我姐姐的养老金资产与代理问题

2012 · 书信 · 原文约 7654 词
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GMO 季度信函 2012 年 4 月

我姐妹的养老金资产与代理问题(保住饭碗与客户资金之间的张力)

杰里米·格兰瑟姆

投资业务的核心真相是,投资行为受职业风险驱动。在专业投资领域,我们都是代理人,管理他人的资金。正如凯恩斯 1 深知的那样,首要指令始终是保住自己的饭碗。为此,他解释说,你绝不能独自犯错。为避免这种灾难,专业投资者会无情地关注其他投资者普遍在做什么。绝大多数人要么完全要么部分“随大流”。这形成了羊群效应或动量,将价格推至远高于或远低于公平价格。市场定价中存在许多其他低效现象,但这是最大的一种。它解释了显著波动的股市与极其稳定的 GDP 增长,以及同样稳定的股市“公平价值”增长之间的差异。这种差异是巨大的——如图表 1 所示,三分之二的时间里,年度 GDP 增长与市场公平价值的年度变化都在其长期趋势的 ±1% 微小范围内波动。而由狂野不羁的个人行为带来的市场实际价格,在三分之二的时间里,波动在 ±19% 范围内。因此,市场波动程度是图表 1 长期企业利润非常稳定,似乎几乎没有长期风险 标普实际价格 vs 完美预见公平价值*:1882 – 2005 13.0 20 波动率 12.5 三分之二时间 GDP ± 1% 18 实际价格与公平价值(对数空间) 12.0 三分之二时间公平价值 ± 1% GDP 16 三分之二时间价格 ± 19% 实际 GDP(对数空间) 11.5 11.0 公平 10.5 价值 12 10.0 9.5 标普实际价格 8 9.0 8.5 8.0 4 * 席勒模型 来源:GMO、标准普尔、美联储 截至 2005 年 12 月 31 日 1 约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯,《就业、利息和货币通论》,1936 年。

GMO QUARTERLY LETTER April 2012 My Sister’s Pension Assets and Agency Problems (The Tension between Protecting Your Job or Your Clients’ Money) Jeremy Grantham The central truth of the investment business is that investment behavior is driven by career risk. In the professional investment business we are all agents, managing other peoples’ money. The prime directive, as Keynes1 knew so well, is first and last to keep your job. To do this, he explained that you must never, ever be wrong on your own. To prevent this calamity, professional investors pay ruthless attention to what other investors in general are doing. The great majority “go with the flow,” either completely or partially. This creates herding, or momentum, which drives prices far above or far below fair price. There are many other inefficiencies in market pricing, but this is by far the largest. It explains the discrepancy between a remarkably volatile stock market and a remarkably stable GDP growth, together with an equally stable growth in “fair value” for the stock market. This difference is massive – two-thirds of the time annual GDP growth and annual change in the fair value of the market is within plus or minus a tiny 1% of its long-term trend as shown in Exhibit 1. The market’s actual price – brought to us by the workings of wild and wooly individuals – is within plus or minus 19% two-thirds of the time. Thus, the market moves 19 times more than Exhibit 1 Long-Term Corporate Profits Are Very Stable and Seem to Offer Little Long-Term Risk Real S&P price vs. perfect foresight fair value*: 1882 – 2005 13.0 20 Volatility 12.5 2/3 of the Time GDP ± 1% 18 Real Price and Fair Value in Log Space 12.0 2/3 of the Time Fair Value ± 1% GDP 16 2/3 of the Time Prices ± 19% Real GDP in Log Space 11.5 11.0 Fair 10.5 Value 12 10.0 9.5 S&P Real Price 8 9.0 8.5 8.0 4 * Shiller model Source: GMO, Standard & Poor’s, Federal Reserve As of 12/31/05 1 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936.

这个结论是得到底层引擎支撑的!这种非理性压倒理性、“有效市场”被碾压的惊人现象,罗伯特·席勒 20 多年前就首次发现了,而理性预期学派拿出的反驳逻辑,堪称是最绞尽脑汁的那一套——这个门槛确实高得吓人。席勒在这项研究中测算“公允价值”时,用了先知视角。他“知道”从 1917 年、1961 年以及此后每一个起点出发,未来所有股息的全飞行路径。由此得出的理论价值始终稳定(即便在大萧条时期也几乎没怎么波动),但这份数据却被广泛认为毫无意义而遭到忽视。对大多数市场参与者来说,忽略它可能是正确的反应——因为无视市场的大起大落,试图把注意力集中在缓慢燃烧的长期现实上,在职业生涯中实在过于危险。错失一次大行情——无论基本面如何不合理——都面临极高的被解雇风险。职业风险以及由此引发的羊群效应,很可能永远主导着投资行为。短期永远会被放大,而企业未来价值会延伸到遥远未来的这个事实,则会被忽略。正如 GMO 的本·英克所写,三分之二的企业价值存在于 20 年之后。然而市场却常常交易得好像所有价值都在未来 5 年内,有时甚至是 5 个月。对我们这个市场而言,那种波动在一个聪明的火星人看来或许荒谬绝伦,但它就是我们的现实,而且人人都喜欢搬出凯恩斯那句“名言”(但从未被证实过):“市场保持非理性的时间,可以长过你保持不破产的时间。”对我们这些代理人来说,他或许更该说:“市场保持非理性的时间,可以长过客户保持耐心的时间。”这些年来,我们估算的“标准客户耐心时长”(姑且造个词)在正常条件下是 3.0 年。在极端情况下——比如合作关系以及启动时机恰逢不幸——耐心可能会短上整整一年。举例来说,在 5 年好业绩之后出现 2.5 年糟糕表现,通常还能忍受;但起步就碰上 2.5 年糟糕业绩——即便你此前 5 年好成绩尽人皆知,但那是给别人的——绝对完全是两码事!如果起步时机好、个人关系牢固、相对业绩也说得过去,客户的耐心可以比 3.0 年多出一年,特殊情况下甚至能多出两年。我喜欢说,出色的客户管理就是为你的公司多赢得一年的耐心。对任何投资产品来说,这多出的一年都至关重要;但在资产配置领域——错误明显可见——这一年的意义绝对巨大,而且通常就足够了。

is justified by the underlying engines! This incredible demonstration of the behavioral dominating the rational and the “efficient” was first noticed by Robert Shiller over 20 years ago and was countered by some of the most tortured logic that the rational expectations crowd could offer, which is a very high hurdle indeed. Shiller’s “fair value” for this purpose used clairvoyance. He “knew” the future flight path of all future dividends, from each starting position of 1917, 1961, and all the way forward. The resulting theoretical value was always stable (it barely twitched even in the Great Depression), but this data was widely ignored as irrelevant. And ignoring it may be the correct response on the part of most market players, for ignoring the volatile up-and-down market moves and attempting to focus on the slower burning long-term reality is simply too dangerous in career terms. Missing a big move, however unjustified it may be by fundamentals, is to take a very high risk of being fired. Career risk and the resulting herding it creates are likely to always dominate investing. The short term will always be exaggerated, and the fact that a corporation’s future value stretches far into the future will be ignored. As GMO’s Ben Inker has written,2 two-thirds of all corporate value lies out beyond 20 years. Yet the market often trades as if all value lies within the next 5 years, and sometimes 5 months. Ridiculous as our market volatility might seem to an intelligent Martian, it is our reality and everyone loves to trot out the “quote” attributed to Keynes (but never documented): “The market can stay irrational longer than the investor can stay solvent.” For us agents, he might better have said “The market can stay irrational longer than the client can stay patient.” Over the years, our estimate of “standard client patience time,” to coin a phrase, has been 3.0 years in normal conditions. Patience can be up to a year shorter than that in extreme cases where relationships and the timing of their start-ups have proven to be unfortunate. For example, 2.5 years of bad performance after 5 good ones is usually tolerable, but 2.5 bad years from start-up, even though your previous 5 good years are well-known but helped someone else, is absolutely not the same thing! With good luck on starting time, good personal relationships, and decent relative performance, a client’s patience can be a year longer than 3.0 years, or even 2 years longer in exceptional cases. I like to say that good client management is about earning your firm an incremental year of patience. The extra year is very important with any investment product, but in asset allocation, where mistakes are obvious, it is absolutely huge and usually enough.

凯恩斯在他的《通论》著名的第 12 章中确实说过:“长期投资者,也就是最促进公共利益的那个人……在实际操作中,只要投资基金由委员会或董事会管理,就会招来最多的批评。”他,那位长期投资者,会被视为“在普通看法中古怪、不守常规且鲁莽……如果他在短期内不成功——这很有可能——他不会得到多少宽恕。”(强调为原文所加。)回顾我们在几次极端异常事件中早早介入的经历,凯恩斯的原话显得精准得令人痛苦,因为“宽恕”有时就像古罗马斗兽场里糟糕的一天那样稀少,满眼都是倒竖的拇指。但与他的归因相比,我们的情况证明他还过于严苛了:我们似乎挺了过来。

What Keynes definitely did say in the famous chapter 12 of his General Theory is that “the long-term investor, he who most promotes the public interest … will in practice come in for the most criticism whenever investment funds are managed by committees or boards.” He, the long-term investor, will be perceived as “eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion … and if in the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much mercy.” (Emphasis added.) Reviewing our experiences of being early in several extreme outlying events makes Keynes’s actual quote look painfully accurate in that “mercy” sometimes was as limited as it was at a bad day at the Coliseum, with a sea of thumbs down. But his attribution, in contrast, has proven too severe: we appear to have survived.

