谦卑算术的无情法则
谦逊算术的无情法则
The Relentless Rules of Humble Arithmetic
John C. Bogle
John C. Bogle
在近年那段灿烂的金融繁荣时期,我们投资界沐浴在几乎难以想象的繁荣阳光下。但正是在这种环境里,我们这一行发展出了对忽视金融市场回报显而易见之现实的既得利益。有人说——我想是我的批评者们说的——我唯一的本事就是“有种识破显而易见之事的神奇能力”。但当我们展望一个远不那么宽容的投资环境时,我们都必须直面这些真相。这个问题并不新鲜。两千五百年前,狄摩西尼就警告过:“人心中所愿,便信以为真。”更近些时候,厄普顿·辛克莱说得更辛辣,也更令人叫绝:“一个人若被付以重金去无视某事,让他理解这件事有多难,实在令人惊叹。”但我们都必须理解我们投资体系的现实,因为这些现实对金融中介体系的运转至关重要,而这一体系支撑着全体公民的集体财富和退休体系中的资产积累。尽管布什政府把我们的制度定义为“所有者社会”,我则称之为“投资者社会”。但无论我们用什么词,资本主义的未来在很大程度上取决于我们对体系现实的深刻理解。
During the glorious financial excesses of the recent era, we in the investment community basked in the sunlight of prosperity that is almost unimaginable. But in this environment, our community developed a vested interest in ignoring the obvious realities of financial market returns. It’s been said—I think by my detractors—that all I have going for me is “an uncanny ability to recognize the obvious.” But as we look ahead to a far less forgiving investment environment, we all must face these truths. This problem is not new. Two and a half millennia ago, Demosthenes warned, “What each man wishes, he also believes to be true.” More recently, and certainly more pungently, Upton Sinclair marveled, “It’s amazing how difficult it is for a man to understand something if he’s paid a small fortune not to understand it.” The investment But we all must understand the realities of our investment system, for they are central to the operation of the system of financial community is intermediation that underlies the collective wealth of our citizenry and the accumulation of assets in our retirement systems. While the Bush administration defines our system as the “ownership society,” ignoring the I call it the “investment society.” But whatever words we use, the future of capitalism depends importantly on our understanding the reality that the realities of our system.
金融成本至关重要假说
最根本的现实很简单:金融市场的总回报减去金融中介的成本,等于投资者实际获得的净回报。尽管数量惊人的投资文献都致力于阐述广为人知的 EMH(有效市场假说),但对我所称的 CMH(成本至关重要假说)却鲜有笔墨。然而,要解释投资者在追求跑赢市场时所面临的严峻净回报几率,我们并不需要 EMH;我们只需要 CMH。无论市场有效与否,投资者作为一个群体所赚取的回报,必定会落后于市场回报,落后的幅度恰恰等于他们承担的总成本。这是投资的核心事实。
有效市场假说 | 成本至关重要假说
- 证据有力 | 证据压倒性
- 解释合理 | 解释显而易见
- 大体正确 | 同义反复式正确
costs of financial The Cost Matters Hypothesis The overarching reality is simple: Gross returns in the financial markets intermediation minus the costs of financial intermediation equal the net returns actually delivered to investors. Although truly staggering amounts of investment literature have been devoted to the widely understood EMH (the are devastating efficient market hypothesis), precious little has been devoted to what I call the CMH (the cost matters hypothesis). To explain the dire odds the net return that investors face in their quest to beat the market, however, we don’t need the EMH; we need only the CMH. No matter how efficient or actually delivered inefficient markets may be, the returns earned by investors as a group must fall short of the market returns by precisely the amount of the aggregate costs they incur. It is the central fact of investing. to investors. Efficient Market Hypothesis Cost Matters Hypothesis • Strong evidence • Overwhelming evidence • Sound explanation • Obvious explanation • Mostly true • Tautologically true
约翰·C·博格尔是先锋集团旗下博格尔金融市场研究中心(位于宾夕法尼亚州福吉谷)的总裁。编者按:本文根据博格尔先生于 2005 年 2 月在《金融分析师杂志》60 周年会议上题为《反思与洞察:投资管理的启发性思考》的演讲整理而成。本文所表达的观点并不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的意见。
John C. Bogle is president of The Vanguard Group’s Bogle Financial Markets Research Center, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. Editor’s Note: This article was developed from Mr. Bogle’s presentation to the FAJ 60th Anniversary conference titled Reflections and Insights: Provocative Thinking on Investment Management (February 2005). The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management.
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然而,我们的财经报刊上满篇都是关于市场回报率的统计研究,这些回报率既无法实现,也从未被实现。我们怎能大谈“创造正阿尔法”,却意识不到在扣除中介成本之后,整个体系其实是负阿尔法?当 10 年期美国国债(或者如果你更喜欢,短期国库券也行)的 100% 回报唾手可得,而股票实际回报中高达 50% 甚至更多可能被我们金融体系的成本吞噬时,对股权风险溢价幅度的投机又有何用?我们怎能忽视这样一个事实:与加里森·凯勒笔下虚构的沃比冈湖那些孩子们不同,我们投资者作为一个群体,在扣除成本之前是平均水平,而在扣除成本之后则低于平均水平?投资者作为一个群体必然处于平均水平,这一观点可以追溯到一个多世纪以前,1900 年路易·巴舍利耶在索邦大学的博士论文中曾这样表述:“过去、现在,乃至折现后的未来事件,都已反映在市场价格中。”这基本上就是有效市场假说的核心观点。将近半个世纪后,当诺贝尔奖得主保罗·萨缪尔森发现巴舍利耶那篇被遗忘已久的论文时,他坦言自己时而觉得这不过是显而易见的道理,时而又觉得它意义深远、涵盖甚广。当然,巴舍利耶是对的。然而,当他继而得出“投机者的数学期望为零”的结论时,巴舍利耶错了。他走得还不够远。事实是,投机者和长期投资者的数学期望都不是零,而是零减去参与这场游戏的成本,这个相对于股市回报的缺口,恰好等于所有那些咨询费、营销开支、销售费用、经纪佣金、法律与交易成本、托管费以及证券处理费用的总和。而这正是成本市场假说的核心要义。
Nonetheless, the pages of our financial journals are filled with statistical studies of rates of market returns that are neither achievable nor achieved. How can we talk about “creating positive alpha” without realizing that after intermediation costs are deducted, the system as a whole has negative alpha? Of what use is speculation about the amount of the equity risk premium when 100 percent of the return on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note (or T-bill, if that’s what you prefer) is there for the taking while as much as 50 percent or more of the real return on stocks can be consumed by the costs of our financial system? How can we ignore the fact that, unlike those children in Garrison Keillor’s fictional Lake Wobegon, we investors are, as a group, average before costs but below average after our costs are deducted? The idea that investors as a group must be average goes back more than a century, expressed by Louis Bachelier in his PhD thesis at the Sorbonne in 1900: “Past, present, and even discounted future events are [all] reflected in market price.” That’s essentially what the EMH says. Nearly half a century later, when Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson discovered Bachelier’s long-forgotten thesis, he confessed that he oscillated between regarding it as trivially obvious and regarding it as remarkably sweeping. Of course, Bachelier was right. However, when he went on to conclude that “the mathematical expectation of the speculator is zero,” Bachelier was wrong. He didn’t go far enough. For the fact is that the mathematical expectation of the speculator and the long-term investor alike is not zero. It is zero minus the cost of playing the game, a shortfall to the stock market’s return that is precisely equal to the sum total of all those advisory fees, marketing expenditures, sales loads, brokerage commissions, legal and transaction costs, custody fees, and security-processing expenses. And that is the essential message of the CMH.
永恒不变的严苛法则
有了这个背景,现在让我转向启发这篇文章标题的那句引言。在《他人之财》(1914 年)中,路易斯·D·布兰代斯——后来成为美国最高法院最具影响力的法官之一——曾痛斥百年前同时掌控美国投资界和企业界的寡头们。他形容他们自私自利的财务管理与盘根错节的利益为“肆无忌惮地践踏”
Relentless Rules That Are Eternal With that background, let me now turn to the quotation that inspired the title of this essay. In Other People’s Money (1914), Louis D. Brandeis, who later became one of the most influential jurists on the U.S. Supreme Court, railed against the oligarchs who a century ago controlled both investment America and corporate America. He described their self-serving financial management and interlocking interests as “trampling with impunity on
November/December 2005
November/December 2005
人间的律法与神明的律法,皆执着于“二加二等于五”的妄想之中。他预测(事实证明,他预测得很准),那个时代普遍的投机狂潮终将崩溃——“沦为朴素算术那无情规则的牺牲品”。接着,他又引用了这样一句出处不明的警告(或许出自索福克勒斯):“陌生人,请记住,算术是科学之首,亦是安全之母。”正如人们所言,世事变化越多,就越是一成不变。布兰代斯所描绘的那个时代的历史,今天或许没有完全重演,但(套用马克·吐温的话说)它是在押韵。美国的投资体系——我们的政府退休计划、私人退休计划,乃至全体股东所持有的所有证券——正饱受着朴素算术无情规则的困扰。因为投资者获得的回报,只有在扣除了我们金融中介体系的成本之后才得以实现——就像赌徒的赢钱,只能来自荷官抽成之后剩下的部分——这些无情的规则摧毁了投资者的长期回报。将布兰代斯的论断应用于这些当代问题,我们似乎正执着于这样的妄想:7% 的市场回报率,减去 2.5 个百分点的成本,仍然等于投资者 7% 的回报率。没有人确切知道我们金融体系的中介成本究竟有多少。然而,我们确实掌握一些主要成本中心的数据。2004 年,投资银行家和经纪商的收入估计达 2200 亿美元;共同基金的直接成本约为 700 亿美元;养老金管理费为 150 亿美元;年金佣金约为 150 亿美元;对冲基金收费约为 250 亿美元;支付给个人理财顾问的费用,可能还有 50 亿美元。仅这些金融中介成本——甚至不包括银行和保险公司提供的投资服务——就达到了约 3500 亿美元,直接从金融市场为投资者创造的回报中扣除。此外,中介的价格也急剧攀升。1985 年,这些成本中心的年收入约为 500 亿美元。仅在泡沫及后泡沫时代(1996 年以来),金融中介的总成本很可能已超过 2.5 万亿美元,所有这些都由我们的股东和股票交易者如数支付。当然,其中部分成本确实创造了价值(例如流动性)。但按照定义,这些成本无法创造超越市场的回报。恰恰相反,它们是……
laws human and divine, obsessed with the delusion that two plus two make five.” He predicted (accurately, as it turned out) that the widespread speculation of that era would collapse—“a victim of the relentless rules of humble arithmetic.” He then added this unattributed warning (perhaps from Sophocles): “Remember, O Stranger, arithmetic is the first of the sciences, and the mother of safety.” As it is said, the more things change, the more they remain the same. The history of the era that Brandeis described may not be repeating itself exactly today, but (paraphrasing Mark Twain) it rhymes. America’s investment system—our government retirement programs, private retirement programs, and indeed all of the securities owned by stockowners as a group—is plagued by the relentless rules of humble arithmetic. Because the returns investors receive come only after the deduction of the costs of our system of financial intermediation— as a gambler’s winnings come only from what remains after the croupier’s rake descends—those relentless rules devastate the long-term returns of investors. Applying Brandeis’s formulation to these contemporary issues, we seem obsessed with the delusion that a 7 percent market return, minus 2.5 percentage points for costs, still equals a 7 percent investor return. No one knows the precise amount of the intermediation costs of our financial system. 1 However, we do have data for some of the major cost centers. During 2004, revenues of investment bankers and brokers came to an estimated $220 billion; direct mutual fund costs came to about $70 billion; pension management fees, $15 billion; annuity commissions, some $15 billion; hedge fund fees, about $25 billion; fees paid to personal financial advisors, maybe another $5 billion. These financial intermediation costs alone—even without including the investment services provided by banks and insurance companies—came to approximately $350 billion, directly deducted from the returns that the financial markets generated for investors. Moreover, the price of intermediation has soared. In 1985, the annual revenues of these cost centers were in the $50 billion range. In the bubble and postbubble era (since 1996) alone, the aggregate costs of financial intermediation may well have exceeded $2.5 trillion, all dutifully paid by our stockowners and stock traders. Of course, some of these costs create value (for example, liquidity). But, by definition, those costs cannot create abovemarket returns. To the contrary, they are the direct
