智慧的十二支柱:熊市前本应学到、现在才懂的教训

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智慧的十二根支柱——那些我们本该在熊市来临前就已学会、却直到此刻才正在汲取的教训

约翰·C·博格尔 演讲

《亚利桑那共和报》投资策略论坛

亚利桑那州菲尼克斯

2001 年 4 月 27 日

尽管过去一个月股市反弹了 15%,从四月初的低点有了不错的回升,但这场始于近 14 个月前的股市熊市,可能还尚存余力。然而,在那个令人恐慌的低点,即便你是一位谨慎的投资者,即便你早已预见到下跌的到来,你很可能至少有过两次事后反思:“为什么一年前我没有减持——甚至清仓!——我的股票持仓?”以及“我现在到底该怎么办?”

The Twelve Pillars of Wisdom Lessons We Should Have Learned before the Bear Market Arrived, but are Only Learning Now Remarks by John C. Bogle The Arizona Republic Investment Strategies Forum Phoenix, AZ April 27, 2001 Despite the 15% stock market rally of the past month, a nice rebound from the early April lows, the bear market in stocks that began nearly 14 months ago may yet have some life remaining. But at that scary low point, even if you were a prudent investor, and even if you had seen the decline coming, you may well have had at least two second thoughts: “Why didn’t I cut back—or even eliminate!—my equity holdings a year ago?” And “What on earth should I do now?”

关于第一个问题,我自己也很纠结。多年来,我一直在逐步降低股票仓位,首先是为了在先天性心脏病的不确定性中求生,并确保妻子财务无忧;其次,是年龄增长和赚钱能力下降的现实。在我的职业生涯中,退休计划和个人账户约有 75% 配置在股票上,到去年夏天,这一比例已逐步降至 45% 以下。即便如此,由于对纳斯达克泡沫深感忧虑,并对未来股票回报前景持谨慎态度,我去年 6 月在晨星会议上甚至公开质疑自己为何还要持有任何股票。但——“医者不自医”,此话一点也不假!——我并未采取进一步行动。

As to the first question, I struggle with that one myself. I have been gradually reducing my equity percentage for years, reflecting first my fight for an uncertain survival from congenital heart disease and my desire to assure my wife’s financial security, and, second, reflecting my increasing age and declining earning power. With some 75% of my retirement plan and personal account in equities throughout most of my career, I had gradually reduced the ratio to below 45% by last summer. Still, deeply concerned about the NASDAQ bubble and cautious about the outlook for future stock returns, I even wondered aloud at the Morningstar Conference last June why I held any equities at all. But—“physician heal thyself,” writ large!—I took no further action.

为什么?惯性无疑是原因之一。但更重要的原因是,我自己的资产配置已经与我在过去半个多世纪后期反复强调的合理保守策略完全一致。此外,我毕生坚信的是,虽然经验丰富的投资专业人士可能相当清楚市场将要发生什么,但我们完全不知道它何时会发生。正如我在近十年前所写的《博格尔谈共同基金》一书中所说:“在一个不确定的世界里,战术性的调整应当谨慎为之,只有当你准备好承担犯错的风险时才能出手。”

Why? Certainly inertia was part of it. But even more important was the fact that my own asset allocation was already fully consistent with the sensibly conservative strategy that I’ve reiterated over the latter part of a half-century. What is more, my lifelong conviction is that while experienced investment professionals may have a pretty good idea of what is going to happen in the market, we have no idea of when. As I wrote in Bogle on Mutual Funds nearly a decade ago, “In an uncertain world, tactical change should be made sparingly, and only if you are prepared to take the risk of being wrong.”

在我的书中,我介绍了一个基础的资产配置模型:对于不再通过追加投资来增加资产、并且越来越依赖收入来生活的年长投资者,建议采用 50/50 的股票/债券配置;对于 75 岁以上的投资者,这一比例降至 35%。(不,我还没到那个岁数,即使按我未换心脏的年龄来算也是!)

In my book, I presented a basic asset allocation model that recommended that older investors, no longer adding to their assets with additional investments and becoming increasingly dependent on income, should focus on a 50/50 stock/bond allocation, reduced to 35% for investors over the age of 75. (No, I’m not there yet, even using my non-heart-transplant age!)

共同基金模拟组合:

分配型投资者
短期债券 10%
价值股 25%
股票收益 15%
价值股 25%
股票收益 20%
短期债券 10%
中期债券 25%
长期债券 20%
中期债券 20%
长期债券 30%
早期年份后期年份
股票:50%股票:35%
债券:50%债券:65%

这两个模拟组合都建议将权益仓位配置为价值型基金和股票收益型基金,排除了成长型基金,尽管我自己并未遵循这一策略。相反,我主要依靠广泛覆盖的指数基金,这些基金对价值和成长型股票给予同等权重。无论如何,在 2000 年期间,无论是 50/50 还是 35/65 的股票收益和价值型组合,实际上都上涨了 14%,而今年以来又进一步上涨了 2 个百分点。(两者的回报率大致相同。)我们都该有这么好的运气才对!

Mutual Fund Model Portfolios: The Distribution Investor ST Bond 10% Value Value Equity Income 15% 25% 25% Equity Income 20% ST Bond IT Bond 10% 25% LT Bond 20% IT Bond 20% LT Bond 30% Earlier Years Later Years Stocks: 50% Stocks: 35% Bonds: 50% Bonds: 65% Both model portfolios recommended that the equity position be composed of value funds and equity-income funds, to the exclusion of growth funds, although I have not followed this strategy myself. Instead, I’ve relied largely on broad-based index funds which weight value and growth equally. In any event, both the 50/50 and 35/65 equity-income and value-based portfolios actually rose 14% during 2000 and are now actually up another two percentage points so far this year. (Both had about the same returns.) We should all have been so lucky!

