完美计划的梦想
完美规划之梦
——先锋集团创始人约翰·C·博格尔主题演讲
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投资论坛暨博览会
《亚利桑那共和报》
亚利桑那州坦佩
2000 年 3 月 18 日
早上好。来到凤凰城真是太棒了,因为此时我已进入共同基金行业的第 51 个年头——尽管这连我自己都难以置信。一切都始于 1949 年 12 月,我在《财富》杂志上读到一篇题为“波士顿的大钱”的文章,它启发我在普林斯顿大学的毕业论文中写下了“投资公司的经济角色”。1951 年毕业后,我加入了这一行业,并一直参与其中,最终领导了最初加入的那家基金管理公司。可惜,1974 年初,我被解雇了,这直接导致了我在 1974 年 9 月(也就是 25 年多前)创立先锋集团。这是一段激动人心的历程,我可以向你保证,终点还远未到来。
The Dream of A Perfect Plan Keynote Speech by John C. Bogle Founder, The Vanguard Group The Investment Forum and Expo The Arizona Republic Tempe, AZ March 18, 2000 Good morning. It’s wonderful to be here in Phoenix, as I begin my 51st year, hard as it is for me to believe, in the mutual fund field industry. It all began when I read an article about mutual funds entitled “Big Money in Boston” in Fortune Magazine in December 1949, which inspired me to write my senior thesis at Princeton University on “The Economic Role of the Investment Company.” When I graduated in 1951, I joined the industry and have been part of it ever since, ultimately heading up the fund management company that I’d joined at the outset. Alas, early in 1974, I was fired, which led directly to my founding of Vanguard in September 1974, just over 25 years ago. It’s been a thrilling run, and I assure you the end is not in sight.
多年来,我愈发认同克劳塞维茨的一句格言:“一个出色计划的最大敌人,是追求完美计划的幻想。”在本次主题演讲中,我将围绕这一观点,探讨在 2000 年乃至新千年“赚钱”所面临的挑战。我的主题将呼应这样一个事实:今天,我们所有人都在努力进行明智投资,但必须面对——动荡的金融市场;日益成为地球村一部分的美国经济;以及信息科技与通信革命带来的深远影响——这场革命正将我们快速推向一个真正的新纪元。
Over the years, I’ve come to respect Von Clausewitz’ epigram, “the greatest enemy of a good plan is the dream of a perfect plan.” I’ll use that theme in this keynote speech as we consider the challenges of “Making Money” in year 2000 and in the new millennium. My theme will echo the fact that today all of us are trying to invest intelligently, as we consider our volatile financial markets; our U.S. economy, each day becoming more a part of the global village; and the implications of our revolution in information technology and communications that is speeding us into a truly new era.
在市场如此狂热的这些日子里,制定一项明智的投资计划,看上去既复杂又令人困惑。你肯定会想,在股票、债券、现金,甚至其他类别的资产之间,到底该如何配置资产才是最佳方式?一旦做出这些决定,又该如何执行你的计划?共同基金应该扮演什么角色?从当今存在的 7500 只基金中,你该选择哪一只?这些都是艰难的决定,尤其是因为当今的投资世界也许正处在一个某种意义上的拐点。预判拐点从来都不容易。但我会尽力提供帮助。
In these wild days in the markets, deciding on an intelligent investment plan must seem both complex and confusing. What, you must wonder, is the best way to allocate your assets among stocks and bonds and cash, and even other kinds of assets? Once you make those decisions, how do you implement your plan? What role should mutual funds play? Which funds should you select from among the 7,500 that exist today? These are all tough decisions, especially since the world of investing may now be at a sort of inflection point. It is never easy to see around corners. But I’ll try to help.
在这次会议上,你会接触到很多应对这些复杂性和不确定性的常识性观点,我建议你认真思考它们。我猜你也会听到不少想法,至少不符合我对常识的理解——我建议你直接忽略它们,忽略程度与它们的复杂程度、音量分贝以及倡导者信誓旦旦保证结果有利的固执程度成正比。避开那些看似为永恒复杂问题提供诱人简易解决方案的复杂策略。但我要提醒你,复杂方案——我们不妨称之为“巫术”——似乎总能给出完美计划,却极少兑现承诺的美梦。更有甚者,复杂本身代价高昂。相比之下,一个好计划的简单性不仅可以有效运作,而且经济划算。好计划之所以奏效,并非因为不贵,而恰恰是因为它便宜。
In this conference, you’ll be exposed to a lot of common sense ideas for dealing with these complexities and uncertainties, and I urge you to consider them with care. I imagine you’ll also hear many ideas that don’t comport with at least my concept of common sense, and I urge you to disregard each one of them in direct proportion to its complexity, its decibel level, and the conviction of its advocates that a favorable outcome is assured. Avoid complex strategies that seem to provide temptingly easy solutions to eternally complex problems. But I warn you that complex solutions—let’s call them “witchcraft”—always seem to offer a perfect plan, but rarely deliver on the promised dream. What is more, complexity is expensive. The simplicity of a good plan, on the other hand, can work not only effectively, but economically. The good plan works, not despite being inexpensive, but because it is inexpensive.