看起来,如果你满足三个条件,你是能够在做空市场非理性牛市中存活下来的。第一,你必须留出像本杰明·格雷厄姆所说的那种宽裕的“安全边际”,等到真正的极端机会出现才下大注。第二,你必须尽量保持适当的多元化。第三,你绝对不要用杠杆。我个人认为(你可能会说,这是事后诸葛亮),尽管我们做资产配置的人当时觉得自己的耐心已经到了异常痛苦的程度,但过去我们并不总是能做到足够的按兵不动或者足够的耐心。价值型基金经理(以及打扑克的人也一样)的经典毛病就是缺乏耐心、下注太猛太早。此外,GMO 的资产组合过去也不总是最优的多元化。现在与 1998 年相比,在耐心和多元化等方面,我们总体上更加谨慎了(或者如果你愿意,也可以说“更有经验了”),而且至少我们在资产配置中从来不用杠杆。3 2000 年的美国成长股和科技股泡沫,是迄今为止美国市场历史上最大的市场极端事件;我们之前曾在日本那场市盈率高达 65 倍的市场中存活下来,那或许是所有重要股票市场中、无论何时何地都最大的极端事件。这些是对基金经理最严酷的考验,而我们在这两次判断中,都提前了 2 到 3 年发出预警。但我们还是活了下来,虽然免不了留下一些战斗的伤疤,好在我们最终赢下了这些赌注,而且是大获全胜。假设一下,如果当初我们能够抵御住投资过早的诱惑…… 2 本·英克,《经济危机中的股票估值》,2009 年 4 月 6 日。

You apparently can survive betting against bull market irrationality if you meet three conditions. First, you must allow a generous Ben Graham-like “margin of safety” and wait for a real outlier before you make a big bet. Second, you must try to stay reasonably diversified. Third, you must never use leverage. In my personal opinion (and with the benefit of hindsight, you might add), although we in asset allocation felt exceptionally and painfully patient at the time, we did not in the past always hold our fire long enough or be patient enough. It is the classic failing of value managers (and poker players for that matter) to get impatient and bet too hard too soon. In addition, GMO was not always optimally diversified. We are generally more cautious (or, if you prefer, “more experienced”) now than in 1998 with respect to, for example, both patience and diversification, and at least we in asset allocation always stayed away from leverage.3 The U.S. growth and technology bubble of 2000 was by far the biggest market outlier event in U.S. market history; we had previously survived the 65 P/E market in Japan, which was perhaps the greatest outlier in all important equity markets anywhere and at any time. These were the most stringent tests for managers, and we were 2 to 3 years early in our calls in both cases. Yet we survived, although not without some battle scars, with the great help that we did, in the end, win these bets and by a lot. Hypothetically, resisting the temptation to invest too 2 Ben Inker, “Valuing Equities in an Economic Crisis,” April 6, 2009.

杠杆的含义可以相当宽泛。就我们的资产配置策略而言,它意味着不使用借来的钱。

3 Leverage can be interpreted quite broadly. For our asset allocation strategies, it means no borrowed money.

GMO 第二季度信函——我姐姐的养老金资产——2012 年 4 月 也许 1931 年才是对逆市而行者生存能力的更严峻考验。幸运的是,我们以及所有价值型基金经理当时都不在场,不至于被那次考验诱惑。(尽管罗伊·纽伯格——不幸于 2010 年 12 月去世——当时在场,而且他能像任何投资者一样清晰地谈论那段经历。)

GMO 2 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 soon in 1931 may have been a tougher test of survival in bucking the market. Luckily we, and all value managers, were not around to be tempted by that one. (Although Roy Neuberger – who died in December 2010, unfortunately – was, and he could talk about it as lucidly as any investor ever.)

这完美诠释了沃伦·巴菲特的那句格言:投资很简单,但不容易。看清需要做什么很简单,但愿意或有能力去做则不容易。重复一个老故事:1998 年和 1999 年,我让大约 1100 名全职股票专业人士就两个问题投票。每一个人都同意,如果标普 500 指数的市盈率从当时的 28 到 35 倍回落到 17 倍,就必然会导致一场大熊市。更为惊人的是,只有 7 个人投票认为它不会回调!因此,超过 99% 的大型和中小型投资机构的分析师和投资组合经理都相信,确实会有一场“大熊市”,即使他们的发言人——除少数可敬的例外——仍在安抚客户说无需担心。职业风险和业务风险在各级投资中的分布并不均匀。例如,挑选保险股时职业风险很小,因此很难丢掉工作。通常需要四五年时间,你的选股表现不佳才会比较明显,而到那时,运气好的话,研究主管已经换了一两次,你的缺陷也就淹没在历史中了。相比之下,挑选石油股而非保险股,风险要显眼得多,因而也更危险。在牛市如火如荼时选择持有现金或采取“保守策略”,其风险可能超出了任何上市公司的承受极限。一家公司根本无法承受在宏观大势上被看作“错了”两三年,同时还要承担随之而来的业务流失。记住,高估的市场可以继续走向极度高估,两三年后依然如此——日本和科技泡沫已经证明了这一点。因此,由于资产类别选择在职业风险和业务风险游戏中具有更致命的冲击力,真正的投资机会更可能出现在资产类别层面,而非个股或行业层面。但亲爱的专业读者,即便你明白这一点,如果你像我那近 1100 名受访分析师一样看重自己的工作,大概也无法对此采取太多行动。除非,这涉及到你自己的资产,或者,比如说,你姐姐的养老金资产。

This exemplifies perfectly Warren Buffett’s adage that investing is simple but not easy. It is simple to see what is necessary, but not easy to be willing or able to do it. To repeat an old story: in 1998 and 1999 I got about 1100 full-time equity professionals to vote on two questions. Each and every one agreed that if the P/E on the S&P were to go back to 17 times earnings from its level then of 28 to 35 times, it would guarantee a major bear market. Much more remarkably, only 7 voted that it would not go back! Thus, more than 99% of the analysts and portfolio managers of the great, and the not so great, investment houses believed that there would indeed be “a major bear market” even as their spokespeople, with a handful of honorable exceptions, reassured clients that there was no need to worry. Career and business risk is not at all evenly spread across all investment levels. Career risk is very modest, for example, when you are picking insurance stocks; it is therefore hard to lose your job. It will usually take 4 or 5 years before it becomes reasonably clear that your selections are far from stellar and by then, with any luck, the research director will have changed once or twice and your deficiencies will have been lost in history. Picking oil, say, versus insurance is much more visible and therefore more dangerous. Picking cash or “conservatism” against a roaring bull market probably lies beyond the pain threshold of any publicly traded enterprise. It simply cannot take the risk of being seen to be “wrong” about the big picture for 2 or 3 years, along with the associated loss of business. Remember, expensive markets can continue on to become obscenely expensive 2 or 3 years later, as Japan and the tech bubble proved. Thus, because asset class selection packs a more deadly punch in the career and business risk game, the great investment opportunities are much more likely to be at the asset class level than at the stock or industry level. But even if you know this, dear professional reader, you will probably not be able to do too much about it if you value your job as did the nearly 1100 analysts in my survey. Except, perhaps, with your own assets or, say, your sister’s pension assets.

这一切将我引向持续时间最长的投资——我姐姐的养老金。这笔养老金始于 1968 年,规模极小,当时我刚在投资行业找到第一份工作。部分由于资产规模小,部分由于我当时更为激进(或者说缺乏想象力),她的养老金资产 100% 投资于我参与的那些股票型共同基金(始终是价值型,且大多是小盘价值型)。不过,投资组合内的配置不时调整,有时变动相当大。例如,当我们进入格林斯潘-伯南克过度刺激的市场(自 1990 年代及之后),她的平均股票仓位明显偏低,并且自 1998 年后大幅转向新兴市场、远离美国市场(在各自操作约束下,GMO 的所有策略均如此)。

My Sister’s Pension Assets All of this brings me to my longest-lived investment: the pension of one of my sisters, which started very modestly in 1968, just after I got my first job in the investment business. Partly because the value of the assets was small and partly because I was more aggressive (or unimaginative) then, her pension assets were invested 100% in those equity mutual funds (always value and mostly small cap value) that I was involved with. However, the allocations within the portfolio changed from time to time, sometimes quite significantly. For example, as we entered the GreenspanBernanke over-stimulated market in the 1990s and onwards, she was notably underweight stocks on average, and hugely tilted to emerging markets and away from the U.S. after 1998 (as were all GMO strategies within their respective operational constraints).

