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Viewpoints | January 05, 2021
Viewpoints | January 05, 2021
等待最后一舞
Waiting for the Last Dance
晚期重大泡沫中资产配置的风险
The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble
作者:杰里米·格兰瑟姆
By Jeremy Grantham
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等待最后一舞
Waiting for the Last Dance
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资产配置团队
Asset Allocation Team
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Jeremy Grantham
Jeremy Grantham
长期投资策略师,联合创始人
Long-Term Investment Strategist, Co-Founder
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格兰瑟姆先生于 1977 年共同创立了 GMO,目前是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,担任公司的长期投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会的成员,也曾在多家非营利组织的投资委员会任职。在创立 GMO 之前,格兰瑟姆先生于 1969 年联合创立了 Batterymarch 金融管理公司,并在 1971 年推荐了商业指数化投资,这被认为是多项“首创”之一。他的投资生涯始于荷兰皇家壳牌公司的经济学家职位。格兰瑟姆先生获得英国谢菲尔德大学的本科学位和哈佛商学院的 MBA 学位。他是美国艺术与科学院院士,持有英国 CBE 勋章,并曾获得卡内基慈善奖章。
Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a member of GMO’s Asset Allocation team, serving as the firm’s long-term investment strategist. He is a member of the GMO Board of Directors and has also served on the investment boards of several non-profit organizations. Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. He is a member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE from the UK and is a recipient of the Carnegie Medal for Philanthropy.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
自 2009 年以来的漫长牛市,终于完全成熟,演变成了一场彻头彻尾的史诗级泡沫。其特征是极度高估、价格爆炸式上涨、疯狂的发行以及歇斯底里的投机性投资者行为。我相信,这一事件将被载入金融史的伟大泡沫之列,与南海泡沫、1929 年和 2000 年相提并论。
The long, long bull market since 2009 has finally matured into a fully-fledged epic bubble. Featuring extreme overvaluation, explosive price increases, frenzied issuance, and hysterically speculative investor behavior, I believe this event will be recorded as one of the great bubbles of financial history, right along with the South Sea bubble, 1929, and 2000.
正是在这些大泡沫中,财富被创造和毁灭——也是投资者真正证明自己的时刻。因为调整投资组合以避开重大泡沫破裂带来的最大痛苦,可能是最困难的部分。行业内的每一个职业激励和人类个体心理的每一个缺陷,都会共同作用,把投资者吸引进来。
These great bubbles are where fortunes are made and lost – and where investors truly prove their mettle. For positioning a portfolio to avoid the worst pain of a major bubble breaking is likely the most difficult part. Every career incentive in the industry and every fault of individual human psychology will work toward sucking investors in.
但无论美联储多么努力地试图支撑它,这个泡沫终将在适当的时候破裂,并对经济和投资组合造成破坏性影响。请记住——对于当今的大多数投资者而言,这很可能将是你投资生涯中最为重要的事件。作为一位市场的老学生和历史研究者,这既让人在智力上感到兴奋,同时也令人恐惧。能够再一次经历这样的市场,是一种荣幸。
But this bubble will burst in due time, no matter how hard the Fed tries to support it, with consequent damaging effects on the economy and on portfolios. Make no mistake – for the majority of investors today, this could very well be the most important event of your investing lives. Speaking as an old student and historian of markets, it is intellectually exciting and terrifying at the same time. It is a privilege to ride through a market like this one more time.
“你永远无法改变的一个现实是,价格更高的资产所产生的回报必然低于价格更低的资产。你不可能鱼与熊掌兼得。你可以现在享受,也可以在遥远的未来稳步享受,但不能两者兼得——而我们为市场不断走高所付出的代价,就是从高位起算的未来十年回报率会更低。”1
“The one reality that you can never change is that a higher-priced asset will produce a lower return than a lower-priced asset. You can’t have your cake and eat it. You can enjoy it now, or you can enjoy it steadily in the distant future, but not both – and the price we pay for having this market go higher and higher is a lower 10-year return from the peak.” 1
大多数时候,也许四分之三的时间,主要资产类别之间的相对定价是合理的。正确的应对方式是对那些衡量下来更便宜的资产进行适度押注,并希望这些衡量结果是正确的。在具备合理资产估值技能的情况下,基于估值的资产配置者可以期望在这些阶段完好无损地存活下来,并取得微小的超额收益。说“微小”,是因为机会本身很小。如果不客气地说,在此阶段的资产配置不太可能非常重要。在这些时期,如果管理者还能在执行层面增加价值——通过有效选择国家、行业、产业、个股以及主要资产类别——那当然会有所帮助。
Most of the time, perhaps three-quarters of the time, major asset classes are reasonably priced relative to one another. The correct response is to make modest bets on those assets that measure as being cheaper and hope that the measurements are correct. With reasonable skill at evaluating assets the valuation-based allocator can expect to survive these phases intact with some small outperformance. “Small” because the opportunities themselves are small. If you wanted to be unfriendly you could say that asset allocation in this phase is unlikely to be very important. It would certainly help in these periods if the manager could also add value in the implementation, from the effective selection of countries, sectors, industries, and individual securities as well as major asset classes.