资产配置
我今天发言的重点是股票型共同基金,但我想先简单谈谈资产配置,因为这是你必须做出的最重要的投资决策之一。虽然存在一些复杂的系统,能提供精确的公式来实现完美的资产配置计划,但一个好的资产配置计划,只是假设这些投资中的细微差别是无法预测的。好的计划主要依赖于股票和债券之间简单直白的传统平衡。每一类配置多少?一如既往,你的投资平衡必须很大程度上取决于你自身的需求和境况。通常来说,配置比例可能从最粗略的比如,对于已经积累了大量资本、达到正常退休年龄且需要提取收入、风险承受能力中等偏上的年长投资者,可能配置 50% 股票和 50% 债券。或者,对于刚开始在 401(k) 退休计划中积累第一笔投资、距离依赖收入还有数十年之久的年轻而自信的投资者,可以配置 100% 股票。简而言之,明智的资产配置是以下因素的必然不完美的组合:(1)你剩余积累财富的年数,(2)你的资产规模,(3)你需要的收入,以及(4)坚持自己设定目标的勇气。在一个充满不确定性的世界里——而且永远如此——让你的配置大致正确,比精确地犯错要好。
Asset Allocation My remarks today will focus on equity mutual funds, but I want to begin with a brief word about asset allocation, for it is one of the most important investment decisions you must make. While there are complex systems that offer precise formulas for implementing the perfect asset allocation plan, the good asset allocation plan simply assumes that these nuances of investing are unpredictable. The good plan relies primarily on a straightforward and conventional balance between stocks and bonds. How much in each category? As ever, your investment balance must depend largely on your own needs and circumstances. Typically, the allocation might range from something as crude as, say, 50% in stocks and 50% in bonds for older, moderately risk-averse investors who have accumulated substantial capital, have reached normal retirement age, and need to draw down income. Or up to 100% stocks for young, confident investors who are just beginning to accumulate their first investments in a 401(k) retirement plan, and have scores of years before income will be an issue. In short, intelligent asset allocation is an inevitably imperfect combination of (1) the years you have remaining to accumulate wealth, (2) the amount of your assets, (3) the income you require, and (4) the courage to stay the course you have set for yourself. In an uncertain world—and it will be ever thus—getting your allocation almost right is better than getting it precisely wrong.
自去年秋天以来,股票这个词本身也仅仅是一种粗略的现实写照,因为各类股票之间的分化之大,在我漫长的职业生涯中前所未有。想一想:在股市整体上涨 15% 的背景下,标普 500 指数上涨 6%,中盘股和小盘股上涨 47%,纳斯达克指数上涨 72%,而道琼斯指数实际上下跌了 4%。尽管如此,在这个充满不确定性的世界里,高度分散的股票组合仍然是股票配置最明智的选择,而一旦你决定了这样的配置,我敦促你坚持自己设定的道路。
Since last autumn, moreover, the very term stock has been but a crude approximation of reality, for the dichotomy among the various types of stocks has been as large as I can recall in my long career. Consider that with the total stock market up 15%, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index is up 6%, mid- and small-cap stocks up 47%, the NASDAQ Index up 72%, and the Dow Jones average actually down 4%. Nonetheless, in an uncertain world, a highly-diversified stock portfolio remains the most sensible choice for the stock allocation, and once you’ve decided on this allocation I urge you to stay the course you have set for yourself.
为什么不去尝试把握市场时机?因为市场时机根本无法成功把握。情绪会驱使你在乐观与亢奋时增加股票持仓(这正是股价过高的原因),在悲观与恐惧时减少股票持仓(这正是股价过低的原因)。但在价格高企时增加股票配置,在价格低迷时减少股票配置,这完全适得其反。更糟糕的是,受当时情绪裹挟,大多数投资者在考虑改变资产配置时,并未意识到这仅仅是两步决策中的第一步。例如,假设近期市场动荡让你决定将股票持仓从资产的 60% 降至 40%。那么接下来该怎么做?这完全取决于两种情况:你可能做对了,也可能做错了。
Why not try to time the market? Because market timing cannot be done successfully. Emotions lead you to increase your stock holdings when you’re optimistic and ebullient (that’s why stocks get too high), and to reduce your stock holdings when you’re pessimistic and scared (that’s why stocks get too low). But increasing your stock allocation when prices are high and reducing it when prices are low is completely counterproductive. What is more, captured by the emotions of the day, most investors consider changing their allocations without recognizing that that it only one step in a two-step process. Assume for example, that the recent market turbulence convinces you to reduce your stock holdings, say, from 60% of assets to 40%. What do you do next? It all depends. For there are only two possibilities: You could be right. Or you could be wrong.
· 如果你判断对了呢?市场下跌 25%。你会恢复你最初的仓位吗?大概率不会。你担心它会继续下跌。那要是下跌 50% 呢?“这次会,”你说。我表示怀疑。因为当道指跌到 4900 点时,你已经吓得半死。所以,即使你判断对了,如果你始终没有再进场,结果你还是错了。
· 如果你判断错了呢?市场上涨 25%。你会买回来吗?大概率不会。你希望它能跌回去,这样你就能不受惩罚地重新入市。下跌 50%?不。你确信自己关于市场即将下跌的判断是对的,你仍然期待时间会验证你的判断。但当市场出现了你未曾预料到的 100% 上涨时,你最终屈服于狂热,恢复了最初 60% 的股票仓位。我敢说,你做出这个决定的当天,恰恰是你回到股市的那一天,也恰恰是它创下历史新高的那一天。第一次是错的,而第二次错得更离谱!
What if you’re right? The market drops 25%. Do you restore your original balance? Probably not. You fear that it will go down further. What about a 50% drop? “Now,” you say. I doubt it. For with the Dow at 4900, you’re scared to death. So even though you were right, you end up being wrong if you never get back in. What if you’re wrong? The market rises 25%. Do you buy back in? Probably not. You hope that it will fall back so you can reinvest without penalty. A 50% drop? No. You’re confident you’re right about the coming decline, and you still hope that time will validate your judgement. But when the market rise you didn’t expect reaches 100%, you finally succumb to the mania and restore your original 60% equity position. The day that you do this, I’d venture to say, will bring you back into the stock market on the very day it reaches its all time high. Wrong first, and then really wrong the second time around!
在金融市场上要两次判断正确,简而言之几乎是不可能的。更好的做法是享受股票投资的长期与生产性经济收益——即稳定且随时间增长的盈利与股息——同时忽略股票投资中的短期且起反作用的情绪波动,这种情绪主要体现为市盈率的疯狂涨跌,常常无明显理由。要保护自己免受这些反作用情绪的伤害,最佳策略是根据我先前列举的四个因素,将你的资产配置设定在一个适合你的水平。然后,只有当这些因素中的任何一个发生变化时,才进行调整。简而言之,遵循投资史上最审慎的一条规则:坚持到底。
Being right twice in the financial markets, in short, is virtually impossible. Better to enjoy the long-run and productive economics of equity investing—earnings and dividends, stable and growing over time— and ignore the short run and counterproductive emotions of equity investing—essentially encapsulated in price-earnings multiples that surge madly to and fro, often for little obvious reason. To protect yourself from these counterproductive emotions, the best strategy is to set your asset allocation at a level that is right for you, taking into account each of the four factors I enumerated earlier. And then change it only if any of those factors change. In short, follow the most careful single rule of investing ever expressed: Stay the course.