我不知道你们当中有多少人遵循了我保守的建议,又有多少人,在一年前股市攀上高点时,被成长型基金和科技基金带来的火车车厢般巨大的收益所诱惑,在最不该放弃的时候抛弃了这个建议。但我相信,如果你受我第一本书后记中“智慧的十二根支柱”的指引,你的表现一定相当不错。为了准备这次发言,我重读了一遍那些内容,发现今天几乎没什么需要修改的。

I have no way of knowing how many of you followed my conservative advice, nor how many of you, lured by the boxcar gains turned in by growth funds and tech funds as the stock market reached its high a year ago, abandoned it at just the wrong time. But I believe that if you were guided by the “Twelve Pillars of Wisdom” that was the epilogue of my first book, you’ve done just fine. In preparation for these remarks, I read them once again, and I found virtually nothing I would change today.

事实上,这十二条明智的成功投资准则,是投资者本应在熊市到来前就学会的教训,但许多人现在才真正开始领悟。牛市来了又去,熊市也紧随其后,来了又去。但这些智慧支柱是永恒的,无论市场如何更替,都应能很好地指引我们。今天,我想与各位一同回顾它们。

Indeed, these twelve sensible guidelines to successful investing are lessons that investors should have learned before the bear market arrived, but that many are only learning now. Bull markets come and bull markets go, inevitably followed by bear markets, which too come and go. But these pillars of wisdom are timeless, and should serve us well in all seasons. I’d like to review them with you today.

第一支柱:投资远没有看上去那么难。

Pillar 1. Investing Is Not Nearly as Difficult as It Looks.

对于共同基金领域的明智投资者而言,凭借常识和并不出众的金融才能,就能达到专业人士的水平。在一个金融市场高度有效的世界里,那些谨慎自律的新手——懂得基本知识但缺乏经验的人——绝对没有理由不能与专业投资者群体旗鼓相当,甚至超越他们的长期回报。成功的投资只需要做对几件事,并避免犯下严重错误。

The intelligent investor in mutual funds, using common sense and without extraordinary financial acumen, can perform with the pros. In a world where financial markets are highly efficient, there is absolutely no reason that careful and disciplined novices—those who know the rudiments but lack the experience—cannot hold their own or even surpass the long-term returns earned by professional investors as a group. Successful investing involves doing just a few things right and avoiding serious mistakes.

正如我在书中所强调的,“做对几件事”包括:聚焦于广泛多元化的大盘主流股票基金;将基金业绩与同类目标基金进行对比;忽略短期表现,看重至少十年的长期业绩;仔细考虑高费率与销售佣金带来的拖累;密切关注投资组合的质量——无论是股票基金、债券基金还是货币市场基金;以及聚焦于与自身风险承受能力相一致的资产配置。

“Doing a few things right,” as I stressed in my book, included focusing on broad-based mainstream equity funds with wide diversification; evaluating funds relative to peers with similar objectives; ignoring short-term performance in favor of performance over at least a decade; carefully considering the drag of high expense ratios and sales charges; paying careful attention to portfolio quality, in stock funds, bond funds, and money market funds alike; and focusing on an asset allocation that is consistent with your own risk tolerance.

“严重的错误,”我指出,包括投资于那些过往业绩极其辉煌的基金(“没有哪个投资者会因为没能投资一个热门新产品而破产”),也包括那些始终垫底的基金;过度依赖那些投资范围狭窄的基金(比如新兴市场基金);以及把共同基金用来做短期交易。

“Serious mistakes,” I indicated, included such errors as investing in funds with spectacular records (“no investor ever went broke by failing to invest in a hot new product”), as well as those persistently at the bottom of the deck; excessive reliance on narrowly-based funds (say, emerging market funds); and using mutual funds for short-term trading.

随着股市泡沫的膨胀,这些该做与不该做的准则中,有一些看起来并非特别必要。如今,泡沫破裂之后,它们的有效性已得到再次确认。

As the stock market bubble inflated, some of these dos and don’ts didn’t seem especially necessary. Now, after the fall, their validity has been reaffirmed.

第二支柱:当一切失灵时,回归简单。

Pillar 2. When All Else Fails, Fall Back on Simplicity.

有一个策略比这差不了多少:花几年时间,把一半资产投入股票指数基金,另一半投入债券指数基金。无视基金净值的中期波动。只要你还活着就持有这些仓位,仅在生活状况发生变化时做极少量、小幅度的调整。当一个问题有多种解决方案时,选最简单的那个。

There are an infinite number of strategies worse than this one: Commit, over a period of a few years, half of your assets to a stock index fund and half to a bond index fund. Ignore interim fluctuations in their net asset values. Hold your positions for as long as you live, subject only to infrequent and marginal adjustments as your circumstances change. When there are multiple solutions to a problem, choose the simplest one.

尽管我写下那些文字后,股市经历了一段狂野不羁的漫长征途,让那些话听起来恍如隔世,但我比以往任何时候都更加坚信那个基本原则:高度依赖指数基金,从 50/50 的债券/股票比例出发,再根据你自身的财务状况调整这一比例。在我的书中,我曾指出这种方法与《聪明的投资者》作者本杰明·格雷厄姆的理念一致。这种简单策略无疑已经一再证明了自己的价值。过去十年间,以标普 500 指数为基准的低成本指数基金年化回报率为 14.4%,而普通权益类基金的平均回报则为 +12.3%。以雷曼综合债券指数为基准的低成本债券基金年化回报率达 +8.0%,而普通应税债券基金的平均回报仅为 +6.8%。

Although the stock market’s wild and wooly odyssey since I wrote them makes those words seem an eon away, I believe more than ever in that basic principle: Rely heavily on index funds, and begin with the idea of a 50/50 bond/stock ratio, adjusting the ratio in accordance with your own financial profile. In my book, I noted that this approach was consistent with the philosophy of Benjamin Graham, author of The Intelligent Investor1. This simplicity surely has continued to prove itself. During the past decade, the annualized return on a low-cost index fund modeled on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index has been 14.4%, while the average general equity fund has earned +12.3%. The low-cost bond fund modeled on the Lehman Aggregate Bond Index has earned +8.0% annually, while the average taxable bond fund has earned +6.8%.