不过,资产配置的真正麻烦在于剩下的那些时候,即资产价格大幅偏离公允价值。在熊市中这还不算太糟,因为重要的熊市往往短暂而猛烈。客户最初的的反应通常是震惊到无所作为,在此期间,管理者有时间重新调整投资组合和说辞,以留住业务。真正的问题在于持续数年的重大牛市。漫长、慢热的牛市可以在高于公允价值的状态下持续多年,甚至超出公允价值两倍、三倍或四倍长达数年。这些事件很容易超出大多数客户的耐心极限。而当价格上涨极为迅速时(通常在牛市末期),耐心之后便是焦虑和嫉妒。正如我喜欢说的,没有什么比看着邻居发财更令人恼火的了。
The real trouble with asset allocation, though, is in the remaining times when asset prices move far away from fair value. This is not so bad in bear markets because important bear markets tend to be short and brutal. The initial response of clients is usually to be shocked into inaction during which phase the manager has time to reposition both portfolio and arguments to retain the business. The real problem is in major bull markets that last for years. Long, slow-burning bull markets can spend many years above fair value and even two, three, or four years far above. These events can easily outlast the patience of most clients. And when price rises are very rapid, typically toward the end of a bull market, impatience is followed by anxiety and envy. As I like to say, there is nothing more supremely irritating than watching your neighbors get rich.
客户如何区分极端市场行为和管理者迷失了方向?通常,证明才能的证据是过去的成功,但市场的长周期少之又少。连续赢下两场或三场比赛,并比不上更大样本容量那样有说服力。更糟糕的是,之前的重大市场崩盘早已远去:2008 年、2000 年,或日本的 1989 年,几乎都成了历史记载。大多数参与者早已改变。当然,那些最终在很久以前获胜的人所感受到的满足感,对于你个人当前所承受的痛苦来说,没有任何安慰作用。更简单的说法也许是,如果凯恩斯真的说过“市场保持非理性的时间可能比你保持偿付能力的时间更长”,他说的就是对的。
How are clients to tell the difference between extreme market behavior and a manager who has lost his way? The usual evidence of talent is past success, but the long cycles of the market are few and far between. Winning two out of two events or three out of three is not as convincing as a larger sample size would be. Even worse the earlier major market breaks are already long gone: 2008, 2000, or 1989 in Japan are practically in the history books. Most of the players will have changed. Certainly, the satisfaction felt by others who eventually won long ago is no solace for current pain experienced by you personally. A simpler way of saying this may be that if Keynes really had said, “The market can stay irrational longer than the investor can stay solvent,” he would have been right.
我早已从投资组合管理的工作中退休,但我很乐意在此发表我的看法:美国市场极有可能正处于一次重大泡沫事件之中,其类型通常每隔几十年出现一次,上一次是在 1990 年代末。它很可能会以糟糕的结局收场,尽管没有什么事情是确定的。我还要告诉你我对成功判断熊市呼声的定义。很简单,就是迟早会有一个时刻,投资者会为之前退出市场而感到高兴。也就是说,他通过退出市场保住了资金,并且在完整周期中降低了风险或波动性。这个成功的定义绝对不包括精确的择时。(预测泡沫何时破裂与估值无关。以往的泡沫市场都极度高估,这次也一样。高估是泡沫破裂的必要条件,但非充分条件。)要准确指出顶部在哪一周、哪一月或哪一季度几乎是不可能的。
I am long retired from the job of portfolio management but I am happy to give my opinion here: it is highly probable that we are in a major bubble event in the U.S. market, of the type we typically have every several decades and last had in the late 1990s. It will very probably end badly, although nothing is certain. I will also tell you my definition of success for a bear market call. It is simply that sooner or later there will come a time when an investor is pleased to have been out of the market. That is to say, he will have saved money by being out, and also have reduced risk or volatility on the round trip. This definition of success absolutely does not include precise timing. (Predicting when a bubble breaks is not about valuation. All prior bubble markets have been extremely overvalued, as is this one. Overvaluation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for their bursting.) Calling the week, month, or quarter of the top is all but impossible.