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低于市场回报的原因,成了投资者整体收益上的一个沉重负担。我们这一行已经从带有商业性质的职业,变成了带有职业性质的商业。投资中,所有投资者合计拿到的,恰恰是他们没有为之付出的东西。因此,我们金融界的所有人都有责任去找到一种更高效的方式,为客户提供投资服务。
共同基金行业
美国最大的金融中介机构是共同基金行业。在我那篇关于基金行业的文章(博格尔 2005 年)里——这个行业我已经待了 56 年——我审视了这段漫长时期内发生的变化,并问自己这些变化是变好了还是变坏了。我遗憾地报告,答案是“变坏了”。看看这个总结:
- 我们创造了数量惊人、往往带有投机性的新基金,向投资者提出了不必要的复杂选择。
- 我们偏离了聚焦长期投资智慧的投委会模式,转向了沉迷于短期投机愚蠢行为的组合经理“明星”模式。
- 我们持有的美国企业所有权份额大幅增长,但与此同时,我们行使这种所有权责任的意愿,就算有的话,也出现了矛盾且令人沮丧的萎缩。
- 我们给投资者施加了节节攀升的成本,这与资金管理中巨大的规模经济背道而驰。
- 遗憾的是,我们的诚信声誉被一系列广泛的丑闻所玷污。
- 在主导该领域的大型管理公司中,我们已经从私人所有制转向了公众所有制,再转向了金融集团的所有制。
共同基金行业的业绩记录
过去二十年的记录表明,我所描述的那种朴素算术——总回报减去成本等于净回报——对那些把辛苦钱托付给共同基金的家庭财富来说,已被证明是危险的。事实上,它几乎精确地按照成本数学假说的暗示,摧毁了他们的财富。投资者已经学到,而且是用惨痛代价学到的,在共同基金里,不是“一分钱一分货”,而是“你没有付出的那部分才是你得到的”。
表 1 显示,在过去 20 年里,一个简单的低成本、免佣金的股票市场指数基金,复制标普 500 指数,实现了 12.8% 的年回报率——仅比市场本身的 13.0% 回报率略低一点。同期,普通股票型共同基金的回报率为 10.0%,比指数基金每年落后 2.8 个百分点,还不到市场年回报率的 80%。按复利计算,在这段时期内,投入指数基金的每 1 美元增长了 10.12 美元——复利回报魔法的受益者——而投入普通基金的每 1 美元只增长了 6.68 美元。
cause of below-market returns, a dead weight on the • We’ve changed from a profession with aspects amount earned by investors as a group. In invest- of a business to a business with aspects of a ing, all investors together get precisely what they profession don’t pay for. So, it is up to all of us in the financial The evidence clearly supports the conclusion community to develop a more efficient way to pro- that the mutual fund industry has moved from vide investment services to our clients. stewardship to salesmanship. To this dispiriting The Mutual Fund Industry analysis of the past, I would add a warning about the future: Unless we return to our traditional role The largest of all U.S. financial intermediaries is the as trustees of other people’s money, the mutual mutual fund industry. In my article (Bogle 2005) fund industry will falter and finally fail—a victim about the fund industry, in which I’ve now spent 56 of, yes, the relentless rules of humble arithmetic. I years, I examined the changes that have taken place love this industry too much to remain silent and let during this long period and asked whether these that happen without putting up a fight. changes are for better or for worse. I regret to report that the answer to the question is “for worse.” T h e R e c o r d . The record of the past two Consider this summary: 2 decades indicates that the humble arithmetic I have • We have created a mind-boggling number of described—Gross Return minus Cost equals Net new and often speculative funds that demand Return—has proven dangerous to the wealth of the unnecessarily complex choices by investors. families who have entrusted their hard-earned • We’ve moved from investment committees wealth to mutual funds. In fact, it has destroyed focused on the wisdom of long-term investing their wealth in almost precisely the measure that to portfolio manager “stars” engaged in the the CMH suggests. Investors have learned, and folly of short-term speculation. learned the hard way, that in mutual funds, it’s not • We’ve enjoyed an enormous growth in our that “you get what you pay for” but that “you get ownership position in corporate America what you don’t pay for.” along with a paradoxical and discouraging Table 1 shows that over the past 20 years, a diminution of our willingness to exercise that ownership position responsibly, if at all. simple low-cost, no-load stock market index fund • We’ve imposed soaring costs on our investors that replicated the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index that belie the enormous economies of scale in delivered an annual return of 12.8 percent—just a money management. hair short of the 13.0 percent return of the market • Our reputation for integrity, sadly, has been itself. During the same period, the average equity tarred by the brush of a broad-ranging series of mutual fund delivered a return of 10.0 percent, a scandals. shortfall to the index fund of 2.8 percentage points • Among the larger management companies a year and less than 80 percent of the market’s that dominate the field, we’ve moved away annual return. Compounded over that period, each from private ownership in favor of public $1 invested in the index fund grew by $10.12—the ownership, and then to ownership by financial beneficiary of the magic of compounding returns— conglomerates. whereas each $1 in the average fund grew by just
表格 1. 平均股票基金与标普 500 指数基金对比,1983–2003 年
| 衡量指标 | 标普 500 指数基金 | 平均股票基金 | 标普 500 指数基金 | 平均股票基金 | 指数利润百分比 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 比率 | 1 美元利润 | 比率 | 1 美元利润 | ||
| 税前总回报 | 13.0% | 10.52 美元 | 13.0% | 10.52 美元 | 100% |
| 基金落后幅度 | –0.2 | –3.0 | |||
| 税前回报 | 12.8% | 10.12 美元 | 10.0%¹ | 5.73 美元 | 57% |
| 税收 | –0.9 | –2.2 | |||
| 税后回报 | 11.9% | 8.47 美元 | 7.8% | 3.49 美元 | 41% |
| 通货膨胀 | –3.0 | –3.0 | |||
| 实际回报 | 8.9% | 4.50 美元 | 4.8% | 1.55 美元 | 34% |
¹ 理柏报告回报率经估算的存活者偏差下调 0.3 个百分点,销售费用再下调 0.3 个百分点。
Table 1. Average Equity Fund vs. S&P 500 Index Fund, 1983–2003 S&P 500 Index Fund Average Equity Fund Profit on Profit on Fund Percent Measure Rate $1.00 Rate $1.00 of Index Profit Gross return 13.0% $10.52 13.0% $10.52 100% Fund lag –0.2 –3.0 Pretax return 12.8% 10.12 10.0% a 5.73 57% Taxes –0.9 –2.2 After-tax return 11.9% 8.47 7.8% 3.49 41% Inflation –3.0 –3.0 Real return 8.9% $ 4.50 4.8% $ 1.55 34% a Lipper reported return reduced by 0.3 pp for estimated survivor bias and 0.3 pp for sales charges.
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5.73 美元,仅为指数基金累计回报的 57%,萎缩得不成样子——这是复利成本暴政的牺牲品。这些数据还未计入税收。若采用税后数据,股票基金与指数基金之间的年度差距会大幅拉大,从每年 2.8 个百分点升至 4.1 个百分点。在此期间,普通基金几乎没有递延任何收益;而指数基金则递延了几乎所有收益。(递延所得税可能是“你不付钱反而能得到好处”的终极例证。)累计来看,普通股票基金的税后回报并非市场的 57%,而只有 41%。但公平地说,指数基金和普通股票基金积累的财富不仅应以名义美元衡量,还应以实际美元衡量。如表 1 所示,指数基金的实际年回报率降至 8.9%,股票基金降至 4.8%,显然两者的差距仍是 4.1 个百分点。但当我们把两者的回报率都按每年 3.0 个百分点的通胀率扣减时,那些懂得基本算术的人不会感到意外:较低的年回报率在复利作用下,进一步拉大了累计差距。过去 20 年,每 1 美元最初投入股票基金的资金,在扣除成本、税收和通胀后,累计实际利润仅为 1.55 美元——只有指数基金实际利润 4.50 美元的 34%。因此,粗略看一下过去二十年的股市,反映出年回报率 13%,每 1 美元初始投资产生了 10.52 美元的利润。但背后的现实却近乎天壤之别。在每年按名义美元扣除投资成本和税收,并考虑通胀侵蚀之后,普通股票基金的年回报率骤降至 4.8%,累计实际利润仅为 1.55 美元,只有市场组合表面利润的七分之一。
$5.73, a shriveled-up 57 percent of the index fund’s cumulative return—the victim of the tyranny of compounding costs. These data are before taxes. When after-tax data are used, the annual gap between the equity fund and the index fund soars far higher, rising from 2.8 percentage points to 4.1 percentage points a year. The average fund deferred almost no gains during this period; the index fund deferred nearly all. (Deferred taxes may be the ultimate example of how you get what you don’t pay for.) Cumulatively, the average equity fund produced, not 57 percent of the market’s after-tax return, but only 41 percent. In fairness, however, the wealth accumulated in the index fund and the average equity fund should be measured not only in nominal dollars but also in real dollars. As Table 1 shows, the real annual return for the index fund drops to 8.9 percent and for the equity fund, to 4.8 percent, obviously the same gap of 4.1 percentage points. But when we reduce both returns by the identical 3.0 percentage points a year for inflation, it will hardly surprise those who know their humble arithmetic that the compounding of those lower annual returns further widens the cumulative gap. Over the past 20 years, the cumulative profit on each $1 initially invested in the equity fund after costs, taxes, and inflation comes to just $1.55 in real terms—only 34 percent of the index fund real profit of $4.50. A casual look at the stock market over the past two decades, then, reflects a 13 percent annual return that produced a profit of $10.52 on each dollar initially invested. But the underlying reality reflects an outcome almost light years away. After investment costs and taxes are deducted each year in nominal dollars, and after the erosion of inflation, the annual return for the average equity fund tumbles to 4.8 percent, with an accumulated real profit of just $1.55, only one-seventh the amount of the apparent profit on the market portfolio.