这些稳固的回报率差距——股票指数基金每年 2.1%,债券指数基金每年 1.2%——是高度可预测的,因为它们主要反映的是指数基金相对于主动管理型基金的成本优势。简单化的大气再次得到了验证——以尽可能低的成本实现尽可能广泛的分散化。

These solid margins in returns—2.1% per year for the stock index fund and 1.2% per year for the bond index fund—were highly predictable, for they largely reflect the cost advantage index funds hold over actively-managed funds. Once again, the majesty of simplicity—the broadest possible diversification at the lowest possible cost—has proved itself.

1. 投资远没有看上去那么难 2. 万般无奈时,回归简单 1991-2001 年年均回报率 16% 14.4% 12.3% 12% 8.0% 6.8% 8% 4% 0% 标普 500 指数 股票基金平均 雷曼综合债券指数 债券基金平均 第三支柱 3. 时间不停向前。

1. Investing is Not Nearly as Difficult as It Looks 2. When All Else Fails, Fall Back on Simplicity Average Annual Returns, 1991-2001 16% 14.4% 12.3% 12% 8.0% 6.8% 8% 4% 0% S&P 500 Index Average Equity Lehman Agg. Average Bond Fund Bond Index Fund Pillar 3. Time Marches On.

时间的推移极大地加速了资本积累,因为复利的神奇效应会不断放大。在年化回报率为 +10% 的情况下,本杰明·格雷厄姆那“标准划分”下的初始 1 万美元总值——即债券和股票各占一半的投资比例。自从他这本经典著作于 1949 年出版以来,这种资产配置基准线所蕴含的智慧光泽,已远比我自己的方法更显岁月沉淀。

Time dramatically enhances capital accumulation as the magic of compounding accelerates. At an annual return of +10%, the total value of the initial $10,000 Benjamin Graham’s “standard division” was 50-50, an equal investment in bonds and stocks. Since his classic book was published in 1949, this allocation baseline has far more patina than mine.

投资额为 10.8 万美元,到 25 年末时,价值增长近 10 倍。尽可能给自己留出足够多的时间。

investment is $108,000, at the end of 25 years, nearly a tenfold increase in value. Give yourself the benefit of all the time you can possibly afford.

当然,自从我写下那段话之后,时间已经向前推进了不少。即便考虑到过去惨淡一年中市场的大幅下挫,过去十年间标普 500 指数基金 14.4% 的回报率,已足以让最初投入指数基金的 1 万美元增值到 3.84 万美元。虽然我在书中提到的 25 年周期尚未过半,但智慧之柱第三条已经看起来相当不错了。即便未来 15 年股市的年回报率只有 7.2%——相当于过去十年的一半——也足以实现那 10% 的终极目标,并在 25 年内积累出 10.8 万美元的资本。

Of course, time has marched on since I wrote those words. Even taking into account the sharp market decline during the dismal past year, the decade-long 14.4% return on the S&P 500 index fund has already carried the value of an initial $10,000 investment in the index fund to $38,400. While the 25-year period that I noted in the book is not yet half over, Pillar of Wisdom #3 is looking pretty good. Even a modest return of 7.2% on stocks during the next 15 years— one-half the rate of the past decade—would result in the realization of that 10% target and the accumulation of the resultant $108,000 of capital over 25 years.

这个时间流逝的例子,无疑印证了诗人玛雅·安杰卢的话:“时间是我们无法影响的唯一非物质对象——既不能加速也不能减速,既不能增加也不能减少——因此,它是一份价值不可估量的礼物。”正是如此,时间提供了投资中最珍贵的礼物。尽你所能去忽略那些日复一日、似乎要压倒我们思维的短期事件,遵循理财的第一原则:给自己尽可能多的时间。

Surely this example of the march of time bears out the words of the poet Maya Angelou: “Since time is the one immaterial object which we cannot influence, neither speed up nor slow down, add to nor diminish, it is an imponderably valuable gift.” And so it is that time provides among the most valuable of all gifts in investing. Do your best to ignore the short-term events that, day after day, seem to overwhelm our thinking, and follow the very first principle for managing your money: Give yourself all the time that you possibly can.

第四支柱:不冒风险,何来收获。

Pillar 4. Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained.

在追求更高的长期回报率过程中,适度承担中间风险是值得的。复利的神奇之处在于,即使年回报率只提高一点点,累积效果也会大幅加速。10,000 美元的投资,若每年获得 +10% 的回报,25 年后将增长至 108,000 美元;而若回报率为 +12%,最终价值则达到 170,000 美元。两者相差的 62,000 美元,是初始投资额的六倍多。

It pays to take reasonable interim risks in the search for higher long-term rates of return. The magic of compounding accelerates sharply with even modest increases in annual rate of return. While an investment of $10,000 earning an annual return of +10% grows to a value of $108,000 over 25 years, at +12% the final value is $170,000. The difference of $62,000 is more than six times the initial investment itself.

过去十年间,我在书中选用的那两个百分点的差异,几乎精确刻画了低成本标普 500 指数基金(年化收益率 +14.4%)与美国股票型基金平均收益率(+12.3%)之间的差距。若初始投资 1 万美元,最终价值分别为:指数基金 3.84 万美元,主动管理型基金 3.19 万美元。而且我必须指出,这份大幅提升的回报完全是伴随零风险增加实现的。事实上,指数基金的波动性比股票型基金平均低约 15%。

Over the past decade, that a two-percentage-point differential I chose in my book characterized almost exactly the spread between a low-cost S&P 500 index fund (+14.4% per year) and the average U.S. stock mutual fund (+12.3%). Final value of an initial investment of $10,000: Index mutual fund $38,400; Managed mutual fund $31,900. And, I should note, that substantial increase in reward came hand-in-hand with no increase whatsoever in risk. In fact, the index fund was some 15% less volatile than the average equity fund.