我在 2008 年相当接近地预测了一次牛市顶部,并在 2009 年初准确抓住了熊市底部,当时我写了《在恐惧中再投资》。这运气远远超出了我哪怕在 50 年职业生涯中可能期望的。更典型的情况是,我在日本泡沫中早了三年。我们 GMO 在 1987 年完全退出了日本市场,当时它在 EAFE 基准指数中占比超过 40%,市盈率超过 40 倍,而此前的历史最高市盈率是 25 倍。当时退出似乎是审慎的,但随后三年,日本市场市盈率升至 65 倍,在基准指数中的占比一度超过 60%,我们因跑输而痛苦万分!但在顶部之后,我们又完全空仓了三年,最终在这个完整周期中赚到了不错的钱。
I came fairly close to calling one bull market peak in 2008 and nailed a bear market low in early 2009 when I wrote “ Reinvesting When Terrified .” That’s far more luck than I could hope for even over a 50-year career. Far more typically, I was three years too early in the Japan bubble. We at GMO got entirely out of Japan in 1987, when it was over 40% of the EAFE benchmark and selling at over 40x earnings, against a previous all-time high of 25x. It seemed prudent to exit at the time, but for three years we underperformed painfully as the Japanese market went to 65x earnings on its way to becoming over 60% of the benchmark! But we also stayed completely out for three years after the top and ultimately made good money on the round trip.
同样,在 1997 年底,当标普 500 指数超过其 1929 年 21 倍市盈率的峰值时,我们迅速减持了自主决定的美国股票头寸,然后眼睁睁地看着市场在盈利增长中市盈率升至 35 倍。我们失去了资产配置业务的一半客户,但在随后的下跌中,我们远远弥补了之前的损失。
Similarly, in late 1997, as the S&P 500 passed its previous 1929 peak of 21x earnings, we rapidly sold down our discretionary U.S. equity positions then watched in horror as the market went to 35x on rising earnings. We lost half our Asset Allocation book of business but in the ensuing decline we much more than made up our losses.
相信我,我知道这些都是老故事。但它们直接相关。因为当前的市场事件确实就是同一个老故事。今年夏天,我说我们很可能处于泡沫的后期阶段,而 COVID 崩盘的独特性带来了一些不确定性。历史上重大泡沫后期最可靠的特征之一,是极其疯狂的投资者行为,尤其是散户投资者。在这个历史上最长的牛市的前 10 年里,我们缺乏这样的狂野投机。但现在我们有了,而且是创纪录的数量。我的同事本·英克和约翰·皮斯在最近的 GMO 季度信函中写到了一些这种狂热案例,包括赫兹、柯达、尼古拉,尤其是特斯拉。作为 Model 3 的车主,我个人最喜欢的特斯拉趣闻是,其目前超过 6000 亿美元的市值,相当于每年每辆售出汽车的价值超过 125 万美元,而通用汽车每辆车仅为 9000 美元。1929 年有什么能与之匹敌吗?这些点滴或许都可以被当作孤立案例而忽略(相信我:它们不是),但大局指标看起来更糟。
Believe me, I know these are old stories. But they are directly relevant. For this current market event is indeed the same old story. This summer, I said it was likely that we were in the later stages of a bubble, with some doubt created by the unique features of the COVID crash. The single most dependable feature of the late stages of the great bubbles of history has been really crazy investor behavior, especially on the part of individuals. For the first 10 years of this bull market, which is the longest in history, we lacked such wild speculation. But now we have it. In record amounts. My colleagues Ben Inker and John Pease have written about some of these examples of mania in the most recent GMO Quarterly Letter , including Hertz, Kodak, Nikola, and, especially, Tesla. As a Model 3 owner, my personal favorite Tesla tidbit is that its market cap, now over $600 billion, amounts to over $1.25 million per car sold each year versus $9,000 per car for GM. What has 1929 got to equal that? Any of these tidbits could perhaps be dismissed as isolated cases (trust me: they are not), but big-picture metrics look even worse.
