。这对国内制造商及其工人是好事,但还会发生什么?第一,价格可能上涨;已有报道称,国内制造商在进口价格上涨的掩护下抬高售价。第二,他们可能开始生产劣质产品,因为不必再与进口商品竞争。第三,由于不必担心来自外国低薪工人的竞争,国内工人能够组建强大的工会并要求高薪,进一步推高国内商品的成本。于是,消费者比进口不受限制时付出更多,而出口量可能实际上下降,因为国内生产商可能在全球范围内失去竞争力。

美国提高关税是正确的吗?

我小时候,“外国车”这个说法几乎是自相矛盾。头两辆大众汽车于 1949 年进入美国。它们是当年约 7500 辆进口汽车中的一部分,仅占

As I also wrote, every one of these eight goals is desirable in itself and something tariffs should bring about. Essentially, raising the cost of imported goods – and that’s what tariffs do – should be a step in all these directions. The important question in economics is what other effects there might be. Let me digress a minute for a primer on trade. Assume there are two countries with a wall between them. In Country A, workers make $100 an hour and a car costs $50,000. In Country B, workers make $50 an hour and the same car costs $35,000. Because there’s no cross-border trade, all remains well and good. But if the wall comes down, some enterprising businessperson will ship cars from Country B to Country A, where they’ll sell like hotcakes at a price of $36,000 (adding in $1,000 for transportation). Highly unequal wages and prices – examples of what economists call disequilibria – can’t persist if things like labor and goods are mobile. That’s trade at work. Thus, over time, workers will move from Country B to Country A for the higher wages. That will cause wages in Country A to come down (more workers available) and wages in Country B to go up (fewer workers available) and, eventually, Country B’s cars to no longer be cheaper. Tariffs are like the wall posited above. They impede foreign competition, enabling domestic manufacturers to sell their products even if they represent an inferior bargain. Let’s say we accomplish the first two goals listed above, both of which are among the foreseeable results of what’s called “protectionism,” because tariffs protect domestic industries from encroachment from abroad. If imports are rendered more expensive by tariffs – or if they’re banned altogether by trade barriers – domestic manufacturers face reduced competition from imports. That’s good for domestic manufacturers and their workers, but what else happens? First, prices might rise; there are already reports of domestic manufacturers raising prices under the umbrella of higher import prices. Second, they may begin producing inferior goods because they don’t have to compete against imports. Third, because they don’t have to worry about competition from low-paid workers in foreign countries, domestic workers are able to form strong labor unions and demand high wages, further adding to the cost of domestic goods. Thus, consumers pay more than they would if imports were unconstrained, and the volume of exports may actually decline, since domestic producers might become globally uncompetitive. Is the U.S. Right to Raise Tariffs? When I was a boy, the phrase “foreign car” was practically an oxymoron. The first two Volkswagens came to America in 1949. They were among roughly 7,500 cars imported that year, representing only

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0.03%——也就是千分之零点三——在美国所有售出的汽车中只占这么点比例。但根据白宫 3 月发布的一份情况说明书,2024 年美国售出的 1600 万辆汽车中有一半是进口车,其中包括 50 万辆大众汽车。为什么?

外国制造商取得成功的原因有不少,包括质量、工程设计和营销,但一个主要原因是消费者得出结论:美国制造的汽车比外国车更贵,但并没有相应更好。(我的第一辆车是奥兹莫比尔 Cutlass,1965 年花 3200 美元买的,而一辆大众甲壳虫只需一半价钱。)美国汽车工人能拿到比德国或日本工人更高的工资,外加一揽子独特的福利待遇,包括终身医疗保障,据说 2008 年这笔费用摊到每辆车上是 1900 美元。这构成了巨大的竞争负担。美国产汽车的销售一直很红火,直到国际贸易兴起,进口车涌上我们的海岸,这时进口车把经济现实强加给了成本结构更高、产品老旧的美国三大汽车制造商。(必须指出,大众汽车成功打入美国市场据说得到了德国政府补贴的帮助。)

结果就是国内生产商销量流失,生产向海外转移。这种情况本来能避免吗?除非美国工人愿意接受与其他国家工人相当的工资水平,否则工作岗位流向国外恐怕不可避免。面对新的外国竞争,美国汽车制造商本可以通过提高质量或提升生产率来应对,但长期来看,他们不太可能抵消自己的高成本结构。