既然如此,那不妨享受这种适度的风险——毕竟股市本就是个风险之地。就连指数基金的价值,从 2000 年 3 月的高点到近期低点,也下跌了 28%。那笔 1 万美元的标普指数投资,到 2000 年 3 月曾增至 4.87 万美元,但一年后便跌至 3.84 万美元。

You might as well enjoy that moderation in risk, for the stock market is a risky place. Even the value of the index fund fell 28% from the March 2000 high to the recent low. The $10,000 investment in the S&P Index had grown to $48,700 by March, 2000, only to tumble to $38,400 a year later.

但请想一想,不愿意承担市场风险的风险。如果十年前将 1 万美元投资于货币市场基金,今天仅值 1.55 万美元——获利 5500 美元,还不到指数基金增值 2.84 万美元的五分之一,即便经历了市场大幅下跌。这些数字强化了股票作为生产性投资和风险投资的声誉——这是一个既宝贵又早该被提醒的事实。

But consider, if you will, the risk of not being willing to assume market risk. $10,000 invested in a money market fund a decade ago would be worth but $15,500 today—a $5,500 profit that was less than one-fifth of the $28,400 appreciation in the index fund, even after the sharp market decline. These numbers reinforce the reputation of equities both as productive investments and as risky ones—a reminder that is both valuable and long overdue.

  1. 时光飞逝
  2. 不入虎穴,焉得虎子

$60,000

平均股票基金

$50,000

标普 500 基金

货币市场基金

$40,000

$38,400

$30,000

$31,900

$20,000

$15,500

$10,000

$0

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001(3 月至 3 月)

注:标普 500 指数到 2016 年达到 10.8 万美元所需的回报率为 7.2%

基于合理预期,我认为未来十年股票回报率可能在 6% 至 10% 之间。如果根据历史经验,这个预期对普通股来说似乎太温和,别忘了,股票 8% 的可能回报率到 2011 年能使每 1 美元变成 2.16 美元,而储蓄 4% 的可能未来回报率只能使每 1 美元变成 1.48 美元,收益不到一半。因此,回避股票风险本身也带来风险。是的,“不入虎穴,焉得虎子。”

3. Time Marches On 4. Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained $60,000 Avg. Eq. Fund $50,000 S&P 500 Fund Money Mkt. $40,000 $38,400 $30,000 $31,900 $20,000 $15,500 $10,000 $0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (March to March) Note: Return required on S&P 500 to reach $108,000 in 2016 is 7.2% Reasonable expectations suggest to me that we might see stock returns in the 6% to 10% range during the coming decade. If that seems too modest an expectation for common stocks based on past history, don’t forget that a possible 8% return on stocks would take each dollar to $2.16 by 2011, while a possible 4% future return on savings would take each dollar to $1.48, less than half the gain. Eschewing the risk of stocks, therefore, carries a risk of its own. Yes, “nothing ventured, nothing gained.”

第五支柱:分散投资,分散投资,分散投资。

Pillar 5. Diversify, Diversify, Diversify.

通过持有一个广泛分散的股票和债券投资组合,特定证券风险被消除。只剩下市场风险。这种风险反映在投资组合的波动性中,随着回报的复利累积,它应该会随着时间的推移自我化解。

By owning a broadly diversified portfolio of stocks and bonds, specific security risk is eliminated. Only market risk remains. This risk is reflected in the volatility of your portfolio and should take care of itself over time as returns are compounded.

正如过去一年的熊市所表明的,投资股票是有风险的:

首先,存在个股风险。我们看到一些股票飙升,一些股票暴跌,几乎无法预知哪只股票会怎样,以及何时发生。谁能预料到,一年前市值 5000 亿美元、曾是全球最大股票的思科(Cisco),会很快暴跌 80%,蒸发 4100 亿美元?

As the bear market of the past year makes clear, investing in stocks is risky:  First, there is individual stock risk. We have seen some stocks soar and some plummet, with little means of knowing which stock will do which, and when. Who would have expected that Cisco, whose $500 billion market capitalization a year ago made it the largest stock in the world, would soon plummet by 80%, erasing $410 billion in value?

其次,存在风格风险。在本十年的前九年,成长型基金跑赢价值型基金,截至去年 3 月惊人地上涨了 609%,是价值型基金 281% 涨幅的两倍多。此后,成长型基金平均下跌 38%,而价值型基金实际上涨了 5%,几乎抹平了成长型基金的全部涨幅,它们累计业绩现在几乎相同。我们中谁足够聪明,知道如何“择时”把握这些变化?

 Second, there is style risk. Growth funds trumped value funds during the first nine years of the decade, rising an amazing 609% through last March, more than double the 281% increase for value funds. Since then, growth funds have fallen 38% on average, while value funds have actually risen 5%, erasing nearly the entire growth fund and their cumulative records are now virtually identical. Who among us is wise enough to know how to “time” those changes?

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

5. 分散投资,分散投资,分散投资

分散投资风格:成长型基金 vs 价值型基金

$8

$7

$7.09

$6

成长型基金

$5

$4.42

$4

$4.01

$3

$3.81

$2

价值型基金

$1

$0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

5. Diversify, Diversify, Diversify Diversifying Investment Styles: Growth Funds vs. Value Funds $8 $7 $7.09 $6 Growth Funds $5 $4.42 $4 $4.01 $3 $3.81 $2 Value Funds $1 $0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  Third, there is manager risk. A growth fund manager, for example, may outpace his peers, or may fall short, and the difference is apt to be enormous. Consider that in the past decade, the top decile of growth fund managers produced an average annual return of 17%, almost three times the 6½% return for the bottom decile. How would you go about picking the winners in advance?