“巴菲特指标”,即股票总市值与 GDP 之比,突破了其在 2000 年创下的历史最高纪录。2020 年,有 480 宗 IPO(其中包括令人难以置信的 248 家 SPAC2),比 2000 年的 406 宗还多。有 150 家非微型股公司(即市值超过 2.5 亿美元)在一年内涨幅超过两倍,是前十年中任何一年数量的 3 倍以上。散户小额购买(少于 10 份合约)美国股票看涨期权的成交量,较 2019 年增长了 8 倍,而 2019 年已经远高于长期平均水平。也许最令人不安的是:诺贝尔奖得主、长期看空者罗伯特·希勒——他正确而勇敢地预测了 2000 年和 2007 年的泡沫,也是我尊重的极少数经济学家之一——这次却采取了骑墙态度,最近指出他那传奇性的 CAPE 资产定价指标(该指标显示股票估值几乎与 2000 年泡沫顶峰时一样高)在与债券相比时,高估程度看起来不那么惊人。然而,从历史比较来看,债券比股票还要贵得多。哦,天哪!
The "Buffett indicator," total stock market capitalization to GDP, broke through its all-time-high 2000 record. In 2020, there were 480 IPOs (including an incredible 248 SPACs 2 ) – more new listings than the 406 IPOs in 2000. There are 150 non-micro-cap companies (that is, with market capitalization of over $250 million) that have more than tripled in the year, which is over 3 times as many as any year in the previous decade. The volume of small retail purchases, of less than 10 contracts, of call options on U.S. equities has increased 8-fold compared to 2019, and 2019 was already well above long-run average. Perhaps most troubling of all: Nobel laureate and long-time bear Robert Shiller – who correctly and bravely called the 2000 and 2007 bubbles and who is one of the very few economists I respect – is hedging his bets this time, recently making the point that his legendary CAPE asset-pricing indicator (which suggests stocks are nearly as overpriced as at the 2000 bubble peak) shows less impressive overvaluation when compared to bonds. Bonds, however, are even more spectacularly expensive by historical comparison than stocks. Oh my!
所以,自夏季以来市场以加速的幅度上涨,投机过度行为日益加剧,我对此一点也不惊讶。这正是你应该从晚期泡沫中预期的:一个加速上涨、近乎垂直的阶段,时长未知——但通常很短。即使很短,泡沫末期的这个阶段也痛苦得令人震惊,并且对空头来说充满了职业风险。
So, I am not at all surprised that since the summer the market has advanced at an accelerating rate and with increasing speculative excesses. It is precisely what you should expect from a late-stage bubble: an accelerating, nearly vertical stage of unknowable length – but typically short. Even if it is short, this stage at the end of a bubble is shockingly painful and full of career risk for bears.
我加倍押注,因为随着价格以加速的速度、日益增长的投机热情进一步偏离趋势,我作为市场历史学家的信心当然会增加,确信这确实是泡沫的后期阶段。一个开始看起来真正了不起的泡沫。
I am doubling down, because as prices move further away from trend, at accelerating speed and with growing speculative fervor, of course my confidence as a market historian increases that this is indeed the late stage of a bubble. A bubble that is beginning to look like a real humdinger.
这轮牛市最奇特之处在于,它与以往所有重大泡沫有一个截然不同的方面。过去的泡沫都结合了宽松的货币环境,以及当时人们认为、无论对错近乎完美的经济状况——这种完美会被无限外推。当然,任何以往泡沫所呈现的经济卓越状态都不会持久,但如果它能持续下去,那么市场以账面价值的巨大倍数交易倒也情有可原。但如今受伤的经济完全不同:只是部分复苏,可能面临二次探底,可能走向放缓,且无疑面临极高程度的不确定性。然而,当前市场却比去年秋天经济看起来不错、失业率处于历史低位时高得多。如今市场的市盈率处于历史区间的最高几个百分点,而经济则处于最差的几个百分点。这完全史无前例,甚至比任何 SPAC 都能更好地衡量投机烈度。
The strangest feature of this bull market is how unlike every previous great bubble it is in one respect. Previous bubbles have combined accommodative monetary conditions with economic conditions that are perceived at the time, rightly or wrongly, as near perfect, which perfection is extrapolated into the indefinite future. The state of economic excellence of any previous bubble of course did not last long, but if it could have lasted, then the market would justifiably have sold at a huge multiple of book. But today’s wounded economy is totally different: only partly recovered, possibly facing a double-dip, probably facing a slowdown, and certainly facing a very high degree of uncertainty. Yet the market is much higher today than it was last fall when the economy looked fine and unemployment was at a historic low. Today the P/E ratio of the market is in the top few percent of the historical range and the economy is in the worst few percent. This is completely without precedent and may even be a better measure of speculative intensity than any SPAC.
