面包与马戏
面包与马戏
——约翰·C. 博格尔,先锋集团创始人兼前董事长
在大峡谷地区世界事务委员会的演讲
2000 年 6 月 15 日
今晚,我想和各位谈谈当今的金融市场、投资策略,以及普通股在我们社会保障体系中可能扮演的角色。但在进入这些我想大多数人都在思考的话题之前,我想先谈谈我所看到的当今美国社会与经济。尽管我们在这个新千年伊始享受着空前的繁荣——我认为这在人类历史上都是无与伦比的——但我对正在发生的很多事情,却抱有挑剔的眼光。因此,我给自己这篇讲话起的标题是:“面包与马戏”。
Bread and Circuses Remarks by John C. Bogle Founder and Former Chairman, The Vanguard Group Before The World Affairs Council of Greater Valley Forge June 15, 2000 Tonight, I want to talk to you about today’s financial markets, investment strategy, and the potential role of common stocks in our Social Security system. But before I get to those subjects—which I imagine are on the minds of most of you—I want to look at American society and our economy as I see it today. Despite our prosperity as we begin this new millennium—unparalleled, I think, in all human history—I look at much of what is transpiring with a jaundiced eye. Hence the title I have chosen for my remarks: “Bread and Circuses.”
你们肯定都记得,公元一世纪上半叶,罗马皇帝们靠提供我们今天戏称的“面包与马戏”,保住了自己高人气,也让平民保持安定。面包就是每月发给平民的免费谷物。马戏则是表演——战车赛、角斗士、体育赛事、戏剧——这些在罗马帝国宏伟的赛马场上演。那些竞技场遍布帝国各地,从君士坦丁堡一直到不列颠。最大的是罗马的大竞技场,那也不过能容纳区区 25 万人。在公元头三个世纪里,演员和运动员成了光彩照人的公众英雄,聚敛了巨额财富和政治影响力。事实证明,“面包与马戏”是一套制胜法宝,罗马帝国也达到了它的巅峰。
As you doubtless recall, during the first half of the first century, the Roman emperors kept their popularity high and their populace peaceful by providing what we today cynically call bread and circuses. Bread was the free grain, given each month to the plebeians. Circuses were the shows—the chariot races, the gladiators, the sporting events, the theatre—that took place in the great hippodromes of the Roman Empire. Those stadiums dotted the empire from Constantinople to Britain. The largest was the Circus Maximus in Rome, which seated a mere 250,000 souls. During the first three centuries A.D., actors and athletes became glamorous public heroes, garnering great wealth and political influence. Bread and circuses proved a winning formula, and the Roman Empire reached its pinnacle.
现在,请听这段话:“在基督教纪元第二世纪,罗马帝国囊括了地球上最美好的部分和最文明的人类。这个辽阔帝国的边疆,由古老的声名和纪律严明的勇武来守护。法律与习俗那温和而强大的影响力,逐渐将各省凝聚为一体。其和平的居民,既享受着也滥用着财富与生活的优裕。自由宪法的形象,以得体的敬畏被保留着……[然而罗马帝国终将]衰亡;一场将永远被铭记、且至今仍被地球上的各国所感受到的革命。”这段著名的话,是爱德华·吉本《罗马帝国衰亡史》的开篇词。
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire Now, listen to these words: “In the second century of the Christian Era, the Empire of Rome comprehended the fairest part of the earth and the most civilized portion of mankind. The frontiers of that extensive monarchy were guarded by ancient renown and disciplined valor. The gentle but powerful influence of laws and manners had gradually cemented the union of the provinces. Their peaceful inhabitants enjoyed and abused the advantages of wealth and living. The image of a free constitution was preserved with decent reverence . . . [Yet the Roman Empire would] decline and fall; a revolution which will ever be remembered and is still felt by the nations of the earth.” Those famous words are the opening lines of Edward Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.
吉本的史诗巨著写到末尾,罗马帝国已分崩离析。君士坦丁堡沦陷,沃野千里的行省被汪达尔人蹂躏;不列颠失守,高卢陷落;就连罗马城本身,也被野蛮的哥特人征服。公元 410 年,正如吉本所写,“罗马立国一千一百六十三年后,这座帝国之城被交付给日耳曼和西徐亚部落恣意肆虐的怒火。”为何会如此?答案似乎藏在其公民秩序的自我放纵之中:民众渴望面包带来的稳妥保障,依赖货币价值来表达欲求与财产,并追逐荣誉与认可——哪怕他们对自由与伟大的愿景早已黯淡。正如圣奥古斯丁所言,正是自私之爱,导致了罗马帝国的覆亡。
By the end of Gibbon’s epic, the Roman Empire had dissolved. Constantinople had fallen, the fruitful provinces overwhelmed by the Vandals; Britain was lost; Gaul had fallen; and the brutal Goths had conquered Rome itself. In 410 A.D., “eleven hundred and sixty-three years after the formation of Rome,” as Gibbon wrote, “the Imperial City was delivered to the licentious fury of the tribes of Germany and Sythia.” Why did it happen? The answer seems to lie in the self-indulgence of its civic order, reflected in the citizens’ desire for the solid assurance of bread; for the acceptance of the value of money to express their wants and their property; and for honor and recognition, despite their fading visions of liberty and greatness. As Saint Augustine put it, it was self-love that led to the fall of the Roman Empire.