第三,存在经理人风险。例如,一位成长型基金经理可能跑赢同行,也可能落后,差异可能巨大。想想看,在过去十年中,表现最好的前 10% 的成长型基金经理平均年回报率为 17%,几乎是表现最差的 10% 的基金经理 6.5% 回报率的三倍。你如何能够事先挑选出优胜者?

Happily, each and every one of these three risks can be easily eliminated. For when you own the entire stock market through an index fund, there is neither individual stock risk, nor style risk, nor manager risk. Only market risk remains. If the past year, demonstrates nothing else, it surely demonstrates that stock market risk, standing alone, is quite substantial enough, thank you.

幸运的是,这三种风险每一种都可以轻松消除。因为当你通过指数基金持有整个股票市场时,就既没有个股风险,也没有风格风险,也没有经理人风险。只剩下市场风险。如果说过去一年证明了什么,那它无疑证明了,仅凭股票市场风险本身就已经相当可观了,谢谢。

So if you can’t be certain about the future—and who among us can?—“diversify, diversify, diversify” remains the essence of wisdom.

所以,如果你无法确定未来——我们又有谁能呢?——“分散投资,分散投资,分散投资”仍然是智慧的精华。

Pillar 6. The Eternal Triangle.

第六支柱:永恒的三角。

Never forget that risk, return, and cost are the three sides of the eternal triangle of investing. Remember also that the cost penalty may sharply erode the risk premium to which an investor is entitled. You should understand unequivocally that investing in a fund with a relatively high expense ratio—more than 0.50% per year for a money market fund, 0.75% for a bond fund, 1.00% for a regular equity fund—bears careful examination. Unless you are confident that the higher costs you incur are justified by higher expected returns, select your investments from among the lower-cost no-load funds.

永远不要忘记,风险、回报和成本是投资中永恒三角的三个边。同时记住,成本惩罚会严重侵蚀投资者应得的风险溢价。你应该明确理解,投资于费用率相对较高的基金——货币市场基金每年超过 0.50%,债券基金超过 0.75%,普通股票基金超过 1.00%——需要仔细审视。除非你确信较高的成本会带来较高的预期回报,否则请从较低成本的无佣金基金中选择投资。

Up-to-the minute evidence reaffirms exactly what I demonstrated in my book. During the past decade, the lowest-cost decile of money market funds provided an average annual return of 5.1%, 11% above the return of 4.6% for the highest-cost decile. For the lowest-cost decile of intermediate-term bond funds, the return was 7.8%, 24% above the return of 6.3% for the highest-cost quartile. And for the lowest-cost decile of large-cap equity funds (excluding index funds), the average return was 13.1%, fully 18% above the return of 11.1% for the highest-cost decile. (Low-cost bond index funds and low-cost stock index funds, I should note, provided even higher returns than their low-cost counterparts that were actively managed.) The eternal triangle of risk, return, and cost is too powerful to ignore.

最新的证据再次证实了我在书中所展示的内容。在过去十年中,成本最低的 10% 的货币市场基金平均年回报率为 5.1%,比成本最高的 10% 的基金 4.6% 的回报率高出 11%。成本最低的 10% 的中期债券基金回报率为 7.8%,比成本最高的 25% 的基金 6.3% 的回报率高出 24%。对于成本最低的 10% 的大盘股票基金(不包括指数基金),平均回报率为 13.1%,比成本最高的 10% 的基金 11.1% 的回报率整整高出 18%。(我应该指出,低成本债券指数基金和低成本股票指数基金甚至提供了比同类主动管理型低成本基金更高的回报。)风险、回报和成本的永恒三角太强大了,不容忽视。

6. The Eternal Triangle: Risk, Return, and Cost 14% 13.1% 12% 11.1% Low Cost 10% High Cost 7.8% 8% 6.3% 6% 5.1% 4.6% 4% 2% 0% Money Market Funds IT Bond Funds Large-cap Funds Pillar 7. The Powerful Magnetism of the Mean In the world of investing, the mean is a powerful magnet that pulls financial market returns toward it, causing returns to deteriorate after they exceed historical norms by substantial margins and to improve after they fall short. Reversion to the mean is a manifestation of the immutable law of averages that prevails, sooner or later, in the financial jungle.

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

6. 永恒的三角:风险、回报和成本

14%

13.1%

12%

11.1%

低成本

10%

高成本

7.8%

8%

6.3%

6%

5.1%

4.6%

4%

2%

0%

货币市场基金 中期债券基金 大盘股票基金

In the boom-and-bust bubble we have just witnessed in the NASDAQ Index, we have a wonderful example of reversion to the mean (RTM). After closely tracking the NYSE Index of all listed stocks from the mid-1970s through the end of 1997, the unlisted stocks in the NASDAQ Index took off in 1998, rising 230% (!) though the first quarter of 2000, eleven times the 20% gain in the NYSE Index. Then, reversion to the mean promptly wreaked its havoc, and with a vengeance. Since then, the NASDAQ has tumbled 67%, compared to a loss of but 7% for the NYSE Index. At the high last March, a dollar invested in NASDAQ Index in 1972 had soared to $1.80 for each dollar in the NYSE Index. But it has now fallen to just 58 cents. RTM strikes again, and, I’m confident, not for the last time.

第七支柱:均值回归的强大磁力。

在投资世界中,均值是一块强大的磁铁,它将金融市场的回报拉向自身,导致回报在大幅超出历史标准后恶化,在低于标准后改善。均值回归是必然平均数定律的一种表现,它或迟或早在金融丛林中占据主导地位。

7. The Powerful Magnetism of the Mean $70 $60 $58.42 Growth of $1 $50 NYSE $40 Nasdaq $30 $32.33 $32.60 $20 $18.99 $10 $0 Pillar 8. Do Not Overestimate Your Ability to Pick Superior Equity Mutual Funds, nor Underestimate Your Ability to Pick Superior Bond and Money Market Funds.