事实是,我们对股票未来能带来多少回报知之甚少。但我们的确知道,必须主要依靠股票实现资本增值、依靠债券获取收入,而且必须认识到股票蕴含着巨大风险。尽管对我们这个生产力非凡的经济体而言,这确实是一个新时代,但我并不相信股市也迎来了新时代。旧有的市场范式——围绕希望、恐惧和贪婪展开——是永恒的,而投资者这些常常适得其反的情绪是一股强大的市场力量。所以,无论你读到多少关于普通股历史回报率的文章,我向你保证,由经济与情绪双重驱动的股票市场,根本不是一张精算表。千万别用惨痛的教训来领悟这一点!
The fact is that we know little about the future returns that stocks will provide. But we do know that we must rely primarily on stocks for capital appreciation and on bonds for income, and we have to realize that stocks involve substantial risks. While this is indeed a new era for our remarkably productive economy, I do not believe that it is a new era for the stock market. The old market paradigm—revolving around hope, fear, and greed—is eternal, and the often counterproductive emotions of investors are a powerful market force. So, no matter what you read about the historical returns of common stocks, I assure you that the stock market, driven as it is by both economics and emotions, is not an actuarial table. Please don’t learn that the hard way!
投资股票配置:尽管当前市场估值处于令人陶醉的高位,你的组合中普通股部分仍是长期积累资本唯一明智的途径。因此问题变为:哪些股票型共同基金能最有效地帮你增值?最理想的方案是找到一只或多只基金,其收益可能显著超越股市整体。历史经验告诉我们,确实有一些共同基金跑赢了市场。但同样那段历史也表明,提前选对赢家是概率极低的事。30 年前,只有 355 只股票型基金,其中整整 189 只——超过一半!——连存续下来都未能做到。仅有 14 只基金跑赢了股市整体的回报(跑赢幅度微乎其微,不过一两个百分点)。也就是说,在税前基础上,基金投资者仅有 1/25 的概率能显著超越市场回报。
Investing the Stock Allocation Despite today’s heady valuations, the common stock portion of your allocation remains the only sensible approach to building your capital over the long-term. So the question becomes: Which equity mutual funds will build your capital with the greatest effectiveness? The perfect plan would be to identify one or more mutual funds that may provide a return significantly greater than that of the stock market. And the lesson of history shows us that some mutual funds have in fact outpaced the market. But that lesson also shows us that there are long odds against selecting the winners in advance. Thirty years ago, there were but 355 stock funds, and fully 189—more than half!—failed even to survive the period. Only 14 funds beat (by as little as a single percentage point) the return on the stock market as a whole. That is, on a pre-tax basis, the fund investor had only one chance out of 25 to surpass the market’s return by a significant margin.
其他基金表现如何?有 53 只基金的收益率与市场相差在 1 个百分点以内,属于统计噪声,反映的是市场平均回报。剩下的 97 只基金落后市场至少 1 个百分点——每出现 1 只赢家,就有 7 只输家,而且输得还更惨。整整 27 只基金的年回报比市场低超过 3 个百分点,而高出市场同样幅度的基金只有 1 只。通过挑选赢家基金来执行一个完美计划的成功概率不仅极低,失败的惩罚也格外沉重。
What about the others? Well, 53 came within a single percentage point above or below the market, statistical noise that reflects a market-equivalent return. That left 97 funds one percentage point or more behind the market, seven losers for each winner, and bigger losers at that. Fully 27 funds fell short of the market by more than three percentage points per year compared to only a single fund that out-gained the market by that amount. Not only are the odds against implementing a perfect plan by selecting winning funds long, but the penalties for failure are disproportionately large.
为什么这些共同基金如此难以做到仅仅跟上股市的回报率?要回答这个问题,我只需指出一点:除了唯一的一个方面之外,股票市场本质上就是一个赌场。在我们熟悉的赌场里,赌博是一场零和游戏。一个赌徒的损失就是另一个赌徒的收益——直到庄家从赌注中抽走他们的份额。轮盘赌桌和赛马场都是如此。一旦庄家抽成落地,赌场就是一场输家的游戏。投资者在赌场里待得越久,他最终被彻底消灭的确定性就越大。
Why was it so difficult for these mutual funds to merely match the return of the stock market? To answer that question, I need only point out that, in all respects save one, the stock market is a gambling casino. In the casino with which we are familiar, gambling is a zero-sum game. One gambler’s loss is another’s gain—until the croupiers rake off their share of the wagers. It is true at the roulette tables and at the racetrack alike. After the croupiers’ rakes descend, the casino is a loser’s game. The longer the investor stays in the gambling casino, the greater the certainty that he will, finally, be wiped out.
股票市场这个赌场又有什么不同呢?唯一的区别在于:投资股票并非零和游戏,而是正和游戏——至少在历史上大部分时间里是如此。随着美国企业的盈利能力和增长,股价多年来稳步上涨。然而,每一天,专业投资者和业余投资者都在相互交易。当卖方获胜时,买方就亏损,反之亦然。因此,在股票市场中,所有投资者获得的回报必然趋于平均,而战胜市场是一场零和游戏。但是,就像在普通赌场里一样,只有在庄家抽走他们的份额之前,它才是零和游戏。在那之后,投资者作为一个群体必然、也确实会落后于市场的回报率。战胜市场同样是一场输家的游戏。
What is different in the stock market casino? Only that investing in equities is not a zero-sum game, but a positive-sum game. Or at least it has been during most of past history. With the profitability and growth of corporate America, stock prices have risen steadily over the years. Yet each day, investment professionals and amateurs alike are trading with one another. When the seller wins, the buyer loses, and vice versa. So in the stock market, the returns earned by all investors are inevitably average, and beating the market is a zero-sum game. But, just as in the regular casino, it is only a zero-sum game until the croupiers rake off their shares. Then, investors as a group must, and do, fall short of the market’s return. Beating the market, too, is a loser’s game.
