等待最后一舞——修订版(2021年9月)

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等待最后一舞 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 观点 资产配置在大型泡沫尾声阶段的陷阱 摘要

2009 年 1 月 5 日启动的漫长牛市,终于成熟为一个彻底的史诗级泡沫。其特征是极端高估、爆炸式价格上涨、疯狂发行,以及歇斯底里的投机行为。我相信这一事件将被载入金融史的伟大泡沫之列,与南海泡沫、1929 年大崩盘和 2000 年互联网泡沫并列。“你永远无法改变的一个现实是,高价格资产产生的回报一定低于低价格资产。你不能鱼与熊掌兼得。你可以现在享受它,也可以在遥远的未来稳步享受它,但不能两者兼得——而我们为市场涨得更高付出的代价,就是从顶部起未来十年的回报更低。”

这些大泡沫正是财富创造与毁灭之处,也是投资者真正证明自己实力的时刻。就投资组合定位而言,避免大型泡沫破裂带来的最惨痛损失,很可能是最困难的部分。行业内每一种职业激励机制,以及个体人类心理中的每一种缺陷,都会把投资者牢牢吸进去。

但这个泡沫终将破裂,无论美联储怎么努力托市,都会对经济和投资组合造成破坏性影响。请别搞错——对当今大多数投资者来说,这很可能就是你投资生涯中最重要的事件。作为一个资深的市场历史研究者,我既感到智力上的兴奋,又感到恐惧。一生中能再经历一次这样的市场,是一种特权。

大多数时候,也许四分之三的时间里,主要资产类别之间的定价是相对合理的。正确的反应是,对那些经测量显得便宜的资产下温和的赌注,并希望测量结果准确。只要具备合理的资产估值能力,基于估值的资产配置者有望安然度过这些阶段,并获得小幅超额收益。“小幅”是因为机会本身就很小。如果你不太客气,可以说资产配置在这一阶段不太可能非常重要。当然,如果经理人还能在实施层面——通过有效选择国家、板块、行业、个股以及主要资产类别——来增加价值,会对这些时期有所帮助。

但资产配置的真正麻烦,在于剩下的那些时候,资产价格大幅偏离公允价值。这其实在熊市中不算太糟,因为重要熊市往往是短期而猛烈的。客户的初始反应通常是震惊到不作为,经理人有时间重新调整投资组合和说服客户的论点,以保住业务。真正的问题在于那些持续多年的大型牛市。漫长而缓慢燃烧的牛市可以在高于公允价值的位置停留多年,甚至在高估两倍、三倍或四倍的位置持续两三年、三四年。这些事态很容易超出多数客户的耐心极限。而当价格上涨速度极快时——通常是在牛市的尾声——不耐烦之后是焦虑和嫉妒。正如我喜欢说的,没有什么比看着邻居发财更让人恼火的了。

客户该如何区分极端市场行为与经理人迷失方向?常用来证明才能的证据是过往的成功,但市场的长周期少之又少。赢了两次或三次的可信度远不如更大的样本量。更糟糕的是,之前的重大市场崩盘早已远去:2008 年、2000 年,或者日本 1989 年的泡沫,几乎都成了历史书里的故事。大多数参与者已经变了。别人很久以前最终获胜后的满足感,对你个人当前承受的痛苦毫无安慰作用。更简单地说,如果凯恩斯真的说过“市场保持非理性的时间,可以比投资者保持偿债能力的时间更久”,那他或许是对的。