今晚,我要借用吉本的一句遗言来敲响警钟:“人啊!不要把这眼前的世界当作你的依靠。”因为美国在当今世界上的伟大地位正在发生的诸多变化,让我深感忧虑。在世纪之交审视我们国家时,我看到商业价值观正在瓦解。是的,我看到了卓越的企业家精神、辉煌的技术、超乎想象的创造力,以及——至少在有些地方——让我们的国家和世界变得更美好的理想主义。但我看到的贪婪、利己主义、物质主义和浪费,也远远超出了我挑剔眼光所能接受的范围。我还看到,经济过度关注“富人”,对“穷人”关注不足;教育投入不足,尤其是对那些最需要教育的人——他们不仅需要教育来发家致富,更需要教育来生存。我看到世界自然资源遭到惊人的滥用,仿佛它们是我们可以随意挥霍的,而不是我们应当作为神圣信托留给后代的;我还看到政治体系被大量金钱渗透而腐化——我可以向你保证,这些钱很少来自那些不求投资回报、没有私心的公民。
Tonight, I strike a chord of concern using some of Gibbon’s final words: “O man! Place not thy confidence in this present world.” For I am troubled by much of what is happening to America’s greatness in this present world. As I survey our nation at the millennium, I see our business values eroding. Yes, I see marvelous entrepreneurship, brilliant technology, creativity beyond imagination, and, at least in some spots, the idealism to make our nation and our world a better place. But I see far too much greed, egoism, materialism, and waste to please my critical eye. I see too an economy too focused on the “haves” and not focused enough on the “have-nots,” underinvesting in education, especially among those who most need it not merely to prosper, but to survive. I see shocking misuse of the world’s natural resources, as if they were ours to waste rather than ours to preserve as a sacred trust for future generations, and a political system corrupted by the staggering infusion of money that is, I assure you, rarely given by disinterested citizens who expect no return on their investment.
美国的“面包与马戏” 千禧年之交,美国也有自己的面包与马戏。它们与古罗马的不同并不令人意外,但它们确实存在。可以说,我们的面包大部分并没用来安抚大众,而是流向了少数精英——包括公司首席执行官、体育明星和演艺人士所获得的惊人薪酬(颇有古罗马帝国的影子!)。更多的面包,则是在金融市场上被富于进取精神的企业家、冒险的投资者、投资银行家、金融家以及管理他人资金的人所创造的惊人财富中发酵而成。至少到目前为止,这种账面财富——如果一个人将自己的股票兑换成美元,那就是真实存在的——主要表现为金融资产的市场价值。而这些市场价值最终赖以实现的现金流,仍远未兑现。例如,尽管所谓“新经济”(科技、科学和通信领域)在过去四年中收益增长率仅为每年 8%,并没有比“旧经济”的 7% 快多少。不过,市场上资产价值的面包,今天就在那里,任由所有人清点和享用。
America’s Bread and Circuses As the millennium turns, we also have our own bread and circuses. That they are not the same as those of ancient Rome is hardly surprising, but they do exist. Much of our bread, as it were, goes, not to keep the masses peaceable, but to a fairly small elite, including the fabulous compensation paid to corporate chief executives and star athletes and entertainers. (Shades of the Roman Empire!). Even more bread has been leavened in the incredible wealth created in the financial markets by aggressive entrepreneurs, venturesome investors, investment bankers, financiers, and the managers of other people’s money. So far at least, this paper wealth—real enough if one converts one’s stocks into dollars—has manifested itself largely in the market values of financial assets. The delivery of the cash flows on which those market values finally depend still lies beyond the horizon. For all its trumped up promise, for example, the earnings growth rate of the so-called New Economy of technology, science, and communications over the past four years has been just 8% per year, not much ahead of the 7% rate of the Old Economy. Nonetheless, the bread of asset values in the marketplace is there today for all to count and enjoy.
马戏团也同样比比皆是。我们国家最大的真正马戏团(密歇根大学的体育场)只能容纳 10.5 万人——不到马克西穆斯竞技场 25 万座位的一半——但电视屏幕将体育和娱乐带给全球数十亿观众。然而,我们最大的马戏团或许是金融市场。股票已经成了娱乐。电子交易比比皆是;日内交易者让市场剧烈波动;市场换手率达到 1929 年以来的最高水平。CNBC、CNN 和彭博社向交易者(甚至无聊人士)提供对股市每一次涨跌、每一次并购、每一份盈利报告的评论。而盈利总是与广为人知的“市场预期”相对照。“超出”是好事。“达到”通常还可以。但“不及”则可能是灾难,瞬间抹去一家公司数十亿甚至数百亿美元的市值。
And circuses abound, too. While our nation’s largest true circus (the stadium at the University of Michigan) holds but 105,000 citizens—less than half the 250,000 capacity of the Circus Maximus— television screens bring sports and entertainment to worldwide audiences that reach into the billions. But perhaps our greatest circus is our financial markets. Stocks have become entertainment. Electronic trading abounds; day traders move the market in spasms; market turnover is the highest since 1929. CNBC and CNN and Bloomberg alert traders (and, for that matter, the bored) to opinions about each uptick and each downtick in the stock market, each merger, each earnings report. And earnings are always described as relative to widely-known “market expectations.” “Exceeded” is good. “Met” is all right . . . usually. “Fell short of,” however, can be a disaster that wipes out billions—even tens of billions—of a single corporation’s aggregate market value in a moment.