英国经济历史学家尼尔·弗格森在 4 月 10 日——新关税刚出台后——做了一期很棒的播客。他在其中说:

每一个实现工业化的经济体,从 18 世纪末到 19 世纪再到 20 世纪,都会在某个节点达到一个峰值,大致是人均 GDP 达到 4 万美元(估计按今天的美元计)的时候,此后制造业占就业的比重就开始下降。所有发达经济体的下降轨迹基本一致,因为人们从工厂工作流向服务业岗位,后者体力要求更低、对教育要求更高。所以这种情况到处都发生了,不光是美国……

换句话说,进步让国家沿着曲线从勉强糊口走向繁荣,一路上从农业经济转向制造业经济再转向服务业经济。美国经济的成功让许多工人离开了制造业部门。结果,如今我们的非农就业中只有 8% 在制造业,而 1950 年大约是 30%。根据弗格森的研究,这大概与汽车行业本身或他国施加的不公平贸易做法关系不大。而且大概也不是因为人们在制造业找不到工作:根据劳工统计局的数据,如今美国制造业有大约 40 万个职位空缺,没人急着去填补。

道理很简单,一个国家不可能在人均收入和生活水平上领先他国,却还指望继续以制造业经济为主。我们也不可能回到制造业经济。以下是尼尔·弗格森的更多论述:

我们回不到 1950 年代,或者说回不到 1910 年代,无论社会层面还是经济层面都回不去。没有任何一种世界图景里,这些政策能带来再工业化。

0.03% – that’s three one-hundredths of a percent – of all cars sold in the U.S. But in 2024, according to a fact sheet published by the White House in March, half the 16 million vehicles sold in the U.S. were imports, and they included 500,000 Volkswagens (usimportdata.com). Why? There were a number of reasons for the success of the foreign manufacturers, including quality, engineering and marketing, but one main reason was that consumers concluded that cars made in the U.S. were more expensive than foreign cars but not correspondingly better. (My first car, an Oldsmobile Cutlass, cost $3,200 in 1965, and a Volkswagen Beetle cost just half as much.) U.S. auto workers were able to command higher wages than those paid in Germany or Japan, plus a unique fringe benefit package including lifetime medical care, which was said in 2008 to amount to $1,900 per car. This represented a tremendous competitive burden. Sales of cars made in the U.S. were brisk until the rise of international trade brought imports to our shores, at which point the imports imposed economic reality upon the Big Three U.S. auto makers, with their higher cost structures and dated products. (It must be noted that Volkswagen’s success in penetrating the U.S. market is said to have been aided by subsidies from the German government.) The result was lost sales for domestic producers and the movement of production overseas. Could this have been avoided? Only if U.S. workers were willing to work at wages comparable to those paid to workers in other countries. Otherwise, the movement of jobs to foreign countries was probably inevitable. U.S. automakers could have responded to the new foreign competition by improving quality or boosting productivity, but it’s unlikely they would be able to offset their higher cost structures in the long run. Niall Ferguson, the British economic historian, did an excellent podcast on April 10, just after the new tariffs were introduced. In it, he said: Every single economy that industrialized, from the late 18th century through the 19th century into the 20th century, reached a peak at some point along the way, roughly when the per capita GDP reached $40,000 [presumably in today’s dollars], after which manufacturing as a share of employment declined. And the decline is essentially identical for all developed economies, as people move out of working in factories and move into service-sector jobs, which are less physically demanding and require more education. So that happened everywhere. It wasn’t just in the United States. . . . In other words, progress takes countries up the curve from subsistence to prosperity, and along the way they transition from agriculture- to manufacturing- to service-based economics. The success of the U.S. economy caused many of its workers to leave the manufacturing sector. As a result, only 8% of our nonfarm jobs are in manufacturing today, down from about 30% in 1950. According to Ferguson’s research, that probably didn’t have much to do with the automobile industry in particular or with unfair trade practices applied by other nations. And it’s probably not because people couldn’t find jobs in manufacturing: according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are about 400,000 job openings today in U.S. manufacturing, and no one’s rushing to fill them. It stands to reason that a country cannot pull ahead of others in terms of per capita income and standard of living and expect to continue as mainly a manufacturing economy. And neither can we return to being one. Here’s more from Niall Ferguson: We cannot go back to the 1950s, or for that matter to the 1910s, not socially, and not economically. There is not a world in which these policies could lead to the reindustrialization of