WAITING FOR THE LAST DANCE JEREMY GRANTHAM VIEWPOINTS The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The long, long bull market since January 5, 2021 2009 has finally matured into a fully-fledged epic bubble. Featuring extreme overvaluation, explosive “The one reality that you can never change is that a higher-priced asset will produce a lower return price increases, frenzied issuance, than a lower-priced asset. You can’t have your cake and eat it. You can enjoy it now, or you can enjoy it and hysterically speculative investor steadily in the distant future, but not both – and the price we pay for having this market go higher and behavior, I believe this event will be higher is a lower 10-year return from the peak.”1 recorded as one of the great bubbles of financial history, right along with the Most of the time, perhaps three-quarters of the time, major asset classes are reasonably South Sea bubble, 1929, and 2000. priced relative to one another. The correct response is to make modest bets on those These great bubbles are where assets that measure as being cheaper and hope that the measurements are correct. fortunes are made and lost – and With reasonable skill at evaluating assets the valuation-based allocator can expect where investors truly prove their to survive these phases intact with some small outperformance. “Small” because the mettle. For positioning a portfolio to opportunities themselves are small. If you wanted to be unfriendly you could say that avoid the worst pain of a major bubble asset allocation in this phase is unlikely to be very important. It would certainly help breaking is likely the most difficult part. in these periods if the manager could also add value in the implementation, from the Every career incentive in the industry effective selection of countries, sectors, industries, and individual securities as well as and every fault of individual human major asset classes. psychology will work toward sucking The real trouble with asset allocation, though, is in the remaining times when asset investors in. prices move far away from fair value. This is not so bad in bear markets because But this bubble will burst in due time, no important bear markets tend to be short and brutal. The initial response of clients matter how hard the Fed tries to support is usually to be shocked into inaction during which phase the manager has time to it, with consequent damaging effects on reposition both portfolio and arguments to retain the business. The real problem is in the economy and on portfolios. Make no major bull markets that last for years. Long, slow-burning bull markets can spend many mistake – for the majority of investors years above fair value and even two, three, or four years far above. These events can today, this could very well be the most easily outlast the patience of most clients. And when price rises are very rapid, typically important event of your investing toward the end of a bull market, impatience is followed by anxiety and envy. As I like to lives. Speaking as an old student and say, there is nothing more supremely irritating than watching your neighbors get rich. historian of markets, it is intellectually exciting and terrifying at the same time. How are clients to tell the difference between extreme market behavior and a manager It is a privilege to ride through a market who has lost his way? The usual evidence of talent is past success, but the long cycles like this one more time. of the market are few and far between. Winning two out of two events or three out of three is not as convincing as a larger sample size would be. Even worse the earlier major market breaks are already long gone: 2008, 2000, or 1989 in Japan are practically in the history books. Most of the players will have changed. Certainly, the satisfaction felt by others who eventually won long ago is no solace for current pain experienced by you personally. A simpler way of saying this may be that if Keynes really had said, “The market can stay irrational longer than the investor can stay solvent,” he would have been right.

杰里米·格兰瑟姆,CNBC,2020 年 11 月 12 日。

Jeremy Grantham, CNBC, November 12, 2020.

等待最后一支舞:资产配置在大型泡沫晚期阶段的危害 | p2 我早已从投资组合管理岗位退休,但很乐意在此分享我的“看法”:当前美国市场极有可能正处于一场重大的泡沫事件中,这类事件通常每隔几十年出现一次,上一次发生在 1990 年代末。它很有可能会以糟糕的结局收场,虽然没有什么事情是确定无疑的。我还会告诉你我对看空市场预测成功与否的定义:简单说就是,迟早会有一个时刻,投资者会庆幸自己已经离场。也就是说,通过离场他既省下了钱,又在整个过程中降低了风险或波动性。这个成功的定义完全不包含精确择时。(预测泡沫何时破裂与估值无关。所有以往的泡沫市场都极度高估,这次也不例外。高估是泡沫破裂的必要条件,但不是充分条件。)想要准确判断周、月或季度的高点几乎是不可能的。

Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p2 I am long retired from the job of portfolio management but I am happy to give my “ opinion here: it is highly probable that we are in a major bubble event in the U.S. market, of the type we typically have every several decades and last had in the late ...sooner or later there 1990s. It will very probably end badly, although nothing is certain. I will also tell you my definition of success for a bear market call. It is simply that sooner or later there will come a time when will come a time when an investor is pleased to have been out of the market. That is to an investor is pleased say, he will have saved money by being out, and also have reduced risk or volatility on to have been out of the the round trip. This definition of success absolutely does not include precise timing. market. (Predicting when a bubble breaks is not about valuation. All prior bubble markets have been extremely overvalued, as is this one. Overvaluation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for their bursting.) Calling the week, month, or quarter of the top is all but impossible.