在我们刚刚目睹的纳斯达克指数的繁荣与崩盘泡沫中,有一个均值回归的绝佳例子。从 20 世纪 70 年代中期到 1997 年底,纳斯达克指数与所有上市股票的纽约证券交易所指数紧密追踪,之后纳斯达克指数中的未上市股票在 1998 年开始飙升,到 2000 年第一季度上涨了 230% (!),是纽约证券交易所指数 20% 涨幅的 11 倍。然后,均值回归迅速造成了破坏,而且是报复性的。此后,纳斯达克指数暴跌 67%,而纽约证券交易所指数仅下跌 7%。在去年 3 月的高点,1972 年投资于纳斯达克指数的 1 美元相对于纽约证券交易所指数的每 1 美元已飙升至 1.80 美元。但现在已跌至仅 58 美分。均值回归再次出击,而且我相信,这不会是最后一次。

In selecting equity funds, no analysis of the past, no matter how painstaking, assures future superiority. In general, you should settle for a solid mainstream equity fund in which the action of the stock market itself explains about 85% or more of the fund’s return, or an low-cost index fund (100% explained by the market). But do not approach the selection of bond and money market funds with the same skepticism. Selecting the better funds in these categories on the basis of their comparative costs holds remarkably favorable prospects for success.

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

7. 均值回归的强大磁力

$70

$60

$58.42

每 1 美元的增长

$50

纽约证券交易所

$40

纳斯达克

$30

$32.33

$32.60

$20

$18.99

$10

$0

While I’ve shown you earlier the near-causal relationship between costs and returns among fixed-income funds, the futility of picking stock funds based on their past returns has seldom been more forcefully demonstrated than in the past two years. Among the twenty top-performing equity funds for the year ending March 31, 2000, 15 of the Top-20 tumbled to ranks ranging from #3453 to #3891 among 3896 funds during the year that followed. Only one fund even ranked higher than #1000. Picking equity funds on the basis of past performance is not a good idea!

第八支柱:不要高估你挑选优质股票共同基金的能力,也不要低估你挑选优质债券和货币市场基金的能力。

8. Do Not Overestimate Your Ability to Pick Superior Equity Mutual Funds, Nor Underestimate Your Ability to Pick Superior Bond and Money Market Funds Leading Bull Market Equity Funds in a Bear Market Rank Year-end Rank Year-end Rank Year-end Rank Year-end 3/31/2000 3/31/2001* 3/31/2000 3/31/2001* 1. 3,784. 11. 3,881.

2. 277. 12. 3,603.

2. 277. 12. 3,603.

3. 3,892. 13. 3,785.

3. 3,892. 13. 3,785.

4. 3,527. 14. 3,891.

4. 3,527. 14. 3,891.

5. 3,867. 15. 1,206.

5. 3,867. 15. 1,206.

6. 2,294. 16. 2,951.

6. 2,294. 16. 2,951.

7. 3,802. 17. 2,770.

7. 3,802. 17. 2,770.

8. 3,815. 18. 3,871.

8. 3,815. 18. 3,871.

9. 3,868. 19. 3,522.

9. 3,868. 19. 3,522.

在选择股票基金时,无论过去分析多么细致,都不能保证未来的优越性。一般来说,你应该满足于一个稳健的主流股票基金,其中股票市场本身的行为解释了该基金约 85% 或更多的回报,或者一个低成本的指数基金(100% 由市场解释)。但不要以同样的怀疑态度来对待债券和货币市场基金的选择。基于相对成本选择这些类别中更好的基金,获得成功的前景相当可观。

10. 3,453. 20. 3,566. *3,896 Total Funds Yet too many mutual fund investors did exactly that, pouring a staggering $242 billion into growth and technology funds during the twelve months ended March 31, 2000, and actually withdrawing $42 billion from the lagging value funds. Yet as the earlier chart on style diversification showed, that was exactly the period when investors should have been moving out of growth and technology funds and into value funds. What folly! When it jumps on the bandwagon of past performance, the crowd is always wrong.

尽管我早些时候已经向你展示了固定收益基金中成本与回报之间近乎因果的关系,但过去两年比任何时候都更有力地证明了基于过去回报选择股票基金是徒劳的。在截至 2000 年 3 月 31 日的一年中,20 只表现最佳的股票基金中,有 15 只在接下来的一年中跌至 3896 只基金中从第 3453 名到第 3891 名的排名。只有一只基金甚至排名高于第 1000 名。基于过去表现挑选股票基金不是一个好主意!

Pillar 9. You May Have a Stable Principal Value or a Stable Income Stream, But You May Not Have Both.

8. 不要高估你挑选优质股票共同基金的能力,也不要低估你挑选优质债券和货币市场基金的能力

领先的牛市股票基金在熊市中的排名

2000 年 3 月 31 日排名 2001 年 3 月 31 日排名* 2000 年 3 月 31 日排名 2001 年 3 月 31 日排名*

1. 3,784. 11. 3,881.

10. 3,453. 20. 3,566.

*共有 3896 只基金

然而,太多共同基金投资者正是这样做的,在截至 2000 年 3 月 31 日的 12 个月里,向成长型和技术型基金投入了惊人的 2420 亿美元,同时从滞后的价值型基金中撤出了 420 亿美元。然而,正如前面关于风格分散的图表所示,那正是投资者应该从成长型和技术型基金中撤出并转入价值型基金的时候。多么愚蠢!当大众跟风追逐过去的表现时,他们总是错的。

Contrast a money market fund—with its volatile income stream and fixed value— and a long-term government bond fund—with its relatively fixed income stream and extraordinarily volatile market value. Intelligent investing involves choices, compromises, and trade-offs, and your own financial position should determine the most suitable combination for your portfolio.2 As 1991 began, the yield of the average money market mutual fund was just under 6%, and the yield on a long-term U.S. Treasury bond fund was just over 7½%. During the ensuing decade, the value of a $1,000 investment in the money market fund never varied, while $100 invested the bond fund fell to as low as $93 (in 1992) and rose to as high as $123 in 1998. Stable principal vs. variable principal.