表 2. 股票基金投资者平均收益与标普 500 指数基金对比(度量标准) 每 1.00 美元投资 毛回报率 13.0% 10.52 美元 基金滞后 –0.2% 基金净回报率 12.8% 10.12 美元 时机/选择 0.0% 净回报率 12.8% 10.12 美元
Table 2. Average Equity Fund Investor S&P 500 Index Fund Profit on Measure Rate $1.00 Gross return 13.0% $10.52 Fund lag –0.2 Net fund return 12.8% $10.12 Timing/selection 0.0 Net return 12.8% $10.12
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November/December 2005
基金回报与投资者回报。更糟糕的是,一个残酷的现实是,普通股票型基金的平均回报远远夸大了普通股票型基金投资者实际获得的回报。当我们考察基金投资者真正赚到多少时,如表 2 所示,与市场回报之间的差距急剧扩大。随着这个行业越来越专注于营销、越来越少关注管理,我们以不断攀升的成本,向投资者倾泻了大量诱人的新基金。我们的营销专家对市场潮流和风尚的起伏反应迅速,最明显的例子是市场泡沫后期的“新经济”基金。在基金行业的推波助澜下,投资者不仅在股市飙升时涌入数千亿美元到股票型基金,而且往往还选错了基金。因此,除了基金费用对财富的侵蚀之外,基金投资者还为其适得其反的择时付出了一笔沉重的代价,又为自己不幸选择的共同基金付出了另一笔巨大的代价。直觉告诉我们这些代价很大,而我们掌握的数据虽然不够精确,却证实了这一假设。共同基金的资产加权回报率——通过检查每只基金的季度现金流即可轻松估算——比标准的时间加权回报率每年落后整整 3.7 个百分点。把这一差距加上过去二十年普通股票型基金时间加权回报率相对标普 500 指数基金每年落后 2.8 个百分点,我们看到,普通股票型基金持有人的资产加权回报率每年总共落后指数基金 6.5 个百分点。该期间的平均年度税前名义回报:指数基金,12.8%;股票型基金投资者,6.3%——不到股市年回报率的一半。
Fund Returns vs. Investor Returns. To make matters worse, the stark reality is that the return of the average equity fund greatly overstates the return earned by the average equity fund investor. When we consider what fund investors actually earn, as shown in Table 2, the shortfall to the market return worsens dramatically. As this industry came to focus more and more on marketing and less and less on management, we deluged investors with a plethora of enticing new funds, at ever-rising costs. Our marketing experts responded with alacrity to the waxing and waning of market fads and fashions, most obviously with the “new economy” funds of the late market bubble. Aided and abetted by the fund industry, investors not only poured hundreds of billions of dollars into equity funds as the stock market soared to its high but also characteristically selected the wrong funds. In addition to the wealth-depleting penalty of fund costs, then, fund investors paid one substantial penalty for the counterproductive timing of their investments and another large penalty for the unfortunate selection of the mutual funds they chose to own. Intuition suggests that these costs were large, and the data we have, although not precise, confirm that hypothesis. The asset-weighted returns of mutual funds—which are easy to estimate by examining each fund’s quarterly cash flows—lag the standard time-weighted returns by fully 3.7 percentage points a year. Adding that shortfall to the 2.8 percentage point annual lag of time-weighted returns of the average equity fund relative to the S&P 500 Index fund over the past two decades, we see that the asset-weighted returns of the average equity fund stockholder fell behind the index fund by a total of 6.5 percentage points a year. Average annual pretax nominal returns for the period: index fund, 12.8 percent; equity fund investor, 6.3 percent—less than one-half of the stock market’s annual return.
与标普 500 指数基金对比,1983–2003 年股票基金投资者利润相对于投资者每 1 美元指数利润的百分比收益率:13.0%,10.52 美元,100%;–3.0%,10.0%,5.73 美元,57%;–3.7,6.3%,2.39 美元,24%。
vs. S&P 500 Index Fund, 1983–2003 Equity Fund Investor Profit on Investor Percent Rate $1.00 of Index Profit 13.0% $10.52 100% –3.0 10.0% $ 5.73 57% –3.7 6.3% $ 2.39 24%
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将复利的严酷法则不仅应用于基金运营的实际成本,还应用于基金所有权这一更为巨大的成本上,我们发现,基金投资者遭受的财富损失令人触目惊心。从 1980 年到 2003 年的 24 年间,普通基金投资者获得的年化时间加权回报率为 6.6%,却累计损失了客户财富的 25%。尽管在广泛分散的大型基金中,时间加权年回报率略低,为 5.4%,但客户财富在此期间增长了 30%——额外增加了 55 个百分点的财富积累。相比之下,平均基金投资者最初投入的每 1 美元,在税前和通胀前,仅增长到 2.39 美元,而简单持有低成本指数基金则能增长到 10.12 美元。也就是说,投资者仅获得了本可通过持有低成本、非主动管理的股票市场组合轻松积累财富的 24%。这额外的滞后很大程度上来自行业创造并推广的专业化(通常是投机性)基金。例如,如表 3 所示,在 1998 年至 2003 年我们经历的牛熊市中,行业六大规模最大的广泛分散基金的资产加权回报率平均低于其时间加权年回报率不到一个百分点。相比之下,六大规模最大的专业化基金的资产加权回报率平均低于其时间加权回报率超过 11 个百分点。在包含泡沫及其余波的六年期间,这一回报差距的复利效应令人震惊。专业化基金的表现显著落后。
基金的“营销化”。揭示基金投资者因两大代价高昂且适得其反的趋势而遭受巨额财富损失的鲜明算术。其一是共同基金行业的营销化,大多数大型公司已转向创造和营销任何能够卖出去的基金。
区分营销型公司与管理型公司的一个合理代理指标——显然并不完美——是其提供的基金数量。数据来自富达投资对 54 家最大型公司的研究,这些公司管理着行业约 85% 的长期资产,清晰地支持了这一命题:那些未被营销伦理主导的基金公司提供了明显更优的业绩。
Applying the tyranny of compounding not duced a positive time-weighted annual return of 6.6 only to the actual costs of fund operations but also percent but lost a cumulative 25 percent of client to the even larger costs of, well, fund ownership, wealth. Despite a slightly lower time-weighted we find that each $1 invested at the outset by the annual return of 5.4 percent in the broadly diversiaverage fund investor, before taxes and inflation, fied large funds, client wealth was enhanced by 30 grew by only $2.39 over the full period, compared percent during the period—an additional 55 perwith the growth of $10.12 that came from simply centage points in wealth accumulation. owning the low-cost index fund. That is, investors received only 24 percent of the wealth that might The “Marketingization” of the Fund easily have been accumulated simply by holding a Industry. The stark arithmetic that illustrates the low-cost, unmanaged stock market portfolio. huge sacrifices of wealth incurred by fund invesMuch of this extra lag came from the specialized tors has been driven by two costly and counterpro(usually speculative) funds that the industry created ductive trends. One is the marketingization of the and promoted. For example, as Table 3 shows, dur- mutual fund industry, in which most major firms ing the bull and bear markets we experienced in have come to create and market whatever funds 1998–2003, the asset-weighted returns of the indus- will sell. try’s six largest broadly diversified funds lagged One reasonable proxy—obviously an impertheir time-weighted annual returns by an average of fect one—for differentiating a marketing firm from less than a single percentage point. The asset- a management firm is the number of funds it offers. weighted returns of the six largest specialized funds, The data, which come from a Fidelity Investments in contrast, lagged their time-weighted returns by study of the 54 largest firms managing about 85 an average of more than 11 percentage points. percent of the industry’s long-term assets, clearly Compounded during the six-year period that support the proposition that fund firms that have included the bubble and its aftermath, the gap in avoided being dominated by a marketing ethic returns was astonishing. The specialized funds pro- have provided distinctly superior performance.