后来,当 GMO 在 1994 年开始推出十年期预测并积累起资产配置领域的经验后,我妹妹的养老金忠实地遵循了这些预测。但让我有点不好意思承认的是,按风险调整后的收益算,她的表现比我们第一个专营的机构资产配置客户还要略好一些。这主要有两个原因。对她来说第一个巨大的优势是,我只需考虑绝对回报,而不受某些投资者施加的投资约束。我完全没有感受到任何职业风险。在当了 43 年基本还算称职的管理人之后,她不那么容易解雇我。况且,她好几年来既不问也不被告知投资变动或短期业绩——说到底,她是我妹妹。完全没有投资约束和被解雇的压力,这给了我最大的投资自由——当数据要求时(就像 1998 年到 1999 年以及 2007 年那样最显著的情况),可以做出资产配置的豪赌。对机构客户而言,这些条件是不可能复制的。(在继续之前,我应该跟你说说我跟我妹妹之间的一次投资沟通试验。在一次令人痛苦的新兴市场股票亏损经历之后,我觉得应该提一下这件事,同时表达我最终会好起来的信心。她一听说了亏损,还没等我提供任何细节,就很快大喊起来:“卖!卖!”完全像是 1929 年的电影桥段。尽管她恳求,我一点没卖,而新兴市场这东西的本性就是如此——它迅速强劲反弹,创出辉煌新高。所以,为了平衡旧的坏消息,我告诉她我们闪电般的收益,结果又被同样即时的惊呼告诫:“卖!卖!”试验到此结束。)

Later, as GMO started to crank out 10-year forecasts in 1994 and build up a body of experience in asset allocation, my sister’s pension faithfully followed the forecasts, but I’m a little embarrassed to admit that on a risk-adjusted basis she has done a little better than our first dedicated institutional asset allocation client. There are two principal reasons for this. The first very large advantage for her is that I have only had to consider absolute return without the investment constraints some investors impose. I have felt absolutely no career risk. She is not going to fire me easily after 43 years as a mostly effective manager. In any case, she does not ask nor has she been told about investment changes or short-term performance for several years, and she is, after all, my sister. The complete lack of investment constraints and pressure from being fired gives me the greatest of all investment freedoms – the freedom to make very big asset bets when the numbers call for it as they did most notably from 1998 to 1999 and in 2007. For an institutional client, these conditions are impossible to match. (Before moving on I should tell you of my one experiment in investment communication with my sister. After a painful losing experience in emerging market equities, I felt I should mention it along with my confidence that it would eventually work out fine. On hearing of the loss and before I could provide any details, she very quickly cried out, “Sell! Sell!” right out of some 1929 movie. In spite of her pleas, I did no selling and, in the nature of emerging, it came storming back quite rapidly to brilliant new highs. So, to balance the Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 3 GMO old bad news, I told her of our lightning-like gain only to be admonished with the same instantaneous exclamation, “Sell! Sell!” End of experiment.)

在对待客户(而非姐妹)时,我们一直试图采取一系列资产配置调整策略——即便我们在极端牛市中提前了整整 2.5 年(熊市通常来得快得多)进场,也会让投资组合看起来至少还算正常,让客户感受到的痛苦勉强可以承受。安全边际留得太大,等于把太多收益白白放弃;那样做可能是在保护自己的工作,而非努力最大化客户的回报。安全边际留得太窄,客户就可能解雇我们——过去确实发生过。我认为这对我们和客户都不利,因为客户往往会在一个非常不合时宜的时机,受极端错误定价市场环境的驱动,转而投向一个风格迥异的投资组合。这当然是投资的核心难题。在我们的资产配置实践的头 15 年里,为了解决这一难题,我们试图将旗舰策略“全球资产配置策略”(原名“全球平衡资产配置策略”)中全球股票仓位的浮动范围限定在最低 50%、最高 75% 之间。我们试图设想典型投资者——无论是个人还是机构——认为至少还算正常的仓位水平,这样当我们不可避免地过早调整时,他们还能坚持住。这个 50% 到 75% 的范围理论上看起来很保守,但 1998 年和 1999 年的经历告诉我们,实践中并非如此。正是在那段时间,市盈率——此前在 1929 年达到过 20 倍的峰值,1964 年达到过 19 倍——在 1999 年初飙升至惊人的 33 倍。在这个环境中不随大流,结果超出了大约 40% 客户的容忍限度。简单说,他们认为我们落伍了,因为我们没能看到格林斯潘所说的“新高原”——一个黄金时代,他声称互联网和其他技术将永久性地改变盈利能力,并且“很可能”也会改变估值水平。(今天市场上规模最大的许多资产配置基金,很明智地避开了这场终极压力测试,因为它们 1998 年和 1999 年还不存在。)但 60% 的客户留了下来。事后看,一位哲学家可能会说,如果在那样一次考验中——从统计上看超过 3 个标准差的事件,在一个正态分布的世界里大约只有千分之一的概率——你没有流失客户,那说明你总体上过于胆小了。这听起来有道理,但很少有人愿意频繁经历这种大放血。不过,对 GMO 来说,押对了赌注让公司在 2003 年到 2006 年间吸引了大量新业务,尽管证明了凯恩斯关于“不会得到宽恕”的说法,但我们似乎反驳了一个普遍观点:理性投资无法在非理性市场中存活。顺便说一句,凯恩斯本人无论是亲身经历还是从历史书上,都没见过像 2000 年美国或 1989 年日本那样的非理性市场。受到这两次经历以及 2007 年下一次泡沫中过度定价的强度和广度(那是一次真正全球性的泡沫)的激励,我们成功推动将“全球资产配置策略”中的股票仓位下限降至 45%,并且确保我们持有的股票整体上更为保守。这一次我们的时机把握得更好,市场在 2009 年初相当快地回落至公允价值,没有重蹈 1999 年和 2000 年初那种疯狂高估的覆辙,尽管美联储照例给了鼓励和过度刺激。因此,2008 年相对该策略的基准取得了可观的超额收益(费后 +6.9%)。然而,我们仍然感到相当不满,因为我们的绝对回报为 -20.8%,而且这一年我们极其确信会发生金融危机和大幅市场下跌。例如,到 2008 年 7 月,我甚至已经放弃了我钟爱的新兴市场股票,并建议客户“承担尽可能小的风险”。我建议无视基准风险或职业风险,将股票持仓降至最低水平。我当时写道,我“正式感到害怕”,并承认发现基本面比我预期的糟糕得多。发出如此可怕的警告,而现实甚至更糟,可以想象我们对相对收益强劲但实际亏损惨重的结果并不满意。还有两件事在我的伤口上撒了盐。首先,我姐妹的养老金资产——虽然使用与专业账户完全相同的输入条件,但承担零职业风险,完全没有基准——我对她工作的描述是:机会好时赚钱,机会差时保本——到 2007 年底股票仓位已经降到 20%。到 2008 年 7 月,这个配置降到了零股票,而且我觉得这并非不合理,因为 GMO 在 2007 年 10 月对任何股票子类给出的最高 7 年预测,也只是惨淡的每年 1.9% 真实收益,而且这个数字在 2008 年头几个月上升得极其缓慢。

In dealing with clients as opposed to sisters, we have tried to adopt a range of asset allocation moves that, even when we are 2.5 years too early in extreme bull markets (bear markets tend to be much quicker), will leave the portfolio looking at least faintly normal and leave the clients’ pain just tolerable. Too big a safety margin and we are leaving too much money on the table; we are probably protecting our job rather than attempting to maximize our clients’ return. Too narrow a safety margin and clients may fire us, as some have done in the past. I believe this is not good for us or our clients, who tend to rebound into much different portfolios, often, given the circumstances of an extremely mispriced market, at a very inauspicious time. It is, of course, a central dilemma of investing. In the first 15 years of our asset allocation experience, our attempt to address this dilemma was to limit the range of our global equity shifts in our flagship Global Asset Allocation Strategy (formerly known as Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy) between a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 75%. We had tried to imagine what the typical investor – both individual and institutional – would consider to be at least faintly normal so that they would hang in when we would inevitably be too early in our market moves. That range – 50% to 75% – had seemed very conservative in theory but not so in practice as we learned in 1998 and 1999. It was then that P/E ratios, which had previously peaked at 20 times in 1929 and 19 times in 1964, moved up to an astonishing 33 times in early 1999. Failing to follow the crowd in this environment turned out to be uncomfortably beyond the tolerance of about 40% of our clients. Basically, they thought that we had been left behind because of our inability to see Greenspan’s new high plateau – a golden era in which he claimed that the internet and other technology would permanently change profitability and “probably” valuation levels as well. (Many of the largest asset allocation funds in the market today had the notable good sense to bypass this ultimate stress test by not existing in 1998 and 1999.) But 60% of our clients stayed. With hindsight, a philosopher might argue that if in a test of that magnitude – statistically over a 3-sigma event, or about a 1 in 1000 chance if it were a normally distributed world – you did not lose business, you were being too timid in general. That sounds reasonable, but few would volunteer to go through that bloodletting too often. For GMO, however, winning the bet attracted a flood of new business from 2003 to 2006 and, despite proving Keynes’s point about receiving “no mercy,” we seemed to have disproved the general thesis that rational investing could not survive an irrational market. Keynes himself, by the way, had not seen such irrational markets as those that occurred in the U.S. in 2000 or in Japan in 1989, either in person or in the history books. Encouraged by those two experiences and by the intensity and breadth of overpricing in the next bubble of 2007, which was truly global in nature, we pushed successfully to have the equity minimum moved down to 45% in our Global Asset Allocation Strategy, and we also made sure that our equities were, on average, more conservative. This time, our timing was better as the market moved down reasonably quickly to fair value in early 2009, resisting the temptation to repeat the crazy overpricing of 1999 and early 2000, despite the usual encouragement and over-stimulation from the Fed. Consequently, 2008 was a year of healthy outperformance against the strategy’s benchmark (+6.9% net of fees). Yet it still left us feeling quite dissatisfied, for our absolute return was -20.8% and it came in a year when we had felt extremely confident of a financial crunch and a severe market decline. By July 2008, for example, I had even thrown in the towel for my beloved emerging market equities and had advised our clients to “take as little risk as possible.” I suggested ignoring benchmark or career risk by reducing equity holdings to rock-bottom. I was, I wrote, “officially scared,” and I confessed to finding fundamentals far worse than I had expected. With such dire warnings and with real life turning out perhaps even worse, one can imagine we were a little unsatisfied with strong relative gains but painful actual losses. And salt was rubbed into my wounds by two other events. First, my sister’s pension assets, driven by exactly the same inputs as our professional accounts but carrying zero career risk and no benchmark at all – I perceived my job description for her was to make money when opportunities were good and protect money when opportunities were poor – was already down to 20% equities by late 2007. By July 2008, this allocation had ducked down to zero equities and not unreasonably so, in my opinion, because GMO’s highest 7-year forecast for any equity subset in October 2007 was a dismal 1.9% a year real and this number rose only slowly in the first few months of 2008.