第九支柱:你可能拥有稳定的本金价值,或者稳定的收入流,但不可能两者兼得。

9. You May Have Stable Principal Value, or a Stable Income Stream, But You May Not Have Both LT Gov't Bond $9.00 Fluctuation in Annual Income Money Market $7.00 $5.00 $3.00 $1.00 $130 Fluctuation in Principal Value $120 LT Gov’t Bond Fund $110 Money Market Fund $100 $90 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 But the annual income on the $100 money market fund investment was not to approach $6 again until 2000. Indeed, with declining interest rates, annual income is now on the way to the $4 level. The annual income stream on the $100 initial investment in the long-term bond fund, on In my book, I compared a 90-day U.S. Treasury bill with a 30-year Treasury bond.

比较一下货币市场基金——收入流波动,本金价值固定——和长期政府债券基金——收入流相对固定,市场价值波动极大。明智的投资涉及选择、妥协和权衡,你自己的财务状况应决定最适合你的投资组合组合。正如 1991 年初,平均货币市场共同基金的收益率略低于 6%,长期美国国债基金的收益率略高于 7.5%。在随后的十年中,投资于货币市场基金的 1000 美元本金从未变动,而投资于债券基金的 100 美元最低跌至 93 美元(1992 年),最高升至 123 美元(1998 年)。稳定的本金 vs. 变动的本金。

the other hand, began at $7.91 in 1991, and has remained above $7.10 each year. It should be about $7.20 in 2001. Variable income vs. stable income.

在我的书中,我比较了 90 天美国国库券和 30 年期美国国债。

9. 你可能拥有稳定的本金价值,或稳定的收入流,但不可能两者兼得

长期政府债券

$9.00

年收入波动

货币市场

$7.00

$5.00

$3.00

$1.00

$130

本金价值波动

$120

长期政府债券基金

$110

货币市场基金

$100

$90

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

但 100 美元货币市场基金投资的年收入直到 2000 年才再次接近 6 美元。事实上,随着利率下降,年收入现在正朝着 4 美元的水平下降。另一方面,100 美元初始投资于长期债券基金的年收入流始于 1991 年的 7.91 美元,并且每年一直保持在 7.10 美元以上。2001 年应该在 7.20 美元左右。变动的收入 vs. 稳定的收入。

对你来说,稳定收入还是稳定本金是更高的优先事项?还是两者各取一些?要清楚你在防守型持仓中计划实现什么,并据此进行投资。

Is stable income or stable principal the higher priority for you? Or some of each? Be clear on what you plan to achieve in your defensive holdings, and invest accordingly.

第十支柱:当心“打最后一仗。”

Pillar 10. Beware of “Fighting the Last War.”

太多投资者——个人和机构都一样——不断根据近期甚至过去较长时间的经验做出投资决策。在上一场战争中股票获胜后,他们追逐股票;债券获胜后,他们追逐债券。在高实际回报变成平庸名义回报的通胀成为公认的恶魔之后,他们担心通胀的影响。你不应该忽视过去,但也不应该假设某个特定的周期性趋势会永远持续下去。没有哪个趋势会这样。

Too many investors—individuals and institutions alike—are constantly making investment decisions based on the lessons of the recent, or even the extended, past. They seek stocks after stocks have emerged victorious from the last war, bonds after bonds have won. They worry about the impact of inflation after inflation, having turned high real returns into so-so nominal returns, has become the accepted bogeyman. You should not ignore the past, but neither should you assume that a particular cyclical trend will last forever. None does.

当我写这本书时,通胀是投资者心中的首要问题。但是,作为永远的逆向投资者,我提出了一个“买者自负”的警告,暗示“认为通胀是永恒不变的常识是愚蠢的。”果然,通胀率在此前 15 年平均为 5.7%,此后运行在不到一半的水平(2.6%)。“上一场战争”,结果发现,已经结束了。

When I wrote my book, inflation was at the forefront of investors’ minds. But, ever the contrarian, I raised a caveat emptor suggesting that “it would be foolish to assume that inflation would be an eternal fact of life.” Sure enough, inflation, having averaged 5.7% during the fifteen previous years, has run at less than one-half that rate (2.6%) since then. “The last war,” it turned out, was over.

同样地,高科技公司股票在 1990 年代末期飙升,大型科技股开始主导成长型基金的投资组合。科技公司将继续飙升的信念俘获了许多缺乏经验投资者的心智。一位基金经理甚至写了一本书,描述他为何选择随大流,并向读者保证,他的基金已经跳上了那列高速行驶的大型、高成长、高科技的潮流班车。

Similarly, stocks in high-tech companies soared during the late 1990s, and large-cap tech stocks came to dominate the portfolios of growth funds. The belief that technology companies would continue to soar captured the mind of many inexperienced investors. One fund manager even wrote a book describing why he had cast his vote with the crowd, assuring his readers that his funds had jumped aboard the fast-moving large-cap, high-growth, high-tech bandwagon.