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美国之所以如此,是因为在这个国家搞制造业,成本比几乎世界任何其他地方都要高得多……

政府若决定某些商品应当在国内生产,某些产业应当受到保护,这或许是恰当的。

the United States, because it is way more expensive to do manufacturing in this country than it is to do it practically anywhere else . . . It can be appropriate for a government to decide that certain goods should be made domestically and certain industries should be protected. •

最典型的例子,就是国家安全受到威胁的时候。我们可能会得出结论,军队不应该去国外采购防务物资,因为我们不想依赖外国供应商,尤其是那些可能成为对手的国家。如果还需要更多说服力,乔·诺切拉 5 月 6 日在《自由新闻》上发表了一篇文章,题为“保护主义的思想教父”,其中写道:

如果说还有人怀疑美国让中国接管如此多的制造业是在拿国家安全冒险,那么新冠疫情彻底打消了这种怀疑。细看之下,美国需要中国来造船、获取稀土矿产、出口半导体以及成千上万的其他必需产品……(引述拉娜·福鲁哈尔的话)“人们终于醒悟过来,我们 80% 的供应链已经外包给了我们最大的战略竞争对手。”

The obvious example is when national security is at stake. We might conclude that our military shouldn’t buy defense materiel abroad, since we don’t want to be dependent on foreign suppliers, especially those in countries that could be antagonists. If you need further persuasion, Joe Nocera wrote this in a May 6 article in The Free Press titled “The Intellectual Godfathers of Protectionism”: If there was any doubt that America had put its security at risk in allowing the Chinese to take over so much manufacturing, COVID put it to rest. A closer look showed that the US needed China to build its ships, to gain access to rare-earth minerals, to export its semiconductors and literally thousands of other necessary products. . . . [Quoting Rana Foroohar], “People finally woke up to the fact that 80 percent of our supply chain had been outsourced to our biggest strategic rival.”

关税也可以合理地对一个对国民身份认同至关重要的标志性产业实施保护。瑞士人或许想禁止进口带孔的白奶酪,正如法国人可能禁止进口带气泡的白葡萄酒一样。

A tariff also might reasonably be enacted to protect an iconic industry that’s important to national identity. The Swiss might want to bar imports of white cheese with holes in it, just as the French might prohibit importation of white wine with bubbles.

最后,对于采用不公平贸易手段的国家,比如补贴本国生产商、拒绝外国企业进入本国市场,美国完全有可能对其加征关税。关税鹰派认为,其他国家多年来一直这么干,才导致我们出现巨额贸易逆差。

Lastly, tariffs might well be applied against countries that employ unfair trade practices, such as subsidizing their domestic producers and denying foreign companies access to their markets. Tariff hawks assert that other countries have been doing things like this for years, leading to our massive trade deficit.

政府在这种情况下可以选择征收关税,哪怕这会干扰自由市场的运作。在所谓的“解放日”之前,我们听到的论调是主张“定向关税”,即选择性地对某些商品征税以实现这些目标。但这与对所有国家的所有商品征税截然不同。政府不能要求一切产品都在国内生产而不付出代价。事实上,鉴于美国比大多数其他国家更大、更富,我们难道不是不可避免地从其他国家购买的东西会多于它们从我们这里购买的吗?

关税本质上是一种努力,旨在促使商品在国内生产,即使同等的外国商品更便宜或更好(或两者兼而有之)。政府可以通过设置壁垒将外国商品拒之门外或使其更加昂贵来实现这一目标。这保护了国内产业和国内工人,但代价是国内消费者(以及全球福祉)的利益。这是一种权衡——正是自由市场所要求的,而那些希望强制经济结果的领导者却宁愿忽视的东西。

还有其他我们可以舍弃的法律吗?