股票市场这个赌场里有大量的庄家。基金经理和运营者;销售基金份额的推销员;执行基金投资组合交易的经纪商。甚至联邦政府也跻身庄家之列,因为基金投资组合的换手会产生已实现的资本利得,从而产生税收。鉴于所有这些从市场回报中扣除的项目,一个好的计划依赖于一条令人惊讶却又显而易见的衡量投资成功的法则。投资的核心任务是实现你投资的金融资产类别中年回报率的尽可能高的份额——同时要认识并接受,这个份额将低于 100%。
There are lots of croupiers in the stock market casino. Fund managers and operators; salesmen who sell fund shares; investment brokers who execute fund portfolio transactions. Even the Federal Government finds itself among the croupiers, for fund portfolio turnover generates realized capital gains, and therefore taxes. Given all of these subtractions from the market’s return, the good plan relies on this surprising, if obvious, rule for measuring investment success. The central task of investing is to realize the highest possible portion of the annual rate of return earned in the financial asset class in which you invest—recognizing, and accepting, that that portion will be less than 100%.
让我来解释一下。从数学上讲,所有投资者作为一个群体达成年股市回报率的 100%,这是根本不可能的——这在定义上就是矛盾的。是的,确实有可能选到那些成功获得——比如说——股市年回报率 105% 的基金。但如前所述,这样做的胜算大约是 25 比 1。此外,历史还告诉我们,可能的结果是,普通基金只能获得大约 80% 的市场回报。如果这是离经叛道,那就随它去吧。但基金股东作为一个群体确实面临着这样的缺口,而认识到这一事实是制定一个良好的股票投资计划的第一步。
Let me explain. It is simply a mathematical impossibility—a definitional contradiction—for all investors as a group to reach 100% of the stock market’s annual return. Yes, it is possible to select funds that succeed in earning, say, 105% of the market’s annual return. But the odds against doing so are about 25 to one as I noted earlier. Further, history also tells us that the probable outcome is that the average fund will earn only about 80% of the market return. If this is iconoclasm, so be it. But fund shareholders as a group face just such a shortfall, and recognizing that fact is the first step toward developing a good plan for equity investing.
有一个最优的——也是显而易见的——方法来接近 100% 的目标:只是拥有整个市场。这很简单。一只全股票市场指数基金,实质上拥有美国每一家上市公司的股份,并持有这些股份直至公司存续期满。通过大幅削减庄家的抽成,这种所有权的成本极低:没有咨询费;没有销售费用;几乎没有投资组合换手,因此交易成本极低,实现的资本利得很少,税收也极少。全市场指数基金是庄家的噩梦,却是投资者的美梦。那么,最简单的股票投资方法,就是仅仅投资于一只全市场股票指数基金的份额——仅此一只基金。这是一个好计划。而且它很有效,通常能产生超过市场税前回报率 98% 的收益。
There is an optimal—and obvious—way to closely approach the 100% target: Simply own the market. It is easy. An all-stock-market index fund, in substance, owns shares in every publicly-held business in America, and holds it for as long as the business exists. By slashing the croupiers’ take, such ownership is available at extremely low cost: No advisory fee; no sales charges; virtually no portfolio turnover and therefore nominal transaction costs, few realized gains, and minimal taxes. The all-market index fund is the croupier’s dark nightmare, and the investor’s bright dream. The simplest of all approaches to equity investing, then, is to invest solely in the shares of a single all-market equity index fund—just one fund. It is a good plan. And it works, regularly producing more than 98% of the market’s pre-tax return.
但我是一个现实主义者。我认识到,在现实世界中,太多人性的特质会妨碍采用这种简单、包罗万象的指数基金方法。“我聪明到不需要它;”你可能会想。“即使游戏代价高昂,它也很好玩。”“不可能这么简单。”这些是投资者脑海中过于常见的陈词滥调——我是在说你们吗?——这些人选择依赖于完全由主动管理型基金来执行其投资策略的传统策略。对于共同基金投资者来说,在寻找未来能战胜市场的基金时,总是“希望源源不绝”。但亚历山大·蒲柏的完整对句是:“希望源源不绝,永驻人类心田;人不会幸福,却永远期盼幸福。”正如完美计划的梦想几乎不可能成为现实一样,对幸福的预期也必然无法实现。
But I’m a realist. I recognize that in the real world, lots of all-too-human traits get in the way of a simple, all-encompassing index fund approach. “I’m too smart for that;” you may think. “Even if the game is expensive, it’s fun.” “It can’t be that simple.” These are the all-too-common refrains in the minds of investors—am I speaking for you?—who choose to pursue the conventional strategy of relying entirely on actively-managed funds to implement their investment strategies. For mutual fund investors, “hope springs eternal” in the search for funds that will beat the market in the future. But Alexander Pope’s full couplet reads: “Hope springs eternal in the human breast; Man never is, but ever to be blest.” Just as the dream of the perfect plan has little chance of coming reality, so the anticipation of being blessed inevitably falls short of the realization.
导致投资者忽视指数化这一好计划的主要因素,不仅是因为它很乏味——市场回报,嗯,只是市场回报而已——还因为指数策略看起来很蠢。从某种意义上说,当然,它确实很蠢。但事实证明,愚蠢的策略却能带来明智,甚至是辉煌的决策。听听沃伦·巴菲特在这个主题上的观点:“通过定期投资于指数基金……一个一无所知的投资者实际上可以胜过大多数投资专业人士。矛盾的是,当‘笨钱’承认自己的局限性时,它就不再是笨钱了。”
The main factor that causes investors to ignore the good plan of indexing is not only that it is boring—the market return is only, well, the market return—but that the index strategy seems dumb. In a sense, of course, it is. But as it turns out, the dumb strategy leads to a smart, even brilliant, decision. Hear Warren Buffett on this subject: “By periodically investing in an index fund . . . the know-nothing investor can actually out-perform most investment professionals. Paradoxically, when “dumb” money acknowledges its limitations, it ceases to be dumb.”