GMO 四季度信函——我姐姐的养老资产——2012 年 4 月 第二个也是更重要的因素,加剧了我们对 2008 年“相对”获胜的不满,那就是我们存在自己专业版本的资产配置策略,该策略“没有基准”——我想,这大概是一种简化的说法,意思是试图大幅降低基准风险的策略。因为几乎每个投资策略(也许除了我姐姐的)都必须在某处进行一些比较。

GMO 4 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 The second and more important factor that increased our dissatisfaction with our 2008 “relative” win was the existence of our own professional version of an asset allocation strategy with “no benchmark,” a shorthand way for saying, I suppose, a strategy attempting to show much reduced benchmark risk, for surely every investment strategy (except perhaps my sister’s) has to make some comparisons somewhere.

1999 年,我们推出了一系列没有官方基准的资产配置策略。其中一种被视为高风险,一种为中风险,一种为低风险。1999 年客户大会上展示的原始展品见附件 2。它显示,根据我们当时的十年期预测,所隐含的实际回报率在 5% 至 6% 之间(实际值),而标普 500 指数隐含回报率为 2.2%。然而,当时市场对一切看涨的热情如此高涨,以至于直到 2001 年我们才签下任何客户,即便在那时,我们的方法也被认为过于另类,以至于被要求将其与我们保守的多策略组合中 20% 的静态配置相匹配。这种组合策略曾面向机构提供,后因容量问题于 2004 年停止接受新资金。但其中的 80% 纯多头部分,出于会计目的,也作为一个独立的投资组合(GMO 无基准配置策略)进行运作。该策略表现优异,大幅跑赢了我们的旗舰产品——全球资产配置策略(见附件 3)。其超额回报的主要原因正是其所拥有的自由度。附件 2:使用非传统投资组合实现 5% 至 5.75% 的实际回报率(来自 1999 年 GMO 秋季会议)

In 1999 we offered a suite of asset allocation strategies that had no official benchmarks. One was deemed high risk, one medium risk, and one low risk. The original 1999 exhibit from our client conference is shown as Exhibit 2. It shows the imputed real returns (from our 10-year forecasts at that time) were in the range of 5% to 6% real, compared to the S&P 500 imputed return of 2.2%. Yet, such was the enthusiasm back then for all things bullish that we could sign no one up until 2001, and even then our approach was deemed so unusual that we were asked to match it up with a static 20% allocation to our conservative Multi-Strategy. This combined strategy was offered to institutions and was closed because of capacity concerns in 2004. But the 80% long-only component was, for accounting purposes, also run as a separate portfolio (GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy). It did well, handsomely beating our flagship Global Asset Allocation Strategy (see Exhibit 3). The main reason for this outperformance was precisely its freedom Exhibit 2 Achieving a 5% to 5.75% Real Return Using a Non-Traditional Portfolio 7% From 1999 GMO Fall Conference 5.75% 6% 5.5% Expected Real Return from Asset Class Emerging 5.0% Non-Traditional Equities 5% 19.3% Frontier REITs 15.0% 10.0% Emerging 12.3%% 10.0% 15.0% Debt 10.0% 8.1% 4% U.S.

16.9% 33.6% 债券 27.7% 通胀保值债券 50.0% 22.1% 3% 政府债券 50.0% 2% 1% 传统投资组合 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 风险(年化波动率) 传统投资组合 非传统投资组合 5.0% 5.5% 5.75% (65% 全球股票,实际回报 实际回报 实际回报 实际回报 35% 美国债券) 2.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.8% 风险 10.4% 4.7% 6.8% 8.8% 回报为负的概率: 3 年内 36.9% 2.6% 7.0% 11.7% 注:基于 GMO 的 10 年资产类别回报预测。上述预测在当时是基于 GMO 合理信念的前瞻性陈述,并非对未来业绩的保证。前瞻性陈述仅在其作出之日有效,GMO 无义务也不承诺更新前瞻性陈述。前瞻性陈述受制于众多假设、风险和不确定性,且这些因素随时间而变化。实际结果可能与此类前瞻性陈述中预期的结果存在重大差异。

16.9% 33.6% Bonds 27.7% Inflation 50.0% 22.1% Protected 3% Gov’t Bonds 50.0% 2% 1% Traditional Portfolio 0% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% Risk (Annualized Volatility) Traditional Portfolio Non-Traditional Portfolios 5.0% 5.5% 5.75% (65% Global Equities, Real Real Real 35% U.S. Bonds) Return Return Return Return 2.0% 5.0% 5.5% 5.8% Risk 10.4% 4.7% 6.8% 8.8% Probability <0% return: over 3 year 36.9% 2.6% 7.0% 11.7% Note: Based on GMO’s 10-year asset class return forecasts. These forecasts above were, at the time they were made, forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and were not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements.

资料来源:GMO,截至 1999 年 9 月 30 日的季度信函——《我姐姐的养老金资产》——2012 年 4 月 5 GMO 在市场定价过高时减少了投资仓位(请记住,当时我们对股票的 7 年预测回报率非常低)。我要指出的是,过去这十年相当有利:市场足够颠簸,比如 2008 年,这让资产配置有了可操作的空间,但又不至于像科技泡沫那样彻底疯狂。换一种情形,如果市场相对平静的十年重现,没有几次极端的过高或过低估值,那么这一策略的表现恐怕不会太好。在 2000 年的科技泡沫中,它也会被激进的投资组合远远甩在身后。你还会注意到 GMO 一贯的倾向:大部分重头操作都集中在投资环境糟糕的时期。

Source: GMO As of 9/30/99 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 5 GMO to be much less invested when the market was overpriced (remember, our 7-year-forecasts for equities were very low). I will point out that this last decade was a very favorable one: bumpy enough, as in 2008, to give asset allocation something to play against, but not really crazy, as the tech bubble had been. Alternatively, this strategy could not hope to do very well in a quiet decade, absent several wild over- or under-valuations, should there indeed be such a decade again. It would also have been badly beaten by aggressive portfolios during the tech bubble of 2000. You will also note the usual GMO tendency to do most of its heavy lifting when investment times are bad.