我现在暂且放下废除经济学规律的话题,转而简要谈谈我们选出的官员们对无视这些规律的意愿。我将讨论两个例子。

第一个与财政纪律有关。简而言之,美国政府习惯性地支出超过收入,我认为这是我们国家正在发生的最糟糕的事情之一。正如我在《无人知晓》中所提到的,

Governments can opt to levy tariffs in cases like these, even if they interfere with the operation of the free market. The argument we heard before the so-called Liberation Day was for “targeted tariffs” that would be applied selectively to accomplish these goals. But that’s different from taxing all goods from all countries. Governments can’t require everything to be made at home without consequences. Indeed, given that the U.S. is bigger and richer than most other countries, isn’t it inescapable that we’ll buy more from other countries than they’ll buy from us? Tariffs are, primarily, an effort to cause goods to be made domestically even when equivalent foreign goods are cheaper or better (or both). Governments can make that happen by erecting barriers that keep foreign goods out or make them more expensive. That protects domestic industries and domestic workers, but at the expense of domestic consumers (and global welfare). That’s a tradeoff – the kind of thing free markets require and leaders who would mandate economic outcomes would prefer to ignore. Any Other Laws We Can Dispense With? I’ll now leave the subject of repealing the laws of economics to comment briefly on our elected officials’ willingness to ignore them. I’ll discuss two examples. The first relates to fiscal discipline. In short, the U.S. government habitually spends more than it takes in, and I think this is one of the very worst things going on in our country. As I mentioned in Nobody Knows

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(再次强调,)美国之所以能这样做,是因为迄今为止世界给了它几乎无限的信贷,而且利率特别低。结果是过去 45 年里有 41 年出现财政赤字,最近五年赤字都超过万亿美元。如果你的小舅子也这么过日子,你会说他不负责任。

经济学家约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯在 1930 年代说过,如果经济增长太慢,无法创造所需就业岗位,政府就应该实行赤字支出。通过这种方式——支出比税收多投入经济——刺激经济增长,进而创造就业。然后,等繁荣恢复,政府应该实现盈余——支出少于收入——并偿还债务。如今,美国两党政客都习惯无视赤字花钱,而盈余和还债那部分早已被遗忘。例如,2024 财年,美国在繁荣时期仍出现了约 1.8 万亿美元赤字,占 GDP 的 6.4%。

如果我们继续每年以超过 GDP 增速的速度借款并增加国债,在利率不变的情况下,利息账单将占预算越来越大的比例,加剧未来赤字和债务。利息占 GDP 的比重会复利式增长,债务也一样。我们每年在利息上的支出已经超过国防开支。如果未来利率上升——无论是因通胀还是美国信用地位恶化——而且低利率到期债务需要在更高利率环境中置换,利息账单还会进一步飙升。我们还能让债务增速快于 GDP 多久?

没人能说清具体时间,但有理由假设我们最终会到达一个临界点:信贷不再无限,利率不再那么低。正如沃伦·巴菲特在 5 月 3 日伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东大会上所说:

我们现在运行的财政赤字,长期来看是不可持续的。我们不知道那是两年还是二十年,因为从来没有像美国这样的国家。但你知道,这件事不能永远持续下去……而且它在某个时刻会变得失控。

解决起来不容易,巴菲特接着说,因为我们养成了糟糕的支出习惯,领导人为了讨好选民而维持低税率。解决方案只有两个可能的部分:削减支出和/或扩大收入。没人想被加税,也没人想看到自己受益的项目被削减。因为需要的是紧缩,而紧缩的方方面面都不讨喜,华盛顿几乎没人真心寻求解决方案。特朗普总统试图通过埃隆·马斯克及其政府效率部削减“浪费、欺诈和滥用”,但潜在节省金额从 2 万亿美元降到 1 万亿美元,最终最多只有几千亿美元,相对而言是个无关紧要的数字。

与此同时,众议院通过了一项法案,延长 2017 年颁布、原定今年到期的减税政策。与让减税按时到期相比,延长它们将大幅增加赤字。此外,该法案还包括一些奇怪的减收项目,例如免除加班费和小费的税收,并提高老年人的标准扣除额。无党派的国会预算办公室估计,该法案将在未来十年累计增加 2.4 万亿美元赤字。众议院怎么能在 2025 年 5 月通过一个既不增税也不减支的法案?惯常的回应是,该法案——尤其是减税——将刺激经济,使赤字和债务占 GDP 的比重缩小。我认为可以说,这一招至今没有奏效。