这一次,投资者比以往任何泡沫时期都更依赖于无限期延续的宽松货币环境和零实际利率。这在理论上产生了一种类似“永远维持经济顶峰表现”的效应:它可以被用来为所有资产低得多的收益率辩护,从而相应地推高资产价格。但完美的经济条件和完美的金融条件都不可能永远持续,问题就在这里。
This time, more than in any previous bubble, investors are relying on accommodative monetary conditions and zero real rates extrapolated indefinitely. This has in theory a similar effect to assuming peak economic performance forever: it can be used to justify much lower yields on all assets and therefore correspondingly higher asset prices. But neither perfect economic conditions nor perfect financial conditions can last forever, and there’s the rub.
所有泡沫的结局,都伴随着一种近乎普遍的看法——当前这个泡沫还不会结束……因为。因为在 1929 年,经济进入了“一个永久性的高原”;因为在 2000 年,格林斯潘领导的美联储预测生产力将持续改善,并向股票市场宣誓了忠诚(或者说道德风险);因为伯南克在 2006 年相信“美国房价仅仅反映了美国经济的强劲”,同时他延续了道德风险:如果你赢了,你靠自己;但如果你输了,你可以指望我们的支持。耶伦,以及现在的鲍威尔,都维持了这一做法。鲍威尔的前三位美联储主席都声称,他们帮助吹起的资产价格,反过来通过财富效应(wealth effect)促进了经济。我们所有人都承认这个效应是真实存在的。但三位主席都避免为随后必然出现的市场破裂承担责任:2000 年的股市崩盘和 2008 年的房市崩盘,每一次都伴随着我们最不需要时到来的反财富效应,放大了经济中本就确定无疑的疲软。这场游戏,毫无疑问是与魔鬼的终极交易。
All bubbles end with near universal acceptance that the current one will not end yet…because. Because in 1929 the economy had clicked into “a permanently high plateau”; because Greenspan’s Fed in 2000 was predicting an enduring improvement in productivity and was pledging its loyalty (or moral hazard) to the stock market; because Bernanke believed in 2006 that “U.S. house prices merely reflect a strong U.S. economy” as he perpetuated the moral hazard: if you win you’re on your own, but if you lose you can count on our support. Yellen, and now Powell, maintained this approach. All three of Powell’s predecessors claimed that the asset prices they helped inflate in turn aided the economy through the wealth effect. Which effect we all admit is real. But all three avoided claiming credit for the ensuing market breaks that inevitably followed: the equity bust of 2000 and the housing bust of 2008, each replete with the accompanying anti-wealth effect that came when we least needed it, exaggerating the already guaranteed weakness in the economy. This game surely is the ultimate deal with the devil.
如今,高价再度持续,因为……利率将永久维持在零附近——这是道德风险的终极宣言,也是我们习以为常并依赖的不对称市场风险。2020 年末的口号是,人为的低利率可以阻止资产价格下跌。永远!但当然,这在 2000 年是个谬论,现在也依然如此。最终,道德风险未能阻止科技泡沫的崩溃,纳斯达克指数下跌了 82%。是的,82%!同样,在 2008 年,它也未能阻止美国房价一路跌回趋势线及以下——这依次导致了:第一,住房感知价值令人震惊地损失超过 8 万亿美元;第二,随后经济疲软;第三,风险溢价全面上升,全球资产价格广泛下跌(见图表 1)。所有承诺最终一文不值,唯有一个例外:美联储尽其所能收拾残局,帮助市场为下一轮价格上涨及随后的下跌做好准备。而我们现在又身处其中,等待最后一舞,最终等待音乐停止。
Now once again the high prices this time will hold because…interest rates will be kept around nil forever, in the ultimate statement of moral hazard – the asymmetrical market risk we have come to know and depend on. The mantra of late 2020 was that engineered low rates can prevent a decline in asset prices. Forever! But of course, it was a fallacy in 2000 and it is a fallacy now. In the end, moral hazard did not stop the Tech bubble decline, with the NASDAQ falling 82%. Yes, 82%! Nor, in 2008, did it stop U.S. housing prices declining all the way back to trend and below – which in turn guaranteed first, a shocking loss of over eight trillion dollars of perceived value in housing; second, an ensuing weakness in the economy; and third, a broad rise in risk premia and a broad decline in global asset prices (see Exhibit 1). All the promises were in the end worth nothing, except for one; the Fed did what it could to pick up the pieces and help the markets get into stride for the next round of enhanced prices and ensuing decline. And here we are again, waiting for the last dance and, eventually, for the music to stop.