学校所谓的教学生投资,却是搞选股比赛。在我看来,他们应该教的,是复利的魔力。而当今最大的金融马戏——当代版本的古罗马大竞技场——就是时代广场上那座八层楼高、花哨刺眼的纳斯达克市场塔,上面用自豪地号称“世界最大视频屏幕”播放着股价。对我来说,那块屏幕恰好证明了我今天的论点:我们正身处一场马戏表演。股市已经变成了投资者的赌场。正如凯恩斯勋爵警告我们的:“如果一个国家的资本发展成了赌场活动的副产品,那这项工作很可能做不好。”
Schools purport to be teaching young students about investing by having stock-picking contests when they should, in my view, be teaching them about the magic of compound interest. And the biggest financial circus of all—today’s incarnation of the Circus Maximus—is the garish eight-story NASDAQ MarketSite Tower in Times Square, displaying stock prices on what is proudly billed as “the world’s largest video screen.” To me, that display closes my case today that we are enjoying a circus: The stock market has become a casino for investors. And as Lord Keynes warned us: “When the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”
当然,我们的“面包与马戏”与古罗马有所不同。但正如那句老话所言:“历史不会重复,但会押韵。”不过,我不想夸大古罗马与现代美国之间类比的含义。虽然我提到的这些问题至关重要,且直指我们这个以财富为导向、迷恋物质的社会核心,但今天我们仍有自由去解决它们,建设一个更美好的世界。我们需要的只是意志力。正如我那位杰出的心脏病专家伯纳德·洛恩医生最近在给我的信中所写:“一个配得上人类的社会,其目的地仍很远,但加速抵达那一天,取决于我们所有人。”所以,我把问题留给你们去判断——不仅是我是否夸大了我们面临的问题,也包括我们是否有解决这些问题的意志。
Of course our bread and circuses are different from those of ancient Rome. But as the old saw goes, “History may not repeat itself, but it rhymes.” Nonetheless, I don’t want to exaggerate the implications of the analogy between ancient Rome and modern America. While the problems I’ve commented on are vital and go to the very heart of our wealth-oriented, things-fixated society, today we have the freedom to solve them and to build a better world. All we need is the willpower. As my marvelous cardiologist, Dr. Bernard Lown, recently wrote to me: “The destination for a society deserving of human beings is still distant, but it is up to all of us to hasten the day of arrival.” So, I leave to you not only to decide whether I exaggerate our problems, but whether we have the will to solve them.
无论情况如何,我认为如今的投资者需要格外谨慎。因为让我担忧的不仅是长期的结构性问题,还有金融层面的问题。以共同基金行业为例,我们看到这个行业已从以管理和受托责任为宗旨,蜕变为以“产品营销大神”为宗旨。基金的诞生、成长(或失败)和消亡速度惊人。上世纪 90 年代运营的基金中,有一半已不复存在。基金的投资组合经理每年调换其股票组合的 90%。(100% 意味着,一只 10 亿美元的基金每年卖出 10 亿美元的股票,再买入 10 亿美元的其他股票。)而追随那些受托付钱的所谓“明智领袖”的脚步,股东们自身也以荒谬的速度频繁调换其共同基金份额。如今普通投资者持有一只基金的时长,已不再是我早年入行时的 12 到 15 年,而是仅仅 3 年。(2000 年至今,已接近 2 年。)
Investing in Equities Today Whatever the case, I think considerable caution is called for on the part of investors today. For it is not only secular issues that concern me, but financial issues. In the mutual fund industry, for example, we have seen an industry turn from management and stewardship as its rationale to the Great God of Product Marketing as its rationale. Funds are born, grow (or fail to), and die at an alarming rate. Half of all funds that operated during the 1990s no longer exist. Fund portfolio managers turn over their stock portfolios at 90% a year. (100% would mean that a $1 billion fund sells $1 billion of stocks each year and replaces them with $1 billion of other stocks.) And, following the putatively wise leaders to whom they’ve entrusted their money, shareholders turn over their own mutual fund share holdings at an absurd rate. The average investor now holds a fund, not for 12 to 15 years as in my early years in this business, but for just three years. (So far in 2000, closer to two years.)