(Yet Again), the U.S. is able to do this because to date the world has given it virtually unlimited credit at particularly low interest rates. The result has been fiscal deficits in 41 of the last 45 years and trilliondollar-plus deficits in all of the last five. If your brother-in-law behaved this way, you’d call him irresponsible. Economist John Maynard Keynes said in the 1930s that if an economy is growing too slowly to produce the needed jobs, the government should engage in deficit spending. By doing so – putting more into the economy through spending than it takes out in taxes – it stimulates economic growth and thus job creation. And then, when prosperity is restored, the government should run a surplus – spending less than it takes in – and pay down the debt. Today, U.S. politicians from both parties are in the habit of spending without regard to the deficit, and the part about surpluses and paydowns has been forgotten. In fiscal year 2024, for example, the U.S. ran a deficit of roughly $1.8 trillion, or 6.4% of GDP, in a time of prosperity. If we continue to borrow and add to the national debt every year at a rate that exceeds the growth of GDP, the interest bill at a constant interest rate will take up a bigger and bigger percentage of the budget, adding to future deficits and debt. The interest bill will compound as a percentage of GDP, and so will the debt. We already spend more on interest each year than on defense. And the interest bill will soar further if rates rise in the future – whether in response to inflation or deterioration of the U.S.’s creditworthiness – and maturing low-rate debt has to be replaced in a higher-rate environment. How long can we increase debt faster than GDP? No one can say when, but it makes sense to assume we’ll eventually reach a point at which our credit is no longer unlimited and our interest rates are no longer so low. As Warren Buffett said at the May 3 Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting: We’re operating at a fiscal deficit now that is unsustainable over a very long period of time. We don’t know whether that means two years or 20 years, because there’s never been a country like the United States. But you know, this is something that can’t go on forever . . . and it has the aspect to it that it gets uncontrollable at a certain point. Fixing this won’t be easy, as Buffett went on to say, because we’ve developed bad spending habits and leaders have pandered to voters by keeping taxes low. There are only two possible parts to the solution: curtail spending and/or expand revenues. No one wants to be taxed higher, and no one wants to see the programs they benefit from reduced. Because what’s required is austerity, all aspects of which are unpleasant, few people in Washington genuinely pursue a solution. President Trump tried to cut “waste, fraud and abuse” through Elon Musk and his Department of Government Efficiency, but the potential savings went from $2 trillion to $1 trillion and ended up in the low hundreds of billions of dollars at most, which is a relatively immaterial amount. At the same time, the House of Representatives has passed a bill that would extend tax cuts that were enacted in 2017 and supposed to end this year. Extending them would significantly increase the deficit relative to what it would be if the cuts were permitted to expire as scheduled. In addition, the bill includes some quirky revenue reducers, such as exempting overtime pay and tips from taxation and increasing the standard deduction for senior citizens. The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimates the bill will add an aggregate $2.4 trillion to the deficit over the next 10 years. How could the House have passed a bill in May 2025 that neither raised taxes nor cut spending? The rejoinder, as usual, is that the bill – and especially the tax cuts – will stimulate the economy, causing the deficits and the debt to shrink as a percentage of GDP. I think it’s fair to say this tactic hasn’t worked to date.

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我们根本没有在解决赤字问题。既没有落实有意义的支出削减,也没有增税。支出不应超过收入这个理念,早已被抛到九霄云外。乔治·F. 威尔在 5 月 28 日《华盛顿邮报》的一篇文章里列出了进步主义的九条信条,其中一条是:“无限度地向未来的美国人借钱,来为今天美国人的政府商品和服务消费买单。”我认为这句话精准概括了华盛顿上下的整体思维,除了少数真正的财政保守派之外。

社会保障的资金问题同样如此。我们的社保制度当初是按现收现付设计的,不是靠一笔基金生息来支付福利的养老基金。你缴的税用来支付退休人员的福利,同样,你退休时领的福利,来自那时在职者缴的税。过去,相对于退休人数,在职人数众多,税收收入超过福利支出,盈余积累进了社会保障信托基金。

如今的问题是,缴纳社保的在职人数与领取社保的退休人数之比已经下降。此外,退休者寿命更长,但在职者缴税年限并没有延长。因此,流入的税收相对于流出的福利支出已经下降,不足以支付福利,差额要靠动用信托基金来弥补。

算术很简单:信托基金里有 x 美元,按国债利率赚取利息。通过预测在职者和退休者的人数增长、福利支出和预期寿命,你可以有相当的把握估算出,如果不采取纠正措施,信托基金将在哪一年耗尽。那一年是 2035 年。到那时,要么(a)削减福利支出,使其与税收收入相等(据估计,税收收入只能支付承诺福利的 79%);要么(b)差额由美国联邦政府总预算补上,进一步加重赤字。这一段里没有任何猜测成分。