2008 年那次,我差不多算是精准命中了牛市顶点,然后在 2009 年初又抓住了熊市底部——当时我写了篇文章叫《在恐惧中再投资》。这样的事运气成分太大,哪怕干上 50 年也不敢指望再来一次。更常见的情况是,我在日本泡沫上提前了整整三年。我们 GMO 在 1987 年就彻底退出了日本市场——当时它占 EAFE 基准权重的 40% 以上,市盈率超过 40 倍,而之前的历史最高是 25 倍。当时退出看起来是谨慎之举,但接下来的三年里,日本市场一路涨到 65 倍市盈率、占基准权重超过 60%,我们跑输得很难看。不过,在见顶之后我们又保持了整整三年完全不碰,最终在这个来回里赚了实实在在的钱。

I came fairly close to calling one bull market peak in 2008 and nailed a bear market low in early 2009 when I wrote “Reinvesting When Terrified.” That’s far more luck than I could hope for even over a 50-year career. Far more typically, I was three years too early in the Japan bubble. We at GMO got entirely out of Japan in 1987, when it was over 40% of the EAFE benchmark and selling at over 40x earnings, against a previous all-time high of 25x. It seemed prudent to exit at the time, but for three years we underperformed painfully as the Japanese market went to 65x earnings on its way to becoming over 60% of the benchmark! But we also stayed completely out for three years after the top and ultimately made good money on the round trip.

同样地,在 1997 年底,标普 500 指数突破了 1929 年创下的 21 倍市盈率历史高点,我们迅速减持了可自由支配的美国股票头寸,随后却眼睁睁看着市场在盈利增长的推动下飙升至 35 倍市盈率。我们损失了资产配置业务的一半规模,但在随后的市场下跌中,我们赚回的钱远远超出了之前的损失。

Similarly, in late 1997, as the S&P 500 passed its previous 1929 peak of 21x earnings, we rapidly sold down our discretionary U.S. equity positions then watched in horror as the market went to 35x on rising earnings. We lost half our Asset Allocation book of business but in the ensuing decline we much more than made up our losses.

相信我,我知道这些都是老掉牙的故事。但它们直接相关。因为眼下这场市场事件,确实就是同一个老故事又上演了一遍。今年夏天,我说过我们很可能正处于泡沫后期阶段,只不过 COVID 引发的崩盘存在的独特特征让判断多了几分不确定性。历史上那些大泡沫处于后期阶段时,最靠得住的一个特征就是投资者行为极度疯狂,尤其散户的表现。在这轮史上最长的牛市的前 10 年里,我们还没有看到那种狂热的投机行为。但现在已经看到了。而且达到创纪录的规模。我的同事本·英克和约翰·皮斯在最新一期的 GMO 季报中写到了其中几个狂热案例,包括赫兹、柯达、尼古拉,尤其还有一个特斯拉。作为 Model 3 车主,我个人最喜欢的一个特斯拉趣闻是:它目前市值超过 6000 亿美元,相当于每辆年销量对应的市值超过 125 万美元,而通用汽车每辆车对应的市值只有 9000 美元。1929 年有什么能比得上这个?这些趣闻中的任何一个,或许都能被当作孤例而不予理会(相信我:它们不是孤例),但宏观层面的指标看上去更糟糕。

Believe me, I know these are old stories. But they are directly relevant. For this current market event is indeed the same old story. This summer, I said it was likely that we were in the later stages of a bubble, with some doubt created by the unique features of the COVID crash. The single most dependable feature of the late stages of the great bubbles of history has been really crazy investor behavior, especially on the part of individuals. For the first 10 years of this bull market, which is the longest in history, we lacked such wild speculation. But now we have it. In record amounts. My colleagues Ben Inker and John Pease have written about some of these examples of mania in the most recent GMO Quarterly Letter, including Hertz, Kodak, Nikola, and, especially, Tesla. As a Model 3 owner, my personal favorite Tesla tidbit is that its market cap, now over $600 billion, amounts to over $1.25 million per car sold each year versus $9,000 per car for GM. What has 1929 got to equal that? Any of these tidbits could perhaps be dismissed as isolated cases (trust me: they are not), but big-picture metrics look even worse.

“巴菲特指标”(股市总市值与 GDP 之比)突破了 2000 年创下的历史最高纪录。2020 年共有 480 宗 IPO(其中包括令人难以置信的 248 宗 SPAC 交易),超过 2000 年的 406 宗。有 150 家非微型股公司(即市值超过 2.5 亿美元)年内涨幅超过两倍,是过去二十年中任何一年的三倍以上。散户对美股看涨期权的交易量(小于 10 张合约的小额买入)相比 2019 年增长了八倍,而 2019 年已经远高于长期均值。也许最令人不安的是:诺贝尔奖得主、长期看空市场的罗伯特·希勒——他曾正确且勇敢地指出 2000 年和 2007 年的泡沫,也是我少数尊重的经济学家之一——这次却采取了对冲立场,最近指出他传奇般的 CAPE 资产定价指标(该指标显示股票估值几乎与 2000 年泡沫峰值时一样高)在与债券比较时显示出不那么惊人的高估。然而,从历史比较来看,债券甚至比股票贵得更加离谱。哦,天哪!