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表 3. 2000 年六大多元化和行业基金的表现 时间加权 资产加权 资产加权回报率减去时间 基金 1998–2000 年 2001–2003 年 1998–2003 年 1998–2003 年 加权回报率 多元化基金 富达麦哲伦基金 14.4% –5.6% 3.9% 3.7% –0.2% 先锋 500 指数基金 12.3 –4.2 3.7 2.4 –1.3 美国投资公司基金 14.2 1.0 7.4 6.7 –0.7 骏利基金 20.2 –11.0 3.4 0.9 –2.5 富达反向基金 15.2 0.4 7.5 7.9 0.4 华盛顿共同基金 9.6 2.8 6.2 5.5 –0.7 平均年回报率 14.3 –2.7 5.4 4.5 –0.9 累计回报率 49.0% –7.9% 37.0% 30.0% –7.0% 行业基金 TRP 科技基金 23.5% –19.1% –0.1% –8.8% –8.7% 塞利格曼通信与信息基金 13.5 –2.4 5.3 2.0 –3.3 AB 全球科技基金 28.0 –15.7 3.9 –9.5 –13.4 先锋医疗保健基金 34.2 1.4 16.7 13.7 –3.0 富达精选电子基金 37.0 –10.2 10.9 0.0 –10.9 蒙德互联网基金 35.7 –21.6 3.1 –25.7 –28.8 平均年回报率 28.6 –11.3 6.6 –4.7 –11.4 累计回报率 113.0% –30.0% 47.0% –25.0% –22.0%
Table 3. Performance of 2000’s Six Largest Diversified and Sector Funds Time Weighted Asset-Weighted Asset Weighted Return minus Time Fund 1998–2000 2001–2003 1998–2003 1998–2003 Weighted Diversified funds Fidelity Magellan 14.4% –5.6% 3.9% 3.7% –0.2% Vanguard 500 Index 12.3 –4.2 3.7 2.4 –1.3 Investment Company of America 14.2 1.0 7.4 6.7 –0.7 Janus Fund 20.2 –11.0 3.4 0.9 –2.5 Fidelity Contrafund 15.2 0.4 7.5 7.9 0.4 Washington Mutual 9.6 2.8 6.2 5.5 –0.7 Average annual return 14.3 –2.7 5.4 4.5 –0.9 Cumulative return 49.0% –7.9% 37.0% 30.0% –7.0% Sector funds TRP Science & Technology 23.5% –19.1% –0.1% –8.8% –8.7% Seligman Communication and Information 13.5 –2.4 5.3 2.0 –3.3 AB Global Technology 28.0 –15.7 3.9 –9.5 –13.4 Vanguard Health Care 34.2 1.4 16.7 13.7 –3.0 Fidelity Select Electronics 37.0 –10.2 10.9 0.0 –10.9 Munder NetNet 35.7 –21.6 3.1 –25.7 –28.8 Average annual return 28.6 –11.3 6.6 –4.7 –11.4 Cumulative return 113.0% –30.0% 47.0% –25.0% –22.0%
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一方面,如表 4 所示,9 家各经营少于 15 只共同基金的公司明显占据排名前列,包揽了前七名中的六席。这些专注于少数基金的公司,在研究的 10 年期间(1994–2003 年),跑赢了近 80% 的同类竞争对手(即其大盘成长基金与其他大盘成长基金相比,其平衡基金与其他平衡基金相比,等等)。另一方面,45 家拥有超过 15 只基金(每家平均 52 只)的公司,则专注于向公众提供广泛的产品线,仅跑赢约 48% 的同行,并占据了 37 个最低排名中的 36 席。显然,营销上的聚焦是以牺牲管理成效为代价的。
基金业的“集团化”。另一股损害投资者利益的趋势是基金业的集团化,即大型国际金融机构急于从中分一杯羹——分享资金管理带来的巨额利润——而掀起了一轮收购狂潮。(这种集团化公众持股的趋势,虽鲜少被提及,却已十分显著。直到 1958 年,所有基金管理公司仍为私人持有。)同样,一个有力的模式占据主导地位:由私人持有的管理公司运营的基金,在投资者回报上明显优于金融集团所有和运营的基金。表 5 比较了如今仅存的 13 家私人公司管理的基金与 41 家公众公司管理的基金的相对回报——这些公众公司要么由公众投资者直接持有(7 家),要么由公众持股的金融集团间接持有(34 家)。由私人持有的 13 家公司管理的基金(平均 34 只,总资产 1.3 万亿美元)跑赢了 71% 的同行,并占据了前九名中的八席。³ 由集团旗下的 34 家基金管理商(平均 47 只基金,总资产 1.6 万亿美元)仅跑赢了 45%。其余 7 家公众持股公司(每家平均 55 只基金,资产 0.6 万亿美元)跑赢了 60%。总体来看,公众公司占据了榜单上 34 个最低排名中的 32 席。从这些令人信服的数据来看,我们有理由认为,这些由远在千里之外、可能从未与基金独立董事对视过的管理者运营的公众持股公司,进入基金行业主要就是为了汇集资产、增加收入、提升品牌知名度。
On the one hand, as shown in Table 4, the 9 firms that each operate fewer than 15 mutual funds clearly dominate the upper reaches of the rankings, holding six of the seven top spots. The firms focused on few funds outpaced almost 80 percent of all their common rivals (i.e., their large-cap growth fund versus other large-cap growth funds, their balanced fund versus other balanced funds, etc.) during the 10-year period studied (1994–2003). On the other hand, the 45 firms with more than 15 funds (averaging 52 funds each) focused on offering a broad line of fund “products” to the public, outpaced only about 48 percent of their peers and hold 36 of the 37 lowest ranks. Marketing focus, apparently, comes at the expense of management success. “Conglomeratization” of the Fund Industry. The other trend that has ill served investor interest is the conglomeratization of the fund industry, in which giant international financial institutions, eager to get a piece of the action for themselves— a share of the huge profits made in money management—have gone on a buying binge. (The trend toward conglomerated public ownership, while little noted, has been dramatic. Until 1958, all fund management firms were privately held.) Again, a powerful pattern prevails, with funds operated by privately held management companies holding an impressive edge in investors’ returns over funds owned and operated by financial conglomerates. Table 5 compares the relative returns of the funds managed by the 13 private companies that remain today and the funds managed by the 41 public companies—those that are held either directly by public investors (7 firms) or indirectly by publicly owned financial conglomerates (34 firms). The funds managed by the 13 firms under private ownership (averaging 34 funds and totaling $1.3 trillion in assets) outpaced 71 percent of their peers and held eight of the top nine spots. 3 The 34 fund managers under the aegis of conglomerates (averaging 47 funds and totaling $1.6 trillion in assets) outperformed only 45 percent. The other 7 publicly held firms (averaging 55 funds each and with $0.6 trillion in assets) outperformed 60 percent. In all, public firms held 32 of the 34 bottom spots on the list. From these compelling data, it seems reasonable to assume that publicly held firms run by farremoved managers who may well have never looked a fund independent director in the eye are in the fund business primarily to gather assets, build revenues, and enhance their brand names.
November/December 2005
November/December 2005
这样的公司,从逻辑上讲,很可能更关心自身资本的回报,而不是其共同基金所有者托付给它的资本的回报。(在最近的丑闻中,我们多少看到了这种综合征的表现,其中最大的违规者正属于这类集团企业。)当然,集团企业的经理人对其自身所有者以及其基金的所有者,都负有明确的受托责任。但记录表明,在考虑基金费率表并创设新的基金“产品”时,集团企业会以牺牲其基金所有者的利益为代价,优先照顾其公开上市的所有者,无视 1940 年《投资公司法》中关于基金必须为股东利益而组织、运营和管理的明确要求。
展望未来。尽管我描述了这些问题,基金投资者(至少那些没有在牛市后期才匆忙上车的投资者)似乎对过去二十年牛市中其基金所取得的极为温和的正回报感到满意。他们似乎愿意忽视基金投资通常隐藏的成本,对税收低效视而不见,乐于用名义美元而非实际美元来思考回报,并理所当然地认为基金择时和基金选择中犯下的错误完全由自己负责。但假设我们正在进入一个回报率较低的时代。这些发现对长期财富积累意味着什么?让我们以当今一位年轻投资者的投资期限来衡量可能出现的典型体验。假设这位投资者刚刚加入劳动力队伍,期待 45 年的职业生涯直至退休,然后按精算师的承诺享受退休后的 20 年生活——总时间跨度 65 年。如果股市足够慷慨,在此时期内每年为投资者提供 8% 的总回报,且共同基金的年度成本保持在 2.5 个百分点,那么基金投资者的回报将平均为 5.5%。在这段漫长时期结束时,以 8% 复利且无成本的投资会将最初的 1000 美元增至 14.88 万美元的最终价值,盈利 14.78 万美元。然而,如图 1 所示,5.5% 的净回报只会使投资者的累计财富增加 3.15 万美元,使投资者的最终投资价值达到 3.25 万美元。实际上,支付给金融体系的金额,同样以复利计算,将高达 11.63 万美元。
Such a firm is, with some logic, likely to be far more concerned about the return on its capital than the return on the capital entrusted to it by its mutual fund owners. (We saw something of that syndrome in the recent scandals, in which the largest offenders were owned by conglomerates.) Of course, the conglomerate’s managers have a clear fiduciary duty to the conglomerate’s owners as well as to the owners of its funds. But the record suggests that when fund fee schedules are considered and new fund “products” created, the conglomerate resolves these dilemmas in favor of its own public owners, ignoring the invocation in the Investment Company Act of 1940 that funds must be organized, operated, and managed in the interests of their shareholders. Looking Ahead. Despite the problems I have described, fund investors (at least those investors who didn’t jump on the bull market bandwagon late in the game) seem satisfied with earning the decidedly modest positive returns achieved by their funds during the bull market of the past two decades. They seem willing to ignore the generally hidden costs of fund investing, oblivious to the tax inefficiency, happy to think in terms of their returns in nominal rather than real dollars, and comfortable in assuming that the responsibility for the mistakes made in fund timing and fund selection are theirs alone. But suppose we are entering an era of lower returns. What are the implications of these findings for long-term wealth accumulation? Let’s measure what might be the typical experience in terms of the investment horizon of a young investor of today. Assume the investor has just joined the workforce and is looking forward to 45 years of employment until retirement and then to enjoying the next 20 years in retirement that the actuaries promise—a total time horizon of 65 years. If the stock market is kind enough to favor investors with a total return of 8 percent a year over that period and if annual mutual fund costs are held to 2.5 percentage points, the return of the fund investor will average 5.5 percent. By the end of the long period, a cost-free investment at 8 percent will carry an initial $1,000 investment to a final value of $148,800, a profit of $147,800. However, as Figure 1 shows, the 5.5 percent net return will increase the investor’s cumulative wealth by only $31,500, bringing the final value of the investor’s investment to $32,500. In effect, the amount paid over to the financial system, also compounded, will come to $116,300.
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基金数量 73 50 34 33 54 35 126 56 42 25 24 58 62 42 60 32 24 38 无
of Funds 73 50 34 33 54 35 126 56 42 25 24 58 62 42 60 32 24 38 No.
等权超收益
Equal-Weighted Outperformance
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49% 49 49 48 47 47 45 44 44 44 43 40 39 38 37 36 33 32
49% 49 49 48 47 47 45 44 44 44 43 40 39 38 37 36 33 32
Adv. 金融快讯 斯坦利·萨克斯 汉考克 林奇基金 公司 万斯 哈特福德 资本 高盛 特拉华 思瑞文特 美国 贝莱德 摩根 伊顿 摩根 普特南 德雷福斯 斯特朗 特拉斯科 美林 国民 先锋 约翰 目标 JP
Adv. Financial Express Stanley Sachs Hancock Lynch Funds Firm Vance Hartford Cap Goldman Delaware Thrivent American BlackRock Morgan Eaton Morgan Putnam Dreyfus Strong Trusco Merrill Nations Pioneer The John Aim JP
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基金数量 45 家 31 家 48 家 61 家 49 家 22 家 37 家 72 家 57 家 36 家 14 家 27 家 65 家 43 家 37 家 57 家 57 家 39 家 否。
of Funds 45 31 48 61 49 22 37 72 57 36 14 27 65 43 37 57 57 39 No.
等权跑赢
Equal-Weighted Outperformance
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61% 61 60 59 59 58 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 52 51 50 50 shares.
61% 61 60 59 59 58 57 56 55 54 54 53 52 52 52 51 50 50 shares.
A-class
A-class
1994–2003 年管理层变动。联合伯恩斯坦、伯曼、里德人寿、欧本海默银行、阿贝特、坎彭、富国银行、普利茅斯、哥伦比亚第一、纽伯格、联邦、常青、花旗,包括沃德尔、USAA、斯库德(阴影部分)、MFS、新银行、洛德、范坎普,以及富国银行、美国回报率,基金收费为第 4、5、8、3、26、14、7、75、51、100、72、21、60、36、54、15、7、207 名。相对基金数量,无销售费用。
1994–2003 Mgmt. AllianceBernstein Berman Reed Life only Firm Oppenheimer Bancorp Abbett Kampen Fargo & Prudential York Columbia One Neuberger Federated Evergreen Citigroup include Waddell USAA Scudder shaded) MFS New Banc Lord Van Wells Returns, US and charges are of Funds 4 5 8 3 26 14 7 75 51 100 72 21 60 36 54 15 7 207 Relative funds No. sales
等权重的超越表现:影响力更小,对比 98% 的基金或 97 91 90 79 79 77 76 76 71 71 70 69 65 64 64 62 62 忽略提供排名的 15 家投资公司。数量(公司 东方/长叶 邓普顿基金 联营公司 世纪业绩 考克斯 价格 顾问 富达 4. & 鹰 卡拉莫斯 美国 先锋 富兰克林 美国 表 道奇 罗伊斯 哈里斯 PIMCO 罗 纽文 富达 来源:公司 第一 骏利 ING WM 戴维斯 注:索。T.
Equal-Weighted Outperformance of fewer impact vs. 98% Funds or 97 91 90 79 79 77 76 76 71 71 70 69 65 64 64 62 62 the 15 ignore offering of rankings Investments. Number (firms Eastern/Longleaf Templeton Funds Associates Century Performance Cox Price Advisors Fidelity 4. & Eagle Calamos American Vanguard Franklin American Table Dodge Royce Harris PIMCO Rowe Nuveen Fidelity Source: Firm First Janus ING WM Davis Note: So. T.