表 3 全球资产配置策略与无基准配置策略业绩 160% 无基准配置策略 +151% 140% 120% 业绩(经 CPI 调整) 100% 80% 全球资产配置策略 +72% 60% 40% +30% 20% 0% 全球资产配置基准* -20% 2001 年 12 月 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 上图中无基准配置策略的业绩显示了无基准配置组合(以下简称“组合”)的历史表现,该组合由 Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co. LLC(“GMO”)管理的账户和/或共同基金组成。该组合包含那些由 GMO 全权管理、且投资目标、政策和策略与组合内其他账户基本相似的付费账户。在 2012 年 1 月 1 日之前,组合内的账户作为更广泛的真实回报策略(自身拥有 GIPS 组合)的主要组成部分(约占 80%),主要服务于 GMO 的独立账户客户。预计无基准配置策略与该更广泛真实回报策略的该组成部分不会有显著差异。预计该策略的投资风险敞口不会与它作为更广泛真实回报策略组成部分时所采用的配置产生显著差异,不过该策略可能会将更高比例的资金配置给那些具有现金类基准的策略。组合中包含的账户并非全部是共同基金;然而,所有账户都将其资产投资于其他共同基金。构成组合的所有账户均由资产配置部门管理。尽管构成组合的共同基金和客户账户具有基本相似的投资目标和策略,但您不应假设这些共同基金或客户账户能够实现与组合内其他账户相同的业绩。组合中的客户账户可能会不时发生变化。每个账户的业绩可能因客户特定的限制和/或约束条件,以及共同基金之间不同的权重而有所不同。所引用的业绩数据代表历史表现,不能预测未来表现。无基准配置策略的净回报,是在从组合的毛回报中扣除模拟管理费和股东服务费后得出的。对于全球资产配置策略,净回报代表组合内所有账户扣除费用后回报的加权平均值。净回报包含交易成本、佣金、外国收入和资本利得的预扣税,并酌情包含股息及其他收入的再投资。在过去 12 个月内,一份符合 GIPS 标准的组合业绩陈述已先于本陈述呈现,或随本陈述一并提供,亦可访问 www.gmo.com 获取。实际费用在 GMO 的 Form ADV 第二部分中披露,也可在各策略的合规陈述中查阅。以上信息是对 2011 年 4 月在 GMO 网站上提供的符合 GIPS 标准的陈述的补充。* 全球资产配置基准由账户基准的加权平均值构成。许多账户基准由标普 500 指数、MSCI 全球除美国指数和巴克莱美国综合指数构成,或采用与每种市场风险敞口类似的替代指标。对于每个底层账户基准,各市场指数的权重可能略有差异(通常为 65% MSCI 全球指数,35% 巴克莱美国综合指数)。该指数由 GMO 内部混合编制,并按月维护。 对于更广泛的真实回报策略,截至 2012 年 2 月 29 日:累计净回报 = 175.18%。各年末净回报为:2001 年 12 月 31 日:0.16%;2002 年 12 月 31 日:8.80%;2003 年 12 月 31 日:34.20%;2004 年 12 月 31 日:15.29%;2005 年 12 月 31 日:13.54%;2006 年 12 月 31 日:11.01%;2007 年 12 月 31 日:9.99%;2008 年 12 月 31 日:-6.61%;2009 年 12 月 31 日:13.41%;2010 年 12 月 31 日:2.72%;2011 年 12 月 31 日:4.22%。

Exhibit 3 Global Asset Allocation Strategy and Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy Performance 160% Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy +151% 140% 120% Performance (CPI-Adjusted) 100% 80% Global Asset Allocation Strategy +72% 60% 40% +30% 20% 0% Global Asset Allocation Benchmark* -20% Dec- 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 The performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy appearing in the chart above shows the past performance of the Benchmark-Free Allocation Composite (the “Composite”) which consists of accounts and/or mutual funds managed by Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co. LLC (“GMO”). The Composite is comprised of those fee-paying accounts under discretionary management by GMO that have investment objectives, policies and strategies substantially similar to the other accounts included in the Composite. Prior to January 1, 2012, the accounts in the Composite served as the principal component (approximately 80%) of a broader real return strategy** (which has its own GIPS composite) pursued predominantly by separate account clients of GMO. The Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy is not expected to differ significantly from that component of the broader real return strategy. It is expected that the strategy’s investment exposures will not differ significantly from the allocations the strategy would have had as a component of the broader real return strategy, although the strategy will likely allocate a greater percentage of its assets to the strategies that have cash-like benchmarks. Not all of the accounts included in the Composite may be mutual funds; however, all the accounts have invested their assets in other mutual funds. All of the accounts that make up the Composite have been managed by the Asset Allocation Division. Although the mutual funds and the client accounts comprising the Composite have substantially similar investment objectives and strategies, you should not assume that the mutual funds or the client accounts will achieve the same performance as the other accounts in the Composite. The client accounts in the Composite can change from time to time. The performance of each account may differ based on client specific limitations and/or restrictions and different weightings among the mutual funds. Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Net returns for the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy are presented after the deduction from the composite’s gross-of-fee returns of a model management and shareholder service fee. For the Global Asset Allocation Strategy, net returns represent the weighted average of the net-of-fee returns of all accounts within the composite. Net returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. A GIPS compliant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The information above is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2011. * The Global Asset Allocation Benchmark is comprised of a weighted average of account benchmarks. Many of the account benchmarks consist of S&P 500, MSCI ACWI ex-U.S. and Barclays U.S. Aggregate or some like proxy for each market exposure they have. For each underlying account benchmark, the weighting of each market index may vary slightly (generally 65% MSCI ACWI, 35% Barclays U.S. Aggregate). The index is internally blended by GMO and maintained on a monthly basis. ** For the broader real return strategy, as of 2/29/12: Net cumulative return = 175.18%. Net year-end performance is: 12/31/01: 0.16%; 12/31/02: 8.80%; 12/31/03: 34.20%; 12/31/04: 15.29%; 12/31/05: 13.54%; 12/31/06: 11.01%; 12/31/07: 9.99%; 12/31/08: -6.61%; 12/31/09: 13.41%; 12/31/10: 2.72%; 12/31/11: 4.22%.

资料来源:GMO 截至 2012 年 2 月 29 日 GMO 第 6 季度报告——我姐姐的养老金资产——2012 年 4 月 那么,无基准配置策略与最初的全球资产配置策略相比如何呢?这里我又得绕个弯,谈谈投资效率的衡量指标,或者说,夏普比率。

Source: GMO As of 2/29/12 GMO 6 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 So, how does the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy compare to our original Global Asset Allocation Strategy? This is where I must take yet another detour to talk about measures of investment efficiency, or, Sharpe Ratios.

夏普比率 在我的投资生涯中,组合层面的夏普比率管理大多时候都是投资组合管理 101 的基础课,但在现实世界中,它几乎没怎么被用过。夏普比率衡量的是一只投资产品过去每单位收益承受了多少单位的价格波动。图表 3 显示,我们全球资产配置策略的基准——65% 全球股票、35% 美国债券——过去 10 年实现了每年 2.7% 的净实际回报,波动率为 ±11.6%(按一个标准差计算,即三分之二的时间)。因此,该基准的夏普比率被认为低于 0.25——也就是说,每获得 1 单位收益就要承受超过 4 单位的波动。相比之下,全球资产配置策略在扣除费用后实现了 +5.4% 的回报,而波动率比基准低了 20%,即每年 ±9.2%。因此,其夏普比率为 0.6,即每单位回报对应不到 2 单位的波动。这意味着,该策略的效率是基准的两倍多,每单位波动带来的回报是基准的两倍以上(我认为,波动常被危险地称为“风险”)。以此为基础,过去 10 年里,无基准配置策略(Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy)的年回报率是全球资产配置策略的 1.7 倍,波动率却低了 10%。这使它的夏普比率达到 1.1,效率几乎是全球资产配置策略的两倍,是平衡型基准的四倍以上。我想补充一句,我认为客户对所有只做多(long-only)投资产品的热情几乎完全取决于“原始”回报。效率提升中因低波动带来的那部分,根据我的经验,多少是被忽略的。这显然在商业上很危险:当市场从已经过高的价位大幅反弹时——这种情况时不时很容易发生——你推出一款策略,它在这些时候的落后程度可能是现有策略的两倍。这种痛苦的一个理论案例是 2008 年,假设市场在 2008 年意外再涨 30%,然后在 2009 年崩盘。一个真实案例是 1999 年,当时市场确实从已经创纪录的高估值水平上强劲反弹。即便如此,我相信夏普比率是“现代投资组合管理”中少数几个在全球化平衡组合层面有用的概念之一。它是一个合理但短期的衡量指标,评估实际亏损的可能性。相比之下,“信息比率”或“基准风险”被广泛使用。它们衡量的是每单位超额回报偏离基准的程度。换句话说,它衡量的是职业风险:让你老板难堪、丢掉饭碗的风险。所以,夏普比率——对最终受益人(比如养老金领取人)的风险——几乎被忽略,也许就不足为奇了。

Sharpe Ratio Managing Sharpe Ratios at the portfolio level has been Portfolio Management 101 for most of my investment career, but in real life it has been used to a negligible degree. The Sharpe Ratio is a measure of how many units of price volatility an investor has received in the past per unit of return. Exhibit 3 shows that the benchmark for our Global Asset Allocation Strategy, which is 65% global equities and 35% U.S. bonds, delivered a net real return for the last 10 years of 2.7% per year and had a volatility of ±11.6% (at 1 standard deviation or two-thirds of the time). It is therefore considered to have a Sharpe Ratio of under .25 – that is to say, it delivers more than 4 units of volatility for 1 unit of return. The Global Asset Allocation Strategy, in contrast to its benchmark, returned +5.4% net of fees, with a volatility that was 20% less, or ±9.2% a year. It has had, therefore, a Sharpe Ratio of 0.6, or less than 2 units of volatility per unit of return. This means that the strategy has been more than twice as efficient, if you will, as its benchmark, delivering over twice the return per unit of volatility (often referred to, rather dangerously, in my opinion, as “risk”). With this as background, for the last 10 years the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy has delivered 1.7 times the yearly return of Global Asset Allocation Strategy with 10% less volatility. This gives it a Sharpe Ratio of 1.1, or nearly twice the efficiency of the Global Asset Allocation Strategy and over four times that of the balanced benchmark. I will add that I believe that clients’ enthusiasm for all long-only investment products has been geared almost entirely to the “raw” return. That part of the increased efficiency that is due to lower volatility has been, in my experience, more or less ignored. This obviously makes it commercially dangerous to offer a strategy that can be caught out twice as badly as an existing strategy on those occasions when the market rallies a lot from an already overpriced level, which it can quite easily do from time to time. A theoretical example of such pain would have been a 2008 that was up another very unexpected 30% before collapsing, say, in 2009. A real example was 1999, when the market really did rally strongly from an already record overpriced level. That said, I believe the concept of the Sharpe Ratio is one of the few aspects of “modern portfolio management” that is useful at the level of a global balanced portfolio. It is a reasonable, although short-term, measure of the chance of real loss of money. “Information Ratio” or “benchmark risk” is, in contrast, very widely used. These measure how much you deviate from the benchmark per unit of extra return. In other words, it measures career risk: the risk of embarrassing your boss and losing your job. It is no wonder, perhaps, that the Sharpe Ratio – the risk to the ultimate beneficiary, the pensioner, say – is more or less ignored.