The "Buffett indicator," total stock market capitalization to GDP, broke through its all-time-high 2000 record. In 2020, there were 480 IPOs (including an incredible 248 SPACs2 ) – more new listings than the 406 IPOs in 2000. There are 150 non-micro-cap companies (that is, with market capitalization of over $250 million) that have more than tripled in the year, which is over 3 times as many as any year in the previous 2 decade. The volume of small retail purchases, of less than 10 contracts, of call options A SPAC is a Special Purpose Acquisition Company, a shell on U.S. equities has increased 8-fold compared to 2019, and 2019 was already well that is created for the specific purpose of merging with above long-run average. Perhaps most troubling of all: Nobel laureate and long-time some private company to take that company public more quickly than could have been the case with a normal initial bear Robert Shiller – who correctly and bravely called the 2000 and 2007 bubbles and public offering (IPO) process. who is one of the very few economists I respect – is hedging his bets this time, recently Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p3 making the point that his legendary CAPE asset-pricing indicator (which suggests stocks are nearly as overpriced as at the 2000 bubble peak) shows less impressive overvaluation when compared to bonds. Bonds, however, are even more spectacularly expensive by historical comparison than stocks. Oh my!

所以,我对自夏季以来市场以加速上涨且投机过度加剧的现象丝毫不感意外。这恰恰是你在泡沫晚期阶段应该预料到的:一段加速的、几乎垂直的、长度不可知——但通常短暂——的行情。即便短暂,泡沫末端的这一阶段也极其痛苦,对做空者而言充满职业风险。

So, I am not at all surprised that since the summer the market has advanced at an accelerating rate and with increasing speculative excesses. It is precisely what you should expect from a late-stage bubble: an accelerating, nearly vertical stage of unknowable length – but typically short. Even if it is short, this stage at the end of a bubble is shockingly painful and full of career risk for bears.

我是在加倍押注,因为随着价格以加速的势头越来越远离趋势线、投机狂热愈演愈烈,作为一名市场历史学者,我的信心当然也在增强:这确实是一场泡沫的后期阶段。一个正开始看起来堪称超级泡沫的泡沫。

I am doubling down, because as prices move further away from trend, at accelerating speed and with growing speculative fervor, of course my confidence as a market historian increases that this is indeed the late stage of a bubble. A bubble that is beginning to look like a real humdinger.

“当前市场的市盈率已处于历史区间的前百分之几,而经济却处于历史区间的后百分之几。这轮牛市最奇特之处在于,它与以往所有大泡沫在一点上截然不同。以往的泡沫都伴随着宽松的货币环境,以及当时被认为近乎完美的经济状况——无论这种判断是对是错——人们还将这种完美状态无限外推。以往任何泡沫中经济处于顶尖状态的那百分之几当然不会持续太久,但如果它能持续下去,那么市场以账面价值的巨大倍数交易就是合理的。但当今受伤的经济完全不同:只是部分复苏,可能面临二次探底,很可能正在放缓,而且无疑面临着极高程度的不确定性。然而,今天的市场却比去年秋天经济看起来不错、失业率处于历史低位时要高得多。当前市场的市盈率处于历史区间的前百分之几,而经济却处于历史区间的后百分之几。这完全史无前例,甚至可能是比任何特殊目的收购公司(SPAC)更准确的投机强度衡量指标。

“ Today the P/E ratio of the market is in the The strangest feature of this bull market is how unlike every previous great bubble it is in one respect. Previous bubbles have combined accommodative monetary conditions with economic conditions that are perceived at the time, rightly or wrongly, as near perfect, which perfection is extrapolated into the indefinite future. The state of top few percent of the economic excellence of any previous bubble of course did not last long, but if it could have lasted, then the market would justifiably have sold at a huge multiple of book. historical range and the But today’s wounded economy is totally different: only partly recovered, possibly economy is in the facing a double-dip, probably facing a slowdown, and certainly facing a very high worst few percent. degree of uncertainty. Yet the market is much higher today than it was last fall when the economy looked fine and unemployment was at a historic low. Today the P/E ratio of the market is in the top few percent of the historical range and the economy is in the worst few percent. This is completely without precedent and may even be a better measure of speculative intensity than any SPAC.