那么,指数基金策略是一个好计划——也许是我们这些凡夫俗子所能获得的最佳计划。但它不一定是最佳计划。尽管挑选出一只优秀基金的概率一直很低,但并非不可逾越。在某个十年里,可能大约有五分之一的基金(税前)跑赢了市场。而且,有一些简单的常识性原则应该能够帮助你选出那些能获得市场回报率相当大份额的基金,尽管它们也很可能达不到 100% 的份额。如果说战胜市场的成功几率渺茫,那么至少,明智地进行基金挑选能够帮助你避免重大失败。因此,让我给你八条可能有助于你做到这一点的规则。
The index fund strategy, then, is a good plan—maybe even the best plan available to most of us mere mortals. But it is not necessarily the best plan. While the odds against picking a superior mutual fund have been powerful, they have not been insurmountable. In a given decade, perhaps one fund in five has beaten the market (before taxes). And there are some simple common sense principles that should help you to select funds that can earn a generous portion of the market’s return, although they too are all too likely to fall short of 100%. If there are long odds against success in outpacing the market, at least going about the task of fund selection intelligently can help you to insure against a major failure. So let me give you eight rules that may help you to do just that.
规则 1:选择费用率低的基金。我说“成本至关重要”已经很久了,以至于我们一只基金的投资组合经理送给我一块有机玻璃柱,上面刻着拉丁文翻译:Pretium Refert(成本至关重要)。但成本确实至关重要,其影响在未来几年可能会越来越大。因为支付给基金经理这些庄家的费用和运营成本,是导致典型共同基金落后于股票市场的主要原因。例如,行业估计 2.5% 的年化全部成本,将会消耗掉 15% 市场回报中的整整 17%,只给你留下 83%。但当回报率回归到较低水平时,情况会更糟。同样的成本将消耗掉 10% 市场回报中的 25%。如果情况真的变得非常艰难,比如在 5% 的市场回报率环境下,2.5% 的基金成本将没收市场回报率的整整 50%,只给投资者留下 50%——这与好计划中 100% 的理想目标相去甚远。所以,选择费用率低的基金。
Rule 1. Select Funds With Low Expense Ratios I’ve said “costs matter” for so long that the portfolio manager for one of our funds gave me a Plexiglas pillar with the Latin translation: Pretium Refert. But costs do matter, and their impact will likely grow in importance in the years ahead. For the fees and operating costs paid to fund manager-croupiers are responsible for a major share of the shortfall of the typical mutual fund to the stock market. The industry’s estimated 2½% annual all-in cost, for example, would consume fully 17% of a market return of 15%, leaving 83% for you. But as returns revert to lower levels, it gets worse. That same cost would consume 25% of a market return of 10%. And if the going got really tough, say, in a 5% market, fund costs of 2½% would confiscate fully 50% of the market return, leaving only 50% for the investor— a far cry from the 100% desideratum of the good plan. So select funds with low expense ratios.
规则 2:重视换手率低的基金。一旦你的钱投进一只基金,下一个庄家的抽成就开始了。大多数基金都在不停地买入然后卖出证券,然后又卖出、买入,循环往复。信不信由你,去年基金投资组合的换手率飙升至 90% 的历史新高。普通基金持有一只普通股的平均时间只有 406 天——这个持有期更像是短期投机,而非长期投资,而在不远的过去,长期投资可是这个行业的全部意义所在。由经纪商、投资银行家和交易员挥舞的抽成耙子,每年通常会消耗掉基金回报率的 0.5% 到 1%。
Rule 2. Emphasize Funds with Low Portfolio Turnover Once your money is invested in a fund, the next croupier’s rake begins to sweep. Most funds continue to buy and then sell securities unremittingly, and then sell them and buy them over and over again. Believe it or not, fund portfolio turnover rose to an all-time high of 90% last year. The average fund held onto the average stock for just 406 days—a holding period far more akin to short-term speculation than to long term investing, which, not so many years ago, is what this industry was all about. The rake wielded by the brokers, investment bankers, and traders typically consumes ½% to 1% of fund returns each year.
如此高的换手率,部分源于那些过度活跃的投资组合经理的交易行为,他们无法安静地坐在房间里,急于在同僚中取得业绩优势,无论这种追求多么徒劳。但经理本身的更替也会造成换手。很多时候,当一位经理离职时,新经理会大刀阔斧地重新洗牌,重新调整投资组合以符合自己的策略。信不信由你,共同基金经理的平均任期只有五年。所以,你不仅要关注基金的换手率,还要留意它更换经理的倾向,有时甚至是一有风吹草动就换人。尽你所能,去寻找那些投资组合和投资组合经理都会坚持原定策略的基金。
This high turnover is in part the product of trading by hyperactive portfolio managers, unable to sit quietly in a room and anxious to garner a performance edge on their peers, however fruitless the quest. But there is also turnover among the managers themselves. All too often when a manager departs, the new manager’s broom sweeps clean, as he reorders the portfolio to comport with his own strategies. Believe it or not, the average mutual fund manager lasts just five years. So be aware, not only of a fund’s turnover rate, but its propensity to change managers around, sometimes at the drop of a hat. Do your best to find funds both with portfolio holdings and portfolio managers that will stay the course.
3:认识到税收也是基金成本。基金赌场里还有第三位庄家。在这个牛市时代,它恰好是所有庄家中最贪婪的一个:联邦政府。别搞错了,山姆大叔热爱共同基金行业,因为通过征收已实现资本利得的税收,它帮助平衡了预算。急躁、激进的基金经理以疯狂的速度买卖股票,几乎完全不顾这种活动将要求你支付多少税款。他们可以忽视税收,但你不行。
3. Realize that Taxes are Fund Costs, Too There is yet a third croupier in the fund casino. And in this bull market era, it happens to be the greediest croupier of them all: The Federal Government. Make no mistake about it, Uncle Sam loves the mutual fund industry, for it helps balance his budget by generating all those taxes on realized gains. Impatient, aggressive fund managers buy and sell stocks at a furious rate and pay virtually no attention whatsoever to the taxes such activity will require you to pay. They can ignore taxes, but you can’t.