解决这个问题有很多办法,包括以下这些:

We’re simply not tackling our deficits. We’re not implementing meaningful spending cuts or tax increases. The idea that spending shouldn’t exceed revenues is completely out the window. George F. Will listed nine tenets of progressivism in a May 28 article in The Washington Post, and one was as follows: “limitless borrowing from future Americans to fund today’s Americans’ consumption of government goods and services.” I think that absolutely nails the thinking that guides all of Washington, with the exception of the rare true fiscal conservative. The same is true with regard to the funding of Social Security. Our Social Security program was designed as a pay-as-you-go program, not a funded endowment that spins off benefit payments like a pension fund. Your tax payments are used to pay benefits to people who are retired, and in the same way, your benefits in retirement will come out of taxes paid by those working at that time. In the past, when many people were working relative to the number who had retired, tax receipts exceeded benefit payments, and the surplus accumulated in the Social Security Trust Funds. Today, the problem is that the number of workers paying into Social Security has fallen relative to the number of retirees taking out. In addition, retirees are living longer, but workers aren’t paying taxes longer. Thus, tax revenues coming in have fallen relative to benefit payments going out, and they are insufficient to pay benefits. The difference is made up by drawing from the Trust Funds. The math is simple: there are x dollars in the Trust Funds, and they earn interest at Treasury rates. By projecting growth in the number of workers and retirees, benefit payments and life expectancies, you can estimate with some confidence the year when, in the absence of corrective action, the Trust Funds will be exhausted. That year is 2035. At that point, either (a) benefit payments will have to be cut so that they equal tax receipts (and it’s estimated that receipts will be sufficient to pay only 79% of the promised benefits) or (b) the shortfall will have to be paid from the general U.S. government budget, further adding to the deficit. Nothing in this paragraph is conjecture. There are many options for solving this problem. They include the following: • • • • • •

提高社会保障税税率

增加征收社会保障税的收入基数(当前上限为 17.61 万美元)

提高退休年龄

缩减退休福利

降低生活成本调整

实施收入门槛测试,随着退休者收入增加逐步削减福利

raise the Social Security tax rate increase the amount of earnings on which Social Security tax is paid (the current cap is $176,100) raise the retirement age shrink retirement benefits reduce the cost-of-living adjustment apply a means-based test, phasing out benefits as a retiree’s income rises

问题在于,上述所有方案在选民中都会极度不得人心。想必正因如此,两党在一件事上倒是达成了共识:“对社会保障制度碰都不碰。” 因而,这件事十多年来从未得到处理。在你所在的组织里,如果高管们对这样一个可预见的问题视而不见,会落得什么下场?

我所属于的婴儿潮一代——即 1946 年至 1964 年间出生的人——人数异常庞大,财富占比偏高,投票意愿也大概率高于平均水平。因此,他们拥有巨大的政治影响力,在 2020 年总统大选中投出了 38% 的选票。所有婴儿潮一代都已退休或临近退休,没有哪个政客想得罪他们。于是,民选官员们承受不了修补社会保障制度带来的政治压力,干脆把球踢到一边。结果就是,社会保障信托基金的破产几乎注定会在大约十年后发生。

咱们说回个人。我满 70 岁才开始领社会保障金,这是能领到的最高年龄档,现在每月能拿 4612 美元。这太离谱了:我和其他富裕的婴儿潮一代根本不该领社会保障金。

The problem is that all the above would be wildly unpopular with voters. It’s assumedly for that reason that the two political parties have one thing they agree on: “hands off Social Security.” Thus, it hasn’t been dealt with in over a decade. What would happen to executives in your organization who turned a blind eye to such a foreseeable problem? The members of the Baby Boomer generation to which I belong – people born between 1946 and 1964 – are unusually numerous, disproportionately affluent and probably above average in tendency to vote. Thus, they have significant political influence, having cast 38% of the votes in the 2020 presidential election. All the Boomers are in or near retirement, and no politician wants to antagonize them. Thus, elected officials can’t stand the political heat associated with fixing Social Security, so they punt. As a result, the insolvency of the Social Security Trust Funds is sure to occur only ten years or so from now. Let’s get personal. I started getting Social Security when I turned 70, the latest possible opportunity, and I now receive $4,612 per month. That’s ridiculous: I and other wealthy Boomers shouldn’t get Social