这一次,比起以往任何一次泡沫,投资者都更加依赖宽松的货币环境和被无限外推的实际零利率。这在理论上产生了一种类似于假设经济永远处于巅峰状态的效应:它可被用来为“所有资产收益率大幅走低、进而资产价格相应显著上涨”提供理由。但完美的经济条件和完美的金融条件都不可能永远持续下去,问题就出在这里。

This time, more than in any previous bubble, investors are relying on accommodative monetary conditions and zero real rates extrapolated indefinitely. This has in theory a similar effect to assuming peak economic performance forever: it can be used to justify “ much lower yields on all assets and therefore correspondingly higher asset prices. But neither perfect economic conditions nor perfect financial conditions can last forever, and there’s the rub.

所有泡沫的结局,都近乎普遍地接受当前这个泡沫不会破裂……但就是还没破。因为 1929 年,经济已经步入“永久性高位”;因为 2000 年格林斯潘领导的美联储,预言生产率将持续改善,并向股市宣誓效忠(或曰道德风险);因为 2006 年伯南克相信“美国房价仅仅反映了美国经济的强劲”,与此同时他延续了道德风险:赢了你靠自己,输了有我们兜底。耶伦,以及现在的鲍威尔,都沿袭了这一做法。鲍威尔的前三任主席都声称,他们助涨的资产价格,通过财富效应反过来提振了经济。这个效应,我们所有人都承认是真实存在的。但三位都避而不谈随之而来的市场崩盘——2000 年的股票崩盘和 2008 年的房地产崩盘,每一次都伴随着反财富效应,在我们最不需要的时候袭来,放大了本已板上钉钉的经济疲软。这场游戏,无疑是终极的与魔鬼的交易。

All bubbles end with near All bubbles end with near universal acceptance that the current one will not end universal acceptance yet…because. Because in 1929 the economy had clicked into “a permanently high that the current one will plateau”; because Greenspan’s Fed in 2000 was predicting an enduring improvement not end yet… in productivity and was pledging its loyalty (or moral hazard) to the stock market; because Bernanke believed in 2006 that “U.S. house prices merely reflect a strong U.S. economy” as he perpetuated the moral hazard: if you win you’re on your own, but if you lose you can count on our support. Yellen, and now Powell, maintained this approach. All three of Powell’s predecessors claimed that the asset prices they helped inflate in turn aided the economy through the wealth effect. Which effect we all admit is real. But all three avoided claiming credit for the ensuing market breaks that inevitably followed: the equity bust of 2000 and the housing bust of 2008, each replete with the accompanying anti-wealth effect that came when we least needed it, exaggerating the already guaranteed weakness in the economy. This game surely is the ultimate deal with the devil.

等待最后一舞:在大泡沫晚期进行资产配置的风险 | p4 然而这一次,高价再次得以维持,原因在于……利率将永久性地维持在零附近,这是道德风险在终极意义上的体现——那种我们早已熟悉并依赖的不对称市场风险。2020 年末的口头禅是,人为压低利率可以阻止资产价格下跌。永远如此!但当然,这在 2000 年是谬误,现在同样是谬误。最终,道德风险未能阻止科技泡沫的崩盘,纳斯达克指数下跌了 82%。没错,82%!同样,在 2008 年,它也没能阻止美国房价一路跌回趋势线以下——这进而首先导致了住房市场超过 8 万亿美元感知价值的惊人损失;其次,经济随之疲软;第三,风险溢价全面上升,全球资产价格普遍下跌(见图表 1)。所有承诺最终都一文不值,唯有一项例外:美联储尽其所能收拾残局,帮助市场重新迈开步伐,迎接下一轮的价格上涨和随后的下跌。而如今,我们又回到了这里,等待最后一舞,并最终等待音乐停止。

Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p4 Now once again the high prices this time will hold because…interest rates will be kept around nil forever, in the ultimate statement of moral hazard – the asymmetrical market risk we have come to know and depend on. The mantra of late 2020 was that engineered low rates can prevent a decline in asset prices. Forever! But of course, it was a fallacy in 2000 and it is a fallacy now. In the end, moral hazard did not stop the Tech bubble decline, with the NASDAQ falling 82%. Yes, 82%! Nor, in 2008, did it stop U.S. housing prices declining all the way back to trend and below – which in turn guaranteed first, a shocking loss of over eight trillion dollars of perceived value in housing; second, an ensuing weakness in the economy; and third, a broad rise in risk premia and a broad decline in global asset prices (see Exhibit 1). All the promises were in the end worth nothing, except for one; the Fed did what it could to pick up the pieces and help the markets get into stride for the next round of enhanced prices and ensuing decline. And here we are again, waiting for the last dance and, eventually, for the music to stop.