附件 1泡沫——存在时美妙无比
EXHIBIT 1BUBBLES – GREAT WHILE THEY LAST
截至 2011 年 11 月 30 日的房地产泡沫,截至 2003 年 2 月 28 日的科技泡沫
数据来源:标普 500 指数(科技泡沫);全美房地产经纪人协会、美国人口普查局(房地产泡沫)
Housing bubble as of 11/30/2011, Tech bubble as of 2/28/2003 Source: S&P 500 (Tech bubble); National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau (Housing bubble)
投资中没有完美复刻这回事。投资泡沫更是如此。每一种非理性繁荣都有其独特的形式;我们只是在寻找所谓的精神上的相似之处。即便现在,我也知道市场可能还会再飙升几周甚至几个月——感觉就像我们处于 1999 年 7 月到 2000 年 2 月之间的某个时点。也就是说,泡沫随时可能破裂——它已具备所有条件——但也可能再狂飙几个月。我对这轮泡沫最长存活期的猜测是春末夏初,与新冠疫苗的广泛普及同步。到那一刻,世界经济面临的最紧迫问题将得到解决。市场参与者会松一口气,环顾四周,然后立刻意识到经济依旧疲弱,疫情危机结束后刺激措施将很快缩减,而估值荒谬至极。“买传闻,卖事实。”但请记住,为泡沫破裂时间点落子,历来令人失望。
Nothing in investing perfectly repeats. Certainly not investment bubbles. Each form of irrational exuberance is different; we are just looking for what you might call spiritual similarities. Even now, I know that this market can soar upwards for a few more weeks or even months – it feels like we could be anywhere between July 1999 and February 2000. Which is to say it is entitled to break any day, having checked all the boxes, but could keep roaring upwards for a few months longer. My best guess as to the longest this bubble might survive is the late spring or early summer, coinciding with the broad rollout of the COVID vaccine. At that moment, the most pressing issue facing the world economy will have been solved. Market participants will breathe a sigh of relief, look around, and immediately realize that the economy is still in poor shape, stimulus will shortly be cut back with the end of the COVID crisis, and valuations are absurd. “Buy the rumor, sell the news.” But remember that timing the bursting of bubbles has a long history of disappointment.
即便事后回溯,也很难精准指出是哪根针戳破了泡沫。之所以难以厘清,主要原因在于,那些大牛市并未在遭遇重大意外利空时骤然崩塌。这类事件——比如 1987 年的投资组合保险崩盘——往往导致市场急剧下跌后又迅速反弹。从更大的格局看,它们属于独特且技术性的波动,并非大泡沫潮起潮落的一部分。大牛市的转折通常发生在市场条件极为有利之时,只是整体环境比昨天稍稍逊色了一点。而这,正是它们总被错判的原因。
Even with hindsight, it is seldom easy to point to the pin that burst the bubble. The main reason for this lack of clarity is that the great bull markets did not break when they were presented with a major unexpected negative. Those events, like the portfolio insurance fiasco of 1987, tend to give sharp down legs and quick recoveries. They are in the larger scheme of things unique and technical and are not part of the ebb and flow of the great bubbles. The great bull markets typically turn down when the market conditions are very favorable, just subtly less favorable than they were yesterday. And that is why they are always missed.
无论如何,市场如今正呈现出一次重大泡沫的所有感性特征。最令人印象深刻的是多头们的狂热与激情,股市与市场的覆盖面之广,以及最重要的是,对空头日益增长的敌意。1929 年,做空头意味着可能遭受人身攻击,并必然招致名誉诋毁。对我们而言,1999 年是唯一一次客户反应仿佛我们有意恶意地剥夺他们收益的经历。相比之下,2008 年根本不算什么。但在过去几个月里,这种敌意语气正迅速升级。不过,对空头来说,讽刺的是,这恰恰是我们最希望听到的。这是最终崩盘的经典前兆;伴随着股价上涨,并非基于基本面,而仅仅是因为它们正在上涨。
Either way, the market is now checking off all the touchy-feely characteristics of a major bubble. The most impressive features are the intensity and enthusiasm of bulls, the breadth of coverage of stocks and the market, and, above all, the rising hostility toward bears. In 1929, to be a bear was to risk physical attack and guarantee character assassination. For us, 1999 was the only experience we have had of clients reacting as if we were deliberately and maliciously depriving them of gains. In comparison, 2008 was nothing. But in the last few months the hostile tone has been rapidly ratcheting up. The irony for bears though is that it’s exactly what we want to hear. It’s a classic precursor of the ultimate break; together with stocks rising, not for their fundamentals, but simply because they are rising.