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表 5. 相对回报与组织结构(私营公司以阴影标示;上市非综合企业以粗体标示)
| 公司 | 等权超额表现% | 公司 | 等权超额表现% | 公司 | 等权超额表现% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dodge & Cox | 98 | Waddell & Reed | 61 | Goldman Sachs | 49 |
| First Eagle | 97 | USAA | 61 | Morgan Stanley Adv. | 49 |
| Calamos | 91 | Oppenheimer | 60 | Eaton Vance | 49 |
| So. Eastern/Longleaf | 90 | Prudential | 59 | The Hartford | 48 |
| Royce | 79 | MFS | 59 | John Hancock | 47 |
| American Funds | 79 | New York Life | 58 | Putnam | 47 |
| Harris Associates | 77 | US Bancorp | 57 | Dreyfus | 45 |
| PIMCO | 76 | Columbia Mgmt. | 56 | Strong | 44 |
| Vanguard | 76 | AllianceBernstein | 55 | Delaware | 44 |
| T. Rowe Price | 71 | Banc One | 54 | Thrivent Financial | 44 |
| Franklin Templeton | 71 | Neuberger Berman | 54 | Trusco Cap | 43 |
| Janus | 70 | Lord Abbett | 53 | Merrill Lynch | 40 |
| ING | 69 | Van Kampen | 52 | Aim | 39 |
| Nuveen | 65 | Scudder | 52 | Nations Funds | 38 |
| American Century | 64 | Federated | 52 | American Express | 37 |
| WM Advisors | 64 | Evergreen | 51 | BlackRock | 36 |
| Davis | 62 | Wells Fargo | 50 | Pioneer | 33 |
| Fidelity | 62 | Citigroup | 50 | JP Morgan | 32 |
注:业绩排名未考虑销售费用的影响,且仅包含 A 类份额。来源:富达投资。
Table 5. Relative Returns and Organizational Structure (private firms are shaded; publicly held, nonconglomerate firms are in boldface) Equal-Weighted % Equal-Weighted % Equal-Weighted % Firm Outperformance Firm Outperformance Firm Outperformance Dodge & Cox 98 Waddell & Reed 61 Goldman Sachs 49 First Eagle 97 USAA 61 Morgan Stanley Adv. 49 Calamos 91 Oppenheimer 60 Eaton Vance 49 So. Eastern/Longleaf 90 Prudential 59 The Hartford 48 Royce 79 MFS 59 John Hancock 47 American Funds 79 New York Life 58 Putnam 47 Harris Associates 77 US Bancorp 57 Dreyfus 45 PIMCO 76 Columbia Mgmt. 56 Strong 44 Vanguard 76 AllianceBernstein 55 Delaware 44 T. Rowe Price 71 Banc One 54 Thrivent Financial 44 Franklin Templeton 71 Neuberger Berman 54 Trusco Cap 43 Janus 70 Lord Abbett 53 Merrill Lynch 40 ING 69 Van Kampen 52 Aim 39 Nuveen 65 Scudder 52 Nations Funds 38 American Century 64 Federated 52 American Express 37 WM Advisors 64 Evergreen 51 BlackRock 36 Davis 62 Wells Fargo 50 Pioneer 33 Fidelity 62 Citigroup 50 JP Morgan 32 Note: Performance rankings ignore the impact of sales charges and include only A-class shares. Source: Fidelity Investments.
换句话说,第 29 年之后投入 100 名金融“荷官”的投资者,其 65 年期间持有的资本不足 1%,却承担了 100% 的风险。这种投资回报的转移具有毁灭性,他们只能获得 21% 的回报。而投入资本为 0%、承担风险为 0% 的金融中介机构,却享有堪称惊人的 79% 的回报。事实上,如今很少有投资者意识到这种无情的算术规则,几乎注定会导致退休储蓄或年轻资本家养老储蓄的累计回报落后于长期累积成本,从而被中介机构攫取大头。
In other words, the investor who put up 100 financial croupiers after the 29th year, less than percent of the capital and assumed 100 percent of halfway through the 65-year period. Devastating the risk would receive only 21 percent of the as is this diversion of the spoils of investing, return. The financial intermediaries, who put up 0 apparently few investors today have either the percent of the capital and assumed 0 percent of the awareness of the relentless rules of humble risk, would enjoy a truly remarkable 79 percent arithmetic that almost guarantee such a shortfall of the return. Indeed, the cumulative return of in their retirement savings or the wisdom to our young capitalist saving for retirement would understand the tyranny of compounding costs fall behind the cumulative return taken by the over the long term.
图 1:在 8% 回报率的市场中,2.5% 的成本造成的累积滞后
Figure 1. The Cumulative Lag Caused by 2.5 Percent Costs in an 8 Percent Market
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累计投资 1 美元的回报(美元,对数尺度) 1,000,000 116,300 美元 100,000 10,000 32,500 美元 投资者 1,000 100 金融体系 10 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 年
Cumulative Return on $1.00 ($, log scale) 1,000,000 $116,300 100,000 10,000 $32,500 Investor 1,000 100 Financial System 10 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 Years
2005 年 11/12 月刊 www.cfapubs.org 29
November/December 2005 www.cfapubs.org 29
国家的财富 如果我们的退休储蓄体系不是国家财富和经济实力的支柱,那么这种消耗财富的算术或许无关紧要。但退休储蓄正是支柱,而这种算术确实至关重要。我们的企业养老金计划持有 1.8 万亿美元的股票和债券;我们的州及地方养老金计划,另有 2.0 万亿美元。私人非保险养老金储备总计 4.2 万亿美元;保险养老金储备 1.9 万亿美元;政府养老金储备 3.1 万亿美元;人寿保险储备 1.0 万亿美元——合计 10.2 万亿美元,约占家庭总资产(除现金和储蓄存款外)的一半。自 1970 年以来,美国的国家政策一直通过提供税收庇护账户,如个人退休账户(IRA)和固定缴款养老金、节俭及储蓄计划(通常为 401[k] 计划),来增加私人退休储蓄。现任政府似乎决心扩大这些税收优惠工具的覆盖范围,以及每个家庭每年可投入其中的金额。那么,这些无情的算术规则如何影响我们的投资社会,或者如果你愿意,我们的所有者社会?当然,早先关于相对回报的数据表明,美国家庭的退休储蓄对国家财富太过重要,不能托付给共同基金行业。此外,向投资者提供的税收激励体系显然未能带来足够的财富积累。只有约 22% 的劳动者使用 401(k) 储蓄计划,只有约 10% 拥有个人退休账户(IRA),约 9% 两者兼有。即使经过三十年这些税收优惠计划的实践,平均 401(k) 余额现在仅为 3.36 万美元,平均 IRA 为 2.69 万美元——这很难说是能提供舒适退休生活的资本。此外,从固定收益计划向固定缴款计划的大规模转变,从投资角度看似乎运作不佳。不仅固定收益计划在 1990 年至 2002 年期间产生的回报高于固定缴款计划(144% 对 125%),而且其波动性远低于后者;在近期市场低迷年份,固定收益计划仅下跌约一半(–12% 对 –22%)。当然,这 12 年期间累积缺口的部分原因,可以追溯到固定缴款计划投资者承担的更高成本,这些计划以共同基金持有为主。
The Wealth of the Nation If our system of retirement savings were not the backbone of the wealth of the nation and our economic strength, perhaps this wealth-depleting arithmetic would not matter. But retirement savings are the backbone, and the arithmetic does matter. Our corporate pension plans hold $1.8 trillion in stocks and bonds; our state and local pension plans, another $2.0 trillion. Private noninsured pension reserves total $4.2 trillion; insured pension reserves, $1.9 trillion; government pension reserves, $3.1 trillion; life insurance reserves, $1.0 trillion—for a total of $10.2 trillion, or nearly onehalf of total family assets (other than cash and savings deposits). Since 1970, U.S. national policy has been to increase private savings for retirement by providing tax-sheltered accounts, such as IRAs and defined-contribution pension, thrift, and savings programs [usually 401(k) plans]. The present administration seems determined to extend the reach of these tax-advantaged vehicles, together with the amount that each family may invest in them each year. So, how do the relentless rules of arithmetic affect our investment society or, if you prefer, our ownership society? Certainly, the earlier data on relative returns show that the retirement savings of U.S. families are too important to the wealth of the nation to be entrusted to the mutual fund industry. Moreover, the system of tax incentives provided to investors clearly hasn’t resulted in adequate wealth accumulation. Only about 22 percent of our workers are using 401(k) savings plans, only about 10 percent have IRAs, and about 9 percent have both. Even after three decades of experience with these taxadvantaged plans, the average 401(k) balance is now a modest $33,600, and the average IRA $26,900—hardly the kind of capital with the potential to provide a comfortable retirement. In addition, the massive shift that has taken place from defined-benefit plans to definedcontribution plans does not seem to be working well from an investment standpoint. Not only have DB plans produced higher returns than DC plans during the period 1990–2002 (144 percent versus 125 percent), they have done so with far less volatility; in the recent down-market years, DB plans fell only about half as much (–12 percent versus –22 percent). Part of the cumulative shortfall over the 12-year period, of course, can be traced to the higher costs imposed on investors in DC plans, dominated by mutual fund holdings.
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养老金计划的朴素算术
显然,这个国家推行固定缴款计划,并未真正打好退休储蓄的坚实基础。但我们的固定收益计划表现更糟,问题不在实际收益,而在过度乐观的预期收益。美国企业的财务报表里充斥着对未来回报的激进假设,导致养老金计划出现巨额资金缺口。即便过去二十年利率一路下滑、盈利收益率持续走低,对未来回报的预测反而越调越高。以 2000 年为例,通用汽车公司对其养老金计划预期年回报 10%,而 1975 年这一假设仅为 6%。为什么?因为它基本依据“长期历史回报”来设定预期。股市涨得越高、利率跌得越狠,养老金计划的预期回报就越高,而且不止通用一家这么干。令人吃惊的是,通用汽车等于在说:“股票过去涨得越多,将来就涨得越多。”美国企业界对养老金回报的预测,既是全国性的丑闻,也是一场迟早要发生的意外。让我们用朴素算术的铁律来审视,今天怎样设定养老金计划的未来回报才算合理。表 6 列出了一只传统养老金组合的数据:60% 美国股票、40% 美国债券。股票组合 7.5% 的预期回报基于现实的假设——当前 2% 的股息率加上约 5.5% 的历史盈利增长率——并且假设当前市盈率(已报告盈利的 21 倍)不发生改变。
The Humble Arithmetic of Pension Plans Clearly, the nation’s foray into DC plans is not doing the job it should in producing a solid base for retirement savings. But our DB plans have done far worse, not because of the returns they have earned, but because of the excessive returns they have projected. The financial statements of U.S. corporations are rife with aggressive assumptions about future returns that have fostered substantial underfunding of their pension plans. Even as interest rates tumbled and earnings yields steadily declined during the past two decades, projections of future returns soared. In 2000, for example, General Motors Corporation was projecting a 10 percent annual return on its pension plan, compared with the 6 percent assumption it was using in 1975. Why? It based the projection largely on “long-term historical returns.” The higher the stock market rose and the more interest rates tumbled, the higher the pension plan’s expected returns rose, and not only in the GM model. Amazingly, General Motors was essentially saying, “The more stocks have gone up in the past, the more they’ll rise in the future.” Corporate America’s projections of pension fund returns are both a national scandal and an accident waiting to happen. Consider from the standpoint of the relentless rules of humble arithmetic what might today be reasonable in projecting future returns of pension plans. Table 6 provides the data for a conventional pension portfolio of 60 percent U.S. equities and 40 percent U.S. bonds. The projected return of 7.5 percent for the stock portfolio is based on realistic expectations—today’s 2 percent dividend yield and historical earnings growth of about 5.5 percent—and assumes no change in the current P/E multiple of 21 times reported earnings.