简而言之,我很高兴地告诉各位,我们现在可以提供一种几乎不带职业风险的投资策略。这就是“无基准配置策略”,现在它可以独立运作,不再依附于过去十年它所从属的真实回报策略。我们愿意进行资产类别押注,这使得该策略在过去十年——一个特别危险的时期——表现极为出色,因为它赢得了那些重大押注。为做到完全充分的披露,显然必须指出:也存在一定的风险,即它可能没有赢下这些大赌注,如果那样的话,业绩自然就会差得多。要进行如此重大的押注,至关重要的是要真正相信一个极强历史规律:金融狂热或悲观情绪的极端状态总会回归正常。幸运的是,我们拥有这份信心。

In a nutshell, I am pleased to say that we can now offer an investment strategy that reflects little career risk. It is the Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy, and it is now available on a stand-alone basis, independent of the real return strategy of which it has been a part for the past 10 years. Our willingness to make asset class bets has enabled this strategy in this past particularly dangerous decade to do very well because it won its big bets. To state the obvious in the interests of very full disclosure, there was clearly some risk that it would not have won its big bets, in which case, of course, performance would have been considerably worse. To make such big bets, it is vitally important to have real confidence in the very strong historical tendency for extremes in financial enthusiasm or pessimism to move back to normal. Which confidence, thankfully, we have.

此时,任何一直细心阅读的读者都会提出一个好问题:我们为什么认为这一策略能够经受住客户的标准耐心测试?诚实的答案是:它可能经不住。我们试图通过将这一策略标榜为“无基准策略”来提高胜算。它的初衷是首先保护资本,同时仍能赚取可观的收益。但凯恩斯知道,正如我所知,在 1999 年那种狂热中,客户那边有人扫一眼业绩榜单,看到看多的竞争对手们的 +47%、+31% 和 +24%,然后看到 GMO 的 +12%,这简直太容易想象了。在战斗白热化时,他们对长期业绩和职责描述的记忆会消退,“谁雇了那个 +12% 的家伙,为什么他在投资组合里?”这样的回应很容易就能听到。我们或许一厢情愿地希望,我们在以往测试中幸存并最终获胜的记录能被记住。谁知道呢?但即使时不时被解雇,可能也值得。毕竟,伟大的机会之所以存在,仅仅是因为职业风险(Career Risk)和商业风险真的、真的非常重要,而它们之所以重要,又是因为伴随而来的痛苦。所以,最终,追求我们能取得的最佳长期业绩的渴望,以及“这是对我们耐心、预测能力,以及,是的,沿途失去业务意愿的最高和最佳利用”这种感觉,占了上风,让我们有信念将无基准配置策略(Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy)作为一个独立策略推出。我相信,这是我第一次专门且相当详细地撰写关于 GMO 某个单一策略的文章,也很可能是最后一次。我的理由是:在所有我深为关切的投资议题中,我认为这个——职业风险——是最重要的。该策略的存在至少会起到两个作用。首先,它将基本上取代我亲自管理我姐姐养老金资产的工作(虽然我会保留在极少数情况下利用期货额外做空 10% 的能力,仅仅是为了炫耀她完全没有职业风险)。其次,凭借其愿意在看起来严重高估的市场偶尔下大赌注的意愿,它可以在我们时机不对时,让客户有绝佳的机会热情地解雇我们。请记住——那些客户可不会记得——尽管我们承担着巨大的职业或商业风险(并且,坦率地说,将其转嫁给了客户……啊,问题就在这里),但我相信,这些额外的风险是职业风险或基准风险,而不是真正的风险。我相信,该策略,就像 GMO 大约 90% 的多头策略相对于其基准一样,承担的实际风险要小得多。这体现在它(以及它们)的高夏普比率上。它的“风险”是在牛市中表现严重不佳。真正的风险,正如我的同事詹姆斯·蒙蒂尔喜欢称之为的那样,是资本的永久性损失的风险。首要规则是在熊市中不要表现不佳。尽管这可能是一条首要规则,但众所周知,在我们的行业里,没有任何有用的保证。

At this point, a good question from any reader who has been paying close attention is: why do we think this strategy can survive the client’s standard patience test? Well, an accurate answer is that it may not. We have tried to improve the odds by branding the strategy as benchmark-free. It is intended to protect capital first and yet still make good money. But Keynes knew, as I know, that in a 1999-type frenzy it would be all too easy to imagine someone at the client end looking down the performance list and seeing the +47%, +31%, and +24% of bullish competitors and then GMO’s +12%. In the heat of the battle, his memory of longer-term performance and job descriptions fades, and the response, “Who hired that +12% guy and why is he in the portfolio?” could easily be heard. We, perhaps fondly, hope that our surviving and eventually winning previous tests might be remembered. And, who knows? But even if frequently fired on occasion, it is probably worth it. After all, the great opportunities only exist because career Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 7 GMO and business risk really, really matter and they only matter because of the pain that accompanies them. So, in the end, the urge to have the best long-term record that we can have and the feeling that this is the highest and best use of our patience, forecasting ability, and, yes, willingness to lose business along the way, has won out, giving us the conviction to offer Benchmark-Free Allocation Strategy as a stand-alone strategy. This is, I believe, the first time I have written specifically and in some detail about a single GMO strategy and it is likely to be the last. My excuse is that of all of the investment issues close to my heart, this one – career risk – is in my opinion the most important. The existence of the strategy will do at least two things. First, it will substantially replace my own efforts to manage my sister’s pension assets. (Although I will retain the ability to go, on rare occasions, the extra 10% short, using futures, if only to rub it in that she has absolutely no career risk.) Second, it can, by virtue of its willingness to make occasional very big bets against markets that appear very overpriced, give clients great opportunities to fire us enthusiastically from time to time when our timing is off. Bear in mind – as such clients will not – that although we are taking enormous career or business risk (and, admittedly, passing it on to clients … ah, there’s the rub), the extra risk, I believe, is career risk, or benchmark risk, not real risk. I believe that this strategy, like roughly 90% of GMO’s long-only strategies relative to their benchmarks, takes considerably less real risk. This is reflected in its (and their) high Sharpe Ratio. Its “risk” has been that of bad underperformance in bull markets. Real risk is the risk of a permanent loss of capital as my colleague James Montier likes to call it. The cardinal rule is to not underperform in bear markets. And though it may be a cardinal rule, there are, as we all know, no useful guarantees in our business.

投资展望 从现在开始,我的信件将像过去几年那样,每季度聚焦一个特定议题。有时我也会涵盖广泛的投资展望,但有时我只会对更短期的一些基本问题做粗略评论,这可能让一些读者不满意。为了弥补这一点,本·因克(Ben Inker),我们资产配置团队的负责人和综合投资组合经理,将接替这个角色。所以我会评论任何我感兴趣的东西,而他会努力确保我们覆盖大部分(如果不是全部)重要的投资议题。有些人得到好工作,有些人得不到!本的评论将作为本信函的单独部分附后。

Investment Outlook From now on, my letter will focus on a particular issue every quarter as it has increasingly over the last few years. Sometimes I have also covered a broad investment outlook, but sometimes I have given only cursory comments on nearer-term bread and butter issues, which can be unsatisfactory for some readers. To remedy this, Ben Inker, the leader of our asset allocation group and general portfolio manager, will take up this role. So I will comment on whatever I like, and he will attempt to make sure we cover most, if not all, of the important investment issues. Some people get the good jobs and some people don’t! Ben’s comments follow as a separate section of this letter.