牛市末期的另一个更可量化的特征——从南海泡沫到 1999 年科技泡沫——一直是最后一程的加速攀升。在最近的案例中,最后 21 个月涨幅超过 60%,这个速度远高于牛市正常涨幅的两倍。这一次,美国各指数在短短 9 个月内,标普 500 指数从 +69% 涨到 +100%,罗素 2000 指数也是如此。真不赖!而且可能还有更多涨幅在后头。但这已经满足了末期泡沫的这一必要检验标准。
Another more measurable feature of a late-stage bull, from the South Sea bubble to the Tech bubble of 1999, has been an acceleration 3 of the final leg, which in recent cases has been over 60% in the last 21 months to the peak, a rate well over twice the normal rate of bull market ascents. This time, the U.S. indices have advanced from +69% for the S&P 500 to +100% for the Russell 2000 in just 9 months. Not bad! And there may still be more climbing to come. But it has already met this necessary test of a late-stage bubble.
作为市场历史研究者,能够再次亲历一场重大的股票泡沫,确实是一种特权。1989 年日本、2000 年科技泡沫、2008 年房地产和抵押贷款危机,再到当下的泡沫——这四件事是我一生中最重大、最扣人心弦的投资事件。在大部分时间里,市场都相对正常,你按时上班,埋头干活,平淡无奇。然后,每隔很久,市场就会脱离公允价值与现实,开始螺旋上升。暴富和惨亏都在转瞬之间发生,投资顾问们罕见地有了真正证明自己存在价值的契机。但和往常一样,天下没有免费的午餐。这些能派上用场的机会,往往伴随着职业生涯的风险。
It is a privilege as a market historian to experience a major stock bubble once again. Japan in 1989, the 2000 Tech bubble, the 2008 housing and mortgage crisis, and now the current bubble – these are the four most significant and gripping investment events of my life. Most of the time in more normal markets you show up for work and do your job. Ho hum. And then, once in a long while, the market spirals away from fair value and reality. Fortunes are made and lost in a hurry and investment advisors have a rare chance to really justify their existence. But, as usual, there is no free lunch. These opportunities to be useful come loaded with career risk.
好了,我们又来到这里。我预计我那“泡沫预言”将再次达到我对成功的适度定义:在未来的某个时刻(无论何时),从 2020 年仲夏开始躲避泡沫都将是值得的。但很少有专业投资者或个人投资者能够做到躲避。时机的不确定性,加上客户方面迅速加剧的懊悔情绪,意味着对于大型商业机构而言,对抗泡沫的职业风险与业务风险都过于巨大。即便市盈率像日本那样达到 65 倍,他们也绝不可能全力支持看空建议。在这些大型机构中,离在泡沫中提供全面看空建议最近的一次,是 1999 年的瑞银,其立场几乎与我们 GMO 一模一样。也就是说,介于勇敢与鲁莽之间。不过,幸运的是,他们在 2000 年 2 月,就在市场见顶前夕,改变了策略,在瑞银 Brinson 及其子公司 Phillips & Drew 转为全面投资成长股的建议。这一下子就消灭了那头 800 磅重的大猩猩,否则它本会因为顽固的逆向操作而拿走大部分回报。所以,别指望高盛和摩根士丹利会变得看空:这永远不可能发生。对他们来说,这是一个糟糕透顶的、不商业的赌注。也许对任何人都是。对客户来说,这能盈利并降低风险,是的,但对顾问来说则商业上不可行。他们的最佳策略清晰而简单:永远极度看多。这既有利于生意,又在智力上不费劲。这对大多数投资者很有吸引力,他们远更喜欢乐观而不是现实的评估,正如新冠疫情中生动展现的那样。而当这一切最终结束时,作为一个持续的看多者,你将拥有压倒性的同路人。这就是为什么在泡沫中你一直得到看多建议,并且永远都会得到。
So, here we are again. I expect once again for my bubble call to meet my modest definition of success: at some future date, whenever that may be, it will have paid for you to have ducked from midsummer of 2020. But few professional or individual investors will have been able to have ducked. The combination of timing uncertainty and rapidly accelerating regret on the part of clients means that the career and business risk of fighting the bubble is too great for large commercial enterprises. They can never put their full weight behind bearish advice even if the P/E goes to 65x as it did in Japan. The nearest any of these giant institutions have ever come to offering fully bearish advice in a bubble was UBS in 1999, whose position was nearly identical to ours at GMO. That is to say, somewhere between brave and foolhardy. Luckily for us though, they changed their tack and converted to a fully invested growth stock recommendation at UBS Brinson and its subsidiary, Phillips & Drew, in February 2000, just before the market peak. This took out the 800-pound gorilla that would otherwise have taken most of the rewards for stubborn contrariness. So, don't wait for the Goldmans and Morgan Stanleys to become bearish: it can never happen. For them it is a horribly non-commercial bet. Perhaps it is for anyone. Profitable and risk-reducing for the clients, yes, but commercially impractical for advisors. Their best policy is clear and simple: always be extremely bullish. It is good for business and intellectually undemanding. It is appealing to most investors who much prefer optimism to realistic appraisal, as witnessed so vividly with COVID. And when it all ends, you will as a persistent bull have overwhelming company. This is why you have always had bullish advice in a bubble and always will.