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社保福利。和国债一样,社保相关的问题会留给后代去应付。这事关代际公平,严重得很,值得关注,却没人理会。

我们的民选官员也许觉得现状能永远维持下去,更可能的是,他们指望在车轮散架之前自己已经卸任了。但说真的,他们没在直面现实。华盛顿在财政赤字和社保岌岌可危这两件事上的做派,让我想起那个从 20 层楼跳下来的家伙。经过 10 楼时,他说:“到目前为止,一切顺利。”

Security benefits. As with the national debt, the problems associated with Social Security will be left for our descendants to deal with. This is a matter of serious generational equity that deserves attention but doesn’t receive it. Our elected officials may believe the status quo can be maintained forever, or more likely they count on being out of office by the time the wheels come off. But certainly, they’re not facing up to reality. The behavior in Washington with regard to both the fiscal deficit and the precariousness of Social Security remind me of the tale of the guy who jumped off the 20-story building. As he passed the 10th floor, he said, “So far, so good.” *

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当经济规律得以正常发挥作用时,它会提供激励,鼓励创新、提高生产率和效率,从而创造繁荣并优化整体福利。例如,全球化带来了“比较优势”的好处,在这一优势下,每个国家都生产自己能够做得更好、更便宜的东西,结果,各地消费者都能享受到质量与价格的最佳组合。在这一过程中,生产国的工人也因劳动获得了尽可能高的报酬。

当保险公司被允许自主决定业务和定价政策时,市场竞争将带来最佳解决方案,即在承保范围充足且价格公平方面达到最优。

当然,优化整体福利与确保每个人都能致富是两回事。一个缺乏比较优势的国家的工人,如果没有关税和贸易壁垒的保护,可能会失业或面临工资下降。而保险购买者支付的保费,也可能高于保险监管机构限制保费时所支付的金额。

要追求普遍繁荣和“公平”——即没有赢家和输家——唯一途径是政府强制推行。但这类努力从未成功过,正如上文以及《我们是否应废除经济规律?》一文所述。它在苏联行不通,在让房主免受加州山火经济冲击方面也未能奏效。

更好的方式是让政府允许市场自由运作,同时应对不良副作用。例如,确保安全网为失业工人提供收入支持和再培训,并确保企业和国家不从事不当的反竞争行为。以这种方式选择限制影响可能会涉及取舍,社会可以合理地决定承担这些成本。

以上所有问题的底线是,自由市场经济不会产生完美的解决方案,但试图大力控制它们只会让事情变得更糟。不可能有让所有人都如愿以偿的解决办法。然而,综合考虑,经济规律会引领我们达到能够实现的最佳方案。

2025 年 6 月 18 日

When allowed to function, the laws of economics provide incentives that encourage innovation, productivity and efficiency, creating prosperity and optimizing overall welfare. For example, globalization delivers the benefits of “comparative advantage,” under which each country produces the things it can make better and cheaper and, as a result, consumers everywhere enjoy the best possible combination of quality and price. In the process, workers in the producing nations receive the highest possible pay for their labor. And when insurance companies are permitted to pursue business and price policies as they choose, market competition will yield the best possible solution in terms of coverage that’s available and fairly priced. Of course, optimizing overall welfare is different from ensuring that all individuals prosper. Workers in a country that lacks comparative advantage may lose their jobs or see their wages decline if not protected by tariffs and trade barriers. And buyers of insurance may pay more for coverage than they would if insurance commissioners limited premiums. The only way to strive for universal prosperity and “fairness” – no winners and losers – is for government to mandate it. But the efforts to do so have never been successful, as described above and in Shall We Repeal the Laws of Economics? It didn’t work for the Soviet Union, and it didn’t work in shielding homeowners from the economic impact of the California wildfires. The much better way is for governments to allow markets to operate freely and deal with undesirable side effects. Examples include making sure a safety net gives workers who lose their jobs income support and retraining, as well as making sure companies and countries don’t engage in improper, anti-competitive practices. Choosing to limit effects in this way may involve tradeoffs, with costs that a society can reasonably decide to bear. The bottom line on all the above is that free-market economies don’t produce perfect solutions, but efforts to significantly control them make things much worse. There can be no solution that gives everyone what they want. All things considered, however, the laws of economics lead to the best solutions that can be attained. June 18, 2025

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