如果说在基金经理和基金股东们那种赤裸裸的投机行为与他们盛行的短期投资策略之间还存在着一条分界线,那这条线也实在模糊。其他投机迹象也比比皆是:我们新经济板块的股票正以 102 倍的市盈率在交易,而旧经济板块只有 26 倍——即便这个 26 倍本身,也已几乎是长期历史均值 15 倍的两倍之高。沃顿商学院教授、长期看多股市的《股市长线法宝》作者杰里米·西格尔告诉我们:“大盘科技股是傻瓜的赌注。”而畅销新书《非理性繁荣》的作者罗伯特·希勒则警告,股市泡沫即将破裂。一些名为“蜘蛛”和“网”的新型高风险金融工具,正吸引着那些对风险一无所知的人入场(没错,这些花哨的名字暗示着:投资就是个闹哄哄的大马戏团!);科技基金(尤其是互联网基金)、聚焦基金(将资产集中到 20 只股票里)和动量基金(“只要利润在增长,价格就不重要”),都在暗中宣扬着超级财富。请务必警惕这些工具。
If a line of demarcation exists between rank speculation and the rampant short-term investment strategies of fund managers and fund shareholders, it is a subtle one indeed. And other signs of speculation abound. The stocks in our New Economy are selling at 102 times earnings, compared to 26 times for the Old Economy—a figure which itself is almost twice as high as the long-term norm of 15 times. Wharton Professor Jeremy Siegel, author of Stocks for the Long-Term and long-time bull, tells us that “Big-cap tech stocks are a sucker bet,” and Robert Shiller, author of the new best-seller Irrational Exuberance, warns that the stock bubble will soon burst. New, risky financial instruments called Spiders and Webs draw in the risk-ignorant (yes, those clever names suggest, investing is just a big, fun circus!); and technology funds (especially internet funds), focus funds (concentrating assets in 20 stocks), and momentum funds (“as long earnings grow, price doesn’t matter”) implicitly promote extraordinary wealth. Please be careful of these instruments.
投资者做什么?
What Does an Investor Do?
这给作为投资者的我们留下的局面一点也不清晰。是要从明显暴露风险的股市仓皇出逃吗?我不这么认为。因为没有人能确定明天、下周、明年、甚至长期——比如说二十五年——的市场会怎样。然而,很多人暗示,长期持有股票总会带来比债券更高的回报,这隐含:(a)我们对二十五年后世界的了解比明天更多,这显然荒谬;(b)股票市场像某种精算表,过去的经验会像时钟一样在未来重复,我向你们保证事实并非如此;(c)随着投资者逐渐确信美国的生产能力和增长是有保障的、我们强大的经济已消除股票的大部分风险,并且股票价格被推高至盈利的高倍数以反映这些预期,这个过程不知怎么就能一再重复,这违背了常理。所以,请不要把未来丰厚的股票回报视为理所当然。
Where this leaves us as investors, nonetheless, is not at all clear. Rush for the exit from a clearly risk-exposed stock market? I don’t think so. For no one can be certain what will happen in tomorrow’s markets, or in next week’s, or in next year’s, or even over the long-term—say, a quarter century. To imply, however, as so many do, that held for the long-term, stocks will always provide higher returns than will bonds implies: (a) that we know more about the world a quarter-century hence than we do about the world tomorrow, which is patently absurd; (b) that the stock market is a sort of actuarial table where past experience, like clockwork, will be repeated in the future, which I assure you it is not; and (c) that as investors come to accept as a certainty that America’s productive capacity and growth is assured and that our powerful economy has eliminated much of the risk in stocks, and as stock prices are driven to high multiples of earnings reflecting those expectations, such a process can somehow be repeated all over again, which flies in the face of common sense. So please don’t take generous future stock returns as a given.
如果我们正进入一个股票回报将降低的时代,投资者该转向何方?我认为答案看似简单:仔细权衡投资组合中股票的成长潜力与风险,以及债券的收入生产力和本金稳定性,找到适合你的平衡点。别让你的情绪——希望、恐惧、甚至贪婪——干扰你。关注的重点不应是获得丰厚回报的概率,而是承担过高风险的后果。但尽管我对当今社会存有疑虑,对目前股市水平深感担忧,也不要抛弃股票。如果你缺乏抵御潜在风暴的财务能力;或者你需要收入,就像资本成长受到威胁时那样;或者你缺乏坚持到底的勇气,那就逐步而审慎地减少持股,降到如罗斯柴尔德男爵所说的“让你能睡着的水平”。
If we are entering an era in which stock returns will be lower, where does the investor turn? I think the answer is deceptively simple: Carefully consider your investment balance between the growth potential and the riskiness of stocks and the income productivity and principal stability of bonds, and get the balance right—for you. Don’t let your emotions—your hopes, your fears, even your greed—get in the way. Focus, not on the probabilities of earning generous returns, but on the consequences of assuming excessive risks. But despite my reservations about our society today and my serious concerns about present levels of the stock market, don’t abandon stocks. If you lack the financial ability to weather the potential storms; or if you need income, as you will when growth of your capital is threatened; or if you lack the courage to stay the course, reduce your equity holdings—gradually and prudently—down to, as Baron Rothschild said, “the sleeping point.”