附言虚假前提 一位发言人很容易获得团队工作的功劳,对我来说情况往往如此。GMO 的资产配置过程一直是一个团队努力;事实上,在我们的大部分历史中,各个 GMO 策略跑赢其基准的能力,对我们资产配置策略成功的贡献,比我们资产配置的变动本身还要大。

PSFalse Pretenses It is easy for a spokesperson to receive credit for the work of a team, and this has often been the case for me. GMO’s asset allocation process has always been a team effort; indeed, for much of our history, the ability of the individual GMO strategies to beat their benchmarks contributed more to the success of our asset allocation strategies than did our movement of the assets.

在配置部分本身,我们始终依赖本·因克的投资组合管理技能,特别是仓位规模和风险控制,他已经担任我们团队的负责人超过 10 年(我对工作的态度一直是尽早且频繁地授权)。在资产配置的想法生成部分,我们一直努力成为一个民主的、由想法驱动的团队,随着我们抱负的增长,我们对脑力和专业知识的需求也随之增长:过去 5 年里,我们的资产配置头脑风暴团队从 4 人扩大到 25 人。我们希望在几乎所有通过资产配置来赚钱或省钱的机会上都能做到信息充分。

In the allocation piece itself we have always depended on the portfolio management skills, particularly sizing and risk control, of Ben Inker and he has been commander in chief of our group for more than 10 years. (My attitude toward work has always been to delegate early and often.) In the idea generation part of asset allocation, we have always tried to be a democratic, idea-driven group and as our aspirations grew, so did our need for brain cells and expertise: our asset allocation brainstorming team has grown from 4 to 25 members over the last 5 years. We want to be well-informed on almost every opportunity to make or save money by moving assets.

业绩数据代表过去表现,不能预测未来业绩。回报是在扣除管理费和(如适用)业绩报酬后列示的。净回报包括交易成本、佣金、对外国收入和资本收益的预扣税,并包括股息及其他收入(如适用)的再投资。一份符合 GIPS 标准的组合业绩报告已在过去 12 个月内在本报告之前提供,或随本报告附上,也可在 www.gmo.com 上获取。实际费用在 GMO 的 Form ADV 第二部分中披露,也可在每个策略的合规报告中获取。全球平衡资产配置策略的业绩信息是对 2011 年 4 月已在 GMO 网站上提供的 GIPS 合规报告的补充。

Performance data quoted represents past performance and is not predictive of future performance. Returns are presented after the deduction of management fees and incentive fees if applicable. Net returns include transaction costs, commissions and withholding taxes on foreign income and capital gains and include the reinvestment of dividends and other income, as applicable. A GIPS compli-ant presentation of composite performance has preceded this presentation in the past 12 months or accompanies this presentation, and is also available at www.gmo.com. Actual fees are disclosed in Part II of GMO’s Form ADV and are also available in each strategy’s compliant presentation. The performance information for the Global Balanced Asset Allocation Strategy is supplemental to the GIPS compliant presentation that was made available on GMO’s website in April of 2011.

免责声明:所表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2012 年 4 月 18 日的观点,并可能根据市场和其他情况随时发生变化。这不构成任何证券的购买或出售要约或招揽,也不应被解释为如此。对特定证券和发行人的提及仅供说明之用,不构成也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending April 18, 2012, and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.

版权所有 © 2012 GMO LLC。保留所有权利。

Copyright © 2012 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.

GMO 季度信函 – 我姐姐的养老金资产 – 2012 年 4 月 第 7 页 GMO 评论 2012 年 4 月 被强行喂食 本·因克 多年来,我们 GMO 确实没少抨击美联储。我们的大部分抱怨都集中在:过于宽松的货币政策,以及拒绝看到资产泡沫的危险甚至存在,是如何导致经济问题的。我们又要来抨击美联储了,但这次是“私人恩怨”。我们对美联储政策的主要抱怨,并非关于今天极度宽松的货币政策给全球经济带来的风险(这些风险相当大¹),而是美联储的政策让我们难以判断,我们为客户的利益所做的决定是否正确。

GMO 8 Quarterly Letter – My Sister's Pension Assets – April 2012 GMO COMMENTARY April 2012 Force Fed Ben Inker Over the years, we at GMO have certainly done our share of Fed bashing. Most of our complaints have centered on the way in which overly accommodative monetary policy and a refusal to see the dangers of, or even the existence of, asset bubbles can lead to economic problems. We’re about to pile on the Fed again, but this time it’s personal. Our major complaint about Fed policy is not about the risks today’s ultra-loose monetary policy imposes on the global economy (which are considerable1), but rather the fact that Fed policy makes it tricky for us to know whether we are doing the right thing on behalf of our clients.

关于 2000 年和 2007 年的资产泡沫,我们可以说的一点是:尽管它们可能对经济和投资者财富造成了重大损害,但至少对我们来说,知道该如何配置我们的投资组合很简单。如果我们避开估值过高的资产(在 2007 年,这几乎指所有有风险的资产),我们就知道自己在做正确的事。当然,即便投资很简单,也不一定很容易。在这两次事件中,特别是 2000 年,我们管理的保守型投资组合在泡沫破裂前都表现不佳,这给客户带来了不少困扰。

One thing that we can say about the 2000 and 2007 asset bubbles is that, while they may have done significant damage to the economy and investors’ wealth, it was at least simple for us to know what to do with our portfolios. If we avoided the overvalued assets (which in 2007 was pretty much everything risky) we knew we were doing the right thing. Of course, even when investing is simple, it isn’t necessarily easy. In both episodes, but particularly 2000, the conservative portfolios we were running underperformed until the bubbles burst, causing plenty of consternation for our clients in the process.

如今,美联储制造了一种局面:真正缺乏吸引力的资产类别,正是我们一直认为是低风险的类别:政府债券和现金。与互联网和房地产泡沫不同,这次它不再是美联储政策的准无意副作用,而是其基本目标。美联储多次表示,低利率和量化宽松的一个核心目标,就是通过推高风险资产的价格来创造财富效应。通过将利率维持在极低水平并将政府债券从流通中移除,美联储正试图诱使投资者购买风险资产。我们今天正在努力应对的问题是,我们是否应该上钩。那么,这跟 2007 年有什么不同呢?我们现在有一些非常缺乏吸引力的资产,以及另一些相比之下看起来好得多的资产。问题在于,如果今天那些缺乏吸引力的资产是现金和债券,那么转向相对有吸引力的资产就涉及增加投资组合风险;而在 2007 年,远离风险资产则会降低投资组合风险。2007 年,我们可以持有一个这样的投资组合:无论资产是花 7 年回归公允价值,还是明天就回归,我们都能跑赢。这令人安心,因为即使我们在预测中使用了 7 年回归期,我们也知道均值回归的时机高度不确定。今天,如果你认为资产会立即均值回归,你想持有的投资组合,与你认为需要 7 年才能回到公允价值而想持有的投资组合,是截然不同的。

Today, the Fed has engineered a situation in which the really unattractive asset classes are the ones we have always thought of as low risk: government bonds and cash. And unlike the internet and housing bubbles, this time it isn’t a quasi-inadvertent side effect of Fed policies, but a basic aim of them. The Fed has repeatedly said that a central part of the goal of low rates and quantitative easing is the creation of a wealth effect by pushing up the price of risky assets. By keeping rates very low and taking government bonds out of circulation, the Fed is trying to entice investors into buying risky assets. The question we are grappling with today is whether we should take the bait. So what makes this different from 2007? We’ve got some very unattractive assets and some others that look a good deal better by comparison. The trouble is that if those unattractive assets are cash and bonds today, moving to the relatively attractive assets involves increasing portfolio risk, whereas in 2007, moving away from risky assets lowered portfolio risk. In 2007, we could hold a portfolio that, whether assets took 7 years to revert to fair value or reverted tomorrow, we would still outperform. This was reassuring, because even though we use a 7-year reversion period in our forecasts, we know that the timing of mean reversion is highly uncertain. Today, the portfolio you would want to hold if assets were going to mean revert immediately is quite different from the one you would hold if you believed it would take 7 years to get back to fair value.

思考这个问题最简单的方法,也许是看看纯多头绝对回报投资组合的有效前沿,这一点我们多年来已多次讨论过(见图表 1)。

Perhaps the easiest way to think about the problem is to look at the efficient frontier for long-only absolute return portfolios, which we have reviewed on a number of occasions over the years (see Exhibit 1).

就其性质而言,有效前沿相对于风险是向上倾斜的。它们随时间的推移而发生的主要变化是线的斜率和线的水平位置。作为投资者,我们都希望这条线在图表上处于高位,当各类资产普遍被定价为能提供强劲回报时,情况就是如此。当这条线陡峭时,意味着你为承担额外风险获得了大量补偿。今天的线(黑色)非常低,但相当陡峭。¹ 具体来说,美联储的零短期利率和量化宽松政策,如果当金融体系恢复正常运转时,他们无法足够快地将宽松政策撤回,就存在引发通胀问题的可能性。与此同时,极低的杠杆成本鼓励了投机、资本错配,并促进了美国和全球各地资产价格泡沫的形成。

By their nature, efficient frontiers are upward sloping with regard to risk. The major ways in which they change over time is the slope of the line and the level of the line. As investors, we all want the frontier to be high on the chart, which will occur when asset classes are generally priced to give strong returns. When the line is steep, it means you are getting paid a lot for taking on additional risk. Today’s line (in black) is very low, but reasonably steep. That 1 Specifically, the Fed’s policy of zero short rates and quantitative easing creates the potential for an inflation problem if they cannot remove the accommodation fast enough when the financial system is back to functioning normally. In the meantime, the extremely low cost of leverage encourages speculation, the misallocation of capital, and encourages the formation of asset price bubbles in the U.S. and around the world.