表 6. 现实回报假设:企业养老金计划 4 1 2 3 (2 – 3) 资产 预计净额 类别 配置 回报 费用 回报 股票 60% 7.5% 1.5% 6.0% 债券 40 4.5 0.5 4.0 加权总计 100% 6.3% 1.1% 5.2%
Table 6. Realistic Return Assumptions: Corporate Pension Plan 4 1 2 3 (2 – 3) Asset Projected Net Class Allocation Return Expenses Return Equities 60% 7.5% 1.5% 6.0% Bonds 40 4.5 0.5 4.0 Weighted total 100% 6.3% 1.1% 5.2%
©2005, CFA Institute
©2005, CFA Institute
一个保守型的美国国债和公司债券组合,当前收益率约 4.5%,加上精明经理人的打理,预计总组合回报率可达 6.3%。再扣除预计的年度计划开支(手续费、交易成本等)1.1%,算下来净回报率为 5.2%,还不到美国大型企业平均预测的 8.5% 的三分之二。做出这种预测的公司,要么是在自找麻烦,要么是想人为抬高向股东报告的盈利。
通用汽车目前就采用了 8.5% 的假设,这看起来就很不靠谱。当我向通用汽车追问此事时,他们告诉我,传统的 60% 股票、40% 债券的政策组合已成历史;通用汽车已经加入了另类投资,比如风险投资和“绝对收益”投资,比如对冲基金。理解这种变化并不难,那就让我们对这个新政策组合可能持有的资产做一些合理假设:
• 30% 投资于美国股票,
• 40% 投资于美国债券,
• 10% 投资于风险投资,
• 20% 投资于对冲基金。
表 7 展示了一个例子,说明要达成 8.5% 的目标,这四类资产各自需要多高的回报率。股票和债券的市场回报率不变,那么股票经理人必须每年跑赢股市 3.0 个百分点,债券经理人必须每年跑赢债市 0.25 个百分点。然后,让我们慷慨地假设风险投资市场能回报 12%,而精明的经理人能赚到将近 18%;再假设对冲基金平均能赚 10%,同样靠精明经理人实现 17% 的回报。接着,我们必须扣除投资成本。瞧!养老金计划就达到了每年 8.5% 的目标!
但现在要考虑一下,这些回报是否真的能实现。能够每年跑赢市场 3 个百分点的股票经理人,简直凤毛麟角。(而且,追求这种超额表现本身就意味着承担相当大的风险。)还要考虑到,假设的风险投资回报远高于历史常态,而历史常态本身已被 1990 年代末市场狂热期间首次公开募股(IPO)的投机泡沫夸大了。再想想,不仅假设的对冲基金平均回报率偏高(10%),更明显的是,要找到一群所谓的绝对收益经理人,能连续十年每年稳定超越这一回报率 6 到 7 个百分点,这胜算简直低得离谱。大多数投资专业人士肯定会认为这些大力神式的假设荒谬至极。
当然,没有人能真正预知未来。假设终究只是假设。但这不是我要说的重点。我的重点是,每家公司的年报都应该向股东呈现一张像表 7 这样简单的表格,让股东能够公平判断养老金计划赖以计算养老金基金回报假设的算术是否合理。这样的报告应该放在财务信息披露优先事项清单的高位,我也希望认真的分析师能直接向公司管理层提出这个问题,质疑那些被认为过高的假设是否合理。公司董事会很少碰这个问题,但股东应该把它推到台前。
The present yield on a conservative portfolio age 10 percent return, with smart managers who of U.S. Treasury and corporate bonds suggests a earn 17 percent. Then, let’s deduct investment projected bond return of about 4.5 percent, bring- costs, as we must. Voila! The pension fund reaches ing the gross portfolio return to 6.3 percent. its goal of 8.5 percent a year! Deducting estimated annual plan expenses (fees, But now consider the possibility that these turnover costs, etc.) of 1.1 percent from the gross returns actually will be achieved. Equity managers return, the arithmetic takes us to a net return of 5.2 who can beat the market by 3 percentage points a percent, less than two-thirds of the 8.5 percent total year are conspicuous by their absence. (And the projected by the average large U.S. corporation. A quest for such outperformance presumes the company making that kind of projection for its assumption of considerable risk.) Consider too that pension plan is either looking for trouble or trying the assumed venture capital returns are far above to engineer upward the earnings it reports to its even the historical norms that were inflated by the shareholders. speculative boom in IPOs during the market madGeneral Motors currently uses that 8.5 percent ness of the late 1990s. And consider not only the assumption, which seems outlandish on the face of high (10 percent) assumed average hedge fund it. When I pursued this issue with GM, I was told return but the obviously staggering odds against that the traditional policy portfolio of 60 percent finding a group of so-called absolute-return manstocks and 40 percent bonds is history; GM has agers who can consistently exceed that return by added alternative investments, such as venture 6–7 percentage points a year over a decade. Surely capital, and “absolute return” investments, such as hedge funds. It’s easy enough to understand that most investment professionals would consider change, so let’s make some reasonable assumptions these Herculean assumptions absurd. about what this new policy portfolio might hold: 4 Of course, no one can really know what lies • 30 percent in U.S. equities, ahead. Assumptions are, after all, only assump• 40 percent in U.S. bonds, tions. But that is not my point. My point is that each • 10 percent in venture capital, and corporation’s annual report should present to • 20 percent in hedge funds. shareholders a simple table like Table 7 so that its Table 7 shows one example of the returns that shareowners can make a fair determination of the would be required from each of these four asset reasonableness of the arithmetic on which the penclasses to reach that 8.5 percent target. The market sion plan is relying to calculate its pension fund returns for equities and bonds are unchanged, so return assumptions. Such a report should be placed the equity managers would have to beat the stock high on the list of financial statement disclosure market by 3.0 percentage points a year and the priorities, and I would hope that serious analysts bond managers would have to beat the bond mar- will take this issue directly to corporate managers ket by 0.25 percentage point. Then, let’s generously and challenge the reasonableness of any assumpassume that the venture capital market will return tions deemed excessive. Corporate boards rarely 12 percent, with smart managers who earn almost touch this issue, but shareholders ought to force it 18 percent, and that hedge funds will earn an aver- to the fore.
表 7. 实现 8.5% 回报率的模板:公司年报的参考框架 5 1 2 3 4(第 2 列 + 第 3 列 – 第 4 列) 预期价值 资产类别 配置比例 基本回报率 增值 a 费用 最终回报率 股票 30% 7.5% 3.00% 1.5% 9.0% 债券 40% 4.5% 0.25% 0.5% 4.2% 风险投资 10% 12.0% 5.50% 3.0% 14.5% 对冲基金 20% 10.0% 6.50% 3.0% 13.5% 加权合计 100% 7.2% 2.80% 1.5% 8.5% a 为达到预期回报率所需。
Table 7. Getting to an 8.5 Percent Return: A Template for Corporate Annual Reports 5 1 2 3 4 (2 + 3 – 4) Projected Value Net Asset Class Allocation Return Added a Expenses Return Equities 30% 7.5% 3.00% 1.5% 9.0% Bonds 40 4.5 0.25 0.5 4.2 Venture capital 10 12.0 5.50 3.0 14.5 Hedge funds 20 10.0 6.50 3.0 13.5 Weighted total 100% 7.2% 2.80% 1.5% 8.5% a Required to produce expected rate of return.