社会保障与退休收入——在市场处于如此水平时,我们又该如何看待在社会保障体系下引入自主导向的股票账户?这是当今主要的政治议题之一,实际上,这一议题正逐渐成为即将到来的总统竞选中的一个关键元素。从某种意义上说,这是一个关于面包的问题。但这里不是古罗马政府对民众的慷慨施舍,而是我们劳动一代对退休一代的责任。让我把这个问题分成两个截然独立的部分:第一,社会保障股票账户对现有福利制度的影响;第二,新退休储蓄计划的最佳结构。这是两个完全不同的问题。
Social Security and Retirement Income With the stock market at these levels, then, how should we think about the introduction of self-directed equity accounts under the Social Security System? It is one of the major political issues of the day, indeed an issue that is shaping up to be a major element in the upcoming presidential campaign. In a sense, it is an issue about bread. But here it is not the government’s largesse to the masses, as in ancient Rome, but the responsibility of our working generations for our retired generations. Let me divide the issue into two distinctly independent parts: First, the effect of Social Security equity accounts on the existing system of benefits; and, second, on the optimal structure of a new system of retirement savings plans. They are two completely different issues.
关于现有制度,它显然陷入了困境。鉴于现有的人口结构,到 2025 年,收入将开始不足以支付福利,那时支出的面包将超过收入的面包。然后(名义)基金将开始被耗尽,到 2037 年将耗尽。如果不对未来福利进行大规模削减,将目前 12.4% 的社会保障税中的任何一部分分流到个人私人计划,只会减少对现有系统的缴款水平,使报应的日子更早到来。因此,系统中的问题必须通过其他方式解决,这些方式绝无政治吸引力,其中包括:(a)采用更准确的通胀率调整,逐步降低福利增长率的过度慷慨;(b)将计算福利的年限从 35 年增加到 38 年;(c)将所有福利纳入正常税收;(d)将覆盖范围扩展到新雇用的州和地方政府雇员;(e)加快提高退休年龄。
As to the existing system, it is clearly in trouble. Given existing demographics, the revenues will begin to fall short of benefits in 2025, when the bread going out exceeds the bread coming in. Then the (nominal) fund will begin to be depleted, and will be exhausted by 2037. Absent a massive reduction in future benefits, any diversion of the present 12.4% Social Security tax to individual private plans would simply reduce the present level of contributions to the system and bring the day of retribution even closer. So, the problems in the system will have to be solved by other means that are by no means politically attractive, among them: (a) using a more accurate cost-of-living adjustment, gradually reducing the overly-generous growth rate of benefits; (b) increasing the number of years for computing benefits from 35 to 38; (c) subjecting all benefits to normal taxation; (d) extending coverage to newly-hired state and local workers; (e) accelerating the increase in the retirement age.
尽管这些步骤可能困难——甚至令人难以接受——但这样就会有足够的空间允许每年那经常被提及的 2% 自愿缴款进入自主导向计划。(丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉和罗伯特·克里参议员等人已经提出了实施这些变革的立法。)采取这些结构性变革需要勇气和决心,但没有它们,即将到来的社会保障赤字永远无法解决。记住这句老话:“你不可能从萝卜里榨出血。”
As difficult—even as unpalatable—as these steps may be, there would then be sufficient room to allow voluntary contributions into self-directed plans of that very 2% per year that is so often bruited about. (Legislation to make these very changes has already been introduced by Senators Daniel Moynihan and Robert Kerrey, and others.) It will take guts and determination to adopt these structural changes, but without them the coming Social Security shortfall will never be resolved. Remember the old adage: “You can’t get blood out of a turnip.”
构建社会保障股票账户——至于如何构建这个自愿系统,我毫无疑问哪一种方法在经济上最可行。我的关键原则:美国家庭的退休储蓄太重要了,不能委托给共同基金行业。如果金融服务公司得到这个机会来处理社会保障储蓄账户,那么这个计划,简单地说,就会失败。为什么?假设未来股票市场回报是,比如说,每年 9%。那么,用于股权计划的资金将能赚取约 5.5% 的回报。差额:投资成本。现有的全包式共同基金成本——销售费用、管理费、运营费用、投资组合交易成本,以及持有现金储备的机会成本——就像基金公司做的那样——现在每年合计至少 2.5%。再加上管理这些账户的额外费用,这些账户的余额比行业典型的要小得多,缴款也更频繁,很可能至少还要再花 1%。总成本:3.5%。这样的成本会将 9% 的股市回报降低到共同基金回报的 5.5%——甚至低于作为社会保障基金名义资产基础的国债 6% 的收益率。
Structuring Social Security Equity Accounts As to how to structure the voluntary system, I have no doubt about the most economically-feasible method. My key principle: The retirement savings of America’s families are too important to be entrusted to the mutual fund industry. If financial service firms are given this opportunity to handle Social Security savings accounts, the plan would, simply put, fail. Why? Assume that future stock market returns were, say, nine percent per year. Then, the funds used in the equity program would earn about 5 ½%. The difference: Investment costs. Existing all-in mutual fund costs—sales charges, management fees, operating expenses, the cost of portfolio transactions, and the opportunity cost of holding cash reserves—as funds do—now total at least 2 ½% per year. Fees to cover the extra costs of administering these accounts, which will have far smaller balances and more frequent contributions than are typical in the industry today, would likely cost at least another 1%. Total costs: 3 ½%. Such a cost would reduce a stock market return of 9% to a mutual fund return of 5 ½%—even less than the 6% yield of the Treasury bonds that represent the nominal asset base of the Social Security fund.