递延税款具有巨大的价值——并且要尽可能长时间地递延它们。你今天缴纳的税款无法在明天为你复利。你递延的每一美元资本利得,都相当于联邦政府提供的一笔无息贷款,事实上,这是一笔在你决定之前都不需要偿还的贷款,而且甚至更好(在某种意义上!)是一笔在你去世时会被完全免除的贷款。然而,基金经理不仅要求你提前支付长期资本利得 20% 的税,他们还实现了约三分之一的短期资本利得,迫使你以最高可达 40% 的股息收入税率纳税。因此,要寻找税收效率高的基金。
There is awesome value in deferring taxes—and deferring them for as long as you can. Taxes you pay today cannot compound to your benefit tomorrow. Each dollar of capital gain you defer is equivalent to an interest-free loan from the Federal Government, indeed a loan that needs not be repaid until you decide, and, even better (in a sense!), a loan that is totally forgiven on your death. Yet fund managers not only require you to prematurely pay the 20% tax on long-term capital gains, they also realize some one-third of all capital gains on a short-term basis, forcing you to pay taxes at rates up to the 40% maximum on dividend income. So seek tax-efficient funds.
4:谨慎为基金选择建议付费。许多投资者在选择基金和资产配置时需要明智的建议——但许多人并不需要。如果你确信自己不需要建议,那么为此付费是不明智的,无论是以前端销售佣金的形式,还是包含在基金费用中的 12b-1 销售费,或者是支付给注册投资顾问和理财规划师的费用。唉,有些基金顾问显然是挥舞着大耙子的庄家。不然怎么解释共同基金公司每年总共花费高达 10 亿美元——来自他们股东来之不易的钱——用于你在电视上持续看到的广告宣传活动?那些营销人员花的钱是你的,不是用来帮助你,而是为了吸引新投资者。仔细考虑一下,你是否希望自己的资产被用于这个目的。
4. Be Careful About What You Pay for Fund Selection Advice Many investors need sensible advice in fund selection and asset allocation—and many do not. If you are convinced you do not need advice, it is unwise to pay for it, either in the form of front-end sales commissions, or 12b-1 sales fees included in a fund’s expense, or fees paid to registered investment advisers and financial planners. Alas, some fund advisers are clearly croupiers wielding wide rakes. How else to describe mutual fund firms which are collectively spending up to $1 billion annually of their shareholders’ hard-earned money on the advertising campaigns you see incessantly on television? Those are your dollars the marketers are spending, not to help you, but to bring in new investors. Consider carefully whether you want your assets used for this purpose.
话虽如此,也有许多投资顾问和券商高管,用“赌场荷官”这个称呼来形容他们绝对不合适。事实上,最优秀的顾问恰恰相反:他们能帮你最大程度地减少基金选择中的诸多陷阱,为你提供合理的资产配置指导,并给予你个性化的关注。如果你需要这类帮助,那就去寻求它!但一定要仔细挑选你的顾问,并确切了解涉及哪些费用。
That said, there are many investment advisers and brokerage executives for whom the term “croupier” is in no way appropriate. Indeed, the best advisers are exactly the opposite: They can help you to minimize the many pitfalls of fund selection, provide you with sound asset allocation guidance, and give you personal attention. If you need this sort of help, get it! But be sure to carefully select your adviser and know exactly what fees are involved.
规则五:警惕用过往业绩预测未来表现。为了让你的完美计划梦想成真,你必须挑选出优质的共同基金。令人吃惊的是,投资者在很大程度上依赖过往业绩来做选择。如果你也这么做,我警告你,你是在倚靠一根脆弱的芦苇。因为根本没有任何方法能根据基金过去的纪录预测其未来的成功。事实上,对于成功基金的未来相对表现,只有一件事似乎是确定的:它们的业绩优势将无法持续。昔日表现顶尖的基金,有极强的趋势沦为明日表现平庸甚至低下的基金,这种现象被称为“均值回归”——这就像一条在金融市场中几乎普遍适用的重力法则。
Rule 5: Beware of Past Performance to Predict Future Performance For your dream of a perfect plan to be realized, you must select superior mutual funds. To an amazing extent, investors rely on past performance to make their selections. If you do so, I warn you, you are leaning on a weak reed. For there is simply no way of predicting a fund’s future success based on its past track record. Indeed, there is but one thing that appears certain about the future relative performance of successful funds: Their performance superiority will not be sustained. The profound tendency of yesterday’s top performing funds to become tomorrow’s below average funds is called “reversion to the mean”—a sort of law of gravity that seems to be almost universally applicable in the financial markets.
均值回归并非统计上的异常。在 1960 年代位居前四分位的基金,其收益率从高于股市 5% 的水平,在 1970 年代跌至低于股市的水平。1970 年代的顶尖基金,其收益率从高于市场 4.6%,在 1980 年代跌至低于市场。而 1980 年代的顶尖基金,其收益率从高于市场 2.8%,在 1990 年代跌至低于市场 1.6%。基金业绩的均值回归现象不仅看起来是一致的——在上述三个案例中,每个都出现了 4% 至 5% 的回归——而且几乎是注定的,这令许多基于过往回报进行投资的投资者的梦想化为泡影。
Mean reversion is not a statistical aberration. The returns of the top quartile funds during the 1960s fell from 5% above the stock market to below it in the 1970s. The top funds during the 1970s fell from 4.6% above the market to below it during the 1980s. And the top funds during the 1980s fell from 2.8% above the market to 1.6% below it during the 1990s. Reversion to the mean in fund performance seems not only consistent—a 4% to 5% reversion in each of those three cases—but almost preordained, frustrating the dreams of so many investors who invest on the basis of past returns.