附录 1泡沫——存在时美妙异常

房地产泡沫 科技泡沫 2.00 2.00 指数水平 1.00 1.00 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 1995 1997 1999 2001

房地产泡沫截至 2011 年 11 月 30 日,科技泡沫截至 2003 年 2 月 28 日

来源:标普 500 指数(科技泡沫);全美房地产经纪人协会、美国人口普查局(房地产泡沫)

投资中没有完全重复的事情,投资泡沫尤其如此。每一种非理性繁荣的形式都各不相同;我们只是在寻找你或许可称为“精神上的相似性”。即便现在,我也知道市场还能再继续上涨几周甚至几个月——感觉我们可能处于 1999 年 7 月到 2000 年 2 月之间的某个位置。也就是说,尽管市场已经具备了所有见顶条件,随时可能崩盘,但它仍可能再疯狂上涨几个月。我对这个泡沫最长存活时间的最佳猜测是春末或夏初,恰逢新冠疫苗大规模推广之时。到那时,世界经济面临的最紧迫问题已经解决。市场参与者会长舒一口气,环顾四周,然后立刻意识到:经济状况依然糟糕,随着疫情结束刺激措施将很快缩减,估值也荒谬至极。“买在谣言,卖在新闻。”但请记住,在押注泡沫何时破裂这件事上,历史上有太多令人失望的先例。

EXHIBIT 1BUBBLES – GREAT WHILE THEY LAST Housing Bubble Tech Bubble 2.00 2.00 Index Level 1.00 1.00 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 1995 1997 1999 2001 Housing bubble as of 11/30/2011, Tech bubble as of 2/28/2003 Source: S&P 500 (Tech bubble); National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau (Housing bubble) Nothing in investing perfectly repeats. Certainly not investment bubbles. Each form of irrational exuberance is different; we are just looking for what you might call spiritual similarities. Even now, I know that this market can soar upwards for a few more weeks or even months – it feels like we could be anywhere between July 1999 and February 2000. Which is to say it is entitled to break any day, having checked all the boxes, but could keep roaring upwards for a few months longer. My best guess as to the longest this bubble might survive is the late spring or early summer, coinciding with the broad rollout of the COVID vaccine. At that moment, the most pressing issue facing the world economy will have been solved. Market participants will breathe a sigh of relief, look around, and immediately realize that the economy is still in poor shape, stimulus will shortly be cut back with the end of the COVID crisis, and valuations are absurd. “Buy the rumor, sell the news.” But remember that timing the bursting of bubbles has a long history of disappointment.

即使事后复盘,也几乎很难准确指出究竟是哪根针戳破了泡沫。之所以看不清,主要原因在于,大牛市并非在市场遭遇重大意外负面消息时突然崩盘的。像 1987 年投资组合保险酿成的灾难这类事件,往往会导致市场急跌后迅速反弹。在更大的格局中,它们是独特且技术性的,并不属于大泡沫涨落的组成部分。大牛市通常是在市场条件非常有利、只是比昨天略逊一筹的时候开始掉头向下。正因如此,它们总是被人错过。

Even with hindsight, it is seldom easy to point to the pin that burst the bubble. The main reason for this lack of clarity is that the great bull markets did not break when they were presented with a major unexpected negative. Those events, like the portfolio insurance fiasco of 1987, tend to give sharp down legs and quick recoveries. They are in the larger scheme of things unique and technical and are not part of the ebb and Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p5 flow of the great bubbles. The great bull markets typically turn down when the market conditions are very favorable, just subtly less favorable than they were yesterday. And that is why they are always missed.