那我们该怎么办?我赞成任命一个真正独立的“社会保障储备委员会”。将政治因素从系统中剔除,这样一个委员会将创建一个全新的全股市场指数基金,归根结底,它必然提供与随机选择的数百只股票基金完全相同的市场总回报。委员会将决定是否以及如何微调投资计划(例如,是否持有烟草股票,或者投资多少外国股票,这些决策具有政治敏感性,但从长期看对经济影响不大)。社会保障参与者可以选择将当前税收缴款的 2% 转入这个全股市场基金(或一个类似的全债券市场指数基金),并且每年只有一次机会调整股票/债券配置。
So what should we do? I favor the appointment of a truly independent “Social Security Reserve Board.” Removing politics from the system, such a Board would create a new all-stock-market index fund which, after all is said and done, will necessarily provide exactly the same gross market return that hundreds of equity funds, randomly selected, will provide. The Board would decide whether and how much to fine-tune the investment program (i.e., whether to own, say, tobacco stocks, or how much to invest in foreign stocks, decisions which are politically sensitive but in the long run economically indifferent). Social Security participants would have the option to divert 2% of their present tax contribution to this all-stock-market fund (or a comparable all-bond-market index fund) and have but one opportunity per year to adjust the stock/bond allocation.
然后——这至关重要——委员会将消除共同基金行业今天提供的所有适得其反的花哨功能:没有电话查询每日价格或其他任何信息;每年一份报表,由现有的社会保障记录系统提供;退休前完全没有流动性。这样的计划可以以极低的成本来管理,当分摊到账户中数千亿的资产时,每年能赚取的不会是 5.5%,而是非常接近假设的 9% 的市场回报。结果:一个简单、真正富有成效的长期计划,专门用于社会保障的既定目的:退休。
Then—and this is vital—the Board would eliminate all of the counterproductive bells and whistles that the mutual fund industry offers today: No phone calls to check the daily price, or anything else; one statement per year, provided by the existing Social Security record-keeping system; and no liquidity whatsoever until retirement. Such a program could be administered at a minuscule cost which, when spread over the hundreds of billions of assets in the account would permit earning, not 5 ½% annually, but very close to the assumed market return of 9%. Result: A simple, truly productive long-term program, used solely for the purpose for which Social Security is intended: Retirement.
两个计划之间的财务差异有多大——一个由基金行业管理,另一个由社会保障储备委员会管理?巨大!假设一个 25 岁的年轻人年收入 2.5 万美元,基础工资每年增长 4%,在 65 岁退休,并将其社会保障缴款的 2 个百分点投资于一个股票账户。共同基金计划净回报率 5.5%:最终价值 14 万美元;年收入(按 6% 计算)8400 美元。储备委员会计划回报率 9%:最终价值 32 万美元;年收入 1.92 万美元。想想这个差异吧,完全由成本造成。真的还有选择的余地吗?
How large would the financial difference be between the two programs—one administered by the fund industry versus one administered by the Social Security Reserve Board? Enormous! Assume that a 25-year old earns $25,000 per year, with base salary growing at 4% per year, and retirement at age 65, and investing two percentage points of his or her Social Security contribution in an equity account. Mutual fund program earning a 5 ½% net return: Final value $140,000; annual income (at 6%) $8,400. Reserve Board program earning 9%: Final value, $320,000; annual income, $19,200. Just think of that difference, accounted for entirely by costs. Is there really any choice?
超出贪婪的梦想——虽然这个差异,嗯,巨大,但绝对值并不大,即使加上常规的社会保障福利也是如此。(当然,对于选择使用新计划、因此只向基本计划缴款 10.4%(而非 12.4%)工资收入的参与者来说,基本福利将会减少。)所以我预计,许多、甚至可能是大多数美国人最终会意识到他们自己有责任提供更高水平的退休收入,尤其是在我们寿命越来越长的情况下。
Beyond the Dreams of Avarice While this difference is, well, enormous, the absolute values are not huge, even when added to the regular Social Security benefits. (Of course, the basic benefits would be reduced for participants who have elected to use the new plan and thus contribute 10.4% of earnings, rather than 12.4%, to their basic program.) So I expect that many, perhaps even most, Americans will ultimately come to realize their own responsibility for providing a higher level of retirement income, especially as we live longer and longer.