不过,对于那些愿意承担这种职业风险的经理人——更可能的是个人投资者——要求你精准择时,实在是强人所难。如果识别泡沫的门槛定得太高,非要你准确猜中顶部,那你永远都不会去尝试。而这样做的代价,就是每个周期你都注定会与绝大多数投资者和经理人一起,从悬崖上跌落。
However, for any manager willing to take on that career risk – or more likely for the individual investor – requiring that you get the timing right is overreach. If the hurdle for calling a bubble is set too high, so that you must call the top precisely, you will never try . And that condemns you to ride over the cliff every cycle, along with the great majority of investors and managers.
该怎么办?
What to Do?
正如在 1929 年、2000 年和 1972 年“漂亮 50”(冠军股中的二流泡沫)这类狂热顶点经常发生的那样,今天的市场在不同资产类别、行业和公司之间呈现出极端的价值分化。处于极低估一端的是全球范围内的传统价值股,相对于成长股而言。截至 2019 年 12 月,价值股经历了有史以来最差的相对十年,随后在 2020 年又经历了有史以来最差的一年,成长股与价值股的单年表现差距平均达到 20 到 30 个百分点!类似地,新兴市场股票正处于其过去 50 年来相对于美国市场的三个相对低点之一(这三个低点大致相当)。不足为奇的是,我们认为,你的相对押注应该投向这两大思路——价值与新兴——的交汇处,同时在你的职业生涯和业务风险允许的范围内,最大限度地避开美国成长股。祝你好运!
As often happens at bubbly peaks like 1929, 2000, and the Nifty Fifty of 1972 (a second-tier bubble in the company of champions), today’s market features extreme disparities in value by asset class, sector, and company. Those at the very cheap end include traditional value stocks all over the world, relative to growth stocks. Value stocks have had their worst-ever relative decade ending December 2019, followed by the worst-ever year in 2020, with spreads between Growth and Value performance averaging between 20 and 30 percentage points for the single year! Similarly, Emerging Market equities are at 1 of their 3, more or less co-equal, relative lows against the U.S. of the last 50 years. Not surprisingly, we believe it is in the overlap of these two ideas, Value and Emerging, that your relative bets should go, along with the greatest avoidance of U.S. Growth stocks that your career and business risk will allow. Good luck!
在此下载文章。
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1 杰里米·格兰瑟姆,CNBC,2020 年 11 月 12 日。
1 Jeremy Grantham, CNBC, November 12, 2020.
2 SPAC 是特殊目的收购公司(Special Purpose Acquisition Company),一种为特定目的而设立的空壳公司,旨在与某家私人公司合并,使其比通过正常首次公开发行(IPO)流程更快地上市。
2 A SPAC is a Special Purpose Acquisition Company, a shell that is created for the specific purpose of merging with some private company to take that company public more quickly than could have been the case with a normal initial public offering (IPO) process.
3 我在 2018 年 1 月发表的论文《为可能出现的近期融涨做好准备》中,对此话题提供了更多数据和图表。
3 My paper of January 2018, “ Bracing Yourself for a Possible Near-term Melt-up ,” has substantially more data and exhibits on this topic.
免责声明:本文表达的观点是截止 2021 年 1 月 5 日杰里米·格兰瑟姆的观点,并可能随时根据市场和其他条件发生变化。本文不构成任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被解释为此类要约或招揽。对特定证券和发行人的引用仅供说明之用,无意也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending January 5, 2021, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
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