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November/December 2005 www.cfapubs.org 31
企业为自己的养老金计划所设定的看似荒诞不经的回报率假设,一直是企业养老金计划资产与负债之间负差距不断扩大的主要因素。固定收益计划的未来充满挑战,这些挑战只能用巨大来形容。摩根士丹利备受尊敬的会计专家特雷弗·哈里斯(与理查德·伯纳合作,2005 年)最近的一份报告一针见血:多年来,养老金成本定价错误、资金不足,以及对寿命和退休年龄过于乐观的假设,导致承诺与现实之间出现经济错配。企业固定收益计划整体资金缺口高达 4000 亿美元。而州及地方政府的计划,缺口可能是这一数字的三倍。这些缺口将拖累许多计划发起人的经营业绩,并威胁到固定收益体系本身,尤其是在市场无法带来高回报或利率持续低迷的情况下。过高的回报假设、不足的缴费,以及几乎普遍忽视投资成本对市场回报造成的长期深度侵蚀——这些因素共同导致了我国私人养老金体系、政府养老金体系、个人退休计划以及固定缴费计划中普遍存在的严重储蓄缺口。造成这一失败的责任,很大程度上要归咎于金融界不愿承认朴素算术的无情法则。
The seemingly outlandish returns being assumed by corporations for their pension plans have been a major factor in the growing negative gap between the assets and the liabilities of corporate pension plans. The future of DB plans is fraught with challenges that can only be described as awesome. A recent report by Morgan Stanley’s respected accounting expert Trevor Harris (with Richard Berner, 2005) put it well: Years of mispriced pension costs, underfunding, and overly optimistic assumptions about mortality and retirement have created economic mismatches between promises made and the resources required to keep them. Corporate defined-benefit plans as a whole are as much as $400 billion underfunded. State and local plans, moreover, may be underfunded by three times that amount. Those gaps will drain many plan sponsors’ operating performance and threaten the defined-benefit system itself, especially if markets fail to deliver high returns, or if interest rates remain low. Excessive return assumptions, insufficient contributions, and the almost universal failure to consider the profound long-term erosion of market returns engendered by investment costs have combined to create this serious savings shortfall that pervades our nation’s private pension system, our government pension systems, our individual retirement plans, and our defined contribution plans. Much of the responsibility for that failure can be laid to the unwillingness of the financial community to recognize the relentless rules of humble arithmetic. 5
比较优势还是社群优势?若要为投资者创造更丰厚的财富积累,我们投资行业必须着眼于这些宏观议题。然而,我们却几乎把全部精力都倾注在为自己客户追求卓越业绩的“圣杯”上,仿佛全然无视所有市场参与者作为一个整体只能获得平均回报这一事实。换句话说,就我们为客户赚取的回报而言,我们投资界人士确实如此,也必然如此——只能平庸。在此,我想就“比较优势”与“社群优势”的区别阐明一点。我在金融学术期刊上读到的大部分内容——有时我觉得几乎是全部——都与比较优势有关,
Comparative Advantage or Community Advantage? If we are to create greater wealth accumulation for investors, we in the investment profession must focus on these broad issues. Yet we continue to focus nearly all of our attention on the search for the Holy Grail of achieving superior performance for our own clients, seemingly ignoring the fact that all market participants as a group earn average returns. Put another way, in terms of the returns we earn for our clients, we in the investment community are, and must be, average. Here, I want to make a point about the difference between “comparative advantage” and “community advantage.” Much—sometimes I think almost all—of what I read in the learned journals of finance has to do with comparative advantage,
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比如挑选牛股,或者利用市场低效之处来提升相对于整个市场的表现,再或者在回报率上胜过职业对手一筹。然而,我们是在一个本质上封闭的市场体系中从业,无法改变市场慷慨赐予我们的任何回报。因此,投资者在市场中每获得一美元的优势,只能以其他市场参与者作为一个整体遭受直接损失为代价。当然,我们每个人都相信自己并非平庸之辈,相信自己能持续获得超越市场的优势。但我们不可能全都正确。《纽约客》最近一篇文章(Gawande 2004)点出了巨大的恐惧:“如果我结果是个平庸之辈怎么办?然而,如果钟形曲线是事实,那么大多数[投资者]将归于平庸也是现实。”文章接着说:成为其中一员并不丢人,对吧?当然,事实上有。不知何故,困扰人们的与其说是平庸本身,不如说是安于平庸。对大多数人来说,平庸是我们注定的命运。唉,在资金管理这个行当里,景象甚至更加黯淡。因为我们只是在扣除投资成本之前才算平庸。扣除成本后,我们相对于市场就成了输家——这是那个谦卑算术的无情法则,我们想否认却做不到。换句话说,成本把我们个人表现的整个钟形曲线向左推移。但这是生活中的一条法则:没人甘愿平庸,而争当最优的竞争至少在一定程度上是健康的。我们为胜利所做的努力,尽管在总体上是徒劳的,却提供了流动性和市场效率所需的交易量。然而,矛盾的是,我们越是接近市场效率,就越接近一个有效市场假说成为同义反复的世界。当然,管理费和交易成本也充实了基金经理和华尔街金融中介的钱包。如果某位基金经理的成功策略尚未被发现且能持续下去,该公司将吸引更多资金管理规模,把费用从竞争对手的口袋转入自己的口袋。这样的成功甚至可能让该公司收取更高的费用,从而增加其咨询费收入(尽管增幅有限,至少初期是这样)。然而,同样矛盾的是,当这种情况发生时,从定义上看,所有投资者作为一个整体获得的净回报也相应减少。
such as picking winning stocks or capitalizing on a market inefficiency that improves performance relative to the total market or gaining an edge in return over professional rivals. Yet we ply our trade in what is essentially a closed market system, and we can’t change whatever returns the markets are generous enough to bestow on us. So, each dollar of advantage one investor gains in the market comes only at the direct disadvantage of other market participants as a group. Of course, each of us believes that we ourselves are not average, that we can gain a sustained edge over the market. But we can’t all be right. A recent article in the New Yorker (Gawande 2004) noted the great fear: “What if I turn out to be average? Yet, if the bell curve is a fact, then so is the reality that most [investors] are going to be average.” The article continued: There’s no shame in being one of them, right? Except, of course, there is. Somehow, what troubles people isn’t so much being average as settling for it. Averageness is, for most of us, our fate. Alas, in the world of money management, the picture is even darker. For we are average only before investment costs are deducted. After costs, we are losers to the market—that relentless rule of humble arithmetic that we want to deny but cannot. Put another way, costs shift the entire bell curve of variations in our individual performance to the left. But it is a rule of life that none of us want to be average, and competition to be the best is, up to a point at least, healthy. Our efforts to win, however fruitless in the aggregate, provide the transaction volumes that are required for liquidity and market efficiency. Yet, paradoxically, the closer we move to market efficiency, the closer we come to a world in which the EMH becomes a tautology. Of course, management fees and transaction costs also fatten the wallets of fund managers and Wall Street’s financial intermediaries. If the successful strategy of a given fund manager remains undiscovered and sustained, that firm will attract more dollars under management, diverting fees into its pockets from the pockets of its rivals. Such success may even allow the firm to charge higher fees, thereby increasing (albeit only modestly, at least at first) its advisory fee revenues. Yet, again paradoxically, when that happens, by definition, the net returns earned by all investors as a group are commensurately reduced.
©2005, CFA Institute
©2005, CFA Institute
意识到我们所有狂热的投资活动的最终结果,无非是让彼得得利而保罗受损,这对投资专业人士来说无疑隐隐作痛。我们都想成功的梦想,违背了伊曼努尔·康德的无上命令,即“你的行动必须能让其后果被无矛盾地普遍化”。然而,我们最优秀、最聪明的灵魂继续在这场比较优势的博弈中竞争——可以说是越发激烈——而这场博弈在扣除成本前不可避免地是零和游戏,在扣除成本后则是输家的游戏。沃伦·巴菲特那位脾气火爆却睿智的搭档查理·芒格,与我同样担忧:在资金管理领域,就客户利益而言,不可能有净增值,只有净减损。以下是他就这么多非凡人才投身投资管理行业所说的话:大多数赚钱活动都带有深刻的反社会效应……随着高成本模式日益流行……这种活动加剧了当前有害的趋势,即这个国家越来越多的道德青年智力被吸引到利润丰厚的资金管理及其伴随的现代摩擦中,而不是投入到为他人提供更多价值的工作中。6 亚当·斯密那只“看不见的手”或许能赋予少数资金管理者竞争优势,但它无法改善投资者作为一个整体的境遇。然而,我们确实有能力做到这一点——创造一个为所有投资者提供价值的共同体优势。而这只有通过大幅削减金融中介成本,并减少当前投资业务中的过剩产能——例如,数量极其泛滥的共同基金和令人瞠目的股票交易活动——才能实现。如果资本主义要蓬勃发展,提高所有投资者作为一个整体的回报,必须成为我们投资社会的一个至关重要的目标。然而,在美企中,管理人资本主义对所有者资本主义的胜利,与之并行的,是投资界——资金管理领域——管理人资本主义对所有者资本主义更胜一筹的胜利。只要赚钱活动仅仅是把回报从平庸者手中转移到聪明者手中,从倒霉者手中转移到幸运者手中,从天真信任系统的人手中转移到在系统边缘钻营的人手中,那么,它当然就具有“深刻的反社会效应”。如果我们积极努力
Realizing that the upshot of all our feverish investment activity is to advantage Peter at the expense of Paul is doubtless vaguely painful to investment professionals. The dream that we can all achieve success defies Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative that you must “act so that the consequences of your actions can be generalized without self-contradiction.” Yet our best and brightest souls continue to compete—arguably, ever more vigorously—in this game of comparative advantage that is inevitably a zero-sum game before costs and a loser’s game after costs. Warren Buffett’s crusty but wise partner, Charlie Munger, shares my concern that in the field of money management, as far as the interests of clients are concerned, there can be no net value added, only value subtracted. Here’s what he had to say about the commitment of so many exceptional people to the field of investment management: Most money-making activity contains profoundly antisocial effects . . . As high-cost modalities become ever more popular . . . the activity exacerbates the current harmful trend in which ever more of the nation’s ethical young brain-power is attracted into lucrative money-management and its attendant modern frictions, as distinguished from work providing much more value to others. 6 Adam Smith’s invisible hand may give a minority of money managers a competitive edge, but it cannot improve the lot of investors as a group. Yet we do have it within our power to do exactly that—to create a community advantage that provides value to all investors. And that can be achieved only by slashing the costs of financial intermediation and reducing the overcapacity present in our investment business today in the form of, for example, the grossly excessive number of mutual funds and the staggering levels of stocktrading activity. If capitalism is to flourish, enriching the returns of all investors as a group must be a vital goal for our investment society. Yet the triumph of managers’ capitalism over owners’ capitalism in corporate America has been paralleled by an even greater triumph of managers’ capitalism over owners’ capitalism in investment America—the field of money management. So long as money-making activity simply shifts returns from the pedestrian to the brilliant or from the unlucky to the lucky or from those who naively trust the system to those who work at its margins, then of course, it has “profoundly antisocial effects.” If we vigorously work
November/December 2005
November/December 2005
为降低系统成本,从而在风险不变的前提下提升投资者回报,这难道不是在为全体股东让资本主义运转得更好吗?这样做的社会效应,岂不是与芒格所担忧的反社会效应截然相反?
to reduce system costs, thereby increasing investor returns while holding risk constant, wouldn’t we be making capitalism work better for all stockowners? And wouldn’t that create, well, profoundly social effects that are the diametrical opposite of the antisocial effects that so concern Munger?