实现这一目标的最佳方式,不是为部分人,而是为所有公民提供通过税收递延储蓄计划积累资本的能力。没有什么比一项结合了(a)额外投资回报,(b)税收递延,(c)和时间的投资更有效的积累资本的手段了。这正是复利的魔力被放大。这样的计划今天可以通过传统 IRA 和罗斯 IRA,以及公司利润分享计划、401(k) 节俭计划和 403(b) 教育计划获得。但所有这些都对总缴款额有严格的限制,近乎惩罚性。这些计划应该惠及更广泛的家庭,并且限制应当放宽。这样做不仅能提高我们可怜的国家储蓄率——目前处于极低水平——还能鼓励有动力的公民承担更多责任,为自己提供退休收入。然后,当我们使更多人接近自给自足的退休时,我们可以重新思考基本社会保障计划的设计和资金安排。
By far the best means of accomplishing this goal is by offering, not just some, but all, citizens the ability to accumulate capital through tax-deferred savings plans. There is simply no more effective means for the accumulation of capital than an investment that combines (a) extra investment return; (b) tax deferral; (c) and time. It is the magic of compounding writ large. Such programs are available today through traditional IRAs and Roth IRAs, and through corporate profit-sharing plans, 401(k) thrift plans and 403(b) educational plans. But all entail stringent limitations on total contributions that approach the punitive. Such plans ought to be available to a broader portion of families, and the limits ought to be relaxed. Doing so would not only increase our pathetic national savings rate—now at an extremely low level—but would also encourage motivated citizens to assume more of the responsibility for providing their own retirement income. Then, as we bring more individuals closer to self-sustained retirement, we can rethink the design and funding of the basic Social Security program.
几个世纪前,约翰逊博士说:“我们来这里不是为了卖一堆锅炉和桶,而是为了卖那种能让人富贵得超出贪婪梦想的潜力。”所以今天,我们应该“来这里不是为了卖一堆金融产品和共同基金,而是为了卖那种能让人富贵得超出贪婪梦想的退休计划。”考虑一下这个完全自愿的税收递延退休计划的潜力:再次假设一个 25 岁的年轻人初年收入 2.5 万美元,随后工资每年增长 4%,直到退休。然后假设每年向税收递延基金缴款 15%,外加公司 4% 的匹配。如果基金每年获得 9% 的回报,到 65 岁时积累的资产将达到 303 万美元。按 6% 的提取率计算,仅来自这一来源的年家庭收入总计为 18.2 万美元。即使考虑到可能的通胀,也很难想象这笔收入不能提供舒适的退休生活。
A few centuries ago, Dr. Johnson said, “we are not here to sell a parcel of boilers and vats, but the potentiality of growing rich beyond the dreams of avarice.” So today we should be here “not to sell a parcel of financial products and mutual funds, but retirement plans that offer the potentiality of growing rich beyond the dreams of avarice.” Consider this potential for a wholly voluntary tax-deferred retirement plan: Assume again that a 25-year old earns $25,000 at the outset, followed by salary increases of 4% annually until retirement. Then assume contributions of 15% per year to a tax-deferred fund, plus a 4% corporate match. If the fund earned a return of 9% per year, the accumulation at age 65 would be $3,030,000. At a 6% withdrawal rate, annual family income would total $182,000 from this source alone. Even taking possible inflation into account, it’s hard to imagine that income wouldn’t provide for a comfortable retirement.
且慢!虽然那 9% 的回报率或许(或许不)代表着股票未来合理的回报,但事实是,只有极少数投资者才能赚到并保住股市 100% 的回报。确实,所有投资者在扣除投资成本之前,必然也确实赚到了市场的总回报,同样确定的是,所有投资者必然也确实因自身的投资成本而落后于市场的总回报。而在共同基金领域,正如我之前所言,目前这一成本可以相当准确地估算为每年 2.5%。结果:在一个回报率 9% 的市场中,基金投资者实际赚到的是 6.5%。
But wait a minute! While that 9% might (or might not) represent a realistic future return on stocks, the fact is that it is a rare investor indeed who earns—and keeps—100% of the stock market’s return. Indeed it is a certainty that while all investors must and do earn the market’s gross return before the costs of investing are deducted, it is an equal certainty that all investors must and do lag the market’s gross return by the amount of their own investment costs. And in the mutual fund field, as I’ve noted in my earlier comments, that cost can presently be fairly accurately estimated at 2 1/2% per year. Result: In a 9% market, fund investors would earn 6 ½%.
这个看似微小的年度回报差异,对长期财富积累却意味着天壤之别。“富裕”或许仍然可达,但仿佛变戏法一般,“贪婪也难以企及”这一项却被抹去了。137 万美元凭空消失,因为赚取 6.5% 回报率的账户最终价值为 166 万美元,而赚取市场 9% 回报率的账户则为 303 万美元。原因何在?因为当复利回报的魔力持续膨胀你的累积资本时,复利成本的暴政却给你的财富增长潜力浇了一盆冷水。
That seemingly small difference in annual return makes an enormous difference in long-term wealth accumulation. “Rich” may still be there, but, as if by sleight-of-hand, “beyond the dreams of avarice” is deleted. $1,370,000 mysteriously vanishes, since the account earning 6 ½% has a final value of $1,660,000, compared with $3,030,000 for the account earning the market’s 9% return. Why? Because while the magic of compounding returns has continued to balloon the accumulated capital, the tyranny of compounding costs has thrown a wet blanket over your wealth-building potential.