规则六:依赖过往业绩来衡量一致性。虽然完美投资计划的梦想很少能完全实现,但确实有办法避免它变成一场活生生的噩梦。如果基金业绩无法预测未来——它也的确不能——那么它仍然可以帮助我们挑选那些过去取得了相当稳定成功的基金,并且在我看来,这些基金相对于具有类似风格和目标的同类基金,更有可能在未来获得稳定的回报。例如,将一个大盘平衡型(成长和价值)基金与其他大盘平衡型基金进行比较,看看它每年表现如何。晨星公司让这项任务变得简单,它提供的图表会显示每只基金在过去 12 年中每年在其同类基金中是处于第一、第二、第三还是第四四分位。在我看来,一只基金要获得顶级业绩评级,意味着它至少要有 6 到 9 年处于前两个四分位,并且只有 1 到 2 年处于最低四分位。在这张图表中,“好”基金有 8 年处于上半区,只有 1 年处于最低四分位。“差”基金有 7 年处于上半区,但有 4 年处于最低四分位。回报的一致性,而非总回报,向明智的投资者传达了重要的信息。
Rule 6: Rely on Past Performance to Measure Consistency While the dream of the perfect investment plan will rarely be fully realized, there are ways to avoid having it become a living nightmare. If fund performance cannot foretell the future—and it cannot—it can still help us to select funds that have enjoyed reasonably consistent past success, and I would argue, have a fighting chance to earn consistent future returns relative to peer funds with similar styles and objectives. Compare, for example, a large-cap blend (growth and value) fund with other large cap blend funds, and see how it stands each year. Morningstar makes this task easy, with charts showing whether each fund has been in the first, second, third, or fourth quartile among its peers during each of the past 12 years. For a fund to earn a top performance rating means, in my mind, at least six to nine years in the top two quartiles and no more than one or two in the bottom quartile. In this chart, the “good” fund is in the top half in eight years, in the bottom quartile but once. The “bad” fund is in the top half seven times, in the bottom quartile, four. Consistency of return, not aggregate return, tells the important story to the intelligent investor.
规则七:注意风险差异。过往业绩也能告诉我们很多关于风险的信息。风险是投资中的关键因素。不同风格之间存在显著差异,这反映在一个事实上:价值基金通常承担的风险明显低于成长基金,而大盘基金的风险低于小盘基金。例如,小盘成长基金承担的风险比普通基金高 48%,而大盘价值基金承担的风险则低 7%——两者风险差距达 55 个百分点。基金相对风险具有相当高的一致性,因此,尤其是在这个波动的市场中,忽视风险会让你自食恶果。
Rule 7: Be Aware of Risk Variations Past performance can also tell us a lot about risk. Risk is a crucial element in investing. There are marked variations from one style to another, reflected in the fact that value funds tend to carry distinctly less risk than growth funds, and large-cap funds less risk than small-cap funds. Small-cap growth funds, for example, have carried risk that is 48% higher than the average fund, while large-cap value funds carry 7% less risk—a 55 percentage point risk differential. Relative fund risks have carried a healthy degree of consistency, so, especially in these volatile markets, ignore risk at your peril.
一个重要的提示:在你审视所有这些业绩数据时,永远不要忘记,基金的选择不仅仅关乎数字。对我来说,基金管理层的品格、诚信、稳定性和判断力,才是你的完美计划之梦应该依赖的品质。在你为描述投资回报而进行的数量化搜寻中,我恳请你不要忽视你所选择的那些受托管理你宝贵资产的人的品质。
An important note: While you’re looking at all those performance figures, never forget there is more to fund selection than numbers. To me, the character, integrity, stability, and judgment of a fund’s management are the qualities on which your dream of the perfect plan should rely. In all of your searching for the quantities that describe investment returns, I urge you not to ignore the qualities of those whom you choose to serve as the stewards of your precious assets.
规则八:不要持有太多基金——也不要交易它们。最后一条规则:限制你持有的基金数量,并且不要交易它们。套用一句老话,“基金太多,坏了好计划。”为什么会这样?首先,你持有的基金越多,一个真正精明的基金选择,其成功就越是可能被另一个表现糟糕的基金所破坏。这个问题被称为“过度分散化(diworsesification)”,因为它导致投资者建立一个持有大量个股的基金组合,使其看起来像一只指数基金,却失去了指数基金成本极低、投资组合换手率最小、税收效率高以及投资目标清晰等积极特征。这种散弹枪式的基金持有方式,在追求完美的过程中,放弃了太多好东西。
Rule 8: Don’t Own Too Many Funds—And Don’t Trade Them One final rule: Limit the number of funds you own, and don’t trade them. To paraphrase an old adage, “too many funds spoil the perfect plan.” Why should this be so? First, the more funds you own, the greater the chance that a truly inspired fund selection will have its success spoiled by another fund that falls on its face. The problem has been called “diworsesification,” for it leads investors to build a portfolio of funds holding so many individual stocks that it looks like an index fund, yet is bereft of the index fund’s positive attributes of exceedingly low cost, minimal portfolio turnover, high tax efficiency, and clarity of investment objective. Such a blunderbuss approach to fund ownership relinquishes far too much good in the search for the perfect.
积极交易你的共同基金份额同样适得其反。如今,普通投资者持有基金的时间仅为 3 年,这对于评估一个本质上应该是长期的——甚至是终身的——投资计划的结果来说,是一个荒谬地不足的时间框架。更糟糕的是,这些基金最初可能就选得不好——业绩被夸大的基金、投资于热门市场板块的基金、电视上做广告的基金、将过多利润贡献给税收的基金、成本高昂但过去业绩看起来很好所以似乎无关紧要的基金。如果你像交易股票那样交易共同基金份额,完美计划的梦想就永远不会实现。其核心理念与你的资产配置相同:正确买入,然后坚定持有。
Active trading of your mutual fund shares is also counterproductive. The average investor today holds funds for but three years, an absurdly inadequate time frame for appraising the results of an investment program that should be inherently long-term—even lifelong—by nature. What is worse, the funds may have been ill-selected in the first instance—funds with inflated performance, funds investing in hot market sectors, funds advertised on television, funds that relinquish far too much of their profit to taxes, funds with high costs that didn’t seem to matter when their past records looked so good. The dream of a perfect plan will never come true if you trade mutual fund shares as if they were stocks. The essential idea is the same as that for your asset allocation: Buy right and hold tight.
好计划还是完美计划?
The Good Plan or the Perfect Plan?