无论哪种情况,市场现在都已呈现出大型泡沫的所有感性特征。最引人注目的,是多头的劲头和狂热、对个股和市场的报道铺天盖地,而最关键的,是对空头日益增长的敌意。1929 年,做空不仅可能招致人身攻击,还会让你名声扫地。就我们而言,1999 年是唯一一次客户的反应仿佛我们在故意恶意地剥夺他们的收益。相比之下,2008 年根本不算什么。但在过去几个月里,这种敌对的调门在迅速升级。对空头来说,讽刺的是,这恰恰是我们希望听到的。这是最终崩盘的经典前兆;伴随着股票上涨——不是因为基本面,而仅仅是因为它们在涨。

Either way, the market is now checking off all the touchy-feely characteristics of a major bubble. The most impressive features are the intensity and enthusiasm of bulls, the breadth of coverage of stocks and the market, and, above all, the rising hostility toward bears. In 1929, to be a bear was to risk physical attack and guarantee character assassination. For us, 1999 was the only experience we have had of clients reacting as if we were deliberately and maliciously depriving them of gains. In comparison, 2008 was nothing. But in the last few months the hostile tone has been rapidly ratcheting up. The irony for bears though is that it’s exactly what we want to hear. It’s a classic precursor of the ultimate break; together with stocks rising, not for their fundamentals, but simply because they are rising.

牛市后期另一个更可量化的特征,从南海泡沫到 1999 年科技泡沫无一例外,就是最后阶段的加速上涨。近期案例中,最后 21 个月到峰值的涨幅超过 60%,速度远高于正常牛市上涨速度的两倍。这一次,美国各大指数在短短 9 个月内,标普 500 指数涨幅从 69% 升至 100%,罗素 2000 指数也同样如此。相当不错!而且可能还有更多涨幅。但它已经满足了泡沫后期的这一必要检验。

Another more measurable feature of a late-stage bull, from the South Sea bubble to the Tech bubble of 1999, has been an acceleration3 of the final leg, which in recent cases has been over 60% in the last 21 months to the peak, a rate well over twice the normal rate of bull market ascents. This time, the U.S. indices have advanced from +69% for the S&P 500 to +100% for the Russell 2000 in just 9 months. Not bad! And there may still be more climbing to come. But it has already met this necessary test of a late-stage bubble.

作为市场历史研究者,能再次亲历一场重大的股票泡沫,是一种特权。日本 1989 年、2000 年科技泡沫、2008 年房地产和抵押贷款危机,以及现在的这场泡沫——这是我一生中最重大、最扣人心弦的四次投资事件。大多数时候,在更正常的市场里,你按部就班去上班,做好自己的工作。平淡无奇。然后,每隔很长一段时间,市场会脱离公允价值与现实,螺旋式失控。财富在短时间内被创造或毁灭,投资顾问们难得有机会真正证明自己的存在价值。但和往常一样,没有免费的午餐。这些派上用场的机会,无不伴随着职业风险。

It is a privilege as a market historian to experience a major stock bubble once again. Japan in 1989, the 2000 Tech bubble, the 2008 housing and mortgage crisis, and now the current bubble – these are the four most significant and gripping investment events of my life. Most of the time in more normal markets you show up for work and do your job. Ho hum. And then, once in a long while, the market spirals away from fair value and reality. Fortunes are made and lost in a hurry and investment advisors have a rare chance to really justify their existence. But, as usual, there is no free lunch. These opportunities to be useful come loaded with career risk.

好了,又到了这个时候。我预计下一次,我的泡沫预警将再次符合我那个谦虚的成功定义:在未来的某个时点,无论那是什么时候,你在 2020 年仲夏选择离场就会被证明是值得的。但很少有专业投资者或个人投资者能够做到离场。时点的不确定性,加上客户那边后悔情绪加速蔓延,意味着与泡沫对抗所面临的职业风险与商业风险,对大型商业机构来说实在过于巨大。它们永远无法全力支持看空建议,即便市盈率像日本那样涨到 65 倍。所以,别指望高盛和摩根士丹利会转为看空:这种事永远不可能发生。对它们来说,那是一场糟糕得可怕、毫无商业回报的赌注。或许对任何人都是如此。对客户来说有盈利、能降低风险,没错,但对投资顾问来说却是商业上不可行的选择。它们的最佳策略清晰而简单:永远保持极度乐观。这既有利于生意,又在智识上毫不费力。这对大多数投资者来说都很有吸引力,他们——正如在新冠疫情中生动展现的那样——更偏爱乐观情绪,而非现实的评估。当一切结束时,作为一个坚定的多头,你会有铺天盖地的盟友相伴。这就是为什么在泡沫中你一直听到、也永远会听到看多建议的原因。