获取股市回报——而且实现起来很容易,只需有效最小化(事实上几乎是中和)投资成本:拥有整个股票市场,没有销售佣金,没有机会成本,运营成本极低,且几乎没有交易成本——这几乎可以保证你获得接近市场 100% 的回报。这样一个延税的计划,如果被美国数百万家庭中的大多数所采纳,将开始把联邦政府提供退休收入的责任转交给个人。实现这一目标只需要:(a)适度放宽缴款限额;(b)投资者拥有做出充分知情投资选择的智慧和能力,尤其是对成本的了解。你需要认识到突出复利的正面(魔力)和消除成本的负面(暴政)的价值,这样才能更好地实现股市的回报。
Garnering the Stock Market’s Return And it’s easy to do, simply by effectively minimizing—indeed almost neutralizing—the costs of investing by owning the entire stock market without sales commissions, without opportunity costs, with minimal operating costs, and with substantially no transaction costs—a virtual guarantee that you will garner a return that is close to 100% of the market’s return. Such a tax-deferred plan, held by most of the millions of America’s families, would begin to turn over to the individual the Federal government’s responsibility for providing retirement income. Accomplishing this goal requires only (a) some liberalization of contribution limits; and (b) the wisdom and ability of investors to make fully informed investment choices, in particular, knowledge about costs. You need to realize the merits of accentuating the positive (magic) of compounding and eliminating the negative (tyranny) of costs, the better to achieve the stock market’s return.
考虑到我在开始时表达的关于“面包与马戏”对我们社会长期影响的担忧,以及我对股市短期内巨大风险的担忧,你可能会奇怪我怎么可能赞同长期持有股票。答案很简单。纵观其历史,美国面临过严峻的挑战——战争、大萧条、分裂、犯罪、毒品、种族不公、教育水平下降,仅举几例——我们一直努力克服它们,有时成功,有时速度慢得惊人。今天的问题,即使不是在重复过去,也无疑与导致罗马帝国衰亡的那些问题押着相同的韵脚。但是,如果有一个开明且具有觉悟的公民群体,由具备乔治·华盛顿、托马斯·杰斐逊、亚伯拉罕·林肯、西奥多·罗斯福和伍德罗·威尔逊所展现的道德价值观和理想主义美德的新领袖所引领,美国就能够并且将会迎接她的挑战。我们一向如此。
Given my concerns about the long-term implications of “bread and circuses” on our society, expressed at the outset, and my concerns about the substantial near-term risks in the stock market, you may wonder how I can possibly countenance owning stocks for the long run. The answer is straightforward. Throughout her history, America has faced serious challenges—wars, depressions, disunity, crime, drugs, racial injustice, and faltering educational standards, to name just a few—and we have always striven to overcome them—sometimes with success, sometimes far too slowly. Today’s problems, if they aren’t repeating the past, surely seem to rhyme with those that led to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. But if an enlightened and aware citizenry—led by new leaders with the kind of moral values and idealistic virtues manifested by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson—America can and will meet her challenges. We always have.
此外,请永远不要忘记,我可能夸大了当今金融体系中面包与马戏的问题。连吉本都警告说:“人性中存在着一种强烈的倾向,即贬低当下的优势,夸大当下的弊端。” 也许我就是这么做的。股市虽然今天看似面临着超乎寻常的短期风险,但从长远来看,它极其理性。正是投资的实质——企业盈利和股息——让投资变得如此富有成效。阻碍投资者利用这些富有成效的经济实体的,是投资中适得其反的情绪,因为我们把股票交易的价格推得过高,然后又压得过低。请记住这一点:投资会成功。投机终将失败。
Also, never forget that I may exaggerate the problems of bread and circuses in our financial system today. Even Gibbon warned that, “there exists in human nature a strong propensity to depreciate the advantages, and to magnify the evils, of the present times.” And perhaps I’ve done just that. The stock market, while it seems to face outsized short-term risks today, in the long run it is brutally rational. It is the economics of investing—corporate earnings and dividends—that make investing so productive. What gets in the way of investors in capitalizing on those productive economics are the counterproductive emotions of investing, as we drive the prices at which stocks change hands far too high, and then far too low. Just remember this: Investment succeeds. Speculation fails.
今天股市中的投机无疑会得到纠正,因为所有的泡沫迟早都会破裂。但投资者应该预料到,在我退休计划案例中提及的 40 年时间跨度内,由情绪驱动的疯狂市场波动将继续是投资中司空见惯的现象。定期投资于高度分散化的投资组合(全市场指数基金是你能在美国股票中获得的最大程度分散化),无论市场好坏,保持低成本,这是将情绪从投资中剥离并利用我们经济生产力的最佳方式。所以,从根本上思考,思考分散化,保持乐观,着眼长远,并且始终确保坚持下去。
Today’s speculation in the stock market will doubtless be corrected, for, sooner or later, all bubbles burst. But investors should expect that, over the 40-year horizon that I presented in my retirement plan examples, wild and wooly market swings driven by emotions will continue to be endemic to investing. Regular investing in highly-diversified investment portfolios—and the all-market index fund is as diversified as you can get in U. S. stocks—through thick and thin, and at low cost, is the best way to take our emotions out of investing and capitalize on the productivity of our economy. So think fundamentally, think diversification, think positive, think long-term, and be sure, always, to stay the course.
你将获得丰厚回报。
You’ll be well-rewarded.
注:本演讲中表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团当前管理层的看法。© 版权所有 2000 约翰·C·博格
Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management. © Copyright 2000 by John C. Bogle