我们的中介化社会。在投资美国,实现“焕然一新”这一理想目标,有两大强大力量挡在途中。其一是金钱。金融中介领域对参与者而言已变得极其有利可图,我们赚取的巨额财富成了一种麻醉剂。我们已对巨额利润上瘾。第二股力量或许更为强大:投资者依赖金融中介来保护自身利益。我们或许以为生活在一个“所有者社会”——尽管这个社会距离实现其承诺还有很长的路要走——但每一天,真正直接持有我们那些创造财富的公司的所有人都在减少。事实是,我们现在生活在一个“中介化社会”,最终的所有者——本质上就是我们的共同基金持有人,以及公共和私人养老金计划的受益人——不得不依赖他们的受托人,充当忠诚的受托者。然而,很大程度上正是因为基金管理业务中那种一美元对一美元的零和博弈(管理者多拿一分,投资者就少得一分),如今这种受托责任的表现实在寥寥无几。但如果我们那超过 1 亿的最终股票持有者和受益人能够奋起,要求他们的管家提供真正的管家服务,那么投资美国就会一切向好——或者至少对客户而言,会比今天好得多。我们不仅要改变金融中介体系的成本和结构,还要改变受托人的理念。早在 1928 年,纽约首席法官本杰明·N·卡多佐就说得很好:在日常世界中,对于保持距离、公平交易的人来说,许多行为是允许的,但对于受受托关系约束的人却是被禁止的。受托人受到的约束,比市场道德更为严格……在这方面,已经形成了一种坚定不移、根深蒂固的传统……行为的标准不仅是诚实,而是最敏锐的荣誉感所要求的那种一丝不苟……唯有如此,受托人的行为水准才能保持在高于芸芸众生的水平之上。7
Our Intermediation Society. Two powerful forces stand in the way of realizing the idealistic goal of “beginning the world anew” in investment America. One of those forces is money. The field of financial intermediation has become so awesomely profitable to its participants that the vast sums of money we earn has become a narcotic. We have become addicted to enormous profits. The second force may be even more powerful: the reliance of investors on financial intermediaries to protect their interests. We may think we live in an ownership society—albeit one that has miles to go before it achieves its promises—but each passing day brings fewer actual direct owners of our wealthgenerating corporations. The fact is that we now live in an intermediation society, in which the last-line owners—essentially, our mutual fund shareholders and the beneficiaries of our public and private pension plans—have to rely on their trustees to act as their faithful fiduciaries. Yet largely because of the dollar-for-dollar trade-off in the money management business (in which the more managers take, the less investors make), there is far too little evidence of such stewardship today. But if our 100-million-plus last-line stockowners and beneficiaries rise up, however, and demand that their stewards provide them with, well, stewardship, then all will be well in investment America—or at least far better for our clients than it is today. We need to change not only the costs and the structure of our system of financial intermediation but also the philosophy of its trustees. Way back in 1928, New York’s Chief Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo put it well: Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. . . . As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 7
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然而不知何故,在当今这个“买者自负”、市场被奉为是非终极裁判、人人都想趁行情好大捞一把的世界里,我们金融界太多人似乎已把这套标准抛在脑后。下一前沿。2005 年初,我即将完成那本关于当今适得其反的资本主义形态的新书(2005 年出版),正翻阅《金融分析师杂志》2005 年 1/2 月刊,上面有我写的一篇关于共同基金行业过去 60 年变迁历史的文章。我注意到基思·安巴切特那篇颇有洞见的文章《超越投资组合理论:下一前沿》。他那敏锐的论点质疑了一个传统观念:投资领域的下一前沿并非围绕“打造系统以期为投资者创造更优财务结果”展开。他提出,我们应当更多思考信息理论——比如关于投资成本的知识——以及代理理论,即经理人/代理人代表其投资者/委托人做决策时所面对的相互冲突的经济利益。他写道,要通过对中介成本的大幅削减和一种“物有所值”的理念——以服务客户和受益人为驱动力——来为投资者寻求“更优结果”。我只能对他深表谢意,他未与我事先商量便毅然在这些问题上亮明立场,而这些议题正是我在本文中反思的核心所在。我有幸在长达半个世纪里参与阐述这些议题,最终在很多年前(30 多年前)创立了先锋集团,使之成为一个真正意义上“共同”的共同基金集团。“先锋实验”,我们早年这样称呼它,是为一种新型金融中介树立标杆的尝试,旨在让投资者公平分享我们市场慷慨给予的一切回报。若我此后没有在真正“共同”的投资实践中身体力行,也就没有资格在这篇文章里高谈阔论。
Yet somehow, in today’s world of caveat emptor, of the marketplace as the ultimate arbiter of what’s right, and of “get while the getting’s good,” too large a portion of our financial community seems to have lost sight of that standard. T he N e x t F ro nt i e r . In early 2005, as I approached the completion of my new book on today’s counterproductive form of capitalism (forthcoming 2005), I was reading the January/February 2005 issue of the Financial Analysts Journal, which included my history of how the mutual fund industry has changed over the past 60 years. I was drawn to Keith Ambachtsheer’s insightful essay “Beyond Portfolio Theory: The Next Frontier.” His perceptive thesis questioned the conventional wisdom that the next frontier in investing is about “engineering systems to create better financial outcomes for investors.” He suggested that we ought to be thinking more about information theory—knowledge about the costs of investing, for example—and agency theory—the conflicting economic interests that manager/agents confront when they make decisions on behalf of their investor/ principals. He wrote of seeking “better outcomes” for investors by virtue of a material reduction in intermediation costs and a “value for money” philosophy in which the driving force is service to clients and beneficiaries. I can only express my deep appreciation for his willingness, without any prior consultation with me, to stand up and be counted on these issues that are at the core of the reflections I present here. I have been fortunate to play a role in articulating these issues for a full half century, culminating in the creation of The Vanguard Group as a truly mutual mutual fund complex all those many (30-plus) years ago. “The Vanguard Experiment,” as we called it in its early years, was an effort to set the standard for a new kind of financial intermediation designed to give investors their fair share of whatever returns our markets are kind enough to deliver. Had I not “walked the walk” of truly mutual investing ever since, I would hardly be in a position to “talk the talk” of this essay.
笃行以致远
这是一段独特而精彩的旅程,让我们得以将投资者的成本保持在低位,投资者的回报相应地保持在较高水平。因此,先锋集团堪称不仅取得了艺术上的成功,也取得了卓越的商业成功。我们在共同基金资产中的份额已连续 23 年攀升——从 1980 年的 1.8% 起步(原文未提及具体年份,但根据上下文推断为 1980 年,此处保留原文表述)。
Walking the Walk It has been a singular and wonderful walk, one that has enabled us to keep investor costs low and investor performance commensurately high. As a result, Vanguard has arguably achieved not only an artistic success but also a remarkable commercial success. Our share of mutual fund assets has now risen for 23 consecutive years—going from 1.8 percent in
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1981 年至 2005 年中期降至 11.0%,如图 2 所示。将这一趋势与我们 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代的老对手马萨诸塞金融服务公司(MFS)的市场份额相比,真是令人大开眼界。
1981 to 11.0 percent in mid-2005, as shown in Figure 2. It is a revelation to compare that trend with the market share of Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS), our longtime rival of the 1950s and 1960s.
图 2:先锋基金与 MFS 的市场份额,1961–2004 年
Figure 2. Market Share of Vanguard and MFS, 1961–2004
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
市场份额(%) 12 10.7% 10.5% MFS 相互化,1969 年 8 6.7% 6.1% 7.0% 先锋基金 4 4.1% 先锋基金 1.9% 相互化,0.9% MFS 1.0% 1974 年 1.1% 0 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05
Market Share (%) 12 10.7% 10.5% MFS Demutualized, 8 1969 6.7% 6.1% 7.0% Vanguard 4 4.1% Vanguard 1.9% Mutualized, 0.9% MFS 1.0% 1974 1.1% 0 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05
注:数据截至 1 月。换算后,Vanguard 的变动幅度为 +156%,MFS 为 –86%。
Note: As of January. The percentage changes after conversion were +156 percent for Vanguard and –86 percent for MFS.
讽刺的是,MFS 在 1969 年从自身的互助结构转变为典型的公众持股(后来成为企业集团)所有制,就在五年后我们恰好反向而行之前。尽管他们的转变并非 MFS 市场份额(同样显示在图 2 中)从 9% 暴跌至 1% 的唯一原因,但肯定无助于挽回局面。在这两种对比鲜明的模式所体现的有限范围内,投资者在发声,他们的声音响亮而清晰:他们希望自己的利益被置于首位。我希望你们能原谅这一结论中带有既得利益的色彩。这恰恰让我回到了本文开头关于“认清显而易见之事”重要性的论述。先锋集团将信条化为行动,无疑印证了著名创业经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特的话,他断言“成功的创新不是智力的行为,而是意志的行为”。基金行业尚未效仿先锋集团的创新,但我向你们保证,我们这一开拓性的前哨不会永远孤零零地站在前沿。我在本次致辞中反复强调的“无情而谦逊的算术法则”,以及随之而来的 CMH 和相关受托责任概念,迟早会与投资大众产生共鸣。公众不会接受我们金融界未能履行我们义不容辞的责任。预警即武装。
Ironically, MFS converted from its own original mutual structure to a typical public (and later conglomerate) ownership in 1969, just before we did exactly the reverse five years later. Although their conversion was hardly the sole cause of the sharp tumble in market share MFS experienced (also shown in Figure 2) from 9 percent to 1 percent, it surely could not have helped. To the limited extent exemplified in these two contrasting patterns, investors are speaking, and their voice is loud and clear: They want their interests placed front and center. I hope you will forgive the vested nature of this conclusion. It merely brings me full circle to the early words in this essay about the importance of “recognizing the obvious.” Surely Vanguard’s turning creed into deed is a validation of the words of famed entrepreneurial economist Joseph A. Schumpeter, who asserted that “successful innovation is not an act of intellect, but of will.” The fund industry has yet to emulate the innovation that is Vanguard, but I guarantee you that our pioneering outpost will not stand alone at the frontier forever. “The relentless rules of humble arithmetic” that I’ve pounded home in this message and the attendant CMH and related fiduciary concepts will, sooner or later, resonate with the investing public. That public will accept nothing less than that we in the financial community live up to the responsibilities we are duty bound to honor. Forewarned is forearmed.
©2005, CFA Institute
©2005, CFA Institute
Notes
Notes
- 现在早就该有人(或许由 CFA 协会来做这件事)对这套体系进行一次认真研究,把真相弄清楚。
- 我承认,确实有一些基金组织是这些泛泛之论的例外,但这类例外的数量少得惊人。
- 各组平均值已针对销售费用和 B 类股做了调整。
- 新政策投资组合及其潜在回报的可能变体多得数不胜数。
- 算术法则同样适用于社会保障制度及围绕私有化的各种争论,不过这些是改日再谈的话题。
- 芒格是在 1998 年 10 月 14 日于加利福尼亚州圣莫尼卡举行的基金会财务官员集团会议上发表这番讲话的。
- 引自梅因哈德诉萨蒙案(1928 年)的判决。
1. It’s high time for someone (perhaps for CFA Institute) to 5. The rules of arithmetic apply also to Social Security and the conduct a careful study of the system and find out. issues surrounding privatization, but these are topics for 2. I recognize that there are fund organizations that are excep- another day. tions to these generalizations. The number, however, is 6. Munger was speaking at a meeting of the Foundation surprisingly small. Financial Officers Group in Santa Monica, California, 14 3. Group averages have been adjusted for sales charges and October 1998. B-class shares. 7. From the decision in Meinhard v. Salmon (1928). 4. Possible variations on the new policy portfolio and its potential returns are myriad.
References
References
安巴切特希尔,基思。2005 年。“超越投资组合理论:下一个前沿。”《金融分析师杂志》,第 61 卷,第 1 期(1 月/2 月):29–33。布兰代斯,路易斯·D. 1914 年。《他人的金钱》。纽约:F.A. 斯托克斯出版社。伯纳,理查德,和特雷弗·哈里斯。2005 年。“养老金改革的金融市场影响。”摩根士丹利研究,全球经济论坛(1 月 18 日):www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20050118-tue.html。加万德,阿图尔。2004 年。“钟形曲线。”《纽约客》(12 月):82–91。在线可查:www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?041206fa_fact。博格尔,约翰·C. 2005 年。“共同基金行业 60 年:更好还是更糟?”《金融分析师杂志》,第 61 卷,第 1 期(1 月/2 月):15–24。
Ambachtsheer, Keith. 2005. “Beyond Portfolio Theory: The Next ———. Forthcoming 2005. The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism. Frontier.” Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 61, no. 1 (January/ New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. February):29–33. Brandeis, Louis D. 1914. Other People’s Money. New York: F.A. Berner, Richard, and Trevor Harris. 2005. “Financial Market Stokes. Implications of Pension Reform.” Morgan Stanley Research, Gawande, Atul. 2004. “The Bell Curve.” New Yorker (6 Global Economic Forum (18 January): www.morganstanley. December):82–91. Available online at www.newyorker.com/ com/GEFdata/digests/20050118-tue.html. fact/content/?041206fa_fact. Bogle, John C. 2005. “The Mutual Fund Industry 60 Years Later: For Better or Worse?” Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 61, no. 1 (January/February):15–24.
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