So, here we are again. I expect once again for my bubble call to meet my modest definition of success: at some future date, whenever that may be, it will have paid for you to have ducked from midsummer of 2020. But few professional or individual investors will have been able to have ducked. The combination of timing uncertainty and rapidly accelerating regret on the part of clients means that the career and business risk of fighting the bubble is too great for large commercial enterprises.4 They can never put their full weight behind bearish advice even if the P/E goes to 65x as it did in Japan. So, don't wait for the Goldmans and Morgan Stanleys to become bearish: it can never happen. For them it is a horribly non-commercial bet. Perhaps it is for anyone. Profitable and risk-reducing for the clients, yes, but commercially impractical for advisors. Their best policy is clear and simple: always be extremely bullish. It is good for business and intellectually undemanding. It is appealing to most investors who much prefer optimism My paper of January 2018, “Bracing Yourself for a to realistic appraisal, as witnessed so vividly with COVID. And when it all ends, you Possible Near-term Melt-up,” has substantially more data will as a persistent bull have overwhelming company. This is why you have always had and exhibits on this topic. bullish advice in a bubble and always will.

2021 年 8 月 26 日更新:在本报告之前的一版中,我们曾指出,2000 年 2 月,瑞银华宝(UBS Brinson)及其子公司菲利普斯与德鲁(Phillips & Drew)在呼吁泡沫即将见顶之际,将持仓调向全仓成长股推荐。这一说法基于当时的新闻报道,但那些报道现在看来很可能是错误推测。因此,我们已删除相关内容。然而,对于任何愿意承担这种职业风险的经理人——或者更可能的是,对于个人投资者——要求必须精准择时,则是对其要求过高。如果全仓成长股投资的门槛定得太高,以至于你必须精确判断顶部,那么你永远不会尝试。而那样,你就注定会像绝大多数投资者和经理人一样,在每个周期中随着泡沫破灭而一同坠落。

August 26, 2021 Update: In a previous edition of this paper, However, for any manager willing to take on that career risk – or more likely for the we suggested that in February 2000, UBS Brinson and its subsidiary, Phillips & Drew, shifted their positioning to a individual investor – requiring that you get the timing right is overreach. If the hurdle for fully invested growth stock recommendation just before calling a bubble is set too high, so that you must call the top precisely, you will never try. the market peak. That statement was based on financial And that condemns you to ride over the cliff every cycle, along with the great majority of news reports at the time that appear to have been incorrect investors and managers. speculation. As a result, we have removed the reference.

等待最后一舞:在后期大型泡沫中的资产配置风险 | 第 6 页 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 该怎么办?

Waiting for the Last Dance: The Hazards of Asset Allocation in a Late-stage Major Bubble | p6 Jeremy Grantham What to Do?

杰里米·格兰瑟姆是 GMO 的联合创始人(1977 年创立),也是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,担任公司长期投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会成员,并曾在多家非营利组织的投资委员会任职。在创立 GMO 之前,格兰瑟姆于 1969 年联合创立了巴特里马克金融管理公司,并于 1971 年率先推荐商业指数化投资,这被认为是其多项“第一”的成就之一。他的投资生涯始于荷兰皇家壳牌集团的经济师。格兰瑟姆在英国谢菲尔德大学获得本科学位,并在哈佛商学院获得 MBA 学位。他是美国艺术与科学院院士,获颁大英帝国司令勋章(CBE),并荣获卡内基慈善奖章。

Mr. Grantham co- As often happens at bubbly peaks like 1929, 2000, and the Nifty Fifty of 1972 (a founded GMO in 1977 second-tier bubble in the company of champions), today’s market features extreme and is a member of disparities in value by asset class, sector, and company. Those at the very cheap end GMO’s Asset Allocation include traditional value stocks all over the world, relative to growth stocks. Value team, serving as the stocks have had their worst-ever relative decade ending December 2019, followed by firm’s long-term investment strategist. He the worst-ever year in 2020, with spreads between Growth and Value performance is a member of the GMO Board of Directors averaging between 20 and 30 percentage points for the single year! Similarly, and has also served on the investment Emerging Market equities are at 1 of their 3, more or less co-equal, relative lows boards of several non-profit organizations. against the U.S. of the last 50 years. Not surprisingly, we believe it is in the overlap of Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham these two ideas, Value and Emerging, that your relative bets should go, along with the was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial greatest avoidance of U.S. Growth stocks that your career and business risk will allow. Management in 1969 where he recommended Good luck! commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. He is a member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE from the UK and is a recipient of the Carnegie Medal for Philanthropy.

免责声明 本文表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2021 年 1 月 5 日的观点,可能随时根据市场及其他情况发生变化。本文不构成对任何证券的买卖要约或要约邀请,也不应被理解为上述内容。

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