他将这一新策略应用于自己管理的股票基金,截至 2000 年第一季度,其激进成长型基金在两年内飙升了 82%。同一时期,他的温和成长股票基金上涨了 51%。然而,这一表现仍不足以让他在与我打的一个赌中获胜——我赌一只指数基金在截至 2000 年 3 月 31 日的五年内表现更好。(指数基金以压倒性的 70 个百分点胜出——+226% 对 +156%。)当我写信感谢他寄来 25 美元结算赌注时(对我来说这钱可不少!),我表达了自己的看法,即他的新策略是“在上一次战争中打仗”。

He applied his new strategy to the equity funds he managed, and his aggressive growth fund leaped by 82% during the two years through the first quarter of 2000. His moderate growth equity fund rose 51% during the same period. That performance was nonetheless insufficient to give him a victory in a bet I’d made with him that an index fund would do better during the five years ended March 31, 2000. (The index fund won by an imposing 70 percentage points--+226% vs. +156%.) When I wrote to thank him for sending me the $25 to settle our bet (huge for me!) I expressed my opinion that his new strategy was “fighting the last war”.

事实证明,这一判断来得很快。在接下来的那一年里,这位经理的两只成长型基金分别暴跌了 45% 和 55%,跌幅是指数基金 22% 跌幅的两倍多。但仅仅因为一些投资者坚持“在上一次战争中打仗”,你并不需要也这样做。这种做法持续不了多久。

And so it quickly proved to be. In the year since then, the manager’s two growth funds have plummeted by 45% and 55% respectively, more than double the 22% decline for the index fund. But just because some investors insist on “fighting the last war,” you don’t need to do so yourself. It doesn’t work for very long.

10. 警惕在上一次战争中打仗 4.00 美元 温和成长基金 激进成长基金 3.50 美元 标普 500 指数基金 3.00 美元 2.50 美元 2.56 美元 2.00 美元 1.53 美元 1.50 美元 1.41 美元 1.00 美元 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 支柱 11. 你几乎从未比市场知道得更多。

10. Beware of Fighting the Last War $4.00 Moderate Growth Fund Aggressive $3.50 Growth Fund S&P 500 Index $3.00 Fund $2.50 $2.56 $2.00 $1.53 $1.50 $1.41 $1.00 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Pillar 11. You Rarely, If Ever, Know Something The Market Does Not.

如果你担心即将到来的熊市,为即将到来的牛市而兴奋,对战争前景感到恐惧,或者担忧经济、选举乃至人类状况,你的观点很可能已经反映在市场中了。金融市场反映了全世界所有投资者的知识、希望、恐惧,甚至贪婪。相信那些你认为独有、实则已被数百万人共享的见解并据此行动,几乎总是不明智的。

If you are worried about the coming bear market, excited about the coming bull market, fearful about the prospect of war, or concerned about the economy, the election, or indeed the state of mankind, in all probability your opinions are already reflected in the market. The financial markets reflect the knowledge, the hopes, the fears, even the greed, of all investors everywhere. It is nearly always unwise to act on insights that you think are your own but are in fact shared by millions of others.

好了,我们又回到了老地方,深陷熊市之中,担心它是否会进一步恶化。没人知道它何时结束。也许已经结束了。尽管如此,只要你在去年 3 月进入熊市时的资产配置是依据(a)你的风险承受能力、(b)你还有多少年可以积累投资、(c)你的财富水平,以及(d)你的收入需求来设定的,你就不应该改变配置。市场承压时期几乎总是改变投资策略的糟糕时机。无论市场多么变幻无常,它通常已经考虑到了几乎每一种可能性。

Well, here we are again, in the grip of a bear market, and worried about whether it will get worse. No one knows when it will be over. Maybe it is over. Nonetheless, provided only that your asset allocation going into the bear market last March had been set in accordance with (a) your risk tolerance, (b) the years you have remaining to build your investment, (c) your wealth level, and (d) your income needs, you shouldn’t change the allocation. Times of market duress are almost always terrible times to change investment strategies. The market, however fickle, has usually taken into account almost every eventuality.

支柱 12. 着眼长期。

Pillar 12. Think Long-Term.

不要让股价的短暂变化改变你的投资计划。

Do not let transitory changes in stock prices alter your investment program.

股票市场的日常波动中存在大量噪音,它常常是“一个白痴讲述的故事,充满喧哗与骚动,却毫无意义”。股票可能被高估或低估数年之久。耐心和一致性是聪明投资者的宝贵财富。最好的规则是:坚守阵地。

There is a lot of noise in the daily volatility of the stock market, which too often is “a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” Stocks may remain overvalued, or undervalued, for years. Patience and consistency are valuable assets for the intelligent investor. The best rule: Stay the Course.

过去两年,随着波动率达到历史最高水平,股票市场的噪音空前响亮。数百万投机者被吓得半死,这也合情合理。但长期投资者必须认识到,当贪婪转为恐惧时,大部分担忧已经反映在降低的股价水平之中。即使我们确实应该在下跌结束前减少股票仓位,我们又从哪里获得洞察力,知道何时才是重新入场的正确时机呢?做对一个决定已经够难了。连续做对两个正确决定——而且都在正确的时机——几乎是不可能完成的任务。冲动是你的敌人,而耐心和一致性是你的朋友。关于我的第十二条智慧支柱——着眼长期,我只能说:“阿门!”

During the past two years, the stock market’s noise has been the loudest in history as volatility has reached record highs. Millions of speculators are scared half to death, as they should be. But long-term investors must realize that, as greed turns to fear, much of the worry is already reflected in the lower level of stock prices. And even if it turns out we should be reducing our stock position until the decline is over, where on earth would we ever get the insight that tells us the right time to get back in? One correct decision is tough enough. Two sequential correct decisions—both made at the right moment—are nigh on impossible. Impulse is your enemy, and patience and consistency are your friends. Of my twelfth pillar of wisdom—Think Long-Term—I can only say, “Amen!”

请将这些智慧十二支柱牢记在心。我相信,在未来几年里,它们对投资者的帮助将与十多年前我写下它们时一样大。祝你好运,投资愉快!

Please keep these Twelve Pillars of Wisdom in mind. I’m confident that they will serve investors every bit as well in the years ahead as they have since I set them down nearly a decade ago. Good Luck, and Happy Investing!