好计划还是完美计划?只有你能决定。但请不要忽视历史的教训。让我们用一个低成本、免销售费、低换手率的全市场指数基金与普通主动管理型股票基金进行对比来做个总结。在过去 15 年中,美国股票市场的平均税前年回报率为 17.2%。指数基金为投资者提供的税后年回报率为 16.1%,而主动型基金每年仅为 11.8%,两者差距高达每年 4.3 个百分点,这反映了销售成本、机会成本、管理成本、交易成本和税收成本的影响。
The good plan or the perfect plan? Only you can decide. But please do not ignore the lessons of history. Let’s conclude with this comparison of a low cost, no-load, low turnover all-market index fund with the average managed equity fund. During the past 15 years, the average pre-tax return of the total U.S. stock market was 17.2% per year. The index fund would have provided an annual rate of after-tax return of 16.1% to the investor, compared to just 11.8% per year for the active fund, a gap of fully 4.3 percentage points each year, reflecting the impact of sales cost, opportunity cost, management cost, transaction cost, and tax cost.
随着回报和成本都在复利增长,差距会扩大。初始投资 1 万美元,在期末的税后价值为:市场指数基金 93,900 美元;普通主动管理型股票基金 53,300 美元。在这两种计划中,投资者都提供了 100% 的资本并承担了 100% 的风险。然而,在追求完美计划的过程中,普通基金的投资者只获得了市场回报的 49%,而将 51% 拱手让给了“赌场荷官”。另一方面,通过将“赌场荷官”的分成控制在市场累积回报的 13%(主要是税收),遵循好计划(市场指数基金)的投资者保留了 87% 的回报。
As both returns and costs compound, the difference widens. The after-tax value of an initial $10,000 investment at the end of the period: Market index fund, $93,900; average managed equity fund, $53,300. In both plans, the investor put up 100% of the capital and assumed 100% of the risk. In search of the perfect plan, however, the investor in the average fund received only 49% of the market’s reward, relinquishing 51% to the croupiers. On the other hand, by holding the croupiers’ share to 13% of the market’s cumulative return (largely taxes), the investor who relied on the good plan of a market index fund retained 87%.
现在,你或许相信,通过挑选表现优于行业平均水平的基金,你就能实现你的完美计划之梦。我承认这至少是可能的——但前提是你必须遵守我今天提出的八条基本规则,主要是通过最大限度地减少那些“赌场荷官”的抽成。换句话说,要实现完美计划,就要尽你所能从好计划中学习。并且永远不要忘记,即使你战胜了概率,成功超越了普通基金令人失望的业绩,你还需要取得真正是赫拉克勒斯式的改进,才能超越全市场指数基金的结果。
Now, you may believe you can realize your dream of the perfect plan by selecting funds that do better than the industry average. And I grant that is at least possible—but only if you honor the eight basic rules I’ve presented today, largely by minimizing the take of all of those croupiers out there. Put another way, to achieve the perfect plan, learn all that you can from the good plan. And never forget that even if you beat the odds and succeed in outpacing the disappointing results of the average fund, you will need to achieve a truly Herculean improvement to outpace the results of the all-market index fund.
指数基金的价值不在于它能够战胜市场。它不能。但它已被证明是实现“在市场中获得尽可能高的税前年回报比例——虽然略低于 100%”的最佳方式。这看起来可能是一个适中的目标,但只有在我们将其与大多数主动管理型基金的结果进行比较之前才会这么觉得。受困于过高的成本和税收,基于过去从不重复的夸大业绩宣传进行推销,并采用要求短期关注点的策略来管理——难怪很少有基金能接近 100% 的回报。我的规则应该能帮助你找到这些基金。
The value of the index fund is not that it can beat the market. It can’t. But it has proved to be the optimal way “to realize the highest possible portion—albeit slightly less than 100%--of the pre-tax annual return earned in the market.” That may seem a modest objective, but only before we compare it with the results of most actively managed funds. Burdened by excessive costs and taxes, promoted based on outlandish claims of past performance success that does not recur, managed with strategies that call for a short-term focus—it’s little wonder that few funds even come close to 100%. My rules should help you find those funds.
遗憾的是,能通过我八项筛选的基金数量相当少。本应有更多才对。这个行业需要整顿其秩序。所以,去要求那些符合你标准的基金吧。如果你用常识和智慧做出自己的投资决策,这个行业将被迫改变,从而更高效、更有效地为股东服务,同时降低成本、风险、换手率和夸张的宣传。最后,必须得到服务的是你——基金股东,基金的所有者。你值得被公平对待,我将一直发声,直到你获得它为止。
Sadly, only a fairly small number of funds filter through my eight screens. There ought to be lots more. This industry needs to get its house in order. So demand funds that measure up to your standards. If you make your own investment decisions with common sense and intelligence, the industry will be forced to change and serve shareholders more efficiently and effectively, reducing costs, risks, turnover, and hyperbole alike. Finally, it is you—the fund shareholders, the owners of the fund—who must be served. You deserve a fair shake, and I’ll keep speaking out until you get it.
最近《波士顿环球报》上的一篇专栏文章将婚姻和共同基金进行了比较,一针见血地指出了问题:“理想的共同基金是一个我们可以‘拥有和持有、无论疾病还是健康、顺境还是逆境、只要我们还活着’的基金。”作者敦促投资者不要与热门基金调情,也不要被对超凡回报的渴望所诱惑,而是要与那些具有品格、稳定性和长期一贯业绩的基金建立长期关系,一种被称为“真爱”的关系。虽然很少有主动型基金能达到这个标准,但我今天描述的好计划——全市场指数基金——将满足这一标准。所以,永远不要忘记这句格言:“一个好计划的最大敌人,是完美计划的梦想。”
A recent column in the Boston Globe compared marriage and mutual funds got the issue just right: “The ideal mutual fund is one we can have and hold, in sickness and health, in good times and bad, for as long as we live.” The author urged investors not to have flings with hot funds nor to be seduced by the lust for exceptional returns, but to have a long-term relationship with funds with character, stability, and consistent long-term performance, a relationship characterized as “true love.” While few active funds will measure up, the good plan I’ve described today—the all-market index fund—will meet that standard. So never forget this maxim: “The greatest enemy of a good plan is the dream of a perfect plan.”
注:本演讲中表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。© 版权所有 2000 约翰·C·博格
Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management. © Copyright 2000 by John C. Bogle