图表 1 绝对回报组合随时间推移的变化——高风险组合(新兴市场与国际市场比重更高)

14%

13%

12.8%

12%

11%

2009 年 2 月前沿

10%

预期实际回报(含阿尔法)

9%

8.1%

8%

7.0%

6.7%

7%

2012 年 2 月前沿

6%

5%

4.4%

2007 年 6 月前沿

4%

4.8%

4.3%

3.2%

4.3%

3%

低风险组合(固定收益比重更高)

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

14%

15%

风险(年化波动率)

注:基于 GMO 对七大类资产回报的预测。这些预测是前瞻性陈述,基于 GMO 的合理判断,并非对未来表现的保证。前瞻性陈述仅代表发布之日的观点,GMO 没有义务、也不承诺对其进行更新。前瞻性陈述受制于众多假设、风险和不确定性,且这些因素会随时间变化。实际结果可能与前瞻性陈述中的预期存在重大差异。

Exhibit 1 Absolute Return Portfolios Over Time Higher Risk Portfolios (more Emerging and International) 14% 12.8% 13% 2/2009 Frontier 12% 11% Expected Real Return with Alpha 10% Lower Risk Portfolios (more Fixed Income) 9% 8.1% 8% 7.0% 6.7% 7% 2/2012 Frontier 6% 5% 4.4% 6/2007 Frontier 4% 4.8% 4.3% 3.2% 4.3% 3% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% Risk (Annualized Volatility) Note: Based on GMO’s 7-year asset class return forecasts. These forecasts are forward-looking statements based upon the reasonable beliefs of GMO and are not a guarantee of future performance. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made, and GMO assumes no duty to and does not undertake to update forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous assumptions, risks and uncertainties, which change over time. Actual results could differ materially from those anticipated in forward-looking statements.

来源:GMO 截至 2012 年 2 月 29 日 这就相当于你承担风险反而获得了回报,但原因并非风险资产回报极高,而是低风险资产回报极低。

Source: GMO As of 2/29/12 means you are getting paid to take risk, but the reason is not very high returns to risky assets but very low returns to low risk assets.

传统定量分析倾向于认为那条线的位置高低无关紧要。你或许希望那条线能更高些,但你对此无能为力。你能做的只是决定自己想在风险前沿上走多远,而这取决于你的风险承受能力以及那条线的斜率。因此,如果我们相信自己对大类资产未来七年的预测,以及某种合理的波动率预测,此外别无其他依据,那么我们就应该向风险前沿推进——而这正是伯南克希望我们去做的。

Traditional quantitative analysis tends to assume that the level of the line is irrelevant. You might wish that the line was higher, but you can’t do anything about that. All you can do is decide how far out on the frontier you want to be, which is a function of your risk tolerance and the slope of the line. So, if we believe in our 7-year asset class forecasts, some reasonable forecast of volatility, and nothing else, we should be pushing out on the frontier, which is what Bernanke wants us to do.

实际上,我们为客户管理的投资组合并没有特别靠近风险前沿。我们承担的风险处于“正常”水平,甚至略低于正常。为什么呢?你可以把这归结为一种膝跳反应式的不情愿——不愿听从央行行长的话去行事,但当资产配置团队讨论我们投资组合中应承担多大风险时,伯南克的名字通常不会被提起。我们不愿沿着风险谱系向前推进,真正的原因来自我们对组合风险驱动因素的理解。我们坚信,资产的风险会随其估值上升而上升。估值合理的股票,风险低于那些交易价格高于合理估值 30% 的股票,因为估值偏高的股票会给你带来损失风险——当价格回落至合理估值时,这种损失就会发生。这种风险——用我同事詹姆斯·蒙蒂尔的话来说叫“估值风险”——会导致损失,而且这些损失不太可能在短期内逆转。便宜的资产当然也可能下跌,但当它真下跌时,你要么预期从那之后会有高复利回报,稳步把钱赚回来;要么,当压低价格的条件消散时,会出现相当迅速的反弹,让你快速回本。因此,这种损失是暂时的,尽管在损失期间可能感觉不好受。当估值偏高的资产跌回合理估值时,后续回报只能假定为正常水平,这意味着相对于预期的财富损失是永久性的。如今,股票相对于我们对长期合理估值的估计是偏贵的。问题是,债券和现金也一样贵。如果一切资产都保证在 7 年内回归均值,我们会持有偏重股票的组合,因为股票与债券或现金之间的差距比正常情况更大。但我们不知道是否真的需要 7 年。由于现金和(大多数)债券相对于股票的折现率变化久期更短,快速回归均值给它们带来的损失会比股票小。持有一个我们得祈祷均值回归过程缓慢的组合,是很难让人兴奋起来的,结果就是,我们在股票上的配置比 7 年预测所暗示的要轻。这样一来,对于对标 65% 股票/35% 债券基准的组合,我们的股票仓位大约在 63% 到 64% 之间;对于绝对收益导向的组合,则根据其激进程度和机会集的不同,股票仓位在 48% 到 58% 之间。在政府债券方面,考虑到目前低得不可思议的收益率,我们比较有好感的只有澳大利亚和新西兰政府债券,因为只有这两个国家的债券兼具还算不错的实际收益率和长期可持续的政府支出政策。但即便是对这些债券,我们的胃口也不算大,最终留下了大量现金和“其他”类资产。如果我们的 7 年预测完全按计划实现,那么没有进一步增持股票就等于在桌上留了一些钱没拿走。然而,我们的仓位确实让我们不必担心资产类别比预期更快回归合理估值的情形,这确实有助于我们晚上睡得踏实。

In reality, the portfolios we are running for our clients are not particularly far out on the frontier. We are running at “normal” levels of risk or slightly lower than that. Why? You could chalk it up to a knee-jerk reluctance to do what a central banker is telling us, but when the asset allocation team is debating the appropriate level of risk to take in our portfolios, Bernanke’s name does not generally come up. The reason for our reticence to move out on the risk spectrum really comes from our idea of what drives portfolio risk. We believe strongly that the risk of an asset rises with its valuation. Stocks at fair value are less risky than stocks trading 30% above fair value because the expensive stocks give you the risk of loss associated with falling back to fair value. That risk – “valuation risk” to use my colleague James Montier’s terminology – leads to losses that should not be expected to reverse themselves anytime soon. A cheap asset can certainly go down in price, but when it does, you should expect either high compound returns from there, which make your money back steadily, or a reasonably sharp recovery when the conditions that drove prices down dissipate, which will make your money back quickly. The loss is therefore temporary, although it may GMO 2 Commentary – Force Fed – April 2012 seem unpleasant while it is occurring. When an expensive asset falls back to fair value, subsequent returns should only be assumed to be normal, which means that the loss of wealth versus expectations is permanent. Today, stocks are expensive relative to our estimate of long-term fair value. The trouble is, so are bonds and cash. If everything was guaranteed to revert to the mean over 7 years, we would hold equity-heavy portfolios, because the gap between stocks and either bonds or cash is wider than normal. But we don’t know that it will take 7 years. Because cash and (most) bonds have a shorter duration with regard to changes in their discount rate than stocks do, fast reversion would lead to smaller losses for them than for equities. Holding a portfolio where we are crossing our fingers that mean reversion will be slow is difficult to be excited about and, as a result, we are lighter on equities than the 7-year forecasts would otherwise suggest. That leaves us around 63% to 64% in equities for a portfolio managed against a 65% equities/35% bonds benchmark and 48% to 58% in equities for absolute return oriented portfolios, depending on their aggressiveness and opportunity set. On the government bond side, given the incredibly low yields around, the only bonds we have much fondness for are Australian and New Zealand government bonds, because only those countries give a combination of a decent real yield and government spending policies that are sustainable in the long run. But our appetite for even these bonds is not great, leaving us with significant holdings of cash and “other.” If our 7-year forecasts play out exactly to plan, we are leaving some money on the table by not moving more heavily into stocks. However, our positioning does leave us in a place where we need not fear the circumstance whereby asset classes revert to fair value faster than expected, and that does help us sleep better at night.

因克先生是资产配置部门主管。

Mr. Inker is the head of asset allocation.

免责声明:本文所表达的观点均系本·英克截至 2012 年 4 月 18 日的个人看法,并可能随时根据市场及其他条件发生变化。本文不构成对任何证券的买入或卖出要约或邀请,也不应被理解为上述内容。

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of Ben Inker as of April 18, 2012 and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such.

版权所有 © 2012 GMO 有限责任公司。保留所有权利。

Copyright © 2012 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.

评述——强行喂入——2012 年 4 月 3 GMO

Commentary – Force Fed – April 2012 3 GMO